Housing accounts for a relatively small share of public expenditure in OECD countries, with housing development spending generally not exceeding 0.5% of GDP in 2023. In most countries, this spending has remained broadly stable compared to pre-pandemic levels. However, sustained increases in house prices and rents relative to household incomes are translating into growing demand for public support. This chapter discusses savings measures targeting spending on housing, which includes both demand-side instruments, such as housing allowances, rent subsidies and homeownership support, and supply-side instruments aimed at expanding or improving the housing stock. The measures identified are more focused on demand-side support and fall broadly into three categories: recalibrating the targeting of housing benefits and tightening eligibility, rationalising programme design and delivery, and tightening housing credit conditions.
Restoring Public Finances
Enabling Effective Government
Abstract
While housing-related public spending in OECD Member and accession candidate countries remains modest in aggregate terms, many are experiencing spending pressures. This is due to a background of sustained increases in house prices and rents relative to household incomes, leading to rising housing costs and reduced access for some households. Recent spending patterns show a spending policy mix that relies heavily on demand-side support, mainly housing allowances and homeownership support. Public investment in housing development, including public capital formation and capital transfers for housing construction, has increased somewhat in recent years, from a very low base in most countries. Findings from the RPF Survey indicate that consolidation efforts focus primarily on containing the growth of demand-side programmes, often through improved targeting and eligibility rules, rather than reducing supply-side spending. Recent measures have focused on recalibrating demand-side programmes and benefits to contain expenditure growth.
Reform initiatives and savings measures
1. Recalibrating targeting of housing benefits and tightening eligibility
Strengthened means-testing, asset-testing and reduced benefit parameters.
Adjustments to eligibility thresholds or calculation formulas to limit programme expansion.
Indexation freezes or reclassification of municipalities to lower maximum eligible housing costs.
2. Rationalising housing programmes design and delivery
Merging multiple benefits into unified schemes to improve coherence and cost control.
Transferring specific beneficiary groups (e.g. students) to alternative support schemes.
Focussing access to emergency housing or temporary accommodation through stricter gateway criteria.
3. Tightening housing credit conditions
Reducing mortgage loan caps or differentiating credit limits by property value.
In general, public spending on housing includes both demand- and supply-side measures. Demand-side support includes housing allowances, rent subsidies, tax relief expenditures, and financial support to households (e.g. for utilities), which represent a direct social benefit. Supply-side support, by contrast, aims to increase or improve the housing stock, either through direct public investment and subsidy for social housing organisations or through incentives to private actors, such as tax advantages, grants, and other support to developers and landlords. Most OECD countries operate one or more housing allowance schemes (OECD, 2024[1]), even if demand-side support has been on a downward-trend over the past 15 years. In parallel, supply-side support has historically been lower but has increased again across OECD countries in recent years (see Figure 5.1).
Most OECD Member and accession candidate countries reported up to 0.5% of GDP in public expenditure on housing development in 2023 – a category that also constitutes a specific form of public investment (see Figure 5.2). This is broadly consistent with trends over the past decade. The exception is Italy, which in 2023, reported the highest general government expenditure in terms of national accounts on housing development relative to GDP (3.9%). This is driven largely by capital transfers recorded as payable tax credits linked to housing support measures (Eurostat, 2025[2]).
Note: 1. Housing development expenditure includes both direct investment (COFOG series P5_K2CG), corresponding to government gross capital formation, and public capital transfers (COFOG series D9CG), which refer to indirect capital expenditure made through transfers to organisations outside of government. See COFOG Statistics for more detail. Part of housing development expenditure overlaps with measures of public investment discussed in the Chapter 6 of this report on public investment.
2. Spending on housing allowances does not include spending on mortgage relief, capital subsidies towards construction and implicit subsidies towards accommodation costs. No data available on housing allowances after 2019. Data on housing allowances exclude Canada, Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica, Korea, New Zealand, Slovak Republic, Switzerland and Türkiye.
3. The OECD-30 average is the unweighted average across the 30 OECD countries with capital transfer and gross capital formation data available for all years between 2000 and 2021. It excludes Canada, Chile, Costa Rica, Israel, Korea, New Zealand, Türkiye and the United States. Data for 2022 are provisional and also exclude Australia, Czechia (capital transfers), and the United Kingdom. Housing development includes, among other things, the acquisition of land needed for the construction of dwellings, the construction or purchase and remodelling of dwelling units for the general public or for people with special needs, and grants or loans to support the expansion, improvement or maintenance of the housing stock.
Source: OECD National Accounts Database as of May 2024, http://oe.cd/ahd and OECD Social Expenditure Database as of May 2024, https://www.oecd.org/en/data/datasets/social-expenditure-database-socx.html.
Note: 1. Costa Rica data from 2021 rather than 2023. Data for Colombia and Costa Rica are not included in the OECD average. No data available for Canada, Chile, Korea, Mexico, New Zealand, Switzerland, Türkiye and United States.
2. The negative housing expenditure for Israel reflects government sales of housing assets and land, which are recorded as negative investment under COFOG.
3. See COFOG Statistics for items included in housing development.
Source: OECD Public finance by function - government at a glance indicators, yearly updates – based on OECD National Accounts Statistics (database) and Eurostat Government Finance Statistics (database) as of 09 January 2026, OECD Data Explorer.
On the demand side, public spending on housing allowances ranges from low levels in many countries to comparatively high levels in a small number of cases, such as the United Kingdom (1.4% of GDP), followed by Finland, Denmark and France (see Figure 5.3). OECD data shows that rent allowances, where they exist, are usually well targeted and reach low-income households (OECD, 2025[3]). Although housing allowances are primarily designed to support renters, in several countries they also extend to homeowners and may cover a wider set of housing-related costs, including utilities, service charges or mortgage-related expenses. These allowances can help households facing affordability pressures, but if they are not well targeted, they increase fiscal costs and, in housing markets where supply is rigid (OECD, 2021[4]), they tend to create price pressures, as they amount to a transfer from taxpayers to landlords via beneficiary renters.
Note: 1. Data refer to the responses to the 2023 OECD Questionnaire on Affordable and Social Housing except for Denmark, Estonia, France, Iceland, Latvia, Lithuania, New Zealand, Poland, Slovenia, and the United Kingdom where they refer to responses to previous iterations of the Questionnaire on Affordable and Social Housing.
2. Data refer to 2022, except for Costa Rica (2023), Australia and Poland (2021-2022), Austria, Germany, the Netherlands (2021), Estonia, Lithuania, New Zealand and the United Kingdom (2020), France, Latvia and Slovenia (2019), Iceland (2018), Denmark (2017).
3. In the following countries, housing allowances exist but data on public spending are not available: Belgium, Canada, Colombia, Hungary, Italy, Japan, Korea, Slovak Republic, Spain, Switzerland, and Türkiye. Spending amounts are not available for Canada and Switzerland, but housing allowances do exist at regional/state level, more precisely they are provided by Provinces and Territories in Canada, and by Cantons in Switzerland.
4. Spending data for the United States include the Housing Choice Voucher Programme, which is largely comprised of tenant-based assistance, with a smaller share that may be allocated towards project-based funding (where funding is tied to a housing unit, rather than a household).
5. The list of measures considered in this indicator are reported in here.
Source: OECD Affordable Housing Database as of June 2024, http://oe.cd/ahd, additional documentation at https://webfs.oecd.org/Els-com/Affordable_Housing_Database/PH3-1-Public-spending-on-housing-allowances.pdf.
Some OECD Member and accession candidate countries allocate public resources to support home ownership through tax relief expenditure measures. Tax relief expenditure relates to the possibility to deducting mortgage interest payments from taxable income, as well as to the exemption of capital gains from the sales of owner-occupied homes. This may also involve subsidised mortgages and public guarantees, and, to a lesser extent, direct grants to home buyers (see Figure 5.4). These can reach up to 1.2% of GDP in the Netherlands, which have both a tax relief from mortgage payments and a property transfer tax (overdrachtsbelasting) exemption for individuals aged 18 to 35 (OECD, 2023[5]).
Note: 1. Data refer to 2022 for Latvia, Luxembourg, New Zealand, Portugal, United States, Norway, Slovak Republic, Lithuania, and Ireland; to 2021 for Poland and Austria. For selected countries, spending data refers to different calendar years depending on the measure: for the Netherlands, 2021 and 2020; for Chile, 2022 and 2021; and for Israel and Croatia, 2023 and 2022. Data for Sweden, Costa Rica, Estonia, Hungary, France, Italy, Slovenia, Japan, Czechia, and Brazil refer to the 2021 QuaSH.
2. No data available for Australia, Belgium, Canada, Colombia, Denmark, Finland, Germany, Greece, Iceland, Korea, Mexico, Spain, Switzerland, Türkiye, and United Kingdom.
3. The list of measures considered in this indicator are reported in here.
Source: OECD Affordable Housing Database as of June 2024, http://oe.cd/ahd, additional documentation here: https://webfs.oecd.org/Els-com/Affordable_Housing_Database/PH2-1-Public-spending-support-to-home-buyers.pdf.
Overall, the data shows that while comparatively modest, spending on housing can be more significant in some countries. In several countries subnational governments play an important role in housing spending decisions. Subnational governments account for more than 80% of public expenditure on housing and community amenities (Dougherty and Kim, 2023[6]). At a time when countries are exploring options to create fiscal space at national level, this multi-level governance structure for the housing area can have implications for designing savings measures, with government focusing on fiscal sustainability, distributional impacts, and alignment with broader effectiveness objectives at national level.
Results from the RPF Survey suggest that housing-related savings efforts are primarily concentrated on targeted adjustments to demand-side support and tighter eligibility rules. Further expenditure reductions on the supply side do not currently appear to be a central focus; In fact, this type of findings is in line with the recommendations of the OECD “Brick by Brick Building Better housing” report (OECD, 2021[4]). Overall, responses are largely motivated by the need to contain rapidly rising programme costs while continuing to protect the most vulnerable households.
Measures approved or submitted to parliament for the fiscal years of 2025 and 2026
Note: Results based on 39 RPF Survey responses. Measures reported as “Streamline/reduce expenditure related to housing” in the RPF Survey have been split into the following three sub-categories, based on the qualitative information provided by respondents: “Rationalising housing programmes design and delivery”, “Recalibrating targeting of housing benefits and tightening eligibility”, and “Tightening housing credit conditions”.
Source: 2026 OECD Survey on Restoring Public Finances, Question 13.1: Other Expenditure - Housing.
5.2.1. Recalibrating targeting of housing benefits and tightening eligibility
Respondents report savings through stricter eligibility rules, reduced benefit parameters, and stronger means-testing, often to limit programme expansion while preserving a safety net. Regular reassessment of eligibility and portability of housing support can help avoid lock-in effects that reduce labour mobility and distort housing choices.
The following examples emerge from the RPF Survey:
Finland reduced housing allowances from 2025. The reforms to the general housing allowance include asset-testing, ending support for owner-occupied housing costs, and reclassifying certain municipalities to lower maximum eligible housing costs, generating estimated savings of over EUR 43 million annually (Kela, 2024[7]). In parallel, Finland also tightened eligibility for the pensioners’ housing allowance through higher deductibles, stricter asset limits and continued indexation freezes, yielding additional net savings of around EUR 25.4 million (Kela, 2024[8]). Further reforms apply to students: transferring beneficiaries from the general housing allowance to the student housing supplement is expected to generate the largest single saving, reducing appropriations for the general housing allowance by approximately EUR 219 million (Finnish Government, 2025[9]).
New Zealand is improving targeting for the Accommodation Supplement, a weekly housing allowance to support rent, board or home ownership costs, by raising the minimum amount homeowners must pay towards their weekly housing costs from 30% to 40% of income, and by updating the geographic area boundaries that determine maximum payment levels. These changes aim to better focus support on households facing higher housing costs relative to their income. Overall, the reform is projected to generate NZD 36.6 million (around EUR 18.8 million) in gross savings over 2026-2029, with 47% reinvested to fund the boundary update, which will require additional resources as some recipients will receive a higher Accommodation Supplement payment and more lower- to middle-income working households may become eligible (MSD, 2025[10]).
5.2.2. Rationalising housing programmes design and delivery
A second reform approach focuses on administrative simplification and system redesign, with the aim of reducing fragmentation and strengthening expenditure control. For example:
Canada has decided not to proceed with the planned Canada Secondary Suite Loan Program, a federal housing initiative aimed at helping homeowners create additional housing units within their properties. The programme had not yet become operational and was cancelled due to potential overlap with announced changes to homeowner insured mortgage rules in 2025. The decision avoids duplication across housing support instruments and limits the expansion of new spending commitments (Government of Canada, 2025[11]). At the same time, funding for key supply-oriented initiatives addressing the housing crisis will be maintained (e.g. the Apartment Construction Loan Program), alongside a pledge of CAD 13 billion (approximately 0.4% of GDP) to capitalise the new agency Build Canada Homes, intended to deliver affordable housing at scale (Government of Canada, 2026[12]).
Czechia is implementing a unified “super allowance” social benefit that consolidates several existing benefits, including housing-related support. The reform aims to improve coherence and simplify delivery, with fiscal impacts depending on final parameter settings (Czech Government, 2025[13]). The housing component supports households whose rent and energy costs exceed 30% of household income, up to a defined threshold (see Box 3.4 in Chapter 3 further details on the structure and eligibility rules of the super allowance).
Denmark’s 2024 Cash Benefit Reform abolishes the former cash benefit cap to simplify the system and avoid the errors and unfair reductions caused by complex interactions between income rules and supplements. In its place, a new housing support cap was introduced, applying only to cohabiting couples and spouses receiving the increased benefit rate. This measure aims to maintain work incentives, ensure transparency, and limit public expenditure. As part of the reform’s broader baseline model, which also includes adjusted benefit rates, supplements, and a more lenient income deduction structure, projected savings start at DKK 70 million (around EUR 9.4 million) in 2026, reaching DKK 115 million (around EUR 15.4 million) annually on a permanent basis after 2045 (in 2024 prices).
New Zealand is tightening “gateway” settings for Emergency Housing to reduce reliance on temporary accommodation (MSD, 2025[14]). Projected savings of NZD 1 billion (approximately 0.22% of GDP) over 2026-2029 are driven by fewer people expected to require emergency housing support.
5.2.3. Tightening housing credit conditions
Some governments may also try to achieve savings through mobilising regulatory instruments in the area of housing, for example through tightening of credit conditions. The following example emerges from the RPF Survey:
Korea is pursuing savings by reducing demand-side pressures in housing markets through tighter housing mortgage rules. Measures implemented in 2025 introduced differentiated caps on maximum mortgage loan amounts based on property prices, lowering loan limits for higher-priced housing segments in an effort to manage household borrowing and housing market pressures (Financial Services Commission, 2025[15]). These measures are estimated to generate expenditure savings of KRW 3.8 trillion in 2026 (around 0.17% of GDP) compared with the previous year, with the savings reinvested in public housing expansion and other housing welfare measures for low-income households.
5.2.4. Balancing demand side versus supply side savings measures in tight housing markets
Countries are facing complex trade-offs in the area of housing, with the need to balance demand- and supply-side measures, while also combining budgetary with other instruments, through regulation and procurement for example. The main underlying cause for the sustained increase in housing costs relative to household incomes, is a combination of strong and growing demand for housing in desirable areas in conjunction with tight supply constraints (Hilber and Schöni, 2022[16]). A key challenge is that public support for homeownership, while aimed at increasing housing market accessibility, has contributed to further increasing housing demand. For example, mortgage interest relief does not appear to increase homeownership rates and, in supply-constrained housing markets, tends to be capitalised into higher house prices (Caldera Sánchez and Andrews, 2011[17]; Davis, 2019[18]; Hilber and Turner, 2014[19]). Homeownership rates among high-income households (e.g. households that benefit the most from tax deductions) are comparable in countries whether they provide tax relief or not (Caldera Sánchez and Andrews, 2011[17]). Mortgage interest relief on owner-occupied housing and capital gains tax exemptions can disproportionately benefit higher-income and wealthier households and drain government budget (OECD, 2022[20]).
Many recent reform efforts across countries have focused on demand-side adjustments to achieve fiscal savings. In some cases, countries are reinvesting savings from demand-side reforms and other budget lines into supply expansion, including social and affordable housing (e.g. Canada and Korea).
By contrast, regulatory measures with medium- to long-term effects, such as addressing land-use and zoning constraints, have been pursued less consistently. These reforms which come at no fiscal cost, can even yield large fiscal gains tax revenues from construction activity and, subsequently, recurring property taxes, while also helping to ease structural pressures. Structural rigidities in housing supply are closely linked to land-use and spatial planning frameworks. While geographical constraints play a role, OECD analyses shows that regulatory restrictions (i.e. zoning rules, density limits and lengthy permitting procedures) contribute to slowing the responsiveness of housing supply to rising demand (Bétin and Ziemann, 2019[21]). These constraints are particularly binding in already highly urbanised metropolitan areas, where population density is high and housing market regulations are more prevalent (OECD, 2021[4]). OECD estimates also suggest that new supply responsiveness tends to be lower in countries where building permit procedures are more time-consuming and complex (Andrews, Caldera Sánchez and Johansson, 2011[22]). Streamlining permitting processes, enabling densification in well-serviced areas, and facilitating the repurposing of underused land can therefore help reduce structural price pressures, and thus can help to ease pressures on public finances in this area in the longer term (OECD, 2024[23]).
Achieving more efficient use of public resources through substituting demand side subsidies with public spending to improve supply responsiveness in high-demand areas
Where housing supply is slow to respond to demand, demand-side subsidies can be for a large part capitalised into higher rents and house prices, weakening their effectiveness and increasing fiscal costs. Research findings suggest substantial pass-through effects: around 59% of housing voucher expenditure in the United States was absorbed into higher rents (Susin, 2002[24]); in France, 50-78% of housing allowance outlays were capitalised (Fack, 2006[25]), with broader upward pressure across the private rental market beyond the lowest-income segment (Grislain-Letrémy and Trevien, 2014[26]); and Finland is recalibrating housing benefits and tightening eligibility, 60-70% of housing allowance spending was reflected in higher rents (Kangasharju, 2010[27]).
OECD analysis suggests that, under such conditions, public spending in social and affordable housing can represent a more efficient use of public resources, to expand the housing stock (Andrews, Caldera Sánchez and Johansson, 2011[22]; OECD, 2021[4]; Dougherty and Kim, 2023[6]). For example, Austria and Denmark, rely on limited-profit or non-profit housing associations supported by favourable tax treatment, long-term loans often backed by public guarantees, and reinvested surpluses (see more in Box 5.1 below). More recently, Latvia has established a housing affordability fund, developed with OECD support, to mobilise financing for affordable rental housing (OECD, 2023[28]).
Austria: Social and limited-profit housing is financed through a combination of long-term bank mortgage loans, public loans with favourable interest rates, and equity contributions from housing associations. The Limited-Profit Housing Act establishes strict governance principles, including cost-based rent setting, continuous reinvestment of surpluses, limitations on dividend distribution, and regular audits. Housing associations operate under a cost-recovery model and are required to ensure financial viability at the building level. This framework has supported a stable expansion and maintenance of the social housing stock over decades.
Denmark: The National Building Fund (established in 1967) plays a central role in financing social and affordable housing. The Fund is financed largely through a share of tenants’ rents (amounting to 2.8% annually of the total acquisition cost of the property) and contributions linked to mortgage repayments (approximately 2% of the property acquisition cost). Over time, as loans are repaid, resources are recycled into new construction, renovation and social initiatives in vulnerable areas. The Fund operates outside the state budget and supports both physical investments and broader social interventions, based on agreed development plans with municipalities. This revolving structure enables sustained investment while limiting direct fiscal pressures.
Source: Adapted from (OECD, 2021[4]; OECD, 2023[28]).
Adjusting co-ordination across levels of government to improve spending effectiveness
The management of spending for housing reflects complex set of co-ordination arrangements across levels of government. In the majority of countries, the governance of the housing sector is shared between the national and local governments, with national governments usually responsible for setting the overall policy priorities, while local governments take on more responsibility for the output and budgeting decisions of social housing provision (Phillips, 2020[29]). Although this division improves responsiveness to local needs, it also generates co-ordination challenges when fiscal responsibilities, planning authority and accountability mechanisms are not well aligned.
Research findings suggest that the design of co-ordination mechanisms has important implications for housing supply responsiveness. A high degree of decentralisation of land-use decisions and a lot of responsibility overlaps is empirically associated with high rigidity of housing supply (Bétin and Ziemann, 2019[21]; Cavalleri, Cournède and Özsöğüt, 2019[30]). Where multiple layers of government can veto projects, regulatory stringency and project review delays tend to increase (Gyourko, Hartley and Krimmel, 2021[31]). Clarifying competences, reducing overlapping veto points and aligning planning authority with functional metropolitan housing markets can improve spending effectiveness in this area, while helping to ease supply constraints.
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