Settling In 2018

Chapter 3. Immigrant skills and labour market integration

Abstract

Immigrants’ skills and how they integrate into the labour market are fundamental to becoming part of the host country’s economic fabric. Although skills and qualifications are obviously decisive determinants in immigrants’ economic and social integration, they do not necessarily indicate how well immigrants actually integrate or fare in the labour market, but rather their ability to do so. Skills have indeed a strong bearing on career paths, and influence what kind of job they find.

Employment is often considered to be the single most important indicator of integration. Jobs are immigrants’ chief source of income and also help them – though there is no guarantee – to take their place in society by, for example, finding decent accommodation, interacting with others in the workplace, and learning the host-country language. Work further confers social standing in the eyes of the immigrant’s family, particularly children, and with respect to the host-country population. However, while employment is important per se, so is its quality.

This chapter begins by considering immigrants’ skills. It compares their levels of educational attainment with those of the native-born (Indicator 3.1), assesses their proficiency in the host-country language (Indicator 3.2) and their access to adult education and training (Indicator 3.3). It then examines immigrants’ labour market outcomes, analysing their employment, participation and unemployment rates (Indicators 3.4 and 3.5) and looking at indicators on labour market exclusion – long-term unemployment and involuntary inactivity (Indicator 3.6). The chapter goes on to look at the characteristics of the jobs that immigrants hold: types of contracts (Indicator 3.7), working conditions (Indicator 3.8) and the skill levels of jobs (Indicator 3.9). It also considers the match between workers’ educational attainment and the requirements of their occupations (Indicator 3.10). The chapter concludes with a look at the incidence of self-employment (Indicator 3.11).

Key findings

• In the OECD, 27% of immigrants are educated to low levels and 11% to very low levels, compared with 26% and 7% of the native-born. The immigrant population is even less well educated in Europe: one-third are low-educated EU-wide, rising to 39% among non‑EU migrants, compared with 23% of the native-born.

• Of the foreign-born, 37% are highly educated, a larger share than among the native-born (32%). With the exception of Iceland and the Latin American OECD countries, the proportion of highly educated immigrants has grown in all OECD and EU countries, rising by 7 percentage points over the past decade in both areas.

• Around half of all the highly educated immigrants in the EU and Canada, and a full 55% in the United States, graduated abroad. In the EU, that share has dropped in over the last decade among both EU-born and non-EU migrants.

• Across the EU, 56% of recently arrived non-native speakers in need of language training have attended classes since their arrival. The share is 70% in the Nordic and German-speaking countries.

• Attending a language course in the host country is associated with an 8 percentage points higher probability of advanced proficiency in an EU host-country language.

• Sixty-eight million immigrants have a job in the OECD, and 28 million in the EU. Across the OECD, native- and foreign-born employment rates are on average very similar, at around two-thirds of the working age population. In the EU, however, immigrants are less likely to be employed than the native-born, a trend attributable to the wide employment gap between the native-born and non-EU migrants. It is as high as 10 percentage points in most Nordic countries and in longstanding European immigrant destinations.

• The employment rate fell in virtually all OECD and EU countries with the onset of the global economic crisis in 2008. However, it is now just slightly lower than it was 10 years ago OECD-wide among both the foreign- and native-born. In the EU, the employment rate of non-EU immigrants has dropped by 3 percentage points over the past decade, while rising by 3 points among both natives and EU-born migrants.

• Education improves the employment prospects of both immigrants and the native-born, though generally less for the former. The employment rate of the highly educated foreign-born is 79%, against 84% among the native-born.

• Almost every labour market in the OECD discounts foreign degrees. In the EU, the employment rate of non-EU migrants with foreign qualifications is 14 percentage points lower than that of immigrants with host-country qualifications.

• If highly educated immigrants had the same employment rate as their native peers, there would be 1.5 million more immigrants in employment in the OECD and 850 000 in the EU.

• In almost half of OECD and EU countries, low-educated immigrants have higher employment rates than their native-born peers – particularly in Southern and Central Europe, Chile and the United States.

• Over 5.8 million immigrants are unemployed in the OECD, and 3.7 million in the EU. The OECD-wide immigrant unemployment rate is 8%, compared to 6% among the native-born. In the EU, the rates are 11.5% and 7.5%, respectively.

• Across the EU, almost one-quarter of economically inactive immigrants and one-sixth of inactive native-born wish to work. In all countries – except Iceland, Australia, the United Kingdom and the Slovak Republic – immigrants are more likely than the native-born to be involuntarily inactive.

• On average 48% of the foreign-born fear losing their jobs, compared to 42% of the native-born.

• Unemployed immigrants are generally less likely to receive unemployment benefits than the native-born in the EU.

• Immigrants are more likely to work on temporary contracts in most European countries, though not, generally, outside Europe and Asia. Comparisons of settled migrants only with the native-born reveal that, over time, the temporary contract gap between them narrows in most countries and even vanishes in one-third.

• Across the OECD, 16% of the native-born in employment work over 50 hours a week, compared to 11% of the foreign-born. In the EU, equal proportions of the two groups work long hours (11%). Among the highly educated, the foreign-born are generally more likely to work longer hours than their native-born peers.

• In all European countries, immigrants, regardless of their educational attainment, are more likely than the native-born to have jobs that put their physical health at risk.

• Over one in four low-skilled jobs is held by an immigrant in the EU, the United States and in the settlement countries. The level rises to over 40% in Austria, Germany, Sweden and Norway, and over 60% in Switzerland and Luxembourg.

• The share of immigrants employed in highly skilled jobs has risen by over 2 percentage points in the EU and 3 points in the OECD in the last decade. In most countries over the same period, however, the gap between the share of immigrants and the native-born in highly skilled jobs widened.

• Among highly educated immigrants, almost 16 million in the OECD and 5.5 million in the EU are either not in employment or in jobs for which they are over-qualified – i.e. almost 45% of the highly educated immigrant population in both areas, compared with 40% of the highly educated native-born in the OECD and 30% in the EU.

• Over one-third of highly educated immigrants in employment are over-qualified for their jobs across the OECD and the EU. Over-qualification rates are higher among non‑EU migrants than EU‑born in all European countries, with the exceptions of Ireland and the United Kingdom.

• EU-wide, over-qualification affects 42% of foreign-educated immigrants. The figure drops to 28% for those who graduated in the host country. To a lesser extent, the same pattern is true for the United States and Australia. In Southern European countries, Nordic countries, France, Germany and the Netherlands, over-qualification rates are twice as high among immigrants who graduated abroad as among those with host-country tertiary degrees.

• Although the share of the foreign-born with host-country degrees has gone up over the last decade in the EU, immigrant over-qualification rates have risen slightly. They dropped in the United States, however, despite an increase in the share of foreign-educated immigrants.

• Around 12% of employed immigrants are self-employed – the same rate as among the native-born. Immigrant businesses tend to be smaller than native ones.

3.1. Educational attainment

Definition

This section measures educational attainment against the International Standard Classification of Education (ISCED). It considers three levels: i) low, no higher than lower secondary education (ISCED Levels 0‑2); ii) very low, no higher than completed primary education (ISCED Levels 0‑1); iii) high, tertiary education (ISCED Levels 5‑8).

Coverage

People not in education aged 15 to 64 years old.

Across the OECD, around one-quarter of both the foreign- and native-born of working age are poorly educated – 27% and 26%, respectively, to a low level and 11% and 7% to a very low one. However, 37% of the foreign-born are highly educated, a larger share than among the native-born (32%). The share of the immigrant population with low levels of education is higher in Europe. It stands at one-third in the EU altogether – 39% of non-EU migrants and some 26% of those who are EU-born – against 23% of the native-born. There are 13 million poorly educated immigrants in the EU. They outnumber their 11 million highly educated peers, who account for 29% of immigrants.

OECD-wide, there are 24.5 million low-educated and 33.5 million highly educated immigrants. The largest shares of those who are highly educated are in settlement countries like Canada and Australia, where they account for more than half of the immigrant population. High proportions are also to be found in EU countries that have recently attracted a large number of highly educated migrants, such as Poland, Ireland and the United Kingdom. In longstanding European destinations, by contrast, as well as in Southern Europe, Korea and Sweden, immigrants are largely overrepresented among the poorly educated, accounting for over 35% in the countries of Southern Europe, Belgium and France. In the EU, 12% of foreign-born people have very low levels of education (15% of non-EU migrants), compared to 5% among the native-born.

With the exception of Iceland and the Latin American OECD countries, the share of highly educated individuals among immigrants has grown throughout the OECD and the EU, rising by 7 percentage points over the past decade. In half of countries, however, the rise was slower than for the native-born. It was at its steepest in countries like Poland, the United Kingdom, Luxembourg and Australia. The increases are due mostly to the fact that recent migrants are better educated than their predecessors virtually everywhere. The pattern is particularly true of the United Kingdom, Denmark and some Baltic countries, where the highly educated share of recent migrants has climbed by at least 20 percentage points over the past decade. It is worth noting that, in two-thirds of European countries, the rise was greater among EU migrants than among non-EU migrants.

Three-fifths of the OECD and EU immigrant populations – 44 and 21 million people, respectively – obtained their highest degrees abroad. The proportion exceeds 70% in Southern Europe, Austria and Luxembourg, and is almost 90% in Korea. Among the highly educated foreign-born, only 42% in Australia obtained their qualifications abroad, around 50% in the EU and Canada, and 55% in the United States. In Canada, this share has dropped by 4 percentage points over the last decade, as it has in the EU for both EU-born and non-EU migrants. Among highly educated non-EU immigrants, the share is also 50% in the EU. It is below 40% only in countries that attract many immigrant students, such as France, the United Kingdom and the Netherlands.

Figure 3.1. Low- and highly educated

Percentages of 15- to 64‑year-olds not in education, 2017

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Figure 3.2. How shares of the highly educated have evolved

Changes in percentage points, 15- to 64-year-olds, 2006‑07 to 2017

Notes and sources are to be found at the end of the chapter.

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3.2. Language proficiency

Definition

Share of the foreign-born who report advanced skills in the host country’s main language or who state that it is their mother tongue.

Coverage

The foreign-born aged 15 to 64 years old. Data on language class attendance refer to those who have lived in the host country for less than 10 years, declare language training needs, and for whom the host country’s main language is not their mother tongue.

Mastering the host-country’s language is the most important skill immigrants need if they are to find their place in its labour market and society at large. Two-thirds of the foreign-born in the EU state they have at least advanced language proficiency. Almost 30% of immigrants have the host country’s language as their mother tongue. In Australia, at 70%, the share of the foreign-born who report advanced proficiency in English is even higher and two out of five have English as their mother tongue. More than 90% of the foreign-born report advanced language skills in countries with an immigrant population shaped by national minorities (such as Croatia or Hungary), as well as in Portugal and Luxembourg. In contrast, less than half of the immigrant population in Estonia, Malta, Latvia and Norway is fluent in the host-country’s main language.

In all countries, longer residence is associated with better knowledge of the host-country language. Among settled immigrants in the EU who are not native speakers, six out of ten report advanced proficiency in the host-language – 20 percentage points more than among recent migrants. The difference is most pronounced in the Slovak Republic, Greece and Germany.

If migrants with limited resources who struggle with the host-country language are to learn it, publicly funded language training is a requirement. Most OECD and EU countries now provide such training. Across the EU, 56% of recently arrived non-native speakers in need of language training have attended courses. The figure exceeds 60% among non-EU migrants – from over 70% in the Nordic and German-speaking countries to less than 40% in Southern Europe, the Slovak Republic and Hungary. In the EU, among recently arrived non-native speakers (not counting those who claim not to need language training) attending a language course in the host country is associated with an 8 percentage point greater likelihood of proficiency in the host language. The difference in the likelihood of advanced host-language proficiency between those who have attended courses and those who have not is particularly wide in Greece, Slovenia, Italy and Belgium, where it exceeds 25 percentage points. In Spain, France, Switzerland and the Nordic countries, by contrast, the share of advanced speakers among recent immigrants is similar whether or not they have attended language classes.

Language skills go beyond mastering the host-country language. Immigrants use more languages in their daily lives than the native-born. Across the EU, over four in five foreign-born people use at least one language that is not their mother tongue, compared to less than two-thirds of the natives. Over one in six foreign-born person uses more than two languages, against only one in 12 among the native-born. 76% of immigrants in the EU speak at least one foreign language fairly fluently, while only 52% of the native-born do. However, the share of immigrants who report good command of English is lower than among the native-born in two-thirds of European countries (excluding English-speaking ones).

Figure 3.3. Advanced host-country language proficiency

Percentages of the foreign-born, 15- to 64‑year-olds, 2014

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Figure 3.4. Shares of advanced host-country language speakers among settled immigrants

Differences in percentage points with recent migrants, foreign-born population who are not native speakers, 15- to 64-year-olds, 2014

Notes and sources are to be found at the end of the chapter.

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3.3. Access to adult education and training

Definition

This section looks at the share of foreign- and native-born adults who have participated in education programmes, training or language courses, classes, workshops and seminars, on-the-job learning and private lessons over the last 12 months. It also considers the share of adults who receive guidance and counselling on learning opportunities from institutions and organisations.

Coverage

Adults aged 25 to 64 years old.

Immigrant adults are slightly less likely to participate in formal and non-formal education and training than the native-born in three-quarters of OECD and EU countries. In the EU, 42% attend a course or training, against 45% of their native peers. OECD-wide, shares are 5 percentage points higher in both groups.

Immigrants lag behind the native-born by over 10 percentage points in the Baltic countries and most longstanding European immigration destinations, where many foreign-born are educated to low levels. In Estonia, France, Latvia and Slovenia, the gap exceeds 15 percentage points. Underrepresentation is also observed in most non-European OECD countries, with the exception of New Zealand and Chile. In the United States, the share of the foreign-born attending adult education is 10 percentage points lower than among the native-born. The foreign-born are more likely than their domestically born peers to take part in adult education and training in only 8 OECD and EU countries, most notably in Poland, Portugal and Malta.

Over the last five years, the share of both the foreign- and native-born participating in adult education and training has increased by 4 percentage points in the EU. There is, however, wide variations from country to country, with the participation gap widening in two-thirds of the countries. It narrowed considerably, by contrast, in Germany, Poland and Turkey.

Immigrants’ lower rates of participation in adult education may be associated with a lack of guidance and counselling on learning opportunities. Across the EU, about a quarter of the foreign-born enjoy such support, against one-third of the native-born. Indeed, immigrants receive less guidance on learning opportunities than natives in virtually all EU countries. The gaps are widest in Sweden, Denmark, Norway, Estonia, the Netherlands and Austria. The sole exceptions are Lithuania, Portugal and Finland. In Finland, for example, almost half of the foreign-born benefit from guidance and counselling, against two-fifths of their native peers.

Figure 3.5. Participation in adult education and training among the foreign- and native-born

Percentages of adults, 25- to 64-year-olds, 2016

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Figure 3.6. How foreign- and native-born participation in education and training has evolved

Changes in percentage points among 25- to 64-year-olds, 2011 to 2016

Notes and sources are to be found at the end of the chapter.

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3.4. Employment and labour market participation

Definition

The employment rate denotes people in employment as a percentage of the population of working age, aged between 15 and 64 years old. The International Labour Organization (ILO) defines an employed person as one who, in the course of the reference week, worked at least one hour or who had a job but was absent from work.

The participation rate (or activity rate) denotes the economically active population (employed and unemployed) as a share of the working age population.

Coverage

Working age population, 15 to 64 years old.

Across the OECD, native- and foreign-born employment rates are very similar – around two-thirds in both groups. In the EU, however, it is lower, at 64%, among immigrants than among native-born (68%). Most immigrants are in employment in all countries except Turkey, where the native-born employment rate is also among the lowest. In total, 68 million immigrants have a job in the OECD, and 28 million in the EU. The foreign-born account for 12% of the employed population in both areas.

Immigrant employment rates exceed 70% in countries where immigration is mostly labour-driven and highly skilled, as in settlement destinations (like Canada, Israel and New Zealand) and in longstanding European destination countries with many recent labour immigrants (e.g. Switzerland and the United Kingdom). In all these countries, however, with the exception of Israel, the native-born are still more likely than the foreign-born to be employed. The opposite is true, however, in a dozen countries, such as the United States, Luxembourg, Italy, Portugal and Central European countries, and new destinations outside Europe, like Korea and Chile.

The immigrant participation rate in OECD countries is 74%, slightly higher than that of the native-born (71%). In the EU, participation is 73% among both groups. In the Southern European countries, Korea, Chile, Israel, Hungary and Luxembourg, immigrants are more likely to participate in the labour market than the native-born. In most of Europe’s longstanding immigration countries, by contrast, they are less likely, particularly among women (see Chapter 6).

The employment rate fell in all OECD and EU countries in the wake of the global economic downturn. It has since recovered, however, and is now only slightly lower than 10 years ago in the OECD as a whole, among both the foreign- and native-born. In the EU, however, immigrants have benefitted less from the recovery than their native-born counterparts, although the effect of the crisis is visible only among migrants from outside the EU. Over the last decade, their employment rate has dropped by 3 percentage points, while increasing by the same amount among both the EU- and native-born. Southern European countries with many recent and less well educated immigrants – such as Spain, Greece and Italy – were worst affected by the crisis, along with Ireland. In those countries, the employment rates of the foreign-born fell by between 5 and 13 percentage points, at least twice as much as for the native-born. Conversely, in half of countries, they increased – even more steeply than among the native-born in most countries. In several Eastern European countries, in contrast, native-born employment rates rose but fell among immigrants, partly due to the ageing of the foreign-born population. In Poland, however, which recently attracted large numbers of foreign workers, the immigrant employment rate increased by a full 34 percentage points.

Figure 3.7. Employment and participation rates

Percentages of 15- to 64-year-olds, 2017

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Figure 3.8. How employment rates have evolved

Changes in percentage points, 15- to 64-year-olds, 2006‑07 to 2017

Notes and sources are to be found at the end of the chapter.

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In the EU, EU-born immigrants show a higher employment rate (71%) than the native-born (66.5%). Among non-EU migrants, however, it is significantly lower (58.5%). In only Italy, Portugal, as well as in a few Central and Eastern European countries (the Czech and Slovak Republics, Hungary) are non‑EU migrants, mostly from neighbouring countries, more likely to be in employment than the native-born. By contrast, native-born employment rates are as much as 10 percentage points higher in most Nordic countries that are home to large numbers of refugees and in long-standing European immigration destinations. In Belgium, for instance, only 46% of the non‑EU foreign-born are in work.

Education improves the labour prospects of immigrants, though less than those of the native-born. Across the OECD, the gap between the employment rates of highly and low-educated immigrants is 21 percentage points, against 29 points among the native-born. Indeed, in virtually all countries, immigrants educated to tertiary degree level struggle more than their native peers to find jobs: 79% versus 84% are in employment, OECD wide. In the EU, too, the average employment rate of the highly educated is lower among immigrants than among native born – by 7 percentage points. And the difference climbs to at least 9 percentage points in long-standing immigration destinations and Southern European countries (except for Portugal). The gap is narrower in OECD countries where many highly educated immigrants came as labour migrants, such as Luxembourg, the United Kingdom and non-European settlement countries. If highly educated immigrants had the same employment rates as their native peers, there would be 1.5 million more immigrants in employment in the OECD and 850 000 more in the EU.

Virtually every labour market in the OECD discounts foreign tertiary degrees, the only significant exceptions being Korea, Finland and the Slovak Republic. The employment gap between immigrants educated in the host country and those educated abroad is 8 percentage points in the OECD. It rises to 10 points in the EU, where the differences are particularly stark for non-EU migrants with foreign qualifications. Their employment rate is 14 percentage points lower than for their peers with host-country qualifications, and at least 20 points lower in Latvia, Portugal, Sweden and the Netherlands.

Employment rates among low-educated immigrants paint an entirely different picture. In almost half of OECD and EU countries, they outstrip those of their native-born peers – particularly in Southern and Central European countries, Israel and Chile. As for the United States, the employment rate of low-educated foreign-born is a full 29 percentage points higher than among their native peers. By contrast, immigrants with little education are less likely to have a job than their native peers in many longstanding European immigration destinations and the Nordic countries. In the Netherlands, Sweden and Denmark, the gap is as wide as 10 percentage points. These poor outcomes are attributable chiefly to the lower employment rates of non‑EU migrants. Indeed, EU‑wide, gaps in employment rates between non-EU and EU migrants are wider among the low-educated (11 percentage points) than among the highly educated (8 percentage points). However, in some Central and Southern European countries (such as the Czech Republic, Hungary, Greece and Italy), non-EU migrants with low levels of education (mostly labour migrants who arrived prior to the global economic crisis) are more likely to be in employment than natives.

The OECD-wide employment rate of recent immigrants – resident in the host country for less than five years – is 10 percentage points lower than that of the native-born and as much as 15 points lower in the EU. Less than half of recent immigrants are in employment in Southern European countries, as well as in many Nordic and longstanding immigration countries. These rates are below 40% in Greece, France and Italy.

Figure 3.9. Employment rates of the foreign-born by level of education

Differences in percentage points with native-born, 15- to 64-year-olds not in education, 2017

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Figure 3.10. Employment rates of the highly educated foreign-born, by place of education

Percentages of 15- to 64-year-olds not in education, 2015‑16

Notes and sources are to be found at the end of the chapter.

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3.5. Unemployment

Definition

The International Labour Organization (ILO) defines the unemployed as people without, but available for, work, and who have been seeking work in the course of the reference week. The unemployment rate is the percentage of unemployed people in the labour force (the sum of employed and unemployed individuals).

Coverage

The economically active population of working age (15 to 64 years old).

The OECD-wide immigrant unemployment rate is 8% and that of the native-born is 6%. It rises to 11.5% in the EU, against the native-born’s 7.5%. In total, 5.8 million immigrant workers are unemployed in the OECD, and 3.7 million in the EU. Indeed, immigrants are more likely to be unemployed than their native counterparts in the vast majority of countries, except for the United States, Chile, Latvia, Hungary, Bulgaria and Israel. The gap is over 5 percentage points in most Southern European countries (such as Spain and Greece), in the longstanding European immigration destinations (like Belgium and France) and in the Nordic countries (where it exceeds 10 points in Sweden). In the latter group of countries, as well as in Switzerland, Austria and the Benelux, the unemployment rates of the foreign-born are at least twice as high as among the native-born. This is observed even in countries where the overall employment situation is good, such as in Switzerland and Austria.

The effects of the economic crisis have started to fade in the OECD and the EU and both foreign- and native-born unemployment rates are now similar to pre-crisis levels. However, that broad picture encompasses very different country-specific situations. The gap in unemployment rates between the foreign- and the native-born has widened in a dozen countries, especially in Poland and Southern Europe. It remained stable in most countries, however, in the last ten years, actually narrowing in a few, particularly the Czech Republic and Germany.

In most countries, low-educated immigrants are more likely to be unemployed than their native-born peers – by over 10 percentage points in Sweden and Belgium. The situation is the reverse in Canada, the United States, and in Central and Eastern European countries like the Czech Republic. Although unemployment is generally more widespread among people with low levels of education, the gap between the foreign- and native-born turns out to be wider among highly educated in two thirds of OECD and EU countries. The only countries where the unemployment rates of highly educated immigrants are lower than that of the native-born are Mexico, Chile, Turkey and most Central and Eastern European countries.

As for the EU, finding a job is particularly difficult for non-EU migrants, whose unemployment rate (all levels of education included) is almost twice that of the native-born. The gap reaches at least 8 percentage points in most Nordic countries, Belgium, Luxembourg and Switzerland. Non-EU migrants are, in fact, the group most affected by the economic crisis, particularly in Greece and Spain, where their unemployment rate rose by 22 and 18 percentage points, respectively.

Figure 3.11. Unemployment rates

Percentages of 15- to 64-year-olds, 2017

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Figure 3.12. How unemployment rates have evolved

Changes in percentage points, 15- to 64-year-olds not in education, 2006‑07 to 2017

Notes and sources are to be found at the end of the chapter.

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3.6. Risks of labour market exclusion

Definition

The long-term unemployment rate is the share of job seekers who have been without a job for at least 12 months among all the unemployed. Involuntarily inactive people are those who are not seeking work but are willing to take up work. They include, among others, discouraged workers, who are not seeking work because they believe no suitable jobs are available.

Coverage

Unemployed and economically inactive persons aged 15 to 64.

Over one-third of unemployed immigrants in the OECD – 2.2 million people – have been looking for a job for at least one year. The long-term unemployed account for almost half of the unemployed foreign-born population in the EU (almost 2 million) – a full 50% among non-EU migrants and 44% of EU migrants.

Ten years ago, immigrants were less likely to be long-term unemployed than the native-born across the OECD and the EU. Rates are now similar after rising by 7 percentage points among the foreign-born in the EU and by 8 points in the OECD, three times as much as among the native-born. Over the same period, the share of long-term unemployed immigrants among those unemployed increased by more than 20 points in countries hard-hit by the global economic crisis, like Ireland, Latvia, Greece and Spain. Shares significantly dropped in only a few countries, such as Estonia and the Czech Republic. Long-term unemployment is more widespread among the foreign-born in two-thirds of OECD and EU countries, particularly in the Nordic countries and most longstanding European immigration destinations. In Denmark, Sweden, Switzerland and Lithuania, rates are more than 10 percentage points higher than those for natives. In contrast, the foreign-born unemployed suffer less from long-term unemployment than their native peers in Southern Europe, Ireland, the United Kingdom and Oceania.

Among the economically inactive, one-quarter of those who are immigrants in the EU wish to work, against one-sixth of the inactive native-born. Involuntary inactivity is less widespread in the United States, where less than 10% of the inactive wish to work, regardless of country of birth. Altogether, 3.4 million foreign-born across the OECD and 2 million in the EU are involuntarily outside the labour force. They are more likely to be involuntarily inactive than the natives everywhere except in Iceland, Australia, the United Kingdom and the Slovak Republic. The involuntary share of the inactive foreign-born is 10 percentage points higher than among the native-born in Luxembourg, Norway, Poland and Austria. In the EU, only 4% of inactive immigrants are not actively looking for a job because they are discouraged, a share similar to that observed among the native-born. Other reasons for involuntary inactivity are family commitments (more widespread among immigrants), health issues and non-specified causes. The share of discouraged workers exceeds 10% only in Italy – among both native- and foreign-born. In the Netherlands, by contrast, it is twice as high among the foreign-born.

Immigrants are also more likely to fear exclusion from the labour market everywhere except Estonia. Between 2010 and 2014, on average 48% of the foreign-born were worried about losing their jobs, compared to 42% of the native-born. Differences were particularly stark in the United States at 20 percentage points, the Netherlands and Sweden (10 points both). Immigrants who had been unemployed for at least two months were also less likely to receive unemployment benefits than their native peers – 36% versus 40% on average in the EU. In the Netherlands, they were three times less likely in 2016. However, proportions were similar among the foreign- and native-born in the Nordic countries, France and the United States.

Table 3.1. Long-term unemployment rate

Percentages of total unemployed, 2006‑07 and 2015‑16

	Long-term unemployment of the foreign-born population (% of total unemployment)		Differences with the native-born (% points) +: higher than natives -: lower than natives
	2006‑07	2015‑16		2006‑07	2015‑16
Australia	17.9	24.3		+1.4	-0.3
Austria	30.4	32.5		+4.1	+2.7
Belgium	57.2	57.1		+8.5	+8.3
Canada	10.4	13.5		+3.2	+2.8
Croatia	60.4	58.4		+0.3	+0.9
Cyprus1,2	19.6	39.2		+0.9	-7.7
Czech Republic	69.9	48.8		+17.0	+7.8
Denmark	20.1	33.8		+1.8	+12.2
Estonia	58.8	38.3		+12.1	+3.9
Finland	32.0	28.1		+10.1	+1.8
France	45.7	49.6		+7.1	+7.7
Germany	56.7	57.7		-0.1	-0.3
Greece	44.5	71.1		-8.2	-1.6
Hungary	41.9	53.8		-4.2	+8.1
Iceland	..	13.1		-0.1	+3.5
Ireland	24.5	52.3		-9.6	-5.5
Israel	..	12.5		..	-0.7
Italy	41.2	55.2		-8.3	-4.1
Korea	..	2.1		..	+0.8
Latvia	28.2	50.5		-2.8	+7.8
Lithuania	..	54.3		+2.8	+14.3
Luxembourg	29.8	30.6		+1.7	+2.1
Malta	..	48.1		-7.7	+6.4
Netherlands	50.2	50.3		+10.8	+9.9
New Zealand	10.4	9.5		-0.8	-2.4
Norway	31.1	34.4		+13.1	+7.9
Portugal	42.2	51.9		-7.2	-5.0
Slovenia	54.8	57.7		+7.9	+5.7
Spain	11.9	48.2		-11.1	-0.3
Sweden	18.7	27.6		+6.6	+13.0
Switzerland	46.3	43.6		+16.2	+14.3
Turkey	..	21.9		+0.0	-2.6
United Kingdom	24.0	24.1		+1.0	-5.0
United States	6.6	11.8		+0.2	+0.4
OECD total (29)	29.2	37.3		-2.1	+4.6
EU total (28)	41.3	48.4		-3.7	+0.1

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Figure 3.13. Involuntary inactivity due to discouragement or other reasons

Percentages among the inactive foreign-born (F) and native-born (N), 15- to 64‑year-olds, 2015‑16

Notes and sources are to be found at the end of the chapter.

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3.7. Types of contracts

Definition

In most countries, temporary work denotes any kind of wage-earning employment governed by a fixed-term contract, including apprenticeships, temporary employment agency work, and remunerated training courses. In Australia, temporary work is defined as work without paid leave. No such definition of temporary work exists in the United States.

Coverage

People aged 15 to 64 years old who are in employment but not self-employed or in education.

In the OECD and the EU, the proportion of foreign-born in work with temporary contracts is 15% in both, and 16% and 12% among native workers, respectively. At 18%, the share of temporary workers EU‑wide is even higher among non-EU migrants. In most Central and Eastern European countries, the United Kingdom, Austria and Italy, however, temporary contracts are slightly more prevalent among EU‑born migrants. In total, 5 million foreign-born workers have temporary contracts in the OECD and 3.4 million in the EU. Immigrants are more likely to work on such contracts in all European countries, though not, generally, in non-European OECD countries.

Shares of temporary workers among immigrants are similar to those of the native-born in Canada, Australia and New Zealand, and around 5 percentage points lower in Latin American OECD countries, where the foreign-born are more likely to be highly educated. The only exceptions among non-European countries are Japan and Korea, where more than half of all immigrants are temporary workers, against one-third of the native-born in Japan and one-tenth in Korea.

Similarly, the share of temporary workers is at least 5 points higher among the foreign- than the native-born in about half of EU countries, and even more in the Nordic countries (with the exception of Norway) and in longstanding immigrant destinations with large numbers of low-educated immigrants. The gap is also wide in Spain, Greece and Poland. By contrast, temporary work accounts for less than 10% of immigrant employment in most Central and Eastern European countries, as well as in those European countries with a significant recent intake of highly educated migrants.

A temporary contract is often the first step into the labour market. Recent arrivals are thus more likely to work in temporary jobs, the proportion of which shrinks as residence lengthens. Across the EU, only 13% of settled immigrants (i.e. the foreign-born with at least 10 years of residence) work on temporary contracts, almost half as many as among their peers with less than 10 years of residence. Comparisons of settled migrants with the native-born reveal that the temporary contract gap between them narrows in most countries with the increase of the duration of stay and even vanishes in one-third, e.g. in Nordic countries (Sweden in particular), Slovenia and Germany.

There was no significant change in temporary contracts as a share of employment arrangements in the past decade. Most countries showed rises or falls of 2 percentage points, irrespective of the place of birth. Among the few exceptions, Spain saw a steep drop in the share of temporary contracts, especially among the foreign-born, from over 50% before the crisis to less than 30% now. The drop was attributable chiefly to job losses that primarily affected temporary positions. The share of temporary immigrant workers fell by a further 5 percentage points in both Portugal and the Czech Republic, while it rose slightly among the native-born. By contrast, in Poland, Slovenia and, to a lesser extent, France, the foreign-born are now much more likely than the native-born to work on temporary contracts.

Figure 3.14. Workers on temporary contracts

Percentages of all wage-earners, 15- to 64-year-olds, 2015‑16

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Figure 3.15. How shares of temporary contracts among workers have evolved

Changes in percentage points among wage-earners, 15- to 64-year-olds, 2006‑07 to 2015‑16

Notes and sources are to be found at the end of the chapter.

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3.8. Working conditions

Definition

This indicator relates to the proportion of employed persons who report working long hours (over 50 per week) and the share of employees who state that their employment generates risk to physical health.

Coverage

All 15- to 64-year-olds in employment. The self-employed are not included in the physical health risk indicator.

Working conditions are strongly related to a person’s overall wellbeing. Overwork, for example, may exert a negative impact on the work-life balance, physical health and social integration. OECD-wide, 16% of the native- and 11% of the foreign-born in employment work over 50 hours. In the EU, native and immigrants workers (whether born inside or outside the EU) are, at 11%, as likely to work long hours. In two-thirds of countries, higher shares of the native-born work more than 50 hours per week. The gap is especially wide in Austria, the United States and Australia. Conversely, in Latin American OECD countries, the United Kingdom, and all Central and Eastern European countries (with the exception of Estonia), the foreign-born work long hours more frequently than the native-born. In the Czech Republic in particular, they are twice as likely to work long hours.

Working hours are determined by the occupational and sectoral distribution of jobs held by the native- and foreign-born, as well as by educational attainment. In three-fifths of countries, the native-born with little education are more likely to work long hours than their foreign-born peers, though generally not by much (except in Greece, Ireland, Iceland, Slovenia, and Switzerland). Among the highly educated, however, it is the foreign-born who are more likely to work longer hours than the native-born in three-fifths of countries. Notable exceptions are Germany and Austria. In the latter, highly educated immigrants are less likely to work long hours than their native-born peers (12% versus 18%).

Certain types of jobs generate physical health risks, which can affect workers’ long-term wellbeing. Employed immigrants in all European countries are more likely to have such jobs – 46% on average against 35% among the native-born. In Germany, Slovenia, Estonia and Sweden, the gap in the shares of foreign- and native-born in occupations that put their physical health at risk is at least 20 percentage points. The only countries where immigrants are not at significantly greater occupational risk than the native-born are Denmark and Norway.

Most occupations that generate physical health risks are low-skilled. Indeed, three in five low-educated immigrants had jobs that put their physical health at risk in 2015, compared to half of their native-born peers. The shares of immigrants at occupational health risk are higher in all countries except France and Spain (where there is no difference between the foreign- and native-born). Even highly educated immigrants are more likely to work in jobs that generate physical health risk.

Figure 3.16. Working long hours

Percentages of 15- to 64-year-olds in employment and not in education, 2015‑16

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Figure 3.17. Shares of the foreign- and native-born in occupations that put their physical health at risk

Percentages of 15- to 64-year-olds in employment, 2015‑16

Notes and sources are to be found at the end of the chapter.

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3.9. Job skills

Definition

Job skills are measured by the International Standard Classification of Occupations (ISCO). The job skills indicator compares the share of workers in low-skilled jobs (i.e. elementary occupations that require simple, routine tasks and, often, physical effort [ISCO 9]) with the share of workers in highly skilled jobs (e.g. senior managers, professionals, technicians and associate professionals [ISCO 1‑3]).

Coverage

People in employment aged between 15 and 64 years old.

Across the OECD, 18% of immigrant workers hold low-skilled jobs, or “elementary occupations”, against 11% of the native-born. At the EU level, these figures are 20% and 8%, respectively. Indeed, immigrant workers are more heavily concentrated in low-skilled occupations in virtually all countries. In Southern Europe (with the exception of Portugal), at least 30% of immigrants work in such jobs, three times more than their native-born counterparts. In Greece, they are as much as six times more likely than the native-born to be in elementary occupations and around four times more in the Nordic countries and some longstanding European immigrant destinations, such as Austria or Germany. Over one in four low-skilled jobs is held by an immigrant in the EU, the United States and in the settlement countries, a level that exceeds 40% in Austria, Germany, Sweden and Norway, and exceeds 60% in Switzerland and Luxembourg. Non-EU migrants are more likely to hold an elementary occupation than their EU peers in all European countries, with the exception of the United Kingdom, Ireland, and Hungary. They are at least three times as likely as the native-born to work in low-skilled jobs in three countries out of five, including longstanding European immigrant destinations, and Nordic and Southern European countries.

Only in Australia, New Zealand, Portugal, Malta, Turkey and some Central European countries (such as Bulgaria and the Slovak Republic) are immigrants not significantly overrepresented in elementary occupations. In these countries, immigrants are more likely than the native-born to work in highly skilled jobs and by as much as 10‑plus percentage points in Poland. Otherwise, though, the share of immigrants in highly skilled occupations is lower than that of the native-born in all OECD and EU countries. One-third of employed immigrants, EU‑wide, work in highly skilled positions – 11 percentage points fewer than their native peers. The share is slightly lower among non-EU migrants.

Nevertheless, the share of employed immigrants in highly skilled jobs has increased in the last decade by over 2 percentage points in the EU (for both EU and non-EU born) and 4 points in the OECD, a trend similar to that observed among the native-born. The rise was particularly steeper among immigrants than among native-born in the United States, the Baltic countries and Ireland. Yet in most countries, the gap between immigrants and the native-born occupying highly skilled positions widened over this period. The widening was especially pronounced in the long-standing European immigration destinations and the Nordic countries (except Sweden). The share of immigrants in highly skilled positions even fell in about one-quarter of countries (e.g. Norway, Iceland, and Belgium), while increasing among their native peers. Overall, though, there was a general rise in the share of skilled employment among all workers (native- and foreign-born) – with the exception of Greece, Italy, the Netherlands and the Slovak Republic.

Figure 3.18. Low-skilled and highly skilled employment

Percentage of 15- to 64-year-olds in employment, 2017

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Figure 3.19. How shares of workers in highly skilled occupations have evolved

Changes in percentage points, 15- to 64-year-olds, 2006‑07 to 2017

Notes and sources are to be found at the end of the chapter.

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3.10. Over-qualification

Definition

The over-qualification rate is the share of the highly educated, i.e. educated to ISCED Levels 5‑8 (see Indicator 3.1), who work in a job that is ISCO-classified as low- or medium-skilled, i.e. ISCO Levels 4‑9 (see Indicator 3.9).

Coverage

People not in education aged 15 to 64 years old who are highly educated and in employment (not including military occupations [ISCO 0], where data on skills levels are not referenced.

Over one-third of highly educated immigrants in employment in the OECD and the EU are over-qualified for their jobs – a rate 13 percentage points above that of the native-born in the EU and 4 points in the OECD area. Immigrant over-qualification is a particular issue in Southern Europe (except in Portugal) where many highly educated labour migrants have taken up low- and medium-skilled jobs. Indeed, over half of all highly educated immigrants work in jobs for which they are formally over-qualified. The issue is also pronounced in Korea, Israel, Germany and the Scandinavian countries, where immigrant over-qualification rates are at least 15 percentage points higher than those of their native peers. In Italy, Norway and Iceland, the foreign-born are three times more likely to be over-qualified. In only a handful of countries, such as Switzerland and the United States, are they as likely or less likely. Overall, over 8 million foreign-born workers are over-qualified in the OECD, and 3 million in the EU. Among the highly educated not in education, almost 15 million immigrants in the OECD and 5.5 million in the EU are either in work for which they are over-qualified or not in employment – i.e. almost 45% of the highly educated immigrant population, compared with 40% of their native peers in the OECD and 30% in the EU.

Non‑EU migrants have higher over-qualification rates than the natives in all European countries. The gap with the native-born is greater than 15 percentage points in half of all EU/EFTA countries. Recent immigrants are particularly affected by over-qualification, with a rate 7 percentage points higher than that of settled immigrants in the EU. Yet, even settled immigrants who have been in a host country for 10 or more years show over-qualification rates that are 6 points higher than those of the native-born. Another highly over-qualified group comprises the foreign-born who graduated abroad. EU‑wide, over-qualification affects 42% of foreign-educated immigrants and 46% if born outside the EU. By contrast, it affects 28% of immigrants with host-country qualifications. To a lesser extent, the same also holds for the United States and Australia, where the over-qualification rate is 7 percentage points higher among foreign degree-holders. Over-qualification rates are twice as high among immigrants who graduated abroad as among their peers with host-country degrees in Southern Europe, Nordic countries, France, Germany and the Netherlands. In the latter three countries, as well as in Portugal and Slovenia, immigrants with host-country education are no more likely than the native-born to be over-qualified, while in all other EU and OECD countries they are.

The immigrant over-qualification rate has risen slightly over the last decade in the EU, but it has dropped in the United States. In most Southern European and Baltic countries, the native-born are more likely to be over-qualified than they were before the crisis, while there is a downward trend among immigrants. The explanation may be that over-qualified immigrants lost their jobs during the crisis, which reduced the over-qualification rate but increased the unemployment rate. That notwithstanding, the incidence of over-qualification rose faster among immigrants than native-born in most European countries, especially in Norway, the United Kingdom, Poland and Italy.

Figure 3.20. Over-qualification rates

Percentage of highly educated, 15- to 64-year-olds, 2017

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Figure 3.21. How over-qualification rates have evolved

Changes in percentage points among highly educated, 15- to 64-year-olds, 2006‑07 to 2017

Notes and sources are to be found at the end of the chapter.

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3.11. Self-employment

Definition

The self-employed are people who work in their own firms or create their own businesses, sometimes hiring employees. Self-employment includes entrepreneurs, liberal professions, artisans, traders, and many other freelance activities.

Coverage

Population aged between 15 and 64 who are in employment, excluding the agricultural sector.

Across the OECD and the EU, around 12% of immigrants in employment are self-employed – the same rate as for the native-born. There are more than 7.5 million foreign-born self-employed workers in the OECD, and more than 3 million in the EU. Immigrants are more likely to be self-employed than the native-born in over two-thirds of the countries, although only slightly in the vast majority of them. They are, however, considerably more likely to be self-employed in Central and Eastern Europe, especially in Poland, where the proportion is twice that of their native peers. When it comes to countries where, on the one hand, self-employment is widespread and, on the other hand, labour migrants account for the bulk of immigration, the foreign-born are less likely to be self-employed than the native-born. That pattern is found in Southern Europe, Japan, Korea and the Latin American OECD countries. In Greece, Italy and Iceland, for example, twice as many native- as foreign-born are self-employed and four times as many in Korea.

Although self-employment is widespread in many countries of origin, immigrants may struggle to adjust to the business environment and rules governing self-employment in the host country. Many new arrivals need time to adapt and build up the necessary capital stock. Lower rates of self-employment are thus to be expected among more recent than settled immigrants, which is indeed the case. The differences between the two groups are particularly marked in the settlement countries, as well as in Chile, Korea and Ireland.

The share of immigrants in self-employment has risen over the last decade in one half of all countries, and dropped in the other half. In countries worst hit by the economic crisis (Spain, Portugal, Greece, and Ireland), the share of employed immigrants in self-employment rose, while a significant proportion of the native-born left self-employment. Across the EU, self-employment increased more markedly among non-EU migrants than among their EU-born peers.

Immigrant businesses in OECD countries tend to be smaller than those of the native-born, with the exceptions of Australia, New Zealand, Central Europe and the Baltic countries. In the EU, three-quarters of immigrant businesses have no employee, while seven natives in ten do. The share of one-person businesses is 10 percentage points higher among foreign-born in Luxembourg, Ireland and Iceland. Throughout EU countries, apart from Central and Eastern Europe, there are relatively more native than immigrant-owned businesses with over 10 employees, particularly in Luxembourg, Denmark and Switzerland, where there are twice as many.

Figure 3.22. Self-employed workers

Percentages of 15- to 64-year-olds, 2015‑16

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Figure 3.23. How shares of self-employed workers have evolved

Changes in percentage points, 15- to 64-year-olds, 2006‑07 to 2015‑16

Notes and sources are to be found at the end of the chapter.

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Notes and sources

Notes on Cyprus

1. Note by Turkey: The information in this document with reference to “Cyprus” relates to the southern part of the Island. There is no single authority representing both Turkish and Greek Cypriot people on the Island. Turkey recognises the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus (TRNC). Until a lasting and equitable solution is found within the context of the United Nations, Turkey shall preserve its position concerning the “Cyprus issue”.

2. Note by all the European Union Member States of the OECD and the European Union: The Republic of Cyprus is recognised by all members of the United Nations with the exception of Turkey. The information in this document relates to the area under the effective control of the Government of the Republic of Cyprus.

Note on Israel

The statistical data for Israel are supplied by and under the responsibility of the relevant Israeli authorities. The use of such data by the OECD is without prejudice to the status of the Golan Heights, East Jerusalem and Israeli settlements in the West Bank under the terms of international law.

Notes on figures and tables

Lithuania was not an OECD Member at the time of preparation of this publication. Accordingly, Lithuania does not appear in the list of OECD Members and is not included in the zone aggregates.

On 25 May 2018, the OECD Council invited Colombia to become a Member. At the time of publication the deposit of Colombia’s instrument of accession to the OECD Convention was pending and therefore Colombia does not appear in the list of OECD Members and is not included in the OECD zone aggregates.

Data for New Zealand and Saudi Arabia include people still in education. Data for Australia and the United States include people aged over 24 who are still in education. The United States calculates rates for the 16- to 64‑year-old age group. Korea calculates rates for the 15‑59.

Japan and Saudi Arabia determine who is an immigrant on the basis of nationality, not on the basis of country of birth. Korea includes in the immigrant population all foreigners and immigrants who have been naturalised in the past 5 years.

Indicators 3.1, 3.4, 3.5 and 3.10: The level of education for Korea includes ISCED 4 in the highly educated. The level of education in South American countries (Argentina, Brazil, Colombia) is based on the IPUMS standardised data and may not be consistent with official data.

Figure 3.1: Japan is not included in the OECD total.

Figure 3.2, Figure 3.21: Due to a break in series from 2014 in the definition of the highly educated, Austria is not included in the OECD and EU totals.

Table 3.1: Turkey is not included in the OECD total.

Figure 3.18: The United States’ Standard Occupational Classification (SOC) system precludes distinguishing between low- and medium-skilled occupations. The low-skilled section does not therefore consider the United States.

Averages factor in rates that cannot be published individually because sample sizes are too small.

For further detailed data, see Annex B.

Table 3.2. Sources by indicator

	3.1 Educational attainment	3.2 Language proficiency	3.3 Access to adult education and training	3.4 Employment and labour market participation	3.5 Unemployment	3.6 Risks of labour market exclusion	3.7 Types of contracts	3.8 Working conditions	3.9 Job skills	3.10 Over-qualification	3.11 Self-employment
OECD/EU
Australia	ASEW 2007 & LFS 2017	Census 2016	PIAAC 2012	ASEW 2007 & LFS 2017, ASEW 2016 (F3.9 & F3.10)	ASEW 2007 & LFS 2017, ASEW 2016 (by education)	ASEW 2007 & 2016; PJSM 2016 (F3.13)	Charac. of employ. 2006 & 2015	ASEW 2016	ASEW 2007 & 2016	ASEW 2007 & 2016	LFS 2006‑07 & 2015‑16
Austria	EU-LFS 2006‑07 & 2017, 2015‑16 (non-EU migrants)	EU-LFS AHM 2014	AES 2011 & 2016	EU-LFS 2006‑07 & 2017, 2015‑16 (non-EU migrants), 2015‑16 (F3.10 and non-EU migrants)	EU-LFS 2006‑07 & 2017, 2015‑16 (non-EU migrants)	EU-LFS 2006‑07 & 2015‑16; EU-SILC 2016 (benefits)	EU-LFS 2006‑07 & 2015‑16	EU-LFS 2006‑07 & 2015‑16; EWCS 2015 (F3.17)	EU-LFS 2006‑07 & 2017, 2015‑16 (non-EU migrants)	EU-LFS 2006‑07 & 2017, 2015‑16 (non-EU migrants)	EU-LFS 2006‑07 & 2015‑16
Belgium	EU-LFS 2006‑07 & 2015‑16	EU-LFS AHM 2014	AES 2011 & 2016	EU-LFS 2006‑07 & 2015‑16	EU-LFS 2006‑07 & 2015‑16	EU-LFS 2006‑07 & 2015‑16; EU-SILC 2016 (benefits)	EU-LFS 2006‑07 & 2015‑16	EU-LFS 2006‑07 & 2015‑16; EWCS 2015 (F3.17)	EU-LFS 2006‑07 & 2015‑16	EU-LFS 2006‑07 & 2015‑16	EU-LFS 2006‑07 & 2015‑16
Bulgaria	EU-LFS 2006‑07 & 2015‑16	EU-LFS AHM 2014	AES 2011 & 2016	EU-LFS 2006‑07 & 2015‑16	EU-LFS 2006‑07 & 2015‑16	EU-LFS 2006‑07 & 2015‑16; EU-SILC 2016 (benefits)	EU-LFS 2006‑07 & 2015‑16	EU-LFS 2006‑07 & 2015‑16; EWCS 2015 (F3.17)	EU-LFS 2006‑07 & 2015‑16	EU-LFS 2006‑07 & 2015‑16	EU-LFS 2006‑07 & 2015‑16
Canada	LFS 2006‑07 & 2017	..	PIAAC 2012	LFS 2006‑07 & 2017, 2015‑16 (F3.9 & F3.10)	LFS 2006‑07 & 2017, 2015 (by education)	LFS 2006‑07 & 2015‑16	LFS 2006‑07 & 2015‑16	LFS 2006‑07 & 2015‑16	..	..	LFS 2006‑07 & 2015‑16
Chile	CASEN 2015	..	PIAAC 2015	CASEN 2015	CASEN 2015	..	CASEN 2015	CASEN 2015	CASEN 2015	CASEN 2015	CASEN 2015
Croatia	EU-LFS 2015‑16	EU-LFS AHM 2014	AES 2016	EU-LFS 2015‑16	EU-LFS 2015‑16	EU-LFS 2015‑16; EU-SILC 2016 (benefits)	EU-LFS 2015‑16	EU-LFS 2015‑16; EWCS 2015 (F3.17)	EU-LFS 2015‑16	EU-LFS 2015‑16	EU-LFS 2015‑16
Cyprus1,2	EU-LFS 2006‑07 & 2015‑16	EU-LFS AHM 2014	AES 2011 & 2016	EU-LFS 2006‑07 & 2015‑16	EU-LFS 2006‑07 & 2015‑16	EU-LFS 2006‑07 & 2015‑16; WVS 2010‑14 (fears); EU-SILC 2016 (benefits)	EU-LFS 2006‑07 & 2015‑16	EU-LFS 2006‑07 & 2015‑16; EWCS 2015 (F3.17)	EU-LFS 2006‑07 & 2015‑16	EU-LFS 2006‑07 & 2015‑16	EU-LFS 2006‑07 & 2015‑16
Czech Republic	EU-LFS 2006‑07 & 2017, 2015‑16 (non-EU migrants)	EU-LFS AHM 2014	AES 2011 & 2016	EU-LFS 2006‑07 & 2017, 2015‑16 (non-EU migrants), 2015‑16 (F3.10 and non-EU migrants)	EU-LFS 2006‑07 & 2017, 2015‑16 (non-EU migrants)	EU-LFS 2006‑07 & 2015‑16; EU-SILC 2016 (benefits)	EU-LFS 2006‑07 & 2015‑16	EU-LFS 2006‑07 & 2015‑16; EWCS 2015 (F3.17)	EU-LFS 2006‑07 & 2017, 2015‑16 (non-EU migrants)	EU-LFS 2006‑07 & 2017, 2015‑16 (non-EU migrants)	EU-LFS 2006‑07 & 2015‑16
Denmark	EU-LFS 2006‑07 & 2017, 2015‑16 (non-EU migrants)	EU-LFS AHM 2014	AES 2011 & 2016	EU-LFS 2006‑07 & 2017, 2015‑16 (non-EU migrants), 2015‑16 (F3.9 & F3.10 & non-EU migrants)	EU-LFS 2006‑07 & 2017, 2015‑16 (non-EU migrants)	EU-LFS 2006‑07 & 2015‑16; EU-SILC 2016 (benefits)	EU-LFS 2006‑07 & 2015‑16	EU-LFS 2006‑07 & 2015‑16; EWCS 2015 (F3.17)	EU-LFS 2006‑07 & 2015‑16	EU-LFS 2006‑07 & 2015‑16	EU-LFS 2006‑07 & 2015‑16
Estonia	EU-LFS 2006‑07 & 2017, 2015‑16 (non-EU migrants)	EU-LFS AHM 2014	AES 2011 & 2016	EU-LFS 2006‑07 & 2017, 2015‑16 (non-EU migrants), 2015‑16 (F3.10 and non-EU migrants)	EU-LFS 2006‑07 & 2017, 2015‑16 (non-EU migrants)	EU-LFS 2006‑07 & 2015‑16; WVS 2010‑14 (fears); EU-SILC 2016 (benefits)	EU-LFS 2006‑07 & 2015‑16	EU-LFS 2006‑07 & 2015‑16; EWCS 2015 (F3.17)	EU-LFS 2006‑07 & 2017, 2015‑16 (non-EU migrants)	EU-LFS 2006‑07 & 2017, 2015‑16 (non-EU migrants)	EU-LFS 2006‑07 & 2015‑16
Finland	EU-LFS AHM 2014	EU-LFS AHM 2014	AES 2011 & 2016	EU-LFS 2006‑07 & 2017, 2015‑16 (non-EU migrants); EU-LFS AHM 2014 (F3.9 & F3.10 & non-EU migrants)	EU-LFS 2006‑07 & 2017, 2015‑16 (non-EU migrants); EU-LFS AHM 2014 (by education)	EU-LFS 2006‑07 & 2015‑16; EU-SILC 2016 (benefits)	EU-LFS 2006‑07 & 2015‑16	EU-LFS 2006‑07 & 2015‑16; EWCS 2015 (F3.17)	EU-LFS 2006‑07 & 2015‑16	EU-LFS AHM 2014	EU-LFS 2006‑07 & 2015‑16
France	EU-LFS 2006‑07 & 2017, 2015‑16 (non-EU migrants)	EU-LFS AHM 2014	AES 2011 & 2016	EU-LFS 2006‑07 & 2017, 2015‑16 (non-EU mig.), 2015‑16 (F3.10 and non-EU mig.)	EU-LFS 2006‑07 & 2017, 2015‑16 (non-EU migrants)	EU-LFS 2006‑07 & 2015‑16; EU-SILC 2016 (benefits)	EU-LFS 2006‑07 & 2015‑16	EU-LFS 2006‑07 & 2015‑16; EWCS 2015 (F3.17)	EU-LFS 2006‑07 & 2017, 2015‑16 (non-EU migrants)	EU-LFS 2006‑07 & 2017, 2015‑16 (non-EU migrants)	EU-LFS 2006‑07 & 2015‑16
Germany	EU-LFS 2006‑07 & Mikrozensus 2016	EU-LFS AHM 2014	AES 2011 & 2016	EU-LFS 2006‑07 & Mikrozensus 2016	EU-LFS 2006‑07 & Mikrozensus 2016	EU-LFS 2006‑07 & Mikrozensus 2016; WVS 2010‑14 (fears); EU-SILC 2016 (benefits)	EU-LFS 2006‑07 & Mikrozensus 2016	EU-LFS 2006‑07 & Mikrozensus 2016; EWCS 2015 (F3.17)	EU-LFS 2006‑07 & Mikrozensus 2016	EU-LFS 2006‑07 & Mikrozensus 2016	EU-LFS 2006‑07 & Mikrozensus 2016
Greece	EU-LFS 2006‑07 & 2017, 2015‑16 (non-EU migrants)	EU-LFS AHM 2014	AES 2011 & 2016	EU-LFS 2006‑07 & 2017, 2015‑16 (non-EU migrants), 2015‑16 (F3.10 and non-EU migrants)	EU-LFS 2006‑07 & 2017, 2015‑16 (non-EU migrants)	EU-LFS 2006‑07 & 2015‑16; EU-SILC 2016 (benefits)	EU-LFS 2006‑07 & 2015‑16	EU-LFS 2006‑07 & 2015‑16; EWCS 2015 (F3.17)	EU-LFS 2006‑07 & 2017, 2015‑16 (non-EU migrants)	EU-LFS 2006‑07 & 2017, 2015‑16 (non-EU migrants)	EU-LFS 2006‑07 & 2015‑16
Hungary	EU-LFS 2006‑07 & 2017, 2015‑16 (non-EU migrants)	EU-LFS AHM 2014	AES 2011 & 2016	EU-LFS 2006‑07 & 2017, 2015‑16 (non-EU migrants), 2015‑16 (F3.10 and non-EU migrants)	EU-LFS 2006‑07 & 2017, 2015‑16 (non-EU migrants)	EU-LFS 2006‑07 & 2015‑16; EU-SILC 2016 (benefits)	EU-LFS 2006‑07 & 2015‑16	EU-LFS 2006‑07 & 2015‑16; EWCS 2015 (F3.17)	EU-LFS 2006‑07 & 2017, 2015‑16 (non-EU migrants)	EU-LFS 2006‑07 & 2017, 2015‑16 (non-EU migrants)	EU-LFS 2006‑07 & 2015‑16
Iceland	EU-LFS 2006‑07 & 2015‑16	EU-LFS AHM 2014	..	EU-LFS 2006‑07 & 2015‑16	EU-LFS 2006‑07 & 2015‑16	EU-LFS 2006‑07 & 2015‑16; EU-SILC 2016 (benefits)	EU-LFS 2006‑07 & 2015‑16	EU-LFS 2006‑07 & 2015‑16	EU-LFS 2006‑07 & 2015‑16	EU-LFS 2006‑07 & 2015‑16	EU-LFS 2006‑07 & 2015‑16
Ireland	EU-LFS 2006‑07 & 2015‑16	..	PIAAC 2012	EU-LFS 2006‑07 & 2015‑16	EU-LFS 2006‑07 & 2015‑16	EU-LFS 2006‑07 & 2015‑16; EU-SILC 2016 (benefits)	EU-LFS 2006‑07 & 2015‑16	EU-LFS 2006‑07 & 2015‑16; EWCS 2015 (F3.17)	EU-LFS 2006‑07 & 2015‑16	EU-LFS 2006‑07 & 2015‑16	EU-LFS 2006‑07 & 2015‑16
Israel*	LFS 2017	..	PIAAC 2015	LFS 2017	LFS 2017	LFS 2016	LFS 2016	LFS 2016	LFS 2017	LFS 2017	LFS 2016
Italy	EU-LFS 2006‑07 & 2017, 2015‑16 (non-EU migrants)	EU-LFS AHM 2014	AES 2011 & 2016	EU-LFS 2006‑07 & 2017, 2015‑16 (non-EU migrants), 2015‑16 (F3.10 and non-EU migrants)	EU-LFS 2006‑07 & 2017, 2015‑16 (non-EU migrants)	EU-LFS 2006‑07 & 2015‑16; EU-SILC 2016 (benefits)	EU-LFS 2006‑07 & 2015‑16	EU-LFS 2006‑07 & 2015‑16; EWCS 2015 (F3.17)	EU-LFS 2006‑07 & 2017, 2015‑16 (non-EU migrants)	EU-LFS 2006‑07 & 2017, 2015‑16 (non-EU migrants)	EU-LFS 2006‑07 & 2015‑16
Japan	Census 2010	..	PIAAC 2012	Census 2015	Census 2015	..	Census 2015	..	Census 2015	..	Census 2015
Korea	SILCLF 2017 & EAPS 2017 (provided by MRTC)	..	PIAAC 2012	SILCLF 2017 & EAPS 2017 (provided by MRTC)	SILCLF 2017 & EAPS 2017 (provided by MRTC)	SILCLF 2017 & EAPS 2017 (provided by MRTC)	SILCLF 2017 & EAPS 2017 (provided by MRTC)	..	SILCLF 2017 & EAPS 2017 (provided by MRTC)	SILCLF 2017 & EAPS 2017 (provided by MRTC)	SILCLF 2017 & EAPS 2017 (provided by MRTC)
Latvia	EU-LFS 2006‑07 & 2017, 2015‑16 (non-EU migrants)	EU-LFS AHM 2014	AES 2011 & 2016	EU-LFS 2006‑07 & 2017, 2015‑16 (non-EU migrants), 2015‑16 (F3.10 and non-EU migrants)	EU-LFS 2006‑07 & 2017, 2015‑16 (non-EU migrants)	EU-LFS 2006‑07 & 2015‑16; EU-SILC 2016 (benefits)	EU-LFS 2006‑07 & 2015‑16	EU-LFS 2006‑07 & 2015‑16; EWCS 2015 (F3.17)	EU-LFS 2006‑07 & 2017, 2015‑16 (non-EU migrants)	EU-LFS 2006‑07 & 2017, 2015‑16 (non-EU migrants)	EU-LFS 2006‑07 & 2015‑16
Lithuania	EU-LFS 2006‑07 & 2017, 2015‑16 (non-EU migrants)	EU-LFS AHM 2014	AES 2011 & 2016	EU-LFS 2006‑07 & 2017, 2015‑16 (non-EU migrants), 2015‑16 (F3.10 and non-EU migrants)	EU-LFS 2006‑07 & 2017, 2015‑16 (non-EU migrants)	EU-LFS 2006‑07 & 2015‑16; EU-SILC 2016 (benefits)	EU-LFS 2006‑07 & 2015‑16	EU-LFS 2006‑07 & 2015‑16; EWCS 2015 (F3.17)	EU-LFS 2006‑07 & 2017, 2015‑16 (non-EU migrants)	EU-LFS 2006‑07 & 2017, 2015‑16 (non-EU migrants)	EU-LFS 2006‑07 & 2015‑16
Luxembourg	EU-LFS 2006‑07 & 2015‑16	EU-LFS AHM 2014	AES 2011 & 2016	EU-LFS 2006‑07 & 2015‑16	EU-LFS 2006‑07 & 2015‑16	EU-LFS 2006‑07 & 2015‑16; EU-SILC 2016 (benefits)	EU-LFS 2006‑07 & 2015‑16	EU-LFS 2006‑07 & 2015‑16; EWCS 2015 (F3.17)	EU-LFS 2006‑07 & 2015‑16	EU-LFS 2006‑07 & 2015‑16	EU-LFS 2006‑07 & 2015‑16
Malta	EU-LFS 2006‑07 & 2015‑16	EU-LFS AHM 2014	AES 2011 & 2016	EU-LFS 2006‑07 & 2015‑16	EU-LFS 2006‑07 & 2015‑16	EU-LFS 2006‑07 & 2015‑16; EU-SILC 2016 (benefits)	EU-LFS 2006‑07 & 2015‑16	EU-LFS 2006‑07 & 2015‑16; EWCS 2015 (F3.17)	EU-LFS 2006‑07 & 2015‑16	EU-LFS 2006‑07 & 2015‑16	EU-LFS 2006‑07 & 2015‑16
Mexico	ENOE 2017	..	..	ENOE 2017	ENOE 2017	..	ENOE 2016	ENOE 2016	..	..	ENOE 2016
Netherlands	EU-LFS 2006‑07 & 2017, 2015‑16 (non-EU migrants)	..	AES 2011 & 2016	EU-LFS 2006‑07 & 2017, 2015‑16 (non-EU migrants), 2015‑16 (F3.10 and non-EU migrants)	EU-LFS 2006‑07 & 2017, 2015‑16 (non-EU migrants)	EU-LFS 2006‑07 & 2015‑16; WVS 2010‑14 (fears); EU-SILC 2016 (benefits)	EU-LFS 2006‑07 & 2015‑16	EU-LFS 2006‑07 & 2015‑16; EWCS 2015 (F3.17)	EU-LFS 2006‑07 & 2017, 2015‑16 (non-EU migrants)	EU-LFS 2006‑07 & 2017, 2015‑16 (non-EU migrants)	EU-LFS 2006‑07 & 2015‑16
New Zealand	LFS 2006‑07 & Q2‑4/2015-Q1/2016	..	PIAAC 2015	LFS 2006‑07 & Q2‑4/2015-Q1/2016	LFS 2006‑07 & Q2‑4/2015-Q1/2016	LFS 2006‑07 & Q2‑4/2015-Q1/2016; WVS 2010‑14 (fears)	LFS 2006‑07 & LFS 2017	..	LFS 2006‑07 & LFS 2017	LFS 2006‑07 & LFS 2017	LFS 2006‑07 & Q2‑4/2015-Q1/2016
Norway	EU-LFS 2006‑07 & 2015‑16	EU-LFS AHM 2014	AES 2011 & 2016	EU-LFS 2006‑07 & 2015‑16	EU-LFS 2006‑07 & 2015‑16	EU-LFS 2006‑07 & 2015‑16; EU-SILC 2016 (benefits)	EU-LFS 2006‑07 & 2015‑16	EU-LFS 2006‑07 & 2015‑16; EWCS 2015 (F3.17)	EU-LFS 2006‑07 & 2015‑16	EU-LFS 2006‑07 & 2015‑16	EU-LFS 2006‑07 & 2015‑16
Poland	EU-LFS 2006‑07 & 2017, 2015‑16 (non-EU migrants)	EU-LFS AHM 2014	AES 2011 & 2016	EU-LFS 2006‑07 & 2017, 2015‑16 (non-EU migrants), 2015‑16 (F3.10 and non-EU migrants)	EU-LFS 2006‑07 & 2017, 2015‑16 (non-EU migrants)	EU-LFS 2006‑07 & 2015‑16; EU-SILC 2016 (benefits)	EU-LFS 2006‑07 & 2015‑16	EU-LFS 2006‑07 & 2015‑16; EWCS 2015 (F3.17)	EU-LFS 2006‑07 & 2017, 2015‑16 (non-EU migrants)	EU-LFS 2006‑07 & 2017, 2015‑16 (non-EU migrants)	EU-LFS 2006‑07 & 2015‑16
Portugal	EU-LFS 2006‑07 & 2017, 2015‑16 (non-EU migrants)	EU-LFS AHM 2014	AES 2011 & 2016	EU-LFS 2006‑07 & 2017, 2015‑16 (non-EU migrants), 2015‑16 (F3.10 and non-EU migrants)	EU-LFS 2006‑07 & 2017, 2015‑16 (non-EU migrants)	EU-LFS 2006‑07 & 2015‑16; EU-SILC 2016 (benefits)	EU-LFS 2006‑07 & 2015‑16	EU-LFS 2006‑07 & 2015‑16; EWCS 2015 (F3.17)	EU-LFS 2006‑07 & 2017, 2015‑16 (non-EU migrants)	EU-LFS 2006‑07 & 2017, 2015‑16 (non-EU migrants)	EU-LFS 2006‑07 & 2015‑16
Romania	EU-LFS 2006‑07 & 2015‑16	EU-LFS AHM 2014	AES 2011 & 2016	EU-LFS 2006‑07 & 2015‑16	EU-LFS 2006‑07 & 2015‑16	EU-LFS 2006‑07 & 2015‑16; EU-SILC 2016 (benefits)	EU-LFS 2006‑07 & 2015‑16	EU-LFS 2006‑07 & 2015‑16; EWCS 2015 (F3.17)	EU-LFS 2006‑07 & 2015‑16	EU-LFS 2006‑07 & 2015‑16	EU-LFS 2006‑07 & 2015‑16
Slovak Republic	EU-LFS 2006‑07 & 2017, 2015‑16 (non-EU migrants)	EU-LFS AHM 2014	AES 2011 & 2016	EU-LFS 2006‑07 & 2017, 2015‑16 (non-EU migrants), 2015‑16 (F3.10 and non-EU migrants)	EU-LFS 2006‑07 & 2017, 2015‑16 (non-EU migrants)	EU-LFS 2006‑07 & 2015‑16; EU-SILC 2016 (benefits)	EU-LFS 2006‑07 & 2015‑16	EU-LFS 2006‑07 & 2015‑16; EWCS 2015 (F3.17)	EU-LFS 2006‑07 & 2017, 2015‑16 (non-EU migrants)	EU-LFS 2006‑07 & 2015‑16	EU-LFS 2006‑07 & 2015‑16
Slovenia	EU-LFS 2006‑07 & 2017, 2015‑16 (non-EU migrants)	EU-LFS AHM 2014	AES 2011 & 2016	EU-LFS 2006‑07 & 2017, 2015‑16 (non-EU migrants), 2015‑16 (F3.10 and non-EU migrants)	EU-LFS 2006‑07 & 2017, 2015‑16 (non-EU migrants)	EU-LFS 2006‑07 & 2015‑16; WVS 2010‑14 (fears); EU-SILC 2016 (benefits)	EU-LFS 2006‑07 & 2015‑16	EU-LFS 2006‑07 & 2015‑16; EWCS 2015 (F3.17)	EU-LFS 2006‑07 & 2017, 2015‑16 (non-EU migrants)	EU-LFS 2006‑07 & 2017, 2015‑16 (non-EU migrants)	EU-LFS 2006‑07 & 2015‑16
Spain	EU-LFS 2006‑07 & 2017, 2015‑16 (non-EU migrants)	EU-LFS AHM 2014	AES 2011 & 2016	EU-LFS 2006‑07 & 2017, 2015‑16 (non-EU migrants), 2015‑16 (F3.10 and non-EU migrants)	EU-LFS 2006‑07 & 2017, 2015‑16 (non-EU migrants)	EU-LFS 2006‑07 & 2015‑16; EU-SILC 2016 (benefits)	EU-LFS 2006‑07 & 2015‑16	EU-LFS 2006‑07 & 2015‑16; EWCS 2015 (F3.17)	EU-LFS 2006‑07 & 2017, 2015‑16 (non-EU migrants)	EU-LFS 2006‑07 & 2017, 2015‑16 (non-EU migrants)	EU-LFS 2006‑07 & 2015‑16
Sweden	EU-LFS 2006‑07 & 2017, 2015‑16 (non-EU migrants)	EU-LFS AHM 2014	AES 2011 & 2016	EU-LFS 2006‑07 & 2017, 2015‑16 (non-EU migrants), 2015‑16 (F3.10 and non-EU migrants)	EU-LFS 2006‑07 & 2017, 2015‑16 (non-EU migrants)	EU-LFS 2006‑07 & 2015‑16; WVS 2010‑14 (fears); EU-SILC 2016 (benefits)	EU-LFS 2006‑07 & 2015‑16	EU-LFS 2006‑07 & 2015‑16; EWCS 2015 (F3.17)	EU-LFS 2006‑07 & 2017, 2015‑16 (non-EU migrants)	EU-LFS 2006‑07 & 2017, 2015‑16 (non-EU migrants)	EU-LFS 2006‑07 & 2015‑16
Switzerland	EU-LFS 2006‑07 & 2017, 2015‑16 (non-EU migrants)	EU-LFS AHM 2014	AES 2011 & 2016	EU-LFS 2006‑07 & 2017, 2015‑16 (non-EU migrants), 2015‑16 (F3.9 & F3.10 & non-EU migrants)	EU-LFS 2006‑07 & 2017, 2015‑16 (non-EU migrants)	EU-LFS 2006‑07 & 2015‑16; EU-SILC 2016 (benefits)	EU-LFS 2006‑07 & 2015‑16	EU-LFS 2006‑07 & 2015‑16; EWCS 2015 (F3.17)	EU-LFS 2006‑07 & 2017, 2015‑16 (non-EU migrants)	EU-LFS 2006‑07 & 2017, 2015‑16 (non-EU migrants)	EU-LFS 2006‑07 & 2015‑16
Turkey	LFS 2017	..	AES 2011 & 2016	LFS 2017	LFS 2017	LFS 2015	LFS 2015	LFS 2015; EWCS 2015 (F3.17)	LFS 2015	LFS 2015	LFS 2015
United Kingdom	EU-LFS 2006‑07 & 2017, 2015‑16 (non-EU migrants)	EU-LFS AHM 2014	AES 2016	EU-LFS 2006‑07 & 2017, 2015‑16 (non-EU migrants), 2015‑16 (F3.10 and non-EU migrants)	EU-LFS 2006‑07 & 2017, 2015‑16 (non-EU migrants)	EU-LFS 2006‑07 & 2015‑16; EU-SILC 2016 (benefits)	EU-LFS 2006‑07 & 2015‑16	EU-LFS 2006‑07 & 2015‑16; EWCS 2015 (F3.17)	EU-LFS 2006‑07 & 2017, 2015‑16 (non-EU migrants)	EU-LFS 2006‑07 & 2017, 2015‑16 (non-EU migrants)	EU-LFS 2006‑07 & 2015‑16
United States	CPS 2006‑07 & 2016‑17	..	PIAAC 2012	CPS 2006‑07 & 2016‑17	CPS 2006‑07 & 2016‑17	CPS 2006‑07 & 2016‑17; WVS 2010‑14 (fears)	..	CPS 2006‑07 & 2016‑17	CPS 2006‑07 & 2016‑17 (highly skilled only)	CPS 2006‑07 & 2016‑17	CPS 2006‑07 & 2016‑17
Partner/G20 countries
Argentina	IPUMS Census 2010	..	..	IPUMS Census 2010	IPUMS Census 2010	..	..	..	..	..	..
Brazil	IPUMS Census 2010	..	..	IPUMS Census 2010	IPUMS Census 2010	..	..	..	IPUMS Census 2010	IPUMS Census 2011	IPUMS Census 2010
Colombia	IPUMS Census 2005	..	..	IPUMS Census 2005	IPUMS Census 2005	..	..	..	..	..	IPUMS Census 2005
Costa Rica	IPUMS Census 2011	..	..	IPUMS Census 2011	IPUMS Census 2011	..	..	..	IPUMS Census 2011	IPUMS Census 2012	IPUMS Census 2011
Indonesia	IPUMS Census 2010	..	PIAAC 2015	IPUMS Census 2010	IPUMS Census 2010	..	..	..	..	..	IPUMS Census 2010
Russia	Census 2010	..	PIAAC 2012	Census 2010	Census 2010	..	..	..	..	..	..
Saudi Arabia	Census 2010	..	..	LFS 2016	..	..	..	LFS 2016	LFS 2016	LFS 2016	..
South Africa	IPUMS Census 2011	..	..	IPUMS Census 2011	IPUMS Census 2011	..	..	..	..	..	..

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