Supporting Better Decision‑Making in Transport Infrastructure in Spain

5. Key findings

Abstract

Chapter 5 provides an overview of the railway infrastructure in the selected countries and summarises key findings regarding their infrastructure governance.

Railway infrastructure in selected countries

OECD countries have made very different choices with respect to their transport infrastructure, as a result of different economic, political, geographical and cultural factors. Railway infrastructure, including high-speed rail (HSR) lines, in Europe is typically managed by corporatised yet public joint-stock companies. Services are provided by a variety of operators, mostly state-owned, in the passenger segment. This is the case for Germany, France, Italy and United Kingdom1 as benchmark countries for this report.

These four countries have built approximately 5 400 km of HSR in total, compared to around 2 500 km in Spain alone (Eurostat, n.d.[78]). Italy was the first European country to inaugurate a high-speed rail line: the line from Florence and Rome opened in 1977. Shortly afterwards, France inaugurated its own “Trains à Grande Vitesse” lines. Germany’s first high-speed lines, served by “Intercity Express” (ICE) trains, opened in the early 1990s, whereas the UK opened the HS1 linked to the Channel Tunnel in 2007.

Based on research by the European Court of Auditors (European Court of Auditors, 2018[79])the number of passengers using high-speed rail in Europe is growing steadily: from roughly 15 billion passenger-kilometres (pkm) in 1990, demand reached more than 124 billion pkm in 2016. In 2015, high-speed rail services accounted for more than a quarter (26 %) of all rail passenger travel in the European Member States where high-speed services are available.

Outside Europe, privately-owned infrastructure and operations are much more common. In the two comparator countries for this report (Australia and Chile) there is no HSR infrastructure to date but rail transport plays a vital role in the countries’ logistics system. In addition, infrastructure investment has favoured roads and airports in order to satisfy demand for passenger transport, leading to high-quality interstate road networks and large international air connections in those countries.

Infrastructure governance in selected countries

The diversity of the countries surveyed allows us to extract some direct lessons on infrastructure governance from those systems with long-standing HSR networks and consolidated infrastructure planning and prioritisation traditions. Thus in Germany, France and Italy a number of practices could be of great interest for Spain.

At the same time, in those countries with no or very small HSR lines, debates both at the political and technical level on whether HSR should be built (Australia) or expanded (the UK – with only HS1 links to France through Kent) inform the thinking behind this note. In some cases, the lack of HSR infrastructure may be very telling in itself, as it can be either the result of scrupulous ex-ante assessments or public policy choices that have not favoured this type of investment, such as in Chile.

The key findings are structured according to the main aspect which form part of the infrastructure governance cycle investment planning, budget allocation and the role of technical analyses to support decision-making. Reference is also made to selected examples relating to infrastructure investment projects that are described more in detail in Chapter 6.

Investment planning

The examples collected aim to address one of the key shortcomings in infrastructure planning across OECD countries: the divergence of public policy goals across the actors involved in drawing up and implementing plans. This is recognised in the literature on institutional design, which notes that it is possible to have a simultaneous and suboptimal expansion of the high-speed rail (HSR), roads and airport networks even in the case of mutually exclusive projects to address the same transport problem (de Rus and Socorro, 2018[80])This is due to different incentives for those parts of government in charge of promoting projects (e.g. regional authorities, economic development ministries), evaluating and appraising projects (e.g. ministry of the economy, independent authority), funding (e.g. ministry of finance) and in charge of delivering infrastructure (e.g. ministry of transport). This separation between who promotes and who pays also affects decisions on infrastructure capacity and the kind of technology chosen (de Rus and Socorro, 2010[81]; Flyvbjerg, 2014[82])).

The development of an investment plan is often seen as an insurance against potential institutional conflicts and constant changes in planning dictated by political cycles. Australia has a national infrastructure plan including energy, telecommunications, water and transport sectors. Two of the countries surveyed, Germany and Italy, have a national transport infrastructure plan. While in France and in Chile, plans tend to be sectoral but respectively for these countries integrated with other aspect of regional infrastructure planning and reflecting a division of competences between ministries. Infrastructure planning in the UK was also historically based on medium-term sectoral plans.

Different practices exist to anchor long-term plans in the infrastructure policy space and ensure their lasting legacy. For example, Australia and Germany adopted a participatory approach. The latest Transport Infrastructure Plan 2030 in Germany ensured stakeholder participation through the entire process. The Federal Ministry of Transport and Digital Infrastructure received approximately 39 000 opinions, including via online forms and emails. The federal states, members of parliament, the Federal Government itself, railway infrastructure companies, members of the public, trade associations and other stakeholders submitted over 2 000 concrete project ideas for appraisal (See Germany case study 4, Chapter 6). The ministry also set up an online project information system (PRINS) allowing interested parties to scrutinise proposed projects for a period of six weeks. The Federal Ministry of Transport and Digital Infrastructure reviewed all the comments that were received within the specified period and summarised them in a Report on the Consultation Procedure.

In Australia, after widespread scepticism was expressed about the process of project selection, and a lack of confidence that the nation was realising the benefits intended through infrastructure investment (Keys, 2016[83]), “Infrastructure Australia” was established in 2008 as the Commonwealth Government’s principal infrastructure advisor (Commonwealth of Australia, 2008[84]). Subsequently, Australia has developed a number of governance tools and practices that support evidence-based development of infrastructure planning and investments. It includes the Australian Infrastructure Audit, the Infrastructure Australia Plan, the Infrastructure priority list (see Australia case study 2, Chapter 6) - that specify national and state level priorities. These key documents are completed by clear and detailed guidance including the Assessment Framework for initiatives and projects to be included in the Infrastructure Priority List (see Australia case study 4, Chapter 6) and the Development of Infrastructure Decision-making Principles (see Australia case study 3, Chapter 6).

Similar to Germany, the Infrastructure Australia Plan was developed through a collaborative 18-month process of research and consultation. The consultation saw 100 formal submissions from subnational jurisdictions, a wide range of industry associations, public interest groups, local government bodies and individuals. Infrastructure Australia has consulted with more than 500 stakeholders in every state and territory, and worked closely with representatives from all levels of government, as well as businesses, industry, and the wider community (Infrastructure Australia, 2016[85]; Infrastructure Australia, 2018[86]). The plan made 78 recommendations grouped into four reform areas: more productive cities and regions, efficient markets, sustainable and equitable infrastructure, and better decision making and delivery (Infrastructure Australia, 2018[86]). In 2018, the report Prioritising Reform, assessed how far the reforms recommended in the plan have progressed in two years. These type of measures prove to enhance the legitimacy and the ownership of the projects.

Another specificity of Australia is that, two of the largest states, New South Wales, Victoria and Queensland have established independent infrastructure bodies. Both Infrastructure New South Wales and Infrastructure Victoria develop long-term (20 and 30-year) infrastructure plans that typically form the basis of submissions to Infrastructure Australia’s long-term planning and the continual update of the Infrastructure Priority List.

In Italy, the latest transport infrastructure plan was published in 2017. The document Connettere l’Italia contains four strategic priorities up to 2030 and a shortlist of 108 priority projects for the 2018-2020 period. Prepared by the Ministry of Infrastructure and Transport, it was presented as an Annex to the 2017 Annual Budget Law and was approved by Parliament. Parliamentary approval in this form granted the plan a different status than it would have had if simply published by the Ministry. It also strengthened the narrative that, in a stagnating economy, infrastructure investment was instrumental to promote economic growth.

In 2018 France created an Infrastructure Guidance Council (Conseil d’Orientation des iInfrastructures), which issues a report providing three strategic scenarios for the development of transport infrastructure in France for the next 20 years. In addition, the ‘performance contract’ concluded between SNCF Réseau and French government serves as a strategic railway infrastructure plan, along with a strategic report that is used to build this contract. It is signed for a period of 10 years (and reviewed every 3 years) and sets out the priorities of the State in terms of management and development of the network. In 2017, the Transport Regulation Authority (Autorité de Régulation des Transports, ART) underlined major drawbacks regarding the performance contract, among which the absence of credible commitments from both contracting parties, thus depriving the railway sector of a long-term vision - particularly vital in the prospect of the opening of the domestic market to competition (Autorité de Régulation des Activités Ferroviaires et Routières, 2017[87]).

In Chile, the issue of co-ordination between national sectoral plans and regional priorities has emerged. A co-ordinating mechanism called the Inter-ministerial Committee for Cities, Housing and Territory (COMICIVYT) was created in June 2015 to co-ordinate integrated policies in urban and rural development (land use and infrastructure planning) across ministries. In addition, the regional governments’ law was modified in 2018 to strengthen multilevel co-ordination using such mechanisms. In some regions, the local representatives of COMICIVYT have successfully integrated regional projects in the framework of national development goals.

The UK does not have overall long-term strategic infrastructure plan. Instead, infrastructure planning in the UK was historically based on medium-term sectoral plans for specific sectors (e.g. energy, water, railways, and motorways). Within the transport sector there are separate five-year plans and funding settlements for the national rail and strategic road networks.

Budget allocation

In parallel to ensuring the stability of investment plans, the review of international practices also begins to highlight measures to ensure the stability of funding for infrastructure development and maintenance. Much like most infrastructure assets, HSR networks have high fixed costs and require a large initial investment. Compared to conventional railway lines, they typically require a double track main line with cab signalling and low slopes in order to achieve high speeds. Operating costs vary in relation to traffic, but maintenance costs tend to be high, at around 50% of all infrastructure costs (ITF, 2014[88])

Some countries have established detailed processes to define budget contributions towards infrastructure projects (see Australia, France, Germany and UK case studies).

Following governance reforms at the European level, including the unbundling of infrastructure assets (natural monopolies) and train operations (competitive segment), the funding and financing of rail infrastructure has been at times overlooked. However, there is little doubt that achieving and preserving financial viability is one of the main challenges for European rail infrastructure managers, if they wish to retain and enhance their role in sustainable mobility and ensure high levels of connectivity, safety and quality.

The main categories of rail infrastructure funding as classified in the literature (Schäfer and Götz, 2017[89])are: funds from public budgets (revenue contributions, grants, etc.); revenue from charges for the use of infrastructure and related services, and; revenue from other commercial sources.

Infrastructure managers’ own resources include infrastructure access charges that can contribute to operations, maintenance and renewals. Among EU Member States, France (81%) is in the top three regarding the proportion of total funding generated internally, while the United Kingdom (at 42%) is ranked fifth2 In many EU Member States (e.g. Germany, Italy, Austria, Spain, Sweden), however, funding generated by rail services is less than 10% of the total. And, in most EU Member States, infrastructure access charges cover between 5% and 10% (Doll, Rothengatter and Schade, 2015[90]) of operations and maintenance costs, although this proportion varies widely. For instance, in Germany, a fund based on a Performance and Funding Agreement between the federal government and Deutsche Bahn AG has been established to cover the maintenance cost of infrastructure. European Union funding is also important for railway infrastructure investments. European Union funding through Cohesion Fund (CF), the European Regional Development Fund (ERDF), the Connecting Europe Facility (CEF), and the European Investment Bank (EIB) contribute an average of 12% of the total funding for investment in rail infrastructure in Europe. Funding is also supported by private financing such as bank loans and by equity capital for large projects.

Recent research shows that total infrastructure subsidies have increased in absolute terms across countries between 2005 and 2012 while operating costs have not decreased substantially (European Commission, 2015). In the presence of high costs and rising debts, maintaining and upgrading existing networks must take place within tighter budgets. Today, infrastructure costs represent around one-third of total rail system costs in Europe, and a growing share of those costs (up to 50% in mature networks) are arising from maintenance and renewal needs. Therefore funding gaps are widening. The ability of railway companies to raise debt further in order to finance new investment is constrained – both by the already high levels of indebtedness3 and by the deterioration of credit ratings for some government bonds following the sovereign debt crisis, to which railway companies’ ratings are closely aligned. Some projects in high-density, high-frequency rail lines have attracted private investment, but no new Public Private Partnerships (PPPs) have been signed since 2014. Unless the fundamentals change, PPP in railways will continue to replace the state only on very specific segments and will not grow the size of the pie of rail funding. Efforts to reduce the funding gap are under way at both national and EU level. More and more Government departments are entering into long-term contracts with their infrastructure managers (Finger and Kupfer, 2017[91]).

The case studies provided in Chapter 6 suggest some practices in relation to securing long-term funding. In France, Italy and Germany, a long-term contract between the state and the railway infrastructure manager exists in compliance with European legislation:

• In France, the ten year ‘performance contract’ introduced by the 2014 Railway Reform Act sets objectives of productivity, quality and security to be achieved by SNCF Réseau, while respecting a financial trajectory. In addition, the Transport Regulation Authority (Autorité de Régulation des Transports, ART) has a strong role in defining the budget for infrastructure investment and maintenance in the railway sector. It is the guarantor of the economic balance of the infrastructure manager. Moreover, in order to control infrastructure manager SNCF Réseau's debt, the 2014 Railway Reform Act introduced a framework governing the financing of railway development projects. The financial contribution of SNCF Réseau is conditional on its level of indebtedness. This “golden rule” requires the railway infrastructure manager to not go into debt to finance new projects beyond a certain ratio (see France case study 3, Chapter 6).

• The Federal Transport Infrastructure Plan (Bundesverkehrswegeplan - BVWP) is the reference document for transport policy in Germany (See Germany case study 1, 2 and 3, Chapter 6). Like the French schemes, it aims to define a set of orientations for the next ten to fifteen years. Adopted by the competent ministers at the federal level, the plan forms the basis of road, rail or waterway development bills (Ausbaugesetze) and the corresponding financing plans. The Bundestag decides on the list of projects ultimately retained in the law. It adopts laws every five years authorising the construction of a set of projects and the related financing needs, on the basis of the strategic document for the planning of transport infrastructure adopted by the Government, after public consultation. Between 2015 and 2019, the Federation made available to the federal railway infrastructure companies funds totalling an average of over EUR 3.9 billion per annum based on a contractual agreement for service and financing (LuFV II). The funds are provided in the form of non-repayable construction cost subsidies. In return, the federal railway infrastructure companies enter into a contractual performance and financing agreement to maintain their lines in a high-quality condition (based on agreed key performance indicators (KPIs)). The third contractual performance and financing agreement (LuFV III) is expected to enter into force in 2020 and have a contract period of 10 years.

• Similarly in Italy, this is known as Contratto di Programma and dates back to 1987. In the latest agreement, covering the period 2017-2021, one part is dedicated to services performance and one part to infrastructure investment. The latter contains a list of priority projects, projected financial needs and sources, and a performance system whereby delays and cost overruns by rail operator RFI trigger financial penalties. RFI needs to report to the Ministry in April every year on the implementation of the agreement.

In these three countries, the regulation of track access charges is overseen by an independent economic regulator (BNetzA in Germany, ART in Italy and ART in France4). The level of oversight that these agencies exercise is defined in European legislation as giving green light to the railway infrastructure manager’s proposals. Besides regulating monopoly prices and verifying that revenue requirements are commensurate to investment needs, independent oversight also provides predictability for potential new entrants in the competitive parts of the railway market. In Italy, the national anti-corruption authority (ANAC) offers an additional layer of scrutiny of all major public contracts.

In Germany, the Railway Regulator(Bundesnetzagentur) supervises non-discriminatory access to rail infrastructure and charges for its use, and checks compliance with statutory pricing principles (Federal Railway Authority, 2020[92]). The Railway Regulator also monitors the German railway market. Infrastructure access charges compensate for the use of tracks and other railway infrastructure facilities by various railway undertakings. The focus of price regulation is the cost level and the charges payable by passenger and freight transport undertakings for access to tracks, stations and other facilities. With price regulation in the railway sector the Bundesnetzagentur aims first and foremost to strengthen competitiveness in rail transport. Even if access to the rail network is provided, discriminatory or abusive charges may pose an obstacle for access beneficiaries and their usage requests. To avoid discrimination and abuse, the legislator has defined specific requirements for price determination.

France was the first country in Europe to use the Public-Private Partnership (PPP) model to finance HSR investment. In 2004, new legislation created a legal framework for Public Private Partnerships5. Two main PPP models have since been adopted in French HSR: partnership contracts, which can be compared to private finance initiative contracts, and concession agreements, which serve to implement major infrastructure projects such as canals, motorways, water distribution systems and toll bridges6 (See France case study 5, Chapter 6). They are both administrative contracts under French law and can be differentiated according to their payment terms7, requirements, bidding and award procedure. For example, bidding and awarding procedures for partnership contracts are closely regulated.

In the UK, with respect to the budget for infrastructure investment and maintenance in the railway sector, the Secretary of State for the Department for Transport publishes the high level output specification (HLOS) and initial statement of funds available (SOFA) for a specific period, currently control period 6 (April 2019 – 2024) (Department for Transport, 2017[93]). On the basis of independent advice from the Office of Rail and Road, that oversees the delivery of the plan, as well as from the rail industry, the government has agreed that an increased volume of renewals activity would be needed over the course of CP6, to maintain safety and improve on current levels of reliability and punctuality, which in places fall short of the levels that passengers rightly expect.

In Australia, one major weakness in the governance of transport infrastructure is that there is no direct linkage between the infrastructure plan and investment budgets. The strategy proposed in the Infrastructure Plan and the infrastructure projects contained in the priority list are recommendations without binding legal force. Implementation of reforms and delivery of investments falls to other central government departments, or state or territory governments. It is thus the responsibility of state governments, or the central government to make the ultimate decisions regarding whether or not to proceed with a particular investment or policy reform. These are under no obligation to deliver on the recommendations proposed by Infrastructure Australia. Governments consider Infrastructure Australia’s advice and recommendations on projects, but also consider other factors, including advice from their own line agencies (Infrastructure Australia, 2016[85]).

The role of technical analyses to support decision-making

Whether by longstanding tradition or more recently, all benchmark countries have introduced systems for socio-economic assessment of proposed infrastructure projects, including in the railway sector. This follows the recommendations of international experts, including at the International Transport Forum at the OECD (OECD/ITF, 2011[94]; OECD/ITF, 2017[95])).Typically a cost-benefit assessment (CBA) takes place at the early stages of decision-making. What varies greatly among countries is the institutional set-up around these analyses and the type of information included in assessments; there are also differences in the timing of the CBA, and whether it is used to prioritise projects or to assess technical alternatives for a selected project.

In Chile, proposed infrastructure projects follow a rigorous process of socio-economic evaluation under the national investment appraisal system (SNI), overseen by the Ministry of Social Development. CBA lies at the heart of project evaluation. The SNI provides a methodology to assess costs and benefits for each type of infrastructure, based on years of experience accumulated in each sector and international good practice. For the railway sector, the official methodology was updated in 2016. It provides guidelines to project developers in relation to asset lives, discount rates, rates of return, etc. However, the SNI methodology does not integrate environmental assessments. Additionally, the requirement to have a socio-economic assessment is not binding, and the Ministry of Social Development can instead authorise the use of least-cost analysis for a majority of projects (see Chile case study 1, Chapter 6).

In France, the State provides a coherent methodological framework for all CBAs (Direction Générale des Infraestructures, des Transports et de la Mer, 2014[96]). The framework instruction on methods for the economic evaluation of transport projects (January 2015) is the benchmark for evaluation based on the principle of a multi-criteria analysis. This methodology aims at being applied to all kind of projects including new infrastructure; development of new services; and the modification, optimisation, renovation or modernisation of an existing infrastructure (Direction Générale des Infraestructures, des Transports et de la Mer, 2014[96]). The socio-economic as well as the environmental assessment of the projects are an integrated component upstream of the financing agreements (ex-ante) as well as downstream several years after their commissioning (ex-post).

Another specificity in France is that for the projects financed by the State and above EUR 100 million, the French legislator entrusted the General Commission for Investment (CGI) with the mission of carrying out a second independent socio-economic evaluation (Sénat, Commission des Finances, 2016[97]). In addition, ART issues a non-binding opinion for all railway investments above EUR 200 million (Autorité de Régulation des Activités Ferroviaires et Routières, 2018[98]). The Regulator focuses its analysis on the financial impact of the project on SNCF Réseau and therefore act as the watchdog of the economic balance of the infrastructure manager.

The lack of sufficient socio-economic assessment can be used in courts by opponents to block a project (see the decision of the Conseil d’Etat (highest administrative court) in 2016 to cancel the declaration of public interest for the HSR project between Poitiers and Limoges because of the weaknesses of the CBA analysis (see France case study 2, Chapter 6).

In addition, following problems with the acceptability of motorway projects and later high-speed rail lines, France has developed an effective consultation process for major transport infrastructure investments8. Stakeholder engagement is mandatory for any transport infrastructure project with a budget above EUR 300 million or a length of more than 40 km. Stakeholder engagement tends to add one year to project completion, but can improve the quality of the projects. The extensions to the Atlantic HSR line provide a good illustration of the stakeholder consultations in France. The Tours-Bordeaux project involved 150 public meetings to provide information on the project from its very earliest stages and 2 000 stakeholder consultations. 500 visits to four construction sites were organised, principally for local residents, with nearly 20 000 people attending over a period of three years. Consultations resulted in modifications to the route of the line and improvements to roads in the vicinity of the line. They also resulted in 10% of the construction jobs on the project being reserved for local people on job creation programs and 10% of the value of construction contracts being sub-contracted to local suppliers. Stakeholder consultations also resulted in agreements on environmental protection, avoiding sensitive sites, and creating natural environments close to the line in compensation for comparable sites disturbed or destroyed.

In Italy, the Ministry also issues guidelines for CBA; as in Chile, these do not include external costs. The methodology applies to all projects, with a distinction for projects below and above EUR 10 million. Different options are available, from needs assessment to cost-benefit analysis. Guidelines also exist for ex-post evaluation. The Ministry of Transport and Infrastructure set up an expert panel to undertake new CBAs of all large proposed investment projects in 2018. For the sake of transparency, all panel reports should be published on the Ministry’s website. The panel included well-known academic experts in the field of transport economics and engineering. The experts submitted their report on the HSR Turin-Lyon to the Ministry in February 2019. The report concluded that none of the proposed engineering solutions would yield a positive cost-benefit ratio and therefore recommended not to pursue the investment. Their calculations estimated a negative net present value for the project in the base case. The report’s publication gave rise to a heated public discussion – eventually, the prime minister decided to go ahead with construction.

In Germany, a methodology manual of the 2030 Federal Transport Infrastructure Plan provides guidance about the evaluation process, criteria, methodology, priority categorisation and assessment. This usually includes impact analysis (comparison of “without scenario” (current condition) and “with scenario” (current condition + effects of the project to be assessed)), CBA, environmental assessment and spatial planning assessment. The methodology for CBA includes external costs amongst its 13 components, such as values for monetarising pollutant emissions, emission costs during power generation, change in noise pollution and change in life cycle emissions of greenhouse gases from infrastructure.

In the UK, once an investment need is identified the strategic case of the Strategic Outline Business Case (SOBC, the first stage of the process) should consider the various options to meet the transport need. These processes are government wide. Although decisions are based across the five case studies (see UK case study, figure 2), CBA and value for money is used in the economic case following guidance issued by HM Treasury (the Green Book). The Green Book provides an overall methodology as well as a list of inputs and parameters to guide the socio-economic assessment of proposed projects and programmes (HM Treasury, 2013[99]). Departmental guidance – in the case of transport, by the DfT – (Department for Transport, 2017[100])aligns with the Green Book. The Centre’s of Excellence provide independent reviews of each of the five cases in the business case. It is also considered good practice for models to be independently verified by an independent peer reviewer. Each economic case should provide an analytical assurance statement, this allows the analysts to describe the robustness of the analysis and the scope for challenge.

Annex 5.A.1. Summary by country surveyed

This summary table highlights the key infrastructure characteristics of each country and governance system surveyed.

Annex Table 5.A.1. Summary by country surveyed

Australia	Key data	Governance highlights		Case study
Rail network length (of which %HSR), km	42 000 (0%)	Planning authority	Infrastructure Australia Independent infrastructure bodies at the state level (most of the bodies retain some degree of independence from government and have a mandate to define and prioritise infrastructure investment options): - Infrastructure New South Wales - Infrastructure Victoria - Building Queensland Australia Infrastructure Audit 15-year Australian Infrastructure Plan Infrastructure Priority List Local long-term infrastructure plans	Rail network length (of which %HSR), km
Passenger-km, millions (2015)	15 675	Budgeting approach	Budgeting done by a Treasury or Finance Department
Network ownership	Mixed	Economic regulation	Freight vs Passengers
Total rail infrastructure investment 2016, EUR million	37	Technical analyses	Set of principles to guide infrastructure decision-making across the country Assessment Framework for initiatives and projects to be included in the Infrastructure Priority List
Chile	Key data	Governance highlights		Case study
Rail network length (of which HSR), km	3 200 (0%)	Planning authority	Fragmented planning frameworks by sector and regions. Vertical co-ordination through COMICYVIT.	Large-scale Logistics Network (RLGE)
Passenger volumes, passenger-km (2017)	596	Budgeting approach	Annual budget drawn by Ministry of Finance with inputs from sector Ministries and regions.
Network ownership	Private (north Chile) Public (central Chile)	Economic regulation	Concession contracts for private infrastructure determine prices and investment. No independent economic oversight of public infrastructure.
Total rail infrastructure investment 2018, EUR million	n/a	Technical analyses	Uniform system of project evaluation by Ministry of Social Development. Projects appraised through either CBA or least-cost analysis.	National system for socio-economic appraisal (SNI)
France	Key data	Governance highlights		Case study
Rail network length (of which HSR), km	28 364 (8%)	Planning authority	Long-term strategic master plans for development of infrastructure by sector with integrated regional planning Independent reports	LISEA: Stakeholder engagement
Passenger volumes, passenger-km (2017)	110 464	Budgeting approach	France was the first country in Europe to use the Public-Private Partnership (PPP) model to finance high speed rail (HSR) investment.	LISEA: PPP for HSR
Network ownership	Public (except LGV Liséa, Ere, Oc’Via)	Economic regulation	ART: guarantor of the economic balance of the infrastructure manager. Golden rule.
Total rail infrastructure investment 2018, EUR million	5 100 54% renewal and performance, 32% development and 14% other	Technical analyses	General Commission for Investment (CGI) independent socio-economic evaluation “Declaration of public interest” based on CBA Stakeholder engagement
Germany	Key data	Governance highlights		Case study
Rail network length (of which HSR), km	39 260 (3%)	Planning authority	Clear financial prospects, 2030 Federal Transport Infrastructure Plan 2030, drawn up and developed by the Federal Minister of Transport and Digital Infrastructure Federal in collaboration with the public Large public consultation in transport infrastructure planning	Transport Infrastructure Plan 2030 user participation
Passenger-km, millions (2016)	99 900	Budgeting approach	Financial planning via the “Finanzplan”. Yearly updated in Parliamentary Committee. Multiannual contract between infrastructure manager and Federal Ministry of Transport and Digital Infrastructure	Multiannual contractual agreement for service and financing - Leistung- und Finanzierungs-vereinbarung (LuFV)
Network ownership	Public via the entity DB Netz AG	Economic regulation	Access and charges regulated by independent regulation authority (Bundesnetzagentur).	Development of Competition – highly intense use of the network in Germany
Total rail infrastructure investment 2016, EUR million	47	Technical analyses	Compulsory CBA ex-ante. Alternative solutions systematically considered.
Italy	Key data	Governance highlights		Case study
Rail network length (of which HSR), km	18 477 (5%)	Planning authority	Interministerial Committee for Economic Planning, with inputs from Ministry of Transport, railway and road network managers
Passenger volumes, passenger-km (2017)	53 957	Budgeting approach	Budget Law Annex. Yearly update in Parliamentary Committee. Multiannual contract between infrastructure manager and Ministry of Transport.	Contratto di Programma 2017-21
Network ownership	Public (private share in HSR stations)	Economic regulation	Access regulated by independent transport authority. Public contracts supervised by national anti-corruption authority.
Total rail infrastructure investment 2018, EUR million	58	Technical analyses	Compulsory CBA ex-ante. Lack of uniform guidelines. No ex-post evaluation.	Turin-Lyon HSR
UK	Key data	Governance highlights		Case study
Rail network length (of which HSR), km	16 253 (1%)	Planning authority	Williams Rail Review
Passenger volumes, passenger-km (2017)	80 238	Budgeting approach	High level output specification (HLOS) and initial statement of funds available (SOFA) for control period 6 (April 2019 – 2024)
Network ownership	Public	Economic regulation	Office or Rail and Road (ORR)
Total rail infrastructure investment 2018, EUR million	98	Technical analyses	Five case study CBA following guidance issued by HM Treasury (the Green Book) The Centre’s of Excellence provide independent reviews of each of the five cases in the business case	High Speed 2 (HS2)

Source: (International Transport Forum, 2020[101])and OECD analysis based on public information and countries’ responses to the Benchmark Surveys.

Notes

← 1.  In the UK, operators are mostly foreign companies, most of them owned by State companies of other countries. For that reason, they can be classified as public https://www.independent.co.uk/news/uk/home-news/trains-uk-railways-renationalise-countries-operators-companies-a9058961.html. In the other European countries, liberalisation of the railway sector is ongoing and should result in increased competition. However, as in the UK, most of the companies entering or about to enter these markets are owned by State enterprise of other countries.

← 2.  (Doll, Rothengatter and Schade, 2015[90])

← 3.  In 2012-13, non-current liabilities stood at roughly EUR 40 billion for Network Rail in the UK, EUR 50 billion for RFF in France and EUR 20 billion for ADIF in Spain (Schäfer and Götz, 2017[89])

← 4.  Previously ARAFER.

← 5.  The Legislation of 2004 (PPP law) created a central PPP unit (MAPPP), which became responsible for the preliminary evaluation of PPP projects.

← 6.  Both models have the same objective—to finance, design, build and operate railway infrastructure. The main difference is in the allocation of traffic risk between the public and private parties, which alters the basis on which the private sector partner is reimbursed for providing new facilities. The Public Procurement and Concession Agreements Code entered into force 1 April 2019. The Code aims at gathering the rules governing the award, performance and termination of public procurement agreements. A concession agreement is defined as an agreement under which a grantor assigns, for a limited period of time, to one or several economic entities, the performance of works or the management of a service, it being specified that: a risk linked to the operation of such works or service must be transferred to the economic entity in exchange for the right to operate the said works or service; a fee in favour of the entity can be added to such operation right; and the risk transfer to the economic entity necessarily implies a real exposure to the market's fluctuation. A partnership contract is an administrative contract under which a grantor entrusts to a private party, for a period set according to the amortisation of investment or agreed financing terms, a comprehensive project relating to the design, construction or conversion, maintenance, operation or management of works, equipment or intangible assets necessary to the public service, as well as to the total or partial financing of the latter.

← 7.  Under a partnership contract, the grantor will pay rent to the private partner in exchange for the performance of the mission, while under a concession agreement the compensation of the concessionaire will mainly arise from payments made by users of the service (Vaissier et al., 2020[149])

← 8.  The approach was initially built around provisions of a 1993 law to protect landscapes and biodiversity (Loi Paysage).