This section provides an overview of the Canadian PBO’s core functions, mandate, resources, and organisational structure, highlighting capacity and workforce challenges. It also describes how the Office prioritises requests, manages productivity, and ensures quality, offering insight into how the PBO delivers its mandate and the operational adjustments needed to sustain its performance in the years ahead.
OECD review of the Canadian Parliamentary Budget Office
Expanded in 2017, the mandate of the Parliamentary Budget Officer is defined by the Parliament of Canada Act. It can be broken down into three core areas of responsibility:
1. Independent fiscal analysis: The Parliamentary Budget Officer is mandated to provide regular non-partisan, independent analysis to Parliament on the federal budget, the government’s estimates, and other federal financial documents; and matters of significant national economic or fiscal importance, as outlined in the Parliamentary Budget Officer’s annual work plan.
2. Parliamentary requests: At the request of designated parliamentary committees or individual parliamentarians, the Parliamentary Budget Officer conducts research on national finances, government estimates, or the financial cost of any proposals within Parliament’s jurisdiction.
3. Election proposal costing: During the pre-election period, the Parliamentary Budget Officer responds to requests from political parties and independent Members of Parliament (MPs) to estimate the cost of campaign proposals.
2.1.1. Independent fiscal analysis
Since its inception, the PBO has developed a suite of regular reports to support parliamentary oversight and enhance fiscal transparency. Initially created in response to committee motions and requests from parliamentarians, the topics covered by these reports have since been formally incorporated into the Parliamentary Budget Officer’s mandate. The PBO currently produces nine regular reports, including:
Budget and fall economic statement analysis (two reports): Compare government and PBO projections, assess fiscal impacts of new measures, and evaluate economic assumptions. These reports identify key issues for parliamentarians and increase understanding around budget assumptions.
Main and supplementary estimates analysis (four reports): Track spending implementation and major allocations, providing historical context and valuable context for committee scrutiny.
Economic and fiscal outlook (two reports): Provide independent projections to support credible fiscal policy debate and as the baseline for election costings.
Fiscal sustainability report (one report): Assess long-term viability of federal and subnational finances, public pension sustainability, and required policy adjustments to avoid unsustainable debt. It offers parliamentarians a clear view of future fiscal risks and trade-offs over the long term.
In addition to its regular reporting, the PBO publishes approximately 20 self-initiated reports annually, as outlined in its work plan. These reports address issues of significant relevance to Canada’s finances and economy, and reflect interests expressed by parliamentarians. The PBO also publishes “Additional Analysis” notes that provide brief analyses (e.g. explainers, and follow-up information) on material topics. In response to positive feedback from parliamentarians and stakeholders to the PBO’s costing service during the 2019 and 2021 federal elections, the PBO continues to publish short costing notes regularly. During the COVID-19 pandemic, the PBO published a record 73 self-initiated costing notes in 2020-2021, reflecting the rapid pace of government initiatives. Since then, the number has stabilised at around 15 self-initiated costing notes per year (see Figure 1).
Source: PBO correspondence
The PBO website complements its publications with a dedicated section of interactive tools designed to support fiscal analysis and policy costing (see Box 1). Covering topics such as the impact of federal tax rates on budgetary revenue and trends in personnel spending, they provide parliamentarians and the public with accessible, data-driven insights that enhance understanding of Canada’s fiscal landscape. Stakeholders note that these tools are useful but could benefit from greater promotion.
The PBO provides a suite of interactive tools designed to support data-driven fiscal decision-making, enabling parliamentarians and the public to assess the financial implications of policy choices quickly and accurately. Key tools include:
Ready Reckoner: Estimates impact on federal revenues from changes to tax rates, credits, and brackets.
Personnel Expenditure Analysis Tool: Compares trends in government personnel spending across departments.
Public Debt Charges Calculator: Calculates interest costs from new policy proposals or budget measures.
Parliamentary Financial Cycle Navigator: Tracks fiscal-year activities and links to key documents and reports.
Force Structure Model: Projects personnel, operations, and sustainment costs for Canadian Armed Forces capabilities.
FSR At-a-Glance: Visualises long-term fiscal sustainability drivers for provinces and territories.
Selection of tools on the PBO website
2.1.2. Parliamentary requests
A core component of the Parliamentary Budget Officer’s mandate is to respond to requests from parliamentarians and parliamentary committees. Under the Parliament of Canada Act, the Parliamentary Budget Officer is required to undertake research and analysis on matters related to the nation’s finances or economy when requested by designated committees, including:
The Standing Committee on National Finance (Senate)
The Standing Committee on Finance (House of Commons)
The Standing Committee on Public Accounts (House of Commons)
The Standing Committee on Government Operations and Estimates (House of Commons)
Additionally, the Parliamentary Budget Officer must respond to requests from any committee mandated to consider government estimates and estimate the financial cost of proposals related to matters under Parliament’s jurisdiction when requested by a committee, individual senators or members of the House of Commons. This service is highly valued by stakeholders across Parliament who see it as integral to their ability to scrutinise the government budget and table legislative proposals.
The PBO receives between 11 and 48 parliamentary research requests annually. The majority of requests are for assistance interpreting government financial information and reports (such as appropriation acts, estimates and budgets all within the public domain). Of these requests, only a small percentage require significant analysis to merit a publication (see Figure 2), supplementing the PBO’s regular and self-initiated publications. Parliament-initiated reports reached its highest levels in 2020 during the COVID-19 pandemic, reflecting uplifts in demand for fiscal analysis during moments of crisis.
Source: PBO correspondence
2.1.3. Election proposal costing
The 2017 amendments to the Parliament of Canada Act granted the Parliamentary Budget Officer a broader mandate to estimate the financial cost of election campaign proposals. Once Parliament is dissolved for a general election, the Parliamentary Budget Officer is obligated, upon request of a political party or independent member, to prepare estimates of the financial cost of election campaign proposals that the party or independent member is considering making.
This exercise aims to enhance transparency and public trust in the democratic process by providing non-partisan, independent costings of campaign commitments. The PBO has conducted three Election Proposal Costing (EPC) exercises to date, in 2019, 2021 and most recently, 2025. The latter two were snap elections with 35-day costing periods instead of the usual 120 days. Despite these compressed timelines, the PBO maintained a high level of output (see Table 1).
Note: PBO costings are published only after a request is completed and the party confirms the proposal has been announced.
Source: PBO correspondence
Stakeholders were mostly positive about the PBO’s EPC exercise, noting that it provides a trusted baseline for election platforms, enhancing transparency and comparability and improving debate quality. However, some stakeholders note that uptake by parties is still limited, and it may create the appearance of a “stamp of approval” for party platforms given that only partial elements are costed, and potential behavioural impacts are not incorporated for every proposal. This is particularly the case during snap elections, where there are only 35 days for parties to submit costing requests. A recurring suggestion from stakeholders was to explore mechanisms that would allow costings to occur outside the compressed timelines of an election period.
In the absence of a fixed election date, one option could be for the PBO to undertake confidential pre-writ costings for political parties, recognising the iterative nature of election platform development over each parliamentary term. This approach is consistent with practices in other jurisdictions such as Australia (see Box 2). At present, the Library of Parliament provides this service, though it does not have information access powers, which limits its ability to produce comprehensive analyses.
A key driver of the creation of the Australian PBO was the perceived need for greater fiscal transparency and accountability regarding the cost of election promises.
The Australian federal legislative framework for election costings has three core elements: confidential pre-election costings; public costings undertaken during the election campaign (also known as the “caretaker period”) and a post-election manifesto costing report.
A unique feature of the Australian approach is the ability for parliamentarians and parliamentary parties to access costing services on a confidential basis outside the caretaker period. This stands in contrast with other election platform costing services that generally have prescribed periods for costing election proposals or undertaking platform analysis closely aligned with the election date.
The Australian model allows the PBO to support political parties in developing new policies throughout the parliamentary session, allowing them to publicly release fully costed policies before an election in the knowledge that the costings have been professionally prepared by the PBO. This results in greater disclosure of election commitments prior to an election and places greater accountability on the parliamentarians and parliamentary parties concerned compared to the pre-PBO regime.
Beyond the PBO’s confidential analysis, the legislation also provides for two other public reports. First, during the caretaker period for a general election, the PBO publishes costings requested by parliamentary parties and independent parliamentarians. This provides flexibility for the political parties to fine-tune their political manifestos in response to developments during the campaign. As well, legislation requires a post-election report on the cost of parties’ election commitments to be published within 30 days after the end of the caretaker period. These mandatory ex-post summary reports provide an added incentive for political parties to meaningfully engage with the PBO prior to the election campaign.
The Australian PBO’s confidential costing service is heavily used by Parliamentarians. Over the 12 months before the May 2025 general election, the PBO completed around 1,100 costings, of which the vast majority were confidential. Confidential costings comprise at least two thirds of the work of the PBO’s 25 analytical staff, the remainder mostly being devoted to publicly released reports on a range of fiscal topics.
Implementing such a model in Canada would require legislative changes, as well as careful consideration of resource implications, as it would necessitate reallocating capacity away from the Parliamentary Budget Officer’s core mandate of supporting parliamentary business. However, transferring responsibility for confidential costings from the Library of Parliament to the PBO may also generate efficiencies by reducing duplication of models and analytical resources.
Enabling the PBO to prepare confidential policy costings between election periods could improve responsiveness during snap elections, as models would already be in place and many costings would already be prepared. Providing parliamentarians with greater control over whether their costings remain confidential or are publicly released may even result in more costings being published, thereby strengthening parliamentary debate and supporting the Parliamentary Budget Officer’s mandate. A key consideration would be how to prevent political parties from releasing confidential PBO reports at times that serve their interests, with limited oversight over how the information is communicated. Before any changes are made to the EPC exercise, a more detailed assessment of whether political parties require additional public resources to develop their election platforms could also be warranted.
Operating with an annual budget of CAD 7.87 million and a workforce of approximately 40 professionals, the PBO has more than doubled its budget and staff levels prior to the 2017 mandate expansion. In general, it is viewed by stakeholders as delivering strong value for money.
The PBO’s analytical work is organised into four streams: Budgetary Analysis, Policy Costing, Fiscal Analysis, and Economic Analysis. Leadership arrangements include four stream directors supported by two general directors, each overseeing two streams (see Annex C). Collaboration across streams is actively encouraged to maintain flexibility and avoid silos, meaning analysts often work on projects in multiple streams concurrently. Project delivery is co-ordinated through a weekly updated work plan that sets out assignments and tracks progress.
Resourcing pressures are evident. Staff report that workload patterns have shifted: peaks and troughs have flattened, leaving analysts under sustained pressure throughout the year. While the PBO has met its expanded mandate, this has relied on higher work intensity, reducing time for non-core tasks such as model maintenance and improvement.
Growing demand from parliamentarians reflects the PBO’s increasing relevance, but it also places significant pressure on workload capacity. Despite its high output, the Parliamentary Budget Officer finds it challenging to decline requests from parliamentarians and committees that technically fall outside of the legislative requirements, often taking on out-of-scope parliamentary requests on a proactive, or self-initiated, basis. The persistent nature of these requests means that important areas of public spending can receive limited scrutiny. Addressing these challenges requires two strategies: systematic application of prioritisation criteria and enhanced productivity.
2.3.1. Prioritisation
The PBO has a structured framework for prioritising requests (see Annex D), but it is rarely applied on a strict basis. Given resource constraints and rising demand, maintaining this framework and applying it more rigorously (e.g. by reducing out-of-scope parliamentary requests) would help ensure that work focuses on the most consequential issues.
The framework is built on two core principles:
Materiality: The extent to which a request could significantly affect government finances, estimates, or the Canadian economy.
Contribution potential: The degree to which a request enhances budget transparency, informs parliamentary debate, and supports sound fiscal policy.
Some OECD peers also have additional criterion, for example, that the institution should have enough expertise and data on the subject.1
Under the Canadian PBO framework, requests meeting these criteria are ranked by relevance to a broad group of parliamentarians, fiscal significance, and whether they address areas of risk or lack government-published impact assessments. Priority goes to proposals from the government, Senate public bills, and private members’ bills on the House of Commons order of precedence. Stakeholders emphasised that the current practice of favouring committee requests over individual members should remain but felt that it could be more clearly communicated.
To make this system effective, the PBO should apply the framework more rigorously and publish clear guidance to manage expectations. Integrating prioritisation discussions into workforce planning and resource allocation meetings would help maintain focus. Communicating the framework widely would support parliamentarians in submitting requests that meet legislative and analytical requirements. This could include briefings or short guidance notes for incoming committee members and analysts. These steps would improve efficiency, reduce resource strain, and ensure that the PBO’s efforts deliver maximum value to Parliament.
2.3.2. Productivity
The PBO’s current processes sit between the initial and repeatable stages of maturity. While templates and models exist, workflows continue to rely heavily on informal practices. At the same time, sustained pressure on resources may at some point limit the ability of the Office to absorb new demands or respond quickly to emerging issues. This makes it an opportune moment for the PBO to look at its practices and processes to identify opportunities for streamlining, formalisation and greater efficiency.
A comprehensive assessment of areas where there is scope to improve productivity would help the PBO determine how best to manage rising demand without compromising the quality of its analysis. It would also support a more strategic allocation of resources toward work that delivers the greatest value to Parliament. Potential opportunities for improvement include:
Leveraging technology: Using AI tools for routine tasks, as well as translation and chart automation could help drive improvements in productivity and reduce production time without sacrificing accuracy.
Streamlining review processes: Clarifying roles and accountability to reduce duplication and improve quality.
Model management: Moving from reactive updates to proactive lifecycle management, supported by documentation and dedicated resources.
Standardising style and writing: Introducing a style guide and templates to ensure consistency and reduce editing time.
Improved productivity will help the PBO keep pace with rapid government program roll-outs by providing timely, complementary analysis. The PBO’s swift COVID-19 response offers useful lessons (see Box 3).
During the COVID-19 pandemic, the PBO demonstrated remarkable agility and relevance in its analytical work. From the onset of the crisis in March 2020, using a “whole-of-office” approach, the PBO swiftly pivoted to produce timely cost estimates and scenario analyses that helped Canadians and parliamentarians understand the fiscal and economic implications of the pandemic.
Over the course of the year, the PBO published 48 COVID-19 cost estimates and six dedicated reports, alongside additional analyses in response to parliamentary requests. These efforts were particularly critical in the absence of a federal budget in 2020. The PBO also developed a COVID-19 Monitoring Framework to track government spending and implementation of pandemic-related measures. The launch of the PBO’s COVID-19 Analysis Tool further enhanced transparency and accessibility, consolidating all pandemic-related fiscal products in one platform. This proactive and adaptive approach ensured that the PBO’s work remained relevant, rigorous, and responsive throughout the crisis.
Lessons and skills learned during the pandemic may prove valuable for the PBO in coming years. Amid ongoing economic uncertainty and the government’s rapid program rollout, the PBO’s proven responsiveness will be essential for ensuring accountability in future government spending.
Maintaining rigorous quality control while providing analysis on a timely basis is essential for the PBO to uphold its credibility and influence. Its work often involves complex fiscal analysis and emerging policy domains, making accuracy and transparency critical for parliamentary debate and public trust.
To further ensure quality, the PBO relies on three pillars: transparency, expertise and peer review (PBO, n.d.[2]):
Transparency: Reports include details on assumptions and methods, enabling scrutiny.
Expertise: Analysts are highly qualified, typically holding advanced degrees and public service experience.
Peer review: Engaging external experts to review work when appropriate.
2.4.1. Transparency
Transparency is central to the PBO’s approach. Reports include details on assumptions and methods, enabling external scrutiny and fostering trust. Stakeholders generally find this to be true; however, some note occasional gaps in explaining assumptions or methods. In these cases, the office is responsive and provides clarification when asked. A review of recent publications confirms this perception: while legislative costing notes consistently provide clear methodological explanations, other reports often lack dedicated sections or accessible links to supporting material. This makes methodological details and data sources difficult to trace in some instances. The PBO could introduce internal guidelines to standardise how methodologies and assumptions are presented across reports. Clear templates and minimum standards would improve consistency, enhance clarity for stakeholders, and maintain the PBO’s reputation for transparency.
2.4.2. Expertise
The PBO relies on highly qualified economists and financial analysts whose expertise underpins its credibility and ability to address complex fiscal issues.
Attracting and retaining junior analysts has generally been manageable, with most recruited from academia and trained internally. However, advancement beyond the advisor level is limited, which may create retention pressures as cohorts hired during the 2017 expansion approach the top of the current classification structure. Recruiting senior talent can be more challenging, reflecting career mobility considerations rather than an absence of qualified candidates.
More frequent secondments could help maintain familiarity with evolving government processes. While interchange programs have supported junior-level placements, senior-level exchanges remain limited. Joining the PBO is often perceived as a longer-term career move, with relatively limited movement back into the core public service. Some IFIs, such as Italy’s PBO, do not have this issue as they have mandatory rights to second selected staff from Parliament and other public bodies, enabling access to senior and specialised expertise as needed.
In light of these challenges, formalising knowledge management should be a heightened priority. The PBO should reduce reliance on informal mentoring for operational training, accompanying it with more structured documentation of models and processes. Addressing these gaps would strengthen institutional knowledge, collaboration, and connectivity to evolving practices. It could also be useful to work with the government to see how senior-level interchange opportunities might be made more attractive.
2.4.3. Peer review
The PBO has a long‑established peer review process, with multiple stages of scrutiny (see Annex E). However, the process does not fully safeguard against error and some external stakeholders remain unclear about the scope and depth of review applied to different types of outputs. Internally, evolving staff roles and reliance on informal practices have occasionally blurred responsibilities, creating risks of both excessive review and gaps in scrutiny.
Strengthening documentation and communication around the review process would help address these concerns. While the diverse nature of PBO projects does not lend itself to a fully standardised approach, there is clear scope to clarify expectations. The PBO could publish a high‑level description of its review framework that sets out:
Each stage of review and its objectives;
The level of review required for different types of outputs, particularly for significant and complex analysis; and
The principles governing internal and external consultation.
Individual reports could also include a short note indicating the nature and extent of any external review. Periodic assessment of the framework would help ensure it remains fit for purpose and continues to support analytical quality and reliability.
A further consideration for the PBO is whether establishing an expert advisory panel could strengthen the rigour of its analysis and enhance its professional reputation. Several OECD peers use such panels for external review (see Box 4). These structures can add value by providing periodic methodological review and timely expert advice, helping to reinforce quality without compromising delivery timelines. Drawing on the PBO’s legislative authority to appoint advisers or panels would align its practices with international good standards, reduce the risk of errors, and bolster stakeholder confidence in its outputs.
In particularly significant and complex areas, the PBO could also consider releasing discussion papers rather than final reports. This would build on their current practice of publishing “Additional Analysis” notes in new areas of work and allow deeper exploration of themes, as a way to encourage participation, generate diverse thinking and shape its subsequent authoritative analysis.
Several OECD IFIs use expert advisory panels to reinforce analytical quality and credibility, though their shape and function vary, as illustrated by the following three examples.
United States CBO: Strengthening economic projections
The Congressional Budget Office (CBO) has maintained a Panel of Economic Advisors for more than four decades. The panel brings together 20 to 25 leading experts from academia, the private sector, and economic forecasting firms, appointed for two‑year terms. It meets twice a year to review preliminary economic projections, present recent research, and provide external challenge. These discussions serve as an important input to the CBO’s official economic projections and enhance the robustness of its Budget and Economic Outlook. CBO staff also consult panel members between meetings as needed.
Lithuania’s BMD: Ensuring methodological rigour and peer review
Established in 2016, the Budget Monitoring Department’s (BMD) Advisory Panel strengthens independence and methodological rigour. Composed of domestic and international experts in macroeconomics and public finance, the panel provides methodological guidance, conducts peer review of forecasting and fiscal assessments, and supports transparent communication. Its contributions help ensure that BMD outputs align with international standards and maintain high technical credibility.
Spain’s AIReF: Safeguarding against institutional and strategic risks
Since 2015, AIReF has had an Advisory Board composed of academics and former senior officials, appointed for renewable three‑year terms. The current board includes 11 unpaid members with experience across government, academia, statistics, the central bank, and the financial sector. The board meets several times a year to advise on strategic and methodological issues. It has been particularly valuable in assessing institutional risks, including the implications of AIReF’s expanded workload following the addition of spending review responsibilities.
The PBO plays a critical role in strengthening fiscal transparency and parliamentary scrutiny through its core functions: independent fiscal analysis, responding to parliamentary requests, and election platform costing. While the PBO generally delivers high-quality outputs, improvements could help to sustain performance and credibility in the face of growing demand. Two areas stand out:
Prioritisation and productivity: PBO resources are becoming more and more stretched. More rigorous application of the current framework for prioritising requests would help to free up resources for analysis in the most strategic areas. At the same time, informal workflows and limited process standardisation constrain efficiency. The PBO can consider how it might leverage technology, a streamlined review process, proactive model management, and standardised templates to help boost efficiency and maintain quality under rising demand.
Quality assurance: The PBO’s peer review approach supports strong analytical quality, but does not fully safeguard against error and has limited external visibility. Additionally, blurred internal roles create risks of inconsistent scrutiny and duplication. To address this, the PBO should formalise and communicate its review framework, clearly defining the level of review required for each type of output, particularly for significant and complex analysis where external review can help manage higher methodological risk. The framework should be reviewed periodically to ensure it remains fit for purpose.
Other recommendations include standardising methodological reporting, formalising knowledge management, and looking at how senior-level interchange opportunities with government could be made more attractive. Together, these measures would help the PBO maintain expertise and manage growing demand without compromising independence or quality, ensuring it continues to deliver high-value analysis for Parliament and the public.
← 1. For example, see the Netherlands CPB’s in Article 8 at: https://wetten.overheid.nl/BWBR0031972/2012-04-01 and the Victorian PBO’s at: https://pbo.vic.gov.au/prioritisation_framework.