This chapter examines how centres of government can guide machinery of government reforms to better align administrative structures with complex, cross-cutting policy priorities, drawing on Estonia’s experience. It shows that while reorganisation, such as the creation of a new ministry and transfers of functions can strengthen alignment between political objectives and delivery structures, its effectiveness depends on having clear objectives, robust ex ante analysis, and strong central co‑ordination. The chapter highlights the potential transaction costs and risks associated with reorganisation along with its alternatives. It underscores, in particular, the important role of the centre in advising on options, assessing impacts, and bridging the political – administrative interface all the while ensuring that organisational reform supports, rather than hinders, policy delivery.
Building Centre of Government Capabilities to Steer and Deliver Complex Priorities
Abstract
In the context of an increasingly challenging global landscape, centres of government (CoGs) are being called upon to support the delivery of complex and cross-cutting issues which frequently transcend the traditional scope of policy area divisions and require co‑ordination and alignment across institutional and sectoral bounds. As a result of these complexities, governments are increasingly re‑examining their machinery of government with the view that mergers, abolitions and the creation of new ministries or agencies might help to support better delivery of government objectives. CoGs as the body or group of bodies advising and supporting the highest level of the executive branch of government and council of ministers, are often one of the first ports of call when the decision is taken to reorganise government around multi-faceted and complex policy areas.
This chapter focuses on ongoing machinery of government changes made in 2023 and 2024 in Estonia. The term machinery of government refers in this context to the ways in which the central government apparatus is structured to achieve government priorities and how these structures are altered (OECD, 2012[1]). Broadly, Machinery of Government (MoG) change includes:
The allocation of functions to and between ministries, agencies and other governmental organisations;
The creation of new ministries or other governmental organisations;
The amalgamation or abolition of existing ministries and other governmental organisations;
And the co‑ordination of the activities of ministries and other governmental organisations (OECD, 2012[1]).
The centre of government has a strategic role to play during any machinery change as it involves aligning civil service organisations with ministerial mandates and functions at the political/administrative interface. A strategic approach to machinery of government change ensures that the division of responsibilities is adequately underpinned by the requisite sets of competencies to deliver, including oversight, monitoring and evaluation, and co‑ordination.
In Estonia, a small state where coalition agreements are the norm, political trade‑offs engender new challenges for the CoG and the public administration as a whole to manage. One recent example of this was the emphasis on new policy priorities which resulted in substantial changes to the structure of line ministries and agencies in Estonia’s public service. While this restructuring can have positive impacts in terms of policy co‑ordination, as outlined below, trade‑offs need also to be understood and managed. The centre of government plays an essential role in steering these efforts but also in bridging the interface between the political requests for organisational change and administrative delivery.
2.2.1. Estonian governance structures
Source: Republic of Estonia (2026[2]), Government Office, https://www.riigikantselei.ee/en/organisation-news-and-contacts/government-office/about-government-office.
The Ministry of Finance (MoF) is headed by a dedicated Minister and currently employs a total of 260 staff members. The lead public servants in the MoF are the Secretary General (SG) of the MoF, and the Deputy Secretary Generals (DSG) who support the SG. All other Estonian line ministries follow the same basic structure, with the lead minister supported by a single SG and their respective DSG.
Within each line ministry, DSGs are respectively heads of individual departments. For example, within the MoF, there are three DSGs, responsible for the separate policy areas of Financial and Tax Policy, Fiscal Policy, and Public Governance Policy. Each of these policy areas are composed of multiple departments: for example, the Public Governance Policy area includes the Public Administration Department and the State Stakeholding and Public Procurement Department. There may be additional departments which are not directly organised under the umbrella of one policy area. Agencies which are independent or semi‑integrated into the public administration system such as the Estonian Accounting Standards Board or the State Shared Service Centre are also important actors in the system, although are not included in the official civil servant headcount.
Source: Republic of Estonia (2024[3]), “Introduction to the Ministry”, https://www.fin.ee/en/ministry-and-contacts/organization/introduction-ministry.
The Estonian public service is made up of approximately 2500 civil servants (as of October 2024). At present, six line ministries in Estonia co-locate, sharing a single workplace in the Joint Building of the Ministries. For these six – the Ministry of Finance, Ministry of Economic Affairs and Communications, Ministry of Justice and Digital Affairs, Ministry of Social Affairs, Ministry of Climate and the Ministry of Regional Affairs and Agriculture – collaboration across ministries is only a few floors away. However, there are some relatively concrete functional and administrative separations between line ministries.
One particularity is that each individual ministry is its own employer, and there is no centralised employer of the public service. In practice, this leads to differences in salary scales, and especially differences in operational matters such as annual leave or allowances and emoluments received in addition to salary. This may be a contributing factor to the strong attachment individual public servants in Estonia feel to their individual line ministry, rather than the public service as a whole. In Estonia, as in most OECD countries, internal mobility is possible for civil servants but not encouraged or recommended (Figure 2.3).
Source: OECD (2023[4]), Government at a Glance 2023: Estonia, https://www.oecd.org/content/dam/oecd/en/publications/reports/2023/06/government-at-a-glance-2023-country-notes_a95d10b5/estonia_6da66b3b/e1676b75-en.pdf.
Additionally, most line ministries have an individualised information technology (IT) system, referred to internally as an IT “house”. At an operational level each line ministry has their own functional system for IT administrative support and staffing structures, as well as differing document sharing and access protocols, differing email domains, and different records management and archiving processes.
It is important to note, as seen in Figure 2.1, that the CoG, in particular the Government Office, does not have a separate higher authority over the individual line ministries. All ministers (and their respective Secretary Generals (SGs)) are equal, with no additional hierarchy between the line ministries themselves. This is relevant to note in relation to the role of the Secretary of State, who does not exert any formal legal power over line ministries or SGs, and who is not allocated any significant “policy” portfolio (Riigikogu, 1996[5]). In some respects, the most important role the Secretary of State plays is therefore as an advisor and broker to the PM, with the majority of the position’s influence stemming from its proximity and ties to the PM’s office.
2.2.2. Structural changes in Estonia
In March 2023, Estonia re‑elected Prime Minister Kaja Kallas’ Reform Party with a parliamentary majority, winning 31.2% of the 101 seats in the Riigikogu (parliament). The prime minister brought in a new cabinet replacing the one that had been in place since the last parliamentary elections held in 2019. In July 2023, alongside the announcement of Kallas’ cabinet structure, several machinery of government changes were announced, including the creation of the new Climate Ministry. In this first round of changes, out of a total of 2 500 civil servants, 700 people (28%) were moved between all MoG changes. In 2024, Kallas was nominated to the European Commission, resulting in a cabinet change with Prime Minister Kristen Michal taking office and a new Cabinet structure announced. As a result of the cabinet changes, further machinery of government changes were announced, triggering a second round of restructuring (ERR News, 2024[6]). For ease of reference, in this chapter the 2023 round of MoG changes as a result of the parliamentary elections will be referred to as Round 1, and the 2024 round of MoG changes as a result of the cabinet shuffle as Round 2.
There are several distinct differences in the way that Round 1 and Round 2 were undertaken, resulting in different perceptions of the success in the changes. The differences relate to the scope of the changes, the perception of the decision-making process, and the role of the CoG and the GO specifically in guiding and communicating these changes.
One of the first significant structural reforms, undertaken during Round 1, was the creation of the Climate Ministry. Officially, the Climate Ministry was created in line with the Ministry of Environmental Affairs, which changed its nomenclature and received significant new policy areas under its portfolio. In its new form, it was established with clear objectives and a robust mandate to drive transformative change in this policy area in Estonia. The initiative aimed to elevate related issues to the forefront of the national agenda and further demonstrate the governments’ commitment to addressing this issue as a political priority. Since its inception, the Climate Ministry has demonstrated progress, most notably in the continued development of a new policy draft. The Ministry of Regional Affairs and Agriculture (MRAA) also underwent significant change during this round, as functions related to regional policy were moved into the MRAA. Approximately 100 new staff joined the ministry in Round 1, including as a result of the addition of the Spatial Planning Department from the Ministry of Finance. Throughout this process, the GO was heavily involved in the development of options for MoG changes and in co‑ordinating their implementation. The GO prepared several rounds of analysis of potential MoG changes at the request of the government, which were used to inform a final decision taken by the council of ministers.
Round 2 introduced a second series of changes across various government departments. These included the prominent transfer of the Digital Policy Department from the Ministry of Economic Affairs to the Ministry of Justice. There were also a number of smaller changes made, including moving the spatial planning department into the Ministry of Economic Affairs and Communications, marking the second time in two years this department was relocated. Unlike the first round of reforms, however, these changes were characterised by less clearly communicated objectives, leading to lower understanding within the civil service. Initiated in July 2024, the changes were implemented beginning on 1 January 2025. Throughout this process, the GO was minimally involved. The GO did not prepare any analysis for decision-makers prior to the decision, and was minimally involved in the roll-out process, having acted in some cases as a mediator or observer in negotiations between Secretaries General but without significant intervention.
2.3.1. Typology of reorganisations
There are a multitude of different ways in which line ministries and their subsequent departments, units, and agencies can be restructured. Box 2.1 provides examples from Ireland and Latvia. The most common are:
Mergers: ministry-level merging of entities or significant functions into a single new organisation
De‑mergers: ministry-level de‑merging of significant functions into their own entity
Start-up: creation of an entirely new ministry with new functional priorities
Acquisitions/transfers of functions: departmental level mergers and de‑mergers of functions
The primary models of restructuring carried out in the Round 1 and Round 2 changes were transfers of functions, where departmental and unit-level changes occurred to shift functions across and within line ministries. The creation of the Climate Ministry in 2023 was also an acquisition/transfer of functions as it also drew most of its component elements from other ministries to centralise a set of strategic priorities and capabilities into one entity.
There were three primary types of transfers of functions in Estonia within the two rounds of restructuring.
Source: Author’s own elaboration.
Each of these types of divisions has its own set of challenges attached. Those affected generally agreed that the least complex type of transfer was the moving of a whole division. In contrast, partial divisions were reported to be more complex and challenging to manage. This is primarily due to the lack of clarity of what specific functions and competencies were to be moved, and how they were to be integrated into the receiving ministry’s structure and systems. In all cases, for civil servants having experienced both the departure and the acquisition of new departments, the acquisition of new functions was experienced as the significantly more challenging scenario.
Reconfiguration of functions within the justice sector in Ireland
The Programme for Government 2025 stated that 'Government departments will be reconfigured, as agreed by the party leaders, to ensure greater policy coherence, programme implementation and a fair division of labour and responsibilities'. As a result, there were several significant transfer of functions including: (1) the transfer of responsibility for international protection accommodation and integration to the Department of Justice, which was redesignated as the Department of Justice, Home Affairs and Migration; (2) the bringing of the National Centre for Cyber Security and the National Security Authority under the remit of the Department of Justice, Home Affairs and Migration to ensure proper alignment of national security infrastructure. Previously it had operated under the ambit of the Department of Communications; (3) transfer responsibility for property services and estate agents to the Department of Housing and censorship to the Department of Communications, Culture and Sport; and (4) responsibility for tourism matters were transferred to the restructured Department of Enterprise, Tourism and Employment. Lessons learned from this change included the need to focus on the possible change as soon as it was highlighted as part of the programme of government and early preparation was key. This allowed support systems and mechanisms to be in place to ensure the machinery of government change was undertaken smoothly.
Reunification of the Chancellery and the Cross-sectoral Co-ordination centre in Latvia
In Latvia, the State Chancellery, and the Cross-sectoral Co-ordination centre (PKC) which were separate institutional structures at the Centre of Government since 2011, have established close functional links, support and co-ordinating procedures and share the same offices.
Nevertheless, as of 2023 the two structures were merged into one under the authority of the Prime Minister, in view of strengthening national development planning and co-ordination, improving oversight of government programme implementation, reducing fragmentation and overlaps in public administration, strengthening the centre of government and improving international co-operation, considering the lessons learned from managing the financial sector reforms, COVID-19 pandemic and other major policy challenges.
The merger aimed to improve the effectiveness and efficiency by delivering “professional, competent and compact public administration proofed for addressing todays and future challenges” with a strong lead from the centre of government. Essentially, a single structure at the centre of government was deemed to provide less fragmentation and better steer than two separate ones, even while functionally close.
Sources: Government of Ireland (2025[7]), Programme for Government 2025 - Securing Ireland's Future, Department of the Taoiseach, https://www.gov.ie/en/department-of-the-taoiseach/publications/programme-for-government-2025-securing-irelands-future/; OECD (2024[8]), OECD Public Governance Reviews: Uzbekistan: Towards a More Modern, Effective and Strategic Public Administration, https://doi.org/10.1787/2f36d8ec-en.
2.3.2. Challenges in restructuring government from the perspective of the CoG
There were a number of significant consequences for the ability of the public administration to deliver sound restructuring plans. Some normal work processes were halted during the reorganisation, and support systems (e.g. HR, IT, and Finance) were significantly challenged (Government of Estonia, 2024[9]). OECD analysis and interviews with senior civil servants from multiple line ministries undertaken for this chapter surfaced the following set of challenges resulting from the two sets of reorganisations.
Administrative burdens
The operational implications of moving hundreds of people between employers at once are significant for the administrative support apparatus of each line ministry. Each line ministry is characterised by a number of differences in terms of human resource management, IT structures, financial structures, and strategic planning. For example, differences in salary allowances, email domains, and the allocation of administrative support staff across line ministries creates a difficult environment for change. Making support services work is a particularly important area of focus and which CoGs, from their central position, can support through guidance and other tools.
IT support is managed differently by each line ministry. Each IT house has unique functions and features and is adapted to the needs of the ministry it serves. However, when moving across ministries, losing access – even temporarily – to critical business information stored in one IT structure makes the continuation of work difficult.
Ratios for support staff versus policy-oriented staff can be quite different across line ministries, creating a challenging starting point for negotiations. Practicalities such as the number of support staff who should move along with their colleagues becomes complex when the operational realities of dividing employees’ time comes into play. The lack of common administrative standards and co‑ordination between each line ministry creates general uncertainty, requiring ministries to negotiate transfers on a case‑by-case basis, typically through their Secretaries General.
Employee stress
Despite high levels of engagement and efforts from senior management to effectively guide the civil service through the period of change, there were indications that the changes resulted in lower engagement, lowered productivity, and retention issues. Government surveys showed that Estonian civil servants tended to feel stronger commitment and loyalty to their line ministry, rather than to the Estonian public administration as a whole. Reports from senior human resources officials indicated that some impacted staff sought out positions in other units that would remain in the original ministry in order to keep to their current line ministry, if not in their current unit. Turnover rates as a result of Round 1 were estimated at between 5-10% (Government of Estonia, 2024[9]). The unit expected to transfer therefore experienced the loss of staff with established competencies in the relevant policy area, as well as institutional memory, creating a compounding effect and extending the time for the transferring unit to become productive and deliver on policy outcomes in the new line ministry.
It was also indicated that units who were transferred in both Round 1 and Round 2, i.e. twice in two years, experienced lower satisfaction in their jobs. Approximately half of employees who were affected by Round 1 reported they did not feel that they had fully adapted to the restructuring one year later (Government of Estonia, 2024[9]). 60% of those surveyed as part of the internal analysis of Round 1 reported that the reorganisation lowered their motivation to work in the public sector, and at the managerial level increased stress and rates of burnout were reported (Government of Estonia, 2024[9]).
Agencies which respond to the line ministry are also affected as their leadership and direction may move between ministries. In one instance, the creation of a new agency was completely halted and restarted in a new ministry due to the removal of some functions related to the agency.
Cultural differences in the workplace between ministries
MoG changes are often done to facilitate joined-up policy development and service delivery, however doing so requires more than moving organisational pieces around (Figure 2.4). It requires significant leadership and management investment in aligning working cultures and processes to generate genuine collaboration. In Estonia, staff reported that ways of working are in practice quite different between ministries, suggesting the need for careful employee integration to reap the benefits of reorganisations. Senior civil servants interviewed for this chapter indicated that from the changes in Round 1, it took one full year to feel that the workplace culture was fully integrated and productive. Issues relating to feelings of belonging, identities, and working cultures were reported by staff and present challenges to integrating organisations (Government of Estonia, 2024[9]).
Note: n=6, Estonia, Greece, Poland, Portugal, Slovak Republic, United Kingdom.
Source: OECD, Machinery of Government changes, unpublished.
Communication challenges within the administration and between the political and technical levels of government
Concerted efforts were made to enhance communication across the administration. One positive development that was highlighted in the interviews for this chapter was bringing multiple line ministries together within one single building complex, reducing physical barriers to collaboration. Despite the challenges of separate IT systems, the majority of internal calendars were shared, allowing for simplified scheduling. And relationships between Secretaries Generals were reported to be strong and positive, with strong informal communication networks and working relationships across ministries. However, different levels of management had to decipher and communicate the purposes of the changes independently. Unified messaging did not adequately pass below the most senior levels of management, and independent interpretations created uncertainty (Government of Estonia, 2024[9]).
Communication between the political layer of government and the administration also presented a challenge. When fully enabled, the CoG through the GO could support with the communication of the vision, goals, and plan of the political side to the administration, and conversely, could convey ideas, analysis, and concerns of the administration to the political decision makers to improve the design of MoG changes. In Round 1, the GO provided analytical support to the political levels of government, however in Round 2 it played a much smaller role. The lack of adequate communication between the political and administrative actors influenced not only the operational-level guidance the administration received, it also negatively influenced the perception of the MoG changes and potentially led to other employee stress issues as outlined above which can be detrimental to productivity and delivery of policy outcomes. On the other hand, when the CoG took a significant and concrete role in advising decision-makers, they were better placed to oversee change management processes which improved overall productivity and effectiveness.
2.3.3. Alternative models to reorganisations
MoG changes can enable a better alignment of ministerial priorities and the administrative structures that deliver them. These transfers, however, can also result in significant disruption of day-to-day work and, in the short term, reduced productivity. This section explores alternative arrangements that could be considered to achieve similar objectives and the role of the centre of government. The six countries examined in this report highlighted a number of alternatives to fully fledged machinery of government change (Figure 2.5). In defining a specific goal for the MoG changes, the CoG can be tasked with assessing different options to advise decision makers on the best approach to achieve their aims. While there are many possibilities for MoG changes, the four outlined below were highlighted by stakeholders in Estonia as being potentially the most fitting alternative options based on precedent and existing civil service structural considerations.
Note: n=6, Estonia, Greece, Poland, Portugal, Slovak Republic, United Kingdom.
Source: OECD, Machinery of Government changes, unpublished.
Multiple ministers within one ministry
One common approach to aligning ministerial roles without changing ministry structures is to have multiple ministers within one (usually large) ministry. In this scenario, the MoG restructuring is avoided by instead only carving up responsibilities within one existing ministry. This can be used to raise the profile of certain activities within one ministry and to balance ministerial portfolios across coalition partners. Given legislation which sets a maximum of 15 ministers in Estonia, there is already experience designating multiple ministers for a single ministry. This is a common arrangement in many countries, especially those which have a significant number of ministerial positions, as in Canada (Box 2.2).
Global Affairs Canada
The Canadian foreign affairs ministry, Global Affairs Canada, is under the shared leadership of three ministers. They are the Minister of Foreign Affairs, the Minister of Export Promotion, International Trade and Economic Development, and the Minister of International Development. While each minister is responsible for their individual portfolios of issues, they also work collaboratively to advance a whole‑of-government approach to Canadian foreign policy.
Source: Government of Canada (2026[10]), Ministers, Secretary of State and parliamentary secretaries: Global Affairs Canada, https://www.international.gc.ca/global-affairs-affaires-mondiales/corporate-ministere/organizational-organisationnelle/index.aspx?lang=eng.
In this case, however, the Secretary Generals may find themselves in the difficult position of responding to two Ministers with differing sets of priorities. One method which has been used to address this issue is the Finnish solution of “political State Secretaries” (Box 2.3). Estonian ministers may have political advisors, with functions and subordination to be determined directly by the relevant minister. While there is a unique context in Estonia given the small number of political civil servants, this arrangement could help reduce friction and better co‑ordinate the roles of multiple ministers within one line ministry.
In 2004, Finland enacted legislative changes enabling ministries to appoint political State Secretaries to support ministers. Previously, these roles were strictly non-political, except in the Prime Minister’s Office. This reform addressed challenges arising in ministries with multiple ministers, particularly where responsibilities were divided between ministers from different political parties.
The introduction of political State Secretaries aimed to enhance political steering capabilities while maintaining a professional and impartial civil service. By attaching political State Secretaries directly to individual ministers, the reform ensured tailored advisory support, reducing the strain on civil servant State Secretaries (or Secretary Generals), who often had to navigate the demands of multiple ministers within the same ministry.
Political State Secretaries focus on advancing the government programme, supporting ministerial leadership, and representing the minister in selected contexts, including for example EU and international engagements. Crucially, they are not involved in cabinet or parliamentary proceedings, preserving the minister’s direct accountability. Meanwhile, civil servant State Secretaries retain their mandate to ensure administrative effectiveness and inter-ministerial co‑ordination.
Source: OECD (2015[11]), Building on Basics, Value for Money in Government, https://doi.org/10.1787/9789264235052-en.
Minister with no designated ministry (Minister without portfolio)
A minister “without portfolio” is an appointed minister without a designated department/line ministry of which they are the head. This arrangement can allow governments to respond flexibly to political priorities, enabling ministers to focus on specific tasks or oversee cross-cutting initiatives without the constraints of managing a full administrative structure. A minister without portfolio may be appointed for example to work on a specific pressing political priority for which there is no existing corresponding structure. These ministers often work in conjunction with task forces, working groups, or other horizontal inter-governmental arrangements to address emerging challenges. Such roles are also common in coalition governments, where they help distribute responsibilities among coalition partners. Examples from other countries, such as France’s “secretary of state” positions or the junior minister roles in Canada and the United Kingdom, demonstrate how similar positions can enhance government capacity and responsiveness (Box 2.4). There is precedent for this model in Estonia, as between 2003-2014 the Government of the Republic Act allowed for the appointment of a position titled Deputy Minister, which had a similar mandate and function until the notion was subsumed by the concept of Minister without portfolio (Riigikogu, 1996[5]).
Secretaries of State in France
In France, the position of Secretary of State is often used for ministers without portfolio. They are appointed to oversee specific issues or sectors but do not manage a full ministry. They report directly to the relevant minister, offering flexibility to address urgent or specialised policy areas. For example, in 2024, the Secretary of State for Artificial Intelligence and Digital Affairs (Ministre délégué chargé de l'Intelligence artificielle et du Numérique) focuses on France’s digital transformation while responding closely with the Ministry for Higher Education and Research (Ministre de l'Enseignement supérieur et de la Recherche) but does not lead a separate ministry.
Three levels of support in the United Kingdom
In the United Kingdom, three levels exist to support Cabinet (the most senior) Ministers. Ministers of State are the direct support to Cabinet Ministers while Parliamentary Under Secretaries of State/Parliamentary Secretaries in turn support the Ministers of State. For instance, the Minister for Education in the United Kingdom may have a junior minister responsible for specific sectors, such as further education or special educational needs, without managing a full department. These roles help streamline government operations by allowing ministers to delegate specific responsibilities while maintaining overall departmental cohesion.
Sources: Devine, D. et al. (2019[12]), Government ministers - Institute for Government, https://www.instituteforgovernment.org.uk/explainer/government-ministers; Government of France (2024[13]) Composition du Gouvernement, https://www.info.gouv.fr/composition-du-gouvernement.
This approach is particularly well-suited to Estonia, given its history of using ministers without portfolio effectively in coalition governments. Estonia’s relatively small government structure makes this a pragmatic option for addressing specific policy priorities or co‑ordinating complex, multi-sectoral initiatives. By enabling ministers to focus on strategic tasks without the need for a full ministry, this model can enhance agility in governance. Furthermore, it provides a mechanism to involve smaller coalition partners in decision making, fostering collaboration while maintaining a streamlined government. This type of arrangement and the significant precedent for its use in Estonia also serve to further suggest that Ministers can effectively carry out a political mandate without a designated line ministry/structure.
Similarly, mission-oriented approaches can be used as a tool in ensuring a focus on cross-cutting policy areas without resorting to extensive machinery changes (see Box 2.5).
Mission-oriented approaches can replace traditional interventions with time-bound, and measurable objectives to address complex, “wicked” societal challenges. Clear narratives and explicit theories of change signal long-term stability, which can help attract private capital and align disparate public policy tools. These approaches bridge the gap between high-level political ambition and operational execution by blending technological, behavioural, and organisational innovations to prevent policy fragmentation.
When governed from the centre of government, missions can support collaborative, solution-oriented routines across traditional ministerial silos, driving institutional renewal and building public sector dynamic capabilities. This top-down administrative wiring shifts the state's role from merely fixing market failures to actively co-creating and shaping new markets. High-level institutionalisation, seen in France, Japan, Korea ensures that central bodies continually audit cross-departmental interventions to prevent strategic mission drift.
Sources: OECD (2026[14]), Forging New Frontiers in Mission-Oriented Innovation Policies, https://doi.org/10.1787/d13d0142-en; OECD (2025[15]), Harnessing Mission Governance to Achieve National Climate Targets, https://doi.org/10.1787/781146eb-en; OECD (2024[16]), Designing Effective Governance to Enable Mission Success, https://doi.org/10.1787/898bca89-en.
Taskforces, working groups, and other common intergovernmental approaches
OECD findings show that the three co‑ordination mechanisms CoGs most frequently used are interdepartmental taskforces, expert groups and advisory groups (OECD, 2024[17]) Permanent or temporary taskforces or working groups typically consist of representatives who meet to co‑ordinate and align on policy issues and can be a useful way to drive enhanced collaborative approaches to cross-cutting issues. A second strong option would be the Thematic Government Cabinet Meetings, which were created to respond to the COVID‑19 crisis. The Thematic Cabinet Meetings allow for deliberations on a specific topic in a focused and dedicated session from a whole of government perspective, as they mandate the presence of the full Cabinet. On the other hand, government committees do not require the full Cabinet and do not always include the PM. Thematic Cabinet Meetings are ongoing on the topics of security and economy respectively. A similar model for levels of horizontal working arrangements exists in Finland. Vertical co‑ordination beyond the ministerial level is equally as important as horizontal co‑ordination, as the Austrian example of the Conference of General Secretaries also demonstrates (Box 2.6). Another model includes bringing a cross-cutting policy area such as Child Poverty and Well-being (see Ireland chapter) into the centre of government to help foster coherence without undertaking full machinery of government change.
The Conference of General Secretaries in Austria
In response to a constantly changing environment, the Austrian Government established the practice of the Conference of General Secretaries. Introduced in 2018, the conference brings together high-ranking officials from various federal ministries. It aims to address common challenges, share best practices and co‑ordinate administrative policies across different policy areas.
The conference entails systematic preparation and monitoring of joint or overarching tasks and projects of federal ministries on presidential and cross-sectional matters, as well as on government programme issues. Such assignments and projects can also be assigned to the Conference of General Secretaries by resolution of the government as regards preparation, monitoring of implementation and monitoring of cross-government priorities.
Governance arrangements and mechanisms for inter-ministerial co‑ordination in Finland
Finland has established a number of co‑ordination mechanisms to support strategy and decision making supported by the CoG, particularly the government Strategic Department. They bring together different line ministries and are usually shared by one or two lead ministries, depending on the topic. Finland has created:
Four permanent Ministerial Committees on Finance, Economic Policy, European Union (EU) Affairs and Foreign and Security Policy that play a key role in co‑ordinating government policies.
Thematic working groups focusing on a few government priorities (e.g. the Ministerial Working Group on Developing the Digital Transformation, the Data Economy and Public Administration) that help steer, monitor and implement those priorities.
Functional working groups on research and foresight.
Sources: OECD (2024[18]), Building capacity for evidence-informed policymaking in Latvia: Assessment and recommendations roadmap, https://doi.org/10.1787/2b43bc19-en; Government of Finland (2023[19]), Ministerial Committees and Working Groups, https://valtioneuvosto.fi/en/governments/ministerial-committees-and-ministerial-working-groups.
Ministers with multiple/shared ministries
An additional, less common scenario exists where ministers work across multiple line ministries. For example, one minister could be responsible for Justice and Digital while leaving the Digital function in the Ministry of Economy. In practice, in Estonia this happened for a number of months in 2024 in order to continue functions in the interim period, as the actual transfers of functions announced in Round 2 of the MoG changes took place on 1 January 2025. With that precedent in mind, decision makers could take into consideration the possibility of simply reshuffling the portfolio of the minister(s) in question without necessarily restructuring the line ministry itself.
Under this scenario, there is an additional burden placed on the affected Secretary General, who is now in the position of responding to more than one minister. However, this would eliminate the significant other externalities and negative effects on productivity which might be caused by a full restructuring.
2.3.4. Decisions on what MoG changes are appropriate
Machinery of government changes are most effective when they are made with the intention of achieving a particular policy objective, which usually involves bringing previously separate parts of ministries together to work more closely and achieve a joined-up outcome. This was the case in the creation of the Ministry of Climate and the Ministry of Regional Affairs and Agriculture. The nature of the policy objectives being sought can influence the design of the reform – and point the government to an optimal solution. In many cases, that optimal solution may not require ministerial restructuring, but rather another form of less disruptive and costly cross-agency activity – ministerial restructuring being held as a last-resort measure. A framework developed by the OECD (Table 2.2) can help guide governments through a process to design more optimal solutions for working across existing agencies (Gerson, 2023[20]).
This chapter puts forward three questions that can be considered in defining the best approach:
What kind of result is the initiative intended to achieve?
What is the expected timing of the results (urgent, short-term long lasting)?
How complex are the results?
The type of results the MoG changes in Estonia in both Round 1 and 2, are intended to achieve are what can be considered “policy-driven” initiatives. In other words, the aim of the reorganisation was to achieve better prioritisation to address complex, multidimensional problems of national scope. Other kinds of objectives could include improving administrative processes (e.g. the creation of shared service centres), or to improve service delivery for a specific community (e.g. creating one‑stop shops for government services).
Setting out the specific time profile of the intended results can help decision makers identify if for example shorter, intense but temporary models will be effective, or if a longer-term result is intended, requiring a structure that can be sustained over time and adjust to changing circumstances. This is important given that ministerial restructuring takes time to implement, and experts generally agree that benefits take 2-3 years to materialise (White and Dunleavy, 2010[21]). Hence, these kinds of changes are only suitable to initiatives that are not of immediate urgency, and that have long-term permanent objectives.
The complexity of the objectives can also help determine the optimal model for results. Relatively simple objectives in a fairly stable operational environment may require a model focused on top-down information sharing, standardisation, control, and risk management – this may be the case in some internal reform implementation processes. In the case of more complex objectives, models may need to enable bottom-up information sharing, experimentation, innovation, learning and adaptation (Gerson, 2023[20]).
Additional factors that can help to determine the right model include the nature of agencies that are involved, and the government systems. When there are a high number of agencies involved, it will be harder to ensure long-term commitment to working together. The relationship between those agencies is also a factor – whether it is hierarchical or not, and the degree to which agencies trust each other. Governments systems determine various factors related to e.g. level of formality and legality needed, dynamics of coalitions vs. single‑party governance, and others.
Source: Gerson, D. (2023[20]), A framework for working effectively across public agencies, https://doi.org/10.1787/c6b0d3a7-en.
The more intensive the changes envisioned are, the higher transaction and co‑ordination costs they will engender. In other words, the more agencies are required to deviate from their usual processes, the more costs will rise. The most effective model will therefore be the one that reduces the intensity of change to the minimal level needed to achieve the desired result (Gerson, 2023[20]). The below decision chart can be used to ascertain the necessity of a more intensive approach.
Source: Gerson D. (2023[20]), A framework for working effectively across public agencies, https://doi.org/10.1787/c6b0d3a7-en.
CoGs can support decision makers by providing data and analysis around alternative models of organisational restructuring. In most cases they tend to be cheaper, faster, and more adaptable, and hence preferable if they can achieve the desired result. It is important to note that initiatives can pass through different kinds of approaches at different phases of their development – often beginning with collaboration in design phase, moving to co‑ordination for implementation, and perhaps co‑operation for reporting. Organisational restructuring is not nearly as adaptable – it is very costly and disruptive to put in place, and even more so to undo.
The below table provides an illustration of the types of questions that could be asked by the centre of government prior to a machinery change (White, A. and Dunleavy P, 2010) to further probe the necessity of such restructuring in Estonia’s context, if that is the decision on the table.
Source: White, A., & Dunleavy, P. (2010[21]), Making and Breaking Whitehall Departments: A guide to machinery of government changes, https://researchonline.lse.ac.uk/id/eprint/27949/1/Making_and_breaking_Whitehall_departments_%28LSERO%29.pdf.
2.3.5. Understanding the role of the CoG in changing the machinery
When considering MoG changes, decision makers and senior leadership of the public administration can work together to envisage the changes with a view to ensuring the effectiveness and the delivery of better policy outcomes. Three key enablers can be used to enhance the changes: defining a role for the CoG in guiding machinery change, setting frameworks to standardise restructuring processes, and strengthening change leadership and communication.
As the support structure for the highest-level forum of decision makers, CoGs are highly involved in fostering quality decision- making processes (OECD, 2018[22]). OECD findings show that a top priority for COGs (73% of the 26 CoGs surveyed) is providing policy advice to help decision makers debate policy options based on data and analysis and impact (OECD, 2024[17]). Most CoGs have a wide range of practices which compose this function, including agenda setting, managing the preparation, and follow-up of the work of the executive branch. Although MoG changes are most often a political decision, most CoGs are responsible for providing advice to the head of government on any such proposed machinery of government changes and, if required, preparing documentation necessary to give effect to the change.
Providing options with analysis for consideration is a key enabler for effective MoG change
The CoG can further enhance the delivery of MoG changes through its role as a bridge at the interface of the political and administrative spheres of government (OECD, 2024[17]). Particularly given the unique context of the very small proportion of Estonian civil servants who are political appointees – only 35 out of the civil service of 2500 – the GO can play an enhanced role in maintaining strong and trusted relationships between the political and the administrative levels of government. Through the role of the Secretary of State as the head of the public service and with the responsibility to observe and participate in Cabinet meetings, the GO is well placed to proactively communicate analysis and advice regarding MoG changes under consideration by a new government. By providing data-based analysis on such changes, based on previous experiences, early in the transition process, the GO can enhance its effectiveness in guiding new political leadership through potential MoG changes.
The centre of government’s capacities to synthesise data and develop strategic insights from their unique position between the political and administrative, as well as their technical expertise on relevant policy areas, makes it well positioned to support decision makers considering MoG changes. The centre of government in Estonia can further emphasise the value that the CoG has to offer decision makers in this context by requiring the development of analysis presenting multiple options for achieving joined-up results, including reorganisations, and their potential impacts prior to the confirmation of MoG changes. The GO would benefit from the development of methodologies that would help to quickly assess the impacts, costs, time requirements, and other factors of proposed changes, as well as alternative arrangement based on institutional memory or what has worked in the past.
Taking such an approach has the potential to improve the design of MoG changes, reduce their frequency if policymakers find less disruptive solutions to achieve their objectives, and improve the legitimacy and acceptance of the changes within the public administration and among those who are called on to implement them. In the first round of MoG changes undertaken in Estonia in 2023, the GO provided analysis to the incoming cabinet regarding potential options and impacts for reorganising line ministries and implicated agencies. In Round 2, this analytical capacity was not utilised to its full potential, as the GO was not asked to provide analysis to decision makers as negotiations took place behind closed doors. This may be a contributing factor to the often-expressed lack of understanding of the rationale and necessity of the second round compared to the first.
Providing comprehensive and relevant technical analysis to support implementation
The Ministry of Finance (MoF) houses some of the more significant administrative and human resources functions in the CoG system of Estonia. Together with the GO, the MoF would benefit from collaboratively developing a framework for analysis of future MoG proposals. A recommended approach would be to conduct a quantitative internal impact assessment of the previous machinery changes in the Round 1 and Round 2 reorganisations, similarly to the analysis undertaken previously but on a larger scale. This evaluation could quantify changes which have been reported informally throughout the process of this report, such as changes in employee morale, attrition rates, and resourcing costs. A clear, centralised, and data-focused report gathering evidence on the costs of restructuring could be a significant basis for improved decision-making processes for future reorganisations. By leveraging this data, the government would also be able to project more realistic timeframes for achieving policy objectives, while ensuring that future reorganisations are informed by data-based insights and aligned with long-term strategic goals. Housing this impact assessment within the CoG implies a co‑ordination role, however the primary data should be sourced from the affected departments and units.
Setting common frameworks and standards to facilitate MoG changes
Frameworks and standards play a crucial role in MoG changes as do good knowledge management practices. They help to reduce uncertainty and, hence, the space for negotiation on thorny issues such as budget transfers and support staff. By setting clear standards, methodologies and criteria, the CoG can help to ensure that all parties involved in the changes are heard from, and that processes are transparent, consistent and fair. This can help to speed up implementation by reducing the time needed to negotiate each element of the transfer – which was mostly done by Secretaries General themselves. Setting common standards through the CoG for the concrete, operational methodology of MoG changes can enable smoother and more effective change processes, as well as allow for enhanced analysis and foresight of envisioned changes ahead of time. The governments of Australia and the United Kingdom (Box 2.7) have established a set framework for calculating resource division between affected agencies, which is often a significant point of contention in MoG changes. By establishing a similar framework and set of guidelines, Estonia could avoid the lengthy case‑by-case negotiation process between Secretaries General in the event of change and centralise the methodology.
Australian Public Service, Australia
The APS Change Framework, developed by the APS Change Management Centre of Excellence within the Department of Home Affairs, is an enterprise change management framework tailored specifically for the APS. Created with input from stakeholders across the APS, the Framework supports, enterprise‑wide change by providing guidance, tools, and templates for practitioners at all levels of expertise. Supporting resources and advisory services are available from the APS Change Management Centre of Excellence to assist organisations in adopting and applying the Framework effectively. The Framework is flexible and adaptable to changes of any scale or complexity and helps organisations navigate four key stages:
1. Understanding the change
2. Assessing impacts and stakeholders
3. Managing implementation
4. Embedding the change so the objectives are met for the organisation
Cabinet Office, United Kingdom
The Cabinet Office has also developed a guide to MoG changes, intended for those leading MoG change. It also establishes key principles and identifies key contacts to obtain more practical and operational guidance. The guide suggests a phased approach:
1. Phase 1: “Preparation,” focusing on appointing key roles, planning, and initial communication
2. Phase 2: “Hitting the ground running,” involves developing a detailed blueprint including building a transition team for the first 100 days to ensure business continuity and effective communication.
3. Phase 3: “Implementation,” emphasises stabilising the affected organisations, ensuring staff involvement, and evaluating the successes of the MoG changes.
The guide also includes advice and analysis of previous MoG changes, and guidance on legal instruments, financial transfers, and resource management.
Sources: Government of Australia (2024[23]), APS Change Framework, https://www.apsacademy.gov.au/resources/aps-change-framework. Government of the United Kingdom (2016[24]), Machinery of Government Guidance, https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/media/5a81a03aed915d74e6233465/2016_07_29_machinery_of_government_guidance.pdf.
The setting of common standards and frameworks across government can enable more joined-up, effective work. In particular, two administrative separations were highlighted during interviews for this chapter as creating a challenge for MoG changes: separate IT houses, and separate employers. Although the issue is complex, shared IT services throughout all line ministries and agencies would significantly simplify not only MoG changes but also potentially improve whole‑of-government policy action and co‑ordination as a whole in the long term. This would enable in Estonia shared standards for records management and digital archiving, which could enhance institutional memory and co‑ordinated action. Finally, the creation of a centralised state employer or a shared employment framework across ministries would also benefit Estonia by simplifying administrative difficulties of standardising allowances, benefits, and leave during MoG changes. It could potentially also aid in levelling the playing field in terms of perceived attractiveness of individual line ministries, as well as contribute to an overall sense of a more cohesive public service model.
Using the CoG to bridge the political-administrative interface
Machinery of government change is driven often by political considerations including placing political emphasis on a specific policy area (for instance the Energy, Sec and Net Zero reorganisation in the United Kingdom) or a reality such as Brexit which led to the Department of Exiting the EU also providing a signal to the public that the government was focused on ‘Getting Brexit done’.
Effective leadership from decision makers and from the highest levels of the public service is crucial to manage MoG changes and ensure their success. A clear vision and mandate from political leaders can enable the public administration to deliver on stated aims. Translating vision and priorities into co‑ordinated action benefits from a co‑ordinated approach across the government and planning of the necessary resources to deliver on the priorities (OECD, 2024[17]). On 12 August 2024, the Prime Minister of Estonia, Kristen Michal released an address titled “Ministerial competences in the management of the ministry and ministerial responsibilities,” announcing the upcoming transfers of functions (Government of Estonia, 2024[25]). However, interviews undertaken for this chapter surfaced that some senior leaders of the public administration were made aware of the Round 2 changes through the media, rather than internally by the administration. Changes such as these should ideally be communicated directly from senior leadership as soon as possible. Public announcements of the changes can also be enhanced by developing a more targeted communications framework which would further clarify divisions of responsibility, as in Australia and Canada (Box 2.8).
Australia
In Australia, Charter letters are provided to ministers to set out expectations in any machinery of government change. When responsibilities move between portfolios via an Administrative Arrangements Order (AAO), a new or amended charter letter is often issued to line ministries to communicate the updated expectations. They are therefore an important communication mechanism for making MoG changes operationally meaningful at the ministerial level. Charter letters at the state level have been made public in some instances- for instance in Queensland where in 2024, they set out values, deliverables, goals and KPIs that were expected to outline government accountability.
Canada
Mandate letters in Canada serve as a valuable governance tool for establishing clear policy objectives and driving change. These documents are issued by the Prime Minister to ministers and outline specific priorities and responsibilities, ensuring alignment with the government’s overarching agenda. By explicitly communicating expectations, mandate letters enhance transparency and accountability, both within the government and to the public. The current government has provided a single‑mission mandate letter, with cabinet ministers responsible for returning proposals that will realise the vision set by the CoG. This approach can help to enhance the communication of strategic priorities to the broader public administration, focusing all policy areas of the government on a handful of goals. This tool not only supports policy coherence but also helps build public trust by offering a clear roadmap for the objective of the government.
Sources: Queensland Government (2024[26]), Our priorities - Right to Information - Department of the Premier and Cabinet, https://www.premiers.qld.gov.au/right-to-info/published-info/our-priorities;); Government of Canada (2025[27]), Mandate Letter, https://www.pm.gc.ca/en/mandate-letters/2025/05/21/mandate-letter; Government of Canada (2023[28]), The Mandate Letter Tracker and the Results and Delivery approach, https://www.canada.ca/en/privy-council/services/results-delivery-unit.html.
Setting clear standards and expectations for change leadership and management
Change management is challenging for even the most seasoned leaders, especially in government settings where regulations, hierarchy and general risk aversion tend to slow change processes and reduce the scope of action. Governments across the OECD are increasingly examining how to take a more sophisticated and institutional approach to change‑management issues and strategies. Governments have begun to move away from top-down change‑management processes to encompass a broader view of change which involves integrating bottom-up and top-down activities, including systematic problem identification, ideas generation, filtering of alternative solutions and their implementation (OECD, 2020[29]). The CoG can be an essential vehicle for enhanced change management processes through the setting of frameworks, standards, and the issuing of guidance, as is done in Australia (Box 2.7) and the European Union (Box 2.9).
The European Commission’s Centre for Organisational Transformation (CfOT) is another example of central support to reorganisations. It sits within the Secretariat-General. It was created to tackle the mismatch between traditional organisational structures and the complex, interconnected crises and challenges facing societies today. It aimed to support organisations to achieve their objectives and adopt participatory leadership methods. More specifically, it provides:
1. Consultancy, strategic advice, and support on transformation processes and collaboration
2. Capacity building, helping colleagues embrace more collaborative and flexible ways of working
3. Co‑ordination of the Collaboration Hub, a community of practice for organisational transformation
4. Scientific advice on knowledge sharing, collaboration, and new ways of working
5. Strategic partnerships with external organisations. It is intended to support the Commission modernise how it works shifting away from top-down hierarchies toward more participatory, flexible, and sustainable ways of organising work.
Source: European Commission (2025[30]), About the Centre for Organisational Transformation, https://knowledge4policy.ec.europa.eu/node/82247_pl
While MoG changes tend to focus on structural and technical issues, the human factors should be at the heart of any change management strategy. Civil servants impacted by such changes often experience high levels of stress and anxiety due to uncertainty and fear of unknown. This can have significant impacts on their mental health, potentially resulting in retention challenges, ultimately and reducing overall productivity. The key to effective change management is communication – both related to the purpose of the change and process to expect – and individualised attention and support from line management, senior management and beyond. All people managers should be expected to undergo training on change management, emotional intelligence, and psychological safety, so as to foster an environment within which change processes contribute to productivity rather than the opposite. Employees should also have access to information resources, including online websites, townhall meetings, available advisors in HR departments and others. This kind of approach can be standardised and put into place whenever an MoG change is required. It would also benefit from being evaluated after every change to identify opportunities for improvement in the next process.
Setting effective timelines
MoG changes should clearly set out expected results and be accompanied by a realistic timeline for achievement. The CoG can play a larger role in ensuring this, by developing strategic advice to decision makers throughout the process of designing and implementing MoG changes.
The timeline of the changes must consider both administrative, legal, and budgetary contexts, and include a realistic medium-term proposal to achieve the stated aims. Given that the budgetary cycle is annual, changes made mid-year create challenges in adequately resourcing the new structures. A better alternative, as was done in Round 2 of the changes, is to implement changes if feasible in the beginning of the calendar year, regardless of the decision date. This timeframe balances the need to achieve quick wins with the necessary time to implement operational changes. However, it may also create a greater time lag between announced changes and implementation – requiring effective change leadership (see above section).
It could also be more effective to align major MoG changes with regular four-year parliamentary election cycles. At this point, when a cabinet shuffle is expected, change within governance structures is anticipated. Given that machinery of government changes are estimated to take at least two years to fully take root in the new functional structure, and two to three years to begin demonstrating results, a four-year cycle would be the minimum time needed for MoG changes to take root, their anticipated benefits to materialise, and the government to evaluate their success (White and Dunleavy, 2010[21]). Frequent or premature changes risk undermining outcomes from previous MoG changes and could detract from their overall effectiveness.
The following sets out a number of options for consideration by Estonia. This is complemented by the tool for the centre of government (online Annex) which sets out the questions that should be asked when embarking on a significant machinery of government change. The following options could be explored by Estonia going forward:
1. Develop a methodology and process to advise governments (particularly at the start of their mandate) on the cost/benefit of organisational restructuring and alternative approaches. This could include:
a. Identification of likely direct and indirect costs based on previous exercises
b. Timeline for benefits realisation
c. Risk assessment and management.
d. Alternative solutions to consider with associated pros and cons (see above section)
2. Articulate a set of principles that should be shared between the political and administrative actors stating when to consider structural changes and when they should be avoided. These could include aspects such as policy justification, timeline, frequency, and process.
3. Set clear standards for implementing MoG changes, in order to reduce the scope for case-by-case negotiations and simplify the process. These could include methodologies to calculate FTEs, associated support staff, budget transfers, strategic planning processes, and document transfers.
4. Clarify roles of actors and processes for implementing MoG changes – including for the government office, corporate services, and related bodies.
5. Develop a manual and support function for change management to support leadership in designing, communicating, and implementing structural changes effectively. This could be a role for the Top Civil Service centre in the GO.
6. Continue to unify and/or harmonise the structures of the public service to facilitate changes, including IT houses, employment frameworks (including pay, and benefits), and document archival systems.
7. Set out commitments to evaluate the results of the machinery of government in the medium-term to ensure objectives are being met and in particular the better delivery of complex and multi-faceted policy priorities.
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