Independent supreme audit institutions are a cornerstone of sound public governance, providing objective oversight of public finances, identifying weaknesses in government performance, and offering evidence-based recommendations to strengthen accountability and trust. Their effectiveness is particularly critical in contexts of low public trust, fiscal constraints, and growing demands for transparency and value for money. While formal legal frameworks define their mandates, the independence and impact of SAIs also depend on informal factors such as institutional relationships, professional norms, credibility, and interactions within the broader accountability ecosystem.
Strengthening the Independence of Supreme Audit Institutions
Looking at Informal Factors Beyond Legal Safeguards
Abstract
Together with other accountability actors, supreme audit institutions (SAIs) are a key pillar of sound public governance. SAIs can assess government actions objectively, identify weaknesses in the management of public finances and offer evidence‑based recommendations for improving the accountability and performance of public institutions and the governance system. Their role in providing independent oversight of how public resources are managed becomes even more pertinent in contexts of low public trust in institutions, rising intolerance to waste and abuse of public resources, and a tightening fiscal space, where limited funds heighten the need for rigorous accountability and prudent financial management (OECD, 2016[1]). Indeed, public trust in national governments, including in OECD countries, remains low. The 2024 OECD Trust Survey shows that only 39% of citizens express high or moderately high trust in their government, while 44% report low or no trust (OECD, 2024[2]). Citizens, civil society and other stakeholders can rely on SAIs’ assessments to understand whether government institutions are acting responsibly and delivering results.
However, the ability of SAIs to operate independently from external influence from the government, legislators or other interested parties, is a key determinant of whether oversight systems function effectively and whether the public will trust their SAI. The fundamental principle of independence was enshrined in two landmark instruments adopted by the International Organization of Supreme Audit Institutions (INTOSAI): the Lima Declaration of 1977 and the Mexico Declaration of 2007. The Lima Declaration established the core principles of independent public sector auditing, affirming that SAIs must be free from external influence to fulfil their mandate effectively. Building on this foundation, the Mexico Declaration translated these broad principles into eight concrete pillars of independence. While both declarations remain normatively important, the Mexico Declaration provides the more operational and measurable framework (Box 1.1). In addition, the relevance of SAI independence has been acknowledged by two different United Nations resolutions (A/RES/66/209 and A/RES/69/228).
The following principles of the Mexico Declaration are the primary reference standard for assessing SAI independence:
Principle 1. The existence of an appropriate and effective constitutional/statutory/legal framework and the de facto application provisions of this framework.
Principle 2. The independence of SAI heads and members of collegial institutions, including security of tenure and legal immunity in the normal discharge of their duties.
Principle 3. A sufficiently broad mandate and full discretion, in the discharge of SAI functions.
Principle 4. Unrestricted access to information.
Principle 5. The rights and obligation to report on their work.
Principle 6. The freedom to decide the content and timing of audit reports and to publish and disseminate them.
Principle 7. The existence of effective follow-up mechanisms on SAI recommendations.
Principle 8. Financial and managerial/administrative autonomy and the availability of appropriate human, material and monetary resources.
Source: (INTOSAI, 2007[3]).
Since the Mexico Declaration in 2007, the context has changed and contributed to growing pressures on independence. These pressures are shaped by a combination of political dynamics, institutional evolution and governance practices that vary across countries but reveal common underlying trends. In many contexts, shifting political environments, characterised by short-term incentives, polarisation and limited consensus, have created gaps between formal frameworks and emerging needs. At the same time, public discourse has become more focused on narratives than evidence, placing SAIs in a position where their mandates are subject to changing political interpretations. Together, these factors contribute to a more complex and potentially fragile environment for maintaining SAI independence.
Data from the World Bank and the INTOSAI Development Initiative (IDI) confirms that SAIs around the world face growing challenges to meet the independence criteria outlined in the Mexico Declaration. According to the World Bank’s 2021 SAI Independence Index, in most assessed countries, SAI budgets and financing were subject to approval by central government budgeting institutions, and only 22 of 118 countries fully met the criteria on staffing autonomy (World Bank, 2021[4]). The latest Global SAI Stocktaking Report (GSR), based on the INTOSAI Global SAI Survey covering 166 SAIs worldwide, provides further evidence (Box 1.2): at least 40% of SAIs reported major interference in the execution of their budgets, and only 44% of SAIs reported experiencing timely, unconstrained and free access to information necessary for the proper discharge of their statutory responsibilities (IDI, 2024[5]). This is a dramatic drop from the 70% who reported having full access to information in 2017.
Every three years, the IDI publishes the Global SAI Stocktaking Report (GSR), providing a system-wide assessment of the performance, capacities and enabling environment of SAIs across all INTOSAI regions. The GSR draws primarily the INTOSAI Global SAI Survey. Its purpose is to provide an evidence base on the state of SAIs worldwide, track performance trends over time, and highlight how global democratic and accountability developments shape SAI functioning. In 2023, the survey covered 166 SAIs worldwide.
Continued decline in SAI independence
For the third consecutive cycle, the GSR reports a global decline in SAI independence. The 2023 SAI Independence Index averages 73/100, representing a one‑point drop from 2020 among SAIs participating in both surveys. Declines are most notable in:
Principle 1 (Legal Framework): down from 68 to 66 points.
Principle 4 (Access to Information): further deterioration, with a shift from “mostly” to “limited” access in many SAIs.
Principle 8 (Financial and Administrative Autonomy): four‑point drop since 2020.
Rising interference in SAI operations, with interference by the executive as a growing concern
10% of SAI heads report undue interference in their work (2021-2023).
15% of SAIs report severe interference in selection of audit programmes – unchanged from 2020.
44% report interference in the SAI budget process, including budget cuts and release delays.
Legal protections remain insufficient: only 43% of SAIs can appeal interference to a Supreme Court or equivalent, although this is an improvement from the 39% in 2020.
Declining access to information
Only 46% of SAIs report full access, and many who had “mostly” adequate access in 2020 have moved to “limited” access.
Restrictions appear to be broadly distributed across regions. Approximately 20% of SAIs from ASOSAI (Asia), ARABOSAI (Arab countries), CAROSAI (Caribbean) and CREFIAF (francophone Africa) have reported facing access constraints (see Annex C).
Deterioration in financial and administrative autonomy
Only 20% of SAIs submit budgets directly to the legislature.
74% of SAIs must submit budgets via the Ministry of Finance.
Only 41% have full autonomy over budget execution once funds are allocated.
57% have full control over internal administrative management.
Shrinking space for public reporting: Freedom to publish reports has declined
The score for Principle 6 (Freedom to Publish) dropped two points since 2020.
14% of SAIs lack any freedom to publish.
Average publication rates decreased from 77% (2020) to 69% (2023).
Source: (IDI, 2024[5]).
These quantitative findings are reinforced by cases brought forward through the SAI Independence Rapid Advocacy Mechanism (SIRAM). The SIRAM was developed by IDI to help SAIs respond to immediate threats to, or breaches of, their independence. SIRAM is designed to identify, assess and mitigate risks to independence, drawing on INTOSAI’s global expertise and normative framework. Between 2018 and 2025, IDI opened 18 SIRAM cases, issuing four reports and seven statements of concern, highlighting emerging and acute risks to SAI independence (Figure 1.1).
Note: The INTOSAI (International Organization of Supreme Audit Institutions) is the global professional organisation that brings together supreme audit institutions (SAIs) from around the world. INTOSAI is structured into regional organisations that group member SAIs geographically. The INTOSAI regions are: AFROSAI (African Organisation of SAIs); ARABOSAI (Arab Organisation of SAIs); ASOSAI (Asian Organisation of SAIs); CAROSAI (Caribbean Organisation of SAIs); EUROSAI (European Organisation of SAIs); OLACEFS (Organisation of Latin American and Caribbean SAIs); PASAI (Pacific Association of SAIs). AFROSAI has sub-regional bodies, including AFROSAI-E (African Organisation of English-speaking SAIs) and CREFIAF (French-speaking SAIs).
Source: INTOSAI Development Initiative (IDI).
The evidence collected by IDI when analysing the SIRAM cases indicates that independence challenges stem not only from formal legal constraints but also reflect the existence of unwritten norms or implicit conventions that shape how the legislative and executive branches interact with SAIs. Formal factors shaping SAI independence include laws as well as regulations or standards (for example, the Mexico Declaration principles). They are codified in legal or quasi-legal documents, making them visible, transferable and enforceable. However, despite their prescriptive power, formal factors do not always dictate real-world behaviour. Rules may be ignored or bypassed, for example, if they conflict with political interests or if they are not actively enforced. Such informal factors refer to unwritten norms, expectations and behaviours that shape how power is exercised and decisions are made in practice and are enforced through informal sanctions (Wenzel, 2004[6]; Claridge, 2020[7]; Hodgson, 2025[8]; North, 1990[9]).
Thus, formal independence on paper may not always automatically translate into effective independence. The relationship between formal and informal norms can be dynamic. Informal norms that support independence, may sooner or later translate into formal laws and regulations to protect independence more sustainably. Conversely, informal norms that undermine independence could eventually be transcribed into legal reforms as well and weaken the legal protection.
Despite informal factors being likely to significantly influence the independence of SAIs, they are usually not at the centre of discussions around the issue. Therefore, in 2023, the OECD and the IDI initiated the Global Project on SAI independence (the Global Project) with the goal of providing a systematic review of the informal factors that shape independence, either undermining or strengthening it, in view of extracting lessons learnt and policy implications (Box 1.3 and Annex A).
Scope
The Global Project examines how informal factors influence the implementation of the INTOSAI Mexico Declaration principles on SAI independence. It analyses how informal norms and behaviours shape the application of the legal framework in practice, as well as how interactions between SAIs and other actors within the broader accountability ecosystem affect the exercise of independence. Grounded in diverse national contexts, the findings are intended to inform policies in both OECD and non-OECD countries, offering insights across different governance systems and SAI models (Annex B).
Objectives
Identify informal factors that enable or constrain SAI independence.
Highlight good practices that mitigate risks or strengthen independence.
Provide actionable recommendations for SAIs and other accountability actors.
Methodology
The Global Project draws on exploratory qualitative methods designed to capture attitudinal and perception-based data related to the informal factors affecting SAI independence. Methods include semi-structured interviews, multi-stakeholder group discussions and structured perception surveys (Annex A). The methods helped identify the informal factors that influence how SAIs operate in practice. Their relevance was assessed using the following criteria:
Whether informal factors appeared across different country contexts and SAI models or whether multiple stakeholders independently described the same phenomenon.
Whether the informal factor had an impact on the SAI’s ability to act in line with the independence principles set out in the Mexico Declaration of INTOSAI.
Limitations
Being primarily based on attitudinal and perception-based data, findings are influenced by country specific conditions and individual viewpoints. However, broad geographic and institutional model coverage strengthens the analysis by enabling cross-country comparison and the identification of patterns, thereby mitigating this limitation.
Source: OECD-IDI elaboration.
The evidence from the Global Project confirms that informal factors shape the operating environment of SAIs. While their independence may be formally recognised in legal frameworks, their de facto independence is influenced and threatened, for example, by the political climate, power dynamics between branches of government, societal expectations and how legal provisions are interpreted and applied in practice. The findings further emphasise the relevance of a SAI’s reputation. This reputation is determined by the SAI’s work and added value, but also by how citizens and stakeholders perceive its integrity, transparency and objectivity. At the same time, independence does not mean lack of accountability. To safeguard its reputation, a SAI must lead by example and abide by the highest standards of integrity, transparency and accountability themselves. The INTOSAI-P 20 sets out principles to guide SAIs in promoting transparency and accountability in their operations and communications, while respecting legal and confidentiality requirements.
These factors affect how SAIs carry out their legal mandates and influence their relationships with key stakeholders, including the executive, the legislative, the judiciary and other oversight actors such as prosecutors, anti-corruption agencies, internal audit bodies, civil society organisations and the media.
Survey data collected for the Global Project confirms the significance of informal factors in practice (see Annex A). SAIs report that informal factors play a role that is comparable to, and in some cases more influential than, formal legal provisions in shaping their independence. In relation to factors that interfere with the ability to operate independently, 43% of responses relate to informal factors, compared to 57% linked to legal factors (Figure 1.2, Panel A). Conversely, when considering factors that strengthen independence, informal factors account for most responses (58%), outweighing legal factors (42%) (Figure 1.2, Panel B). The relevance of informal factors has been confirmed from the perspective of external stakeholders as well: a survey of CSOs conducted by the World Justice Project for the Global Project via their network shows that legal (92%) and informal factors (90%) are considered to be equally relevant in explaining SAI independence.
Note: This data was analysed from a SAI questionnaire, based on responses collected from 50 SAIs (both OECD and non-OECD). Further information on the data collection is included in Annex A.
Source: OECD-IDI elaboration.
Based on these findings, this report provides concrete guidance and recommendations to SAIs and other actors on how to strengthen de facto independence of SAIs and therefore contribute to improving a country’s overall accountability system. Especially for informal factors, a more in-depth analysis of a given national context is necessary to understand power dynamics and relationships between the different actors, and to fully grasp cultural and legal dimensions in the public sector. SAIs are not insulated from their country context. They are affected by its weaknesses, benefit from its strengths and can also actively contribute to shaping change as drivers of broader system-wide improvement. Using this report as guidance for such a contextual analysis, and recognising that SAIs are part of a system, detailed reform options can be identified.
While the report focuses on SAIs, the findings have broader relevance for other independent public institutions facing similar pressures, including regulators, ombuds institutions, anti-corruption institutions and independent fiscal institutions (De Vrieze and Murphy, 2020[10]). Across these bodies, de facto independence is similarly shaped not only by formal legal frameworks, but also by informal dynamics such as institutional relationships, political incentives, professional norms and levels of trust, as well as by the quality of interactions within the wider accountability ecosystem. In many contexts, these informal factors are critical in determining how formal mandates are exercised in practice and whether institutional safeguards are effective. The analysis therefore offers transferable insights on how independence is enabled or constrained within complex governance systems, particularly where institutions operate in politically sensitive environments. More broadly, it highlights the importance of viewing independence as a system outcome rather than an institutional attribute, with implications for how resilience is built across the wider public sector. The report therefore offers insights for strengthening institutional resilience within the public governance system as a whole.
The report’s findings and recommendations are organised around the core insights of the Global Project. Chapter 1 outlines how SAIs function within an institutional system that extends beyond what is formally defined in legal frameworks and is shaped in part by informal factors that influence their impact, strengths and opportunities. Chapter 2 provides recommendations directed to different actors within the public accountability system, stressing their role in safeguarding and promoting SAI independence for the benefit of all. On the other hand, the public trust placed into SAIs, reflecting the SAI’s reputation, acts as a protective element for its independence and also enables them to effectively fulfil their role as active agents in the accountability system. Chapter 3 thus provides guidance on how SAIs can work on strengthening the trust of stakeholders in their work.
References
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