International Migration Outlook 2026

3. Recent developments in migrant integration policy

Abstract

In a context of persisting fiscal pressure in the field of integration and the widespread policy goal of maximising the productive potential of migrants, this chapter offers an overview of the notable trends in integration policy in OECD countries over the past year. It focusses in particular on citizenship access and naturalisation, access to benefits and material support and on decentralisation and the role of subnational levels in integration.

In Brief

Key findings

• Integration policy across OECD countries has entered a more constrained phase, reflecting tighter public finances, growing pressure on housing and public services, and weaker political support for broad-based integration spending.

• Overall, integration policies in 2025‑2026 reflect a continued shift towards activation, conditionality and individual responsibility. While these reforms may improve policy targeting and fiscal sustainability, they also increase the risk of slower integration for migrants facing persistent structural barriers, including limited language skills, caring responsibilities and weaker labour market attachment.

• The policy focus continues to shift from universal integration programmes towards more targeted, conditional and employment-oriented measures, often delivered through digital tools and local implementation arrangements.

• Countries are introducing integration measures earlier, differentiating pathways by migrant category and strengthening links between integration participation and labour market outcomes.

• Labour market integration remains the principal policy objective. Reforms increasingly promote rapid labour market entry while strengthening measures to improve job matching and protect migrant workers from exploitation.

• Civic integration requirements are becoming more prominent, with greater emphasis on language acquisition, civic knowledge and shared values as part of integration.

• Support for displaced Ukrainians is evolving from emergency assistance towards longer-term inclusion. At the same time, several countries are making support more targeted, conditional or time‑limited as policies increasingly prioritise self-sufficiency.

• OECD countries are placing greater emphasis on social cohesion, anti-discrimination, civic participation and addressing negative social control, reflecting a broader understanding of integration that extends beyond labour market outcomes.

• Citizenship policy is becoming a more explicit instrument for shaping integration expectations. Across many OECD countries, reforms strengthen requirements related to language proficiency, residence duration, civic knowledge and economic self-sufficiency, although some countries continue to facilitate access for specific groups.

• Access to benefits and material support is increasingly linked to residence history, labour market participation and engagement in integration measures. While protection for vulnerable groups is generally maintained, eligibility conditions are becoming more restrictive for working-age migrants with weaker labour market attachment.

• Local and regional authorities continue to play a growing role in integration governance. Municipal implementation, place‑based approaches and strengthened monitoring frameworks are increasingly used to address integration challenges and tailor support to local needs.

Major changes over the past year

Integration policy has entered a more constrained and politically contested phase. Tight public budgets, pressure on housing and public services and weaker political appetite for broad-based integration investments have slowed reform and changed its character. Large universal integration programmes are giving way to measures that are targeted, conditional, employment-oriented, digitally delivered, or locally implemented.

The trend towards structured early integration pathways has continued but countries are now extending integration earlier in the migration trajectory, differentiating provision by migrant category, and linking participation more explicitly to labour market participation.

In the region of Flanders in Belgium, pre‑arrival integration trajectories are being developed in fully digital form for people still abroad, with separate modules for labour migrants and family migrants, remote coaching and continuity into post-arrival integration. From 2027, many third-country workers will face a mandatory tailored integration trajectory, and language requirements are being raised from A2 to B1 for some groups.

Estonia revised its Early Integration Programme, introducing a new B1 language course, adjusting the duration of A1‑A2 courses to improve accessibility and flexibility, and adding a short orientation module for beneficiaries of temporary protection from Ukraine. From 2026, applicants for permanent settlement also need to complete the programme and pass an A2 language examination. As part of transposing the EU Migration and Asylum Pact, Estonia is also preparing to make participation mandatory during the asylum application stage.

In Finland, the 2026 budget provides for the national core curriculum for integration programme to be reviewed, with the aim of allowing training to be combined more flexibly with work or entrepreneurship. Lithuania is preparing new language examinations ahead of requirements entering into force from January 2026, when immigrants working in the service sector will need at least A1 proficiency.

A number of new programmes are also targeted at migrant entrepreneurs. For example, Hungary’s SMART UA programme, launched in 2025, offers a six‑week entrepreneurship course for displaced Ukrainians with business ideas or early-stage ventures.

The emphasis on civic and social integration has also grown. France introduced a civic exam for first applications for multi-year residence permits in 2025 and launched a dedicated training website for applicants. Lithuania trained its first instructors for a standardised sociocultural introduction course, with 19 instructors from 14 municipalities completing a 20‑hour programme to support people granted asylum, beneficiaries of temporary protection and other newcomers.

Austria expanded mandatory Values and Orientation Courses from three to five days on a pilot basis in 2024, with nationwide implementation in place since 2026. A new law on “integration obligations” is currently under discussion which will, among other measures, render the signature of a new “value charter” obligatory.

To combat negative social control and honour-related issues, Norway has implemented a range of measures. In May 2025, the government launched the new action plan “In charge of your Own Life – Strengthened Efforts Against Negative Social Control and Honour-Related Violence” (2025‑2028). The action plan contains 29 measures within the following priority areas: legal protection, prevention, capacity-building within public services, and involuntary stays abroad. Norway also has special envoys for integration. These work to provide support and aid to Norwegian citizens and people with legal status in Norway who are victims of negative social control and honour-based violence abroad.

Likewise, Denmark launched a four‑year plan to address negative social control and honour-related conflict, including a 50% increase in security consultants advising municipalities, rights advisers placed in youth education institutions, and new crisis centre places for families with children. Sweden appointed public inquiry to examine parallel social structures and their consequences for integration and exclusion. Both initiatives reflect a broadening of integration policy to address behaviour and social structures within settled communities.

Sweden commissioned Statistics Sweden (SCB) to assess the feasibility of creating an Integration Barometer – a proposed survey instrument to monitor aspects of integration that cannot be captured through administrative registers alone, including trust in institutions, democratic participation, social networks, language use, belonging and perceptions of discrimination. The initiative is part of a broader effort to strengthen integration monitoring, including plans for regular monitoring of geographically concentrated disadvantage.

The link between integration support and labour market entry has strengthened. This is partly driven by labour shortages, but also by the political need to demonstrate that integration spending supports self-sufficiency. In Greece, for example, the 2025 draft legal migration framework explicitly links access to some integration support to active job search by beneficiaries of international protection. In Sweden, reforms in 2025‑2026 retain an individualised introduction model but place greater emphasis on work incentives, particularly for women with children and weak labour market attachment. Alongside this push to incentivise work, the growing contribution of migrant workers to municipal and regional welfare services, including elderly care, has been highlighted by Swedish Association of Local Authorities and Regions.

In Finland, legislative amendments entering into force in June 2025 gave third-country nationals holding work-based residence permits three months – or six months for specialists and entrepreneurs – to find new employment before their residence status is affected, while also broadening their right to seek work across any designated labour shortage sector rather than only their original field.

The employment-first approach is increasingly accompanied by stronger safeguards against exploitation. In Korea, an amendment to the Immigration Act entering into force in November 2025 exempts foreign victims of unpaid wages from notification obligations and allows labour inspectors to assist them without reporting their immigration status. Earlier reforms in Finland clarifying employer responsibilities to migrant workers, introducing consequences for employers suspected of offences, and creating residence‑permit options for victims of exploitation continued to be debated and refined in 2025‑2026.

In Switzerland, the government has extended the pilot programme “PERSPECTA” which aims at a better labour market integration of family migrants.

Early intervention is also becoming more prominent. In the new Dutch coalition agreement, it is foreseen that asylum seekers with a good prospect of obtaining a residence permit will obtain language training at the very start of the asylum procedure. Likewise, “Participation Resource Centres” are planned to be set up at large reception locations. These Centres aim at supporting asylum seekers in arranging language training, volunteer activities or paid work.

In a similar vein, the new law on “integration obligations” in Austria, which is currently under discussion, foresees early obligatory integration measures including for asylum seekers from countries with high recognition rates.

In Canada, labour migrants and their families have traditionally had access to settlement services until obtaining citizenship. Since April 2026, access has been reduced to up to six years after obtaining permanent residence, and a further reduction to five years is foreseen for April 2027.

Fiscal pressure has led a number of countries to target support to groups that are particularly vulnerable or have poor labour market outcomes. Support for migrant children is expanding, mainly through targeted measures. Poland’s “Friendly School” programme running from 2025 to 2027, with a EUR 118 million budget, funds intercultural assistants, psychological support, career counselling and training for teachers working with migrant pupils. Czechia expanded language‑support eligibility for newly arrived foreign pupils, from 12 to 24 months and up to 400 hours of instruction. The Austrian School Organisation Act was amended in February 2026 and gives schools more autonomy in German language support and requires students to attend summer school to improve their German language.

Italy issued new school guidelines in 2025, strengthening Italian as a second language, promoting linguistic and cultural mediation, and introducing migration history into curriculum objectives. Sweden announced a three‑year reinforcement of SEK 40 million per year from 2026 for language‑strengthening initiatives through folk high schools, targeted at adults with weak language skills who have vocational education but are unemployed or weakly attached to the labour market. Regarding children, in 2026, the Swedish Government has been examining the introduction of compulsory language screening for young children in order to strengthen their language development. To this end, an internal government inquiry has been tasked with analysing how such a system could be designed and implemented.

Overall, all OECD countries, extended temporary protection provision for internationally displaced Ukrainians in 2026, but policy for Ukrainians is moving from emergency reception towards longer-term inclusion, though, in some countries support is also becoming more conditional and time‑limited. Romania’s support shifted in 2025‑2026 towards structured inclusion with Ukrainian children given provisional school enrolment pending recognition of prior studies, alongside Romanian-language courses for children and adults, psycho-pedagogical counselling and cross-ministerial co‑ordination. Greece expanded the HELIOS integration programme, which provides housing support and counselling. In Belgium, Flanders and Wallonia simultaneously reduced reception capacity, signalling a shift from emergency hosting towards self-sufficiency. Poland began phasing out emergency measures introduced in 2022. From March 2026, beneficiaries of temporary protection face reduced access to some family benefits, healthcare and accommodation, while retaining full labour market access.

In a number of OECD countries, integration policy in 2025‑2026 is increasingly linked to social cohesion and anti-discrimination. In the EU, many countries adopted new national action plans to fight against racism and discrimination, following up on the new EU anti-racism strategy 2026‑2030. In Spain, for example, the hate‑crime action plan for 2025‑2028 reinforces prevention, reporting and support for victims, expands co‑operation with migrant associations and civil society organisations, and promotes intercultural awareness among public officials and law enforcement. Luxembourg presented its first national action plan against racism in 2025, with 23 objectives and 128 measures to strengthen equality, prevent discrimination and improve victim support, including an anti-racism label.

Citizenship access and naturalisation

Citizenship requirements have become a more explicit instrument for defining integration expectations. The direction is not uniform, but the centre of gravity is shifting towards more demanding conditions for access, particularly where political debates have become more restrictive.

Germany’s Act to Modernise Nationality Law entered into force on 27 June 2024, introducing dual nationality and reducing the general residence requirement for naturalisation from eight to five years. In 2025, however, the federal government removed the accelerated route that had allowed applicants with strong integration outcomes to naturalise after three years of residence. Applicants must now have resided in Germany for at least five years and meet other requirements, including sufficient German-language skills and financial independence.

In Sweden, amendments to the Citizenship Act entered into force in June 2026, making the requirements for obtaining Swedish citizenship more stringent. The new rules include requirements for knowledge of the Swedish language and Swedish society, a longer period of residence (generally increased from five to eight years), a self-support requirement, and stricter assessment of whether the applicant has led, and can be expected to lead, an orderly and law-abiding life.

In addition, a government-appointed public inquiry has proposed legislative amendments that would allow Swedish citizenship to be revoked from dual nationals who acquired citizenship on false grounds or who have committed certain particularly serious crimes, including offences related to national security. While proposals in this area have been advanced and a constitutional amendment has been approved in principle, the revocation regime has not yet fully entered into force and remains subject to completion of Sweden’s constitutional amendment process.

Poland announced a tightening of access to citizenship in 2025. The required period of stay for a permanent residence permit is to be extended from three to five years, during which time applicants must maintain tax residency in Poland. Applicants will sign a loyalty declaration and a naturalisation test will be introduced, covering Polish history, language and recent political, economic and social developments, as well as basic values and norms of Polish social life. The required language level will rise from B1 to B2. Application fees also increased. Presidential approval of citizenship now carries a fee of PLN 1 669 (EUR 393), with administrative recognition carrying a fee of PLN 1 000 (EUR 240).

Belgium raised the fee for acquiring Belgian nationality from EUR 150 to EUR 1 000 in 2025, with annual indexing. This change is part of broader government measures placing greater emphasis on individual responsibility in citizenship applications. Illiterate persons continue to be exempt from the written language test component of the citizenship test, following the 2024 amendment to Belgium’s Citizenship Code.

Language requirements are also being strengthened for permanent residence. As part of its ongoing earned settlement reforms, the United Kingdom will raise English language requirements for settlement (Indefinite Leave to Remain). Under the new rules, most applicants will need to demonstrate B2 level English (A-level standard), replacing the current B1 level (GCSE standard). The change was formally announced on 5 March 2026 and is scheduled to take effect from March 2027, giving applicants time to prepare.

Ireland improved the efficiency of citizenship administration in 2025, building on reforms already visible in 2024. Citizenship applications can now be made online, with electronic payments and vetting. Processing times fell from 15 months in 2023 to 8 months in 2024. In December 2025, however, the government extended the residence requirement for people granted international protection seeking naturalisation from three to five years.

Finland extended the residence requirement for naturalisation from five to eight years in October 2024, with further tightening planned in subsequent phases, including a self-support requirement, an integrity condition, and a citizenship test.

In the Netherlands, the 2026 coalition agreement foresees tightening of access to Dutch nationality. This concerns both the required language proficiency (from A2 currently to B1) and the minimum residence duration (from five to six years).

The exception to the trend towards more stringent requirements is Romania, where reform of the Citizenship Act reduced the mandatory residence period for people with refugee status who can demonstrate active integration, and introduced exemptions from minimum residence requirements for stateless persons and third-country nationals with significant contributions to the economy, arts, culture, sport, or volunteering. Romania also introduced a requirement to show Romanian-language proficiency at B1 level for applicants seeking acquisition or reacquisition of citizenship.

Overall, citizenship reforms in 2025‑2026 point to more stringent conditions for access, with language proficiency, civic knowledge, fiscal contribution, residence duration and economic self-sufficiency becoming more prominent across OECD countries. The cumulative effect of higher fees, longer residence requirements and more demanding conditions risks excluding migrants who are functionally integrated but lack the resources or formal credentials these measures require.

Access to benefits and material support

Reforms to social benefits and material support are among the clearest signs of the tighter fiscal and political environment in 2025‑2026. Support is being narrowed, made more conditional or linked more explicitly to labour market participation. Vulnerable groups are often protected, but working-age adults, especially recent arrivals and those without stable employment histories, increasingly face stricter activation requirements, residence‑duration rules, income tests or reduced support.

Denmark’s 2025 social-assistance reform is one such example. The reform simplifies benefits into three main rates – minimum, basic and increased. The central integration effect of the reform lies in differentiated eligibility based on residence and employment history. Access to higher benefit levels depends on long residence, typically nine out of the previous ten years, and an employment record of around two and a half years. Those who do not meet these criteria are placed at the lower minimum rate. Although formally nationality-neutral, this primarily affects newcomers and third country national (TCN) migrants, who are less likely to meet these thresholds. The reform also expands the work obligation to around 22 000 recipients, with participation of up to 37 hours per week in activation activities such as internships, training or community work. The work obligation is formally general, but in practice has a substantial impact on refugees and third-country national women with weak labour market attachment. Denmark has also asked municipalities to review 5 000 disability pension cases involving third-country nationals. The review applies to cases approved after 2003 in 74 designated housing areas and includes interviews and reassessment of medical and work-ability documentation. This fits a broader trend in which access to support is increasingly scrutinised through the lens of work capacity, self-sufficiency and residence history.

In early 2026, the Swedish Government proposed to limit access to welfare benefits for newly arrived migrants by introducing new eligibility requirements. If implemented, as of 1 January 2027, certain welfare benefits, such as child and housing allowances, will only be available to migrants who have resided in Sweden for a period of five years within a 15‑year period or who pass certain employment income requirements.

In Austria, the planned new law on “integration obligations” foresees benefit cuts for non-participation or drop-out of integration activities. Cuts in social benefits for recent arrivals are also under discussion.

In Finland, healthcare reforms in 2025‑2026 restricted access to non-urgent medical services for undocumented migrants while preserving emergency care. Comprehensive healthcare remains available for pregnant women and children. In France, from July 2026, foreign students from non-EU countries who are not eligible for need-based grants will be excluded from housing assistance. Students in precarious situations or with low incomes will retain access. In Sweden, a government-appointed inquiry presented proposals in March 2026 to introduce mandatory fees for publicly funded interpretation services.

A number of OECD countries are also withdrawing support initially extended to people displaced from Ukraine. In Poland, legislation from 2025 begins to phase out measures introduced in 2022. From 5 March 2026, following a transitional period, beneficiaries of temporary protection face reduced access to some family benefits, healthcare and accommodation, mainly affecting non-working adults outside vulnerable groups. They retain full access to the labour market upon registration, but lose the right to start businesses on the same terms as Polish citizens, and lose special provisions for medical employment and education. The Netherlands has adjusted support for displaced Ukrainians such that adults no longer receive a living allowance if they have a job or other income. Ukrainians with income living in municipal shelter must also contribute to utility costs.

Countering this tendency to remove and restrict support, the Czechia 2025 Housing Support Act, which takes effect gradually between January and June 2026, offers foreign nationals with permanent residence, asylum or subsidiary protection housing rights on the same terms as Czech citizens. It establishes municipal Housing Contact Points, guarantees and compensation for landlords and municipalities, and provides for direct housing assistance.

The overall direction in 2025‑2026 is not the withdrawal of support, but its reconfiguration. Support is increasingly targeted at vulnerability, conditioned on activation, or linked to residence and employment history. This reflects budgetary pressure and weak political will for expansive integration spending, but it also increases the risk that low-income migrants, women with care responsibilities and people with limited language skills face slower or more precarious integration.

Decentralisation and the subnational level

Local and regional authorities are becoming more central to integration policy in 2025‑2026. This is partly pragmatic: many difficult integration bottlenecks including housing, school placement, language access, childcare, transport, and public employment services are experienced locally. It also reflects national fiscal and political constraints. Where central governments are reluctant to expand large universal programmes, local systems, civil society organisations and EU-funded projects are increasingly called upon to deliver targeted support. A parallel trend towards place‑based integration governance reflects a move away from migrant-specific investments at the national level, towards identifying neighbourhoods where integration challenges coincide with broader socio‑economic disadvantages. Such approaches can help target employment, education and community-support measures more effectively, but they require careful communication to avoid reinforcing territorial stigma or conflating migration-related challenges with wider patterns of social exclusion.

Belgium provides a clear example of expanding local responsibility. In Wallonia, a 2024 decree implemented in 2025 formally makes socio-professional integration a core mission of the Regional Integration Centres, consolidating their role in supporting migrants’ access to employment through tailored programmes, partnerships with public employment services and local actors, and stronger engagement with employers.

The Netherlands remains one of the most developed examples of decentralised civic integration. Since the entry into force of the 2021 civic integration system, municipalities have been responsible for providing civic integration courses, monitoring quality and preparing a personal integration plan for each newcomer. They are also expected to encourage employers to create job opportunities for recognised refugees. In 2025‑2026, this municipal model remains central to Dutch integration policy, especially as national policy seeks to reduce pressure on reception and housing systems.

In Sweden, the government submitted a proposal for a new law on the settlement of newly arrived refugees and beneficiaries of subsidiary protection and their family members, which is expected to enter into force on 1 January 2027. The aim of the proposal is to increase the influence of municipalities over the reception of new arrivals and strengthen incentives for newly arrived migrants to actively contribute to their integration, while at the same time ensuring more equal housing support across the country by obliging municipalities to provide housing for three years. The allocation of new arrivals would be based on the conditions for integration in each municipality.

In 2025, Czechia launched a new funding system for municipal projects supporting the integration of temporary protection holders. Municipalities, voluntary associations of municipalities, cities and urban districts can apply for additional funds for counselling, co‑ordination of integration activities and direct personal work with clients. Funding is available with a 10% co-financing requirement and must be spent by the end of 2026.

Italy has also expanded its focus on local capacity-building. The Charter for the Integration of Refugees, launched in 2022 by six major cities and later joined by ten others, was followed in 2025 by the Interior Ministry’s LGNetForma programme, run with ANCI, Cittalia and 22 partner municipalities. The programme targets 2 300 municipalities with more than 5 000 inhabitants, using webinars to strengthen municipal capacity on reception and inclusion.

Monitoring is also becoming more place‑sensitive. Germany’s national Integration Dashboard, launched through the Federal Statistical Office in April 2025, is a notable example. In Belgium, the Walloon Observatory for Foreigners’ Integration, established as part of the 2025 reforms, gives Wallonia a more permanent monitoring and co‑ordination body. Canada has expanded common performance frameworks across federally funded settlement programmes, requiring providers to report against harmonised indicators covering economic integration, language acquisition, social participation and civic engagement, strengthening comparability across provinces and the evidence base for funding decisions. Spain’s 2025 monitoring framework strengthens national tracking of migrant inclusion and anti-racism outcomes; while many indicators can be disaggregated geographically, the framework is primarily a national instrument rather than a subnational dashboard.

EU funding is reinforcing this local turn. The 2025 Asylum, Migration and Integration Fund explicitly encourages local and regional authorities and migrant organisations to apply, focussing on practical integration bottlenecks including healthcare access, migrant women’s labour market integration, digital literacy, refugee education pathways and protection of migrant children.