This chapter analyses public perceptions of government decision making on complex, uncertain and long‑term policy challenges, drawing on evidence from the 2025 OECD Survey on Drivers of Trust in Public Institutions. It focuses on how people assess governments’ capacity to manage trade‑offs, use evidence, act with integrity, and respond to public and stakeholder input in contexts where outcomes are uncertain and benefits may only materialise over time. Overall, the chapter illustrates how uncertainty, long-time horizons and contested interests make complex policy making particularly vulnerable to scepticism, while underscoring that improvements in evidence use, responsiveness, integrity and collaboration can meaningfully contribute to strengthening trust in public institutions.
OECD Survey on Drivers of Trust in Public Institutions 2026 Results
Abstract
People’s confidence in their government’s ability to protect them during large-scale emergencies is generally larger than their confidence that their government can tackle long-term or highly complex issues. While 51% across the OECD find it likely that government institutions are ready to protect lives in large-scale emergencies, only 34% are confident that government adequately balances between the interests of current and future generations – a challenging issue with long-term trade-offs.
Across the OECD, 42% find it likely that government decisions are evidence-informed, and 40% feel that public services adapt to changing societal needs. The two perceptions are strongly correlated at the country and individual level, but their relationship with trust varies according to different institutions: While positive assessments of evidence-informed decision making are strongly associated with trust in the national government and moderately associated with trust in other institutions, greater confidence that public services adapt to changing long-term needs is only associated with greater trust in the national civil service.
Close to one in four people (39%) across the OECD, and more than one third across the participating OECD accession countries, find it likely that a policy would be changed if a majority of people are against it, while a similar share (41%) find it unlikely a policy would be changed. However, assessments of responsiveness are on the rise across the countries that participated in the OECD Trust Survey previously.
Only 37% across the OECD find it likely that their government is able to co-operate with key stakeholders, such as private sector organisations and trade unions, to better tackle long-term challenges. This is an important driver of trust in the national government.
A modest share believe in the integrity of individual politicians and of government. Nevertheless, the small decline from 2021 to 2023 in the share who say it is not likely a politician would provide a political favour in return for a lucrative private-sector job has been reversed between 2023 and 2025. The share who find it likely that government withstands lobbying on a policy that could be against the public interest has likewise slightly increased since 2023.
Providing high-quality essential services that meet people’s needs, and ensuring that people perceive day-to-day interactions with public institutions positively, presents multiple challenges for public institutions, as illustrated in Chapter 3. Yet policy design and implementation in these areas largely address challenges that have been ongoing for years and are relatively well-understood.
The same cannot be said for many other thorny, complex and future-facing policy issues, including those which require sacrifices today for what may be diffuse, long-term outcomes. In many policy areas, it is difficult to even project how decisions and transitions will play out and what future needs will be. In these situations, policymakers make decisions with incomplete information and future uncertainties. At the same time, the faster changing technological and socio-economic environment as well as the growing complexity of policy issues, including cross border dimensions, are making policymaking more complex.
Yet it is precisely perceptions of the outcomes and processes of government decision making on complex policy issues that have the greatest association with trust in national government (see Chapter 1) and legislature (see Chapter 7). Even trust in local government and the national civil service are significantly associated with many perception indicators on complex decision making in a manner that is roughly on par with the importance of perceptions of day-to-day interactions with public institutions (see Chapter 1).
As can be seen in this chapter, when there is greater uncertainty between different objectives and interests, people are less confident that long-term and complex policy goals can be achieved. At least part of this lower optimism is related to limited faith that decisions are informed by evidence, responsive to inputs from the general population and concerned stakeholders, and taken with the public rather than private interests in mind. Nevertheless, compared to 2023, there has been a small rise in the proportion of people who hold positive views of the integrity and responsiveness of governmental decision making.
People’s confidence in their government’s ability to plan for and address policy challenges varies with their associated complexity and time horizon. People’s confidence in the ability of institutions to protect them during large scale emergencies is generally larger than their confidence in government regulating new technologies, supporting affected people during economic crises, reducing greenhouse gas (GhG) emissions and ensure that the interests of current and future generations are adequately taken into account (Figure 4.1). Regression results show that positive views on intergenerational equity are more strongly related to trust in the national government and legislature than perceptions of achieving other policy objectives are (Chapter 1).
Share of population reporting different levels of confidence in achieving stated policy objective, OECD
Note: The figure presents the unweighted OECD averages of the weighted OECD country averages for responses to the following questions: (1) “If there was a large scale emergency, how likely do you think it is that government institutions would be ready to protect people’s lives?”, (2) “If new technologies (for example artificial intelligence) became available, how likely do you think it is that the national government will regulate them appropriately to help businesses and citizens use them responsibly?”, (3) “In the event of an economic crisis, how likely do you think it is that the federal/central/national government would provide appropriate support to affected people?”, (4) “On a scale of 0 to 10, how confident are you that [COUNTRY] will succeed in reducing GhG emissions in the next ten years?” and (5) “On a scale of 0 to 10, how confident are you that the national government adequately balances the interests of current and future generations?”. The “likely/confident” proportion is the aggregation of responses from 6-10 on the scale; “neutral” is equal to a response of 5; “unlikely/not confident” is the aggregation of responses from 1-4; and “don't know” was a separate answer choice.
Source: OECD Survey on Drivers of Trust in Public Institutions 2025.
4.2.1. People generally feel government will better protect them from large-scale emergencies than economic crises
Ensuring that people feel secure and stable is generally considered among the core functions of modern states. Individuals in OECD countries generally feel more at ease about the question of physical security, at least within the context of large-scale emergencies that have the potential to take people’s lives, than they are about the ability of government to maintain their economic stability.
In 2025, a majority (51%) across the OECD find it likely that government institutions are ready to protect people’s lives in a large-scale emergency (Figure 4.2). The proportion exceeds 50% in 18 of the 33 participating OECD countries, and rises above 75% in Finland. In contrast, in Croatia – the participating OECD accession candidate country where emergency preparedness is seen most positively – 42% find it likely that government institutions are prepared in this way. The average share across a selected sample of OECD countries has remained stable, changing by less than 1 percentage point, between 2023 and 2025.
At 41%, the proportion of the OECD population that believe government will provide appropriate support to affected people during an economic crisis is 10 percentage points lower than the proportion who believe in the emergency preparedness of institutions. In the European OECD accession candidate countries,1 the average share is equal to 29%. The pattern of higher confidence in disaster preparedness than in adequate support during economic crises applies in every single one of the surveyed OECD and OECD Accession countries with available data.
This finding is reinforced by evidence from the 2024 OECD Risks that Matter Survey (RTM), a population survey of 27 countries covering perceptions of economic risks and social protection. RTM finds that only slightly more than one third of the population believe they can count on government to get them through financial trouble (OECD, 2025[1]). The survey also reveals solid support for government intervention on economic security, finding consistently across survey waves since 2018 that around 70% of people want their government to do more to ensure economic security.
Share of population who finds it likely that government institutions can protect people’s lives in a large-scale emergency and that it provides appropriate support to affected people during an economic crisis, 2025
Note: The figure presents the weighted share of ‘likely’ responses to the questions: “If there was a large scale emergency, how likely do you think it is that government institutions would be ready to protect people’s lives?” and “In the event of an economic crisis, how likely do you think it is that the federal/central/national government would provide appropriate support to affected people?”. The “likely” proportion is the aggregation of responses from 6-10 on the 0-10 scale. “OECD” presents the unweighted average of weighted OECD country averages.
Source: OECD Survey on Drivers of Trust in Public Institutions 2025.
People with above-average confidence in receiving adequate government support during an economic crisis are 3.1 percentage points more likely to place high or moderately high trust in the national government, and 1.3 percentage points more likely to trust the national legislature. There is no relationship between perceptions of this indicator and trust in local government or the civil service. In contrast, positive perceptions of emergency preparedness have a smaller but more uniform association with trust in public institutions: Individuals who find it particularly likely that government institutions are able to protect people’s lives are 1.6-2.3 percentage points more likely to trust the studied institutions spanning the national civil service, government and legislature as well as local government (see Chapters 1 and 7).
4.2.2. Fewer people are confident in policymaking on emerging and long-term issues
Ensuring disaster prevention and protection, as well as income support during economic crises, is by no means easy and is usually expensive. Yet other issues involve high degrees of uncertainty, as well as important trade-offs between different policy objectives. When considering these issues, only a minority has confidence in government.
Fewer than four in ten people across the OECD are confident that their country can reduce GhG emissions and that their government adequately balances the interests of current and future generations. The share who find it likely that government appropriately regulates new technologies to help people and businesses use them responsibly is slightly higher, at 42% (Figure 4.1).
On average across the OECD, the share who are confident that their country will succeed in reducing GhG emissions over the coming decade (38%) is nearly identical to the share who are not confident (37%) (Figure 4.1). In Finland and Switzerland, as well as in Brazil, a majority are confident (Figure 4.3). In most countries there are slightly more people who find it likely that the country will reduce GhG emissions than adequately balance between intergenerational interests. Australia, Estonia and Mexico are exceptions to this pattern, with more people having confidence that government can balance intergenerational interests. People’s perspectives on GhG emission reductions have been variable over time: In 2021, across the 18 OECD countries with available information for all three survey waves, 36% were confident, rising to 40% in 2023 and 37% in 2025. This variation is larger than observed for most public governance perceptions measured through the OECD Trust Survey.
Share of population confident that the country will reduce GhG emissions in the coming decade and that government manages to adequately balance the interests of current and future generations, 2025
Note: The figure presents the weighted share of ‘likely’ responses to the questions: “On a scale of 0 to 10, how confident are you that [COUNTRY] will succeed in reducing GhG emissions in the next ten years?” and “On a scale of 0 to 10, how confident are you that the national government adequately balances the interests of current and future generations?”. The “confident” proportion is the aggregation of responses from 6-10 on the 0-10 scale. “OECD” presents the unweighted average of weighted OECD country averages.
Source: OECD Survey on Drivers of Trust in Public Institutions 2025.
Few people are confident that their government balances well the interests of current and future generations in decision making: Only about one third of people across the OECD (34%) are confident (Figure 4.3), compared to 44% who are not confident (Figure 4.1). In the participating OECD accession countries, the same pattern occurs, with a larger gap among the European accession countries than in the Latin American ones. Across the 29 OECD countries that participated in the 2023 and 2025 Trust Survey, the share who are confident has declined from 38% to 35%.2
There is no straightforward answer to how the interests of current young and older people (and generations that are not yet born) should be weighed against each other in situations where interests may be in conflict, and how a given policy or programme is likely to affect different generations. As a first step, it is useful for policymakers to have the simple awareness that this is a relevant factor for trust in public institutions: individuals who are especially confident that policies balance intergenerational interests well are 4.2 percentage points more likely to place high or moderately high trust in the national government, making this the second most important driver of trust. They are also 2.6 percentage points more likely to trust the legislature than otherwise similar individuals. Going a step further than mere awareness of this relationship, analysing a prospective policy using a tool like the Intergenerational Fairness Policy Assessment can support decision makers in thinking about effects on different generations (OECD, 2021[2]).
Individuals evaluate policies and adjust their views on whether public institutions are trustworthy not only on the outcomes of these policies, but also on the process by which outcomes are reached. Do people believe that policymakers take into account the preferences of the population and that they are they guided by the public good, or do they instead view decisions to be overly influenced by special – or even policymakers’ own – interests? Do they think it is likely or unlikely that government decisions are guided by the best available evidence, and that draw on the expertise of stakeholders?
A look at the relevant indicators in the OECD Trust Survey shows that the share of people across the OECD who have a positive view of these aspects of decision making on complex policy issues is around four in ten people or below. Yet several of these perceptions, chief among them people’s assessment of whether government decisions are evidence-informed, are strongly related to trust. The combination of relatively negative current views on these process-oriented perception indicators and relatively high association with trust in particular in the national government make these prone for policy actions to increase trust.
4.3.1. Policymaking is not always perceived as responsive to the best available evidence nor as adaptive to changes in society’s needs
Results from the 2025 OECD Trust Survey suggest that more than a third of people across the OECD have doubts that policy decisions are evidence-informed and anticipate changing needs.
Across the OECD, 42% find it likely that decisions are evidence-informed (Figure 4.4), compared to 37% who find it unlikely. Among the participating OECD accession countries, Brazil is the only country where equal shares find it likely or unlikely. In the remaining four accession countries, the share who find it unlikely is substantially larger.
The share who feel governments make evidence-informed decisions has remained constant across the 29 OECD countries part of the 2023 and 2025 OECD Trust Survey.3 Nevertheless, the perception in some individual countries underwent important changes. For example, in Korea, the share who find it likely that decisions are evidence-informed increased by eleven percentage points from 2023 to 2025.
At the country level, the proportion of the population who believe governments make use of relevant evidence and who find it likely that public services adapt to changing societal needs – 40% on average across the OECD - are highly correlated (with an R2 of 0.6 and a correlation coefficient of 0.77) (Figure 4.4). This strong correlation even exists at the individual level, even though it is smaller.
These two perceptions interact differently with trust in public institutions: Positive perceptions of evidence-informed decision making are associated with a 6.0 percentage point increased likelihood of having high or moderately high trust in national government, but also with a 2.2-3.5 increased likelihood of trusting legislatures, the civil service and local government. In contrast, believing more confidently that public services adapt to changing long-term needs is only associated with placing increased trust in the national civil service,4 and the average marginal effect is only equal to 1.6 percentage points.
Share of population who find it likely that government makes decisions based on the best available evidence (x-axis) and that government adapts public services to changing societal needs (y-axis), 2025
Note: The figure shows the weighted shares of “likely” responses to the questions “If the national government takes a decision, how likely do you think it is that it will draw on the best available evidence, research, and statistical data?” and “If society’s needs change, how likely do you think it is that public services would adapt adequately to meet these needs?”. The “likely” proportion is the aggregation of responses from 6-10 on the 0-10 scale. “OECD” presents the unweighted average of weighted OECD country averages. Points shown in light blue depict accession candidate countries, which are not included in the OECD average nor affect the regression line.
Source: OECD Survey on Drivers of Trust in Public Institutions 2025.
Many governments are strengthening their capacity for incorporating varied sources of evidence in decision making and ensure that public services keep adapting to changing needs. To effectively increase the use of evidence in policymaking, a systematic approach has to ensure that the right evidence is available at the right time – the supply side – and that decision makers are incentivised to access and use this evidence – the demand side (OECD/European Commission, 2025[3]). This is not always the case. For instance, the OECD’s 2024 Serving Citizens’ survey finds that while 23 of 31 (74%) reporting countries collect data related to performance targets, only 16 of 31 (51%) actually incorporate these data into their decision-making processes (OECD, forthcoming[4]).
4.3.2. Few view policymakers as receptive to criticism of a policy or capable of co-operating with key stakeholders in solving important policy challenges
Opinions regarding whether policies are likely to be informed by co-operations with other major stakeholders and responsive to majority preferences are also evenly split.
Close to four in ten people (39%) across the OECD and more than one third across the participating OECD accession countries find it likely that a policy would be changed if a majority of people are against it, while a similar share (41%) find it unlikely (Figure 4.5). The proportion who find it likely that policy would be adapted to reflect public feedback is close to or above 50% in Australia, Canada, Finland, Korea, Mexico and Switzerland, as well as in Brazil. Among the sub-set of 17 countries with available information for all three years, in 2025, the share of people who do has increased by 2 percentage points relative to 2021 and 3 percentage points relative to 2023. In comparison to 2023, the share of the population who find it likely has risen by more than 10 percentage points in Iceland, Korea and the United Kingdom.
Share of population who find it likely or unlikely that government would change a national policy if over half of the people expressed a view against it, 2025, and evolution of the responses 2021-2025, OECD-17
Note: The figure presents the within-country distributions of responses to the question “If over half of the people in [COUNTRY] clearly expressed a view against a national policy, how likely do you think it is that it would be changed?”. The “likely” proportion is the aggregation of responses from 6-10 on the scale; “neutral” is equal to a response of 5; “unlikely” is the aggregation of responses from 0-4; and “Don't know” was a separate answer choice. “OECD” presents the unweighted average of the weighted OECD country averages. “OECD-17” presents the unweighted average of the weighted county averages for the 17 countries for which this data point is available for all three years.
Source: OECD Survey on Drivers of Trust in Public Institutions 2021, 2023, and 2025.
While only a minority in most OECD and participating OECD accession countries find it likely that governments would adjust policies based on majority opposition to them, the share who believe that government co-operates with other stakeholders is even slightly lower. On average across the OECD, 37% find it likely that government can co-operate with other national stakeholders, such as private sector organisations and trade unions, to better tackle long-term challenges (Figure 4.6). 18% provide a neutral response and 38% find it unlikely. Switzerland and Brazil are the only countries where a majority believes in government’s ability in this area. Perceptions of this public governance aspect is an important driver of trust in the national government.
Share of the population who are confident or not confident that the national government co-operates with stakeholders to better tackle long-term challenges, 2025
Note: The figure presents the within-country distribution of weighted response to the question “On a scale of 0 to 10, how confident are you in the national/federal/central government’s ability to co-operate with other national stakeholders, such as private sector organisations and trade unions to better tackle long-term challenges?”. The “confident” proportion is the aggregation of responses from 6-10 on the scale; “neutral” is equal to a response of 5; “not confident” is the aggregation of responses from 1-4; and “do not know” was a separate answer choice. “OECD” presents the unweighted average of weighted OECD country averages.
Source: OECD Survey on Drivers of Trust in Public Institutions 2025.
There is no one-size-fits-all solution to the appropriate degree and nature of consultation with stakeholders, and practices vary widely across countries and policy areas. Overall, most of OECD Governments have a wide array of consultation mechanisms of stakeholders, but this remains a complex endeavor: how to make these consultations meaningful and effective, how to differentiate consultations of citizens from consultation of stakeholders and the representativity of these stakeholders are all questions that are today at the core of the governance policy agenda (OECD, 2025[5]). Many view politicians and governments as vulnerable to undue influence, but views have slightly improved since 2023.
Public skepticism that policies are responsive to majority views and well-consulted across different stakeholders may be related to doubts about politicians’ integrity and the hidden influence of private interests.
Only around one third of people across the OECD and the participating OECD accession candidate countries find it likely that a politician would refuse to grant a political favour in return for a lucrative private-sector job. Specifically, an average of 32% in the OECD and 34% in participating OECD accession countries find it likely that they would refuse to grant a favour (Figure 4.7). The share who find politicians unlikely to refuse to grant a favour is far larger at 48% across the OECD and 52% across the accession countries. In view of the high skepticism regarding the integrity of politicians, it is particularly noteworthy that there may be some small improvements in these perceptions: Across the sub-sample of OECD countries with relevant information available for all three years, the share saying politicians are unlikely to grant a favour rose by 2 percentage points relative to 2023, returning to 2021 values.
Share of the population that finds it likely a politician would refuse a well-paid private sector job, 2025
Note: The figure presents the within-country distribution of weighted response to the question “If a politician was offered a well-paid job in the private sector in exchange for a political favour, how likely do you think it is that they would refuse it?”. The “likely” proportion is the aggregation of responses from 6-10 on the scale; “neutral” is equal to a response of 5; “unlikely” is the aggregation of responses from 1-4; and “do not know” was a separate answer choice. “OECD” presents the unweighted average of weighted OECD country averages.
Source: OECD Survey on Drivers of Trust in Public Institutions 2025.
People are also skeptical that government withstands efforts at undue influence. 32% across the OECD find it likely that government would refuse a corporation’s demand for a policy that could be harmful to society as a whole, while 41% find it unlikely their government would refuse (Figure 4.8). In the five participating OECD accession countries, 33% say their government is likely to refuse, and in Peru, 39% do. Positively, in the 29 OECD countries with available data for 2023 and 2025, the share who find it likely has increased by 3 percentage points. In fact, the share with an optimistic assessment went up more than two percentage points in two thirds of the countries, and only declined by more than 2 percentage points in four countries.
Share of population who find it likely that government would refuse a corporation’s demand for a policy that could be harmful to society as a whole, 2023 and 2025
Note: The figure shows the weighted shares of “likely” responses to the questions “If a corporation promoted a policy that benefited its industry but could be harmful to society as a whole, how likely do you think it is that the federal/central/national government would agree to the corporation’s demand?”. For ease of analysis, the direction of the answers were turned around, to match a share of likely with a positive meaning. In detail, the share of ‘likely the government agree to’ of the original question corresponds to ‘unlikely government refuses’ above. The “likely” proportion is therefore the aggregation of responses from 0-4 on the scale of the original question on the 0-10 scale. “OECD 2025” presents the unweighted average of weighted country averages of all OECD countries participating in the 2025 survey wave. “OECD-29” presents the unweighted average of weighted country averages of the 29 OECD countries that participated in both the 2023 and 2025 survey waves.
Source: OECD Survey on Drivers of Trust in Public Institutions 2023 and 2025.
Strengthened integrity systems regarding conflict of interest and lobbying may be a potential avenue to support improved perceptions of integrity. Evidence from the OECD Public Integrity Indicators (OECD, 2026[6]) suggest that while among OECD countries 80% of the criteria for the regulation of conflict of interest are fulfilled, when it comes to their implementation, this only applies to 45% of the criteria. Even more notably, OECD countries fulfil 43% and 38% of the criteria on the regulation of lobbying and its implementation, respectively. Depending on the rules already in place, countries could focus on closing the implementation and information gaps and update integrity systems to face emerging corruption risks.
Perceptions of government decision making on complex policy issues are highly associated with trust in national governments and legislatures, but are also drivers of trust in local government and the national civil service. Actions that can enhance these views can therefore contribute to strengthening trust in public institutions:
Continuing to pay attention to emergency preparedness, which a slight majority across the OECD see positively, can have positive repercussions for trust in government and governmental institutions at all levels. In contrast, acknowledging that fewer than one third believe that government provides appropriate support to people affected by economic crises, and taking steps to help people in precarious financial situations, might yield larger increases in trust in the national government. While fiscal pressures mean that there is a need for efficiency in social programmes, supporting people in accessing benefits for which they are eligible could be one step in this direction (OECD, 2025[1]).
Enhancing two-way communication on policies that require trade-offs between different policy objectives and the interests of different groups could benefit trust in the national government and legislature. For example, 34% find it likely that government adequately balances between the interests of current and future generations. Since there is no one ‘right’ answer for such trade-offs, enhancing opportunities for different population groups to voice their opinions on different policy initiatives and being transparent when communicating about policy decisions about how different aims or interests were weighted against each other could help improve perceptions of these key public governance drivers.
Strengthening the use of evidence and forward planning in policymaking and public service provision can be crucial for enhancing trust. About four in ten people across the OECD find it likely that government draws on the best available evidence when taking decisions and that public services adapt to changing societal needs. Increasing the smart use of evidence by policymakers on the one hand, and the combination of traditional planning tools with anticipatory approaches on the other hand, could help enhance the practices of evidence-informed decision making and dynamic adjustments of essential public services to changing needs. Additionally, the communication on the data being used and the types of data that matter to people could also help improve trust. Over time, such improvements can be reflected in enhanced perceptions. This can contribute to increasing trust in all public institutions, above all the national government, when it comes to evidence-informed decision making, and in the civil service when it comes to adjusting services to changing societal needs.
Addressing perceived barriers to ‘having a say’ in what government does (see Chapter 6) successfully could likewise help increase trust as well as improving people’s assessment that they have political voice.
Acknowledging that scepticism on the integrity of public representatives and government can remain pronounced even when government takes actions to protect public integrity, governments across the OECD should nonetheless continue to pursue comprehensive integrity frameworks that do not only fulfil good practices regarding regulatory design, but also effective implementation and transparency.
References
[6] OECD (2026), Anti-Corruption and Integrity Outlook 2026: Harnessing the Integrity Advantage, OECD Publishing, Paris, https://doi.org/10.1787/16708b78-en.
[5] OECD (2025), Exploring New Frontiers in Citizen Participation in the Policy Cycle, OECD Public Governance Reviews, OECD Publishing, Paris, https://doi.org/10.1787/77f5098c-en.
[1] OECD (2025), More Effective Social Protection for Stronger Economic Growth: Main Findings from the 2024 OECD Risks that Matter Survey, OECD Publishing, Paris, https://doi.org/10.1787/3947946a-en.
[7] OECD (2025), OECD Survey on Drivers of Trust in Public Institutions in Latin America and the Caribbean 2025 Results, OECD Publishing, Paris, https://doi.org/10.1787/ea3385cf-en.
[2] OECD (2021), Observatory of Public Service Innovation - Intergenerational Fairness Poliy Assessment Toolkit, https://oecd-opsi.org/innovations/intergenerational-fairness-policy-assessment-toolkit/ (accessed on 30 March 2026).
[4] OECD (forthcoming), Serving Citizens, OECD Publishing, Paris.
[3] OECD/European Commission (2025), Strengthening National Evidence-Informed Policymaking Ecosystems: Lessons from Seven European Countries, OECD Publishing, Paris, https://doi.org/10.1787/855c5286-en.
← 1. The question was not asked in Brazil and Peru, where data collection took place earlier in the context of the OECD Trust Survey in Latin America and the Caribbean (OECD, 2025[7]).
← 2. The question was not yet asked in the 2021 Trust Survey wave.
← 3. The question was not yet asked in the 2021 Trust Survey wave.
← 4. The variable also has a marginally positive effect of 1 percentage point on trust in local government. However, this average marginal effect is only statistically significant at the 5% level, compared to 1% for other average marginal effects discussed in the report.