International Migration Outlook 2026

2. Recent developments in migration policy

Abstract

This chapter provides an overview of the changes in the immigration policies of OECD countries during the period 2025‑2026, with a particular focus on policy changes linked to return migration and international researcher mobility.

In Brief

Key findings

• Migration policy developments in 2025 and 2026 largely extended trends observed in recent years. Governments continued to balance political pressure to strengthen migration control with the need to address labour shortages, attract talent and maintain international protection systems.

• In the European Union, the implementation of the Pact on Migration and Asylum advanced significantly in 2025 and 2026, alongside broader efforts to strengthen EU-level migration governance. The implementation process was accompanied by the adoption of the EU’s first Visa Strategy, a new European Asylum and Migration Management Strategy, and negotiations on the Return Regulation establishing a Common European System for Returns.

• Many OECD countries introduced measures aimed at reducing irregular migration, reflecting growing political pressure to strengthen control over migration flows following several years of high migration levels. Reforms included stronger border controls, enhanced enforcement measures, expanded efforts to combat migrant smuggling and increased emphasis on returns and deterrence.

• Several countries tightened asylum and international protection systems, reflecting both broader efforts to strengthen migration management and preparations for the implementation of the EU Pact on Migration and Asylum. Reforms included stricter eligibility rules, accelerated procedures and greater emphasis on the temporary nature of protection status and the prospect of return.

• Labour migration systems became increasingly selective and targeted, with tighter admission conditions for some categories of workers alongside continued recruitment in shortage occupations and sectors.

• Competition for highly skilled workers intensified, with many countries expanding fast-track pathways, talent visas and other measures aimed at attracting workers in strategic sectors, including technology, healthcare and research.

• Return policies remained a major area of reform, with governments seeking to accelerate return procedures, increase enforcement and strengthen co‑operation with countries of origin and transit.

• Countries increasingly viewed international researcher mobility as a strategic policy issue linked to innovation, competitiveness and technological leadership. Against a backdrop of intensifying global competition for scientific talent, several OECD countries expanded immigration pathways, launched dedicated recruitment initiatives and strengthened measures to attract and retain international researchers.

Major policy trends in 2025-2026

Migration policy developments in 2025 and 2026 continued trends observed across OECD countries in recent years. Governments sought to balance political pressure to strengthen control over migration flows with the need to address labour and skills shortages, attract talent and maintain international protection systems. Across many OECD countries, migration policies became increasingly differentiated, with tighter controls on irregular and lower-skilled migration coexisting alongside efforts to attract workers and talent considered strategically important. The resulting reforms combined tighter controls on irregular migration, asylum and return policies with more selective approaches to labour migration and talent attraction.

Major developments in migration governance frameworks

The most significant development occurred within the European Union with the implementation of the Pact on Migration and Asylum, which began to apply in June 2026. Alongside implementation of the Pact, the European Commission launched the EU’s first Visa Strategy, presented a new European Asylum and Migration Management Strategy and adopted additional initiatives to strengthen legal migration and talent attraction. Negotiations also progressed on the Return Regulation establishing a Common European System for Returns, which seeks to further harmonise return procedures and strengthen co‑operation on return and readmission across Member States. Together, these measures reflect an increasingly comprehensive approach to migration governance that seeks to combine asylum management, border security, labour migration, return policy, talent attraction and co‑operation with third countries within a common policy framework. The Pact itself was the result of several years of negotiations aimed at balancing effective management of external borders with solidarity among Member States. While implementation has progressed significantly, discussions regarding responsibility-sharing and the operationalisation of the new solidarity mechanism have illustrated the continuing complexity of translating a common framework into practice across Member States. The European Commission’s assessment of progress in May 2026 noted substantial advances in implementation preparations but also identified continuing challenges related to legislative adaptation, administrative capacity, staffing, infrastructure, digital systems and uneven levels of preparedness across Member States (European Commission, 2025[1]).

Meanwhile, migration governance in the Americas underwent a significant reorientation following the return of the Trump administration in January 2025. Changes to US asylum, humanitarian and border policies, combined with a stronger focus on enforcement, removals and migration deterrence, altered migration dynamics throughout the region. Migration co‑operation increasingly centred on border control, deportations, readmission arrangements and the management of irregular migration flows, often through bilateral agreements between the United States and countries of origin and transit. These shifts also marked a broader reorientation of migration governance in the region. The Los Angeles Declaration on Migration and Protection, adopted in 2022, sought to establish a regional framework based on shared responsibility, expanded legal pathways, international protection and migrant integration. While the Declaration remains formally in place, the political momentum behind the Declaration has weakened considerably, with migration governance increasingly shaped by national policy responses and bilateral arrangements.

Stronger controls on irregular migration and border management

In the United States, the Trump administration made border enforcement a central policy priority, introducing a range of measures intended to deter irregular arrivals, strengthen enforcement and increase removals. European countries similarly reinforced border controls in response to concerns about irregular migration and secondary movements. Following the formation of a new coalition government in 2025, Germany extended and reinforced border controls at several land borders as part of a broader effort to reduce irregular migration. Poland introduced temporary border controls at its borders with Germany and Lithuania in July 2025, citing sustained migratory pressure, while Italy extended controls at its border with Slovenia until December 2026 because of concerns relating to irregular migration and migrant smuggling networks.

In 2025, France and the United Kingdom reached a new agreement intended to reduce irregular crossings of the English Channel and weaken the business model of migrant smuggling networks. The agreement facilitates the return of certain irregular entrants while creating additional legal pathways for others.

Spain, by contrast, pursued an alternative approach to addressing irregular migration through a regularisation programme implemented in 2026, which targeted certain foreign nationals already residing in the country. The measure grants eligible applicants a residence permit with work rights and was presented as a response to existing irregular residence, labour market needs and social cohesion objectives.

Tightening asylum and international protection systems

Several OECD countries introduced reforms affecting asylum seekers, refugees and beneficiaries of international protection. These measures sought to tighten access to protection systems, accelerate procedures, strengthen enforcement and increase governments’ capacity to manage asylum caseloads. In the European Union, the implementation of the Pact on Migration and Asylum increasingly translated into national reforms of asylum procedures and protection systems. In parallel, several countries introduced additional measures aimed at accelerating procedures, managing asylum caseloads more effectively and strengthening the link between protection status and evolving protection needs.

The United States adopted and proposed a series of restrictive measures affecting refugees and asylum seekers. These measures included the suspension of the US Refugee Admissions Program (USRAP), a substantial reduction in refugee admissions, the expansion of travel restrictions affecting several major refugee‑origin countries, enhanced review of refugee and immigration status determinations, restrictions on access to resettlement and integration services, reduced access to certain public benefits for refugees, and proposed restrictions on employment authorisation for asylum applicants.

Several other OECD countries similarly tightened asylum procedures. Canada adopted the Strengthening Canada’s Immigration System and Borders Act in 2026, introducing new eligibility restrictions for certain asylum claims, including claims submitted more than one year after entry and some claims lodged following irregular entry from the United States. Ireland announced plans to introduce a mandatory accommodation contribution for employed applicants for international protection residing in state‑provided accommodation. Greece adopted legislation strengthening sanctions for rejected asylum seekers and reinforcing a deterrence‑oriented approach to migration management. The United Kingdom also announced a package of asylum reforms aimed at tightening the system and strengthening incentives for return where protection needs are no longer present.

Closely linked to these debates has been a growing emphasis on protection statuses that are temporary, conditional and subject to periodic review. Finland amended its Aliens Act in 2025 to shorten the duration of residence permits granted on the basis of refugee status and subsidiary protection and increase the frequency of reassessments of protection needs. The United Kingdom announced that newly recognised refugees would generally receive 30‑month protection permits instead of the five‑year period previously granted as standard, with protection needs reassessed at each renewal and greater emphasis placed on return where conditions in countries of origin are considered to have improved. Sweden continued its shift away from permanent settlement as the default outcome of asylum through reforms in 2026 limiting access to permanent residence for beneficiaries of protection, while the Netherlands moved away from permanent asylum residence permits and reinforced a system based on renewable protection statuses.

The tightening of asylum and protection systems also gave rise to renewed debate regarding the scope of international legal protections. Several European Governments called for a reassessment of the interpretation of the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR), particularly with regard to its implications for removals of rejected asylum seekers and foreign nationals convicted of crimes. Critics argue that current interpretations constrain governments’ ability to remove rejected asylum seekers and foreign nationals convicted of crimes.

Despite the overall trend towards more restrictive asylum policies, several countries also expanded pathways for refugees and displaced persons. Costa Rica created a special humanitarian permit for certain Latin American nationalities, and Italy expanded labour mobility pathways for refugees through dedicated admission quotas linked to training and employment opportunities.

The trend towards more selective and targeted labour migration continues

While many governments sought to reduce overall migration levels and strengthen labour market protections for domestic workers, persistent labour and skills shortages continued to generate demand for foreign workers in a range of sectors. As a result, labour migration systems became increasingly selective and targeted, with tighter conditions for some categories of migrants alongside expanded pathways for workers in shortage occupations and highly skilled professionals, continuing trends observed in recent years (OECD, 2024[2]; OECD, 2025[3]).

In several OECD countries, labour migration reforms were explicitly linked to efforts to reduce migration levels and strengthen protections for domestic workers. The United Kingdom’s 2025 Immigration White Paper set out a strategy centred on reducing net migration, raising skill requirements and strengthening domestic workforce development. Subsequent reforms increased the skill threshold for the Skilled Worker route from RQF Level 3 to level 6, removed more than 100 medium-skilled occupations from eligibility for overseas recruitment and substantially increased salary thresholds. Additional restrictions were introduced across several migration categories, alongside tighter scrutiny of selected visa applications.

Canada similarly tightened elements of its Temporary Foreign Worker Program and International Mobility Program through higher wage thresholds, more restrictive eligibility conditions linked to regional labour market circumstances and stronger employer compliance requirements. At the same time, Canada continued to expand pathways from temporary to permanent residence for selected workers already established in the country. Quebec also narrowed the list of occupations eligible for simplified labour market impact assessments. Mexico strengthened documentation and compliance requirements for employment-related residence permits, while Japan introduced stricter documentation and language requirements for certain work visa categories.

The United States announced a broad package of proposed reforms aimed at tightening employment-based migration programmes and strengthening labour market protections. These included higher prevailing wage requirements for H‑1B and permanent labour migration pathways, stricter labour market testing, additional employer compliance obligations and reforms to H‑1B eligibility criteria. The administration also introduced a USD 100 000 fee for certain H‑1B petitions involving workers recruited from abroad, substantially increasing sponsorship costs for some employers.

Despite these tightening measures, labour shortages remained a significant concern in many OECD countries, prompting governments to maintain or expand selected labour migration channels.

Italy adopted a new three‑year Decreto Flussi for 2026‑2028 authorising almost 500 000 entries of non-EU workers, with allocations focussed on sectors experiencing persistent shortages, including agriculture, tourism, construction, transport and manufacturing. Ireland revised its occupation lists and expanded quotas in selected sectors, notably care work. New Zealand also expanded eligibility under its occupational shortage framework.

More broadly, many European countries continued to adjust labour migration programmes to address specific labour market needs. Austria expanded seasonal worker quotas, Germany doubled admissions under its Western Balkans labour migration scheme, Greece increased the number of positions available to third-country nationals and Ireland expanded opportunities in shortage occupations. At the same time, some countries moved in the opposite direction. Lithuania reduced admission quotas, while Hungary ended its guest worker programme in 2026.

Several countries also introduced targeted flexibility measures to address localised labour shortages. Canada temporarily increased the cap on low-wage temporary foreign workers for rural employers, while Quebec introduced transitional arrangements allowing certain workers awaiting permanent selection decisions to remain employed. Finland eased restrictions for workers changing jobs within labour shortage occupations, and Estonia introduced reforms increasing employment flexibility for foreign workers and employers.

Competition for highly skilled workers and strategic talent intensified

Alongside tighter controls on lower- and medium-skilled migration, many OECD countries continued to strengthen pathways for highly skilled migrants and workers in strategic sectors considered important for economic growth, innovation and competitiveness.

Canada further expanded its category-based Express Entry selection system, including targeted invitations for STEM occupations and new pathways for foreign doctors. The country’s broader Tech Talent Strategy continued to prioritise highly skilled workers through accelerated processing and targeted recruitment initiatives. Japan expanded its focus on highly skilled migration through the Japan System for Special Highly Skilled Professionals (J‑SKIP) and the Japan System for Future Creation Individual Visa (J‑FIND) programmes, designed respectively for highly qualified professionals and graduates of leading universities.

Greece adopted reforms centred on attracting technology and innovation talent, including a new Tech and Talent Visa and more flexible EU Blue Card arrangements. Sweden extended the validity of EU Blue Cards, while France expanded talent pathways for medical and pharmacy professionals. Portugal reoriented parts of its immigration system towards highly qualified workers, and Germany continued implementation of its Skilled Immigration Act while also advancing plans for a new Work-and-Stay Agency. The agency is intended to act as a one‑stop platform for skilled immigration, improving co‑ordination between visa authorities, labour market institutions and migration administrations and simplifying recruitment procedures for employers seeking to hire skilled workers from outside the European Union.

At EU level, efforts to attract skilled talent increasingly complemented national reforms. In December 2025, the European Commission announced the launch of the first European Legal Gateway Office pilot project in India, aimed at facilitating recruitment in the ICT sector and supporting legal pathways for skilled workers. Similar initiatives, together with ongoing reforms to the EU Blue Card framework, reflect a growing emphasis on international competition for talent.

Return systems under reform across OECD countries

Return policies have become an increasingly prominent component of migration management across OECD countries in recent years. Recent policy developments have focussed on accelerating return procedures, strengthening enforcement, expanding co‑operation with countries of origin and transit, and increasing the implementation of both voluntary and forced returns.

Focus on accelerated voluntary and forced return in many OECD countries

Recent years have seen a renewed policy focus on increasing return rates and improving the implementation of return decisions across OECD countries, with the most significant reforms taking place in Europe and the United States. In the European Union, the adoption of the Pact on Migration and Asylum in 2024 marked a major overhaul of the EU migration framework, including in the area of return migration. While the Pact covers a broad range of issues related to asylum, border management and responsibility-sharing, it also places greater emphasis on returns by strengthening the link between asylum and return procedures. In particular, it introduces a border return procedure for certain categories of rejected asylum applicants and seeks to ensure that negative asylum decisions are followed more systematically by return procedures.

The return dimension of the Pact has subsequently been reinforced through the European Commission’s proposal for a Common European System for Returns (CESR) in March 2025, implemented through a proposed Return Regulation. The reform seeks to establish a more integrated EU-wide return framework through common procedures, a European Return Order, stronger obligations on returnees to co‑operate with return procedures, mutual recognition of return decisions across Member States, and enhanced provisions on readmission and co‑operation with third countries (see Box 2.1). The Council and the European Parliament reached a political agreement on the Regulation in June 2026, which was subsequently approved by the European Parliament and was awaiting final Council approval as of July 2026.

Alongside the reforms introduced through the Pact on Migration and Asylum and the Return Regulation, several Member States have strengthened their national return frameworks through a combination of enhanced enforcement measures, greater detention capacity, expanded return support and efforts to improve the implementation of return decisions.

Germany adopted the Act to Improve the Return of Foreigners (Rückführungsverbesserungsgesetz) in 2024, introducing measures to facilitate the implementation of return decisions and removals through extending detention periods prior to removal, expanding powers to identify and locate persons subject to removal, and facilitating the deportation of criminals and other removable migrants. France implemented several provisions of its 2024 immigration law aimed at accelerating removal procedures following negative asylum decisions and strengthening the enforcement of obligations to leave the territory. Sweden has undertaken a broader overhaul of its migration system and implemented measures to strengthen both voluntary and forced returns. Recent reforms have combined expanded financial incentives for voluntary return with increased detention capacity, reforms intended to facilitate the implementation of removal orders, and stronger co‑operation between migration and law-enforcement authorities to increase the implementation of removal orders. Belgium, meanwhile, adopted a new Proactive Return Policy Law and expanded dedicated return structures for rejected asylum applicants as part of broader efforts to increase effective returns.

Denmark has strengthened its return framework with the establishment of the Danish Return Agency, operational since 2021, which centralised responsibility for return-related activities previously spread across several authorities. The agency oversees return counselling, voluntary return programmes, reintegration assistance, accommodation for persons awaiting return and co‑operation with countries of origin. Recent reforms have placed greater emphasis on sustainable reintegration through pre‑departure counselling, financial assistance and post-return support, complemented by the Danish Migration Management and Return, Readmission and Reintegration Programme (2024‑2029), which seeks to strengthen return and reintegration capacities both in Denmark and in partner countries.

Box 2.1. The EU Return Regulation: Towards a common European system for returns

In June 2026, the European Parliament approved the Return Regulation, a major reform of the EU return framework that replaces the Return Directive that had governed EU return policy since 2008. The Regulation forms the core of the proposed Common European System for Returns and reflects a stronger emphasis on accelerating returns, harmonising procedures across Member States, and strengthening migration-control instruments. It was approved by the European Parliament on 17 June 2026 following a political agreement reached between the Council and Parliament on 1 June 2026.

Among its most significant tools, the Regulation broadens the range of countries to which third-country nationals may be returned and establishes a legal framework for the creation of return hubs in third countries. It also introduces a system for the mutual recognition and enforcement of return decisions across Member States through a new European Return Order. At the same time, the Regulation expands obligations on individuals subject to return procedures, strengthens the use of entry bans, increases powers to locate persons subject to return, and extends the maximum detention period from 18 to 30 months.

In addition, the Regulation expands the operational role of Frontex in return procedures, information exchange and implementation of the new return architecture. Once formally approved by the Council, several provisions, including those relating to return hubs, readmission co‑operation and Frontex support, will apply immediately, while most other provisions will enter into force after a 12‑month transition period.

Source: https://ecre.org/european-parliament-approval-of-the-return-regulation/; https://home-affairs.ec.europa.eu/news/commission-welcomes-political-agreement-return-regulation-2026-06-02_en.

In the United States, return and removal policy has similarly moved to the forefront of the migration agenda. Since 2025, the Trump administration has pursued a goal of substantially increasing the scale of removals, including a stated objective of reaching 1 million deportations annually. This effort has involved expanding detention capacity and increasing interior enforcement operations and terminating or allowing the expiry of several temporary protection programmes. The administration has also placed emphasis on encouraging voluntary departure. A federal incentive programme provides travel assistance and financial incentives, recently raised to USD 2 600, for migrants who agree to leave voluntarily and register their departure through the “CBP Home” Mobile application. These measures seek to increase departures beyond those achieved through formal removals. More generally, tighter immigration enforcement and changing conditions for undocumented migrants have further contributed to pressures toward “self-deportation”, particularly in locations experiencing intensified enforcement activity.

The increase in return and deportation flows from the United States has had repercussions across the region, particularly in Mexico. In January 2025, the Mexican Government launched the national repatriation strategy México te Abraza (“Mexico Embraces You”) and established a network of reception centres in northern border states to receive returning Mexican nationals deported from the United States. Co‑ordinated by the Ministry of the Interior and involving 34 federal agencies, the programme provides returning migrants with temporary accommodation, food, medical and psychological assistance, identity documents, transport to their communities of origin, access to social programmes and labour market services. Repatriated individuals also receive a repatriation certificate granting access to programme benefits and temporary access to public health insurance. Although the programme was primarily designed for returning Mexican nationals, Mexico has also received increasing numbers of third-country nationals deported from the United States. Mexican authorities have indicated that such migrants may receive humanitarian assistance and support for onward voluntary return to their countries of origin.

Outside Europe and North America, Japan has tightened its return framework following revisions to its Immigration Control and Refugee Recognition Act that entered into force in 2024‑2025. The reforms were intended to address repeated asylum applications used to delay removal and allow deportation of certain repeat asylum applicants whose claims have already been rejected. The reforms have been accompanied by a stronger focus on enforcement, including the Immigration Services Agency’s 2025 “Zero Illegal Foreign Residents Plan”, which aims to increase removals of persons subject to final deportation orders.

In Korea, recent policy developments have centred on recurring voluntary departure programmes for irregular migrants. Since 2022, the Ministry of Justice has periodically introduced temporary departure programmes under which irregular migrants who leave voluntarily receive exemptions from administrative fines and temporary suspension of entry restrictions. These programmes primarily target migrants who have overstayed their visas or otherwise fallen into irregular status after lawful entry. Authorities have simultaneously maintained immigration enforcement measures against migrants who do not participate in the voluntary return programme.

Externalisation of return and removal arrangements

Another important development has been the growing interest in the externalisation of return procedures. Rather than relying exclusively on direct returns to countries of origin, several countries have explored mechanisms involving third countries as destinations for deportees, hosts of return facilities or partners in broader return management arrangements. The objective is generally to address cases in which direct return is difficult or impracticable and to increase the effectiveness of return systems.

Within the European Union, discussions on return hubs advanced rapidly between 2025 and 2026. Following a joint letter from 19 Member States calling for the development of “innovative solutions” for migration management, the proposed Common European System for Returns incorporated a legal basis for return hubs in third countries. Return hubs are facilities located in third countries where persons subject to a return decision in an EU Member State could be transferred while awaiting return to their country of origin, or, under certain arrangements, be returned directly to the third country hosting the hub. The concept subsequently received support from the Council in its December 2025 negotiating position and was retained in the provisional political agreement on the Return Regulation approved in June 2026 (see Box 2.1). The agreed text allows Member States to establish return hubs in third countries through agreements or arrangements that comply with international human rights standards and the principle of non-refoulement. While no operational EU return hubs had been established as of mid-2026, the concept had moved from political debate into the emerging EU legislative framework on return.

When it comes to national initiatives, Italy and the Netherlands have been at the forefront of efforts to externalise migration management. Italy signed an agreement with Albania to provide facilities that initially were designed to process certain asylum claims outside Italian territory but were repurposed in 2025 through Decree Law No. 37/2025 to also accommodate migrants already subject to removal orders in Italy. The reform transformed the facilities into a potential component of Italy’s return infrastructure and represented one of the first attempts by a European country to establish offshore facilities directly linked to return procedures.

In September 2025, the Netherlands and Uganda signed a Letter of Intent on a pilot transit hub. The initiative was not operationalised and Dutch efforts subsequently shifted towards a broader coalition with Denmark, Germany, Austria and Greece seeking shared return hubs outside the EU. Following the political agreement on the EU Return Regulation, participating countries began discussions with potential host countries and explored wider migration and development partnerships linked to the operation of such hubs. As of mid-2026, no specific countries of co‑operation had yet been announced.

Since 2025, the Trump administration has made increasing recourse to third-country removal arrangements, under which migrants may be transferred to countries other than their country of nationality. Initial agreements focussed on transit countries in Central America, notably Panama and Costa Rica, which agreed to receive non-national deportees pending onward return. Subsequently, the United States expanded co‑operation with a broader group of partner countries, including countries outside the Americas, as part of a strategy to increase removal capacity when direct returns to countries of origin are difficult to implement.

Reassessment of protection needs and renewed returns to Syria and Afghanistan

Another notable development has been the reassessment of protection conditions in major countries of origin and the resulting expansion of return possibilities. For much of the past decade, large‑scale returns to countries such as Syria and Afghanistan were largely suspended across many OECD countries due to security concerns and humanitarian protection considerations. Since 2024, however, governments have increasingly revisited these assumptions, reflecting changing political conditions in origin countries, domestic pressures to increase return rates, and broader efforts to reduce asylum backlogs.

In Europe, this shift has been particularly visible in relation to Syria and Afghanistan. Germany resumed deportations of Afghan nationals in 2024, initially focussing on individuals convicted of serious crimes and persons considered security risks. Similar discussions subsequently emerged in several other European countries. Following political developments in Syria in late 2024, a number of European Governments reassessed the situation in the country. Austria became the first EU Member State since 2011 to carry out deportations to Syria in 2025, while several other countries announced plans to explore similar measures. At the same time, several European countries temporarily suspended the processing of Syrian asylum applications pending new assessments of country conditions and protection needs. These measures initially concerned relatively small and selected groups, but they signalled an important shift in return policy and in the interpretation of protection obligations.

Türkiye, the world’s largest host of Syrian refugees, introduced a “go‑and-see” policy in the first half of 2025 allowing Syrians under temporary protection to visit Syria and subsequently return to Türkiye without losing their status, enabling them to assess conditions before deciding whether to return permanently.

EU-level discussions have also evolved. As implementation of the Pact on Migration and Asylum progresses, debates have intensified around the designation of safe countries of origin and the reassessment of country conditions in major refugee‑origin countries. New evaluations of the security situation in Syria and other countries could provide additional momentum for expanding return programmes beyond the limited categories currently targeted. While large‑scale returns to Syria and Afghanistan remain politically and operationally challenging, the direction of policy has clearly shifted towards increasing the scope for returns where governments consider conditions to have improved sufficiently.

The United States has also tightened its approach to temporary protection as part of a broader effort to increase returns and reduce the use of humanitarian migration pathways. In 2025, the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) terminated Temporary Protected Status (TPS) for Afghan nationals, arguing that conditions in Afghanistan no longer justified continued protection. The termination took effect in July 2025. DHS subsequently announced the termination of TPS designations for several other nationalities, including Syrians and Haitians, on the grounds that country conditions no longer met the statutory requirements for TPS. While the Syrian designation initially remained in place following court orders suspending the termination, the US Supreme Court ruled in June 2026 that federal courts could not review TPS determinations on non-constitutional grounds, thereby allowing the administration to proceed with the termination of TPS for both Syria and Haiti.

Return and readmission increasingly embedded in migration partnerships and international development co‑operation in the EU

While recent EU reforms have focussed heavily on increasing return rates and improving the enforcement of return decisions, EU institutions and several Member States have also sought to strengthen co‑operation with countries of origin and support the longer-term reintegration of returnees. As a result, return, readmission and reintegration have become increasingly embedded in broader migration partnerships and external co‑operation frameworks. Recent examples include the EU – Tunisia Memorandum of Understanding (2023), the EU – Egypt Strategic and Comprehensive Partnership (2024) and the EU – Mauritania Partnership (2024), which combine migration-management and border-control objectives with co‑operation on readmission, return and reintegration. In parallel with the proposed Return Regulation, the European Commission and Member States have increasingly sought to strengthen co‑operation with third countries on return and readmission through a broader migration-diplomacy approach that includes the use of financing instruments, visa policy and trade relations as incentives for co‑operation (European Commission, 2026[4]).

Several OECD-EU countries have also taken steps to strengthen the alignment between return and reintegration and development co‑operation (OECD, 2025[5]). This trend is illustrated by recently adopted strategies for return and reintegration among Nordic countries. Sweden’s 2024‑2028 Strategy for Global Development Co‑operation on Migration, Returns and Voluntary Repatriation explicitly aims to create synergies between migration policy and development assistance. The strategy supports reintegration programmes, migration-management capacity building and local development in countries of origin. Denmark has adopted a similarly integrated approach through its Danish Migration Management Programme (2024‑2029). The programme seeks to strengthen migration-management capacities in partner countries while improving structures for return, readmission and sustainable reintegration. It explicitly positions development assistance as a tool for supporting longer-term migration management objectives and strengthening co‑operation with countries of origin. While Norway has had multi-year return strategies in place since 2011, the 2025-2030 Return Strategy is the first strategy published jointly by the Ministry of Justice and Public Security and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs.

Researcher mobility and global competition for scientific talent

Growing geopolitical tensions, concerns about research funding environments and intensifying international competition for highly skilled workers have increased the strategic importance of international researcher mobility across OECD countries. Governments are increasingly seeking not only to facilitate the admission of researchers and scientists but also to actively attract, recruit and retain global scientific talent as a means of strengthening research excellence, innovation, technological development and economic competitiveness. These efforts accelerated markedly in 2025, when concerns regarding research funding cuts, constraints affecting academic institutions and tighter immigration policies in the United States prompted a number of OECD countries to position themselves as alternative destinations for internationally mobile researchers.

Expansion of dedicated pathways for researchers and scientific talent

A first major trend has been the expansion of immigration pathways specifically designed to attract researchers and scientists. Across OECD countries, governments have sought to facilitate international mobility by accelerating admission procedures, broadening eligibility criteria and reducing administrative barriers for researchers and their families.

Within the European Union, national reforms have developed alongside common EU frameworks governing the admission and mobility of third-country researchers. The Students and Researchers Directive (Directive (EU) 2016/801) establishes common rules for the admission of researchers and facilitates short- and long-term mobility across Member States. In parallel, the revised EU Blue Card Directive (Directive (EU) 2021/1883), which Member States were required to transpose by November 2023, has sought to strengthen the EU’s attractiveness to highly qualified talent through lower salary thresholds, shorter minimum contract requirements, expanded recognition of professional experience, enhanced intra-EU mobility and easier access to long-term residence. Together, these instruments provide an important framework underpinning researcher and highly skilled mobility across the European Union.

Several major European destinations for international researchers continue to rely on immigration pathways introduced in earlier years. France’s Passeport Talent – Chercheur, introduced in 2016, remains the principal admission channel for non-EU researchers, providing multi-year residence permits, simplified admission procedures and facilitated family reunification for researchers hosted by recognised institutions. The United Kingdom similarly continues to rely on its Global Talent Visa, introduced in 2020, which offers a flexible route for leading and emerging researchers, scientists and innovators and provides pathways to long-term settlement. Germany, by contrast, does not operate a dedicated researcher visa of comparable prominence. Instead, researcher mobility is supported through a combination of residence permits for researchers, the EU Blue Card and broader skilled migration channels. Recent reforms implementing the revised EU Blue Card Directive, together with wider changes to Germany’s skilled migration framework, have expanded eligibility, lowered salary thresholds and facilitated admission for highly qualified workers, indirectly improving mobility opportunities for researchers and other STEM professionals.

Sweden has recently adopted reforms aimed at improving the attractiveness of the country for international researchers and doctoral candidates. The reforms allow doctoral candidates with hosting agreements to obtain residence permits for research, facilitate changes between permit categories within Sweden and extend post-study residence rights for researchers and doctoral graduates. These measures form part of a broader effort to strengthen Sweden’s competitiveness in the global competition for talent.

Outside Europe, Japan introduced the Japan System for Special Highly Skilled Professionals (J-SKIP) and the Japan System for Future Creation Individual Visa (J-FIND). J-SKIP provides an accelerated route for highly qualified researchers and professionals, while J-FIND allows graduates from leading universities worldwide to enter Japan for job seeking, entrepreneurial activities or research-related opportunities. Together, these programmes represent a significant effort to strengthen Japan’s attractiveness as a destination for global scientific talent. Korea has similarly strengthened dedicated pathways for scientific talent through the introduction of the K-STAR Visa Track in 2025. The programme expands fast-track residence opportunities for outstanding international graduates and researchers in science and technology, provides access to an F‑2 residence visa without employment requirements for selected candidates, and shortens the path to permanent residence from six years to three years.

Canada has expanded immigration pathways targeting researchers, technology professionals and STEM workers through initiatives associated with its Tech Talent Strategy, while Australia introduced the National Innovation Visa in December 2024, a permanent migration pathway targeting exceptionally talented individuals, including researchers, academics and innovators capable of contributing to strategically important sectors of the economy.

Researcher recruitment increasingly embedded in national innovation and competitiveness strategies

Recent reforms also indicate a broader shift away from isolated researcher visa programmes towards comprehensive talent-attraction strategies that integrate immigration policy with innovation, industrial and economic objectives. The most prominent recent example is the European Commission’s Choose Europe for Science initiative, launched in 2025. The initiative seeks to position Europe as a preferred destination for internationally mobile researchers by mobilising research funding, strengthening research careers and supporting recruitment efforts across the European Research Area. Building on existing instruments such as Horizon Europe, the European Research Council (ERC) and the Marie Skłodowska-Curie Actions, the initiative reflects a shift from simply enabling mobility towards actively attracting leading researchers and research teams. It also illustrates the growing tendency to view researcher attraction as an issue of strategic competitiveness, innovation and technological sovereignty rather than solely one of migration policy.

The European initiative has been accompanied by a proliferation of national programmes. France launched Choose France for Science, designed to attract international researchers and research teams through dedicated funding opportunities and institutional support. Germany has expanded recruitment efforts through initiatives such as Global Minds, while Denmark has strengthened international recruitment efforts through Science Hub Denmark, a national initiative launched in 2024 to increase the international visibility of Danish research and attract leading researchers in strategic scientific fields.

Norway has adopted one of the most ambitious recent recruitment initiatives. In 2025, it launched a dedicated international researcher recruitment scheme with a budget of NOK 300 million for 2025‑2028 (about EUR 27 million), aimed at helping Norwegian institutions recruit and retain highly qualified researchers from abroad. The programme was explicitly presented as a response to growing global competition for research talent and concerns about academic freedom in other parts of the world. Norway has further sought to reduce barriers affecting the recruitment and retention of international researchers. In 2025, the government announced that it would reverse a recently adopted requirement obliging foreign doctoral candidates and postdoctoral researchers to undertake mandatory Norwegian-language training, following concerns that the measure could hinder international recruitment and weaken Norway’s attractiveness as a research destination. The reform formed part of a broader effort to strengthen the country’s international research competitiveness and improve conditions for globally mobile scientists.

Italy has taken a particularly targeted approach. In 2025, it launched a EUR 50 million programme encouraging highly qualified researchers currently based abroad to relocate to Italy. The programme specifically targets recipients of ERC Starting and Consolidator Grants and provides funding of up to EUR 1 million per project to support relocation and research activities. Estonia has adopted a similar strategy on a smaller scale, introducing schemes aimed at attracting internationally mobile researchers, including dedicated opportunities for holders of the Marie Skłodowska-Curie Seal of Excellence and mobility grants supporting relocation to Estonian research institutions. The Austrian Academy of Science APART-USA funding programme is supporting outstanding postdoctoral researchers working at a US university or non-university research institution who wish to relocate their research activities to excellent research locations in Austria. Together, these initiatives illustrate the growing use of targeted research funding as a tool for attracting internationally mobile scientific talent.

Outside Europe, Canada has significantly expanded efforts to attract global scientific talent through its Canada Global Impact+ Research Talent Initiative, launched at the end of 2025. Backed by CAD 1.7 billion (approximately EUR 1.1 billion) over 12 years, the initiative aims to recruit more than 1 000 leading international researchers, early-career academics, doctoral students and postdoctoral researchers to Canada. It combines support for world-leading research chairs, recruitment of emerging research leaders, research infrastructure investments and dedicated funding for doctoral and postdoctoral researchers, reflecting a highly strategic approach to strengthening national research capacity and innovation performance. The initiative was announced in the context of intensifying international competition for scientific talent and was explicitly presented as a means of strengthening Canada’s position as a global destination for research excellence. Australia has similarly sought to capitalise on growing international mobility among researchers through the Australian Academy of Science’s Global Talent Attraction Program, which aims to recruit world-leading researchers and technologists, particularly from the United States, and support their relocation to Australian universities, research institutes and industry.

Beyond national initiatives, regional governments and individual research institutions have also launched targeted programmes to attract internationally mobile researchers. In Spain, the Catalan Government’s Catalunya Talent Bridge programme aims to attract internationally mobile researchers through dedicated research positions and funding support. In France, Aix-Marseille Université launched the Safe Place for Science programme in 2025, a programme specifically designed to host researchers who felt that their work could be constrained by changing conditions in the United States. It initially planned to mobilise around EUR 10‑15 million over three years and host approximately 15‑20 researchers. In Australia, the state of South Australia launched the Global Researcher Attraction Program, providing dedicated fellowships to recruit internationally recognised researchers in STEM fields aligned with strategic state priorities, including critical technologies, artificial intelligence, defence and cybersecurity.

Several national and regional/institutional initiatives highlighted reductions in research funding, constraints on academic freedom and a less favourable environment for international researchers in the United States as opportunities to attract globally mobile scientific talent. Norway’s international researcher recruitment programme, Austria’s APART-USA fellowships and Catalonia’s Talent Bridge programme all emerged within this broader context.

Greater attention to retention and long-term careers

A related development has been the growing recognition that attracting international researchers is insufficient unless countries can also provide conditions that encourage them to remain and build long-term careers. As global competition for scientific talent intensifies, policymakers are increasingly paying attention not only to recruitment and admission but also to settlement, career development and family support.

Japan provides one of the clearest examples through the J-SKIP programme, which combines facilitated admission with exceptionally rapid access to permanent residence, extensive rights for accompanying family members and flexible conditions for spouses. The programme is explicitly designed to attract and retain internationally mobile talent. Korea has also introduced stronger retention incentives for highly qualified scientific talent under the K-STAR Visa Track, which enables outstanding international researchers and science and technology graduates to obtain long-term resident status more easily and reduces the period required to qualify for permanent residence from six years to three years.

Sweden has strengthened retention pathways for international researchers and doctoral candidates. Reforms adopted in 2026 facilitate access to permanent residence, reduce the qualifying period for researchers and doctoral candidates, extend opportunities to remain after completing research or studies, and allow doctoral candidates to obtain residence permits specifically for research rather than study purposes. Germany has similarly strengthened pathways from study and research to employment and long-term settlement, while France’s Passeport Talent – Chercheur framework combines facilitated admission with multi-year residence permits and favourable provisions for accompanying family members.

Overall, recent reforms suggest a significant evolution in researcher mobility policy. While earlier initiatives focussed largely on facilitating entry, current approaches increasingly span the full mobility cycle from recruitment and admission to integration, settlement and long-term retention. As global competition for scientific talent intensifies, the ability to retain internationally mobile researchers is becoming as important as the ability to attract them in the first place.

References

[4] European Commission (2026), Commission welcomes political agreement on the Return Regulation, https://home-affairs.ec.europa.eu/news/commission-welcomes-political-agreement-return-regulation-2026-06-02_en.

[1] European Commission (2025), State of play on the implementation of the Pact on Migration and Asylum, https://home-affairs.ec.europa.eu/state-play-implementation-pact-migration-and-asylum_en.

[3] OECD (2025), International Migration Outlook 2025, OECD Publishing, Paris, https://doi.org/10.1787/ae26c893-en.

[5] OECD (2025), Strategic alignment of Migration and Development in Return and Reintegration, OECD, Paris, https://www.oecd.org/content/dam/oecd/en/topics/policy-issues/migration/Strategic-Alignment-Migration-Development-Return-Reintegration-Report-2025.pdf.

[2] OECD (2024), International Migration Outlook 2024, OECD Publishing, Paris, https://doi.org/10.1787/50b0353e-en.