Subsidisation of the steel industry continues to increase, mainly outside of the OECD area. The latest data show that the median Chinese firm received 15 times more subsidies relative to its asset size than the median firm elsewhere in 2024, up from 10 times more in earlier years. Recent empirical work shows that the pervasive use of subsidies is highly distorting competition and weakening the market function of the sector. In 2025, Chinese support measures were dominated by provincial and municipal subsidy programmes, which introduced 59 new programmes in 2025 to support the domestic steel industry. The measures mainly involved grants, preferential finance and regulatory adjustments that facilitated investment in the industry. In several cases, support instruments were linked to output performance or export competitiveness, potentially dampening market-based exit signals. Recent monitoring work shows that steel producers across the Middle East and North Africa (MENA) region are also benefitting from a wide range of capacity-inducing subsidies.
OECD Steel Outlook 2026
Abstract
The pervasive use of market-distorting subsidies has been a significant, longstanding problem for the steel industry. Subsidies lead to excess capacity and severely distort international competition. The subsidies include grants, below-market borrowings (BMB) and tax concessions, which have been quantified using the OECD’s MAnufacturing Groups and Industrial Corporations (MAGIC) database of firm-level support. Regular monitoring by the OECD Steel Committee provides evidence of many other forms of subsidies that are more difficult to quantify, such as equity infusions inconsistent with market-based conditions, non-market-based equity swaps, government provision of goods and services at subsidised prices, export subsidies, and input support at preferential or non-market rates, including the provision of land, energy and raw materials to steel companies at preferential rates (OECD, 2025[1]).
The latest available data for subsidies that are quantified in the MAGIC database show that steel firms in partner economies continue to receive more subsidies per unit of asset size than firms in OECD Member countries. Moreover, there is a substantial discrepancy in both the levels and trends of subsidy data between Chinese firms and firms headquartered in partner economies. Figure 4.1 presents data on both Chinese firms and firms in partner economies and compares them with those of OECD Member countries. The figure shows that the Chinese subsidy rate has been on a strong upward trend since 2019, with the median firm now receiving about 15 times more subsidies relative to its asset size than firms in other partner economies and OECD Member countries in 2024. Adding to these concerns is anecdotal evidence that China is making much more intensive use of subsidy instruments that are particularly challenging to quantify (Mercier and Giua, 2023[2]).
Subsidy divided by asset, median, 2006-2024
Note: Subsidies are computed here as the sum of grants, below-market borrowings (BMB) and, if available, tax concessions.
Source: OECD MAGIC database.
Recent research by the OECD Steel Committee provides evidence of the general distortive effects of subsidies that erode market-driven behaviours in the steel sector (OECD, forthcoming[3]). Even in the absence of subsidy-induced capacity expansions, subsidies can distort competitive conditions both domestically and internationally. By weakening market signals, subsidies enable less efficient firms to maintain or even expand their market share, to the detriment of less subsidised competitors, whether domestic or abroad. In doing so, subsidies result in a clear suboptimal allocation of resources and a net loss to economic welfare.
The distortive effects of subsidies are significant. Econometric regressions provide robust evidence that cash grants, BMB and tax concessions positively impact the market share of recipient firms, even though their productivity, cost efficiency and financial strength do not improve and are often lower than those of less subsidised firms to start with (OECD, 2025[4]; forthcoming[3]). There are also harmful spillover effects on competitors, who lose market shares to more subsidised firms, despite having stronger financial performance (Figure 4.2). These effects can crowd out investments by the sector as a whole and discourage rivals from modernising or otherwise investing in the industry.
Market performance by subsidy intensity quartile
Note: The subsidy intensity quartiles are displayed on the X axis, from the lowest quartile Q1 to the highest quartile Q4. Hence, subsidisation increases when one moves from left to right. This is an observation-level graph, meaning that a single firm may appear in different subsidy intensity quartiles across years, depending on its annual subsidy-to-asset ratio. Subsidy quartiles are defined based on the 25% quantiles of the combined grants and below-market borrowings (BMB) relative to total assets - i.e. (grants + BMB) / assets. By construction, each quartile contains approximately the same number of observations (around 174 per quartile).
Source: OECD MAGIC database for steel firms.
In well-functioning markets, higher profitability, higher capacity utilisation and a lower debt burden tend to be rewarded with larger sales volumes. OECD research finds that, in the steel sector, when government support increases or is higher (as in the case of partner economies), these signals quickly fade: highly subsidised firms gain ground even when they are less profitable, less cost-efficient and more indebted than their peers (OECD, forthcoming[3]). The more a firm is subsidised, the less its market-share gains correlate with profitability, cost efficiency, capacity utilisation and lower debt (Figure 4.3).
Correlations between firms’ financial performance and changes in market share, by subsidy intensity quartile
Source: OECD MAGIC database for steel firms.
The weakening correlation between market-share outcomes and performance indicators, such as profitability, capacity utilisation, and leverage, among more subsidised steel producers indicates that subsidies distort well-functioning market outcomes. By dampening the market signals that would normally reward more efficient firms – those that use resources effectively, add greater value, or operate with lower debt – subsidies risk reducing overall economic efficiency and, ultimately, aggregate welfare.
The OECD conducts regular monitoring of subsidies and other non-market policies and practices (NMPPs) in key countries. The work carried out in 2025 and early 2026 covers China, the Middle East and North Africa (MENA) region. Other countries and regions will be included in future analyses to provide an increasingly comprehensive picture of NMPPs used in the steel sector.
China
In 2025, China’s steel sector continued to face pronounced structural pressures, with weak domestic demand, persistent excess capacity and intensifying price competition weighing on the steel industry’s performance. Against this backdrop, policymakers increasingly framed market conditions through the lens of “anti-involution”, which focusses on excessive competition and destructive price wars that erode margins without resolving underlying supply and demand imbalances. The national steel-specific policy response in 2025, the Steel Industry Stable Growth Work Plan (2025-2026), centres on strengthening regulatory discipline, discouraging below-cost competition and steering firms towards upgrading, decarbonisation and higher value added production (Chinese government, 2025[5]).
The programme is operationalised primarily through provincial and municipal entities, which may nevertheless go beyond the national objectives by providing grants, preferential finance and regulatory breaks that support the local steel industry. This results in decentralised competition at the local level, frequently leading to uncoordinated capacity expansion, continued support for loss-making firms, and supply growth that significantly exceeds domestic demand, thereby reinforcing structural overcapacity and amplifying market distortions (Wu, 2019[6]).
OECD research located 59 steel-related support programmes implemented at the local government level in 2025, with a clear concentration of policy activity in eastern and coastal provinces, where steel production plays a more central role in local industrial activity. However, transparency remains a significant challenge. Of the 59 steel-related subsidy programmes identified at the provincial and municipal levels in 2025, only 22 disclose either the total amount disbursed or the maximum support available per firm, and only a very small subset reports the actual amounts received by individual steel enterprises. Most programmes either list beneficiaries without financial details or describe eligible instruments, such as grants, preferential credit, tax incentives or energy cost relief, without disclosing disbursement levels. This represents a deterioration relative to 2024, when 41% of programmes disclosed subsidy amounts. At the same time, access to Chinese public information has become increasingly constrained, including through geo-blocking of official government websites, which now affects more than half of domestically hosted government portals when accessed from abroad (Brussee, 2026[7]). Transparency constraints are a significant policy concern, with practical consequences. They undermine independent monitoring and the ability to assess the scale, structure and trade effects of the subsidies.
Output / sales-linked subsidies
A first category of potentially distortive programmes consists of instruments that directly tie public support to realised production volumes or sales performance. Unlike upgrading or transition-oriented measures, these schemes reduce firms’ marginal operating costs and explicitly reward continued output, thereby weakening market exit signals and risking the prolongation of excess capacity. The clearest example is Zhejiang’s Yunhe County steel support policy, which provides a grant equal to up to 2.3% of annual sales, supplemented by tiered per-tonne production bonuses for output exceeding agreed baselines, with payments made on a monthly basis and additional penalties or rewards linked to operational targets (Economy and Information Technology Departments of Zhejiang, 2025[8]).
A similar dynamic is observed in Guangxi’s Q2-Q3 2025 industrial stabilisation package, which offers cash rewards based on year-on-year increases in quarterly output value and explicitly extends eligibility to “difficult industries” such as steel. Although framed as short-term growth stabilisation, the scheme directly incentivises higher production regardless of underlying market conditions (Guangxi Government, 2025[9]).
Together, these mechanisms stand out as particularly problematic because they support continuous output rather than structural adjustment, potentially delaying capacity rationalisation and reinforcing supply-side imbalances. Moreover, these local measures also contradict national anti-involution directives, which emphasise production discipline, capacity control and reductions of destructive competition.
Preferential credit sustaining excess capacity
A second category of potentially distortive support concerns large, policy-driven preferential credit programmes, particularly when financing is extended to incumbent steel producers without explicit capacity-reduction requirements. The most prominent example is Hebei’s Steel Industry Transition Finance Guidelines (2025), under which financial institutions approved CNY 27.2 billion (Chinese yuan) (approximately USD 2.8 billion) in transition credit lines by Q1 2025, with CNY 15.8 billion already disbursed to 11 steel enterprises and one downstream user, to finance firm-level transition plans and project-level low-carbon investments (notably ultra-low-emission retrofits, energy-efficiency improvements and process upgrading), at rates 5-150 basis points below comparable non-transition loans (People's Bank of China, 2026[10]). Such a scale of concessional lending creates a risk of competitive distortion by lowering financing costs for participating firms relative to non-supported producers, both domestically and internationally.
More fundamentally, the programme reflects a broader pattern of “upgrade without exit”, in which subsidised or preferentially financed investments improve efficiency and environmental performance at the firm level without requiring reductions in capacity. In practice, this can weaken normal market-driven adjustment. By lowering financing costs for existing producers, the programme supports firms that might otherwise scale back or exit, thereby slowing consolidation and capacity reduction. Without binding requirements to retire inefficient capacity, large-scale transition finance can sustain aggregate supply and delay structural rebalancing, meaning that sector-wide overcapacity may persist even as individual plants become cleaner or more efficient.
Export-oriented competitiveness support
Export support appears in fewer programmes than for digitalisation or the green transition. Several provinces embed export promotion within broader industrial upgrading frameworks that combine cost-reduction instruments with market-access support. In Hebei, the Hebei Products Going Overseas initiative explicitly mobilises steel and steel-using clusters to “go abroad” through co-ordinated overseas promotion, compliance assistance and participation in international trade fairs, reinforced upstream by a provincial steel supply chain platform providing logistics and supply chain finance (Hebei, 2026[11]).
In Shandong, export competitiveness is supported through subsidised green certification, and the development of product carbon-footprint accounting and labelling systems designed to meet destination-market requirements, alongside preferential trade finance and overseas market development tools (Department of Science and Technology of Shandong, 2025[12]; CCN, 2025[13]; Shandong Provincial Department of Finance, 2025[14]).
Guangxi province provides export support in the form of grants, interest subsidies and cost-reduction measures covering warehousing, transport, guarantees and overseas market expansion (Guangxi Government, 2026[15]; 2025[9]). These measures reduce export costs, thereby somewhat muting producers' response to global price signals. When combined with extensive upgrade subsidies and preferential finance, such export-oriented instruments risk reinforcing excess capacity by enabling Chinese steel firms to maintain or expand foreign sales despite weak domestic demand, thereby shifting domestic imbalances onto international markets.
MENA region
Steel producers across the MENA region benefit from a wide range of capacity-inducing subsidies. These measures seek to reduce reliance on foreign inputs used in the region’s steel production through upstream integration into raw materials and intermediates, while also fostering downstream integration with domestic consuming industries. At the same time, governments are promoting digitalisation, the green transition, and cost competitiveness, while encouraging foreign direct investment to build local value chains. Common channels of support include subsidised energy, tax and customs exemptions, concessional loans, preferential treatment of state-owned enterprises (SOEs), public procurement and local content requirements. However, the Middle East conflict has increased the fiscal impact of these measures, as higher oil and gas prices raise the cost of maintaining subsidised domestic energy prices in some countries and may expose the dependence of several regional support regimes on stable trade routes and energy infrastructure (IMF, 2026[16]).
At present, available information on support measures in MENA does not permit robust comparison with other regions. Further work will therefore focus on improving the comparability of these measures across jurisdictions.
Algeria
Subsidised energy has a large impact on production in Algeria, where domestic steel plants mostly rely on electric arc furnace (EAF) and induction furnace (IF) technologies. Indeed, there is only one steel plant using the blast furnace-basic oxygen furnace (BF-BOF) method, located in the El Hadjar industrial complex in the province of Annaba. Since the rest of the industry uses the EAF or IF methods, which rely on direct reduced iron (DRI) or scrap, they use natural gas and electricity as energy inputs.
Algeria is the largest natural gas producer in the region, with state-owned Sonatrach dominating production, transport and distribution. Natural gas is sold at more than 90% below recovery price levels in the country, and for high-intensity industrial users, the Electricity and Gas Regulatory Commission (CREG) sets the price at USD 0.48 per MMBtu (million British thermal units), one of the lowest rates in the MENA region (Electricity and Gas Regulatory Commission, 2025[17]).
This advantage in natural gas supply allows Algeria to provide low-cost inputs for electricity generation, with electricity prices in 2023 estimated at 60% below cost-recovery levels (OECD, 2025[1]). For high-intensity electricity usage, the price set by CREG is USD 58 per MWh (megawatt-hour) for peak hours, USD 20 for normal hours, and USD 5 at night (Electricity and Gas Regulatory Commission, 2025[17]). According to Bloomberg, the average price of electricity for industrial use between 2020 and 2023 fluctuated between USD 12.4 and USD 13.4 per MWh, making it one of the lowest in the MENA region (BloombergNEF, 2025[18]).
Egypt
Natural gas in Egypt continues to be subsidised by the Egyptian government. Previous OECD work noted that the gas price for the steel sector was cut to USD 5.5 per MMBtu in 2019-2020 and USD 4.5 per MMBtu in 2020-2021, which was below the general industrial price (OECD, 2025[1]). The price for the steel industry has remained at USD 5.75 per MMBtu since 2021. Most other industries benefit from natural gas subsidies to different degrees. In the context of the conflict in the Middle East, maintaining such fixed industrial gas prices may become more fiscally burdensome for Egypt, as oil-importing economies in the region are exposed to higher imported energy costs and tighter external conditions (IMF, 2026[16]). Despite these subsidies, natural gas prices generally remained higher than global gas prices.
The government also controls electricity prices for all operating steel plants using EAF or IF technologies, meaning Egyptian producers benefit from subsidised electricity prices. The Ministry of Electricity and Renewable Energy sets prices for businesses at around USD 0.028 per kWh (kilowatt-hour), which was 80% lower than the world average in 2024 (Global Petrol Prices, 2025[19]).
Investment Law 73 of 2017 remains in force and provides tax incentives, including a 30% reduction in tax on investment profits in several sectors, such as the metallurgical, engineering and textile industries. Under the same law, special economic zones (SEZs), where most steel plants are located, benefit from a 50% tax reduction on investment profits (Arab Republic of Egypt, 2017[20]).
The government is actively looking to increase steel capacity and exports (Ministry of Industry, 2025[21]), while also recognising that the country has already reached a surplus of production (Salaasil news, 2025[22]). The government has, for example, approved the construction of a new steel complex in the Suez Canal Economic Zone despite a slump in the domestic steel industry caused by a decline in domestic steel demand and a shortage of currency in 2023 (Ahram Online, 2023[23]).
The war in the Islamic Republic of Iran (hereafter “Iran”) may also complicate this expansionary policy stance, as Egypt has already announced a temporary slowdown in large fuel-intensive state projects and cuts to fuel allocations for government vehicles in response to higher energy costs and the fiscal strain linked to the conflict (Reuters, 2026[24]).
Libya
There is currently only one steel producer in the country, the state-owned Libyan Iron and Steel Company, which started operations in 1979. A second steel plant project announced in 2024 is planned in Benghazi by Türkiye’s Tosyali; the new plant is projected to have an annual capacity of 2.7 Mt, which would increase national steelmaking capacity by 163% (Yermolenko, 2024[25]). In addition to steel, the country produces DRI; announced projects could place it among the world’s top five DRI producers if fully realised.
The government continues to provide high subsidies on electricity (EIA, 2024[26]). The general price of electricity for heavy industry was set at USD 36 per MWh during 2025 (Libyan Centre for Strategic Studies, 2025[27]).
Morocco
Morocco’s steel industry has been developing rapidly in recent years, despite having electricity costs that are considerably higher than those of other MENA countries. Support has come in various forms, often in the form of cash grants.
Morocco’s National Hydrogen Strategy 2020-2030 is driving the rapid expansion of green hydrogen production and renewable energy capacity. The country aims to become a leading global exporter of green hydrogen, with ambitions to supply 4% of global demand by 2050 (Kingdom of Morocco, 2021[28]). To spearhead these objectives, the government is providing around 1 million hectares for integrated green hydrogen projects, offering parcels ranging from 10 000 to 30 000 hectares (Kingdom of Morocco, 2025[29]). Feasibility studies are conducted jointly by the public agency ONEE and private companies.
While part of the produced hydrogen will be exported, the kingdom also plans to use green hydrogen to decarbonise certain industries as part of its emission-reduction targets and to mitigate the impact of the European Union’s Carbon Border Adjustment Mechanism (CBAM). While green hydrogen would have a more direct role in decarbonising Morocco’s large fertiliser industry, once abundant and cost-effective, it could also benefit the steel industry.
Finally, the Fond de soutien de l’innovation (FSI) has actively supported the domestic steel industry through programmes that help producers develop innovative steel products. In 2023, the first project benefitted Maghreb Steel, one of the largest domestic steelmakers, providing it with USD 31 million in financial support to develop an innovative type of micro alloyed steel. Other projects aim to support downstream producers of steel, for example, such as corrosion-resistant steel and a galvanisation simulator. Through these programmes, the state is effectively providing cash grants to steel producers (Ibriz, 2023[30]).
Oman
The Omani government supports its steel industry through a wide range of instruments, and both SOEs and private companies appear to benefit from these measures. Steel plants in Oman are concentrated in two industrial zones, with a presence in a third. The Free Zone Law of 2002 establishes that investors in SEZs are exempt from corporate income tax, customs duties, and restrictions on foreign currency exchanges and transfers (Sultanate of Oman, 2022[31]). There is also a streamlining of administrative procedures through a One Stop Shop policy, which regroups in a single portal all services, such as application for utilities, environmental approvals, certificates for tax exemptions or labour permits (Sohar Port and Freezone, 2025[32]).
Out of the currently operational steel plants in Oman, three out of five are in the Sohar SEZ, with a combined steel-producing capacity of 3.8 Mt of crude steel equivalent, representing 90% of domestic capacity as of 2025. The two smaller remaining plants are located within the Rusayl SEZ near Muscat. The largest planned steel project in the country will be an integrated green steel project by China’s Jindal Steel (Oman Observer, 2023[33]).
The SEZs are also attracting a significant number of upstream producers of steelmaking inputs, such as iron concentrate, iron pellets, pig iron, DRI and hot briquetted iron (HBI). The Duqm SEZ is attracting one HBI and one DRI plant (Trade Arabia, 2023[34]; Hill, 2023[35]), while an iron concentrate, iron pellet, and pig iron plant are planned in the Suhar SEZ (Steel Radar, 2024[36]; Prabhu, 2022[37]).
Qatar
Qatar Steel, a SOE, accounts for 96.9% of the country’s steel production capacity. Qatar Steel is indirectly owned by Qatar Energy, the main domestic producer of natural gas, meaning that it is supplied with energy internally. Qatar Steel, which is located in the Mesaieed Industrial Zone, is managed by the Qatari Economic Zones Authority (Manateq). The authority has previously provided land lease reductions to attract new businesses and has announced a 50% reduction in lease prices for 2025.
In Qatar, industrial projects in the automotive and other advanced manufacturing sectors can benefit from state support if they align with Qatar’s Third National Development Strategy for 2024-2030. Financial contributions can cover up to 40% of local qualifying investment expenditures for a period of five years. This can cover capital expenditure in construction, the purchase of machinery and the outfitting of factories, as well as the rental of facilities and legal costs (Qatar Invest, 2025[38]). While not directly linked to the steel industry, financial assistance to downstream sectors can be considered an indirect subsidy, as it increases domestic demand for steel.
Saudi Arabia
Saudi Arabia’s industries are benefitting from government-led initiatives to promote the diversification of the economy in the framework of its Vision 2030 plan. Saudi Arabia could also become a more important player in the region’s steel supply chains, as it seeks to develop iron ore mining and the production of intermediate products such as DRI.
Most Saudi steel plants produce long products for the construction sector, using either IF or EAF technology and a mix of scrap and DRI. Integrated steel mills are also emerging in Saudi Arabia, often in partnerships with foreign companies that bring their know-how and technology.
Saudi Arabia’s steel industry is rapidly growing through partnerships with foreign companies. The requirement to have foreign companies undertake a joint venture with a domestic firm often results in projects that are done in partnership with institutions linked to the state, such as the Saudi Arabian Oil Company (Aramco), the Public Investment Fund, the National Industrial Development Centre, or the Royal Commission for Jubail and Yanbu.
The Saudi Electricity Company (SEC), which holds a quasi-monopoly on domestic electricity distribution and is 81.2% state-owned, sets fixed electricity tariffs for industrial users (Saudi Electricity Company, 2025[39]). Prices are differentiated by the type of connection: USD 48.6 per MWh for facilities connected to the distribution network, and USD 32.4 per MWh for those connected to the transmission network (Saudi Electricity Company, 2025[40]). Given that EAF plants, which account for 91.8% of Saudi steelmaking capacity, are almost always connected to the transmission grid, they benefit from the lower industrial tariff. Electricity prices are not subject to market fluctuations, as they are centrally determined by the SEC, reflecting both the company’s public ownership and the lack of liberalisation in the electricity pricing system.
In 2021, the government launched the Shareek programme, which aims to boost private investment in large domestic companies by streamlining procedures to enable companies to benefit from incentive packages. To benefit from the programme, a company needs to invest more than USD 2.667 billion in the next ten years to be publicly listed and have a minimum project size of USD 53.34 million in capital expenditures (Shareek, 2025[41]). The programme is government-led and assisted by 10 ministries and 11 additional public bodies, which provide tailored enabling tools to each company in the programme and increase local content in production. Since its implementation, at least one major steel project has benefitted from the programme.
The Saudi Industrial Development Fund (SIDF) provides advantageous loans to industrial sectors in Saudi Arabia. While steel is not mentioned directly as a sector targeted by its loans, USD 70.38 million went to the manufacture of sport utility vehicles (SUVs) and passenger vehicles in 2023. It is thus more a form of indirect support to the steel sector, as it resulted in domestic demand for steel from downstream sectors (Sidf, 2023[42]).
United Arab Emirates
The United Arab Emirates seeks to become a pioneer in steel decarbonisation in the region by developing low-carbon hydrogen capabilities. In 2021, the government announced the Hydrogen Leadership Roadmap, with the aim of producing 25% of global low-carbon hydrogen by 2030. The federal government released a National Hydrogen Strategy in 2023, which outlines its potential for the domestic steel industry. The government hails Emsteel as the fastest steel producer to adapt to the green steel market globally, and the first green steel in the MENA region was produced through a joint pilot project between Emsteel and Masdar, an Emirati renewable energy company (Ellis, 2024[43]). The company, which is state-owned, dominates the domestic steel industry, owning plants with a combined capacity of 3.6 Mt of crude steel, representing 74.3% of national capacity. Another company, Persian Gulf Steel Industries, announced in 2024 that it has achieved net-zero emissions at its rebar plant, which is entirely based on scrap-fed EAF technology (Durmus, 2024[44]).
As part of its strategy to promote green hydrogen production, the government of Abu Dhabi has outlined several supporting measures to accelerate its development. A low-carbon hydrogen support committee was created to provide support and facilitate investments in early-stage projects. The government allows the committee to use regulatory, economic and financial instruments to reach its objectives. The committee is formed of several government bodies: the Abu Dhabi Department of Economic Development, the Abu Dhabi Investment Office, the Department of Finance, the Environment Agency Abu Dhabi, the Abu Dhabi Department of Municipalities and Transport, and the Abu Dhabi Department of Energy (Abu Dhabi Department of Energy, 2022[45]). By supporting this upstream industry, these state policies help steel firms better integrate green steel into their products.
All steel production plants are located in industrial zones, which provide advantageous regulatory incentives. Companies operating in these areas are exempt from corporate and income taxes, as well as customs duties (Ministry of Economy, 2025[46]). Finally, manufacturers also benefit from simplified and accelerated business procedures. The industrial zones relevant to steel production are the Industrial City of Abu Dhabi, where 92% of production capacity is concentrated, and the Dubai Industrial City and Sharjah Industrial Area 6.
While industrial zones provide broad regulatory incentives, the Ministry of Finance has further clarified that certain strategic companies may benefit from additional corporate tax exemptions. Moreover, SOEs, including Emsteel, are automatically exempt from corporate income tax under current regulations (Federal Tax Authority, 2025[47]). Moreover, the UAE federal government continues to subsidise energy, with the Ministry of Energy and Infrastructure allocating USD 54.45 million for subsidies in the 2025 state budget (United Arab Emirates, 2025[48]).
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