Over time, the stock of regulation across countries has continued to expand, leading to a rise in regulatory burdens and complexity. This introductory chapter puts this regulatory expansion into the wider context of a fast-changing policy landscape, where governments are seeking to solve a set of complex challenges. It highlights evidence on the negative economic impacts of increasing regulatory burdens. It also acknowledges that established rulemaking practices and institutions have not been effective enough in keeping burdens in check, placing regulatory simplification and burden reduction at the top of the contemporary political agenda.
Smart Regulations, Strong Business
Enabling Growth and Societal Protection in a Fast‑Changing World
Abstract
Policymaking requires leaders to balance competing priorities and manage trade-offs, as they define how governments will – or will not – intervene in the economy or society to influence outcomes. They dispose of a set of tools to achieve their goals, including spending in priority services, sectors or regions, taxing certain activities or actors, or promulgating rules through laws, regulations, or any other binding legal requirements that seek to shape behaviours to fulfil public policy objectives. For example, traffic rules aim to reduce accidents and fluidify the flow of vehicles; licence or permit requirements aim to manage hazardous activities that could generate harm; and caps or bans on pollution or specific chemicals aim to protect public health and the environment.
Like all public policy tools, the process of regulation should be carefully designed with democratic guardrails and quality processes that guarantee regulation is developed and implemented in the public interest. Sound regulatory frameworks, based on good practices in design and implementation, support well-functioning markets by providing clarity and predictability, and enable governments to protect public health, safety and the environment. The challenge for governments is how to ensure regulation is of high quality and delivers on its intended outcomes.
Evidence suggests that the regulatory stock has expanded steadily over time in response to a number of developments (OECD, 2020[1]), such as the increasing complexity and interconnectedness of today’s world and associated policy challenges at a fast pace. In particular, governments use regulation to manage the transformational changes brought by rapid technological advances, growing environmental concerns and public expectations for protections. While practices have been adopted to support proportionate high-quality regulation across countries, evidence links the growing regulatory stock to adverse economic outcomes such as weaker productivity growth and economic dynamism (OECD, 2025[2]).
Achieving well-intentioned policy goals and legitimate societal objectives whilst managing the risks of growing regulatory burdens requires careful balancing. This is particularly challenging in a rapidly changing social and technological environment. In the context described above, regulatory simplification and burden reduction have gained centre stage on many government and international policy agendas. This report discusses these trends and makes the case for well-planned and impactful simplification and burden reduction, supported by a renewal of regulatory governance as a whole.
The world – and context for rulemaking – has changed dramatically. Established rulemaking institutions and procedures are struggling to deal with the increased pace, complexity and interconnectedness of policy challenges. Policies and their outcomes are increasingly interconnected in a world where innovation straddles traditional sectors, value chains are integrated, and in some areas market power is concentrated in a few global players. Objectives like public health, economic resilience, financial stability or environmental protection are interdependent and cannot be fully achieved within the confines of individual jurisdictions or through sectoral policies. This has made it more difficult to assign responsibility and accountability for outcomes. Moreover, the uncertainty and pace of many market developments make it hard for policymakers to manage risks and effectively assess, monitor and respond to emerging issues. Finally, the definition of common goals and targets – and pathways to achieving them – is under stress in a weakened multilateral system.
At the same time, evidence shows that public expectations for protections and government reactivity are high. Citizens across countries expect their governments to step up to solve major societal challenges that involve trade-offs but doubt their capacity to do so effectively. For instance, according to the OECD survey on the drivers of trust in public institutions only four in ten people (41%) find it likely that their national government would adequately regulate new technologies and just over one in three believe governments can adequately balance the needs of different generations (OECD, 2024[3]). Citizens also demand more involvement in these pivotal decisions that have far-reaching impacts across the society, but a majority of respondents in OECD countries do not believe that their political system allows people to have a say in what the government does. Both the actual capacity on governments to weigh on complex and long term challenges and the sense of citizens having a voice on those decisions are the strongest drivers of trust in national government today according to the OECD Trust Survey (2024[3]).
Pressure from the public to act on fast changing policy matters is one driver that has pushed governments to turn to regulation as a primary tool to address the complex technological, environmental and societal challenges they are facing. The result has been an expansion of regulatory frameworks that are more complex, not always coherent, layered, and resource-intensive to enforce and comply with, risking negative impacts on competitiveness, business dynamism and productivity.
In a challenging economic outlook, evidence points to a global slowdown in productivity, driven in part by declining economic dynamism. This is reflected in fewer new and young firms, whose share in employment has fallen by 6 percentage points in selected OECD countries since 2004. A growing regulatory environment diverting limited resources away from more productive activities and creating fixed costs that disproportionately penalise new and small firms is seen as one of the drivers underpinning this (OECD, 2025[2]).
Statistical evidence suggests that regulation has significantly expanded across countries. The increase in length or aggregate number of regulations are not a perfect proxy for measuring regulatory burden or proportionality, but this does suggest that today businesses on average have more rules to comply with than in the past. For instance, in the European Union, the number of Commission legislative proposals has increased from 374 in the 1999-2004 to 431 in 2019-2024, while the average length of each proposal has almost doubled (Marcus, 2024[4]). In the United States, the number of pages in the Code of Federal Regulations increased by 3.5% per year from 1949 to 2005 (Dawson and Seater, 2013[5]); restrictive words (like “shall” or “must”) in the Code of Federal Regulations have also increased by around 2% per annum over the past 50 years: 400 thousand restrictive words were present in 1970 against more than 1 million recently (QuantGov, 2025[6]). In Australia, the number of restrictive terms in primary legislation has increased by 10% per year since 1977 (Wild and Hussey, 2019[7]) and studies show how amendments made from 2011 to 2021 have led the total word count to increase by 248%.
Accordingly, estimates show that the real resources allocated to regulatory compliance activities by businesses are both substantial and rising, and may represent today more than 4% of all wages and 3% of all employment in the economy across OECD countries (Andrews, Turban and Tyros, 2026[8]). This is also supported by reports on the increased recruitment of compliance-related staff (Mandala, 2025[9]), (Diegmann and Kubis, 2025[10]). This risks diverting real labour and managerial resources away from innovation, investment and other productive activities, thereby weighing on productivity growth. In addition, by increasing the fixed costs of business operations, regulatory accumulation weighs disproportionately on the prospects of start-ups and potential market entrants, thereby reducing business dynamism and weakening the reallocation mechanisms through which productivity growth typically occurs: average increases in resources devoted to complying with regulation over a five-year period are associated with a 0.18% decline in labour productivity and a 0.16 percentage point reduction in the share of workers employed in young firms.
Country-level estimates point to similar patterns. In Canada, a 2.1% annual increase in federal regulatory requirements has been associated with a 1.7 percentage point decline in GDP growth and a 1.3 percentage point decline in employment growth over the same time period (Gu, 2025[11]). Survey-based evidence from seven European countries likewise suggests that administrative regulations can distort investment decisions and reduce GDP by around 0.8% (Pellegrino and Zheng, 2023[12]). Similarly, recent analysis focusing on Spain have shown that the negative impacts of higher regulation is concentrated in smaller firms and more recent entrants (Mora-Sanguinetti et al., 2024[13]).This raises the fundamental question: can governments achieve the same economic and social benefits of regulation whilst reducing unnecessary administrative and compliance burdens?
Over the years, policymakers have developed practices and institutions of regulatory governance to minimise costs whilst ensuring effectiveness of regulation. Well-implemented good regulatory practices (GRP) form the backbone of evidence-informed decision making and good governance. These range from ex ante regulatory impact assessment and stakeholder engagement practices to more modern approaches around agility and regulatory experimentation, with the OECD in a leading role for developing recommendations and practical guidance for governments. Box 1.1 summarises the trajectory of these tools and their scope over the last four decades.
Since the early 1980s, the conception and implementation of Good Regulatory Practice (GRP), later reframed as the Better Regulation agenda, has undergone a profound transformation. Initially rooted in deregulation and market liberalisation, this area of public governance has gradually evolved into a sophisticated governance framework oriented toward improving regulatory design and delivery, reducing burdens, enhancing transparency, and fostering adaptability in complex, fast‑changing environments.
1980s: Privatisation and the emergence of regulatory review tools
The origins of GRP lie in the early privatisation and liberalisation reforms of the US and UK, which sought to dismantle state-owned monopolies in sectors such as energy, transport, and telecommunications through privatisation. Reforms were driven by supply-side economic policy aiming to tackle stagnation and increasing levels of public debt. Technological progress, further enabled the unbundling of infrastructure and introduction of competition in previously monopolistic industries.
The privatisation of key industries and sectors created the need for new regulatory frameworks to oversee markets that retained natural monopoly characteristics. Independent sectoral regulators were established to protect consumers, ensure quality of services and create the conditions for effective competition in network industries. In this context, the first systematic methods for assessing regulatory impacts emerged. The United States institutionalised regulatory impact assessments (RIA) in 1981, requiring cost-benefit analysis for major regulations. Early administrative burden reduction efforts also appeared, including to streamline how regulations are implemented through such as one-stop business licensing services. At this stage, GRP largely focused on reducing regulatory interventions, lowering compliance costs, and introducing analytical tools to justify regulatory choices.
1990s: Diffusion of liberalisation and foundations of modern regulatory governance
In the 1990s, regulatory review tools evolved to reflect market integration and trade liberalisation. With the opening of markets, including under the World Trade Organisation or the creation of the European Single Market, governments progressively introduced stronger, more transparent regulatory frameworks to manage competition, protect consumers, and address market failures.
This marked a conceptual shift: GRP moved from removing regulations to improving them and countries adopted more systematic regulatory scrutiny, and broadened programmes to simplify rules and eliminate barriers to competition. The 1990s also marked a shift in the institutional landscape, with many countries creating independent regulators to manage key sectors of the economy. Despite momentum, reforms were often fragmented, reactive, and hampered by weak evaluation tools, limited inter‑agency co-ordination, and insufficient enforcement capacity.
2000s: Consolidation of Better Regulation and quantification of burdens
The 2000s saw the formalisation and institutionalisation of the Better Regulation agenda across OECD countries. Focus shifted from sectoral deregulation to improving regulatory design and administrative efficiency across the economy. One of the most transformative developments was the introduction of the Standard Cost Model (SCM) in the Netherlands (2003), enabling quantitative measurement of administrative burdens. The introduction of the SCM triggered a wave of burden reduction programmes with explicit quantitative targets, notably the EU’s 25% reduction goal (2007-2012). Better Regulation became more politically appealing because administrative simplification did not challenge policy objectives, only the procedures surrounding them. Tools to enhance design and implementation of regulation such as RIA, simplification units, “once only” portals, regulatory offsetting (i.e. one-in, x-out) and digital one-stop shops became more mainstream. GRP thus evolved into a structured approach to ex ante assessment, procedural streamlining, and embedding simplification within digital government strategies.
2010s: Restoring trust and strengthening regulatory governance
After the 2007/08 global financial crisis exposed major regulatory failures, countries reinforced their regulatory systems, giving GRP a renewed legitimacy as a means to rebuild trust. This notably led to the adoption of the OECD Recommendation on Regulatory Policy in Governance in 2012, representing the first international soft-law instrument treating regulatory quality as a whole-of-government endeavour. By 2015, nearly all OECD members had formal regulatory policies, oversight bodies, and mandatory RIA and consultation requirements.
“Red tape” reduction remained a core political theme, illustrated by initiatives such as the UK Red Tape Challenge, Canada’s Red Tape Reduction Commission, and the EU’s REFIT programme and “fitness checks.”
In the late 2010s, the agenda diversified and became more sophisticated. Countries reinforced stakeholder engagement and RIA quality and began experimenting with approaches like behavioural insights, regulatory sandboxes, and one-in, one-out rules. Governments also adopted life-event approaches to identify burdens from the user’s perspective.
Early 2020s: Crisis response and agility
The Covid-19 pandemic, starting in 2020, put regulatory systems across the globe to the test. Governments introduced emergency regulatory frameworks, including fast-tracked approvals, simplified rules and real-time adaptation to rapidly evolving data, and waived or suspended many regulatory requirements and administrative procedures, such as permit registrations. The crisis highlighted the importance of risk-based approaches and proportionality to the design and delivery of regulation, emphasising agility and adaptability. The global recession and surge in inflation that followed the pandemic focused governments’ attention again on eliminating unnecessarily burdensome regulations to support economic recovery.
Despite decades of experience and substantial investment, governments have not yet fully leveraged regulatory governance and its tools to keep regulatory burdens in check. Over the years, countries have developed sophisticated frameworks, methodologies and institutions to manage the flow of new regulation, e.g. through ex ante impact assessment and stakeholder consultation. Whilst regulatory governance tools are designed to inform decisions rather than to pre-empt them, they can play a crucial role in avoiding and reducing unnecessary burdens. However, progress towards achieving best practice is stagnating (OECD, 2025[24]) and evidence suggests tools are being implemented procedurally and too late to genuinely inform decisions, with both engagement and impact assessment typically taking place on the basis of a preferred option or draft regulation. As a result, theoretically sound tools like impact assessment and stakeholder consultation often tend to turn into bureaucratic exercises that drain resources and miss their potential to improve outcomes. Critically, this leaves the risk of a “regulatory reflex” to respond to arising policy issues unchecked, leading to, decisions that can be ill-informed, ineffective and burdensome.
Progress in managing the existing stock of regulations to keep it fit for purpose and nimble remains yet more elusive. Despite investment in methodologies, for instance through adoption of guidance and training, systematic requirements to undertake ex post evaluations exist in fewer than one-third of OECD members (OECD, 2025[24]). In addition, countries are only starting to adopt more novel iterative and adaptive approaches to rulemaking as advocated in the OECD Recommendation on Agile Regulatory Governance (2021[25]). As a result, policymakers remain largely at risk of obsolete “regulate-and-forget” approaches, risking increasingly outdated and inflated rulebooks that fail to achieve their objectives and create excessive burdens.
In the face of rising regulatory burdens and a slow-down of productivity growth across economies, regulatory simplification has regained centre stage and political momentum. Announcements or electoral promises by political leaders regularly underscore the ambitions to get a grip on regulatory costs and complexity, raising expectations amongst stakeholders and the general public alike.
A wide variety of different terms and approaches are being used in the context of regulatory simplification and burden reduction, which is used as an umbrella term for the purpose of this report. They include the following (see also Annex A for a typology of different approaches and tools):
Regulatory rationalisation to eliminate regulations that have become outdated or redundant while preserving the core policy objectives;
Administrative simplification (or “red tape” reduction) to identify and eliminate unnecessary complexities, redundancies, inconsistencies and contradictions in administrative procedures;
Regulatory stock review and improvement to ensure that existing regulations are fit for purpose, achieve their intended objectives effectively and minimise unintended consequences; and
Deregulation through the complete or partial removal of regulations to improve economic performance, encapsulating a change in policy direction.
These terms are often used interchangeably, creating the risk of misconceptions amongst stakeholders and the general public about the objectives of simplification measures and the trade-offs involved. Governments are struggling to meet the varying, and sometimes, competing expectations that flow from this ambiguity. As a result, they might see themselves accused of not delivering on commitments to enhance the business environment and stimulate investment and growth or watering down regulatory protections, undermining public value.
At the heart of the current political debate around simplification is the question of how to maximise public value and outcomes while minimising costs and complexity. The considerations and decisions to determine this “sweet spot” are highly context-specific: the expectation for government action in creating public value, the acceptance of costs incurred for the greater good, or the level of risk appetite vary between (and within) countries and cultures. The stylised model in Figure 1.1 aims to illustrate that, despite these differences, the extremes of extremely limited regulatory frameworks or overly complex and prohibitive regulatory frameworks are generally not desirable. For instance, a complete absence of traffic rules would risk leading to chaos on roads and lead to more accidents harming people; too many or overly complex rules would slow down the traffic and lead to congestion.
Source: Authors’ elaboration.
This report presents new emerging evidence from surveys conducted with governments and business organisations (see Box 1.2 for evidence base and limitations) to provide an indication of their views on the current challenges around regulatory burdens and recent efforts to simplify regulatory frameworks. The report also offers policy considerations to help governments achieve lasting burden reduction results. The following chapters are structured as follows:
Chapter 2 will highlight where regulatory burdens are felt most acutely and what the specific drivers and pain points are. Importantly, it will acknowledge that, government and business organisations views on the scale of the challenge and specific priority areas are not fully consistent, potentially pointing to “blind spots” resulting from knowledge gaps or structural challenges that hold back the effectiveness of simplification measures.
Chapter 3 will present evidence on the goals, tools, and methods that characterise the current wave of simplification initiatives. In analysing the challenges governments report with current initiatives, it will emphasise the need to learn lessons from the past to avoid repeating ineffective patterns and falling short of expectations.
Finally, Chapter 4 will argue that, to achieve lasting impact, policymakers need to move from treating the symptoms to understanding and tackling the underlying root causes of regulatory burdens and complexity. Ensuring effectiveness and efficiency, simplification needs to be embedded in a systemic renewal of regulatory governance to 1) simplify existing rules with a focus on outcomes, 2) streamline processes and procedures and 3) future-proof rulemaking for lasting impact.
Evidence base
The analysis in this report is largely based on the OECD Simplifying for Success (S4S) surveys, which were conducted between July and September 2025. Responses are shown as aggregates, i.e. not on a country-by-country basis.
Data for government respondents reflects the aggregated responses from 28 OECD Member countries (Austria, Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica, Czechia, Denmark, Estonia, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Iceland, Israel, Italy, Korea, Latvia, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Netherlands, New Zealand, Poland, Portugal, Slovak Republic, Slovenia, Spain, Switzerland, Türkiye, and the United Kingdom), 6 Accession countries (Brazil, Bulgaria, Croatia, Peru, Romania, and Thailand) and the European Union (EU).
Data for business organisation respondents reflects the aggregated responses from business and employers’ organisations that are national member and observer organisations of Business at OECD (BIAC), across 27 OECD Member countries (Australia, Austria, Czechia, Denmark, Estonia, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Iceland, Ireland, Israel, Italy, Japan, Lithuania, Mexico, Netherlands, New Zealand, Poland, Portugal, Slovak Republic, Slovenia, Sweden, Switzerland, Türkiye, and the United States) and 4 Accession countries (Argentina, Bulgaria, Romania, and Thailand). Two responses were received for Germany and Türkiye. Where the two responses diverge, they are not included in the aggregated data; where they converge, they are counted as representing one answer. The S4S survey to business organisations was implemented in collaboration with BIAC.
This report also draws from data gathered through the OECD Indicators of Regulatory Policy and Governance (iREG) Survey. The 2024 iREG Survey is based on responses from all 38 OECD Members and the EU. More information on the iREG Survey scope and methodology is set out in the Reader’s Guide of the Regulatory Policy Outlook 2025.
Limitations
The data gathered through the S4S surveys is largely based on perceptions by business organisations and government respondents. The ensuing analysis therefore offers emerging evidence of current views on regulatory burdens but does not constitute objective evidence in form of comparable measurements of regulatory costs. By definition, perception-based responses and the resulting data are influenced by the subjective judgement of respondents. They also represent a “snapshot” capturing views at a specific point in time and can therefore be influenced by issues that are particularly topical at the moment.
The data collected also needs to be understood and interpreted based on the organisational background of respondents: for governments, responses were sought from central government authorities and therefore do not exhaustively account for variations at sub-national levels (which may have significant regulatory competencies depending on the jurisdiction); for business organisations, responses from Business at OECD national member and observer organisations will be informed by the scope of their own respective membership and focus areas. As such, their answers cannot reflect the varying views businesses may have on regulation depending on their size, sector or type. Finally, the S4S surveys’ use of multiple-choice answers in some of the questions means that results have to be read in relation to each other rather than in absolute terms.
Source: OECD 2025 S4S Surveys; (OECD, 2025[24]).
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