This chapter examines how the centre of government (CoG) in Ireland (Department of the Taoiseach), is playing a role in steering and co‑ordinating the delivery of high-profile, cross-cutting priorities such as child poverty and well-being. It highlights a shift from a primarily co‑ordination-focused role toward more direct involvement in implementation and oversight, exemplified by the creation of dedicated programme offices in the centre that convene cross-government actors, structure delivery frameworks and maintain political attention on key priorities. While this central involvement can improve coherence, visibility and momentum, the chapter underscores the associated risks of overextension, blurred mandates, and reduced line ministry ownership over priorities. It identifies the importance of establishing clear criteria for CoG engagement, strengthening existing co‑ordination mechanisms, and ensuring robust feedback loops between political and administrative levels of government. It highlights the importance of the centre in setting out transition or legacy strategies to sustain results over time once there is less need for central steering. Overall, it argues that the CoG’s effectiveness lies in its ability to act as a convenor, broker, and enabler of cross-government collaboration, maintaining strategic focus without displacing departmental responsibility for implementation.
Building Centre of Government Capabilities to Steer and Deliver Complex Priorities
Abstract
Governments today operate in increasingly fragmented policy environments, often shaped by short-term political cycles, stretched delivery systems, and growing public expectations. In this context, the CoG can play a central role in maintaining clarity of purpose, reinforcing shared priorities, and connecting political ambition with administrative implementation. OECD findings highlight how CoGs are being asked not only to facilitate co‑ordination, but to help set strategic direction, hold focus across time, and enable coherence between planning, policy, and budgeting (OECD, 2024[1]). These expectations are especially relevant when the issues at stake are politically visible, cross-cutting by nature, and not easily anchored in any one department.
Ireland is no exception. The country’s governance model is shaped by coalition governments, a high degree of ministerial autonomy, and a long-standing reliance on informal co‑ordination. The Department of the Taoiseach (Department of the Prime Minister) serves as Ireland’s centre of government, supporting the Taoiseach (Prime Minister) and Cabinet in setting direction and convening cross-government processes, in close co‑operation with the Finance and Public Expenditure Ministries. The Department of the Taoiseach has traditionally focused on sustaining the overall coherence of government policies, including through a set of social-partnership agreements. However, these agreements fell into abeyance following the financial crisis of 2008-2009. In recent years, the Department of the Taoiseach has seen a shift toward more active involvement in implementation and strategic oversight of significant cross-sectoral issues. This shift has been driven in part by the experience of managing crises such as Brexit and COVID‑19, as well as growing pressure to deliver on complex national priorities such as housing.
The creation of the Child Poverty and Well-being Programme Office in 2023 reflects this evolving role. Situated within the Department of the Taoiseach, the Office was established as part of the Taoiseach’s commitment to reduce child poverty and address long-standing gaps in co‑ordination across departments. Child poverty had previously been addressed through a mix of policies led by departments responsible for areas such as children, social protection, sports, housing, and education. However, no single actor had the mandate or capacity to drive a sustained, whole‑of-government response. The decision to place the Office at the centre reflected both political priority and institutional necessity.
The Programme Office was designed to bring greater coherence, visibility, and follow-through to the child poverty agenda. It supports alignment across six strategic focus areas: income support, cost of education, early years and childcare, service integration with respect to health and well-being, family homelessness, and participation in culture and sport. It provides a focal point for policy analysis, cross-departmental co‑ordination, and public engagement. The Programme Office has also introduced a consolidated approach to monitoring progress, supporting local service integration initiatives, and bringing a child poverty lens to the national budget process. The Office does not control budgets or programmes, but works through relationships, convening power, and the ability to frame a shared narrative. Its establishment has also helped elevate the visibility of child poverty and well-being inside and outside government, supported by a growing network of departmental contact points and the annual Child Poverty and Well-being Summit.
As previously described (OECD, 2023[2]) , Ireland’s Department of the Taoiseach has recognised the need to take a more structured and coherent approach to determining when and how the centre should become involved in these priorities. There is increasing awareness that taking on too many issues can risk overextension, reduce traction, and weaken the ability of the centre to provide sustained leadership. In this context, the challenge lies in balancing responsiveness with focus, and in maintaining the institutional space needed for deeper engagement where it is most needed.
The first part of this chapter examines how Ireland’s CoG functions in practice. It explores how its stewardship of complex policy issues is extending beyond the Department of the Taoiseach’s traditional oversight through Cabinet Committee structures, and how the centre can best calibrate its engagement when political priorities, institutional capacity, and the complexity of the issues themselves are increasingly shifting. In particular, it considers whether the CoG’s role should be to strengthen capacity in line departments through iterative performance routines, how it can maintain political visibility on key priorities amid competing demands, and how it can plan for the point at which it steps back.
The second part focuses on the Child Poverty and Well-being Programme Office as a case study of how these issues are highlighted and addressed in practice. It analyses how the Office operates within the Department of the Taoiseach and the role of the Cross-Government Network it convenes. The case examines how the Office contributes to strengthen capabilities across government within their realm of work.
The Department of the Taoiseach is considered the CoG institution in Ireland, as it supports the Taoiseach -the Prime Minister- and government in providing strategic direction, overseeing key policy priorities, and facilitating co‑ordination across government departments. Its functions are similar to the ones of other OECD countries: define and sustain long-term priorities, ensuring co‑ordination between the political and administrative levels, promoting good governance and policy standards, maintaining operational stability in times of disruption, and supporting the communication of shared government direction.
The Department of the Taoiseach carries out these roles through a compact institutional structure. It is organised into Divisions, as illustrated in Figure 7.1, each of them reflecting core governance functions (parliamentary liaison, and international affairs) or policy priorities (housing and infrastructure). These divisions work together to support the work of the Taoiseach and Cabinet, co‑ordinate input across departments, and facilitate decision making through the cabinet committee system.
Source: Information provided by officials within the Department of the Taoiseach
The Department of the Taoiseach is positioned as a steward to support co‑ordination on cross-cutting issues through its central location within government and proximity to political leadership. In its day-to-day operations, the Department works closely with other departments to support policy development and monitor progress on key issues. Much of this co‑ordination occurs through formal mechanisms such as Cabinet Committees and associated Senior Officials Groups (SOGs). These are defined in the Irish Cabinet Handbook as structures to assist the government in carrying out its responsibilities regarding major policy areas or issues of significant public importance or sensitivity that have a cross-cutting dimension. They serve as primary fora for interdepartmental alignment and oversight.
The Department of the Taoiseach prepares the agendas and follow-up materials for Cabinet Committees, shaping how strategic issues are framed and discussed. In some areas, the Department of the Taoiseach has supported the creation of delivery and performance frameworks to help maintain focus over time. Examples of cross-cutting priorities overseen or co‑ordinated by the Department of the Taoiseach include child poverty, housing, disability, and the Shared Island initiative -a whole‑of-government programme aimed at strengthening North-South co‑operation through joint investment, research, and dialogue.
In these cases, the Department’s role has ranged from convening delivery boards and facilitating targeted budget discussions (as in child poverty) to overseeing performance frameworks (in housing) and shaping strategic narratives (in the case of Shared Island) (Government of Ireland, 2025[3]). Table 7.1 provides an overview of these initiatives.
Source: Author’s own elaboration
The Climate Action Delivery Board, for instance, provides strategic direction and leadership to ensure co‑ordinated implementation of the government’s action agenda in this area, monitors departmental performance against emissions targets, and identifies pathways for barriers to achieving the government’s objectives. Similarly, there is a Secretary General Delivery Group devoted to housing – chaired by the Department of the Taoiseach – with dedicated workstreams on investment, industry capability and public service delivery.
While the Department’s institutional configuration and co‑ordination mechanisms provide a stable foundation, the way in which it engages with policy challenges is shaped not only by its formal role, but also by informal working relationships. These informal tools have a number of benefits such as quicker decision making or increased ownership over those decisions, but also carry with them a number of risks- in particular around institutional memory.
As outlined in previous reports (OECD, 2023[2]), there has been an ongoing internal reflection on how to ensure the Department of the Taoiseach’s involvement in cross-cutting priorities is structured and sequenced to ensure the best possible outcomes. The following section examines this issue.
OECD analysis and findings highlight the rationale behind the CoG’s decision to take on a new cross-cutting issue. These may be multi-faceted and cover both political, administrative and technical reasons (Figure 7.2).
Note: n=8, Bulgaria, Estonia, Greece, Ireland, Latvia, Poland, Portugal, Slovak Republic.
Source: OECD, Agile and Dynamic Stewardship of Cross-Cutting Policies at the CoG, unpublished.
As the number of cross-cutting priorities grows, the Department of the Taoiseach has recognised the risk of taking on too many issues. This has prompted discussion on how to set clearer internal thresholds for engagement, how to transition responsibilities to line departments over time, and how to support continuity in the face of shifting political attention.
In recent years, the Department of the Taoiseach has taken on a wider set of responsibilities. Officials interviewed for this chapter noted that responsibilities often land at the Department of the Taoiseach when issues are politically visible, span multiple departments, or carry significant implementation risks. Civil society advocacy and media attention can also elevate issues, reinforcing the expectation that the CoG will provide co‑ordination, visibility, and momentum. This reflects a broader trend observed across OECD countries, where CoGs become the default hub for strategically important or politically sensitive issues that do not fall neatly within existing ministerial boundaries (OECD, 2023[2]).
This potential for expansion has resulted in a governance model in which the Department of the Taoiseach is expected not only to initiate and align multi-sectoral strategies, but also to manage delivery risks and mediate between departments in real time. The growing number and scope of whole‑of-government priorities have created a complex co‑ordination environment, in which the Department of the Taoiseach is called upon to support a broadening portfolio of initiatives requiring both interdepartmental collaboration and sustained political attention.
The case of the Child Poverty and Well-being Programme Office illustrates this dynamic in practice. The decision to locate this portfolio at the Department of the Taoiseach reflected its political visibility as a personal priority of the then-Taoiseach, who felt strongly committed to the reduction of child poverty and wanted to see sustained progress on the issue. It also resolved a practical challenge: no single department was willing or positioned to take full ownership of such a cross-cutting agenda.
While this case‑by-case approach allows for responsiveness, this piecemeal agenda raises questions about role clarity, strategic capacity, and long-term sustainability. It is not uncommon in OECD systems, where political priority is a legitimate driver of central engagement, but this poses the challenges of ensuring that central involvement is used where it adds value, without allowing responsibilities to accumulate in ways that dilute focus or create ambiguity about institutional roles. The case‑by-case approach can also neglect commonalities across policy areas which reduces the possibility of explicit and clear learning from previous approaches, particularly in terms of whether and how the involvement of the CoG assisted in cultivating more effective, mainstreamed approaches.
Many countries face similar challenges in determining how and when CoG should engage in cross-cutting issues. International guidance recommends internal mechanisms such as filtering criteria, role allocation tools, and transition pathways to help CoGs remain focused on issues where their involvement provides strategic added value (OECD, 2023[4]; Davies and Vági, 2023[5]). While the SIGMA Principles of Public Administration do not prescribe specific entry or exit criteria, they highlight the importance of harmonised planning processes, clearly defined institutional responsibilities, and coherence across strategic instruments. Several Irish stakeholders interviewed for this chapter similarly suggested the development of simple internal tools, such as informal engagement guidelines or decision-support checklists, to support consistency in how and when the Department of the Taoiseach engages, though others acknowledged that such tools may oversimplify what is, in most cases, a political decision driven by context.
While few governments have codified criteria for assigning cross-cutting issues to the CoG, international experience reveals a set of factors under which central co‑ordination is typically warranted. Table 7.2, presents a number of factors that while not exhaustive can provide useful inspiration and guidance.
However, as mentioned, assessing where and how the Department of the Taoiseach can add value is not a mechanical exercise. A number of determinants are less explicit, harder to codify, and not always immediately visible. These require judgement, strategic analysis, and an explicit balancing of priorities in light of the specific context.
In this context, two considerations stand out from the analysis. The CoG should be mindful of the risk of duplicating activities more appropriately carried out by line departments, which could displace them from their mandates and weaken system-wide ownership. It should also ensure that any additional responsibilities can be assumed without undermining its capacity to deliver on its core functions.
At the same time, the scale and urgency of certain issues – as Ireland experienced with Brexit and the COVID‑19 pandemic – will necessitate direct CoG engagement irrespective of any formal criteria. This underscores a broader point: the centre of government’s role is inherently dynamic, shaped by political, economic, and social developments. In practice, this means calibrating engagement over time, mobilising actors and resources quickly when issues escalate, and shifting from operational management to strategic steering where appropriate.
7.3.1. Co‑ordinating and ensuring coherence and continuity
Determining when the CoG should engage in cross-cutting issues cannot be separated from understanding the environment in which it operates. In Ireland, coalition dynamics and an increasingly complex political-administrative interface have created conditions that both necessitate and complicate central co‑ordination. These dynamics fundamentally shape what the CoG can realistically achieve and how it must position itself.
Ireland’s coalition governments since 2020 reflect a shift in the country’s political configuration. For the first time, the historic rivals Fianna Fáil and Fine Gael entered government together, joined by the Green Party under a rotating Taoiseach model. This setup has been maintained in the current government arrangements, formed in January 2025, with Fianna Fáil and Fine Gael and a number of independent members of the parliament.
The co‑ordination role of the Department of the Taoiseach, as a fundamental part of the CoG, has been evolving since the 1970s. Ireland’s accession to the then European Economic Community expanded the range of policy areas requiring cross-government co‑ordination and increased the Taoiseach’s role in representing Ireland in collective decision making at European level. Over time, the growing prevalence of coalition governments has further reinforced the importance of co‑ordination over direction, while the increasing pace and continuity of government business has heightened the need for coherence across departments. These developments have increased the importance of the CoG’s co‑ordinating role, particularly in relation to complex cross-cutting policy challenges such as housing and decarbonisation.
At the same time, across OECD countries, the interface between political and administrative levels is changing. Ireland is no exception. Several officials noted that the growing role of political staff in what have traditionally been more technical co‑ordination processes reflects a broader tension between the need for short-term political responsiveness and longer-term policy development.
These political and policy dynamics have practical implications for the civil service. As one senior official noted during interviews for this chapter, “working in coalition governments is more complex. (…) We need to be more careful while addressing cross-cutting issues”. As a result, the Department of the Taoiseach’s convening and brokering functions have become more prominent, as it works to align diverse agendas -both political and technical- and ensure the continuity of cross-cutting initiatives. Departments may look to the Department of the Taoiseach to resolve inter-departmental disputes and provide political cover when navigating contentious issues. As one official put it, “initiatives fall back one or two years when leadership is unclear”, a dynamic that underscores a reliance on the centre’s role in playing that leadership role, sustaining momentum, supporting follow-through and shared accountability in terms of delivering on commitments contained in the Programme for government.
The Department of the Taoiseach, therefore, plays a critical role in maintaining policy coherence and continuity. Effective bridging requires not only technical capacity, but also the institutional authority to uphold neutrality, navigate political transitions, and support sustained implementation over time (OECD, 2024[1]). In a system shaped by informal co‑ordination, fast-paced announcements, and rotating leadership, the Department of the Taoiseach helps provide continuity and maintain attention on longer-term priorities. While this function is rarely codified, its value was widely recognised across departments during the meetings, particularly in relation to whole‑of-government issues such as housing and child poverty among others. The key question is how the CoG can support line departments in a way that is both effective and targeted, while recognising that the intensity of its involvement cannot be sustained indefinitely.
7.3.2. Balancing direction and empowerment
Once the decision is made to engage the CoG on a priority issue, the question becomes how it can add value in practice. These functional choices can determine not only the immediate effectiveness of central involvement, but also the sustainability of reforms and the feasibility of eventual transition back to line departments.
The way CoGs engage in implementation and co‑ordination varies significantly across countries, reflecting differences in administrative tradition, political structure, and the maturity of cross-government collaboration (OECD, 2024). While some CoGs focus on setting strategic direction and convening actors, others adopt a more hands-on delivery role, providing active support to line ministries in shaping and executing joint initiatives. This evolving function can take many forms: from facilitating co‑operation across ministries to more structured, interventionist models, depending on where each country’s system draws the line between central steering and ministerial autonomy. In all cases, the challenge lies in balancing the CoG`s strategic oversight with its capacity to catalyse sustained collaboration across institutional boundaries.
Ireland’s current governance model and political dynamics means that CoG has to increasingly work to balance its directive and facilitative roles, encouraging line ministries to take ownership of policies while adopting practices that improve co‑ordination across sectors. This is particularly important given the cross-cutting nature of challenges such as housing, poverty, or migration. As one key stakeholder put it, a role that the Department of the Taoiseach plays in some policy areas is to “build connective tissue across departments”. In this context, the Department is increasingly taking on responsibilities as a policy broker and strategic integrator, fostering interdepartmental collaboration capabilities on shared priorities. It supports departments in collecting and synthesising data and in monitoring government-wide initiatives, particularly in high-profile areas. However, as these collaborative arrangements take shape, a key challenge is to ensure that line departments are able to absorb and sustain them independently, especially as the Department of the Taoiseach shifts its attention to new or emerging priorities. During interviews for this chapter, some stakeholders highlighted the need for clearer guidance on the nature, scope and -if possible‑ timing, of the Department of the Taoiseach’s engagement, although there is a question whether this can be fully defined ex ante given the intrinsically dynamic nature of the CoG.
The debate centres around whether CoGs can adopt a more explicit approach to helping line departments work together on cross-cutting priorities. Ireland stands out among OECD countries in institutionalising policy development as a core civil service capability (OECD, 2023[7]). The establishment of the IGEES, the adoption of a unified policy framework underpinned by the principles of evidence, feasibility and legitimacy (Government of Ireland, 2025[8]), and the stewardship of the Civil Service Management Board collectively demonstrate a mature and system-wide approach to professionalising policy advice. These initiatives position Ireland at the forefront of efforts to embed analytical rigour and cross-government coherence in policymaking. As the OECD previously highlighted (OECD, 2023[2]), the next step lies in ensuring that these frameworks translate into consistent policy development infrastructure across all departments. This will require deepening practical skills in design and delivery planning, fostering stronger horizontal collaboration during early stages of policy formulation, and developing more structured feedback loops between the centre and line departments to strengthen collective ownership of policy outcomes.
A broader strategic approach for the Department of the Taoiseach would be to focus on strengthening the state’s ability to work across boundaries over time. In that sense, the role of the CoG would not simply be to intervene where co‑ordination challenges arise, but to help build the underlying capacities that allow line departments to respond, adapt and collaborate more effectively in a changing environment. This would imply combining strategic steering with a deliberate effort to strengthen how government analyses problems, co‑ordinates across organisational boundaries, and supports delivery, rather than relying mainly on ad hoc central intervention (Kattel, 2022[9]). In Canada, new agencies have been developed to support cross-cutting policy issues, including the Major Projects Office, aimed to bring together various stakeholders on infrastructure projects.
In Canada, the Major Projects Office is a federal agency designed to co-ordinate across federal departments and work with provinces, territories, Indigenous Peoples, and private-sector participants to fast-track the development of major infrastructure projects. By providing a single point of contact and leadership on major infrastructure projects referred to the office, the aim is to streamline regulatory approvals, facilitating financing and removing government barriers in order to bring large infrastructure projects to fruition more quickly. In so doing, the Office contributes to an emerging cross-cutting economic agenda involving various policy areas and stakeholders.
Source: Government of Canada (2026[10]), Major Projects Office, https://www.canada.ca/en/privy-council/major-projects-office.html
One avenue for putting this into practice would be for the Department of the Taoiseach to provide guidance, capacity building for structuring joint working arrangements, and targeted policy support in areas such as design, delivery planning, or outcome definition. This would allow the centre to play a more enabling role: not replacing line departments but helping them develop the routines and capabilities needed to sustain collaboration themselves.
A promising approach to tailoring this type of support, and also build accountability with line departments, is through structured feedback from line departments. The Child Poverty and Well-being Programme Office, for instance, has conducted surveys to gather feedback from line departments to inform its work. While these were not carried out in a fully structured way, they represent an interesting practice to take into consideration. Periodic surveys or structured consultations could be conducted across departments to assess existing capabilities and identify where the Department of the Taoiseach can add most value. For example, in the United Kingdom, the Cabinet Office and HM Treasury jointly surveyed departments to understand barriers to cross-government working, using the insights to design targeted tools and guidance (see Box 7.2).
In 2022, the Cabinet Office and HM Treasury conducted a survey of over 200 departmental officials to identify how the centre could better support cross-government working. The responses highlighted several priority areas where departments needed more help, including governance, data-sharing, finance, and organisational culture.
In response, the Cabinet Office worked with the cross-government Policy Profession to create a joint-working hub. The hub provides departments with tools, guidance, and examples to help establish clear accountability structures and co‑ordination practices. It also serves as a signposting mechanism for existing cross-government support and resources. This initiative reflects a broader effort to strengthen the centre’s enabling function by actively gathering practitioner feedback and using it to tailor policy support.
Source: National Audit Office, United Kingdom (2023[11]), Cross-Government Working, https://www.nao.org.uk/wp-content/uploads/2023/07/GPG-cross-government-working.pdf
New Zealand’s Policy Project also provides an interesting model for this kind of enabling approach (see Box 7.3). Hosted within the Department of the Prime Minister and Cabinet, it equips policy practitioners, teams, and agencies with frameworks, tools, and support to strengthen capability across the public service. Drawing on this example, the Irish CoG could help build system-wide capacity to design and deliver coherent responses to complex priorities.
New Zealand’s Policy Project, hosted within the Department of the Prime Minister and Cabinet, helps strengthen the quality of policy advice and capability across the public service. Rather than focusing solely on central oversight, the initiative provides practical tools and training for policy practitioners, teams, and agencies to improve their work and align with whole‑of-government priorities.
The Policy Project promotes three integrated frameworks that guide system-wide improvement: the Policy Quality Framework, the Policy Skills Framework, and the Policy Capability Framework. These provide clear standards for what good policy looks like, the skills required to deliver it, and what constitutes an effective policy unit.
To support day-to-day implementation, the team has developed tools such as:
The Policy Skills Framework and Development Pathways Tool, which help practitioners plan professional growth across levels of seniority.
Policy Tools, a curated repository to help teams select appropriate development methods.
A Start Right Guide and a Commissioning Worksheet for Policy Papers, which guides teams through the early stages of defining and structuring policy work.
Workshops and training on topics such as policy fundamentals, intervention logic, and starting successful projects.
The Policy Project operates as a support unit to the policy profession, rather than a regulator or approver. Its value lies in equipping the system with shared resources, structured learning opportunities, and a clear vision of quality policymaking. For CoGs exploring ways to support better cross-government co-ordination, it offers a practical model of enabling policy capacity from within.
Source: Government of New Zealand (2026[12]), The Policy Project, https://www.dpmc.govt.nz/our-programmes/policy-project
While national governance initiatives, such as those in the United Kingdom and New Zealand, offer useful normative frameworks, it is also important to recognise the challenges of embedding them in mainstream practice. An evaluation of the New Zealand Policy Project found, for example, that officials responsible for day-to-day implementation were not always aware of the resources provided by the CoG. This suggests that CoG interventions require active implementation support to ensure uptake, and that early momentum should not be assumed to be self-sustaining.
This point also highlights that the value of CoG support often lies in its novelty and limited duration. Prolonged involvement can dilute impact and risk disempowering the actors it is intended to support. This underlines the importance of well-defined exit strategies that are linked to criteria and demonstrate the required capabilities in the relevant institutions.
7.3.3. The exit: planning the path forward and avoiding losing political momentum
A recurring challenge in public governance is how to hand over responsibility from the CoG to line ministries without losing coherence or momentum. Stakeholders noted that while CoG engagement might be essential during the launch and framing of cross-cutting initiatives, these functions often remain concentrated in central units longer than necessary. The result can be overstretched co‑ordination units and blurred lines between delivery and strategic guidance.
Defining a structured transition or “legacy” strategy could help mitigate this risk if it is linked to a capability assessment. Such strategies should aim not to withdraw central support too early, but to plan systematically for when, how, and under what conditions specific functions should shift. This may include readiness assessments to evaluate the technical capacity, governance clarity, and institutional stability of departments, as well as stakeholder alignment and accountability arrangements.
There are few examples of structured approaches to managing this transition. Estonia offers a case of how responsibilities can successfully evolve from temporary, central co‑ordination to more permanent institutional arrangements in a planned way. Its experience with policy co‑ordination illustrates how a CoG can design and implement a gradual “exit strategy” once policy frameworks and capacities have matured (see Box 7.4).
Estonia provides a clear example of how responsibilities can successfully transition from central co‑ordination to dedicated ministerial structures (see Chapter two). In 2022, responding to the need for fundamental shifts in climate policy design and implementation, Estonia established an co‑ordination unit within the Government Office to tackle this issue. This central approach included three key elements: a Committee of Green Transition Policy led by the Prime Minister, an expert group with private sector and scientific representatives, and a dedicated green transition team within the government Office to co‑ordinate government-wide processes.
The central co‑ordination model proved effective in securing a political mandate and driving sectoral planning across government. However, recognising the long-term nature of this issue, Estonia planned from the outset to transition leadership to a dedicated ministry. In 2023, this transition occurred with the creation of the Climate Ministry, which assumed responsibility for the Committee of Green Transition Policy and overall process leadership.
This approach demonstrates how CoG co‑ordination can serve as an effective incubator for cross-cutting priorities while planning systematically for institutional transition. Estonia’s experience highlights key success factors: securing initial political leadership through central co‑ordination, allowing sufficient time for institutional development, and maintaining flexibility in implementation approaches.
Source: Kaur, M. et al. (2023[13]), Steering responses to climate change from the centre of government: A stocktaking, https://doi.org/10.1787/b95c8396-en.
In Ireland, a relevant example can be found in the policing reform process (Box 7.5). This case illustrates how the Department of the Taoiseach can support implementation during a critical phase of reform while also creating the conditions for responsibilities to be transferred back to the relevant line institutions over time.
The Commission on the Future of Policing (CoFPI) in 2018 recommended that an Implementation Group for Policing Reform (IGPR), with an independent Chair, should be established to ensure delivery of the reform programme, and that an Implementation Programme Office resourced with the appropriate expertise should be established to support the IGPR in its work. The IGPR had collective responsibility for the delivery of the Implementation Plan, with the core membership of the IGPR comprising of senior officials from the organisations most closely involved in driving the transformation programme: An Garda Síochána, Department of Justice, Department of Public Expenditure and Reform, and Department of the Taoiseach.
The Department of the Taoiseach took on a co‑ordinating role in a number of ways:
Firstly, the High-Level Steering Board on Policing Reform (HLSB), was established to guide the work of the IGPR and was chaired by the Secretary General of the Department of the Taoiseach. It also acted as a clearing house for issues that could not be adequately resolved by the IGPR, or where particular blockages were experienced in the implementation of A Policing Service for our Future. The Cabinet Committee on Social Affairs and Public Services provided political oversight of the implementation plan.
Secondly, a Policing Reform Implementation Programme Office (PRIPO) was established in the Department of the Taoiseach with the purpose of driving implementation. The Office was staffed by personnel with expertise in the areas of project management, policing, justice, and public service reform. The PRIPO provided progress reports on the delivery of the Plan to the HLSB and the relevant Cabinet Committee. The PRIPO was also committed to publishing periodic progress reports at key stages of the reform programme to reinforce oversight and transparency of the implementation of the Plan and monitored and drove the agenda for the IGPR.
Part of the progress achieved was deemed the result of the fact that the locus of implementation was situated in Department of the Taoiseach with an independent Chair, who had been a member of the Commission – bringing continuity, and supported by a dedicated programme office with full-time resources, was seen as crucial and enabling credible oversight of the transformation process.
At the end of the mandate of the Implementation Group for Policing Reform (IGPR), the next steps in the reform process were devolved back to departments with a new governance framework as well as continuing political oversight through the Minister of Justice. It was seen as appropriate to shift the locus of oversight back to the respective line department and related agencies as set out in legislation, and the enhanced reform capabilities of the police organisation was a guarantor of further change. The cabinet committee structure devoted to Justice and related matters exists to ensure that policing is seen as a collective responsibility across all relevant government bodies.
Source: Government of Ireland (2023[14]), A Policing Service for our Future: Implementing the Report of the Commission of Policing in Ireland, https://www.garda.ie/en/about-us/a-policing-service-for-the-future/implementation-plan.pdf
The example of policing reform suggests that the Department of the Taoiseach’s role is not only about convening and steering but also about managing how and when responsibility is handed back to line ministries. While such transition strategies are not common in OECD governments, developing a more structured approach could be seen as an innovative step: one that helps preserve coherence without overstretching the centre, while embedding reforms more firmly within the machinery of government.
7.3.4. Case Study: The Child Poverty and Well-being Programme Office
The Child Poverty and Well-being Programme Office was established in 2023 within the Department of the Taoiseach to improve the visibility, coherence, and co‑ordination of Ireland’s response to child poverty. Designed to work with and complement Young Ireland, the overarching policy Framework for children and young people and aligned with the EU Child Guarantee.
The decision to locate the office at the Department of the Taoiseach reflected both political and institutional dynamics. On the political side, child poverty had been identified as a personal priority of the Taoiseach at the time, warranting high-level visibility. Administratively, the issue spanned multiple departments, including Social Protection, Children, Education, and Housing, without a single lead ministry. During the interviews for this chapter, stakeholders described how proposals to house the Office in line departments proved unworkable, as no department was willing or positioned to take full ownership of the agenda.
Applying the factors outlined in Table 7.2, child poverty in Ireland combined high political salience, a broad cross-sectoral scope, and the absence of a single lead institution, all conditions that made central co‑ordination both legitimate and necessary. From its inception, the Office has functioned as a facilitation and co‑ordination hub rather than a delivery unit. It does not develop new programmes or directly manage funding. Instead, it co‑ordinates inputs from departments, builds a shared narrative, and enhances interdepartmental exchange (Government of Ireland, 2025[3]). The Office has also played a behind-the‑scenes role, reviewing draft materials, connecting actors across policy areas, and encouraging consistency in how children’s well-being is framed across government.
In its initial 24-month Programme Plan, From Poverty to Potential: A Programme Plan for Child Well-being 2023-2025, the role of the Programme Office was defined as follows: “enhance delivery across six key priority areas, provide a focus on specific issues that require urgent attention and action, and to support strategic initiatives that will amplify the impact of these initiatives (Government of Ireland, 2023[14]).
The six focus areas were selected to deliver tangible improvements for families and children living in poverty. They are necessary, though not sufficient, to realise the government’s ambition to make Ireland the best country in Europe to be a child. The priority areas are:
Income support and joblessness
Early learning and childcare
Reducing the cost of education
Family homelessness
Consolidating and integrating family and parental support, health and well-being
Enhancing participation in culture, arts and sport for children and young people affected by poverty
In addition, the Programme Office undertakes a small number of strategic initiatives which have the potential to increase the impact of current and emerging measures to fight child poverty and support child well-being. In the first Programme, the goals were to strengthen the focus on child poverty in the annual Budget, developing a national framework to support service integration for children and families, promoting key tools to enhance policy and implementation focus on child poverty, and supporting the cross-Government focus on the children’s services workforce (Government of Ireland, 2023).
In addition to the more ‘traditional role of monitoring and oversight of relevant government policy, since its inception, the Office has achieved several milestones. A central achievement was bringing greater focus on child poverty in the annual Budget process, resulting in greater co-ordination of spending plans on child poverty for the first time and the preparation of two cross-government Budget reports with a third under development.
As a system convener, the CPWPO successfully established a Cross-Government Network (CGN) on Child Poverty and Well-being and hosted two Child Poverty and Well-being Summits (2024 and 2025), which have promoted focus among stakeholders and showcased strong political commitment. The Office has also progressed a number of strategic initiatives including convening and leading work in relation to developing new strategic directions on enhancing service integration and on the important question of family homelessness.
During the interviews for this chapter, stakeholders consistently emphasised the value of this Office; which combines the formal monitoring and policy support functions of its mandate with a more informal role in brokering, quality assurance, and promoting consistency and co-operation across departments. One stakeholder noted that if the Programme Office didn’t exist, policies would likely continue in a more siloed fashion, while another described how it has promoted a more co-ordinated, cross-government approach, particularly through informal quality assurance and brokering support. Others saw its symbolic contribution as equally important, highlighting that the Office provides visibility and “political weight” to the child poverty issue.
Rather than providing a comprehensive description of all of the work of the Programme Office, the rest of this chapter will focus specifically on one initiative – the cross-government network on child poverty and well-being. Many stakeholders identified this network as a key contribution of the Programme Office, making it valuable to explore this area of work in greater depth.
7.3.5. The Cross-Government Network on Child Poverty and Well-being
One of the Programme Office’s innovations is the establishment of a Cross-Government Network on Child Poverty and Well-being, which provides a space for informal alignment and relationship-building across departments. Convened by the Office and hosted within the Department of the Taoiseach, the network brings together senior officials from key departments, agencies, and local authorities. It was created to improve visibility, coherence, and informal alignment around the national child poverty agenda. Although it is not a formal decision-making body, it serves as a trusted space for cross-departmental exchange, shared learning, and relationship-building.
The network has been widely welcomed by stakeholders, who credit it with enhancing the profile of child poverty across government and helping to foster both formal and informal connections. In a system where co‑ordination often relies on personal relationships, the network fills an important gap. OECD data shows that over 50% of Irish civil servants depend on informal contacts outside their department for policy development (OECD, 2023[2]), and participants consistently cited the meetings as a rare opportunity for honest, cross-cutting dialogue.
Despite these strengths, several stakeholders noted that the network’s current format may limit its strategic potential. Participants recognised its value in knowledge sharing, updates, and fostering informal relationships across departments. However, many observed that once the initial trust-building phase is achieved, the co‑ordination process needs to evolve. To remain effective, the network should offer more tangible value to its members.
Viewed through the lens of dynamic capabilities (Kattel, 2022[9]) , co‑ordination networks -among other public sector bodies - can play three complementary roles: (i) facilitating sense‑making, through sharing analytical perspectives on what is working; (ii) enabling connecting, by building alliances that strengthen collective ownership; and (iii) supporting shaping, or in other words, developing shared tools, standards, and working routines that embed improved practice across departments.
A recent innovation of the Network has been the establishment of a series of Action Learning Sets (ALS). These projects are led by network members who have identified a particularly challenging or “wicked” problem in their work (OECD, 2017[15]). They convene an ALS with others who share a stake in the issue, in order to explore its root causes and identify potential innovations and experiments. ALS is an established methodology that not only creates opportunities for deeper exploration, but also provides a forum for action-based collaboration and for building capacity in multidisciplinary working. The advantage of the Department of the Taoiseach convening these ALS is that it provides not only support to the convenors, but also credibility and legitimacy in seeking out new working relationships. While there is significant variation across the ALSs, several of them have met multiple times over a period of months and the Network is planning a convening session to share learning early in 2026. Five of the ALSs presented their emerging learning at the 2025 Child Poverty Summit.
The ALS model as an experiment in enhancing the role of the network, has parallels with ‘policy lab’ approaches for surfacing and refining shared goals, testing outcome targets and sub-targets, and exploring how departments can collectively support delivery (see example from Estonia in Box 7.6). A policy lab aims to host “challenge” sessions around complex programmes and pilot short, time‑bound policy sprints focused on advancing specific priorities, such as school meals, early years access, or child homelessness. The Programme Office’s ALS model and policy lab formats preserve flexibility while encouraging practical collaboration.
Estonia’s Innosprint is a design sprint model tailored specifically for the public sector. Developed by the government Office’s Public Sector Innovation Team, it introduces civil servants to design thinking, co-creation, and problem-solving methods through a structured sprint format.
Each Innosprint runs over five days spread across six weeks. A distinctive feature is the time allocated between sessions for participants to conduct user research, such as interviews or fieldwork. This approach helps shift civil servants’ mindset from internal process orientation to user-centred problem definition.
To date, Innosprint has engaged 381 participants from 85 organisations across 53 project teams. Teams apply to the sprint with a real policy or service challenge and are supported by facilitators -trained civil servants known as “sherpas”- who guide them through the sprint process. Innosprints are run fully online, making them scalable and accessible across Estonia.
The model has been successfully replicated by other public sector bodies and is recognised for its practical value, low cost, and capacity-building benefits. It has led to stronger procurement design, wider adoption of collaborative methods, and improved confidence in using innovation tools across government.
Source: OECD (2023[7]), Observatory of Public Sector Innovation, https://oecd-opsi.org/innovations/innosprint-a-design-sprint-for-the-public-sector/
The Programme Office is well positioned to guide the future evolution of the Network by broadening and deepening its role in three directions, aligned to supporting the development of dynamic capabilities: strengthening shared analytical perspectives on what is working, building alliances across departmental boundaries, and embedding improved working practices that can be sustained without continuous central involvement.
7.3.6. Prioritisation and thematic focus
This section summarises the role of the Child Poverty and Well-being Programme Office at the centre of government. It considers how clearer prioritisation and thematic focus could strengthen the Office’s capacity, how a stronger measurement framework with targets and milestones could support alignment around shared objectives, how budget co‑ordination could be further developed to deepen cross-departmental engagement, and how sustaining political momentum requires a longer-term approach to institutional development. Taken together, these themes illustrate both the opportunities and challenges of embedding child poverty reduction as a national priority and inform the evolving role of the centre of government.
Effective co‑ordination across government depends not only on the ambition of a shared agenda but also on the ability to focus attention and resources on a manageable set of priorities over time. The initial six priority areas of the Child Poverty and Well-being Programme Office were selected for impact and intended to capture the multidimensional nature of child poverty, nonetheless they represent a wide‑ranging agenda, one that spans income, services, education, housing and participation (Government of Ireland, 2025[3]).
This breadth has helped give visibility to the complexity of the issue and encouraged engagement from a wide range of departments. At the same time, there was broad agreement among stakeholders that trying to advance all six strands simultaneously, with limited staff and without implementation authority, has stretched the Office’s capacity. Several departments noted that while the Office has successfully convened actors, the wide scope of its mandate can make it harder to maintain depth of focus, facilitate strategic dialogue or support follow-through on specific actions (Government of Ireland, 2025[3]); (OECD, 2023[2]).
A number of stakeholders interviewed for this chapter suggested that a more focused and sequenced approach could enhance the effectiveness of the Programme Office’s work. Rather than advancing all six objectives with equal intensity, the Programme Office could prioritise specific areas where co‑ordination is most needed or where implementation challenges are particularly acute. This might involve selecting one or two priority themes each year - such as child nutrition, school exclusion, or housing - as focal points for targeted cross-government collaboration, even as implementation continues in the other priorities. Prioritisation would not narrow the agenda, but instead provide a practical mechanism for focusing attention, facilitating strategic dialogue, and enabling more sustained follow-through.
Looking ahead, the development of the Office’s second Programme Plan offers an opportunity to embed this kind of thematic sequencing. Annual summits, budget preparation and cross-government network activities could be aligned around selected themes, enabling participating actors to prepare more concrete contributions and support a more coherent policy cycle.
7.3.7. Measuring progress: balancing targets, milestones, and learning
In cross-government initiatives such as child poverty reduction, the question of how best to measure progress is as much political as it is technical. Targets can be powerful: they provide visibility, signal ambition, and help align departmental efforts toward shared outcomes.
Just before the Child Poverty and Well-being Summit in September 2025, the Taoiseach and the Minister for Social Protection announced the government’s new target on child poverty: by the end of 2030, no more than 3% of children should live in consistent poverty. Framed as one of the most ambitious commitments in Europe, the target will be accompanied by a dashboard of well-being indicators designed to capture how children are doing across all dimensions of their lives (Government of Ireland, 2025[16]). During the interviews for this chapter, many stakeholders underlined that shared targets could improve strategic focus and shared accountability across government.
While the new target is significant, responses from interviews for this chapter and international experience point to the limits of relying solely on headline targets. Child poverty outcomes are shaped by many factors, including those difficult for ministers to control - household composition, employment, migration, or housing availability - making attribution difficult and political accountability highly exposed. Such concerns are not unique to Ireland and reflect a wider body of evidence cautioning against over-reliance on fixed measures. Research on Goodhart’s Law, for example, underscores how indicators risk distortion when turned into rigid targets, as actors may focus on improving the metric itself by shifting resources, narrowing effort to what is measured, or gaming the system – rather than tackling the broader problem it was meant to capture (CNA, 2022[17]).
The establishment of the Child Poverty and Well-being Programme Office has created an institutional anchor for cross-government collaboration and increased the visibility of child poverty as a shared policy concern. The Office has made significant progress in developing monitoring frameworks, producing a first detailed annual progress report (Child Poverty and Well-Being in Transition: Learning and Adapting to Accelerate Change in Children’s Lives) that captures activities and investment flows across departments, and conducting cross-government budget analyses (Government of Ireland, 2025[3]). These contributions have helped to sustain attention on child poverty across government. Yet, as some stakeholders have stressed, they remain largely descriptive and focused on inputs, making it difficult to assess whether current initiatives are contributing to structural change.
Several OECD reviews have noted the importance of building iterative performance routines, milestones, and shared delivery mechanisms to steer complex agendas (OECD, 2024[1]) . Rather than viewing targets as “magic bullets,” these approaches are rooted in the importance of building performance management systems and working routines that work. In other words, that are tailored to the policy challenge at hand. Some countries such as the United Kingdom, for instance, implement milestones instead of indicators to track progress on infrastructure projects, as it is an easier way to measure progress considering the complexity of delivery. The goal is to build broader frameworks that allow for course correction and learning, and more importantly, a shared understanding of the common goals and clear accountability measures. In practice, this can include targets but also interim trajectories and process milestones that can help sustain political momentum, like in the case of Australia with its National Health Reform Agreement (Box 7.7).
Australia’s National Health Reform Agreement (NHRA) offers lessons for steering complex reforms. Endorsed by all Health Ministers, the Roadmap set a shared vision and identified seven priority reform streams (from prevention and well-being to enhanced health data). Each stream was accompanied by an Outcome Map, which laid out intended outcomes, contributing actions, deliverables, and timeframes for 2021‑2025. These maps made explicit how short-term deliverables were expected to contribute to intermediate outcomes and, over time, to the longer-term reform goals. They also clarified responsibilities across the Commonwealth and state governments, creating a transparent chain of accountability.
A mid-term review in 2023 concluded that while the Roadmap provided clarity and transparency, progress was uneven. It found that reforms advanced most where milestones were well-defined, backed by data systems, and resourced with joint governance structures. By contrast, areas with vague milestones or diffuse accountability lagged. The Review recommended strengthening the performance framework by adding patient experience and outcome measures, creating a new 10-year Funding and Payments Framework with measurable milestones, and establishing a dedicated National Innovation and Reform Agency to maintain momentum. Overall, Australia’s experience shows that roadmaps with outcome maps can help keep governments focused on long-term ambitions while ensuring flexibility for adaptation and iterative learning.
Source: Government of Australia (2026[18]), National Health Reform Agreement (NHRA), https://www.health.gov.au/our-work/national-health-reform-agreement-nhra
Some practices could be considered by Ireland to measure, manage, and communicate progress in a more structured way such as the ‘dashboard’ (Government of Ireland, 2026[19]), which could bring together outcome data in key areas of children’s lives. International experience - such as Scotland’s National Performance Framework - shows how such platforms can sustain political attention and public trust.
Another practice is to use milestones alongside indicators. Instead of relying solely on long-term outcome measures, and without the need to rigidly formalise process or output indicators, the Programme Office could support the identification of short-term milestones for each of its priority areas (e.g. roll-out of universal school meals, expansion of early learning access, reductions in homelessness among children). These milestones should be time‑bound, realistic, and jointly owned by the responsible departments. The U.S. performance management framework is a well-known example: each government policy priority has a political appointee and a senior civil servant responsible for its implementation, creating a clear sense of accountability.
As part of New Zealand's Results Programme, the government chose to measure 'intermediate outcomes' as a method of milestone tracking. Intermediate outcomes sit between outputs (goods and services delivered by agencies), which are easily controllable but have limited intrinsic value on their own, and end outcomes (the ultimate societal changes desired) which have high intrinsic value but are slow to materialise). This approach allowed public servants to observe the consequences of their actions and adapt, while still pursuing results that citizens could recognise as genuinely valuable.
Finally, some stakeholders have pointed to the potential value of a child poverty ‘roadmap’, which could set out expected milestones across the six thematic areas of the Programme Office and identify priority metrics to be tracked over time. Drawing inspiration from Australia’s use of outcome maps, such a roadmap could illustrate how near-term deliverables and medium-term outcomes link to the 2030 headline target, while allowing for periodic revision and learning. This would not only clarify the contribution of individual departments, but also provide a shared frame for accountability and communication with the public.
Regardless of the specific tools or practices, the main goal is to develop a monitoring system that proves useful for decision making, accountability and transparency. Ideally, it should address all three dimensions simultaneously, ensuring that Ireland’s political commitment to reduce consistent child poverty to 3% by the end of 2030 is matched by an equally robust framework for tracking and sustaining progress.
7.3.8. Budget co‑ordination
Ireland’s budget process is highly centralised, with decision making concentrated in the final weeks of the cycle and shaped primarily through political negotiations. Within this context, departments face limited opportunities to co‑ordinate in advance or advocate for joint priorities. While informal communication channels can support alignment, several participants noted the need for more structured entry points to enable shared proposals and cross-departmental engagement.
The Programme Office has taken steps to strengthen visibility around child poverty-related spending. In 2023, 2024, and 2025, it led the preparation of cross-government budget analyses -presented as part of the Breaking the Cycle reports - that identified new or expanded allocations across the Programme’s six priority areas (Government of Ireland, 2025[20]). These efforts were widely welcomed as an important innovation, contributing to greater transparency and signalling government attention. The formal post-Budget analysis builds on informal networking, outreach, and engagement undertaken in advance of the Budget. The Programme Office engages with all relevant departments to explore possible spending plans, provide feedback on which areas could have the greatest potential impact, and reminds departments that child poverty is a key priority area for government. This engagement enables the Office to build a broad picture of the potential landscape of initiatives and serves as a resource for enhancing connectivity across the system. It does not, however, represent a formal or structured role in the Budget decision-making process, which is progressed bilaterally between departments, their Ministers, and the Department of Public Expenditure.
The Office has a valuable assessment and mapping role, however it currently does not directly participate in formal budget planning discussions, nor does it have a formal mechanism to co‑ordinate investment proposals linked to child poverty outcomes. Departments prepare their estimates independently, and although the Office has played an important role in promoting prioritisation of spending within line departments on child poverty-related themes, shared priorities are not always reflected in the final submissions. The Office contributes to the Taoiseach’s own budget engagement and leverages governance structures, such as the Cabinet Committee on Children and Education, to strengthen the profile of child poverty within government.
An interesting innovation contained in the secondary Budget report was the inclusion of a set of core principles which can inform decision making. The Budget report offered an analysis of how the Budget aligned with the following principles:
Principle 1: Universal measures can provide an important safety net, but progress on universal measures should not be to the detriment of targeting those with the greatest need.
Principle 2: Prevention and early intervention supports are particularly important for the most disadvantaged children.
Principle 3: Responses to child poverty and well-being need to address income as well as broader supports and services.
Principle 4: Given the ambition to eliminate child poverty, income of low-income families must increase by more than the general population.
Principle 5: The most significant investment the State makes in ending child poverty is through existing programmes and supports; new measures should address gaps or seek to replace or evolve programmes which have become obsolete.
Principle 6: Decisions need to be cost effective, efficient and fiscally sustainable.
International experience suggests that alignment between social priorities and public spending can be enhanced through the use of clearly defined indicators and targets, supported by structured reporting, shared metrics, and collaborative planning routines (OECD, 2019[21]). As discussed above, targets not only clarify expected outcomes but also enable more strategic budgeting: they help identify which interventions require greater investment, justify additional allocations based on projected results, and provide a basis for spending reviews that improve efficiency across the expenditure cycle. In New Zealand, for example, the Child Poverty Reduction Act requires the publication of a Child Poverty Report alongside each national budget (see Box 7.8).
While the Programme Office will continue to work within the specificities of the Irish budget system, it is well placed to support a potentially similar shift in Ireland. While the Office does not control spending decisions, it can contribute by identifying strategic gaps, facilitating joint investment planning, support multi‑annual planning and helping departments align their submissions with measurable outcomes. Over time, deepening engagement in the budget cycle – particularly during pre‑estimates discussions – could help embed child poverty as a shared policy concern and strengthen the connection between data, analysis, prioritisation and public investment.
In New Zealand, cross-government co‑ordination on child poverty is supported through the formal integration of targets and reporting into the annual budget process. Under the Child Poverty Reduction Act (2018), the government is required to publish a Child Poverty Report alongside each Budget. This report prepared jointly by the Treasury and the Ministry of Social Development - explains how new budget measures are expected to contribute to poverty reduction targets.
New Zealand’s Social Investment Agency also plays a central role in child poverty reduction by directing funding and resources toward early interventions for at-risk youth and disadvantaged families.
The Child Poverty Reduction Act 2018 sets out three primary measures for poverty reduction (e.g. low income before housing costs). Statistics New Zealand publicly reports on progress against reducing child poverty using these measures each year.
This model illustrates how structured reporting, shared accountability and cross-departmental co‑ordination can help embed social priorities in fiscal planning.
Source: Office of the Auditor-General New Zealand (2025[22]), Effectiveness of Arrangements for Reducing Child Poverty, Wellington. https://oag.parliament.nz/2025/child-poverty
While stronger planning routines and pre‑budget engagement could help the Programme Office improve alignment across departments, several stakeholders also highlighted the potential to explore other concrete incentives to sustain collaboration. One way to foster co‑ordination is through shared or pooled resources. Even modest funding streams, structured around joint proposals or cross-government priorities, can encourage departments to work together in new ways. The United Kingdom’s Shared Outcomes Fund offers one such example. It allocates time‑limited funding for projects that require collaboration between departments, linked to clearly defined outcomes and joint reporting (see Box 7.9).
Launched in 2019, the United Kingdom Shared Outcomes Fund (SOF) was created to improve co‑ordination on complex policy issues that cut across departmental responsibilities. Administered jointly by HM Treasury and the Cabinet Office, the fund supports pilot initiatives that require collaboration between two or more government departments, with an emphasis on delivering shared outcomes and generating data and analysis through evaluation.
Departments apply by submitting joint proposals that must include governance arrangements and plans for monitoring and evaluation. The fund prioritises projects that test new approaches to joint delivery and produce insights on what works. Successful pilots may be considered for scale‑up where evaluations demonstrate positive results.
By May 2023, the fund had supported 44 initiatives across areas such as public health, family justice, youth mental health, digital connectivity, and refugee integration. These projects bring together departments and agencies under shared governance and are designed to inform future cross-government policy and delivery.
A review by the National Audit Office found that the Shared Outcomes Fund has incentivised collaboration and surfaced practical lessons for aligning policy, delivery, and outcomes across a system traditionally structured around individual departmental mandates.
Source: National Audit Office (2023[23]), Lessons Learned: Cross-Government Working, HC 1659, Session 2022‑23, https://www.nao.org.uk/wp-content/uploads/2023/07/012220-BOOK-Cross-government-working-Summary.pdf
7.3.9. Sustaining political momentum with a clear long-term strategy on the future of the Programme
The creation of the Programme Office at the centre of government has been instrumental in generating political attention and shared commitment to child poverty as a national priority. As an initiative of the Taoiseach, its convening power has enabled a more coherent approach to an issue that cuts across traditional departmental boundaries. This central positioning helped bring visibility and focus to child well-being during the Programme’s early stages.
Yet there is broad recognition that this initial momentum cannot be sustained indefinitely through political capital alone. As the system begins to refocus on other priorities – such as disability inclusion – stakeholders have emphasised the need to strengthen institutional underpinnings that support co‑ordination and shared ownership. A key part of this shift involves clarifying how the Programme Office and its functions might evolve over time, and at what stage of development would these functions be appropriately handed over the line departments or will be no longer required.
Interviews with stakeholders undertaken for this chapter underscored that the Office was never intended to become a permanent unit. Its core purpose lies in shaping direction, aligning departments, and embedding long-term goals that can be progressively internalised by the system. Some of the policy and governance options outlined in this paper could contribute to lay the ground for this transition.
Over time, some functions may shift to line departments, while the Department of the Taoiseach retains a high-level strategic convening and oversight role. Transitioning in this way can reduce the risk of over-concentration at the centre, prevent mandate drift, and support the long-term institutionalisation of reform goals by building capabilities across government.
The analysis in this chapter points to two main areas where the Department of the Taoiseach could strengthen its approach to steering cross-cutting priorities. These are complemented by the online Annex which includes questions that can support better decision-making around cross-cutting policy priorities and practical solutions that are in use by other countries:
Clarify how the CoG adds value across the policy system. The Department of the Taoiseach could develop a more explicit approach to how it supports line departments on cross-cutting issues, by facilitating collaborative working practices, iterative performance routines, and shared learning. Further examinations of domestic and international experience, including through peer-to-peer exchanges, would offer useful reference points for what this facilitative role can look like in practice.
Develop structured transition strategies. To manage the risk of overextension and ensure that central engagement strengthens rather than supplants departmental capacity, the Department of the Taoiseach could develop clearer frameworks for transferring responsibilities back to line departments. These could include readiness assessments, handover criteria, and phased timelines, building on the experience of initiatives such as policing reform or international practice.
Strengthening the Child Poverty and Well-being Programme Office:
The Programme Office has made significant progress in establishing co‑ordination and visibility around child poverty. The following areas of development could deepen its strategic role and strengthen the capabilities needed for long-term impact:
Refining the cross-government network into a platform for alignment and collaborative problem‑solving, as well as shared learning.
Working together with the network’s participants to progressively embed milestones on child poverty into departmental planning.
Introducing thematic prioritisation to sharpen focus and resource allocation and enhancing budget co‑ordination to incentivise joint action, so the Office can further strengthen coherence across government while building the capabilities needed for long‑term impact, and ultimately for its own withdrawal.
Any enhancement of the capacity of the Programme Office will require situating its role within a broader strategic vision of the centre of government’s long‑term responsibilities for child poverty.
References
[18] Australian Government (2026), National Health Reform Agreement (NHRA), https://www.health.gov.au/our-work/national-health-reform-agreement-nhra.
[17] CNA (2022), “Goodhart’s Law: Recognizing and Mitigating Manipulation of Measures in Analysis”, https://www.cna.org/reports/2022/09/Goodharts-Law-Recognizing-Mitigating-Manipulation-Measures-in-Analysis.pdf.
[5] Davies, A. and P. Vági (2023), “The role and functions of the centre of government in the European Neighbourhood Policy East region”, SIGMA Papers, No. 67, OECD Publishing, Paris, https://doi.org/10.1787/9e1fc1fd-en.
[6] Evans, G., et al. (2010), Functional Review of the Centre of Government in Romania, World Bank, Washington, DC, https://documents.worldbank.org/en/publication/documents-reports/documentdetail/379311468106147470.
[10] Government of Canada (2026), “Major Projects Office”, https://www.canada.ca/en/privy-council/major-projects-office/our-priorities/projects-transformative-strategies.html (accessed on 11 June 2026).
[19] Government of Ireland (2026), “Child Poverty Target Indicators – Recent data, June 2026)”.
[20] Government of Ireland (2025), “Breaking the Cycle: New Measures in Budget 2025 to Address Child Poverty and Promote Well-being”, Department of the Taoiseach, Child Poverty and Well-being Programme Office, https://www.gov.ie/en/publication/e8315-budget-2025.
[3] Government of Ireland (2025), First Progress Report of the Child Poverty and Well-being Programme Office: Child Poverty and Well-being in Transition: Learning and Adapting to Accelerate Change in Children’s Lives, Department of the Taoiseach, Child Poverty and Well-being Programme Office, https://www.gov.ie/en/publication/871df-annual-summit/.
[16] Government of Ireland (2025), “Taoiseach Micheál Martin and Minister Dara Calleary publish the new National Child Poverty Target”, https://www.gov.ie/en/department-of-social-protection/press-releases/taoiseach-miche%c3%a1l-martin-and-minister-dara-calleary-.
[8] Government of Ireland (2025), Three pillars of policy development, https://www.gov.ie/en/department-of-the-taoiseach/publications/three-pillars-of-policy-development/.
[14] Government of Ireland (2023), A Policing Service for our Future: Implementing the Report of the Commission of Policing in Ireland, https://www.garda.ie/en/about-us/a-policing-service-for-the-future/implementation-plan.pdf.
[12] Government of New Zealand (2026), The Policy Project, Department of Prime Minister and Cabinet, https://www.dpmc.govt.nz/our-programmes/policy-project.
[9] Kattel, R. (2022), “Dynamic capabilities of the public sector: Towards a new synthesis”, IIPP Working Paper WP, No. 2022/07, UCL Institute for Innovation and Public Purpose, https://discovery.ucl.ac.uk/id/eprint/10196044/1/Kattel_kattel_dynamic_capabilities_of_the_public_sector_towards_a_new_synthesis.pdf.
[13] Kaur, M. et al. (2023), “Steering responses to climate change from the centre of government: A stocktaking”, OECD Working Papers on Public Governance, No. 65, OECD Publishing, Paris, https://doi.org/10.1787/b95c8396-en.
[23] National Audit Office (2023), Lessons Learned: Cross-Government Working, National Audit Office, https://www.nao.org.uk/wp-content/uploads/2023/07/012220-BOOK-Cross-government-working-Summary.pdf.
[11] National Audit Office, United Kingdom (2023), Cross-Government Working, https://www.nao.org.uk/wp-content/uploads/2023/07/GPG-cross-government-working.pdf.
[1] OECD (2024), Steering from the Centre of Government in Times of Complexity: Compendium of Practices, OECD Publishing, Paris, https://doi.org/10.1787/69b1f129-en.
[7] OECD (2023), Observatory of Public Sector Innovation, https://oecd-opsi.org/innovations/innosprint-a-design-sprint-for-the-public-sector/.
[2] OECD (2023), Strengthening Policy Development in the Public Sector in Ireland, OECD Public Governance Reviews, OECD Publishing, Paris, https://doi.org/10.1787/6724d155-en.
[4] OECD (2023), The Principles of Public Administration, OECD Publishing, Paris, https://doi.org/10.1787/7f5ec453-en.
[21] OECD (2019), OECD Good Practices for Performance Budgeting, OECD Publishing, Paris, https://doi.org/10.1787/c90b0305-en.
[15] OECD (2017), Systems Approaches to Public Sector Challenges: Working with Change, OECD Publishing, Paris, https://doi.org/10.1787/9789264279865-en.
[22] Office of the Auditor-General New Zealand (2025), Effectiveness of Arrangements for Reducing Child Poverty, Wellington, https://oag.parliament.nz/2025/child-poverty.