This chapter explores the extent to which countries consider the interlinkages between the components of the triple planetary crisis by reviewing the Biennial Transparency Reports (BTRs) under the Enhanced Transparency Framework of the Paris Agreement and the latest National Biodiversity Strategies and Action Plans (NBSAPs) aligned with the Kunming-Montreal Global Biodiversity Framework from a representative set of ten countries around the world. These documents reflect “whole of government” perspectives and are aligned to multilateral environmental agreements, facilitating cross-country comparison. While similar national documents do not exist for pollution, some interlinkages with pollution are explored in both BTRs and NBSAPs and with reference to a subset of relevant national documents. The chapter first introduces the methodological approach and scope of the analysis. It then presents the findings from the analysis, identifying the varying focus and notable examples.
Environmental Outlook on the Triple Planetary Crisis
Abstract
Tackling the triple planetary crisis of climate change, biodiversity loss, and pollution necessitates consideration of policy interlinkages to maximise synergies and manage trade-offs, as detailed in the conceptual overview provided in the previous chapter (Chapter 4). There are important interlinkages between the planetary processes underpinning the triple planetary crisis, as well as between the policies developed and implemented at multiple levels of government.
National policies, institutional arrangements and capacities are integral to tackling environmental challenges (OECD, 2021[1]; Fiorino, 2011[2]). Policymaking at the national level plays a critical role in unifying the actions taken at multiple levels; it is a key unit of analysis for assessing the progress towards global environmental goals, while setting the direction for local and regional implementation. The consideration of the interlinkages at the national level can therefore facilitate an integrated policy approach. However, the knowledge on whether and how countries acknowledge these interlinkages in policymaking is currently limited.
To identify the broad trends across countries and potential policy gaps, a national policy stocktake is conducted for a representative set of ten countries around the world varying in geographical location, biodiversity richness, size and income. Two documents have been selected for the analysis: (i) the first Biennial Transparency Reports (BTRs) by the Parties to the Paris Agreement under the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) and (ii) the latest National Biodiversity Strategies and Action Plans (NBSAPs) aligned with the Kunming-Montreal Global Biodiversity Framework (KMGBF) adopted by the Parties to the UN Convention on Biological Diversity (CBD).
While there are other documents detailing a range of national sectoral strategies (e.g. energy, agriculture) and multi-year plans, BTRs and NBSAPs are developed in the context of reporting to multilateral environmental agreements. Their standardised and largely contemporaneous submissions facilitate cross-country comparison. These documents also reflect the official and “whole of government” perspectives based on cross-ministerial co-ordination. While similar national documents do not exist for pollution, the chapter examines interlinkages with pollution as covered in BTRs and NBSAPs, as well as with reference to standardised documents where relevant and available.
At the same time, it is important to note that an analysis of national documents only presents a broad picture. BTRs and NBSAPs are not intended as documents detailing and attributing implemented and planned policies to outcomes. They also do not reflect how the interlinkages between climate change, biodiversity loss and pollution manifest themselves during the implementation stage and how these synergies and trade-offs are dealt with across sectors and projects. These synergies and trade-offs at the policy design and implementation stage are examined through “deep-dives” in the next chapter (Chapter 6).
5.2.1. Methodology
This chapter analyses the extent to which countries pay attention to the interlinkages between climate change, biodiversity loss and pollution and their policy responses. The analysis builds on the methodological approach for content analysis developed in Gagnon-Lebrun and Agrawala (2007[3]), which assessed progress on adaptation in developed countries through examining the National Communications under the UNFCCC. Content analysis is a tool that has been used to systematically assess written material in the context of both academic research and policy evaluation (Seymour-Ure and Berelson, 1972[4]). The analysis of the two sets1 of national documents was carried out in two steps. The first step involved the development of thematic categories to map the consideration of the pairwise (e.g. between climate change and biodiversity loss) interlinkages of: (i) the biophysical impacts and (ii) policy responses and projects. The second step involved categorising the level of detail of the consideration of these interlinkages on a five-point qualitative scale: (i) absent, (ii) generic, (iii) moderate, (iv) substantive, and (v) extensive and in-depth.
5.2.2. Scope
Selection of documents
BTRs submitted by the Parties to the Paris Agreement are examined to explore the extent to which they pay attention to the interlinkages with biodiversity loss and pollution. The BTRs encompass a country’s National Inventory Report (NIR) of anthropogenic emissions by sources and removals by sinks of greenhouse gases (GHGs), progress towards its climate goals (especially its Nationally Determined Contribution, NDCs), policies and measures, climate change impacts and adaptation, levels of financial, technology development and transfer and capacity-building support, capacity-building needs and areas of improvement (UNFCCC, 2019[5]). Parties were required to submit the first BTRs by the end of 2024 (UNFCCC, 2019[6]).2 The common modalities, procedures and guidelines for the Enhanced Transparency Framework allow for a cross-country comparison of the BTRs.
For countries from which the BTRs were not yet available,3 National Communications (NCs) documents were analysed. While the comparability of the NCs is more limited, they still detail a country’s inventory of anthropogenic greenhouse gas emissions4 and its planned or implemented actions (UNFCCC, 2009[7]). They are submitted periodically by all Parties to the UNFCCC and follow an established structure (UNFCCC, 2025[8]). Nevertheless, it is important to note that the NCs can vary in the year and the round of submission across countries. Moreover, both the breadth and the depth with which countries deal with different topics in their NC submissions may diverge from their previous submissions.
NBSAPs are analysed to examine the extent to which they consider the interlinkages with climate change and pollution. NBSAPs outline approaches and policies to protect biodiversity and ecosystem services as key instruments for the implementation of the CBD at the national level (CBD, 2022[9]). In 2022, 196 Parties to the CBD adopted the KMGBF, which is built around the 4 goals for 2050 and 23 targets for 2030, including two targets which explicitly establish the links between biodiversity loss, pollution (target 7) and climate change (target 8). Subsequently, the Parties have been requested to revise the NBSAPs aligned with the KMGBF. As of October 2025, 55 Parties have submitted their revised NBSAPs (CBD, 2025[10]). While the length and depth of the content can vary, the overarching framework makes the documents relatively comparable across countries.
No similarly standardised national documents describe the strategies for addressing pollution as such. This reflects, in part, the multifaceted nature of pollution, varying in pollutants and media (e.g. air, soil and water). Furthermore, policies targeting pollution are developed in the complex landscape of multilateral frameworks targeted at specific sets of pollutants (e.g. the Minamata Convention on Mercury), hazardous chemicals and wastes (e.g. the Basel, Rotterdam and Stockholm Conventions) as well as types of pollution (e.g. the UNECE Convention on Long-Range Transboundary Air Pollution). While some of these Conventions also have established reporting frameworks such as National Implementation Plans and National Reports, they are distinct in focus areas, scope and timeliness. The interlinkages that pertain to pollution are therefore assessed indirectly in the analysis through the review of BTRs and NBSAPs, complemented by a review of a subset of national documents and other relevant information provided under multilateral frameworks.
It is important to note that national documents also do not cover the full range of existing policies, instruments and projects within a country, as they contain relatively high-level descriptions of approaches and strategies. Furthermore, national documents can refer to planned policies and may not necessarily reflect implemented policies or projects. Notwithstanding these limitations, the analysis can help elucidate the extent to which countries already consider the interlinkages and help identify the gaps that can be addressed to develop an integrated policy approach.
Selection of countries
Only those countries with both a BTR (or an NC) and a KMGBF-aligned NBSAP were selected for the stocktake analysis, limiting the sample to 55 countries (as of October 2025). From this set of countries, the current analysis examines twenty national documents in total from ten countries: Argentina, Australia, Canada, China, France, India, Indonesia, Japan, Peru, and Uganda. While limited in number, this subset of countries nevertheless encompasses considerable variation in terms of geographical location, biodiversity richness, size and level of income (see Table 5.1). Australia, China, India, Indonesia and Peru are megadiverse, which means that they are home to at least 5 000 of the world’s endemic plants and have marine ecosystems within their borders (Mittermeier and Goettsch Mittermeier, 1997[11]). The selected countries also vary in their level of development as defined by the World Bank country and lending groups classification (World Bank Group, 2025[12]): four are high-income countries (Australia, Canada, France and Japan), four are upper-middle-income countries (Argentina, China, Indonesia and Peru), one is lower-middle-income (India), and one is a low-income country (Uganda). A point to note is that the submission year of these documents can still vary slightly, and they may therefore not reflect the latest policies (see Table 5.2).
Source: Authors’ own elaboration using Conservation International’s classification for the biodiversity richness column (WEF, 2024[13]) and World Bank Group (2025[12]) classification for the income group column.
Source: Authors’ own elaboration based on the UNFCCC (2025[14]; 2025[15]) and the CBD (CBD, 2025[16]).
This section first explores whether BTRs and NBSAPs contain a high-level of acknowledgement of pairwise interlinkages between climate change, biodiversity loss and pollution as well as the prevalence of framing of the three-way interlinkages in these national documents. This section then turns to an assessment of the level of detail with which the pairwise interlinkages are considered and introduces notable examples from ten countries.
5.3.1. High-level acknowledgement of pairwise and three-way interlinkages
A review of the BTRs and NBSAPs reveals that all ten countries acknowledge the pairwise interlinkages between climate change, biodiversity loss, and pollution in some fashion (see Table 5.3), referring to interactions between these environmental challenges and their impacts, as well as relevant policy responses, implementation challenges, institutional arrangements and resource needs.
Four of the ten countries also refer to the “triple planetary crisis” or its three components altogether in at least one of the two national documents. This ranges from a high-level mention in Indonesia’s NBSAP (MoNDP, Indonesia, 2024, p. 2[17]) to India’s identification of “slow percolation, poor understanding and realisation of biodiversity concepts, conservation priorities, and impact of interconnected triple crisis at the grassroot level” as a key issue for which they identify a “communication, education and public awareness” strategy as a potential remedy (MoEFCC, India, 2024[18]). Canada’s NBSAP contains a dedicated section explaining the interlinkages of the triple planetary crisis. Its national target 14 (mainstreaming of biodiversity values) states that the federal government may explore ways to address the triple planetary crisis “in an integrated manner, while seeking to maximise co-benefits in novel ways” (ECCC, 2024, p. 87[19]). France mentions in its BTR that it is pursuing its climate, biodiversity and pollution reduction objectives (Government of France, 2024[20]).
Canada and France further elaborate on their recently implemented policies, which aim to address the triple planetary crisis in an integrated manner. As of April 2024, Canada’s new Climate, Nature and Economy Lens requires federal public servants to weave considerations of climate change, biodiversity loss and pollution in government decision-making (see Box 5.1 for further details). France discusses its national ecological planning approach, formally instituted in July 2022 with the creation of the General Secretariat for Ecological Planning. Through this approach, France aims to mobilise all stakeholders including households, businesses, and local authorities to advance a broad set of environmental objectives including addressing climate change, biodiversity loss and pollution (Government of France, 2024[20]).
Note: In the absence of a BTR, the analysis was completed using the country’s latest NC document.
Source: Authors’ own elaboration based on the review of national documents.
The Cabinet Directive on Strategic Environmental and Economic Assessment, focused on the consideration of the potential environmental and economic impacts of key government decisions, has introduced a standardised Climate, Nature and Economy Lens (CNEL) template on April 1, 2024 (Government of Canada, 2024[21]). The CNEL template must be completed by federal public servants when submitting proposal assessments to the Cabinet, the Prime Minister and the Minister of Finance (ECCC, 2024, p. 168[22]). The CNEL, highlighted in Canada’s BTR and NBSAP, requires evaluations of a proposal’s effects (positive or negative) on climate change (e.g. capture and sequestration of GHG), nature and biodiversity (e.g. migratory birds) and pollution (e.g. soil). Mandatory preliminary screening and a set of exceptions helps ensure that the application of the CNEL assessment is necessary and proportionate. A CNEL assessment is also not required for proposals already subject to federal environmental or impact assessment legislation (e.g. the Impact Assessment Act or the Canadian Environmental Assessment Act) as well as routine procedures that are considered to pose minimal risk to the environment.
For instance, the integrative tool requires federal public servants to indicate whether the policy proposal has an “improving effect” or “deteriorating effect” on the following categories: GHG emissions, effects on species at risk, general effects on wildlife, noise, air, water, soil, among others. The template encompasses direct and indirect GHG emissions (Scope 1, 2 and 3 emissions) (OECD, 2024, p. 34[23]) (see Figure 5.1). Whether an impact is positive, negative or undetermined, a justification of up to 200 words is requested: “Provide a narrative response below that outlines how this proposal will not have an important impact on nature and/or biodiversity” (Government of Canada, 2024[24]).
Source: Government of Canada (2024[24]).
5.3.2. BTRs detail climate change-biodiversity interlinkages and policy synergies, with only a few discussing how to manage potential trade-offs
All ten countries discuss country-specific climate change impacts on biodiversity (Table 5.4). BTRs discuss heterogeneous climate change impacts on ecosystems, flora and fauna, and microorganisms. Australia notes that 18 out of 19 ecosystems assessed across the country are under pressure from climate change. Climate risks to biodiversity encompass “risks to aquatic and terrestrial ecosystem condition and function or landscape function and collapse, including through species loss and extinction” (DCCEEW, Australia, 2024[25]). Australia also discusses how climate change is impacting the frequency, severity and duration of weather conditions (fire season starting earlier in spring and lasting longer into autumn) conducive to bushfires that impact ecosystems (e.g. loss of pasture), as exemplified by the Black Summer bushfires over 2019-20205 that burned more than 24 million hectares (DCCEEW, Australia, 2024, p. 232[25]).
Uganda discusses the impacts of climate change on water, which is a cross-cutting resource sustained through ecosystem services (MoWE, Uganda, 2022[26]). In particular, Uganda details that increasing temperatures reduce oxygen concentration in water bodies, leading to less availability of aquatic plants that serve as food for fish, which in turn contributes to fish mortality. China similarly reports that the significant increase in the frequency and intensity of marine heatwaves is severely impacting “marine organisms, ecosystems and aquaculture” in its coastal waters, citing mass mortality of cultured sea cucumbers in the Yellow and Bohai seas in 2018 as an example (China, 2024[27]).
1. In the absence of a BTR, the analysis was completed using the country’s latest NC document.
2. Impacts refer to the biophysical impacts of climate change on biodiversity (loss) and vice versa.
3. Government actions refer to policies and projects.
4. Dimensions of biodiversity include species, ecosystems and biota.
Source: Authors’ own elaboration based on the review of national documents.
Similarly, the impacts of biodiversity loss on climate change are well-acknowledged, albeit to a lesser extent than climate change impacts on biodiversity. Six out of the ten countries provide country-specific examples, which demonstrate the vital contributions of biodiversity to climate mitigation and adaptation, as well as the observed impacts of biodiversity loss. These examples commonly pertain to the carbon removal capacity of ecosystems. For example, Australia highlights the role of its rich blue carbon ecosystems – mangroves, saltmarshes and seagrasses – which are estimated to hold approximately 12% of global blue carbon stock. These ecosystems also help shield coastal areas from climate change impacts such as flooding, sea level rise, and intense storm surges (DCCEEW, Australia, 2024[25]). Meanwhile, Japan highlights the declining trend of the amount of carbon removals due to the maturity of its planted forests making up 40% of the country’s forests, half of which are over 50 years old6 (Japan, 2024, p. 28[28]). Peru, where the Amazon biome represents about 60% of the country’s surface area, identifies deforestation – induced by the land-use change and conversion of intact ecosystems for agriculture, grasslands and mining – as the primary driver of GHG emissions (MoE, Peru, 2024, p. 34[29]). Canada notes that over the century, the thawing of permafrost in its boreal and arctic regions will release large stocks of sequestered methane (CH4), a potent GHG (ECCC, 2024[22]).
The interlinkages between climate change and biodiversity loss are also well-acknowledged in policy responses detailed in BTRs in nine countries (Table 5.4). Policies discussed include management and expansion of protected areas, tax incentives and grants for tree planting, as well as carbon credits and offsets schemes. Most countries provide examples of policy response considering synergies between climate change mitigation and biodiversity conservation (see Table 5.5 for illustrative examples).
In its BTR, Indonesia highlights the importance of restoring and preserving peatlands in order to protect these natural carbon sinks and their biodiversity (MoE, Indonesia, 2024[30]). The participation in peatland restoration is mandatory for all companies with a Business Permit for the Utilisation of Timber Products and Oil Palm Plantations. Meanwhile, restoration of non-concession areas is carried out under the Peatland Steward Village Program (extending over 200 villages) through which communities, together with the field facilitator, co-develop a work plan at the site level. From 2016 to 2021, the restoration of peatlands in seven priority provinces has led to the revegetation of 1 892 hectares of land (MoEF, Indonesia, 2022, p. 58[31]).
In response to the increased frequency of heavy precipitations, Japan promotes “Ecosystem-based Disaster Risk Reduction” to simultaneously pursue resilience against natural disasters and biodiversity conservation. To foster a shared understanding of the important areas for climate and biodiversity objectives and inform policy planning and cross-sectoral engagement, Japan is developing a mapping tool7 for identifying areas with the potential to deliver multiple benefits by overlaying various data including topographic wetness and diversity of natural landscape (Ministry of the Environment, Japan, 2023[32]). In addition, Japan’s water basin management project for all 109 rivers classified as significant incorporates the ecosystem-based approaches through promoting green infrastructure. The design of water reservoirs and river channels are calibrated to serve the purpose of enhancing resilience against natural disasters, while at the same time contributing to the formation of ecosystem connectivity to provide foraging and breeding grounds for vulnerable species (Ministry of Land, Infrastructure, Transport and Tourism, Japan, 2019[33]; MILT, n.a[34]).
Canada highlights its Sustainable Canadian Agricultural Partnership (Sustainable-CAP), which is a five-year (2023-2028) partnership that integrates the three dimensions of the triple planetary crisis. In addition to the goal of cutting GHG emissions by 3 to 5 million tonnes of carbon dioxide equivalent (MtCO2e) in the sector (which resulted in emissions of 55 MtCO2e in 2020) (ECCC, 2025[35]), the programme also aims to facilitate the sector’s adaptation to climate change, as well as the efforts to protect and restore critical wildlife habitats and soil, water and air quality. As part of the Sustainable-CAP, the Resilient Agricultural Landscape Program offers targeted funding to increase the uptake of beneficial management practices and technologies that can simultaneously deliver several environmental benefits in addition to GHG emissions reduction, in accordance with varying local priorities across different provinces and territories.
Source: Authors’ own elaboration based on the review of national documents.
Management of trade-offs in policies is much less extensively discussed, with three out of ten countries providing examples of such consideration in policies and at the project level. For instance, Japan discusses the need to optimise environmental impact assessments to alleviate adverse biodiversity impacts of wind power facilities (Japan, 2024[28]). Similarly, France highlights the need to balance biodiversity conservation with the expansion of ground solar photovoltaics (PV) as outlined in their second Multi-year Energy Plan (PPE 3). Calls for tenders prioritise the installation of ground solar PV on converted or degraded lands over farms and biodiversity-rich lands (see Chapter 6 for more details) (Government of France, 2024[20]). This is also in line with its legally binding target to achieve “no net land take” by halving the conversion of natural, agricultural and forest areas over 2021-2031 relative to the previous decade and eliminating it by 2050. Meanwhile, Argentina discusses its insurance mechanism for facilitating investments into reforestation while preserving native forest ecosystems (see Box 5.2).
In its BTR, Argentina addresses the trade-offs between climate change mitigation measures and biodiversity protection by highlighting the Environmental Sustainability and Insurance Programme (PROSAS) (SSA, Argentina, 2024[36]). Implemented in 2009, the programme encourages investments in reforestation and enrichment of the native forests as a tool for climate mitigation, while ensuring effective biodiversity conservation (SSA, Argentina, 2024[36]). The Programme, also referred to as the “Green Insurance”, is based on a voluntary agreement between 12 insurance companies and the Argentinian Government. It allocates 1% of the premiums from motor-insurance policies to tree planting (90%) and to environmental education (10%) (SIF, 2020[37]).
In 2019, the Argentinian National Insurance Superintendecy (Superintendencia de Seguros de la Nación (SSN)) stated that the Green Insurance had contributed to financing for the planting of more than 21 million trees (SIF, 2020[37]). As a result, the forested area more than doubled from 1990 to 2022, reaching 1.26 million hectares in 2022 (SSA, Argentina, 2024[36]). This represents an offset of 10% of the annual CO2 emissions from motor vehicles (SIF, 2020[37]). The law on investments in cultivated forests (MoJ, Argentina, 1999[38]), which provides the policy framework for the insurance programme, includes safeguards for protecting native forests, stipulating that the reforestation strategy should not alter the original land use in native forest ecosystems and should ensure the preservation of biodiversity (SSN, 2018[39]). For instance, zoning by forest basins for the location of enterprises must respect the territorial planning of native forests and environmental, economic and social criteria (MoJ, Argentina, 1999[38]).
5.3.3. BTRs discuss climate change-pollution interlinkages, synergies and trade-offs in less detail
Climate change impacts on pollution are discussed by most countries, though largely in generic terms (Table 5.6). A notable, detailed acknowledgement is made in China’s BTR, highlighting that rising sea levels along its coast have exacerbated coastal erosion and led to sea and saltwater intrusion in estuarine areas. For example, saltwater intrusion in the Pearl River Estuary has seriously affected the quality of drinking water (China, 2024[40]). Uganda, a land-locked country, also highlights in its NC that climate change will result in significant impacts on the availability and quality of water resources, mainly due to prolonged droughts, floods and run-off (MoWE, Uganda, 2022[26]).
All of the ten countries mention the impacts of pollution on climate change, albeit with different levels of detail and with varied focus on the types of pollution. Peru cites GHGs emitted from the untreated wastewater discharge into water bodies (MoE, Peru, 2024[29]). Uganda discusses the rise in GHG emissions due to the increased volume of waste, especially in urban areas, due to population growth, urbanisation and industrial development. In particular, solid waste disposal contributes to significant amounts of CO2, CH4 and nitrous oxide (N2O) emissions (MoWE, Uganda, 2022[26]).
1. In the absence of a BTR, the analysis was completed using the country’s latest NC document.
2. Impacts refer to the biophysical impacts of climate change on pollution and vice versa.
3. Government actions refer to policies and projects.
4. Dimensions of pollution include subsets of media (e.g. air) as well as types (e.g. nutrient).
Source: Authors’ own elaboration based on the review of national documents.
All ten countries examined8 touch upon synergistic policies advancing climate action and pollution management in their country. Examples include economic, regulatory and information instruments touching upon waste management, road transportation, ecosystem restoration, and sustainable agriculture (see Table 5.7 for illustrative policies). Some countries call for an economy-wide plan to synergistically tackle pollution and GHG emissions. For example, China highlights its “Synergistic Implementation Plan for Pollution Reduction and Carbon Reduction”, which informs the integrated approach involving different levels of governments and five economic sectors to 2030 (China, 2024[40]). One of the approach taken is to integrate the country’s land-use and spatial planning systems with the “Three Zones and One Line” environmental zoning systems, identifying polluted and at-risk areas to inform and adjust the land use (Wang et al., 2020[41]). Another example is pilots of innovation models such as “waste-free cities”. Shenzhen is one of the first of the 11 pilot cities, and green buildings accounted for almost all of the new construction in the city in 2023 (Shenzhen Daily, 2023[42]). Most countries acknowledge the synergy between climate mitigation and reduction in co-emitted air pollutants in their BTRs (and NCs). Several countries also discuss transport sector policies aimed at transitioning fuel- and gas-based public transport systems to lower- and zero-emission ones. For example, Queensland, Australia, has recently implemented the Zero Emissions Bus Program, where all new buses in South East Queensland will be replaced with battery electric buses between 2025 and 2030. China also promotes the adoption of inland river vessels powered by liquified natural gas (LNG) and batteries, and the use of shore power for vessels docking in key economic regions such as the Yangtze River Economic Belt (China, 2024[40]).
Countries also highlight sustainable agriculture policies that synergistically address climate change as wells as nutrient pollution and hazardous chemicals. For example, France is addressing nitrous oxide (N2O) emissions from nitrogen fertiliser use (with the latter also being a significant contributor to atmospheric ozone depletion) through policies aimed at a 15% reduction in N2O emissions by 2030 relative to the level of 2015 (Government of France, 2024[20]). Uganda implements a project that reuses waste sludge, rich in nutrient and organic matter for producing fertilisers, which can reduce GHG emissions while promoting more environmentally safe waste disposal methods. Indonesia’s Integrated Planting Calendar Information System (KATAM) programme provides information on planting timings, crop varieties and optimal quantity of fertilisers and pesticides calculated based on the rainfall forecast (MoEF, Indonesia, 2018[43]). The information provided can help foster resilience of the agricultural sector to climate change, while facilitating the management of chemical and nutrient pollution. In addition, Indonesia and China rely, respectively, on an integrated watershed management strategy and an eco-compensation mechanism to improve synergies among the three components of the triple planetary crisis (see Box 5.3).
The interconnectedness of climate change, biodiversity loss and pollution is salient in watershed areas. Climate change significantly impacts watershed ecosystems and water resources, and also exacerbates soil erosion and water pollution (Qiu et al., 2019[44]). For example, in Indonesia, upstream watersheds are prone to floods and landslides during the rainy season and droughts in the dry season, which make them particularly vulnerable to climate change (MoEF, Indonesia, 2022[31]). Diffuse pollution from the upstream catchment can also potentially trigger regional conflicts of interest between upstream and downstream areas (Sheng, Cheng and Wu, 2023[45]). Activities conducted in upstream areas, such as the use of pesticides in agriculture or discharges from industrial plants, can introduce pollutants into water that flows towards downstream areas (Chakraborti, 2020[46]).
Indonesia’s BTR discusses watershed management as an integrated key strategy for enhancing synergies between climate change mitigation, ecosystem development and the protection of terrestrial water resources (MoE, Indonesia, 2024[30]). Integrated watershed management encompasses the holistic approach of management of water, soil and community well-being, simultaneously addressing environmental protection, natural resource use, and human needs. As part of the “FOLU Net Sink 2030” strategy, Indonesia rehabilitates the land with tree seedlings of fruits and nuts sourced from 57 permanent nurseries around the country and through soil and water conservation structures (e.g. gully plug) development. The country prioritises the rehabilitation of areas that are particularly vulnerable to climate change (MoEF, Indonesia, 2022[31]).
In its NBSAP and BTR, China identifies improving the watershed eco-compensation (WEC) system as a priority action to enhance ecological protection (China, 2022[47]; China, 2024[27]). Based on the “beneficiary pays” principle, the system is a combination of Payments for Ecosystem Services (PES) and Ecological Compensation (EC). WEC mechanisms function as incentive-compatible mechanisms between downstream beneficiary areas and upstream provider areas through the transfer of fiscal payments and other methods such as the provision of goods, services or infrastructure (China, 2018[48]; Sheng, Cheng and Wu, 2023[45]). Between 1999 and 2016, more than 50 WEC projects were implemented in multiple provinces in China to reduce polluting activities (Jiang, Eaton and Kostka, 2021[49]).
Policies and projects tackling climate and pollution objectives sparsely touch upon the trade-offs in the BTRs, although there are some mentions of the risks and the need to manage them. For instance, France mentions its plan for light pollution reduction in its renewables expansion policy to support biodiversity (Government of France, 2024[20]). For example, red aviation lighting (to signal the presence of wind turbine farms to nearby aircraft) attracts migratory bats, which heightens the species’ collision risk (Voigt et al., 2018[50]). One of the proposed ways France aims to avoid this trade-off generated by its wind farm expansion policy is through adaptive lighting that is activated based on presence of aircraft near farms (Government of France, 2024[20]).
Source: Authors’ own elaboration based on the review of national documents.
5.3.4. NBSAPs discuss biodiversity-climate change interlinkages and synergies, but only a few illustrate how trade-offs are managed
All ten countries examined acknowledge interlinkages between climate change and biodiversity loss in their NBSAPs, albeit to a varying degree (Table 5.8). The country-specific examples provided in NBSAPs vary in their scales, ranging from responses of endemic species to climate change and altered interactions between species to ecosystem-wide impacts arising from the climatic conditions. For instance, Japan mentions the northward expansion of its warm-climate bamboo species (moso bamboo and giant timber bamboo) and the southern species of butterflies (MoE, Japan, 2023[51]). Uganda discusses the climate-change-driven spread of invasive species such as sicklebush, which causes extensive alterations of ecosystems, including in protected areas (NEMA, Uganda, 2024[52]). Indonesia mentions the risk to the species in the Arafura Sea due to their sensitivity to rising sea surface temperature and acidity (MoNDP, Indonesia, 2024[17]).
Countries similarly discuss the impacts of the adaptive behaviours of species to climate change, including the migration of species in search of suitable climatic conditions (MoNDP, Indonesia, 2024[17]) and altered interactions between different species (Commonwealth of Australia, 2024[53]). India mentions additional conservation management of 53 tiger reserves across the country (NTCA, India, 2022[54]), which also contribute to enhanced carbon storage as these ecosystems are protected from pressures such as deforestation (Lamba et al., 2023[55]).
Other examples highlight the ecosystem-wide implications of climate change. Peru highlights the risk of climate-induced losses of Yungas montane forests9 and Puna grasslands,10 threatening a range of habitats and their microclimatic conditions upon which a rich assemblage of endemic species rely. Endemic species in alpine areas are often considered particularly vulnerable to climate change due to various factors, including the limited possibility for them to migrate further upward (Anthelme et al., 2014[56]). Australia also attributes “mass deaths of flora and fauna” to the impacts of climate change, including more frequent wildfires and coral bleaching (Commonwealth of Australia, 2024[53]).
Conversely, the impacts of biodiversity loss on climate change are less commonly discussed in the NBSAPs. The examples provided focus on the decline in regulating ecosystem services (e.g. climate regulation and CO2 fixation) (SSA, Argentina, 2024[36]) and the diminishing role of biodiversity in climate change mitigation and adaptation (ECCC, 2024[19]). Various countries also note the mutually reinforcing nature of biodiversity loss and climate change. For instance, Uganda mentions that its extensive wetlands have been severely degraded, diminishing their role both as an important habitat for species and a carbon sink (NEMA, Uganda, 2024[52]).
1. Impacts refer to the biophysical impacts of biodiversity (loss) on climate change and vice versa.
2. Government actions refer to policies and projects.
3. Dimensions of biodiversity include species, ecosystems and biota.
Source: Authors’ own elaboration based on the review of national documents.
The NBSAPs from ten countries acknowledge the interlinkages between biodiversity and climate change in policies and projects, highlighting ways to foster synergies (Table 5.8 and Table 5.9). For instance, Uganda’s biodiversity policy is shifting away from the focus on the conservation of specific species to the recognition of the interconnected ecosystems. It aims to take a holistic view “of the broader ecological context in which species live, including habitats, landscapes, ecosystem services, and the impacts of human activities on these systems” (NEMA, Uganda, 2024, p. 193[52]) (see Box 5.4).
Uganda is home to rich assemblages of species, ranked among the top ten countries in the world in terms of the number of species recorded (CBD, n.d.[57]). In recent years, deforestation has threatened biodiversity; once covering almost a quarter of the land, forest cover has diminished to less than 10% by 2015 (NEMA, Uganda, 2023[58]). The impact of climate change on key agricultural exports such as coffee is also a rising concern (NEMA, Uganda, 2023[58]).
In recent years, Uganda has set out an ambitious plan to enhance biodiversity. The focus of biodiversity conservation in Uganda has progressively moved away from targeting species and broadened to the interconnected ecosystems. Uganda has implemented several ecosystem-based conservation plans, including in the Kidepo Critical Landscape (a vast savanna woodland in northeastern Uganda) and the Mount Elgon Landscape (a national park hosting a range of endemic species). In Uganda, the establishment of monoculture is recognised as a threat to biodiversity and ecosystem health (Government of Uganda, 2016[59]). For instance, the monoculture tea plantations in Mulehe wetland, or the monoculture paddy rice cultivation, have negatively affected the diversity of flora in the country (Government of Uganda, 2016[59]). The regulations of the Kidepo landscape ensure that areas surrounding streams and rivers are protected from monoculture plantations and enriched with suitable native species to protect the existing natural vegetation (NEMA, Uganda, 2018, pp. 81-82[60]).
The Mount Elgon National Park mitigates the impacts of climate change on its rich ecosystem by restoring degraded areas through tree planting and riverbank management. The implementation of softwood plantations also responds to the economic demand for poles, timber and fuel wood. The plantations are operated “on a rotational harvesting period of 20 years with intermittent harvesting of thinnings at agreed intervals.” (UWA, Uganda, 2022, p. 21[61]). Long rotation length allows harvested areas a period of rest, thus enhancing the ecosystem’s ability to regenerate. It also reduces soil erosion and increases species diversity (Başkent and Kašpar, 2023[62]).
In 2024, Uganda became the first country in Africa to submit national targets in accordance with the KMGBF (CBD, 2024[63]). Notably, recognising the interlinkages between biodiversity and the vital ecosystem services they provide in adapting to and mitigating climate change, Uganda’s NBSAP highlights the importance of pursuing synergies with other environmental objectives and the need for mechanisms for monitoring and evaluation. For example, biological monitoring and field surveys have been conducted to track pests and diseases of Arabica coffee in the Mount Elgon area (Kucel et al., 2024[64]). Planting shade trees, such as banana crops, reduces the temperature in coffee gardens and solar radiation, thus, providing fodder and shelter for animals that are natural predators of coffee pests and protecting the coffee plants from microclimate variability (Kagezi et al., 2018[65]; Harelimana, Rukazambuga and Hance, 2022[66]).
Canada’s NBSAP calls for harnessing nature-based solutions (NbS) to reduce the effects of climate change while supporting biodiversity. Canada has set up the Natural Climate Solutions Fund as a horizontal initiative to promote NbS to mitigate and adapt to climate change, improve air and water quality and provide habitats for wildlife, including through progressing towards its goal of planting two billion trees across the country in both rural and urban areas under the 2 Billion Trees Program. To ensure planting also contributes to biodiversity conservation and pollution prevention and control, shrubs are planted together with trees as the mixture provides numerous benefits for forests, including preventing the (re)establishment of invasive species, enhancing wildlife corridors and preventing soil erosion (Government of Canada, 2023[67]). The emphasis on nature-based solutions is also echoed in the Canada’s approach to international climate finance, which allocates a minimum of 20% of the funding (which has doubled to CAD 5.3 billion for 2021-2026) to nature-based climate solutions and projects that deliver synergies for biodiversity.
Similarly, France implements rewilding projects in cities by expanding urban tree canopy cover and de-sealing soils under built structures (e.g. roads) to simultaneously improve soil health and capacity for carbon sequestration. The programme also aids with climate adaptation by providing cooling benefits for local residents against the backdrop of increasingly intense heatwaves (Government of France, 2023[68]). Relatedly, Japan’s NBSAP highlights the importance of local action and engagement with local economic activities (including agriculture, fishery and forestry) for the expansion of conservation areas, formation of ecological connectivity and appropriate management of alien species. The NBSAP is translated into local strategies, ensuring that local action is tailored to specific needs while adding up to national objectives (see Box 5.5).
The NBSAP in Japan emphasises that the local action is integral to effective biodiversity conservation, noting important local synergies as well as some risks of trade-offs. For instance, Japan highlights that while ecological connectivity is important, it needs to be carefully managed at a local scale as enhancing connectivity also runs the risk of accelerating the spread of highly pathogenic avian influenza (HPAI), which can bring adverse impacts on rare species as well as livestock production (Japan, 2023[69]).
Japan facilitates the consideration of synergistic action by promoting the development of locally tailored strategies and providing tools and mechanisms for informing local action and engagement. Under the technical guidance and support of the national government, the NBSAP is translated into a local biodiversity strategies and action plans (i.e. “L” BSAP) across all 47 prefectures, as well as 178 cities and towns within prefectures in Japan. Recognising that establishing and enhancing ecosystem connectivity for biodiversity conservation requires co-ordination at the units (e.g. watershed) that may not necessarily coincide with administrative units, it also encourages co-ordination, and where relevant, the development of a joint-strategy for biodiversity conservation across administrative areas (Ministry of the Environment/Japan, 2023[70]). The Ministry of Environment has also developed a pilot mapping tool to visualise the protected areas to disseminate information about notable examples, highlight the ecosystem services and track and inform local spatial planning (Ministry of the Environment/Japan, 2025[71]).
As part of the strategy to meet “30by30 target” under the KMGBF, Japan has also officially certified 328 sites managed by corporations and local stakeholders as the Nationally Certified Sustainably Managed Natural Sites since 2023 (Japan, 2023[69]; MoE, Japan, 2025[72]). One of the certified sites delivering synergies is a marine area in Yamakawa (Kagoshima), where local fishing communities and conservation organisations restore withering seaweed beds caused by warmer sea temperature and altered feeding behaviours of fish and marine invertebrates (e.g. sea urchins) due to climate change. Beyond hosting and protecting a wide range of species including sea turtle hatchlings, the restoration of seaweed beds delivers a number of synergies. Seaweed beds play a number of roles including carbon storage (blue carbon) as well as removal of excess nitrogen and phosphorous. To better integrate various related measures, the government provides current and prospective managers of the certified sites with information on relevant local and regional initiatives including Decarbonization Leading Areas and the Circular and Ecological Economy1 (Japan, 2023[69]).
1. The national government implements a number of initiatives to support local governments implement locally specific strategies while providing an overarching framework and technical capacity. Among these, Decarbonization Leading Areas (90 proposals were selected as of September 2025) and Circular and Ecological Economy (implemented by 167 subnational governments as of March 2025) seek to pursue synergies by tackling local socio-economic challenges and environmental challenges together (OECD, 2025[73]).
There are examples of funding mechanisms for projects that are anticipated to deliver synergies between climate change mitigation, adaptation and biodiversity conservation. For example, Australia’s NBSAP highlights the Nature Repair Market Scheme – the world’s first legislated national voluntary biodiversity market established in 2023 – and its alignment with the carbon markets under the Australian Carbon Credit Unit (ACCU) Scheme, which outlines the scope for various vegetation management including tidal restoration of blue carbon ecosystems. The project proponents can therefore design a project and earn both a biodiversity certificate and the ACCU credit by designing a synergistic project that aims to revegetate land and replant local native vegetation and enhance ecological connectivity (DCCEEW, Australia, 2025[74]).
However, discussions of policies or projects managing trade-offs are limited, although some countries mention their institutional arrangements that facilitate such consideration. For instance, France has implemented Green Budgeting since 2020 to assess the potential impact of public expenditure on the environment, including biodiversity conservation, climate change mitigation and adaptation and pollution reduction to inform budgetary allocation (see Box 5.6).
Green budgeting refers to the use of budgetary policy tools to better understand and advance climate and environmental objectives. As of 2022, 22 OECD countries have integrated green budgeting practices, with the most common approaches being environmental impact assessments (18 countries) and green budgeting tagging (13 countries) (OECD, 2024[75]). The NBSAP mentions that France promotes the “widespread adoption” of the green budgeting approach, which encompasses the three components of the triple planetary crisis (Government of France, 2023[68]). Since 2020, France has produced a Green Budget report annually, as an annex to its Finance Bill. The report lists and assesses all planned public expenditures for the coming year based on their positive or negative impact on the environment. In line with the EU green taxonomy, it tags budget appropriations, tax expenditures and taxes allocated to public bodies according to their impact on six environmental objectives: climate change mitigation, climate change adaptation, water resources management, circular economy, pollution abatement and biodiversity protection (Government of France, 2023[76]).
Each expenditure receives an overall tag once the action or sub-action has been rated across six environmental objectives. The action is tagged “favourable” if at least one dimension is rated favourable, and the others are neutral; “unfavourable” if at least one dimension is rated unfavourable, and the others are neutral; “mixed” if at least one dimension is rated favourable and at least one other is unfavourable; “neutral” when all dimensions are neutral. For example, the construction of new railway lines funded by taxes is rated as “mixed” because it has a positive impact on climate change and pollution, but it generates waste and leads to the artificialisation of land, which is rated as “unfavourable” in terms of waste management and biodiversity (Government of France, 2023, p. 76[76]) (see Figure 5.2). In the 2024 Finance Bill, out of a total state budget of EUR 569.7 billion, favourable expenditures account for EUR 39.7 billion, mixed expenditures for EUR 3.1 billion, and unfavourable expenditures for EUR 13.1 billion. The majority (76%) of the expenditures is “neutral” and 16% is untagged. The “untagged” category may be due to a lack of data or to the heterogeneity of an expenditure’s effects (Government of France, 2023, p. 36[76]).
Source: Government of France (2023, p. 76[76]).
Source: Authors’ own elaboration based on the review of national documents.
5.3.5. NBSAPs discuss biodiversity-pollution interlinkages in a dissimilar way, and illustrate synergies in more detail than trade-offs
All of the ten countries discuss the impacts of pollution on biodiversity, although the discussion varies in terms of the level of detail (Table 5.10). Most NBSAPs provide detailed examples of pollution affecting freshwater and marine ecosystems. Peru highlights the issues of contamination of river basins associated with gold mining (mercury) waste, as well as water used during oil extraction (MoE, Peru, 2024[77]). Peru also details the cumulative nature of acids and heavy metals due to mining activities affecting the Amazon basin. In 2021, 6 902 sites were identified to have been contaminated by mining activities and associated waste (INEI, 2022[78]). In a more generic consideration, Indonesia explains that at the national level, its aquatic systems are the most affected by pollution, with sources mainly originating from land, such as plastic waste, excess nutrients and pesticides (MoNDP, Indonesia, 2024[17]). Land is at the nexus of tackling climate change and biodiversity loss (see Box 5.7), and countries’ NBSAPs also mention soil pollution and soil health degradation, albeit with fewer details than water pollution.
Conversely, biodiversity loss impacts on pollution are discussed in less detail. Key impacts of biodiversity loss on pollution discussed in the NBSAPs include the role of biodiversity in soil formation, nutrient recycling (see Box 6.10 in Chapter 6), water filtration, and air pollution control. For instance, Canada and Uganda both mention how the loss of wetlands leads to lower water quality (ECCC, 2024[19]; NEMA, Uganda, 2024[52]), while Australia notes that urban green spaces can attenuate harm from air pollution (Commonwealth of Australia, 2024[53]). Meanwhile, India notes the importance of more than 300 types of agriculturally important insects (MoEFCC, India, 2024[79]), which provide regulating and supporting ecosystem services to agriculture and biodiversity conservation, such as pollination, natural pest control, waste disposal and nutrient recycling (Redhead et al., 2020[80]; Noriega et al., 2018[81]).
1. Impacts refer to the biophysical impacts of biodiversity (loss) on pollution and vice versa.
2. Government actions refer to policies and projects.
3. Dimensions of pollution include subsets of media (e.g. air) as well as types (e.g. nutrient).
Source: Authors’ own elaboration based on the review of national documents.
Defined as “a terrestrial bio-productive system that comprises soil, vegetation and other biotas and the ecological and hydrological processes” in the United Nations Convention to Combat Desertification (UNCCD, 1994[82]), land is a critical nexus at which climate change and other pressing environmental challenges converge (Rackelmann et al., 2024[83]).
Climate change and land degradation are mutually reinforcing. Increased temperature and altered precipitation patterns can accelerate the processes of desertification and land degradation (e.g. soil erosion and vegetation loss) (IPCC, 2019[84]), as well as diminish soil moisture and accelerate soil erosion. Climate-induced disturbances such as droughts and pest outbreaks can also cause the loss of soil organic carbon, the largest carbon sink on land that is also integral to soil productivity and ecological processes, including nutrient cycling (Chotte et al., 2019[85]). Furthermore, climate change affects direct (e.g. sea level rise) and indirect drivers (e.g. irrigation) of soil salinisation, which lowers the soil quality (Eswar, Karuppusamy and Chellamuthu, 2021[86]). In turn, poor soil quality can amplify the impacts of extreme weather events.
The feedback dynamic affects and is affected by anthropogenic activities, and further drives climate change and biodiversity loss. The expansion of crop and pastureland is already among the main drivers of land conversion (UNCCD, 2024[87]). Climate change impacts on land degradation (e.g. increased temperatures diminish soil moisture and accelerate soil erosion), in turn, can reduce the quality and availability of agricultural land, grazing areas and water resources and lead to abandonment of cropland and pastureland and subsequent land conversion elsewhere at the expense of intact ecosystems (Yang et al., 2024[88]).
While only a handful of countries currently have dedicated soil-related legal instruments (FAO, 2025[89]), some countries are developing national and regional strategies to protect soil in recognition of its contribution to climate mitigation, adaptation, and biodiversity. For instance, Australia’s NBSAP highlights the importance of soil quality and its BTR mentions the National Soil Action Plan 2023-2028 under the National Soil Strategy 2021-2040, which recognises the interlinkages between soil health and climate resilience and biodiversity, calling for an integrated and aligned approach to value, manage and improve soil health (DAFF, Australia, 2023[90]). Four priority actions under the Plan include the development of a common measurement, monitoring and reporting with which to better understand soil health, as well as an integrated policy approach and strategies for ensuring the value of soil is recognised across policy portfolios, emphasising the engagement with stakeholders at local, regional and national levels.
All ten countries consider some synergistic policy action to address biodiversity loss and pollution in their NBSAPs, including circular economy policies (see Table 5.11). For instance, one way France is tackling both issues is through its circular economy law, which includes a phase-out plan to close all former municipal landfill sites along the coast to eliminate the risk of (plastic) waste leakage to the marine environment (Government of France, 2023[68]). Similarly, Japan and Australia mention a range of policy measures to halt and reverse biodiversity loss, focusing on the circular economy transition to address pollution and alleviate pressures on biodiversity (see Box 5.8 for more information).
Other examples of synergistic policy considerations include the use of economic instruments and information policies to contribute towards dual objectives. For example, India implements a scheme for promoting soil health through alternative farming practices and fertiliser use through allocating grants. The scheme incentivises sustainable agricultural practices by reducing government subsidy for chemical fertilisers and reallocating half of the saved fertiliser subsidy to States and Union Territories consuming less chemical fertiliser compared to the previous three-year average (MoEFCC, India, 2024[18]). Argentina aims to improve its research and the development of a tool for identifying important areas for biodiversity, considering a range of environmental factors including nutrient cycles and soil formation to support the planning and implementation of land restoration policy of regional and local governments (SSA, Argentina, 2024[36]).
The principle of circular economy features prominently in Japan’s BTR and NBSAP, which call for the transition to a more circular economy both as a mean to tackling climate change and stemming biodiversity loss, as well as an objective in itself. The BTR in Japan emphasises the synergies between climate change mitigation and circular economy built around the “3Rs+Renewable” (reduce, reuse and recycle and promoting biomass and use of recycled materials) (Japan, 2024[28]), with the Circular Economy Roadmap developed in 2022 highlighting that circular economy has the potential to contribute towards emission reductions for 36% of sources of GHG emissions (Ministry of the Environment/Japan, 2023[91]). Japan’s NBSAP similarly highlights the role of circular economy in alleviating pressures on biodiversity. Japan aims to double the treatment volume of recycled metal materials (which has already doubled between 2001 and 2020) by 2030 to reduce energy use and adverse biodiversity impacts associated with extraction and processing of metals, while enhancing access to the materials. Japan also promotes repurposing of dredged sediment and other by-products from port development to restore and enhance natural (e.g. tidal flats and seaweed beds) and engineered blue infrastructure (e.g. algae farm) to tackle nutrient pollution and prevent adverse impacts on water quality (e.g. turbidity) (Japan, 2023[69]).
Improving circularity of resources use is also an important consideration for tackling biodiversity loss in Australia. Along with climate change, marine and coastal pollution constitute the main drivers of biodiversity loss in Australia, which is now suggested to have 19 degraded ecosystems across the continent that signal their (near) collapse. In its latest NBSAP, Australia states its aim to reduce the impacts of pollution on biodiversity by propelling the circular economy strategy and lowering material footprint and waste generation by 2030 (Commonwealth of Australia, 2024[53]). Australia’s Circular Economy Framework highlights restoring biodiversity as one of its circular economy transition objectives. It also describes some of the types of indicators that can help track a more circular economy such as biodiversity loss , alongside other indicators such as water use; GHG emissions; water, soil and air quality; and nutrient capture and reuse (DCCEEW, Australia, 2024[92]). The NBSAP also emphasises addressing plastic pollution to alleviate pressure on freshwater and marine ecosystems and robust environmental management of chemicals to manage the risks on water resources, wildlife and human health (DCCEEW, Australia, 2024[93]).
Source: Authors’ own elaboration based on the review of national documents.
However, much less attention is paid to manage the risks of trade-offs between policy actions targeted at biodiversity conservation and pollution control and management. Given the importance of regulating ecosystem services for air, water and soil quality, this may partially reflect the fact that enhancing biodiversity often deliver synergies automatically for pollution objectives. Nonetheless, the lack of substantive discussions on trade-offs in NBSAPs appears to constitute a missed opportunity for considering the risks associated with policies to tackle pollution, such as unintended burden shifting (see also Chapter 4).
5.3.6. National documents on pollution are disparate and diverse, but some interlinkages with climate change and biodiversity loss are acknowledged
While the need for an integrated approach to tackle pollution is recognised (e.g. the Recommendation on Integrated Pollution Prevention and Control (OECD, 1991[94])), there are no national documents that detail countries’ plans for addressing all the different dimensions of pollution11 and can be considered as equivalents to the BTRs and NBSAPs. Instead, the national pollution control and management policy landscape is shaped by a set of disparate policies and plans developed in response to different priorities and multilateral environmental agreements targeting different environmental sinks (e.g. air) and pollutants (e.g. hazardous chemicals) across different stages of their lifecycle (Allan et al., 2025[95]).
Air pollution is a widely recognised as a key environmental challenge that affects human health and ecosystems (WHO, 2021[96]). Air pollution comprises the complex interactions between a range of substances, which vary in their sources and characteristics. For instance, emissions sources can be both stationary (e.g. industrial facilities) and non-stationary (e.g. vehicles). Air pollutants can be emitted directly or formed from precursors (e.g. CH4 and NOx for ground-level ozone). Pollutants emitted into air also affect other environmental sinks. For instance, as a result of deposition through precipitation, air quality in turn can also affect water quality through acidification and eutrophication (Edo et al., 2024[97]).
While many countries implement air quality control measures building on the Air quality guidelines developed by the World Health Organization (WHO, 2021[96]), there is no single global framework for addressing air pollution (UNEP, 2021[98]). Efforts to tackle air pollution have been progressively strengthened and expanded in scope in terms of the acknowledgement of the interlinkages with other environmental challenges, notably through the UNECE Convention on Long-range Transboundary Air Pollution (Air Convention), along with its eight Protocols and their subsequent amendments.12 The “multi-pollutant and multi-source” Protocol to Abate Acidification, Eutrophication and Ground-level Ozone (Gothenburg Protocol) has been amended to include black carbon – both a component of particulate matter with a diameter smaller than 2.5 micrometres (PM 2.5) and a short-lived climate pollutant (UNECE, 2012[99]). The most recent revision process launched in 2023 considers the interlinkages between air pollution and climate change explicitly and proposes a number of broader consideration including the inclusion of CH4 under the reduction commitments, integrated approach for air quality, climate change and energy policies, as well as risk-based targets to alleviate the adverse impacts on health and ecosystems (UNECE, 2024[100]).
Information sharing on strategies and policies is encouraged by the Air Convention, but national reporting on policies is far less systematic than the emission inventory reports. However, the Convention has been instrumental in the development and amendments of legislations and there are standardised national documents on air pollution in some regions. For instance, the emissions limits (including from specific sources such as combustion plants) set out in the Gothenburg Protocol have been transposed in the National Emission Reduction Commitments Directive in the European Union (EEA, 2024[101]). Countries develop and communicate the plans for achieving emission reduction under the common template of the National Air Pollution Control Programme (NAPCP) (European Commission, 2018[102]). The template explicitly recognises the interlinkages between air pollution and climate change and ensures that relevant sectoral policies are considered in relation to climate change as well as energy priorities (see Section 6.4 of Chapter 6 for more discussions on policies to address air pollution).
Growing evidence also highlights the interlinkages between hazardous chemicals and wastes and climate and biodiversity. The Basel, Rotterdam and Stockholm Conventions are multilateral environmental agreements administered by the joint secretariat to protect human health and the environment from hazardous chemicals and wastes. While none of the articles of the Basel, Rotterdam and Stockholm Conventions mention climate change or biodiversity explicitly, there has been a greater recognition of these interlinkages in recent years. The joint secretariat (together with the secretariat of the Minamata Convention on Mercury) conducted exploratory studies, highlighting the interrelated nature of managing chemicals, wastes and climate change (2021[103]) and biodiversity loss (2021[104]).
The key findings of these exploratory research strengthen the rationale for integrating climate change and biodiversity loss in efforts to tackle issues relating to hazardous chemicals and wastes. Climate change influences primary emissions of hazardous chemicals with adverse impacts on biodiversity. For instance, higher incidence of pest outbreaks may necessitate increased pesticide usage, which can have adverse effects on species, including birds and pollinators. Climate change can also increase secondary emissions, as they are released from reservoirs, including soil and glaciers. For instance, the melting of permafrost – a significant reservoir of mercury – is suggested to be increasing the export of mercury to downstream environments (Chételat et al., 2022[105]). Furthermore, climatic variables such as temperature, wind speed and precipitation patterns affect the transport and environmental fate of hazardous chemicals. Since many chemicals can bioaccumulate and travel over long distances, species and environments far removed from the original sources can also be exposed.
Beyond these biophysical interlinkages, the need for more consolidated environmental monitoring efforts is also increasingly highlighted as a solution to these challenges. For instance, the recent global monitoring report on the Stockholm Convention highlights the potential for enhancing co-ordination with other multilateral environmental agreements, including the CBD and the UNFCCC, for monitoring and modelling efforts (UNEP, 2023[106]).
Examining the national implementation plans (NIPs) submitted by select Parties to the Stockholm Convention for which the BTR and NBSAP documents are analysed, these interlinkages are sparsely discussed in NIPs. Discussions focus on (i) acknowledgement of the bioaccumulative nature and long-range transport through air, water and migratory species (as specified in the text of the Convention) and, relatedly, (ii) the results of monitoring of the concentrations of POPs in species across different types of ecosystems.
However, there are some limited examples in which climate and biodiversity considerations are discussed in greater detail. For instance, Canada’s latest NIP notes the impact of climate change on the release and environmental fate of POPs (ECCC, 2024[107]) as highlighted in the assessment conducted by the Arctic Monitoring and Assessment Programme (2020[108]). It also discusses Canada’s assessment and regulatory schemes for both new and existing substances, including pesticides and industrial chemicals. The New Substances Notification regime under the Canadian Environment Protection Act mandates assessments of new substances to determine if they enter the environment in a quantity, concentration or conditions that “have or may have an immediate or long-term harmful effect on the environment or its biological diversity” among other conditions. Screening assessments of existing substances also determine whether such substances are harmful to human health and/or the environment. The NIP of Canada also acknowledges the particular vulnerability of Canada’s Arctic due to the tendency for POPs to settle in colder climates and the disproportionate exposure of Indigenous Peoples in the region due to their diets traditionally rich in marine mammals. In response, Canada implements several programmes, including the Northern Contaminants Program (NCP), which was established to reduce and eliminate the contaminants contained in harvested foods wherever possible. The NCP also facilitates engagement, capacity building and awareness activities to ensure informed decision-making.
In Peru, where agriculture (mainly consisting of smallholders) constitutes an important part of the economy, excessive use and improper handling of pesticides remain a key challenge. The five most commonly detected pesticides in the country are considered to be highly hazardous (this includes chlorpyrifos13, which has been added to the list of pesticides to be eliminated under the Convention in 2025) (MoE, Peru, 2024[77]). The NIP discusses its goal to eliminate or reduce the use of pesticides listed under the Convention by promoting alternatives, including less hazardous chemicals and agro-ecological practices for natural pest control (MoE, Peru, 2022[109]). For instance, sweeping methods and soil sanitation are mentioned as an alternative to chlordecone, a pesticide commonly used in tropical climates. In this context, the National Agrarian Health Service of Peru (SENASA) offers information and training through Good Agricultural Practices Guides for 20 types of commonly grown crops in the country. The NBSAP of Peru similarly highlights the importance of facilitating the take-up of these agro-ecological practices to alleviate the issue for human health and degradation of microorganisms in the soil.
This chapter analysed twenty national documents of ten diverse countries to examine the extent to which countries pay attention to interlinkages between the dimensions of the triple planetary crisis. The analysis suggests that all ten countries examined recognise the pairwise interlinkages between climate change, biodiversity loss, and pollution in both their BTRs and NBSAPs. However, the framing of the “triple planetary crisis” is less commonly used, with only four countries explicitly discussing it in their BTR (France) and NBSAPs (Canada, India and Indonesia).
Examining the level of detail with which the interlinkages are considered, the analysis finds that they are unevenly considered across countries. There are relatively extensive and detailed discussions on the interlinkages between climate change and biodiversity in terms of their biophysical impacts, particularly in the BTRs. However, in both BTRs and NBSAPs, the impacts of climate change on biodiversity feature more prominently than the implications of biodiversity loss on climate change. Most of the ten countries examined also consider ways to foster synergies between climate mitigation and adaptation and biodiversity conservation in both BTRs and NBSAPs. In addition to integrating the consideration of other environmental objectives in the design of economic, regulatory and information instruments, a range of nature-based solutions feature prominently in these documents, recognising the role of nature in regulating the climate and enhancing resilience against the impacts of climate change. A few countries also highlight the importance of circular economy and resource efficiency in alleviating environmental pressures arising from the common interlocking drivers of climate change, biodiversity loss and pollution. Relatedly, countries also discuss various institutional mechanisms and tools that facilitate broadening of a “lens” in decision-making and budgetary allocation, such as the “Climate, Nature and Economy Lens” in Canada and “Green Budgeting” in France.
While the analysis demonstrates a number of examples of integrated policy solutions, it also identifies two potential areas of oversight. Notably, although some of the synergies in policies are discussed in terms of the sector-specific approaches as specified in the common reporting format of BTRs, such as in energy, agriculture, transport and waste(water) management, considerations of how climate change and biodiversity loss might affect the severity and the extent of pollution are largely lacking from both BTRs and NBSAPs. Furthermore, discussions on trade-off management in policies are almost entirely absent or are discussed in generic terms, particularly for pollution. Given the growing salience of the potential trade-offs, such as between the need for renewables expansion to tackle climate change and the risks it carries for biodiversity, the lack of consideration appears to constitute a missed opportunity for anticipating and managing trade-offs.
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← 1. For countries from which the first BTRs were not yet available, National Communications (NCs) documents were analysed as complementary materials.
← 2. Small Islands Developing States (SIDS) and Least Developed Countries (LDCs) can submit the information at their discretion.
← 3. Within the scope of this analysis, India and Uganda.
← 4. The emissions inventory encompasses “sources and removals by sinks of all greenhouse gases not controlled by the Montreal Protocol, to the extent its (the Party) capacities permit, using comparable methodologies to be promoted and agreed upon by the Conference of the Parties” (UNFCCC, 2009[7]).
← 5. The unprecedented scale of the fire prompted large-scale studies on its impact on biodiversity, finding an overall decline in species abundance in the areas while identifying both positive and negative impacts that are mediated by land tenure, drought and recent fire history (Driscoll et al., 2024[110]).
← 6. Planted trees are considered to peak in their capacity to absorb carbon around 4-5 age classes (i.e. between 16 to 25 years), after which they decline.
← 7. The tool is called “Ecosystem Conservation/Restoration Potential Map” and overlays statistical analyses with geospatial information using Geographic Information System (GIS). The Map helps stakeholders understand the current and anticipate future status, evaluate the potential for disaster risk reduction and biodiversity conservation and land-related regulations.
← 8. Argentina’s BTR does not cover this point, but its latest NC from 2015 does, in a “moderate” way.
← 9. The Peruvian Yunga are a mosaic of montane forests which offer a highly varying microclimate.
← 10. The South American Puna spreads along the Andean mountain range across Argentina, Bolivia, Chile and Peru, located between 30 000 and 4 000 m above sea level.
← 11. One possible exception at a regional level is the “Zero Pollution Action Plan” of the European Union, which sets out a vision to reduce air, water and soil pollutions to levels “no longer considered harmful to health and natural ecosystems […]” and integrates pollution prevention in relevant EU policies to maximise synergies and identifying trade-offs (European Union, 2021[112]).
← 12. These legally binding Protocols set targets for emission reductions and define the specific measures to be undertaken.
← 13. Chlorpyrifos has also been banned for agricultural use as of August 2024 (National Agrarian Health Service of Peru, 2023[111]).