Competition law enforcement in informal markets in Latin America and the Caribbean

3. Enforcement challenges for competition authorities involving informal markets

As indicated in previous OECD discussions, the relationship between competition policy and informality is complex and extends far beyond the traditional view that informal firms simply evade regulation and taxes. Informal firms can exert significant competitive pressure on formal businesses, influence market structure and market shares, affecting merger review and competition assessments. In this context, while competition authorities face a potential “blind spot” if they ignore informal economic activity when analysing markets, enforcement involving informal firms is often complicated by the lack of reliable data or legal registration. Consequently, competition authorities should take enforcement actions mindful of the specific challenges related to informality, in addition to advocacy efforts aimed at addressing the underlying causes of informality such as unnecessary regulatory barriers, excessive compliance costs, and burdensome administrative requirement (OECD, 2010[3]).

This section will cover the main enforcement challenges that competition authorities in LAC countries face when applying competition law in cases involving informal markets. Overall, the ultimate challenge is engagement and communication with informal players, which leads to secondary challenges that concern practical issues related to the engagement with informal firms, particularly getting information to and from them, creating difficulties while managing cases in both substantive and procedural dimensions. More precisely, these challenges include the competition analysis itself (e.g. identifying competitors and defining the relevant market) as well as procedural difficulties that need to be overcome to ensure due process, right of defence and proportionality (e.g. notifying defendants of the beginning of an investigation, as well as calculating and collecting the fine of an infringement).

3.1. Definition of relevant market

The definition of relevant market is a key component to competition analysis, for instance to establish market power, and it emerges as an important challenge competition authorities face in LAC countries when enforcing competition law in markets involving informal firms. This challenge usually relates to situations of actual or potential competition between formal and informal firms – most commonly in merger reviews but possibility in abuse of dominance cases. In more rare occasions, the issue can also appear in cartels cases dealt by LAC jurisdictions that still commonly assess relevant markets and the existence of market power prior to sanctioning cartels.

In practice, experiences from the LAC region reveal that competition authorities have addressed this issue in several cases in the past 25 years (see Annex A of this paper for list of selected cases). They concern mostly merger cases although abuse of dominance cases can also be identified as commented below.

In 2001, the former Comisión Nacional de Defensa de la Competencia (CNDC) identified concerns in the acquisition of Correo Argentino by International Mail in Argentina. In its merger analysis, the CNDC considered information submitted by the merging parties on the number of non-registered operators active in the market, revealing the difficulty in obtaining reliable data as the information provided by the merging parties was the only available data (and possibly overestimated according to CNDC’s analysis). The former CNDC concluded that the inclusion of the informal firms did not have any relevant impact on the competitive constraints of the case, excluding it from the relevant market. The transaction was ultimately withdrawn by the merging parties (CNDC, 2001[12]).

Also in Argentina, similar discussions took place in the merger cases involving Adidas/Reebok in 2006 and Dass-Nordeste/Vulcabras-Azaleia in 2018. Both cases concerned the market of sport shoes, in which with former CNDC excluded the sport shoes produced in informal markets from the relevant market definition. In the Adidas/Reebok merger case, the main argument was that sport shoes sold in informal markets were not substitutes of those produced by Adidas/Reebok due to significant differences in technology and quality: “this National Commission understands that brands coming from certain supermarkets and hypermarkets, as well as illegal products [sold in informal markets], should not be considered as part of the relevant market because consumers seek for certain technologies when buying sport shoes, which the first do not offer [at the same level as Merging Parties]” (CNDC, 2006[13]). To reach this conclusion, the former CNDC relied on information provided by market players such as distributors of sport shoes, making a qualitative assessment. Although informality played a marginal role in the CNDC’s analysis, this was the second time that informal markets were addressed in a merger case in Argentina, acknowledging their relevance in the economy and for competition assessments. This view was then corroborated in the Dass-Nordeste/Vulcabras-Azaleia transaction, later in 2018.

More recently, the Conselho Administrativo de Defesa Econômica (CADE) reviewed a merger case in the market of pet shop services (e.g. pet walking and pet bathing) in Brazil, which considered market definition scenarios with and without competitive pressure arising from individual service providers (which have informality elements), in addition to formal companies providing those services. The argument was initially presented by the merging parties who claimed that individuals, integrating the informal economy, should be factored in the calculation of their market shares. CADE’s Economics Department indicated that the argument was valid but proposed different alternative scenarios of relevant markets to benefit also from more conservative approaches for the competition analysis. At the end, CADE’s Economics Department concluded that most relevant market scenarios would still lead to market shares above 20%, with a significant number of them exceeding 50%, thus high levels of concentration that justified further analysis. The case was finally approved with remedies by CADE’s Tribunal to address the competition concerns identified in the analysis (CADE, 2025[14]).

Unlike the merger cases reviewed by the former CNDC in Argentina, CADE relied on official data in Brazil, namely data from the Annual Report of Social Information (RAIS) linked to the Brazilian Ministry of Labour. The use of this dataset followed a proposal made by the merging parties and enabled the estimation of the number of individuals providing services in the relevant market, which would otherwise be left uncounted if only considered the turnover of the main companies (including merging parties). In other words, the number of individuals was significant in RAIS’s official database, and they could potentially reduce the combined market shares of merging parties for purposes of merger review analysis.

In Costa Rica, the Comisión para Promover la Competencia (COPROCOM) may also factor informality in its competition analysis. In two recent merger cases, COPROCOM acknowledged the competitive pressure exerted by informal players. In 2024, the presence of numerous informal players was considered a transaction in the market of artisanal bakery and pastry, an activity requiring little technology to package and sell products through small retailers, thus performing alongside formal competitors in a sector with low barriers to entry (COPROCOM, 2024[15]). In 2023, COPROCOM explicitly considered informal players, namely business that were not affiliated with the industry association nor registered with the country’s Institute for Tourism, as part of the broader supply in the vehicle rental market, therefore reducing the competition concerns related to the transaction (COPROCOM, 2023[16]).

In Peru, the enforcement experience related to informality started with discussions concerning market power of dominant firms, then expanded to merger review (since merger control was limited to the electricity sector until 2021). This included an important reference to informality in Instituto Nacional de Defensa da la Competencia y de Protección de la Propiedad Intelectual (INDECOPI)’s Merger Guidelines issued in 2022 (as indicated further below).

In 2015, INDECOPI was requested to issue an opinion on the market conditions of services provided at the new Yurimaguas Port, located in the northeastern region of Peruvian Amazon, following a concession contract awarded to Concesionaria Puerto Amazonas to operate the new port terminal of Yurimaguas. In 2015, INDECOPI concluded that there were no competitive conditions for standard port services, triggering regulatory powers of Organismo Supervisor de la Inversión en Infraestructura de Transporte de Uso Público (OSITRAN), the Peruvian regulator in charge of public transportation infrastructure including the enforcement of sanctions and corrective measures when necessary (INDECOPI, 2015[17]). Following INDECOPI’s assessment, OSITRAN decided to open an ex officio tariff‑fixing procedure, covering a wide range of standard services, and determined that tariffs would be established under the applicable regulatory framework using a benchmarking methodology, while requesting the concessionaire to submit a tariff proposal within a specified deadline. In its analysis, OSITRAN considered informality in the river transportation services in Yurimaguas, which acknowledged the significant presence of informal operators, affecting both supply and demand dynamics. In addition, the Peruvian authorities examined whether formal firms could meet demand and provide the operational capacity of informal providers, for instance availability of small or large vessels for different needs. On the demand side, consumer preferences and habits, often favouring cheaper or more accessible informal services, were also considered. Ultimately, informal markets were explicitly incorporated into the competitive assessment, influencing market definition, participation shares and conclusions about effective competition (OSITRAN-Peru, 2015[18]).

In another case in Peru, the Organismo Supervisor de Inversión Privada en Telecomunicaciones (OSIPTEL), the country’s telecom regulator which also serves as competition authority in telecom markets, considered elements of informality in a competition analysis performed in 2021. Within the framework of a specific administrative review to determine whether companies hold “Significant market power” (Proveedor Importante), which would then require additional regulatory obligations, OSIPTEL found that Telefónica del Perú held significant market-share and benefited from structural advantages in the market of cable TV. This included economies of scale and commercial practices such as volume discounts, bundled services and exclusive content. Informal markets were explicitly considered in assessing market share to ensure a more realistic measure of Telefónica’s dominance. Even when accounting for informal providers, Telefónica remained the leading operator and OSIPTEL concluded that Telefónica held a dominant position in several regions of the country, justifying its designation as a “Proveedor Importante” and potential regulatory intervention to prevent anticompetitive effects (OSIPTEL-Peru, 2021[19]).

Although the above-mentioned cases did not concern merger control, those experiences had a crucial role for the inclusion of elements of informality in INDECOPI’s Guidelines for Merger Review in 2022. Indeed, the Peruvian Merger Guidelines has a specific section dedicated to informality (i.e. Section 2.2.8) as highlighted in Box 1 below, which is possibly the only Merger Guidelines around the world with such provision.

Box 1. Guidelines for Merger Review in Peru (2022)

Specific provision on informality

In 2022, INDECOPI issued its first Guidelines for Merger Review, providing guidance on the definition and competition analysis of merger transactions in Peru. The guidelines contain a specific provision on informality:

Section 2.2.8. Informality

The informal supply of products may enjoy the preference of a segment of consumers who prioritise a (lower) price in their consumption decisions.

(…).

Informal companies tend to remain small in size and often have low productivity, as growth would imply assuming the costs of formalisation and, because they are small, they can more easily evade detection and punishment.

On the other hand, consumers may be unwilling to take risks on quality or other characteristics that formal products do possess. This may mean that many informal suppliers may not be a perfect substitute for formal supply.

The analysis of the informality factor to define the relevant market will be determined in the review of each particular case.

(…).

The Commission may incorporate into its analysis of informality such factors as it deems appropriate to define the market involved, which will be determined based on the characteristics of the economic activity under review.

Source: INDECOPI (2022[20]), Guidelines for Merger Review, Lineamientos para la calificación y análisis de las operaciones de concentración empresarial - Informes y publicaciones - Instituto Nacional de Defensa de la Competencia y de la Protección de la Propiedad Intelectual - Plataforma del Estado Peruano, https://www.gob.pe/institucion/indecopi/informes-publicaciones/3862900-lineamientos-para-la-calificacion-y-analisis-de-las-operaciones-de-concentracion-empresarial.

The key message of INDECOPI’s Guidelines for Merger Review is that informality matters for competition assessment in Peru. To ensure flexibility in this assessment, the Guidelines establish that INDECOPI will assess the role of informality in defining the relevant market in a case-by-case, considering both supply factors such as capacity of formal firms and informal providers, as well as demand factors such as consumer preferences.

In Paraguay, a recent merger case cleared with conditions also addressed the issue of informality for purposes of market definition. In 2022, the Comisión Nacional para la Competencia (CONACOM) reviewed a merger involving supermarkets and classified the relevant market into “modern retail channels” (i.e. supermarkets) and “traditional retail channels” (i.e. municipal markets, known as “despensas”) considering factors related to informality before deciding to focus exclusively on the “modern channels” as relevant market. Furthermore, and considering that the merging parties claimed that the merger would contribute to the formalisation of jobs, the remedies’ package to approve the transaction included the formalisation of contracts between the acquired supermarket and its suppliers since many did not have them in writing, thus facilitating informality (CONACOM, 2022[21]).

Barbados also had a recent enforcement experience in addressing the issue of informal markets, namely the competitive pressure over the formal markets subject to merger review scrutiny. In 2023, the Fair Trading Commission (FTC) approved the acquisition of iExchange by CashWiz in the markets of product retail and pawnbroking services (i.e. loan granted in exchange for the deposit of values such as jewellery, television or other equipment). In its analysis, the FTC explicitly acknowledged that merging parties “face[d] considerable competitive pressure from a number of businesses that retail similar goods. The number of product sub-markets in product retail and the number of players operating in both the formal and informal sectors are too many to visually represent with data. However, the Commission is satisfied that the relevant market is highly competitive”, so without the need to reach a precise relevant market definition. In other words, FTC’s analysis indicated that competition occurred between merging parties and formal firms (i.e. formal retailers, jewellers and consignment stores) but also between merging parties and a large number of informal sellers (e.g. individuals offering products through social media and other e-commerce channels), limiting the ability of merging parties to exercise market power after the transaction (FTC-Barbados, 2023[22]).

In other Caribbean jurisdictions, additional merger enforcement experience involving informal markets has been reported in Jamaica, where the Fair Trading Commission (FTC) has encountered problems in identifying market players and in defining relevant markets because of grey areas in terms of market segmentation, as well as in obtaining relevant data that is required for the analysis (Jamaica, 2018[23]). The issue of grey area is echoed by Professor Taimoon Stewart who provides the example of shoes sold by the “Informal Commercial Importers” (ICIs), a group of women who travel to the US and other destinations to buy supplies and resell them informally in Jamaica at lower prices than formal firms with the same or similar products (Stewart, 2018[24]).

In sum, the case law experience of competition authorities from the LAC region reveals the relevance that informality can play to establish market power in concrete cases, for instance when defining relevant markets for purposes of merger review. Enforcement challenges also include the identification of relevant competitors and the related lack of reliable data to perform competition assessments.

3.2. Service of process

Another set of enforcement challenges arise from investigations against informal firms, which are not exempt from competition law. In these situations, competition often takes place within informal markets – and not between formal and informal firms (as seen previously for issues related to market power and definition of relevant markets).

The most prominent manifestation of this issue relates to the service of process, meaning the procedure by which a competition authority gives appropriate notice of the beginning of a formal investigation to a firm or individual, a key step in cartel prosecution cases before turning them formally into defendants. It is commonly a key stage of an investigative proceeding to ensure that companies and individuals receive a fair opportunity to defend themselves, safeguarding due process and the right of defence. A similar challenge may also exist when a competition authority is seeking to obtain information from an informal player for an investigation against formal players.

In the Dominican Republic, Pro-Competencia closed 17 investigations due to the absence of verifiable information between 2018 and 2023, largely related to informality issues. Examples included sectors where more than 60% of purified water supply from unlicensed operators (confirmed by the Ministry of Health), and an automotive spare parts investigation in which six firms were unregistered and could not be located.

Box 2. Key investigations closed due to informality in the Dominican Republic (2018-2023)

Between 2018 and 2023, Pro-Competencia closed 17 investigations due to informality issues, particularly the lack of sufficient information to notify defendants. They represent around 20% of the total cartel investigations of that time, which have been negatively affected by informality challenges.

The list below illustrates two markets concerned by those cartel investigations:

• In the market of automotive and spare parts, attempts of Pro-Competencia to serve formal notice were unsuccessful: the addresses provided in the complaints corresponded to closed commercial premises, spaces occupied by other businesses or simply vacant lots. The investigation was completely frustrated by the impossibility of identifying legal representatives, requesting accounting information or accessing transaction records.

• In the market for purified water, more than 60% of operators were informal. Public authorities could not identify market participants, calculate market shares or concentration levels, define the relevant market or formally notify firms. The investigation was therefore closed without determining whether cartels or abuses of dominance existed.

Source: Dominican Republic (2025[25]), Contribution from Dominican Republic, Informality and Competition Defense in the Dominican Republic, https://one.oecd.org/document/DAF/COMP/GF/WD(2023)1/en/pdf.

The cases in the Dominican Republic indicate the difficulties to notify unregistered business, generally due to the lack of legal representation of informal firms, revealing that informality raises specific challenges to effectively fighting cartels and enforcing competition law more broadly. The current Bill of Law, formally proposed by Pro-Competencia in February 2026, intends to address this gap by introducing the possibility to prosecute individuals since the current legislation limits enforcement actions to companies. The adoption of sanctions to individuals will allow Pro-Competencia to prosecute market players operating informally, partially overcoming the difficulties faced in the abovementioned cases. The Bill of Law also proposes to further modernise competition law in the Dominican Republic in a number of ways including the introduction of a merger control regime, the introduction of leniency policy to detect cartels, in addition to stronger sanctions and remedies – all in which could apply to informality issues.

3.3. Collection of evidence

The collection of evidence in informal markets is also subject to specific challenges as informality often reduces the availability, reliability and traceability of evidence. For instance, documentary evidence can be limited since informal players rarely maintain formal business records such as invoices, contracts, accounting sheets and professional e-mails. Proving an agreement between competitors can be particularly challenging when practices in informal markets tend to orality instead of written recordings or exchanges.

In practice, evidence of cartels can be detected in unusual ways and formats in informal markets. In Brazil, for example, a cartel between small bakeries in Sobradinho, a city located in the suburb area of Brasília, was detected because of an orthographic typo in printed notice that announced the increase in the price of the bread, replicated and fixed in several bakeries of the city. While this was a key piece of evidence to prove exchanges for price-fixing, it also reveals an apparent low knowledge of the wrongdoing itself (CADE, 2013[26]).

In Chile, the Fiscalía Nacional Económica (FNE) encountered public evidence of co-ordination, including a local radio announcement in a transport case and a signed protocol within an informal trade association in the bakery case. The challenge was not in demonstrating the agreement itself but in applying enforcement tools effectively where counterparties lack legal representation and where their advisors may be unfamiliar with competition law, investigative powers or settlement procedures (FNE, 2025[27]; 2025[28]).

In the Dominican Republic, several cases revealed the challenges to collect evidence in informal markets. In the market of egg production and distribution, the common practice of cash transactions, the lack of accounting records, and unregistered producers made it impossible to establish market structure, verify market shares or prove alleged collusion. The case was closed because evidence could not be substantiated (Dominican Republic, 2025[25]).

3.4. Calculation of fines

Another common challenge for competition authorities in LAC countries is the calculation and, particularly, the collection of fines in cases involving informal markets. This issue arises most frequently in cartel investigations, as firms sanctioned for abuse of dominance are generally active in formal markets and therefore have a legal identity, accounting records and identifiable assets against which sanctions can be enforced. By contrast, participants in informal cartels often operate without legal incorporation, tax registration or other forms of formal business organisation. As a result, the undertaking itself may lack legal personality, making it difficult (or sometimes impossible) to impose or enforce a fine directly against the business. In practice, competition authorities may need to sanction the individual acting as the firm's owner, representative, or de facto operator, or rely on alternative legal mechanisms available under domestic law to attribute liability and recover penalties. More specifically, the absence of reliable financial records complicates the assessment of turnover or other metrics commonly used to calculate fines, potentially undermining both the proportionality and the deterrent effect of sanctions.

In Mexico, the former Comisión Federal de Competencia (COFECE) used public information from the National Institute of Statistics and Geography to estimate average annual income in the context of a cartel case in the market of tortilla producers, sanctioned by COFECE in 2015. These proxies were essential to ensure proportionate sanctions, consistent with constitutional requirements of proportionality and legal certainty (COFECE, 2017[29]).

Box 3. Calculation of fines in a cartel of tortillas in Mexico (2017)

In 2017, Mexico’s former COFECE sanctioned a cartel in the market of tortillas in the State of Jalisco. The case concerned an illegal agreement promoted through trade associations and supported by a state‑level public official, which established a reference range for the retail price of tortillas. Sanctions were imposed on individuals involved, including business representatives and the public official who facilitated the agreement.

The tortilla market in Mexico is characterised by a high level of informality, with a large number of small producers and limited availability of reliable financial records. This created significant challenges for the competition authority, particularly in calculating proportionate fines and ensuring due process.

To address these constraints, former COFECE relied on publicly available statistical proxies from the National Institute of Statistics and Geography (INEGI), including average income figures and sectoral data, to estimate economic capacity and calibrate sanctions. By using objective, third‑party data rather than firm‑specific turnover, the competition authority was able to impose fines consistent with constitutional principles of proportionality and legal certainty.

Source: COFECE (2017[29]), Administrative Proceeding Nº DE‑009‑2016 (from 26.10.2017).

The Mexican case also indicates how statistical co‑operation can fill evidentiary gaps in informal markets, allowing competition authorities to pursue deterrence without excluding informal actors from enforcement or undermining procedural safeguards.

In Colombia, the Superintendencia de Industria y Comercio (SIC) faced similar challenges in calculating fines in 2018. The case refers to a cartel in the freight transportation services, more specifically a freight-rate table managed by two associations including the Colombian Association of Truck Drivers (Asociación Colombiana de Camioneros – ACC). According to SIC’s findings, the association disseminated the price‑table through meetings, e-mails and regional branches, seeking to influence the prices charged for freight transport services. As a result, two associations and several individuals were sanctioned, with challenges to establish the quantum of fines for the associations which did not have turnovers nor reliable information related to the financial records of their associates, mainly individual truck drivers (SIC, 2018[30]).

In Brazil, CADE sanctioned a long-standing cartel in the market of salt production covering nearly one hundred defendants, several of them performing informal business which raise concrete difficulties in various fronts including both the calculation and collection of fines. In total 18 companies and 38 individuals were sanctioned for cartel, several of them small firms, which made difficult to obtain the relevant data such as official turnover to calculate fines. More precisely, three of them were fined by a general legal provision that is applicable when turnover data is unavailable (CADE, 2018[31]).

In a nutshell, the issue of calculation and collection of fines relates to both proportionality of sanctions and to effectiveness, thus with wider implications to competition policy including an effective deterrence of future anticompetitive practices.

3.5. Purchasing power

While competition law often focusses on the selling side of markets, the process of rivalry between parties, does not only take place between sellers. Competition can also take place between purchasers, or buyers, for the acquisition of goods. This is particularly evident when sellers must deal with a single buyer, known as a monopsonist, or a number of sellers co-ordinating to behave as one. However, even in the absence of a full monopsony, buyers may possess significant purchasing power, and this will similarly affect outcomes in markets (OECD, 2022[32]).

In informal markets, the dynamics of buyer power are also relevant, particularly where informal firms are often fragmented and small-sized entrepreneurs, which can contribute to a lack of bargaining power when supplying to formal firms (e.g. agriculture products or small service providers). In such vertical relationships, informal firms may depend on a limited number of larger purchasers, creating conditions in which buyers can have significant influence on prices, payment conditions and other commercial practices that can lead to market distortions such as predatory pricing, unfair business and exclusion of market players.

In 2025, a case in Chile illustrated the issue of purchasing power in informal markets. In a cartel investigation, FNE proposed to sanction a buyer‑side cartel concerning king crab purchases in Patagonia. According to the authority, the victims are informal fishermen, whereas the investigated buyers are formal multinational companies that export most of their output. The investigation required direct engagement in the field, including taking statements onboard fishing vessels and making multiple site visits. The case revealed that the issue of purchasing power and buyers’ cartel can also involve the informal markets, where informal players are the victims and not the infringers as seen the previous examples related to investigation challenges related to service of process and calculation of fines.

Box 4. Alleged buyers’ cartel in the king crab market in Chile (2025)

In 2025, Chile’s FNE proposed to sanction a buyer‑side cartel concerning king crab purchases in Patagonia, in which informal entrepreneurs are the main victims (and not infringers of anticompetitive practices).

In this vertical relationship between informal players and formal companies, the upstream segment of the market is composed almost entirely of artisanal fishers and small intermediaries, a group that is highly fragmented and weakly capitalised. These players lack bargaining power, have limited mobility and are dependent on a small number of formal companies to commercialise their catch.

According to the authority, informality plays a specific role in this case as it amplifies the harm suffered by informal players from the buyers’ cartel. In its opinion, FNE argues that many of the informal players serving as suppliers depend economically on the king crab fishing, which represents their primary source of living.

Source: FNE (2025[33]), Administrative Proceeding N° 2627-20 (from 12.09.2025).

In this Chilean case, FNE argues that the fragmented and quasi‑informal supply side is a factor of increased vulnerability to anticompetitive conduct, so informality is an element of the analysis and represent a particularity in the investigation. Rather than mitigating market power, informality amplifies the effectiveness and harm of the buyers’ cartel by preventing suppliers from switching buyers or resisting to the co-ordinated price behaviour of the buyers’ side.

In 2022, COPROCOM sanctioned nine formal firms for agreeing not to purchase paddy rice produced in Costa Rica. In this case, the domestic paddy rice producers constitute the less formalised segment of the supply chain and they were directly harmed by a co-ordinated boycott perpetuated by the formal agroindustry. The precedent also illustrates how competition law can protect informal players against anti-competitive practices exercised by formal firms (COPROCOM, 2022[34]).

Previous discussions held at the OECD also acknowledged the existence of this issue in Jamaica, where large firms that buy from the informal sector can exercise monopsony power. She argues that competition authorities have an important role to play in protecting competition, covering both formal and informal markets, so regardless of the fact that firms are informal (OECD, 2018[2]).

In addition, purchasing power can also occur in labour markets, specifically in situations in which firms can have “labour market power” when hiring informal workers. In cases of bargaining power, firms can set wagers below the level of competitive prices for wages in that market, leading to inequality between workers linked to concentrated labour markets and those performing in competitive labour markets. In these situations, low-income workers (generally connected to informality) tend to suffer most given the lack of bargaining power (Naidu, Posner and Weyl, 2018[35]).

In LAC countries, enforcement actions in labour markets have been limited to a few cases. Although they are not related to informal markets, this is possible area that competition authorities in the region could further consider intervening. Indeed, recent literature also argues that monopsony power in Latin American labour markets may contribute to the rise of informal labour, which deserves to be analysed as a theory of harm pursuant to competition law (Johannsen and Rodriguez, 2025[36]).