The 2026 edition of the Munich Security Conference (MSC) revealed that geopolitics is being securitised, rearmament is urgent, and deterrence is the ascendant form of conflict prevention.
Yet these choices come at the expense of strategic vision that may undermine their impact. The prevention value of development co-operation can address underlying drivers of fragility, enhance human security, derisk defence investments, and allow for the concentration of hard security where it is needed most. All of which are being overlooked, for now.
Key takeaways from the Munich Security Conference
The following are eight observations from the MSC from a development perspective:
Development co-operation has a communications problem. Development actors were present but security speakers were notably absent from many of their events—are development actors too comfortable in their own company? Perhaps a sacrilegious statement, but they also appear to be overly focused on finance and are not paying sufficient attention to the development co-operation offer in the current geopolitical landscape.
Development is not a priority for most politicians. The urgency to restore defence capacities, especially in Europe, is palpable. The extent of the defence deficit is such that restoring it is taking up all available political energy—development is not getting a look in. There is also a view among some western politicians that development co-operation has failed to fulfil its promise. One political participant at the conference suggested it was yesterday’s instrument, "a technocratic tool of overseas engagement, not a strategic asset". Another noted that "political leaders do not see themselves in the development space".
Military leaders are more open to development ideas but they have little scope to engage constructively. Many acknowledge that the prevention value of development allows them to prioritise their resources where they are needed most, but development co-operation is well down on their list of priorities. Nuclear and force deterrence and the complexities of modern warfare are foremost in their minds. The prevention value of development remains underappreciated and unsupported.
The rapid rearmament agenda is politically powerful but comes with trade-offs. There is no longer any debate about whether to rearm; the discussion has shifted decisively to how much and how quickly military capabilities should be enhanced. Total world military spending reached an unprecedented US $2.7 trillion in 2024, the largest annual increase since the Cold War. The focus on defence spending crowds out other forms of strategic investment—especially long-term development and prevention efforts that can address sources of instability.
The haste to rearm also risks exposing weak governance that will undermine security investment among donors and partners alike. The ability of security sector governance and development more generally to derisk investments in defence is being overlooked, seeding not insignificant risk in the years to come.
Is the securitisation of geopolitics echoing the mistakes of the recent past? It is worth questioning whether the failures of international engagement in Afghanistan and the Sahel risk being repeated at a global scale. Unlike those experiences, where development instruments were largely subordinated within a security-led approach, thereby reducing their impact, development co-operation is not seen as part of the current geopolitical calculus. The structural implications of overlooking development co-operation do not bode well for future capacities to "win peace".
The concept of resilience discussed at the MSC is quite different to what is normally referred to as resilience in development discussions. For a security audience, resilience is inward looking and focused on sustaining force capacity and a societal ability to withstand sustained conflict. While it is generally accepted that the roots of domestic "societal" resilience often extend beyond national borders - through organised crime networks, energy supply chains, or hybrid threats – the value of development co-operation across those spaces, and the resilience of partner countries, does not appear to be a fully integrated part of the conversation.
For the representatives from the global south present at the Munich Security Conference, security is important but development is the priority. At 3% in 2024, growth in military expenditure in African states is substantially lower than elsewhere in the world. Though military spending in Central America and the Caribbean more than doubled between 2015 and 2024—reflected in a militarisation of approaches to justice and rule-of-law in many countries—that approach is delivering mixed results. MSC speakers from countries facing high levels of fragility instead choose to focus on economic growth, education, health, food security, supply chains and building peace. Their demands for different forms of development co-operation are clear, but the geopolitical implications of who meets those demands—and why—deserves more careful consideration among security and development leaders.
Development co-operation is central to national security
By relegating development co-operation policy to the margins of geopolitical discourse, donor countries are creating blind spots. Contexts facing high fragility become fertile ground for exploitation by adversaries, undermining both security and development goals.
That deterrence is the politically dominant concept of prevention should not mask the reality that upstream conflict prevention through development is more effective and less costly over the long term. Development is not a distraction from national security; it is central to it, although this point remains underappreciated in policymaking circles. The Munich Security Conference showed that the key messages of the development co-operation community are not cutting through.
So the question remains: Can the community adapt its offer to resonate in a political-military context where security imperatives dominate? Can it state with clarity and impact why development matters, rather than simply how much it costs?
For more on how fragility analysis informs strategy, see the OECD States of Fragility 2025 report.
