This chapter examines the Competition Authority of Kenya’s institutional co‑operation with other domestic entities and competition authorities in other jurisdictions.
10. Co‑operation
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10.1. Domestic co‑operation
Copy link to 10.1. Domestic co‑operation10.1.1. Law and practice
Consumer protection
In addition to its functions as a competition authority, the CAK is the consumer protection authority for Kenya. This includes enforcement, advocacy and public awareness activities in relation to the consumer protection and product safety provisions with the Competition Act, advocacy and public awareness campaigns.
As detailed in Chapter 2, the consumer protection functions of the CAK sits within the same directorate as competition enforcement.
Other areas of the CAK are similarly responsible for overseeing the dual mandate of the authority, such as the Policy and Planning Department. Given the broader public awareness and interest in consumer protection matters, the Communications and External Relations Department estimates that around 70% of their time is occupied with communications related to consumer protection.
Sector regulators
As noted in Chapter 1, sector regulators have some limited legal powers relating to competition law and policy in Kenya in the telecommunications and energy sector. The Communications Authority is the only sector regulator with the power to investigate anticompetitive conduct under their legislation, although this has not taken place in practice.1 The Energy and Petroleum Authority’s legislation has a mandate to co‑operate with the CAK regarding trade practices and facilitating competition in regulated energy markets.2
In mergers involving banking, energy, insurance, telecommunications, or publicly traded firms, both the CAK and the relevant sector regulator have concurrent jurisdiction to review the transaction. Only the CAK conducts a competition assessment as part of its merger review process.
Historically, the extent to which these legislative frameworks overlapped was ambiguous, with uncertain regulatory mandates. This was particularly in relation to mergers, where both CAK and sector regulator approval was necessary to clear a transaction.
As such, the CAK has worked to develop MoUs with a number of domestic sector regulators:
Central Bank of Kenya (April 2015)
Communications Authority of Kenya (May 2015)
Insurance Regulatory Authority (April 2016)
Kenya Civil Aviation Authority (August 2018)
Energy and Petroleum Regulatory Authority (February 2020)
Public Procurement Regulatory Authority (June 2018)
These MoUs aim to facilitate the exchange of information, collaborate on merger reviews, report anticompetitive conduct and ensure the consistent application of competition law.
Additionally, the Capital Markets Authority is involved in merger transactions involving publicly listed companies in Kenya.
In practice, there is very little co‑operation between the CAK and sector regulators in relation to enforcement against anticompetitive conduct. The only co‑operation in this regard is occasionally relying on sector regulators to informally encourage firms in their sector to comply with CAK requests for information.
The vast majority of domestic co‑operation relates to merger control activities. While the reviews conducted by the CAK and the relevant sector regulators are independent, there is co‑operation through providing opinions to one another, or through establishing a joint committee to discuss relevant elements of a transaction. Such co‑operation aims at ensuring a convergent and complementary analysis (including in design of remedies), without implying that the agencies are abdicating their statutory mandates.3
The CAK has also co‑operated with sector regulators in relation to advocacy activities. For example, in 2020, the CAK launched an inquiry into the digital credit market in Kenya to identify and address competition and consumer protection issues in the market. Although not a market regulated by the Central Bank at the time, the CAK involved the Central Bank during the inquiry through developing the data collection requests and when conducting the data analysis. The CAK and Central Bank jointly developed the recommendations. This ultimately resulted in the passage of legislation to bring digital lenders under the regulatory remit of the Central Bank.4
By contrast, the CAK also notes that the lack of consistency in legal frameworks between the competition authority and sector regulators has led to inconsistent advocacy opinions. In their responses to a parliamentary inquiry into the telecommunications sector, the CAK and Communications Authority arrived at different conclusions about a firm’s dominant position based on their different regulatory frameworks.5
Public procurement
As noted in Chapter 1, Kenya’s Constitution has a requirement that all public procurement contracts take place in a system that is competitive (as well as being fair, equitable, transparent and cost-effective), with sanctions for breaches of procurement laws and policies.6
Chapter 4 provides a comprehensive overview of the CAK’s bid rigging enforcement framework and practices. In addition to the cartel conduct prohibition in the Competition Act (which includes bid rigging), the Public Procurement Regulatory Authority (“PPRA”) has a mandate to investigate allegations of bid rigging.
The CAK and the PPRA signed an MoU in March 2019 which includes mutual training and information sharing as part of investigations. To date, there has been limited co‑operation between the two authorities. Co‑operation has focussed on capacity building and training for procurers, and providing input on the current standard tender form used in Kenya. The two authorities do not regularly meet.
There has been no co‑operation on enforcement activities, with no referrals of conduct that may amount to bid rigging. The PPRA has never imposed a sanction for a breach of Kenyan public procurement law, including no enforcement activity relating to bid rigging.
The CAK can request data from the PPRA as part of investigations. However, this has not taken place in practice. Neither the PPRA or CAK have the capacity to conduct any proactive screening of procurement processes and are solely reliant on complaints or random auditing. Further, there is limited visibility over procurement processes, as the centralised electronic procurement portal is used by just over 2% of procuring bodies in Kenya.
Public Prosecutor
In Kenya, the Office of Director of Public Prosecutions (“Public Prosecutor”) is the authority responsible for:
Bringing criminal prosecutions under the Competition Act.7
Enforcing the provisions relating to failure to comply with a request from the CAK (such as a request for information or a request to attend an interview), or hindering a CAK investigation.8
Bringing an action against a party for failing to comply with a CAK order or decision (such as non-payment of a fine).9
As discussed in Chapter 3, to bring these actions, the CAK must refer the case to the Public Prosecutor, providing the relevant evidence. There is no co‑operation between the CAK and the Public Prosecutor and there has been no enforcement of the Competition Act by the Public Prosecutor.
10.1.2. Analysis of domestic co‑operation
It is widely accepted that effective co‑operation between competition authorities and sector regulators or other national bodies with mandates that are relevant to competition is a critical component of effective competition policy and enforcement. Such other bodies can promote competition and provide intelligence and insights on potentially problematic conduct or transactions, and therefore contribute to competition advocacy and enforcement (OECD, 2022[1]).
As detailed in the subsections below, while the CAK has made admirable efforts in the past to establish MoUs with relevant domestic counterparts, implementation and substantive co‑operation remains more limited. Past OECD work has recognised that MoUs are just one aspect of effective domestic co‑operation. Without meaningful bottom-up co‑operation between agencies, focussed on notification and consultation, sharing expertise among working groups at the staff level and developing a culture of engaging in ad hoc co‑operation where beneficial, what is outlined in MoUs is less likely to take place (OECD, 2022[1]).
Sector regulators
The CAK’s relationship with sector regulators in the context of mergers appears to be successful in minimising duplication and inconsistent processes when assessing transactions.
Similarly, the CAK and most sector regulators appear to have built working relationships that enable them to seek guidance when developing policy or seeking to understand market dynamics.
In the medium to long term, the CAK and sector regulators should consider enhancing their co‑operation in the field of enforcement, particularly mutual notification of potential anticompetitive conduct (OECD, 2022[1]).
Public procurement
The Kenyan Government reports that public procurement accounts for 60% of the government’s annual budget, typically amounting to 10‑13% of GDP (National Treasury of Kenya, 2025[2]; Kenyan Public Procurement Regulatory Authority, 2023[3]). As noted by OECD Recommendation of the Council on Fighting Bid Rigging in Public Procurement [OECD/LEGAL/0396], competition in public procurement promotes efficiency, helping to ensure that goods and services offered to public entities more closely match their needs and preferences, producing benefits such as lower prices, improved quality, increased innovation, higher productivity and, more generally, “value for money” to the benefit of users of public goods and services, and taxpayers.
The lack of co‑operation between the CAK and the PPRA suggests there is a lack of alignment with the OECD Recommendation of the Council on Fighting Bid Rigging in Public Procurement [OECD/LEGAL/0396]. Among the activities suggested in the Recommendation that are currently not being undertaken includes:
Establishing a working relationship between the competition and public procurement authorities to report suspected collusion, with the confidence that the authorities will help investigate and prosecute wrongdoing.
Reviewing the level of competition in past tenders to inform tender planning.
Using electronic procurement systems for all stages of the procurement process to the extent possible.
Keeping reliable and comprehensive procurement databases.
Developing digital filters or using screening tools to detect bidding cartels.
Considering the use of debarment as a sanction for firms and individuals that have engaged in bid rigging in the past.
A number of stakeholders expressed the view that the widespread concerns about corruption in public procurement in Kenya meant that there should be greater efforts to enhance co‑operation between the CAK and the PPRA.10 Competition and integrity in public procurement reinforce each other, and the formal and informal co‑operation of public sector authorities with relevant policy and law enforcement powers is essential.
Public Prosecutor
The current level of co‑operation between the CAK and the Public Prosecutor inhibits the competition authority’s capacity to effectively enforce the Competition Act. Currently there is no mechanism to legally enforce obligations to comply with CAK requests, not obstruct CAK activities, or comply with CAK decisions and orders. The ability to impose sanctions for this behaviour is considered as best practices, such as under the OECD Recommendation of the Council concerning Effective Action against Hard Core Cartels [OECD/LEGAL/0452].
As the CAK is currently hesitant to issue the maximum civil sanction for cartel conduct (i.e. 10% of turnover), there is little likelihood that the competition authority will explore the use of the criminal sanctions regime that exists under the Competition Act. In the longer-term the CAK and Public Prosecutor should explore whether the use of criminal enforcement may be an effective way of adequately deterring hard core cartel and bid rigging conduct in Kenya, as suggested in the OECD Recommendation of the Council concerning Effective Action against Hard Core Cartels [OECD/LEGAL/0452].
Consumer protection
During OECD fact-finding, no stakeholders raised specific concerns relating to the co‑operation between the overlapping competition and consumer protection functions of the CAK. Indeed, external stakeholders that mentioned consumer protection were generally complimentary of the CAK in this regard. They highlighted that the CAK was generally willing to engage with advocacy and interest groups, and that the CAK was more responsive to complaints than when consumers attempted to engage with relevant sector regulators. As noted in Chapter 2, the broader challenge the CAK faces in relation to its competition and consumer protection functions is balancing allocation of resources between these two mandates and concerns raised by stakeholders that this is contributing to the low level of competition enforcement activities by the CAK.
10.2. International co‑operation
Copy link to 10.2. International co‑operation10.2.1. Law and practice
Co‑operation with supranational competition authorities
This Peer Review report was drafted from June to September 2025, a time of major change for the supranational competition policy and enforcement landscape in Africa.
Kenya is a member of three trade blocs that have established or are working to establish supranational competition frameworks. These are the:
Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa (COMESA), which has established the COMESA Competition Commission (CCC). The CCC has been active since 2013.
East African Community (EAC), which is currently in the process of establishing an operational EAC Competition Authority (EACCA). The first area of enforcement for the EACCA (merger control) is scheduled to commence in November 2025.
African Continental Free Trade Area (AfCFTA), which includes a plan to establish the AfCFTA Competition Authority in the future.
The CAK has entered into MoUs with the CCC (signed in March 2022) and the EACCA (signed in May 2023).
Chapter 5 of this Peer Review provides a detailed description and analysis of the CAK’s international co‑operation in merger control. This is the one of enforcement co‑operation area where the CAK is active (currently only with the CCC as the EACCA framework is not yet operational). Chapter 5 also highlights the longer-term challenges Kenya and the CAK face with potentially three overlapping supranational frameworks as well as its domestic framework.
In addition to mergers, the CAK has also co‑operated with the CCC in other activities, including:
The CAK conducted the Kenyan data collection, providing technical expertise, and disseminating findings domestically in a CCC market study into the fertiliser and vegetable oil sectors.
The CCC facilitated the CAK’s fact finding across COMESA member states as part of the CAK’s market inquiry into the regional shipping, trucking and haulage sector.
The CAK conducted a compliance check on behalf of the CCC as part of an investigation into anticompetitive practices in the alcoholic beverages sector.
The CAK facilitated requests for information that were issued to Kenyan healthcare firms as part of a CCC market study.
The CAK provided technical expertise when the CCC was reviewing an exemption application in the aviation sector.
The CAK conducted a compliance check in Kenya with the CCC related to a merger in the drinks market, visiting bottling plants to ensure compliance with the conditions of the merger.
As one of the more experienced competition authorities in Africa, the CAK has also hosted delegations of staff from the COMESA region to assist in capacity building efforts in the region.
The CAK expects to begin formal co‑operation on merger clearance with the EACCA once this supranational authority commences operations in November 2025.
Co‑operation beyond supranational frameworks
To date, the CAK has not directly engaged in international enforcement co‑operation beyond its supranational framework with the CCC.
However, the CAK entered into an MoU with the Competition Commission of South Africa in October 2016. Since then, the CAK and South African authority have co‑operated on capacity building and best practices dissemination activities.
The CAK also signed an MoU with the Japan Fair Trade Commission in June 2016 which includes provisions on the exchange of information and facilitating training programmes. Since then there has some been capacity building activities for CAK technical staff.
Co‑operation through participation in international fora
Kenya has been an invitee of the OECD Competition Committee since 2014 and has consistently attended the OECD Global Forum on Competition for the past five years. The CAK has submitted eight contributions to Global Forum on Competition sessions in that time. In the June 2025 Competition Committee session on Mobile Payment Services, the CAK gave an extended presentation to delegates about Kenya’s experiences in this sector.
Kenya is also a founding member and sits on the steering committee of the African Competition Forum (ACF). Founded in 2011, the ACF is an informal network of African national and multinational competition authorities. Its principal objective is to promote the adoption of competition principles in the implementation of national and regional economic policies of African countries.
Staff within the CAK have acted as contributors to a number of the ACF’s cross-country research studies into sectors. To date, these have covered:
Airlines (African Competition Forum, 2021[4])
International roaming charges (African Competition Forum, 2023[5])
Generic pharmaceuticals (African Competition Forum, 2023[6])
Agriculture and agro-processing (African Competition Forum, 2024[7])
Construction markets (African Competition Forum, 2020[8])
Kenya is also a member of the International Competition Network and participates in its various working groups. The CAK currently co-chairs the ICN Advocacy Working Group and is a member of the steering group for the ICN special project on Food and Agriculture Markets. In February 2024, the CAK hosted an ICN Advocacy workshop, with over 200 participants from 46 jurisdictions attending.
Kenya also participates in the UNCTAD Intergovernmental Group of Experts on Competition Law and Policy. The CAK has attended all three sessions in the past five years and submitted a total of 10 contributions.
10.2.2. Analysis on international co‑operation
International co‑operation with foreign competition authorities is also important as businesses and supply chains cross increasingly national borders. The significant benefits of international co‑operation are detailed in the Recommendation Concerning International Co‑operation on Competition Investigations and Proceedings [OECD/LEGAL/0408].
Chapter 5 of this Peer Review provides specific observations about the CAK’s merger control practices. This includes strengthening co‑operation in certain aspects of cross-border merger control that involves one of the supranational competition authorities and ensuring that the addition of new supranational frameworks does not create legal uncertainty and cost burdens on stakeholders.
More broadly, stakeholders were complimentary of the CAK’s international co‑operation practices. They were viewed as diligent and willing to assist where they can, particularly for newer and smaller competition authorities in the region.
Despite the concerns raised by stakeholders about the CAK that are detailed throughout this Peer Review on a wide range of aspects, many of the international stakeholders consulted during OECD fact-finding insisted that the CAK must be assessed against the counterfactual. The CAK remains one of the more experienced, most staffed and highest funded competition authorities on the continent. Accordingly, while there may be many challenges the CAK faces and there are many things it could improve, for the region it still is seen as a regional leader that other authorities seek to learn from.
References
[7] African Competition Forum (2024), ACF Cross-country Study on Trade Flow Patterns and Regional Value Chains in the Agriculture and Agro-processing Sector, https://www.compcom.co.za/wp-content/uploads/2024/12/ACF-Agricultural-Report_Full.pdf (accessed on 12 November 2025).
[6] African Competition Forum (2023), Cross-country Research Study – Competition in the Generic Pharmaceutical Industry, https://www.compcom.co.za/wp-content/uploads/2023/08/pharmaceutical-report-final-5.pdf (accessed on 12 November 2025).
[5] African Competition Forum (2023), International Roaming Charges, https://www.compcom.co.za/wp-content/uploads/2023/08/ACF-roaming-Study-Final-Book-print-3.pdf (accessed on 12 November 2025).
[4] African Competition Forum (2021), ACF Cross-country Study on Airlines, https://www.compcom.co.za/wp-content/uploads/2021/10/ACF-CROSS-COUNTRY-STUDY-ON-AIRLINES_amend-12.pdf (accessed on 12 November 2025).
[8] African Competition Forum (2020), ACF Cross-country Study on Challenges in African Construction Markets, https://www.compcom.co.za/wp-content/uploads/2020/04/ACF_Competition-challenges-in-African-construction-markets-2019.pdf (accessed on 12 November 2025).
[10] Kenyan Ethics and Anti-Corruption Commission (2015), An Evaluation of Corruption in Public Procurement: A Kenyan Experience, https://eacc.go.ke/default/wp-content/uploads/2018/09/Evaluation-of-corruption-in-the-public-procurement.pdf.
[3] Kenyan Public Procurement Regulatory Authority (2023), Public Consultation/Invitation of Comments and Feedback on the Proposed Public Procurement Capacity Building Levy, https://ppra.go.ke/capacity-building-levy/ (accessed on 12 November 2025).
[2] National Treasury of Kenya (2025), The launch of the Electronic Government Procurement System, https://newsite.treasury.go.ke/launch-electronic-government-procurement-system (accessed on 12 November 2025).
[1] OECD (2022), “Interactions between Competition Authorities and Sector Regulators ”, OECD Roundtables on Competition Policy Papers, No. 285, OECD Publishing, Paris, https://doi.org/10.1787/b85b4140-en.
[9] Transparency International (2024), Our Work in Kenya, https://www.transparency.org/en/countries/kenya.
Notes
Copy link to Notes← 1. Kenya Information and Communications Act (2012), p.p. VIC.
← 2. Energy Act (2019), ss 10(m), 10(bb).
← 3. As underlined by the Competition Tribunal in Telcom Kenya Limited & another v Competition Authority of Kenya, Case No. CT/005/2020, decision of 24 April 2020.
← 4. Central Bank of Kenya (Amendment) Act (2021).
← 5. OECD Global Forum 2022, Interactions Between Competition Authorities and Sector Regulators – Contribution from Kenya, https://one.oecd.org/document/DAF/COMP/GF/WD(2022)17/en/pdf.
← 6. Constitution of Kenya, s 22.
← 7. Competition Act, ss 21(9), 22(6), 24(3).
← 8. Competition Act, ss 87, 88.
← 9. Competition Act, ss 54, 89.