This chapter provides a detailed overview of the present and future trajectories of indicators for each dimension of the triple planetary crisis. A select set of key indicators is chosen to create a dashboard that allows for a quick, clear overview of the state of the environment at both global and regional levels. This dashboard also highlights how the different dimensions of the crisis are interconnected and mutually reinforcing. Additionally, the chapter addresses the challenges of assessing the economic impacts of environmental degradation, offering some estimates based on existing literature.
Environmental Outlook on the Triple Planetary Crisis
Stakes, Evolution and Policy Linkages
Abstract
This chapter links socioeconomic trends and specific drivers (Chapter 2) to the evolution of environmental pressures and subsequently changes in the state of climate change, biodiversity loss and pollution to 2050. Section 3.2 emphasises how pressures simultaneously contribute to dimensions of the triple planetary crisis, thus highlighting trade-offs and synergies. The following Sections 3.3 through 3.5 examine the current and projected future state of each dimension individually – climate change, biodiversity loss, and pollution – before integrating them in a comprehensive assessment in Section 3.6. Where available, projections of selected impacts and cross-cutting topics such as health, water, and adaptation are presented to provide further insight into the anticipated consequences of ongoing environmental pressures.
The socioeconomic trends and specific drivers of climate change, biodiversity loss and pollution, as discussed in Chapter 2, are associated with multiple environmental pressures as part of the driver-pressure-state-impact-response methodological framework outlined in Chapter 1. For instance, providing food for a growing population drives an increase in agricultural production, which puts pressure on the environment in terms of emissions, land use change, and nitrogen and phosphorus pollution. Adding to the complexity, one environmental pressure can affect more than one dimension of the triple planetary crisis. Methane (CH4), for example, is a greenhouse gas (GHG), and at the same is a precursor for ground-level ozone; CH4 emissions thus connect climate change and air pollution.
Encompassing a broad range of indicators is therefore essential to understand the evolution of the environmental pressures behind climate change, biodiversity loss and pollution. This section aims to offer such a view, focusing on the evolution of these pressures between 2020 and 2050. It draws on carefully selected indicators that, while not being exhaustive, provide an informative snapshot, enabling a high-level overview of the evolution of key factors behind the crisis (see Annex 3.A) and especially their interactions.1 Together, these indicators describe a wide set of pressures on air, land, water and soil that lead to environmental degradation. The set of indicators used in the modelling toolbox is presented in Table 3.1 (see Annex Table 3.A.1 for the associated units).
Combined, the selected indicators paint a mostly worsening picture at the global level. Under current policies, global environmental pressures are projected to rise between 2020 and 2050 across most dimensions, i.e. most bars extend beyond the circle that represents the 2020 value in Figure 3.1. This implies current policies are insufficient to safeguard human and planetary health. Pressures primarily related to air pollution (emissions of BC, SO2 and NOx) are the exception.
Global evolution of selected indicators of environmental pressures, 2020-2050
Note: The length of the bars represents the evolution from 2020 to 2050. The circle indicates the 2020 level. For instance, under current policies, NH3 emissions increase by 43% globally over the 2020-2050 period, while NOx emissions are expected to decrease by 10%. Annex 3.A provides detailed values and units for the reported indicators.
Source: Environmental Outlook modelling toolbox.
Mismanaged plastic waste and land covered by built-up area exhibit the most significant projected increases over the 2020-2050 period, rising by 68% and 49%, respectively. The growth in mismanaged plastic waste is substantial, driven by a doubling of global plastics use by 2050 (see Chapter 2). Although modest improvements in waste management are projected under current policies, plastic leakage to the environment continues to grow. The expansion of built-up area, while still representing a relatively small proportion of total land, is also projected to be considerable. Urbanisation tends to contribute to deforestation (Hosonuma et al., 2012[1]) and disrupts local ecosystems and wildlife in complex ways (see Box 2.3 in Chapter 2 for details). More broadly, land use change is one of the leading drivers of biodiversity loss and is projected to continue playing this role under current policies. Cropland area, in particular, is expected to increase globally by 13% by 2050, adding further pressure on pollution and biodiversity. Despite this expansion, current policies aimed at limiting deforestation and promoting re- and afforestation – driven by both climate change and biodiversity goals – are projected to drive a 4% reduction in CO2 emissions from Agriculture, Forestry and Other Land Use (AFOLU) over the same period.
Global emissions of air pollutants BC and SO2 are projected to decline significantly (by 42% and 64%, respectively), while NH3 emissions are expected to rise sharply, increasing by 43% globally, not least due to increases in livestock. These contrasting trends reflect differences in underlying drivers and the uneven adoption of new technologies. BC and SO2 are primarily associated with energy use, and their decline is largely due to the increasing uptake of renewables and improved (end-of-pipe) emission control technologies, related to current policies to reduce pollutant emissions. These advances also contribute to a global reduction in NOx emissions (‑10%). In contrast, NH3 emissions are mainly linked to agricultural activities, particularly fertiliser use and livestock farming, and are not expected to benefit from advances in the energy system. Other agriculture-related indicators, including CH4, N2O and phosphorus delivery2 also show projected increases, even if more moderate (5%, 11 and 20% respectively).
Meanwhile, global CO2 emissions are projected to continue rising over the coming decades under current policies, despite a reduced contribution by AFOLU. Although technological improvements reduce emissions intensity at the sectoral level, they are insufficient to counterbalance the overall increase in fossil energy use (as projected in Chapter 2), unlike the more favourable trends seen for several air pollutant emissions.
Significant regional variations in environmental pressures are apparent (Figure 3.2). The global trend, as shown in Figure 3.1, is depicted by a black dot and serves as a reference point for comparison. To further aid interpretation, the figure also includes a colour scale indicating the regional intensity of each indicator in 2050, ranging from dark purple indicating for the highest intensity across the regions to yellow for the lowest.3 This dual representation allows for a nuanced comparison, capturing both the magnitude of regional change between 2020 and 2050 and the relative intensity of each indicator in 2050 compared to other regions. For instance, built-up land area is projected to more than double in Sub-Saharan Africa from 2020 to 2050, marking the largest increase among all regions (as shown by the bar extending well beyond the 2020 circle and the global average dot at 49%). However, built-up area per capita in 2050 remains among the lowest in the world, as indicated by the yellow shading, and is projected to be five times smaller than in Europe by that time.
Some trends are observed across regions. The increase of land covered by built-up area and NH3 emissions increase in all nine regions, signalling widespread challenges in reversing these pressures. Other indicators closely linked to agriculture also show rising environmental pressure across most regions. Cropland area is projected to expand in all regions except Europe, while N2O emissions and phosphorus delivery increases in six of the nine regions considered. Agriculture-related environmental pressures are projected to rise particularly in Sub-Saharan Africa, which records the highest relative increases in cropland area (+41%) and phosphorus delivery (+62%), and the second largest in CO2 emissions from AFOLU (+40%). Nonetheless, the intensity of these indicators remains among the lowest compared to other regions. Central and South America stands out as the region with the largest increase in land dedicated to pastures (+9%, equivalent to 48 million hectares) and the most significant decrease in area dedicated to forests (-64 million hectares), corresponding to annual deforestation rates comparable to those observed in recent years (FAO, 2024[2]). As a consequence, this region contributes to approximately half of global emissions of CO2 from AFOLU in 2050. While indicators strongly linked to land use and agriculture are generally projected to incur rising pressures, some regions show signs of progress over time, albeit modest in certain cases. Europe and (to some extent) East Asia experience declining pressures in terms of phosphorus delivery and N2O emissions. In addition, these two regions are projected to become net sinks of CO2 emissions from AFOLU in 2050, having been net emitters in 2020.
The results further illustrate that global progress on air pollution is not uniformly reflected in all regions. Emissions of BC and SO2 are projected to decrease in all regions. NOx emissions also show decreasing trends in most regions, with Sub-Saharan Africa and South Asia being the two exceptions. These regional differences reflect the energy drivers discussed in Chapter 2, which highlight growing fossil energy use and continued coal-based electricity generation in both regions, driven at least partially by relatively low income levels in many countries in these two regions. CO2 emissions are projected to decrease in Europe (-46% in 2050 relative to 2020), Japan, Korea and Oceania (-42%), North America (-33%) and East Asia (-18%, following a peak in 2030). They remain roughly stable in Eurasia over the period. In contrast, no peak in CO2 emissions is observed in the other regions; South Asia and Sub-Saharan Africa, in particular, more than double their CO2 emissions in 2050 with respect to 2020. The decrease in five of nine regions is not sufficient to offset increases in the remaining four regions. As a result, under current policies, global CO2 emissions are projected to increase, placing the goal of net zero emissions by 2050 out of reach. In per capita terms, the lowest CO2 emissions in 2050 are projected for Sub-Saharan Africa, Europe, and South Asia.
Regional evolution for selected indicators of environmental pressure, 2020-2050
Note: The length of the bars represents the evolution from 2020 to 2050. The circle indicates the 2020 level. The colour indicates the relative intensity of the considered indicator in each region (e.g. per capita CO2 emissions) compared to the region with the highest intensity in 2050. Black dots represent evolution at the global level. Region-indicator pair bars extending beyond the dot, imply that the region experiences faster growth than the global average over the 2020-2050 period. Environmental pressure indicators are defined in Figure 3.1. For readability, bars related to CO₂ AFOLU have been truncated for East Asia and Europe. Annex 3.A provides detailed values and units for the indicators.
Source: Environmental Outlook modelling toolbox.
3.3.1. Climate-induced temperature changes
Global surface temperatures have been increasing rapidly since 1970, outpacing any other 50-year period in at least the last 2000 years (IPCC, 2023[3]). While the warming effect of GHGs is partially offset by the cooling influence of aerosol emissions, the overall trend remains one of significant heating. In addition to global surface warming, (upper) oceans have also warmed since the 1970s. As a result of this warming in the climate system, global mean sea levels are rising at an accelerating rate. Hot extreme weather has become more frequent and more intense across most land regions since the 1950s, while cold extreme weather has become less frequent and less severe. Marine heatwaves have doubled since the 1980s. The observed frequency and intensity of heavy precipitation events have increased since the 1950s (Calvin et al., 2023[4]).
Future GHG emissions trajectories are projected to lead to an increase in the global mean temperature of approximately +2.1°C by 2050, relative to pre-industrial levels (Figure 3.3, right panel). As climate change is a long-term phenomenon with long-lasting impacts of current emissions, it is also important to look at climate effects beyond the model horizon of 2050. Assuming a continuation of current policies beyond 2050, the projected temperature increase by 2100 is projected to be +3.4°C, in line with IPCC (2023[3]) . These temperature increases far exceed the Paris Agreement’s goal of limiting “the increase in the global average temperature to well below 2°C above pre-industrial levels” and pursue efforts “to limit the temperature increase to 1.5°C above pre-industrial levels”. They also contradict the goal of achieving carbon neutrality by 2050.
Temperature increases are projected to be unevenly distributed, with mean annual temperature increases varying between +0.3°C and +4.2°C from 2020 to 2050. North-western Europe and the southern parts of South America are projected to experience the lowest increases in mean temperature, while the highest increases will occur near the North Pole, particularly in northern Europe and around the Bering Strait (Figure 3.4). Other regions of the world will also see varying degrees of warming, with three notable hot spots in mountainous areas: the Himalayas, the Ethiopian Highlands, and the Andes. As a result, by 2050, the warmest regions are expected to remain around the Equator, the Sahel, and South-East Asia, where average annual temperatures will reach 30°C. The lowest average annual temperatures are likely to remain in Greenland and Siberia, though they are projected to no longer drop below -29°C.
Foreseen global warming under current trajectories likely increases the probability of the occurrence of climate tipping-points significantly. Under a warming of more than 3°C, tipping points such as the East Antarctic Subglacial Basins collapse, the Sahel greening, or the Boreal Forest southern dieback could be breached (OECD, 2022[5]). Each of these tipping points could trigger cascading effects, such as intensifying warming or rising sea levels.
Note: In the left panel, the dots represent global emissions under current policies, as projected by the Environmental Outlook modelling toolbox. The red shaded area provided for 2025-2050 reflects the 5%-95% confidence interval of all "Current policies" scenarios from the IPCC AR6 database (Byers et al., 2022[6]). The green shaded area represents the corresponding interval of scenarios aiming to limit warming to 2°C in the IPCC AR6 database. In the right panel, the blue line shows the global temperature increase projected by the Environmental Outlook modelling toolbox. The grey lines represent increases projected for SSP2 baselines and scenarios in the IPCC AR6 database, which includes scenarios with stringent mitigation efforts.
Source: IPCC (2023[3]) and Environmental Outlook modelling toolbox.
Mean annual temperature in 2050 (left) and temperature increase 2020-2050 (right)
Source: Environmental Outlook modelling toolbox.
The economic consequences of these temperature increase, and the associated changes in water systems outlined below, are projected to be severe (OECD, 2015[7]). A brief discussion of the recent literature on this topic is provided in Annex 3.B.
3.3.2. Climate-induced changes in water systems
Beyond temperature increase, changes in the climate portend changes to global water cycles. Changes in global temperature patterns and their distribution will continue to induce significant alterations in the climate system, particularly through shifts in the precipitation patterns. Most regions will experience a decrease in precipitation, except for some already wet areas, such as monsoon and mid-latitude wet regions, which will see further increases. Seasonal variance is also projected to rise globally by 2050, with more extreme dry and wet days (IPCC, 2023[3]).
As a result of temperature increases and precipitation changes, the distinction between arid and humid land is projected to become more pronounced by 2050. Arid land expands around the Mediterranean Sea, in North America, Western South America, Western Europe, Caucasus, around the Gobi Desert and in Australia. On the contrary, the northern parts of the northern hemisphere and equatorial regions will see a decrease in aridity.
Along with changes in precipitation patterns, water demand will also increase, mainly from the energy and industry sectors, as well as from households. Global irrigation demand is projected to increase less than water demand because increased water use efficiency is foreseen to offset some of the increase in the irrigated area, at least at a global level (there can be significant variations across regions though that may cause bottlenecks).4 The combination of these two drivers results in significant changes in river dynamics. In the worst cases, increased demand can lead to water flows that are unsustainable, even ending in rivers drying up. This has already happened in the Colorado river (Fleck and Udall, 2021[8]) and the Aral sea (Micklin et al., 2020[9]).
Water stress is another key water-related indicator, reflecting the number of people living in areas that are at risk of water shortage. The population at risk of water stress is projected to rise significantly, by over 40% between 2020 and 2050, amounting to around 1 billion additional people (Figure 3.5).5 The impacts of water scarcity vary across sectors: it can reduce energy generation (including from hydropower, as well as from coal, gas or nuclear power plants with significant cooling water needs), restrict domestic water use, and limit irrigation, thereby decreasing crop yields. Under current policies, the area at risk of water stress shows a negligibly small projected increase by 2050. This is the result of spatially diverse trends, with some areas experiencing more stress while others see a reduction, due to changes in water withdrawal and varying precipitation patterns. This underscores the concern that regions already vulnerable to water shortages are likely to see much faster population growth, further intensifying the risks.
Population at risk of water stress in million people
Note: Water stress is defined by the share of water withdrawal per 30 arc-min grid cell that needs to be obtained from non-renewable sources (i.e. no surface water or renewable groundwater, e.g. deep aquifers or desalinisation). Population is classified according to the severity of water stress based on the percentage of non-renewable water needed: moderate (> 10%), high (> 25%) and critical (> 50%).
Source: Environmental Outlook modelling toolbox.
Approximately 3.3 to 3.6 billion people live in locations that are highly vulnerable to climate change (IPCC, 2023[10]). Among those, people with considerable development constraints, such as Indigenous Peoples, small-scale food producers and low-income households, are more vulnerable to climatic hazards. Increasing weather and climate-related extreme events have exposed millions to acute food insecurity and reduced water security, with the largest adverse impacts observed in Africa, Asia, Central and South America and the Arctic. Between 2010 and 2020, human mortality from floods, droughts and storms was 15 times higher in highly vulnerable regions, compared to regions with low vulnerability.
Humanity has always modified the ecosystems it inhabits. However, at global level human-induced drivers of environmental change have accelerated dramatically in recent years, which directly affect biodiversity.6 Although the complexity of biodiversity makes it challenging to measure comprehensively, indicators used to monitor changes in different dimensions of biodiversity all show a clear continuing loss. This section draws on a selected set of key biodiversity indicators (see Box 3.1) to provide an overview of past and projected changes in ecosystem structure, the composition of natural communities, and the state of certain species populations, particularly their persistence and size. Projections for biodiversity loss are restricted to the terrestrial realm.7 In addition, estimates of changing provision of ecosystem services are also presented in this section, as are the strong interconnections among the different dimensions.
Biodiversity can be defined as the variability among living organisms from terrestrial, marine and other aquatic ecosystems and the ecological complexes of which they are part, including diversity within species, between species and of ecosystems (United Nations, 1992[11]). The multidimensionality of biodiversity has consequences for how it can be measured and monitored. In particular, assessments focusing on a single biodiversity indicator are likely to underrepresent the full meaning of the biodiversity concept. Furthermore, capturing this multidimensionality with a limited number of indicators is challenging, yet crucial for informing and assessing policies.
The modelling toolbox used in this Environmental Outlook projects changes in different species populations indicators to assess biodiversity change: Mean Species Abundance (MSA) and Living Planet Index (LPI). MSA is an indicator of local biodiversity intactness, ranging between 0 and 1, and relates to the naturally occurring species in affected ecosystems compared to an undisturbed situation. When the species assemblage is fully intact MSA is equal to 1; when all original species are locally extinct, MSA equals 0 (Alkemade et al., 2009[12]; Schipper et al., 2019[13]). LPI measures the mean relative change in population size (number of individuals) compared to a reference year (1970). LPI values lower than 1 indicate that most populations have declined, whereas values higher than 1 indicate increases in population size of most species relative to the reference year (Collen et al., 2009[14]). It is important to note that, in this report, the projected MSA covers terrestrial warm-blooded vertebrates (birds and mammals) and plants, while projected LPI covers terrestrial mammals only.
The Red List Index (RLI) is another indicator that is widely used in the literature. RLI shows trends in overall extinction risk for species. An RLI value of 1 indicates that all species qualify as Least Concern (i.e. not expected to become Extinct) whereas an RLI value of 0 equates to all species having gone Extinct. If RLI remains constant over time this indicates no change in the extinction risk of the group of species analysed (Butchart et al., 2004[15]).
To facilitate the reading and interpretation of these three indicators, this Outlook follows the approach used by IPBES (2019[16]) and presents the numbers as an index by presenting the value on a scale of 0-100. For example, MSA in 2020 was estimated at 0.597 globally, i.e. the index equals 59.7.
3.4.1. Losses in terrestrial biodiversity
Most global indicators show a steady deterioration in ecosystem integrity. For instance, high-biodiversity tropical forests continue to decline, albeit at a slower rate than between 1990 and 2000 (FAO, 2024[2]). Forests covered about 4.1 billion ha of the global land surface in 2020, a more than 10% decline from 1990 levels. While forest loss continues, the net rate of loss has halved since the 1990s, largely due to net increases in temperate and high latitude forests. IPBES (2019[16]) estimates that more than one in eight animal and plant species already face global extinction, and about one quarter of animals, plants and non-insect invertebrates are now threatened with extinction (Díaz and Malhi, 2022[17]).
Since 1970, the composition of natural communities has changed dramatically in many regions. The global MSA index considers both the number of species and the size of their populations. As calculated using the Environmental Outlook modelling toolbox, MSA for warm-blooded vertebrates and terrestrial plants has declined by approximately 1 point each decade, to an estimated value of 59.7 in 2020 (Box 3.1). This decline is more pronounced in areas with both exceptional concentrations of endemic species and significant loss of habitat (Myers et al., 2000[18]). The decrease in original species has occurred alongside the addition of already widespread species to ecological communities, including through the influx of invasive alien species. These two processes have contributed to the erosion of differences between ecological communities in different places. This homogenisation of natural communities is now well established and may jeopardise ecosystem integrity (IPBES, 2019[16]).
Terrestrial MSA is projected to decline in all regions by 2050, with the impact of future climate change playing an increasingly important role (Figure 3.6). Regions expected to experience the greatest biodiversity loss include Sub-Saharan Africa, South Asia, Central and South America, as well as Europe (see also the discussion on the drivers of regional biodiversity loss in Section 3.4.4 below).8
Terrestrial Mean Species Abundance in 2020 (left) and absolute changes by 2050 (right)
Note: MSA levels are projected against a local “pristine state” baseline and is thus not relevant to compare biodiversity richness across regions.
Source: Environmental Outlook modelling toolbox.
These results for the MSA index are confirmed by other indicators (Figure 3.7):
The state of biodiversity is projected to continue deteriorating over the next three decades. Under current policies, MSA for both warm-blooded vertebrates and terrestrial plants is projected to decline. Plant biodiversity is expected to be more severely affected than that of vertebrates: the MSA for plants is projected to decline to reach 50.6 by 2050 (4.3 points less than in 2020), while the MSA for warm-blooded vertebrates is expected reach 62.4 (2 points less than in 2020). In other words, global plant biodiversity is projected to be almost halved on average by 2050. The relative vulnerability of plants may be related to the complete removal of vegetation due to intensive land use and land conversion. Overall, by 2050, the global remaining terrestrial MSA index is projected to be 56.5, 3.2 points lower than in 2020. At first glance, this reduction may appear modest. However, a decline of 2 to 6 points in the MSA index corresponds to the conversion of approximately 2.5 to 8 million km2 of pristine habitat into areas where all the original species have been lost, i.e. where all the native biodiversity has been destroyed (Schipper et al., 2019[13]). The projected decline is equivalent to the conversion of pristine habitat of more than 4 million km2 into an area where all the original species have been lost.
The LPI measures the state of global biodiversity based on population trends of vertebrate species from terrestrial, freshwater, and marine habitats (mammals, birds, fish, reptiles and amphibians). The Living Planet Report (WWF, 2024[19]) looks at field data for a subset of populations for selected species and finds a 73% decline in the average size of monitored wildlife populations between 1970 and 2020. For mammals, Kok et al. (2023[20]) report a decline more limited than the average, using a model-based approach. In line with the methodology of Kok et al. (2023[20]), the LPI index calculated in the Environmental Outlook modelling toolbox is expected to fall from 68 in 2015 to 62.3 by 2050, indicating that most species are projected to decline in their extent of occurrence or extent of suitable habitat (Figure 3.7). The projection of the LPI provides a clear message of continuous declines resulting from important drivers such as land use and climate change.
The RLI tracks trends in the survival probability of the species listed in the International Union for Conservation of Nature and Natural Resources (IUCN) Red List of threatened species. In 2015, it stood at 75% of the value it would have been without human impacts, having decreased by an average of 4% per decade between 1970 and 2015. Species living exclusively in forested areas (the so-called forest specialists) displayed the lowest RLI index in 2015, at 72, not least due to deforestation causing permanent forest cover loss (although temporary loss of forest cover from e.g. wildfires also play a role). Meanwhile, species used for food and medicine experienced the largest per-decade rate of change in their RLI (-1.7%). Kok et al. (2023[20]) suggest that the RLI could decrease by over 6 points by 2070 at the global level. Population sizes are projected to continue declining for 70% of threatened mammal species, with rates of decline exceeding 50% for around 30% of the species. Only 5% of threatened mammal species are expected to experience an increase in population size in the coming decades.
Global MSA and LPI index values in 2005, 2020, 2035 and 2050
Note: The left panel presents MSA index values which measure the local biodiversity intactness. Values below 100 indicate that some local species have become extinct. MSA values are presented for both plants and vertebrates. The right panel presents LPI values which measure the relative increase/ decline in populations since 1970. Values lower than 100 indicates a decline in populations whereas values greater than 100 indicate growing populations. LPI values contain both plants and vertebrates.
Source: Environmental Outlook modelling toolbox.
3.4.2. Losses in aquatic biodiversity
Inland waters and freshwater ecosystems show among the highest rates of degradation of their structures (IPBES, 2019[16]). Coastal marine ecosystems are among the most productive globally. Their loss and deterioration diminish their ability to protect shorelines – and the people and species that rely on them – from storms, as well as their capacity to support sustainable livelihoods (IPBES, 2019[16]).
Inland waters – such as rivers, lakes, marshes, peatlands and other wetlands – are particularly rich in biodiversity and underpin essential ecosystem services. For example, peatlands, covering only 3% of the planet’s surface, store twice as much carbon as the world’s forests (Beaulne et al., 2021[21]). Furthermore, rivers and their riparian habitat (such as riverbanks and floodplains) also provide vital connectivity between different freshwater, terrestrial and marine ecosystems, supporting habitat heterogeneity essential for riverine fish abundance and diversity. Inland waters are, compared to marine and terrestrial ecosystems, the most threatened ecosystems. This is because lakes around the world are warming faster than the atmosphere and the oceans and the flow regime of entire river systems is shifting amongst other reasons. Estimates of threats to freshwater species suggest that nearly one in three species is threatened with extinction. According to the 2024 LPR (WWF, 2024[19]), in 2020, monitored populations of freshwater species had declined by 85% on average compared to 1970, a much faster rate than in marine and terrestrial realms.
With the oceans containing around 80% of the earth’s biodiversity, marine biodiversity and its ecosystem services are a particularly important contributor to food security, nutrition, and poverty reduction. Marine populations have declined by 56% in 2020 relative to 1970, as measured by the 2024 LPI (WWF, 2024[19]). Although most indicators of marine biodiversity have declined less than terrestrial or inland water biodiversity, the marine index is dominated by fish species, many of which are managed to control the level of fishing pressure. Overall, the fraction of marine fishery stocks within biologically sustainable levels decreased to 62.3% in 2021, 2.3% lower than in 2019 (FAO, 2024[22]). Unmanaged fish stocks such as sharks and rays continue to show critical levels of decline. Apart from fishing, threats to marine biodiversity include a more than 30% fall in the ocean pH since the industrial revolution (IPBES, 2019[16]). Increasing nutrient pollution and eutrophication affect particularly coastal regions that make up only a relatively small area but contain around 90% of ocean animal life (Deutsch, Penn and Lucey, 2024[23]). Beyond animals, aquatic plants are also affected.
There is greater uncertainty in quantifying the future changes in aquatic biodiversity relative to terrestrial biodiversity. Inland water biodiversity is projected to decline further in the future. Focusing on freshwater MSA, OECD projections suggest a major decline for Africa in 2050 compared to 2000 (Janse et al., 2015[24]; OECD, 2012[25]), with declines also in Asia, Latin America and Eastern Europe. A modest improvement is projected in parts of the USA, central Asia and Europe, due to an assumed stabilisation of agricultural area and eutrophication abatement.
When it comes to marine biodiversity, climate change alone is projected to decrease ocean net primary production (i.e. the uptake of carbon dioxide through photosynthesis by phytoplankton) by between 3 and 10%, and fish biomass by between 3 and 25% (in low and high warming scenarios, respectively) by the end of the century (IPBES, 2019[16]). Most marine organisms are cold-blooded and have the same temperature as the surrounding water. Therefore, variations in water temperature and marine heatwaves directly impact their functioning, including reproduction, migration and survival (Payne, 2024[26]; OECD, 2025[27]).
Most studies agree that climate change will shift the location of marine species (García Molinos et al., 2015[28]; Jaureguiberry et al., 2022[29]; Meyer et al., 2024[30]). While climate change is expected to have an impact on potential habitat areas, the size and even sign of the overall effects on marine habitats is still unclear (Chen et al., 2024[31]; Meyer et al., 2024[30]; Santana-Falcón et al., 2023[32]). In addition, further research is needed to use potential habitat predictions to predict realised species distribution (where species actually are found) as well as the extent to which they are found. Beyond temperature, pH and other abiotic variables can also limit the colonisation of newly suitable thermal habitats, while ocean currents can function as biogeographic barriers or facilitate access to habitats. Marine biodiversity also depends on the interaction between invasive and resident species (Araújo and Luoto, 2007[33]). Immigrating species can introduce new predators, pathogens and competitors, disrupting trophic interactions and causing the decline of resident species (Meyer et al., 2024[30]).
3.4.3. Ecosystem services
Nature and biodiversity contribute to human well-being in a variety of ways. In recent decades, economists have developed a conceptual landscape to take into account that environmental systems play a fundamental role in determining a country's economic output and social well-being. In this framework, a nation's wealth is grounded in four core stocks of capital: manufactured capital, human capital, social capital and natural capital (whether renewable or not). Natural capital describes the stock of natural assets. These assets produce a flow of services, called ecosystem services (MEA, 2003[34]). Methods for measuring the values of these assets and flows are still being refined (see Box 3.2), and frameworks for natural capital accounting and assessment are being developed but are considered to still be in their early days (Dasgupta, 2021[35]).9
Several studies have attempted to assign a value to biodiversity and ecosystem services, but the methodologies and valuation efforts remain a work in progress. Given the resulting uncertainties and challenges, the main text focuses on indicators that measure the state of biodiversity and ecosystem services in physical units. This box offers a brief overview of ongoing efforts to value natural capital and ecosystem services, while also highlighting the limitations of these exercises.
The economic consequences of biodiversity loss have received less attention than those of climate change and pollution. While growing evidence highlights the value of biodiversity and the costs associated with its decline (TEEB, 2010[36]), significant gaps remain.
Biodiversity loss is typically assessed through a narrow focus on a select number of species or ecosystem services, such as pollination, timber, marine fisheries, and carbon sequestration. Recent studies have demonstrated the high economic value of nature’s ecosystem services in specific contexts, for example sanitation services provided by vultures in India (Ishwar and Das, 2024[37]). The decline of these species has led to human health impacts with economic costs estimated in USD billions. Ranger et al. (2023[38]) find lower-bound nature-related economic risks of USD 5 trillion for five analysed ecosystem services. The wide range of estimates is also reflected in Constanza et al. (2014[39]), who estimate that between 1997 and 2011 the world lost an estimated USD 4-20 trillion per year in ecosystem services owing to land use change, depending on which unit values are used.
Valuing non-marketed ecosystem services – those essential to human well-being – would likely increase damage estimates. Efforts like the Gross Ecosystem Product, GEP (Ouyang et al., 2020[40]), attempt to address this by monetising nature’s inputs where markets do not exist, but GEP only measures current flows and not depletion of natural stocks. Similarly, the World Bank (2021[41]) valued renewable natural capital—forests, mangroves, fisheries, agricultural land, and protected areas—at USD 35 trillion in 2018, excluding many regulating services, which Dasgupta (2021[35]) notes are large but difficult to capture in economic terms. Despite uncertainties (OECD, 2019[42]), estimates such as those by Constanza et al. (2014[39]), which amount to USD 125-145 trillion in 2011, i.e. well over one and a half times the size of the world’s GDP that year, underscore the vast economic value of biodiversity.
Beyond the challenges of valuation, non-linearity of ecosystems and tipping points are also important to consider. Ecosystems that are pushed too far can collapse abruptly and irreversibly, posing a severe risk to the economy and human well-being (OECD, 2021[43]). For instance, Johnson et al. (2023[44]) project a loss in global GDP of USD 2 trillion in the case of a partial ecosystem collapse, several orders of magnitude larger than the loss estimated when assuming that tipping points are not reached. Overall, Dasgupta (2021[35]) argues that the biosphere’s value lies not in its sheer economic worth but in the fact that, without it, life as we know it could not exist.
Ecosystem services are grouped in three main categories, following the Common International Classification for Ecosystem Services (CICES): (i) provisioning services encompass the material outputs produced by ecosystems, such as food and water; (ii) supporting and regulating services are related to the ecological processes that maintain the functioning of ecosystems, for example, pollination, carbon sequestration, erosion and flood control, as well as genetic diversity; (iii) cultural services cover the benefits that people derive from their relationship with ecosystems, including inspiration and recreation, among others. Since ecosystem services stem from the overall state of nature, they are not tied to a single dimension of the environmental crisis. Changes in ecosystem services capture the impacts of the broader degradation of the environment on what nature can contribute to human societies. With this respect, they serve as good indicators of the impact of the triple planetary crisis.
Over the past 50 years, a clear trade-off has emerged between provisioning services and regulating services (Pereira et al., 2024[45]). While material outputs from nature (e.g. food, timber and energy) have increased due to agricultural expansion and land transformation, these changes have led to the loss of natural habitats such as forests and grasslands. Combined with pollution and climate change, this has resulted in declines in supporting and regulating services, including a global decrease in pollinator abundance and diversity (IPBES, 2019[16]). This underscores the extent to which man-made capital ultimately relies on the integrity of natural capital, which also provides the essential ecological functions that underpin long term productivity and resilience.
Under current policies, the trade-off between provisioning and regulating services is expected to continue. By 2050, global agricultural production is projected to increase by over 60% (measured in terms of dry matter and excluding feedback from environmental degradation). In contrast, most regulating services are expected to decline, with the notable exception of carbon removal by AFOLU, which is projected to increase by around 0.5 Gt CO2 in 2050, thanks to policies aiming at improving carbon storage from forests for climate change mitigation purposes. This increase is 8% larger than the one in total GHG emissions. Conversely, Kok et al. (2023[20]) project declines in other key regulating services: the area of cropland under natural pest control, the share covered by pollinators, and the area protected from erosion by natural vegetation are projected to fall by 4.4%, 1.1%, and 10.5%, respectively.
These trends are marked by substantial regional disparities. For instance, carbon capture by AFOLU in East and South Asia is projected to more than triple between 2020 and 2050. In stark contrast, it is expected to fall significantly in Central and South America and in Sub-Saharan Africa. East Africa is projected to see large declines across all regulating services: -35% in natural pest control, -36% in soil erosion protection, and ‑12% in pollinator coverage. Similarly, in Indonesia, pest and erosion control services are expected to fall by over 30%. Even small declines in ecosystem services, while seemingly modest at the global level, could have severe impacts on human societies. Beyond a certain threshold, even minor changes in ecosystems can push them past a 'tipping point', leading to a new, potentially less favourable equilibrium.
Aquatic inland ecosystems also provide substantial ecosystem services (Moberg et al., 2024[46]). These ecosystems are vital for a wide range of functions, including the provision of drinking water, irrigation, water quality regulation, pollution control, support for food security through freshwater fishes and other species, health and well-being, climate mitigation and adaptation – for example through the reduction of flood damage by natural floodplains and riparian vegetation. Freshwater ecosystems, a subcategory of inland waters excluding saline and some brackish systems, cover only around 2% of the planet yet are home to about (and probably more than) 12% of known species, one-third of known vertebrate species and more than half of all fish species (Moberg et al., 2024[46]).
Complementing the critical role of inland waters, marine ecosystems also underpin major ecological and economic functions. In 2022, 62% of aquatic animals were harvested in marine areas, with 69% originating from captures fisheries – i.e. 43% of the total, amounting to approximately 80 million tonnes – and 31% from marine aquaculture (FAO, 2024[22]). According to FAO estimates, around 16 million people were employed worldwide in the primary sector of marine fisheries in 2022. Beyond their importance for food security and livelihoods, marine ecosystems also play a key role in climate change mitigation and adaptation, sequestering and storing a significant part of CO2 emissions from human activities (Rohr et al., 2023[47]).
3.4.4. Decomposing biodiversity loss
Historically, land and sea use change have been the most significant human-induced direct cause of change in the global state of biodiversity, accounting for 30% of the overall human impact. This is followed by direct exploitation (23%), climate change (14%), pollution and invasive species (IPBES, 2019[16]). In the coming decades, climate change will overtake land use change as the main cause of biodiversity loss. The global MSA index is expected to decrease by 3.2 between 2020 and 2050, with climate explaining two thirds of the decline (Figure 3.8).10 Damaged ecosystems show reduced ability to act as carbon sinks, especially forests and oceans (see Section 1.3 of Chapter 1). Meanwhile, habitat fragmentation, infrastructure expansion, hunting, and nitrogen deposition are projected to have a declining impact, as a result of changing habits and current policies to protect natural areas. However, the reduction in harm from these sources is insufficient to counterbalance the growing losses associated with climate change and land use transformation.
From a regional perspective, the developments in South Asia are particularly concerning, as the region already exhibited one of the lowest MSA indexes in 2020 (48.5) and faces one of the largest decreases, driven by both climate change and land use impacts (Figure 3.9). East Asia is expected to remain the region with the lowest MSA by 2050, dropping to 43.5. In Europe, the projected biodiversity decline is primarily driven by land-use changes, including a 22% expansion of built-up areas and continued agricultural land expansion. Although biodiversity recovery is occurring on abandoned croplands and in young forests, this regeneration takes time to become fully effective and is insufficient to compensate for the losses by 2050.
The decomposition of the drivers of biodiversity loss also alludes to the fact that while the (direct) causes of climate change and pollution are local – even if climate change is global – the main driver of future MSA loss is global climate change. This will have implications for policymaking, where local action can mitigate global environmental change that feeds back to local effects.
Global biodiversity (expressed in MSA index): contribution of the main causes to biodiversity loss
Note: The left graph presents the remaining biodiversity and the contribution of the different causes of biodiversity loss. The right graph zooms in the change in the MSA index between 2020 and 2050, breaking down the contribution of each cause to this projected change. The black dot reflects the net result on the overall MSA index.
Source: Environmental Outlook modelling toolbox.
Note: Values smaller than 3 are not reported in the figure.
Source: Environmental Outlook modelling toolbox.
The pollution crisis is multifaceted, involving the release of various substances into the environment across several media (air, water, and soil). Its impact on both human health and wildlife is significant, with pollution responsible for an estimated 9 million deaths annually, equivalent to one in six deaths worldwide (Fuller et al., 2022[48]). This section examines pollution from particulate matter and ground-level ozone (air pollution), nutrients, chemicals and plastics.
As outlined in earlier chapters, there are clear, direct (yet complex) links between air pollutants and climate change. The links between pollution and biodiversity loss are less known, but are also pronounced. Among species at risk of extinction, 18.2% are affected by pollution, with 4.7% facing it as the primary driver of their decline (Hogue and Breon, 2022[49]). A recent assessment by Jaureguiberry et al. (2022[29]) ranks pollution as the third most significant driver of biodiversity loss, up from fourth in the 2019 IPBES report (IPBES, 2019[16]). Especially freshwater fauna species are threatened by pollution. A recent study found that more than half of the threatened species are impacted by pollution (Sayer et al., 2025[50]).
3.5.1. Air pollution
Both outdoor and indoor air pollution are major public policy concerns since they cause premature mortality and illness. Particulate matter and tropospheric ozone concentrations result from the emissions of various compounds and their chemical interactions in the atmosphere.11 Air quality is therefore affected by emissions of several pollutants, originating from the combustion of fossil fuels and biomass (including wildfires), animal-based agriculture, and manufacturing and extracting industries, which also emit heavy metals.
Air pollution has been acknowledged as an important environmental and health issue at least since around 400 BC (Fowler et al., 2020[51]). Recently, the combination of policy measures and technological progress have led to reductions in air pollution exposure in many countries. Exposure to indoor air pollution, primarily due to the burning of solid fuels for cooking and heating in countries in the lower-income region, has been decreasing as the take-up of modern technologies rises with growing incomes. Policies such as enhanced technology standards for the combustion of fossil fuels have contributed to limiting exposure to outdoor air pollution, although strong variation persists across countries.
Within countries, there is evidence from the Netherlands and the United Kingdom that outdoor air pollution affects low-income households more (Fecht et al., 2015[52]). Data for Europe shows that groups of lower socio-economic status tend to be more negatively affected by environmental health hazards (EEA, 2018[53]). Such results likely extrapolate to other regions, which is particularly concerning for lower-income, high pollution exposure regions.
Population-weighted fine particulate matter concentrations are projected to decline further in most regions in the 2020-2050 period (Figure 3.10). In line with strong emission reductions, projections indicate large air quality improvements between 2020 and 2050 in several regions, especially East Asia, Middle East and North Africa, and Eurasia, for both fine particulate matter and ground-level ozone. While air quality is set to improve in most regions, projections also indicate PM2.5 in Sub-Saharan Africa as an exception.
Population-weighted concentrations of ground-level ozone (parts per billion volume, ppbV) and fine particles 2.5 (micrograms per cubic meter, µg/m3) in 2020 and 2050
Source: Environmental Outlook modelling toolbox.
Another air pollutant of interest is SO2. Exposure to ambient SO2 has been associated with all-case and respiratory mortality, conditional on particulate matter exposure (Orellano, Reynoso and Quaranta, 2021[54]) and with morbidity impact such as asthma and chronic bronchitis. Like nitrogen compounds, SOx can react with other compounds in the atmosphere to form particulate matter detrimental to health. Moreover, SO2 emissions also have impacts on ecosystems. For example, SO2 contributes to acidification of surface water, reducing biodiversity and killing fish (US EPA, 2002[55]). Acidification also damages forests through direct impacts on leaves and needles, contributing to soil nutrient depletion. Thanks to technical progress, SO2 emissions are expected to significantly decrease in all regions (Figure 3.2), decreasing by 64% on average at the global level (Figure 3.1).12
Air pollution is a key risk factor behind environment-related premature deaths, with an estimated 6.7 million lives lost annually, 4.1 million of which are from outdoor air pollution and the rest from exposure to indoor air pollution (Fuller et al., 2022[48]), making it the fifth ranking mortality factor (Cohen et al., 2017[56]).13 The increase over the last 15 years reflects a growth in the population exposed in developing countries as well as some increases in concentrations. During this period most developed countries have seen a decline in death rates, whereas some emerging economies have seen an increase, particularly India.
The number of premature deaths due to PM2.5 are projected to decline over time in all regions (Figure 3.11). Declines in PM2.5 mortality rates are particularly strong in Eurasia and Europe, largely due to strong implementation of current policies to improve air quality and reduce emissions of air pollutants, including PM2.5. For example, in the EU, the National Emission Reduction Commitments Directive sets national reduction commitments for five pollutants including PM2.5 (European Parliament and Council, 2016[57]). These ambitious emission standards contribute to driving down air pollution.
While PM (and specifically PM2.5) accounts for the highest share of deaths from outdoor air pollution, the overall share of global premature deaths due to ground-level ozone is projected to increase over time (Figure 3.11), mainly because of higher temperatures and projected increases in urban population. Premature deaths due to ground-level ozone rise especially for regions where high numbers of premature deaths due to ground-level ozone already take place, in particular South Asia, in line with rising emissions of NOx and NH3 (Figure 3.2). In addition to levels of air pollution, the evolution of demographic characteristics contributes to the changes in incidence of air pollution-related diseases over time.
Change in the number of deaths caused by PM2.5 and ground-level ozone outdoor air pollution between 2020 and 2050, per 100 thousand population
Source: Environmental Outlook modelling toolbox.
3.5.2. Chemical pollution
Chemical pollution is a critical component of the broader pollution crisis, especially in light of the projected increase in global chemical production and use (see Chapter 2). Releases of manufactured chemical products to the environment can occur at every step of their global value chain, from raw materials extraction, to manufacture, use and disposal. Large volumes are released as waste materials during production stages, and unintentional leaks, spills and fugitive emissions produce other significant releases. Major sources of hazardous chemicals include mining, agriculture, wastewater treatment, energy generation, chemical production, and product manufacturing, use and disposal (United Nations Environment Programme, 2019[58]).
According to WHO (2021[59]), more than 2 million deaths in 2019 could have been prevented through better management and reduction of environmental chemical exposures. Of these, 45% were attributable to lead exposure,14 44% to occupational exposure to hazardous chemicals, and the remainder to acute poisonings, 20% of which were self-inflicted. Alarmingly, the full extent of the disease burden from chemical pollution is likely underestimated due to limited toxicity testing and the growing complexity, diversity, and volume of chemicals, which outpace scientific and regulatory capacity (Carney Almroth et al., 2022[60]). Additional health impact estimates are available for specific substances. For instance, recent estimates indicate that lead exposure causes 5.5 million premature deaths globally each year (Larsen and Sánchez-Triana, 2023[61]). Moreover, between 14 and 19 million artisanal and small-scale gold miners are at risk of occupational exposure to mercury (Landrigan et al., 2018[62]). Despite regulatory actions at both national and international levels, the market for most heavy metals (including lead and mercury) is stable or growing (United Nations Environment Programme, 2019[58]).
In addition to well-known hazardous substances, a number of emerging chemical concerns have gained prominence in recent years and are expected to become increasingly important. Endocrine-disrupting chemicals, including phthalates, dioxins and some pesticides, interfere with hormonal systems in both humans and wildlife, disrupting physiological functions even at very low doses. The disease cost attributable to endocrine-disrupting chemicals has been estimated at EUR 163 billion annually in the European Union (Duh-Leong et al., 2023[63]).
Another major concern is the persistence of certain chemicals, particularly Per- and polyfluoroalkyl substances (PFAS), known as "forever chemicals". PFAS have been detected in drinking water, soils, food, and household products across many countries (Wee and Aris, 2023[64]). Efforts to track, assess, and regulate PFAS, as well as to identify safer alternatives, have been underway for over two decades (OECD, 2015[65]; OECD, 2024[66]; OECD, 2024[67]; OECD, 2023[68]). In early 2023, the Forever Pollution Project, a consortium of 16 European newsrooms, reported that nearly 23 000 sites in Europe are contaminated with PFAS, with a further 21 500 sites likely contaminated due to industrial activity (The Forever Pollution Project, 2025[69]). While certain PFAS have already been linked to adverse health outcomes, the long-term effects of chronic, low-dose exposure remain poorly understood. Cumulative impacts and low-dose chronic exposure are key concerns when considering PFAS and endocrine-disrupting chemicals.
Chemicals pose a significant and growing concern for wildlife and biodiversity. For example, while pesticides have contributed to agricultural productivity—helping sustain rapid population growth (Tudi et al., 2021[70])—a recent study estimates that around 75% of global agricultural land is at risk of pesticide pollution, with serious implications for biodiversity-rich and water-scarce regions (Tang et al., 2021[71]; Tang et al., 2021[71]). Major environmental risks are associated with the run-off of pesticides from agricultural land in soils and water systems.
Chemical pollution poses a multifaceted threat to ecosystems through both direct and indirect pathways (Sigmund et al., 2023[72]). Direct impacts include acute toxicity leading to mortality, and sub-lethal effects such as developmental, physiological, and behavioural alterations that compromise individual fitness and population viability. For example, psychoactive substances and metals can alter animal behaviour, increasing predation risk (Brodin et al., 2013[73]; McIntyre et al., 2012[74]), while even low, chronic exposures can drain energy reserves critical for survival and reproduction. Moreover, the development of chemical tolerance may reduce genetic diversity, weakening long-term resilience. Environmental assessments often overlook these complex dynamics, focusing narrowly on a few toxicity indicators like survival and reproduction.
Indirect effects of pollution emerge through ecological interactions, such as altered food webs, disrupted social behaviours, or imbalanced predator-prey dynamics. Chemical pollutants can modify microbial communities and trophic structures, with consequences that depend on context-specific interactions. Persistent organic pollutants like certain PFASs, polychlorinated biphenyls (PCBs), and dichlorodiphenyltrichloroethane (DDT), due to their longevity and global spread, accumulate in organisms and magnify up food chains, often with irreversible consequences. Even chemicals that are not inherently persistent—such as diclofenac—can become "pseudo-persistent" due to continual use, harming non-target species and triggering ecosystem-wide cascades (Green et al., 2004[75]).
3.5.3. Nutrient pollution
Nutrients are elements that are essential for plant growth. They include nitrogen (N), phosphorus (P), potassium (K), calcium (Ca), magnesium (Mg), sulphur (S) and silicon (Si). However, excessive application of nutrients, particularly nitrogen and phosphorus, leads to water pollution. In large quantities, the leaking of these nutrients to the environment can act like fertilisers, promoting excessive algae growth, a process known as eutrophication. Severe algae blooms can block sunlight needed by aquatic plants, such as seagrass, causing them to die. Their decay depletes oxygen levels in the water, leading to death of aquatic animals. Beyond eutrophication and the resulting threat to biodiversity, nutrient pollution also degrades water quality, potentially making it unsuitable for drinking.
More generally, human activities are causing an imbalance in the nitrogen to phosphorus (N:P) ratio in the biosphere, an issue that has received less attention but warrants increasing concern (see also Chapter 6). This growing N:P imbalance can have significant consequences, not only for natural ecosystems but also for crop production, food security, and ultimately human well-being (Peñuelas and Sardans, 2022[76]).
Nutrient pollution originates from both natural processes and human activities. Natural sources include nitrogen fixation in vegetation and the weathering of rocks and soils. Human inputs exceed natural ones, primarily from wastewater, fertiliser runoff from agricultural land (see also Section 2.2.1 of Chapter 2), and aquaculture activities. At the global level, according to the historical data gathered in the Environmental Outlook modelling toolbox, in 2020 agriculture accounted for 53% of global nitrogen delivery, followed by natural sources (26%), wastewater (19%), and aquaculture. A similar ranking applies to phosphorus delivery, though the scale differs: at the global level, nitrogen delivery amounted to 68 Mt in 2020, compared to 10 Mt of phosphorus delivery. This ranking is projected to remain consistent to 2050, although absolute numbers will change. However, these global figures conceal regional variations. In countries in the higher-income region, where agriculture is more intensive and wastewater treatment more widespread, agriculture contributes an even larger share of nitrogen delivery (61% in 2020), while wastewater accounts for 15% of nitrogen delivery. In contrast, in the middle-income region, wastewater and agriculture are responsible for 21% and 49% of all nitrogen delivery, respectively.
By 2050, nitrogen and phosphorus delivery (the transfer of nutrients to ground- and surface water) are projected to rise respectively by 22% and 20% globally. However, with global GDP expected to more than double between 2020 and 2050, nutrient intensity per unit of economic output is set to decline significantly. This relative decoupling is anticipated across all regions, with phosphorus delivery in the higher-income region expected to experience absolute decoupling. The largest increases in nutrient delivery will occur in the lower-income region, where nitrogen and phosphorus delivery are expected to grow by 41% and 40%, respectively. This is primarily driven by population and economic growth, along with the expansion and intensification of agricultural activities. The agricultural sector in these regions is anticipated to expand crop and livestock production, leading to a 55% growth in overall value added. Under current policies, this expansion will necessitate higher fertiliser applications and increased manure production, contributing to a 41% rise in nitrogen delivery.
Decoupling between economic activity and nutrient delivery is even stronger in higher- and middle-income regions. In the higher-income region, phosphorus delivery is projected to stabilise, and nitrogen delivery is projected to increase by 4%. The primary driver of this near-complete decoupling is improvements in wastewater treatment, which will reduce delivery by 43% for nitrogen and 27% for phosphorus, respectively, while the population remains largely stable. In the middle-income region, however, nutrient delivery is expected to increase by 18% and phosphorus delivery by 14%, largely driven by agricultural activity.
Nutrient delivery indicates potential risks to water quality and biodiversity, but do not necessarily translate into environmental problems or water quality concerns for local populations, except in locations where nitrogen concentrations exceed critical standards. In 2020, the global area with groundwater concentration of nitrogen exceeding the WHO standard for drinking water reached around 5 million km2 (Figure 3.12). In 2020, over 17% of Europe’s total area exceeded critical thresholds for nitrogen concentrations in groundwater (followed by almost 17% in the Middle East and North America, and 15% in East Asia). Europe also is the region with the highest share of area (48%) exceeding critical thresholds for nitrogen concentration in surface water in 2020, followed by East Asia (41%) and South Asia (21%).
By 2050 under current policies, the global area with poor-quality groundwater is expected to increase by 22%, reaching around 6 million km2. The biggest increases are projected for the Americas, Sub-Saharan Africa, and Middle East and North Africa, and South Asia. In contrast, the area with poor-quality groundwater is projected to decrease in Europe (-14%) and in Japan, Korea and Oceania (-7%), due to ongoing improvements in wastewater treatment and a modest reduction in agricultural production. However, at the global level, this small improvement is counterbalanced by significant increases in the area where groundwater is unsuitable for drinking, in the lower-income region (+37%) and middle-income region (+28%).
The water quality indicators related to phosphorus suggest that in 2020 most of Europe (70%) exceeded critical thresholds for phosphorus concentrations in surface water, followed by East Asia (66%) and South Asia (57%). Water quality indicators related to phosphorus are expected to remain poor due to the slow turnover of phosphorus in soils leading to long-term effects of historical over-application.
Change in areas exceeding critical thresholds for a) nitrogen concentration in surface water, b) nitrogen concentrations in groundwater, c) phosphorus concentrations in surface water
Note: The critical threshold for nitrogen in groundwater considered is the standard for drinking water set by the World Health Organization, 11.3 mg N/L. For nitrogen and phosphorus in surface water, thresholds of 2.5 mg N/L and 0.1 mg P/L, respectively, are considered, based on a literature review, as proposed by Bouwman et al. (2024[77]).
Source: Environmental Outlook modelling toolbox.
3.5.4. Plastic pollution
In 2020, 83 Mt of plastic waste was estimated to be mismanaged globally, as shown in Figure 3.13, significantly more than what is recycled.15 A substantial portion of mismanaged waste (21%; 22 Mt) leaked into terrestrial and aquatic environments. The remainder consisted mostly of non-sanitary landfills and dumpsites (42% of mismanaged waste in 2020) and open burning (31%).
Mismanaged plastic waste and plastic leakage in Mt in 2020 and 2050
Source: Environmental Outlook modelling toolbox.
Under current policies, annual mismanaged plastic waste is expected to increase by 66% (to 138 Mt) by 2050 from 2020 levels. This increase is despite a decreasing share of total waste being mismanaged; all regions are assumed to improve their waste management systems over time, driven by income growth. Consequently, annual plastic leakage is projected to continue to grow by two-thirds in the absence of new policies, from 22 Mt in 2020 to 37 Mt in 2050, while almost 900 Mt of plastics are projected to accumulate in the environment over the same period. Plastic leakage is more pronounced in countries currently lacking advanced waste collection and management systems, as discussed in earlier OECD reports (OECD, 2022[5]; OECD, 2024[78]; OECD, 2025[79]). Macroplastic leakage is projected to remain at or decline to near zero levels in the higher-income region with advanced waste management infrastructure. In contrast, macroplastic leakage continues to increase in regions currently lacking comprehensive waste management. This increase is further exacerbated by fast projected GDP growth in those regions. For instance, the volume of macroplastic leakage in Non-OECD Asia is projected to grow by more than 80% between 2020 and 2050, and by more than 150% in Sub-Saharan Africa, well above the global average of 64%. Despite a relatively low growth rate, China remains the country with the highest plastic leakage, projected to rise to 6.8 Mt in 2050. A major risk for the coming decades is the significant increase in plastic waste that is generated (see also Chapter 2), which could overwhelm waste collection, sorting and treatment capacities.16
A substantial share of plastics that leak to the environment reach aquatic environments, where they accumulate in rivers, lakes and oceans (OECD, 2022[5]). Some of the accumulated plastics eventually degrade into smaller macroplastics and microplastics, which can also travel through the aquatic environments. Given the transboundary nature of rivers and oceans, plastic pollution can reach countries different from where the leakage occurred. Large stocks of plastics have already accumulated in the aquatic environment (mostly in rivers), and continued plastic leakage implies these stocks continue to build up. Projections for Southeast and East Asia show that especially the lower-middle income ASEAN countries are vulnerable to plastic pollution (OECD, 2025[79]). In contrast, recent data suggests that plastic leakage on European coastlines may have reduced by approximately 29% in recent years (Hanke et al., 2025[80]), highlighting that advanced policy frameworks can be effective in reducing aquatic plastic leakage.
Climate change, biodiversity loss and pollution are connected through shared drivers, interacting pressures, and compounding impacts. Consequently, both a comprehensive understanding and the development of effective solutions require moving beyond siloed approaches. As shown in the previous subsections, the state of each dimension can be assessed using a range of indicators. A dashboard for tracking the evolution of each dimension can therefore take multiple forms. Throughout this report, a wide array of detailed indicators has been presented to reflect the complexity of the challenges, drawing on the quantitative modelling toolbox described in Chapter 1. A synthetic dashboard, based on selected key indicators, can summarise how the developments in the state of climate change, biodiversity loss and pollution interlink. As above, the selection is not exhaustive but is intended to underscore the interdependencies between the three dimensions, in particular how the state of one dimension can influence the others.
The dashboard brings together a set of “headline indicators” for each of the dimensions of the triple planetary crisis. For climate change, it tracks global temperature change relative to pre-industrial levels. Terrestrial biodiversity loss is measured through MSA of plants and warm-blooded vertebrates. Pollution is represented through several indicators: population-weighted PM2.5 concentration for air pollution, leakage of plastic waste into the environment for plastic pollution, area of surface water exceeding critical phosphorus concentration thresholds, and nitrogen surplus from agriculture for nutrient pollution. In addition, the dashboard also includes “interaction indicators” that illustrate how the three dimensions are interlinked: air pollutants and SLCP influence global warming; climate change leads to biodiversity loss; and nitrogen pollution acts as a further driver of biodiversity decline. While not an exhaustive list, this combination of quantified indicators offers a valuable first insight into the overall trajectory of the triple planetary crisis and its interconnections. Figure 3.14 displays the evolution of all selected indicators at the global level. As in Figure 3.1, the length of each bar indicates the change over time (2020-2050). For indicators with a strong local component (all indicators except climate-related ones), the regions with the fastest and slowest growth (or decline) are marked.
Global evolution towards 2050 for selected indicators of the state and interactions of biodiversity, climate change and pollution
Note: The length of the bars represents the evolution from 2020 to 2050. The circle indicates the 2020 level. For the sake of readability, the bar for the Climate change related to air pollution is truncated. Annex 3.A provides detailed values and units for the reported indicators.
Source: Environmental Outlook modelling toolbox.
Once again, the overall picture sends a clear signal: current policies are insufficient to reverse environmental degradation. Compared to 2020, most dimensions are projected to worsen by 2050 under the continuation of existing policy efforts. Global temperatures rise from around 1.2°C in 2020 to 2.1°C by 2050. Biodiversity continues to decline, with MSA falling from 59.7 in 2020 to 56.5 in 2050. As mentioned in Section 3.4, this reduction may appear modest but actually is equivalent to the conversion of several million km2 of pristine habitat into areas where all the original species have been lost. Plant biodiversity fares even worse than that of warm blooded vertebrates, dropping from 55 to less than 51 over the same period. In other words, by 2050, nearly half of the global plant biodiversity is projected to be lost. Clearly, current policy measures (see Annex 2.A for details) fall short of halting and reversing biodiversity loss, as agreed under the Kunming-Montreal Global Biodiversity Framework.
Various forms of pollution also follow a rising trend. Plastic leakage into the environment is expected to increase by 64% between 2020 and 2050, undermining efforts to meet the global ambition to end plastic pollution. The nitrogen surplus indicator shows a smaller but still notable increase, reaching a 32% rise over the same period. A more positive development is the projected global decline of 21% in population-weighted PM2.5 concentrations by 2050 relative to 2020.
These projections further illustrate that climate change, biodiversity loss and pollution mutually reinforce each other, with several interaction effects expected to intensify over time. Climate change emerges as the dominant driver of future biodiversity loss, overtaking land use change, which has historically been the primary cause. This shift highlights the deepening interlinkage between these two dimensions. In turn, even if not visible from our dashboard, biodiversity decline is expected to limit climate change mitigation by reducing the ability of ecosystems to act as carbon sinks, especially forests and oceans (IPBES, 2024[81]). In parallel, the contribution of air pollutants and SLCPs to climate change is growing significantly in proportional terms. Historically, the combined effective radiative forcing of SLCPs, aerosols, and ozone has been negative, exerting a net cooling effect on the climate system. By 2020, however, this effect has diminished, turning into a small warming effect that is projected to grow over time. While rising CH4 emissions contribute to this trend, the principal driver is the decline in emissions of aerosols, SO2 and, to a lesser extent, BC, thereby reducing the offsetting cooling influence they previously exerted. Finally, nutrient pollution will continue to pose a threat to biodiversity loss. Although terrestrial biodiversity loss linked specifically to nitrogen pollution shows a slight decrease by 3% at the global level between 2020 and 2050 under current policies, this global average masks significant regional disparities. In some regions, nitrogen-driven biodiversity loss increases, up to 7%, reflecting uneven mitigation efforts and differing agricultural intensities. More generally, pollution, not limited to nutrients, is projected to remain one of the key five drivers of biodiversity loss and, in response, biodiversity decline is expected to exacerbate water pollution, not least through diminished pollution filtering (IPBES, 2024[81]).
Local and global scales are closely interconnected. While climate change is inherently a global phenomenon, since greenhouse gas emissions contribute to planetary warming regardless of their origin, its physical manifestations, such as temperature and precipitation changes, vary significantly across regions. In contrast, biodiversity loss and pollution are often more localised in nature, with their drivers, pressures and impacts being tightly linked to specific geographies (albeit with global consequences). The projections presented in this chapter underscore the growing importance of global factors, particularly climate change, in accelerating biodiversity decline. Similarly, while air pollution is largely shaped by regional trends in emissions, resulting in varied air quality outcomes across the world, cross-border and transboundary dynamics remain important. Biophysical and economic channels—including international trade, atmospheric transport of pollutants, and other spillover effects—establish strong linkages between countries and regions, reinforcing the need for co-ordinated global action alongside locally tailored solutions.
There is substantial regional variation in the evolution of all dimensions (Figure 3.14). For example, while the leakage of plastic waste into the environment is projected to increase by 64% globally between 2020 and 2050, regional trends diverge sharply, from very small leakage rates in most OECD countries to more than a doubling (155%) in Sub-Saharan Africa. Other indicators also illustrate contrasting trends: for instance, nutrient pollution is expected to rise in some regions while declining in others. Biodiversity loss due to climate change increases by approximately 30% in all regions, while biodiversity losses caused by nitrogen pollution differ substantially across regions increasing in four out of nine regions and decreasing in the remaining five. Despite these differences, all regions are expected to experience an increase in biodiversity loss, ranging from 2% to 12%, with a global average of 8%. These trends highlight that maintaining protected areas alone, as modelled under our current policies scenario, is insufficient to reverse biodiversity loss, and more systemic, integrated actions are needed to "bend the curve". PM2.5 concentrations are projected to decrease in all regions, but at different speeds, from -32% in Europe to ‑4% in South Asia, where it remains the highest in 2050.
The outlook presented in this chapter sends a clear signal that current trends are unsustainable, and environmental degradation is set to exacerbate in the coming decades. Projections show that the state of climate change, biodiversity loss and pollution is likely to diverge even more from pathways aligned with global goals and ambitions, underscoring the urgent need calling for stronger and more co-ordinated policy action. The increasing impacts associated with each dimension also heighten the costs and complexity of adaptation efforts, as the biophysical and economic consequences affect current and future health, wealth, and overall well-being through multiple channels. Notably, the overlapping nature of the three dimensions of the triple planetary crisis puts stress on the same systems, creating compound impacts that may make effective adaptation even more challenging.
At the same time, the analysis reveals that progress is possible: several region-indicator pairs show positive trends, suggesting that well-designed and ambitious policy measures can reverse negative developments and steer economies toward more sustainable trajectories.
It is important to note that the projections presented here do not account for government pledges that have yet to be translated into concrete policy measures, as is the case for e.g. many Net Zero targets for climate change mitigation announced in Nationally Determined Contributions and Action Plans set in National Biodiversity Strategies. This reinforces the urgent need to convert high-level ambitious targets into comprehensive and actionable policy packages. The complex interlinkages—spanning drivers, pressures, state, and impacts—highlight the critical importance of integrated and aligned policy responses across environmental domains.
This chapter focuses on a selected set of environmental pressures, related to air, land, water and soils; together these give an informative snapshot of projected trends, without being exhaustive. The first set of selected indicators covers the environmental pressures that are emitted to the air, thereby affecting climate change and pollution, particularly air pollution. These include emissions of carbon dioxide (CO2), CH4, and nitrous oxide (N2O). In addition to GHGs – the primary drivers of climate change – this set also includes emissions of other gases that influence global temperatures. Short-lived climate pollutants (SLCPs) such as black carbon (BC), contribute to global warming (through positive effective radiative forcing, especially when deposited on snow), while also causing fine particulate matter (PM) air pollution. Conversely, gases such as sulphur dioxide (SO2) contribute to air pollution but have a negative effective radiative forcing, exerting a net cooling effect on the planet. CH4, a potent GHG, is also a precursor for the formation of ground-level ozone, a harmful air pollutant. The emission of these gases therefore represents pressures on climate change and (air) pollution and often stem from common drivers. For example, coal-fired electricity generation results in emissions of CO2, BC, and SO2 (and some other gases) simultaneously.
A second set of indicators capture pressures associated with land use. Land use change, especially when it involves deforestation, can contribute to net GHG emissions – as well as to emissions of air pollutants – and is one of the five main causes of biodiversity loss (IPBES, 2019[16]). For example, healthy forests and peatlands act as carbon sinks by absorbing CO2 and serve as vital reservoirs of biodiversity. Conversely, the expansion of agricultural land threatens biodiversity through habitat destruction and fertilised soils and livestock are major sources of N2O and CH4 emissions. Deforestation in tropical forests leads to increased CO2 emissions, while simultaneously endangering biodiversity, especially when it occurs in biodiversity hotspots. The combination of several indicators – CO2, N2O, and CH4 emissions, and cropland area increases – reflects the fact that Agriculture, Forestry and Other Land Use (AFOLU) activities are a shared driver of both climate change and biodiversity loss. This set of integrated indicators provides a more comprehensive view of the environmental pressures than a fragmented focus on individual indicators or domains.
A third group of environmental pressures is related to pressures to water and soil (and directly or indirectly in some cases also the air) that link biodiversity loss and pollution. Emissions of ammonia (NH3) and nitrogen oxides (NOx) contribute to air pollution through the formation of fine particulate matter (PM) and, in the case of NOx, ground-level ozone – but as part of a complex nitrogen cascade (see Chapter 6) these emissions also lead to nitrogen deposition, which adversely affects biodiversity. Phosphorus pollution – and mining of phosphorus rock – is similarly associated with ecological degradation and biodiversity decline. For instance, nutrient pollution in water bodies increases the risk of eutrophication, causing significant harm to aquatic ecosystems. SO2 emissions also contribute to PM air pollution and, together with NOx, can cause acidification, impacting both terrestrial and aquatic ecosystems. The expansion of built-up areas can result in biodiversity loss through habitat destruction or fragmentation and can be associated with waste streams that exacerbate pollution and localised sources of nutrient pollution. Finally, mismanaged plastic waste is a major pollution concern in its own right but also intersects with climate change and biodiversity loss. As most plastics are currently produced from fossil fuels, their production and processing contribute to greenhouse gas emissions. Once released into the environment, plastic waste can damage natural ecosystems and poses a threat to biodiversity.
Figure 3.1 and Figure 3.2 in the main text reported the global level and the regional intensities of selected environmental pressures. Annex Table 3.A.1 provides the units of these indicators and Annex Table 3.A.2 summarises their values. Similarly, Figure 3.14 shows indicators on the state of the environment: Annex Table 3.A.3 lists the units of these indicators and Annex Table 3.A.4 details their values.
Note: Indicators on the level of the pressures determine the length of the bars, while indicators on the regional intensity determine the colour shade of the bars in regional plots.
Note: Values in 2020 and 2050, as well as intensities for 2050 are reported in the units listed in Annex Table 3.A.1, while the relative change in 2050 compared to 2020 is presented as a percentage. For example, in the North America region, the built-up area in 2020 was 22.3 million hectares; this is projected to increase by 43.3% by 2050, reaching 32 million hectares. In 2050, this will represent 1.8% of the total land area in this region. In Figure 3.1 and Figure 3.2, the length of the bars represents the relative change between 2020 and 2050; in Figure 3.2, the colour shading of the bars reflects the intensity in 2050.
Source: Environmental Outlook modelling toolbox.
Note: Indicators on the level of the pressures determine the length of the bars. Biodiversity indicators (based on MSA) are already indexes, without unit.
Note: Values in 2020 and 2050, as well as intensities for 2050 are reported in the units listed in Annex Table 3.A.3, while the relative change in 2050 compared to 2020 is presented as a percentage. For example, global increase in temperature (Climate change) was 1.2°C in 2020, it is projected to reach 2.1°C by 2050, corresponding to a 73.2% increase. In Figure 3.14, the length of the bars represents the relative change between 2020 and 2050.
Source: Environmental Outlook modelling toolbox.
Climate change affects everyday life through many channels: extreme events, human health, labour productivity, crop yields, sea level rise, etc. Combined, their impact translates into economic damages, which are expected to increase significantly over time. It is important to note that the literature on macroeconomic damages from climate change provides a wide range of estimates. The lack of comparability between the methodologies used render an attempt of identifying a robust range of damage estimates from climate change challenging.17 Due to the long-term nature of climate change and the effect of emissions in the coming decades, it is essential to look at consequences through the 21st century.
Recent literature indicates high damages from climate change, although there is a lively debate about a plausible range of damages and the causes for the wide variety of estimates (Morris et al., 2025[82]). An ongoing debate is whether climate damages should include effects on economic growth rates. Some statistical models assume that climate change impacts can reduce economic growth, not just levels. Nath, Ramey and Klenow (2024[83]) highlight that this assumption influences end-of-century damage projections. Along with other recent studies, such as Bilal and Känzig (2024[84]), they suggest that impacts persist over 10 years after a temperature shock but their shocks do not support permanent growth reductions. This partially bridges the gap in existing studies, which tended to assume either no effect of climate damages on growth rates at all (e.g. Barrage and Nordhaus (2024[85])) or a full effect of damages on GDP growth rates Burke et al., (2015[86]). Advanced structural models, such as the one used in OECD (2015[7]) take an intermediate approach by assuming damages affect capital stocks, which in turn have an effect on growth rates by diminishing expansive investment rates (as more investments are needed to replace existing capital stocks).
Even at current levels of global warming, there is a wide span of damage projections. Since we lack a no-warming counterfactual, it is impossible to verify which estimate is correct. Bilal and Känzig (2024[84]), for example, suggest that warming of 1°C lowers global output 12% below what it would have been without climate change. By 2100, they project that warming of 3°C could lower global output by almost half. Their impact estimate for a 1°C shock scales up the linear effect of smaller shocks (observed in the sample), implying extrapolations far beyond the sample. This implicitly assumes adaptation "as observed historically" but might underestimate adaptation in a future richer and high-warming world, as well as any non-linearities in the system.
These estimates contrast with recent structural modelling from the COACCH project (van der Wijst et al., 2023[87]), which projects global damages from a 3°C temperature change by 2100 to range between 10% to 12% of GDP (medium estimate). Importantly, climate change impacts are not evenly distributed across the globe: regions such as Sub-Saharan Africa and South Asia are expected to experience damages (expressed as a share of GDP) up to 1.5 times higher than the global average, qualitatively in line with earlier OECD analysis (OECD, 2015[7]). Despite the significant differences compared to the results from statistical modelling (Bilal and Känzig, 2024[84]), the COACCH project represents a notable advancement by broadening the scope of quantified impacts. When aggregated at the global level, the COACCH low, medium and high damage estimates align closely with those from the damage functions in DICE (Nordhaus, 2014[88]), Howard and Sterner (2017[89]) and Burke, Hsiang and Miguel (2015[86]), although regional results and underlying drivers of impacts vary significantly.
In addition to methodology, projections of future climate damages depend on the emissions and temperature trajectory used. Literature on future climate impacts covers a wide range of temperature scenarios, with IPCC AR6 projections for 2100 ranging from 1.4°C to 4.4°C. Many studies use the high-end RCP 8.5 pathway or its successor, SSP5-8.5 (Burke, Hsiang and Miguel, 2015[86]; Nath, Ramey and Klenow, 2024[83]), which projects more than 4°C warming by 2100, resulting from emissions that continue to rise rapidly throughout the century, well above the current policy trajectory projected in this Environmental Outlook. Such a high emissions trajectory is thus more of an upper bound of what could happen than a plausible current policies projection. According to the UNEP Emissions Gap report (United Nations Environment Programme, 2024[90]), global warming by 2100 is projected to range from 1.9°C to 3.6°C, with a median forecast of 3.1°C, roughly in line with the pathway of this Environmental Outlook. Thus, climate risks are significantly lower for the median current policy emissions pathways than for no-policy upper-bound scenarios.
Not all economic consequences are easily expressed in terms of changes in economic output or GDP. In some cases, the biophysical impacts are important from a welfare perspective, even if they do not significantly affect macroeconomic activity. The key example of this is mortality (OECD, 2015[7]). Uncertainty surrounding temperature-related mortality estimates is large. Some studies indicate that at a global level increased deaths from heat already outweigh reductions in cold-related mortality (Bressler et al., 2021[91]; Gasparrini et al., 2017[92]). However, other studies suggest that, at low levels of warming, the reduction in cold-related mortality in cold and temperate climates may still exceed the increase in heat-related deaths in hotter climates (Carleton et al., 2022[93]; Zhao et al., 2021[94]).
Using data from 43 countries, Zhao et al. (2021[94]) estimate that, between 2000 and 2019, approximately 489 000 heat-related deaths occurred each year, 46% in Asia and 37% in Europe. Cold-related mortality is also large, with an average of 4.6 million deaths annually over the same period — about 52% of these in Asia and 26% in Africa (Zhao et al., 2021[94]).
Under current policies, temperature-related mortality risk is set to rise in the coming decades, disproportionately affecting the lower-income region. Using projections from the Environmental Outlook modelling toolbox and the methodology of Carleton et al. (2022[93]), estimates suggest that by 2050, the average temperature-related mortality risk will reach -1.9 deaths (increasing from -4.8 in 2020) per 100 thousand people in high income countries, 5.2 in upper-middle income countries, and 2.9 in low and lower-middle income countries (Annex Figure 3.B.1). By 2100, the corresponding mortality risk is projected to rise sharply to 5.7, 9.1 and 14.6 death per 100 000 people in higher income, upper-middle income and low and lower-middle income regions respectively.
Additional deaths per 100 000 people
Note: Projections under warming of around 2.1°C in 2050 and 3.4°C in 2100 using the Environmental Outlook modelling toolbox. Cost of climate adaptation included for full mortality risks following Carleton et al. (2022[93]). Negative numbers reflect a reduction in mortality risk (i.e. current levels of warming have reduced cold-related mortality especially in countries in the higher-income regions with colder climates.
Source: Authors’ own calculations based on damage functions provided by Carleton et al. (2022[93]).
These increased mortality risks can be valued using different techniques to assess the welfare effects and thus make them comparable to other economic impacts. One measure that is often used to assess the economic values associated with increased mortality risks is the concept known as the value of an avoided fatality or the value of statistical life (VSL).18 Assuming a global average VSL of USD 2.7 million,19 the more than 340 000 additional deaths globally by 2050 would translate into a welfare loss of a little more than USD 925 billion (for comparison, this is equivalent to 0.3% of GDP in 2050).
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← 1. In line with the approach used and explained in Chapters 1 and 2, feedback links from environmental degradation on environmental pressures are excluded from the modelling projections.
← 2. Phosphorus delivery reflects the transport of phosphorus to the water system. It differs from phosphorus application, which is the phosphorus content of fertiliser or manure put on the ground, as it excludes e.g. plant uptake of applied phosphorus.
← 3. As explained in Annex 3.A, these intensities are calculated differently for different indicators, e.g. where relevant in terms of per capita values; converting absolute values into intensities allows a cross-regional comparison that is not affected by the size of a region.
← 4. This is less beneficial than it may sounds, as increased water use efficiency for irrigation means that less water is returned to rivers and aquifers, and more water is evapotranspired (Perry et al., 2023[99]).
← 5. In contrast, the population in areas not at risk grows by 21% (around 1.1 billion additional people).
← 6. Clearly, this acceleration started earlier in some regions than others, and in some regions the degradation has recently slowed down.
← 7. The modelling toolbox used in this Environmental Outlook to produce projections focuses on terrestrial biodiversity and therefore the current and future states of terrestrial and aquatic ecosystems are discussed separately, the latter only qualitatively.
← 8. According to the modelling, the last large region in 2020 where biodiversity was least disturbed with respect to its pristine state was Greenland, with a MSA index higher than 92. By 2050, this will no longer be the case, due to climate change, which will drive Greenland’s MSA down to 90. The regional uncertainty in the modelling toolbox does not allow to draw robust conclusions from this.
← 9. Natural capital will also be discussed in Chapter 6.
← 10. The relative importance of each cause varies considerably across biodiversity indicators. Since 1970, land use changes explain more than half of global losses in the Red List Index (RLI), while they account for 40% of the changes in Living Planet Index (LPI) and the MSA indicator calculated in (IPBES, 2019[16]) (which has a different definition from the indicator calculated in the Environmental Outlook modelling toolbox. The IPBES MSA index has been particularly sensitive to climate change, which explains 30% of the overall losses. In contrast, for species population trends, direct exploitation is the second most significant factor, accounting for 30% and 25% of LPI and RLI losses, respectively (IPBES, 2019[16]).
← 11. Fine particulate matter, defined as particles with a diameter smaller than 2.5 µm (PM2.5), includes both primary particles – such as BC, organic carbon (OC) and other directly emitted particles – and secondary particles formed through atmospheric reactions involving sulphur oxides (SOx), NOx, NH3, CH4 and non-methane volatile organic compounds (NMVOC). Tropospheric ozone, also known as ground-level ozone, is not emitted directly but forms through chemicals reactions involving NOx, CH4, and NMVOC.
← 12. As explained above, this has had the perverse effect of accelerating climate change, as SOx act as a coolant.
← 13. While the two pollutants responsible for most of the impacts are PM2.5 and ground-level ozone, concern has also risen in recent years about the impact of NOx. Global estimates for this pollutant are not available but studies for the EU show that about 10 000 premature deaths annually can be attributed to NOx emissions from diesel cars, vans and light commercial vehicles. This is part of a total of about 425 000 premature deaths in the EU, Norway and Switzerland from outdoor air pollution (IIASA, 2017[96]). Concentrations of NOx have declined considerably in these countries since 1990 (European Environment Agency, 2018[95]), as the evidence of the health risks associated with air pollution grows (Harrison, 2018[97]).
← 14. Many heavy metals are hazardous chemicals.
← 15. Note that significantly more plastic is collected for recycling than actually recycled; in 2020 57 Mt was collected for recycling, but only 34 Mt actually recycled. The rest was incinerated or landfilled.
← 16. Thus, curbing demand and designing for circularity remain cornerstones of an ambitious policy response (OECD, 2024[78]).
← 17. Structural models focus on drivers, sectoral impacts and interactions, examining how specific biophysical changes (e.g. heatwaves) affect economic activities (e.g. labour productivity) (OECD, 2015[7]). However, these models often provide incomplete estimates, as not all impacts can be quantified with confidence globally. Statistical models, by contrast, take a top-down approach but generally lack insights into underlying drivers and detailed impact categories.
← 18. The VSL represents the value a given population places on avoiding the death of an unidentified individual, such as reducing the number of deaths from air pollution or the number of traffic fatalities. As underlined in (OECD, 2012[98]), the VSL is not the value of any individual person’s life, but an aggregation of how individuals value small changes in mortality risk.
← 19. Based on ENV/EPOC/WPIEEP(2024)9/REV3. This uses 2023 PPP exchange rates.