This chapter presents key developments in crypto-asset and stablecoin markets across Africa. It analyses market and adoption trends, including the prominent role of retail participation and considers how the expansion of crypto-assets and stablecoins may affect financial intermediation, investor participation and market development. The chapter examines associated policy challenges including consumer protection, illicit finance, and cybersecurity vulnerabilities, as well as the implications of deepening interconnections with traditional finance. It also reviews recent legal and regulatory initiatives across African economies and concludes with policy considerations to foster sound and sustainable innovation, while safeguarding investors, market integrity and financial market resilience.
8. Developments in crypto-asset and stablecoin markets in Africa
Copy link to 8. Developments in crypto-asset and stablecoin markets in AfricaAbstract
Key messages
Copy link to Key messagesThe uptake of crypto-assets and stablecoins has been growing across the African continent during the period 2021-2025, in line with global trends. Adoption levels differ across jurisdictions, reflecting the pace of technological uptake and the range of regulatory approaches pursued by governments and financial supervisors.
Africa is emerging as an important retail market for crypto-assets and stablecoins. Sub-Saharan Africa recorded a 52% year-on-year increase in the total value of crypto-assets transacted in 2025, making it the third-fastest growing region globally. This activity is accompanied by a gradual scaling‑up of policy engagement across sub-Saharan Africa. While this activity remains predominantly retail-driven, institutional participation is gradually increasing, strengthening the linkages between crypto-asset markets and the broader financial system.
Crypto-assets and stablecoin activity is also driven by speculation and arbitrage opportunities and, to a far lesser extent, cross-border transactions and payments. Nevertheless, stablecoins have the potential to facilitate remittance transfers and enable faster and cheaper cross-border settlement. Over time, their integration into financial market infrastructure could also create new links with capital markets, although the extent of these benefits will depend on regulatory, technological and market developments.
Crypto-assets can create vulnerabilities related to illicit finance and market integrity. Their use for cross-border transfers can complicate oversight and the detection of unlawful activities, particularly where transactions involve entities operating across multiple jurisdictions. These vulnerabilities are amplified by the inconsistent implementation of international standards, notably recommendations from the Financial Action Task Force.
Cybersecurity is another key concern across crypto-asset markets, affecting individual users, exchanges and service providers, with potential systemic implications. Globally, cyber-attacks involving crypto-assets generated losses estimated at USD 16.5 billion during the past decade. More than half of these losses, worth approximately USD 9 billion, were associated with attacks on wallet holders through compromised private keys and digital wallets.
Growing retail participation in crypto-asset and stablecoin markets across Africa underscores the importance of robust financial consumer protection frameworks. These frameworks are particularly important in addressing risks faced by retail users, including frauds and scams.
Clear and effective regulatory frameworks can support safer digital innovation and entrepreneurship in financial systems. Greater alignment of national policy frameworks with international standards would support these efforts, promoting greater consistency, interoperability and resilience across jurisdictions. This can provide a stronger foundation for beneficial applications of crypto-assets and stablecoins in financial markets, while managing risks as their connections with the broader financial system and capital markets develop.
8.1. Introduction
Copy link to 8.1. IntroductionCrypto-asset1 markets have gained global prominence over the past decade with growing, though still limited, inter-linkages with traditional financial markets. These linkages are reflected in the increasing participation of traditional financial institutions and institutional investors in crypto-asset markets, and in the expansion of regulated crypto-asset investment products, as well as the emerging integration of crypto-assets and stablecoins into payment and settlement infrastructure and the tokenisation of traditional financial assets (OECD, 2022[1]; 2025[2]).
In Africa, crypto-asset adoption is growing rapidly, albeit at a different pace across countries and from a relatively low base. Elements of crypto-asset markets have the potential to support the region’s economic development and resilience, for example by streamlining payments within and across borders, facilitating trade and remittance flows. At the same time, crypto-assets may also introduce new vulnerabilities, or amplify existing vulnerabilities, related to financial stability, integrity and cyber-resilience.
This chapter discusses the key trends in crypto-asset adoption across Africa; the enabling factors for well-functioning crypto-asset markets; the impacts for the region’s economic resilience; the evolving policy and regulatory approaches taken across African jurisdictions; and key policy considerations.
8.2. Global crypto-asset market developments
Copy link to 8.2. Global crypto-asset market developmentsGlobally, crypto-asset markets have grown since 2021, with market capitalisation peaking at USD 3.4 trillion in October 2024 (Figure 8.1, Panel A) before declining to USD 3 trillion in December 2025. Within crypto-asset markets, stablecoins are playing an increasingly important role, with the total market capitalisation of the top five stablecoins reaching USD 283 billion as of end-2025, representing around 8% of total crypto-asset market capitalisation (Figure 8.1, Panel B).
Figure 8.1. Global crypto-asset and stablecoin market capitalisation
Copy link to Figure 8.1. Global crypto-asset and stablecoin market capitalisation
Note: OECD analysis based on CoinGecko, Chainalysis and TRM Labs reports.
Sources: TRM Labs (2026[3]), 2025 Crypto Adoption and Stablecoin Usage Report, https://www.trmlabs.com/reports-and-whitepapers/2025-crypto-adoption-and-stablecoin-usage-report; CoinGecko (2025[4]), Top stablecoins by market capitalisation, https://www.coingecko.com/en/categories/stablecoins; Chainalysis (2025[5]), Crypto adoption index, https://www.chainalysis.com/blog/2025-global-crypto-adoption-index/.
8.3. Crypto-asset market developments in Africa
Copy link to 8.3. Crypto-asset market developments in AfricaAcross Africa, user uptake of crypto-assets and stablecoins has also been growing. The continent saw consistent increases in crypto-asset transactions between July 2021 and June 2025 (Chainalysis, 2025[6]), with sub-Saharan Africa emerging as the third fastest growing crypto-asset adoption region globally (Chainalysis, 2025[7]). The total value of crypto‑assets transacted in that region rose 52% year-on-year in 2025, albeit from a low baseline, making it the third-fastest growing region globally, after Asia-Pacific (69%) and Latin America (63%) (Figure 8.2, Panel A).
In many African countries, the use of crypto-assets in real economy transactions remains low (IMF and FSB, 2024[8]). Policy approaches from financial authorities, discussed later in this chapter, suggest that policy makers in the region generally consider crypto-asset use to be driven mainly by speculation and, to a lesser extent, cross-border transactions within the crypto-asset domain. In most countries, crypto-assets have not led to currency substitution, which is also explained by their lack of official legal status.
Market participants such as financial technology (FinTech) firms, payment service providers, and, in some cases, financial institutions are beginning to explore and integrate crypto-asset infrastructure into their service offerings. This not only supports higher transaction volumes but also contributes to improving market confidence and operational maturity in these ecosystems.
Figure 8.2. Growth in crypto-asset markets by region and in crypto-asset adoption by countries
Copy link to Figure 8.2. Growth in crypto-asset markets by region and in crypto-asset adoption by countries
Note: Panel B is based on the Chainalysis 2025 Global Crypto Adoption Index, which combines four usage‑based sub‑indices that capture the volume of use in a country across different crypto-asset services. For each sub‑index, countries with sufficient data are ranked, with results adjusted for factors such as population size and purchasing power.
Sources: Chainalysis (2025[5]), The 2025 Global Adoption Index, https://www.chainalysis.com/blog/2025-global-crypto-adoption-index/;
IMF (2025[9]), Crypto-Assets Monitor, https://www.imfconnect.org/content/dam/imf/News%20and%20Generic%20Content/GMM/Special%20Features/Crypto%20Assets%20Monitor.pdf
Nigeria has the highest level of crypto-asset penetration in the region, followed by Morocco, Kenya, Egypt and South Africa (Figure 8.2, Panel B). Adoption is motivated by factors such as hedging against inflation and currency volatility, overcoming limited access to traditional financial services, and reducing dependency on costly correspondent banking arrangements. Usage tends to be driven by necessity and grassroots demand rather than large-scale use-cases. Nigeria also scores third in the world with respect to transaction volumes relating to Decentralised Finance (DeFi) protocols (Chainalysis, 2025[5]).
Globally, cross-border payments, remittances, and preservation of value are reported as motives for investments in crypto-assets during periods of exchange-rate volatility and high inflation (Chainalysis, 2025[7]; IMF, 2026[10]; BIS, 2025[11]). In particular, demand for crypto-assets, particularly USD-pegged stablecoins, has been driven by foreign exchange shortages, currency depreciation, and the high cost of traditional remittance channels. In several countries, crypto-assets have become a practical mechanism for accessing international payments and transferring value across borders more efficiently (Chainalysis, 2025[7]; IMF, 2026[10]; BIS, 2025[11]).
Several specific use cases for crypto-assets and stablecoins are emerging in African jurisdictions. In Kenya, Nigeria, Tanzania and Uganda, Bitcoin-based micro-, small and medium-sized enterprise loans are available through traditional bank accounts, despite the high volatility of Bitcoin’s value (Liu, Goni and Mitha, 2021[12]). Additionally, in Kenya, consumers can send, receive and convert stablecoins into local currencies through mobile payment services and specialised Bitcoin automated teller machines (CoinMarketCap, 2025[13]), though denomination of settlements in a non-local currency represents a liquidity settlement risk. In Zimbabwe, consumers and corporates have taken up crypto-assets and stablecoins as hedges against foreign exchange risk and inflationary pressures. Zimbabwe also launched a gold-backed crypto-asset – the ‘ZIG’ in 2024 (World Economic Forum, 2024[14]).
These kinds of use cases have served to underpin a more than two-fold growth in crypto-asset adoption across sub-Saharan Africa between 2021 and 2025 (Figure 8.3).
Figure 8.3. Sub-Saharan Africa aggregate crypto-asset transaction values (2021-2025)
Copy link to Figure 8.3. Sub-Saharan Africa aggregate crypto-asset transaction values (2021-2025)
Note: Sub-Saharan Africa includes the following jurisdictions: Angola, Botswana, Cameroon, Côte d’Ivoire, Ethiopia, Ghana, Kenya, Madagascar, Mauritius, Mozambique, Namibia, Nigeria, Senegal, South Africa, Tanzania, Reunion, Rwanda, Togo, Uganda, Zambia, Zimbabwe.
Source: Chainalysis (2025[6]), Geography of crypto report, https://www.chainalysis.com/reports/2025-geo-crypto-report/
8.3.1. Growing adoption of stablecoins
Stablecoin use is also increasing, with activity largely linked to crypto-asset trading and, to a lesser extent, cross‑border payments and remittances. This aligns with global trends, where the use of stablecoins to facilitate crypto-asset trading accounts for 89% of usage, while payments represent a much smaller share, at 2% (Figure 8.4). This distribution underscores the continued primacy of trading functions, while also pointing to a nascent role for stablecoins in payment and settlement activities (BCG, 2025[15]).
Figure 8.4. Top five global stablecoin use cases, by value and share (2024)
Copy link to Figure 8.4. Top five global stablecoin use cases, by value and share (2024)
Note: Approximated values across total identified stablecoin transactions of USD 26.1 trillion in 2024. P2P refers to “person to person”, B2C refers to “business to consumer” and C2B refers to “consumer to business”
Source: BCG (2025[15]), White Paper on Stablecoins, https://media-publications.bcg.com/Stablecoins-five-killer-tests-to-gauge-their-potential.pdf
In many sub-Saharan African economies, traditional remittance channels remain relatively costly, with the average price of remittances at 6.4% in 2025 (World Bank, 2025[16]). Transactions can also be slow or inaccessible to segments of the population. Under certain conditions, stablecoin‑based transfers could offer a more efficient alternative, enabling users to send and receive funds more quickly and at lower cost (CPMI, 2023[17]; Adrian et al., 2025[18]). This has made them especially attractive in contexts characterised by high levels of outward migration and strong reliance on diaspora inflows, such as Ghana, Kenya and Nigeria (African Development Bank Group, 2025[19]; IMF, 2025[9]).
Nigeria and South Africa are emerging as key stablecoin demand drivers, with both high usage and strong expectations of future adoption (BVNK et al., 2026[20]). In both countries, uptake is substantial: close to 80% of respondents to a survey of current retail crypto-asset owners reported holding stablecoins, and more than 75% of stablecoin holders planned to expand their holdings over the next year. The results also suggested stronger prospective adoption in lower- and middle-income economies. In Nigeria, an overwhelming majority of respondents expressed a preference for receiving payments in stablecoins rather than in domestic currency. These findings suggest expanding demand, but also a growing expectation that stablecoins will achieve wider acceptance within domestic payment ecosystems (Reuters, 2026[21]).
8.4. Enablers of crypto-asset activity
Copy link to 8.4. Enablers of crypto-asset activityThe adoption of crypto-assets and stablecoins across jurisdictions is influenced by several factors, including regulatory arbitrage, economic fundamentals, geopolitical posture, fiscal and monetary policies, digital literacy levels and technical capacity at the national or regional level. Accordingly, levels of adoption of the technologies vary between African countries, and governments and financial supervisory authorities have adopted a wide range of regulatory approaches (OECD, 2023[22]; OECD, 2025[23]; BIS, 2023[24]; OECD, 2022[25]). This section outlines the specific conditions that contribute to expanding crypto-asset and stablecoin activity in Africa.
8.4.1. Infrastructure
Crypto-assets, stablecoins and the underlying Distributed Ledger Technologies (DLT) require reliable continuous and widely available computing infrastructure, including secure hosting services, reliable uptime and the capability to process transactions at high speed with minimal delay. Crypto-asset networks, custodial services and exchanges require reliable data storage capabilities and well-developed backend systems (Demmou and Sagot, 2021[26]).
Access to dependable electricity sources is a key enabler for systems that regularly access crypto-asset and stablecoin services. This is particularly pertinent in Africa’s context. Stable electricity supply plays a central role in ensuring consistent system availability, which is critical for payment-related use cases such as merchant transactions, remittances, bill settlements, and salary disbursements – areas where stablecoins often serve as solutions. Reliable electricity is also a key foundation because it sustains the telecommunications and internet infrastructure on which crypto-asset and stablecoin services depend (Jameaba, 2024[27]; Khiaonarong et al., 2021[28]).
8.4.2. Technical skills
The development of domestic crypto-asset activity also relies on the availability of advanced software and related technical skills, which can support FinTech innovation and the development of digital payment infrastructure. These capabilities can increase the supply of crypto-asset products and services and support the development of crypto-asset markets in African jurisdictions.
In terms of technical skills in the labour force, South Africa is best positioned among the countries analysed. It possesses a mature information and communication technology (ICT) skills base, supported by universities, private-sector technology firms, and a mature financial services industry (World Bank, 2018[29]).
Improving financial literacy is also crucial in ensuring that the demand for crypto-assets is informed, and decisions made by individuals who understand their underlying functioning and characteristics. Efforts to enhance retail users’ understanding of crypto-assets and stablecoins should focus on their characteristics, opportunities, and risks, especially with regard to volatility, technological and operational risks. Across sub-Saharan Africa, Mauritius, Botswana, South Africa and Zimbabwe stand out as the highest achievers on financial literacy scores as of 2012 (OECD, 2025[23]; OECD, 2012[30]).
8.5. Implications of growing crypto-asset and stablecoin adoption for economic resilience in Africa
Copy link to 8.5. Implications of growing crypto-asset and stablecoin adoption for economic resilience in AfricaCrypto-asset and stablecoin deployment carries both opportunities and risks, with some appearing more prominent for African jurisdictions. This section outlines the specific opportunity for stablecoins to support cheaper and faster cross-border payments in support of Africa’s economic development, as well as challenges related to monetary policy, currency substitution, financing of illicit activities, cyber-resilience and consumer protection.
8.5.1. Facilitating remittances and cross-border payments
The use of stablecoins can support trade flows between African countries and other countries or regions, acting as settlement rails with significantly lower transaction fees and faster settlement. Disregarding the jurisdictions where issuance or use of stablecoins is unauthorised, such crypto-assets may be attractive to larger corporations, smaller enterprises and individuals, due to less rigorous regulatory obligations, facilitated high-value transactions, and reduced volatility in the case of stablecoins linked to the US dollar (IMF and FSB, 2024[8]; Chainalysis, 2025[6]). In that sense, stablecoins are increasingly being used as a preferred alternative to traditional channels for transmission and settlement of remittances (Auer, Lewrick and Paulick, 2025[31]; Arner, Auer and Frost, 2020[32]). Local issuance of stablecoins is being explored in Ghana, specifically domestic-currency stablecoins backed by commodity-linked assets, or designs tied to the local currency while deriving credibility from commodities (Cook et al., 2025[33]).
Mobile payments (mobile money) are still the dominant digital payment channel for sub-Saharan Africa, with a 14.5% year on year (2023-2024) increase in daily transaction values (GSMA, 2026[34]). By giving users an easy and convenient entry point to electronic payments and providing assurance and comfort to end users of digital finance solutions, mobile payment ecosystems could cause consumers to be more prone to experimenting with technologies such as crypto-assets and stablecoins (World Bank, 2022[35]; Illes, Kosse and Wierts, 2025[36]). Crypto-asset adoption is expanding most rapidly in countries where mobile money ecosystems are already well established, such as Kenya, Nigeria, Ghana, and South Africa (Ricci et al., 2025[37]). The settlement of crypto-asset and stablecoin payments into mobile wallets is also making their use increasingly attractive amongst retail users. The additional potential for stablecoins to be used in countries with currency instability, facilitating cross-border interactions and seamless interoperability of systems in-country as well as globally, cannot be overlooked (Adrian et al., 2025[18]).
One key challenge is the ability of stablecoin holders to redeem their coins at par, en masse and at short notice (a ‘run’ on a stablecoin), which requires sufficient backing assets to be held to meet potential redemption demands (OECD, 2022[1]). This is particularly relevant in African jurisdictions, where foreign exchange constraints and limited convertibility can complicate the ability of issuers to maintain sufficient liquid reserves and meet redemption demands in foreign currency. Data from the US Office of the Comptroller of the Currency reveals that even in advanced economies, stablecoin liquidity is still a critical issue (Andersen Institute, 2026[38]).
8.5.2. Impacts on monetary policy, capital flows and currency substitution
Risks exist for crypto-assets to erode fiscal and monetary policy objectives, especially in jurisdictions with no formal regulatory foundation or oversight mechanisms. Ensuring appropriate tax collection on crypto-asset transactions requires both an updated legal framework that treats such operations as taxable, and sufficient supervision and enforcement of on-chain activities by the relevant authorities. South Africa has the continent’s most developed and clearly documented crypto-assets tax framework, having implemented the OECD’s Crypto-Asset Reporting Framework (South African Revenue Service, 2026[39]; South African Revenue Service, 2018[40]).
Crypto-asset usage at a widespread scale can also lead to “crypto dollarisation” or external currency reliance, negatively affecting monetary sovereignty and monetary policy transmission, with hazards amplified where regulatory frameworks are not mature (Pazarbasioglu Ceyla et al., 2020[41]). Crypto dollarisation could reduce the impetus for savings in local currency, while negatively affecting domestic transactions and resulting in a loss of seigniorage (Adrian et al., 2025[18]; Nikolić, 2023[42]). Further potential adverse consequences include the facilitation of capital flight in economies with exchange controls, wealth exiting the domestic monetary system, central banks losing control over money supply, local banks holding fewer deposits and governments losing monetary policy power (BIS, 2023[24]; Hacibedel, 2023[43]; IMF and FSB, 2023[44]; Arner, Auer and Frost, 2020[32]).
8.5.3. Illicit finance and cybersecurity challenges
Crypto-assets also carry significant illicit financing risks in jurisdictions with outdated regulatory frameworks that lack comprehensive safeguards. This is due to the inherent nature of crypto-assets, particularly their ability to facilitate near-anonymous cross-border payments outside traditional payment rails. Certain technical features of DLTs can be exploited for illicit purposes, including their pseudonymous nature, cross‑chain interoperability, and rapid settlement, which can facilitate layering and chain‑hopping.2 These features can reduce traceability, and complicate timely detection, supervision and enforcement. Stablecoins have emerged as a preferred tool of illicit finance, making up as much as 84% of the global illicit financing volume involving crypto-assets in 2025 (Figure 8.5, Panel A). Africa has also seen prominent cases of crypto-asset misuse for criminal activity. For example, in February 2025 Nigerian authorities brought charges against 53 individuals for criminal activities that included crypto-asset-based fraud, with USD 222 million in crypto-assets seized as part of the investigation (OCCRP, 2025[45]).
The lack of robust regulatory frameworks exacerbates the risks of misuse of crypto-assets. Outdated, inadequate or fragmented requirements for due diligence, monitoring and enforcement weaken policymakers’ ability to intervene and prevent illicit finance flows through online marketplaces (Hunter, Mclaggan and Harbottle, 2025[46]). Uneven implementation of key international standards such as the FATF Recommendations is a further challenge that requires policy action (discussed further in Section 8.7 below).
Cybersecurity is another key concern affecting crypto-asset wallet holders, exchanges and other service providers. At the global level, crypto-asset related cyber-attacks have led to losses valued at USD 16.5 billion over the past decade (DefiLlama, 2026[47]). Attacks targeting wallet holders, through unauthorised access to private keys and wallets, resulted in losses of around USD 9 billion, or 56% of total losses in the same period (Panel B). This highlights challenges in securing crypto-assets against cyber-theft, in particular those held in hot wallets.3
Figure 8.5. Illicit finance and cybersecurity challenges related to crypto-assets
Copy link to Figure 8.5. Illicit finance and cybersecurity challenges related to crypto-assets
Note: This figure shows illicit financing and cybersecurity challenges observed globally. Panel B groups different types of hacking techniques causing compromised private keys, namely brute force, social engineering and other unknown techniques.
Source: Chainalysis (2026[48]), The 2026 Crypto Crime Report, https://www.chainalysis.com/wp-content/uploads/2026/03/the-2026-crypto-crime-report-3-17-release.pdf; DefiLlama (2026[47]), Hacks: Overview, https://defillama.com/hacks.
8.5.4. Consumer protection and financial literacy challenges
Certain features of crypto-asset markets pose significant retail investor risks, namely high price volatility, a lack of oversight and protection measures such as deposit insurance, information asymmetries and investors’ behavioural biases such as fear of missing out (herd behaviour) (OECD, forthcoming[49]; 2025[23]). Further, crypto-asset markets also increasingly feature sophisticated investment techniques such as leveraged positions and derivatives, which may not be suitable for non-expert investors (OECD, 2022[1]; 2024[50]).
Fraud and scams are an important source of risk for retail investors. As an example, in 2025 Zambian authorities carried out an intervention against fraudulent online crypto-asset investment schemes, estimated to have impacted 65 000 people with total losses worth USD 100 million (Interpol, 2025[51]). This incident aligns with global patterns; a recent OECD report notes that 41 out of 60 surveyed jurisdictions worldwide have observed an increase in financial scams and frauds in 2025, compared to 2024. Eighty-five per cent of these jurisdictions identified scams and frauds as one of the top three risks financial consumers currently face (OECD, 2026[52]). Fraud and scams are increasingly complex, leveraging generative Artificial Intelligence (AI) and other new technologies, with detection and screening systems struggling to keep pace (OECD, 2026[53]).
Seventy percent of Africa’s population is below the age of 30 (United Nations, 2026[54]). Younger and less experienced investors are more likely to engage with crypto-assets (Lanciano, Previati and Ricci, 2026[55]). This pattern may have particular relevance for Africa, where economic uncertainty may influence young people’s interest in alternative financial products, while behavioural biases can influence investment decisions and perceptions of potential returns (OECD, 2025[23]).
These risks are compounded by inadequate levels of digital and financial literacy, both globally and across Africa. OECD research highlights that crypto-asset users tend to be younger and less experienced than users of traditional financial instruments, with only 55% of these users understanding basic concepts such as the lack of legal tender status for these assets (OECD, 2023[56]).
8.6. Evolving crypto-asset policy and regulatory stances in Africa
Copy link to 8.6. Evolving crypto-asset policy and regulatory stances in AfricaAfrican authorities regulate crypto-assets to address financial crime, macroeconomic pressures, financial system risks and monetary sovereignty concerns (Ozili, 2024[57]). Compliance with FATF grey4 and black5 list requirements is one motivation, alongside efforts to prevent money laundering, and the financing of terrorism and proliferation. In June 2026, six African jurisdictions were included on the FATF grey list (FATF, 2026[58]). Authorities also seek to curb exchange-rate manipulation and foreign-exchange outflows linked to crypto-asset trading. Other motivations include protecting consumers, preventing fraud and preserving financial system integrity and stability. Cybersecurity weaknesses compound these concerns. In 2021, an estimated 90% of African companies lacked the necessary cybersecurity protocols (INTERPOL, 2021[59]). Finally, authorities may seek to protect national legal tender by preventing crypto-assets from being used as such, while permitting investment and trading.
African jurisdictions are nonetheless taking diverging approaches towards crypto-assets and stablecoins (see Table 8.1). Several jurisdictions have already introduced formal policy frameworks with clear supervisory pathways. Other jurisdictions are taking a more cautious “explore, but wait and see” approach with sandboxes in place, draft legislations and rules being considered and consultation ongoing amongst financial supervisory authorities, financial intelligence units and key market and industry stakeholders. Lastly, a group of jurisdictions have maintained a restrictive stance, in some cases prohibiting crypto-asset trading and related activities.
Table 8.1. Crypto-assets and stablecoins: Key policy and regulatory developments in Africa
Copy link to Table 8.1. Crypto-assets and stablecoins: Key policy and regulatory developments in Africa|
Jurisdiction |
Description |
|---|---|
|
Botswana |
Botswana has in place a comprehensive crypto-assets statute, which also addresses Crypto Asset Service Provider (CASP) licensing, under the Virtual Assets Act, 2025. The law also covers exchanges and custody. Stablecoins are not expressly addressed through a distinct regulatory category. They may fall within the framework where they satisfy the statutory definition of a virtual asset. (National Assembly of Botswana, 2025[60]). |
|
Egypt |
Egypt has in place a “de facto” ban on crypto-assets and stablecoins. Law 194 of 2020 prohibits issuing or trading these assets, unless individual approval is granted by the Central Bank of Egypt, with no such approvals given up to September 2026. (Central Bank of Egypt, 2023[61]). |
|
Ghana |
Ghana enacted the Virtual Asset Service Providers Act, 2025, establishing activity-based licensing and supervision by the Bank of Ghana and Securities and Exchange Commission. The framework covers exchanges, custody, wallet services, transfers and issuance. Stablecoins fall within the general crypto-asset perimeter, although no separate stablecoin-specific regime has been publicly established (Republic of Ghana, 2025[62]). |
|
Kenya |
Kenya regulates crypto-asset services under the Virtual Asset Service Providers Act, 2025 and implementing Regulations adopted in 2026. The framework establishes licensing requirements for exchanges, custodial wallet providers, brokers, advisers and crypto-asset payment processors. The Regulations expressly recognise stablecoins as consumer assets and subject related services to the broader crypto-asset framework (Republic of Kenya, 2025[63]; Republic of Kenya, 2026[64]). |
|
Mauritius |
Mauritius has in place comprehensive statutes for CASP licensing and initial token offering services, inclusive of conduct and custody rules and guidelines, while stablecoins are classified as tokens and not standalone assets (Financial Services Commission Mauritius, 2021[65]). Stablecoins are not separately regulated, but may fall within the framework when they meet the definition of a crypto-asset or virtual token. |
|
Morocco |
Morocco has not established a licensing framework for crypto-asset service providers. Financial authorities continue to classify virtual-currency activity as unauthorised and warn that its use may breach foreign-exchange and financial regulations. No separate stablecoin framework exists, and stablecoins may fall within these restrictions when used as virtual currencies or unauthorised payment instruments (Office des Changes, 2022[66]; Bank Al-Maghrib, 2026[67]). |
|
Namibia |
The Virtual Assets Act of 2023 regulated the licensing, registration and oversight of crypto-assets and currencies including tokens, stablecoins, exchanges and custody (Bank of Namibia, 2023[68]). |
|
Nigeria |
Nigeria has in place formal statutes and securities regulatory regimes through the Investments and Securities Act (2025). The rules cover issuance, offering, custody, CASPs and exchanges (Nigeria SEC, 2025[69]). Stablecoins are regulated through the same oversight framework. |
|
Rwanda |
Rwanda enacted its first framework governing crypto-asset businesses in 2026. The Capital Market Authority licenses and supervises service providers, in cooperation with the National Bank of Rwanda. The framework addresses crypto-asset services, issuance, consumer protection and financial integrity risks. It does not appear to establish a separate stablecoin category, and payment use requires explicit central bank authorisation (Republic of Rwanda, 2026[70]). |
|
Seychelles |
Seychelles has in place formal legislation via the VASP Act (2024) administered by the Financial Services Authority. It provides a legal framework for regulation of licensing, initial coin offerings, crypto-assets and stablecoins (Seychelles FSA, 2024[71]). |
|
South Africa |
South Africa has in place formal legislative frameworks for the regulation of crypto-assets under the existing legal framework which cover licensing, designation and oversight, although there is no dedicated crypto-asset specific law (FSCA, 2024[72]). Stablecoins are regulated only insofar as they are crypto-assets under licensing stipulated by the Financial Advisory and Intermediary Services Act (Republic of South Africa, 2002[73]); a separate stablecoin law is not yet in force. |
|
Tanzania |
The Bank of Tanzania has warned that crypto-assets are not legal tender and has cautioned regulated institutions against facilitating related transactions. Its 2024 fintech sandbox permits controlled testing of eligible financial innovations, including DLT applications. However, official sources do not confirm that stablecoins have been admitted, approved or generally authorised through the sandbox (Bank of Tanzania, 2024[74]; Bank of Tanzania, 2025[75]). |
|
Tunisia |
Tunisia has not established dedicated legislation or a licensing framework for crypto-assets or CASPs. (Ministère des Finances, 2019[76]). |
|
Zambia |
Zambia is currently developing a CASP register as of April 2026. However, the use of crypto-assets is still not permitted by the law and they are not regulated (Bank of Zambia, 2018[77]). Stablecoins are not currently under consideration. |
Note: Summary of policy and regulatory developments in selected African countries
A range of factors influence the differing regulatory stances, such as the level of domestic crypto-asset activity, the capacity and resourcing available to financial authorities, and political and cultural priorities. Among jurisdictions maintaining a restrictive stance, financial authorities express concerns that promoting and supporting the use of crypto-asset-based currencies and assets could potentially erode sovereignty, reduce demand for local currency and unintentionally enable currency substitution (OECD, 2024[50]; BIS, 2023[24]).
African authorities are already actively pursuing policies and initiatives that fight illicit finance in crypto-asset markets (African Union, 2024[78]). In 2024, African Union Mechanism for Police Cooperation (AFRIPOL) provided tools and conducted capacity building sessions on crypto-assets and open-source intelligence to African Union jurisdictions. Beyond these initiatives, AFRIPOL, in collaboration with INTERPOL, employs efforts to integrate African law enforcement agencies from the operational all the way up to the strategic levels. Such efforts support the practical enforcement of anti-money laundering and countering the financing of terrorism (AML/CFT) frameworks by equipping authorities with the skills required to identify illicit activity in increasingly complex digital environments.
8.6.1. Initiatives and activities relating to central bank digital currencies
Central bank digital currency (CBDC) exploration is still at an initial stage in African jurisdictions. Research and exploration predominate among central banks and similar authorities. The two notable exceptions are South Africa, which has been part of a BIS multilateral CBDC pilot but has not undertaken any domestic CBDC initiatives for the time being, and Nigeria, which launched its retail CBDC (eNaira) in October 2021 but saw low adoption (See Annex Table 8.A.1 for an overview of CBDC exploration in the continent).
8.7. Key policy recommendations
Copy link to 8.7. Key policy recommendationsStablecoins and crypto-assets present economic opportunities for African countries, but also significant risks as discussed above. This requires regulators to be open to financial innovation while at the same time attentive to the risks it poses to the financial system, in order to safeguard consumers and protect market resilience.
This section discusses key policy recommendations to ensure effective regulation and oversight of crypto-asset activity in Africa, in support of economic development. The recommendations are presented in a sequenced manner, starting from those most foundational and with the most immediate capacity to improve markets and cross-border policy alignment. The establishment of a solid national policy foundation, paired with international standards, will facilitate improvements to policy frameworks for AML/CFT, cybersecurity and financial consumer protection. These areas should be pursued in parallel by regulators, rather than sequentially, to address existing policy and regulatory fragilities without delay and avoid making progress in one area contingent on initiatives in another.
Regional co-operation should support each stage of this approach, rather than operating as a separate policy objective (African Development Bank, 2021[79]). Common regulatory baselines among African jurisdictions can reduce arbitrage, while supervisory co-operation can strengthen oversight of foreign CASPs and stablecoin arrangements. Regional institutions can also pool expertise, develop shared supervisory tools and support jurisdictions facing capacity constraints. Stronger alignment among these jurisdictions could, then, support regional integration.
To promote economic development, African jurisdictions could integrate crypto-assets and stablecoins in a safe manner into resilience‑oriented policy frameworks. Alternative and sustainable revenue streams could be generated by developing mechanisms for taxation6 of existing and future crypto-asset-based activities, including trading, mining, and service provision, while avoiding excessively punitive approaches that drive activity offshore. This approach aligns crypto-asset adoption with environmental and development priorities rather than speculative use alone.
8.7.1. Aligning national policy frameworks with international standards
Policy approaches to crypto-assets are evolving along different trajectories across African jurisdictions. While some authorities are yet to put regulation in place, others have either banned, started exploring or fully regulated crypto-assets or stablecoins. A central policy objective remains the progressive implementation of international standards, which are designed to address the risks associated with crypto-assets while supporting market development. Such international alignment can enhance the resilience of domestic financial systems, close continental regulatory gaps and strengthen investor confidence and protection vis-à-vis crypto-assets.
Regional co-ordination could ease translating international standards into more consistent local approaches, while allowing proportionate responses to different market conditions. Regional bodies could develop common licensing expectations, reporting templates and supervisory protocols for cross-border crypto-asset activities. Co-operation could also support supervisory colleges, co-ordinated inspections and information exchange concerning providers operating across several African jurisdictions.
Key international standards include:
FSB principles: In 2023, the Financial Stability Board (FSB) updated its High-level Recommendations for the Regulation, Supervision and Oversight of Global Stablecoin Arrangements (FSB, 2023[80]). These emphasise that stablecoin activities7 should achieve regulatory outcomes equivalent to those applied in traditional finance. In 2023, the FSB also updated its High-level Recommendations for the Regulation, Supervision and Oversight of Crypto-asset Activities and Markets (FSB, 2023[81]). These stress the importance of ensuring that all crypto‑asset activities and market participants are brought within regulatory and supervisory perimeters, to close regulatory gaps and inconsistencies across jurisdictions.
BCBS and IOSCO frameworks: From a prudential perspective, the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision (BCBS) developed a risk-based regime that requires due diligence and classification, among other measures (BCBS, 2024[82]). The framework is already in place and parts of it are currently under revision (BCBS, 2025[83]). The International Organization of Securities Commissions (IOSCO) also revised in 2023 its policy recommendations to explicitly incorporate crypto-assets, aiming at maintaining safe, well governed and transparent markets from an integrity and investor protection point of view (IOSCO, 2023[84]).
The CPMI-IOSCO Principles for Financial Market Infrastructures (PFMIs): The PFMIs provide a reliable and internationally accepted set of standards applicable to stablecoin arrangements in African countries designated as systemically important (CPMI and IOSCO, 2012[85]). Key considerations include: (i) the prospective use of settlement assets that are neither central bank money nor commercial bank money, which may introduce additional sources of financial risk; (ii) the interdependencies across multiple stablecoin arrangement functions; and (iii) the extent of decentralisation in operational processes and/or governance structures. Adoption of the PFMIs in the governance of stablecoins is an enabler for governance and oversight of SAs in Africa (CPMI and IOSCO, 2023[86]).
ISO 20022: The International Organization for Standardization’s (ISO) 20022 Standard is an internationally recognised financial messaging standard facilitates the exchange of detailed, structured and interoperable data across payment and financial market infrastructures. For African economies, ISO 20022 can serve as a critical enabler of safe and efficient integration of crypto-assets and stablecoins within the broader financial system. A key challenge to wider crypto-asset and stablecoin adoption is the limited interoperability between traditional financial infrastructures and blockchain-based networks. By establishing a common data language across payment ecosystems, ISO 20022 can help bridge this gap, enabling more seamless communication between regulated financial institutions and crypto-asset platforms. When combined with stablecoin-based settlement arrangements, ISO 20022 has the potential to support faster transaction processing, lower payment costs and enhance the transparency and traceability of financial transactions. These improvements could contribute to greater efficiency, interoperability and confidence across both conventional and digital financial services (Swift, 2026[87]).
8.7.2. Enhancing measures against illicit finance and cybercrime
FATF’s Recommendation 15, which extends AML/CFT obligations to crypto-assets and their service providers, could be the starting point for African jurisdictions to enhance their measures against illicit finance. It requires such service providers to be subject to licensing or registration, ongoing supervision, and the full set of preventive AML/CFT measures applicable to financial institutions, including customer due diligence, record‑keeping, and suspicious transaction reporting (FATF, 2012[88]). Risk assessments and a risk‑based approach to crypto-asset activities are also recommended, recognising the potential for regulatory gaps to be exploited. Given the borderless nature of crypto-assets, authorities should ensure compliance with the FATF “Travel Rule”, which requires the collection and transmission of originator and beneficiary information for relevant crypto-asset transfers (FATF, 2025[89]).
African jurisdictions should take account of national and regional specificities in their financial systems and user profiles when designing AML/CFT measures (Cook et al., 2025[33]). Supervision, for instance, could consider financial market depth and the scale of stablecoin adoption across jurisdictions. With stablecoins having pronounced cross-border usage, most of these instruments are issued outside Africa, making it important to strengthen oversight at domestic touchpoints and enhance co-operation with foreign regulators to ensure effective compliance. Co-operation through the relevant FATF-Style Regional Bodies (FSRBs)8 could also support risk assessments, supervisory convergence, information exchange and co-ordinated enforcement.
African jurisdictions could consider introducing comprehensive national cybersecurity strategies, integrating cybercrime prevention and institutional strengthening. A first priority could be establishing and reinforcing specialised cybercrime units. Closer co-ordination between financial regulators and cybersecurity authorities can enhance the protection of crypto-asset-related activities, while structured public‑private partnerships can facilitate real‑time information sharing and threat intelligence (INTERPOL, 2021[59]). At a regional level, strengthened cross‑border co-operation, including joint operations, data exchange platforms and harmonised investigative practices, can help address the transnational nature of cybercrime and support the secure development of digital asset markets across the continent.
8.7.3. Ensuring robust financial consumer protection and financial education frameworks
The G20/OECD High-Level Principles on Financial Consumer Protection provide guidance for jurisdictions on financial consumer protection policy (OECD, 2022[90]). Digitalisation, of which crypto-assets and stablecoins are a part, is a cross-cutting theme of the Principles, reflecting its implications for consumers, providers and financial markets. The Principles emphasise fair treatment of users, transparency, and access to suitable financial services, which if fully implemented would help safeguard trust across the full lifecycle of crypto-assets and stablecoins.
Almost 80% of surveyed sub-Saharan African financial authorities identify speculation as the main driver of crypto-asset adoption (Ricci, 2024[91]). This assessment is consistent with evidence highlighting speculative behaviour and related consumer risks (OECD, 2023[56]). Crypto-assets transacted in sub-Saharan Africa are also predominantly issued outside these jurisdictions. This underlines the centrality of implementing and strengthening regulatory frameworks and standards to ensure that the nascent but growing use of both crypto-assets and stablecoins in African jurisdictions does not expose merchants or consumers to undue risks.
The comprehensiveness of financial consumer protection frameworks is essential to safeguard users of crypto-assets and stablecoins. More specific measures could include standardised disclosures and risk warnings to improve comparability and reduce misleading practices across providers. Users should understand each instrument’s characteristics, including the absence of deposit insurance or sovereign guarantees for stablecoins. Transparency alone may however be insufficient where financial literacy is limited. Authorities could complement disclosure requirements with effective customer support, timely dispute resolution and robust fraud prevention measures (Cook et al., 2025[33]). The OECD Recommendation on Financial Literacy provides an overarching framework for developing national financial literacy policies (OECD, 2020[92]). Complementing it, the G20/OECD INFE Policy Guidance on Digital Financial Literacy addresses financial literacy needs associated with digital financial products and services (OECD, 2018[93]). Both instruments emphasise the importance of considering the needs of vulnerable groups.
References
[18] Adrian, T. et al. (2025), “Understanding Stablecoins”, Departmental Papers, Vol. 2025/009, p. 1, https://doi.org/10.5089/9798229024075.087.
[79] African Development Bank (2021), 2021 AEC: Experts call for African crypto currency, integrated capital market to ease business costs, https://www.afdb.org/en/news-and-events/press-releases/2021-aec-experts-call-african-crypto-currency-integrated-capital-market-ease-business-costs-47279 (accessed on 9 September 2026).
[19] African Development Bank Group (2025), Unlocking Africa’s Potential: Making Remittances Work for Development, African Development Bank Group, https://www.afdb.org/en/documents/category/working-paper-series (accessed on 1 July 2026).
[78] African Union (2024), African Union strengthens investigation capabilities on virtual assets and cybercrime., https://au.int/en/pressreleases/20240522/african-union-strengthens-investigation-capabilities-virtual-assets-and (accessed on 18 May 2026).
[38] Andersen Institute (2026), Unintended Consequences of the OCC’s Stablecoin Liquidity Rules - Andersen Institute, Andersen Institute, https://anderseninstitute.org/unintended-consequences-of-the-occs-stablecoin-liquidity-rules/ (accessed on 5 June 2026).
[32] Arner, D., R. Auer and J. Frost (2020), “Stablecoins: Risks, Potential and Regulation”, SSRN Electronic Journal, https://doi.org/10.2139/SSRN.3979495.
[31] Auer, R., U. Lewrick and J. Paulick (2025), “DeFiying gravity? An empirical analysis of cross-border Bitcoin, Ether and stablecoin flows”, BIS working papers, https://www.bis.org/publ/work1265.htm (accessed on 8 April 2026).
[67] Bank Al-Maghrib (2026), Monnaie virtuelle, https://www.bkam.ma/Trouvez-l-information-concernant/Monnaie-virtuelle (accessed on 9 September 2026).
[96] Bank of Botswana (2024), Annual Report, https://www.bankofbotswana.bw/sites/default/files/news-files/Annual%20Report%202024.pdf (accessed on 11 May 2026).
[103] Bank of Ghana (2025), Talk by Mr. Musa Itopa Jimoh at CEDI@60 International Currency Conference [video], https://youtu.be/67lMQ_pKk28?t=18379 (accessed on 12 May 2026).
[100] Bank of Mauritius (2024), Media Release: The Bank of Mauritius calls for participation in projects for its Innovation Hub, https://www.bom.mu/media/media-releases/media-release-bank-mauritius-calls-participation-projects-its-innovation-hub (accessed on 11 May 2026).
[68] Bank of Namibia (2023), Bank of Namibia - Virtual Assets Act 2023, Bank of Namibia, Windhoek, https://www.bon.com.na/Regulations/Virtual-Assets-Act-2023.aspx (accessed on 11 May 2026).
[75] Bank of Tanzania (2025), Official Announcement - THE 2ND COHORT OF BANK OF TANZANIA FINTECH REGULATORY SANDBOX, https://frsp.bot.go.tz/ (accessed on 9 September 2026).
[74] Bank of Tanzania (2024), Fintech Regulatory Sandbox Regulations.
[105] Bank of Tanzania (2023), Public Notice: Bank of Tanzania Progress on Central Bank Digital Currency, https://www.bot.go.tz/Adverts/PressRelease/en/2023011413181519.pdf (accessed on 12 May 2026).
[106] Bank of Uganda (2024), Integrated Annual Report, https://bou.or.ug/uploads/Integrated_Annual_Report_2024_2025_9bfa4a9ed6.pdf (accessed on 12 May 2026).
[77] Bank of Zambia (2018), Press Release on Cryptocurrencies, Bank of Zambia, Lusaka, https://www.boz.zm/PRESS-RELEASE-ON-CRYPTOCURRENCIES.pdf (accessed on 30 April 2025).
[83] BCBS (2025), Basel Committee continues to prioritise Basel III implementation, approves final principles on third-party risks and agrees to expedite targeted review of cryptoasset standard, https://www.bis.org/press/p251119.htm (accessed on 18 May 2026).
[82] BCBS (2024), Core Principles for effective banking supervision, https://www.bis.org/bcbs/publ/d573.htm (accessed on 18 December 2025).
[98] BCEAO (2024), Rapport annuel de la BCEAO, https://www.bceao.int/fr/publications/rapport-annuel-de-la-bceao-2024 (accessed on 11 May 2026).
[15] BCG (2025), BCG, Visa Onchain dashboard stablecoins use cases, Boston Consulting Group, Boston, https://media-publications.bcg.com/Stablecoins-five-killer-tests-to-gauge-their-potential.pdf (accessed on 1 June 2026).
[11] BIS (2025), Stablecoin growth – policy challenges and approaches, BIS Bulletins, https://www.bis.org/publ/bisbull108.htm (accessed on 23 June 2026).
[24] BIS (2023), The crypto ecosystem: key elements and risks, Bank for International Settlements, Basel, https://www.bis.org/publ/othp72.pdf (accessed on 8 April 2026).
[114] BIS (2021), “III. CBDCs: an opportunity for the monetary system”, in Annual Economic Report, https://www.bis.org/publ/arpdf/ar2021e3.htm (accessed on 13 May 2026).
[95] BIS Innovation Hub (2022), Project Dunbar: international settlements using multi-CBDCs, https://www.bis.org/about/bisih/topics/cbdc/dunbar.htm (accessed on 13 May 2026).
[94] BISIH et al. (2022), BIS Innovation Hub and central banks of Australia, Malaysia, Singapore and South Africa develop experimental multi-CBDC platform for international settlements, https://www.resbank.co.za/content/dam/sarb/publications/media-releases/2022/project-dunbar-/BIS%20Innovation%20Hub%20led%20Project%20Dunbar%27s%20final%20report.pdf (accessed on 12 May 2026).
[20] BVNK et al. (2026), Stablecoin Utility Report 2026, https://info.bvnk.com/utility.
[61] Central Bank of Egypt (2023), The Fourth (4th) Warning Statement on Cryptocurrencies, Warning statement, Cairo, https://www.cbe.org.eg/en/news-publications/news/2023/03/08/warning-statement (accessed on 12 May 2026).
[99] Central Bank of Kenya (2023), Issuance of Discussion Paper on Central Bank Digital Currency: Comments from the Public, https://www.centralbank.go.ke/uploads/press_releases/103592893_Press%20Release%20-%20Issuance%20of%20Discussion%20Paper%20on%20Central%20Bank%20Digital%20Currency%20-%20Comments%20from%20the%20Public.pdf (accessed on 11 May 2026).
[48] Chainalysis (2026), The 2026 Crypto Crime Report, https://www.chainalysis.com/wp-content/uploads/2026/03/the-2026-crypto-crime-report-3-17-release.pdf (accessed on 6 May 2026).
[5] Chainalysis (2025), 2025 Global Adoption Index, https://www.chainalysis.com/blog/2025-global-crypto-adoption-index/ (accessed on 19 March 2026).
[7] Chainalysis (2025), Sub-Saharan Africa Emerges as Third-Fastest Growing Crypto Region with Strong Retail Activity, Chainalysis, New York City, https://www.chainalysis.com/blog/subsaharan-africa-crypto-adoption-2025/ (accessed on 9 April 2026).
[6] Chainalysis (2025), The 2025 Geography of Crypto Report, https://www.chainalysis.com/wp-content/uploads/2025/10/the-2025-geography-of-crypto-report-release.pdf (accessed on 18 March 2026).
[109] Coinbase (2024), Hot vs cold crypto wallet: What’s the difference?, https://www.coinbase.com/en-fr/learn/wallet/hot-vs-cold-crypto-wallet-what-is-the-difference (accessed on 6 May 2026).
[4] CoinGecko (2025), Top Stablecoins by Market Cap | CoinGecko, Stablecoins by Market Capitalization, https://www.coingecko.com/en/categories/stablecoins (accessed on 29 April 2026).
[13] CoinMarketCap (2025), Bitcoin ATMs Appear in Kenya Before Regulators Issue Licenses | CoinMarketCap, CMC Crypto News, https://coinmarketcap.com/academy/article/bitcoin-atms-appear-in-kenya-before-regulators-issue-licenses (accessed on 30 June 2026).
[33] Cook, N. et al. (2025), Stablecoins in Africa: Translating Global Principles into Local Regulatory Practice, AIR, CGAP & DCI, https://www.dci.mit.edu/projects/stablecoins-in-africa-translating-global-principles-into-local-regulatory-practice (accessed on 18 May 2026).
[17] CPMI (2023), Considerations for the use of stablecoin arrangements in cross-border payments, https://www.bis.org/publications/considerations-use-stablecoin-arrangements-cross-border-payments (accessed on 10 September 2026).
[86] CPMI and IOSCO (2023), “Considerations for the use of stablecoin arrangements in cross-border payments”, https://www.bis.org/cpmi/publ/d220.htm (accessed on 28 May 2026).
[85] CPMI and IOSCO (2012), “Principles for financial market infrastructures”, https://www.bis.org/cpmi/publ/d101.htm (accessed on 28 May 2026).
[47] DefiLlama (2026), Hacks: Overview, https://defillama.com/hacks (accessed on 9 April 2026).
[26] Demmou, L. and Q. Sagot (2021), “Central Bank Digital Currencies and payments: A review of domestic and international implications”, OECD Economics Department Working Papers, No. 1655, OECD Publishing, Paris, https://doi.org/10.1787/f06c0d89-en.
[58] FATF (2026), “Black and grey” lists, https://www.fatf-gafi.org/en/countries/black-and-grey-lists.html (accessed on 15 May 2026).
[111] FATF (2026), Global Network, https://www.fatf-gafi.org/en/countries/global-network.html (accessed on 11 September 2026).
[89] FATF (2025), FATF urges stronger global action to address Illicit Finance Risks in Virtual Assets, https://www.fatf-gafi.org/en/publications/Fatfrecommendations/targeted-update-virtual-assets-vasps-2025.html (accessed on 4 May 2026).
[88] FATF (2012), The FATF Recommendations, https://www.fatf-gafi.org/en/publications/Fatfrecommendations/Fatf-recommendations.html (accessed on 18 May 2026).
[65] Financial Services Commission Mauritius (2021), Virtual Asset and Initial Token Offering Services Act of Mauritius, https://www.fscmauritius.org/media/119928/the-virtual-asset-and-initial-token-offering-services-act.pdf (accessed on 12 May 2026).
[81] FSB (2023), FSB Global Regulatory Framework for Crypto-asset Activities, https://www.fsb.org/2023/07/fsb-global-regulatory-framework-for-crypto-asset-activities/ (accessed on 20 October 2025).
[80] FSB (2023), High-level Recommendations for the Regulation, Supervision and Oversight of Global Stablecoin Arrangements: Final report, https://www.fsb.org/2023/07/high-level-recommendations-for-the-regulation-supervision-and-oversight-of-global-stablecoin-arrangements-final-report/ (accessed on 20 October 2025).
[115] FSB (2020), Regulation, Supervision and Oversight of “Global Stablecoin” Arrangements: Final Report and High-Level Recommendations, https://www.fsb.org/2023/07/high-level-recommendations-for-the-regulation-supervision-and-oversight-of-global-stablecoin-arrangements-final-report/ (accessed on 20 April 2026).
[72] FSCA (2024), FSCA confirms CASP licensing commenced 1 June 2023 under FAIS, Financial Sector Conduct Authority, https://www.fsca.co.za/_api/cr3ad_newses(ac3ef686-badb-f011-8544-000d3ab44730)/cr3ad_document/$value (accessed on 12 May 2026).
[34] GSMA (2026), The State of the Industry Report on Mobile Money 2026 | Mobile for Development, GSMA, London, https://www.gsma.com/solutions-and-impact/connectivity-for-good/mobile-for-development/gsma_resources/the-state-of-the-industry-report-on-mobile-money-2026/ (accessed on 11 May 2026).
[43] Hacibedel, B. (2023), “Assessing Macrofinancial Risks from Crypto Assets”, IMF Working Papers, Vol. 2023/214, p. 1, https://doi.org/10.5089/9798400255083.001.
[46] Hunter, M., M. Mclaggan and H. Harbottle (2025), Illicit Finance and Africa: A Regional Assessment, Global Initiative against Transnational Organized Crime, https://globalinitiative.net/wp-content/uploads/2025/11/Marcena-Hunter-Michael-McLaggan-Henry-Harbottle-Illicit-finance-and-Africa-A-regional-assessment-GI-TOC-November-2025.v2.pdf (accessed on 19 May 2026).
[36] Illes, A., A. Kosse and P. Wierts (2025), “Advancing in tandem - results of the 2024 BIS survey on central bank digital currencies and crypto”, https://www.bis.org/publ/bppdf/bispap159.htm (accessed on 22 May 2026).
[10] IMF (2026), Stablecoins in Nigeria: A Growing Cross-Border Channel, IMF News, https://www.imf.org/en/news/articles/2026/06/16/stablecoins-in-nigeria (accessed on 23 June 2026).
[9] IMF (2025), IMF Q2 2025 crypto assets monitor, IMF, https://www.imfconnect.org/content/dam/imf/News%20and%20Generic%20Content/GMM/Special%20Features/Crypto%20Assets%20Monitor.pdf (accessed on 1 June 2026).
[8] IMF and FSB (2024), G20 Crypto-asset Policy Implementation Roadmap: Status report - Financial Stability Board, IMF & FSB, Washington D.C. & Basel, https://www.fsb.org/2024/10/g20-crypto-asset-policy-implementation-roadmap-status-report/ (accessed on 8 April 2026).
[44] IMF and FSB (2023), FSB and IMF outline comprehensive approach to identify and respond to macroeconomic and financial stability risks associated with crypto-assets - Financial Stability Board, IMF & FSB, Washington D.C./Basel, https://www.fsb.org/uploads/R070923-1.pdf (accessed on 8 April 2026).
[97] Information and Decision Support Center (2023), أبرز التوجهاتِ الاستراتيجيةِ للاقتصادِ المصري للفترةِ الرئاسيةِ الجديدة (2024-2030) -التقرير الكامل - The Document of the Most Prominent Strategic Directions for the Egyptian Economy for the New Presidential Term (2024-2030), https://idsc.gov.eg/Publication/details/8857 (accessed on 11 May 2026).
[59] INTERPOL (2021), INTERPOL report identifies top cyberthreats in Africa, https://www.interpol.int/News-and-Events/News/2021/INTERPOL-report-identifies-top-cyberthreats-in-Africa (accessed on 18 May 2026).
[51] Interpol (2025), African authorities dismantle massive cybercrime and fraud networks, recover millions, https://www.interpol.int/en/News-and-Events/News/2025/African-authorities-dismantle-massive-cybercrime-and-fraud-networks-recover-millions (accessed on 21 May 2026).
[84] IOSCO (2023), Policy Recommendations for Crypto and Digital Asset Markets: Final Report, https://www.iosco.org/library/pubdocs/pdf/IOSCOPD747.pdf (accessed on 4 May 2026).
[27] Jameaba, M. (2024), Digitalization, Emerging Technologies, and Financial Stability: Challenges and Opportunities for the Indonesian Banking Sector and Beyond, https://doi.org/10.2139/SSRN.4808469.
[113] Jhanji, K. et al. (2025), White Paper on Stablecoins: Five killer tests to gauge their potential, https://media-publications.bcg.com/Stablecoins-five-killer-tests-to-gauge-their-potential.pdf.
[28] Khiaonarong, T. et al. (2021), “Operational Resilience in Digital Payments: Experiences and Issues”, IMF Working Papers, Vol. 2021/288, https://doi.org/10.5089/9781616355913.001.A001.
[101] Kunaratskul, T. et al. (2025), Namibia: Retail Central Bank Digital Currency Exploration and Roadmap, IMF, https://doi.org/10.5089/9798229001458.029.
[55] Lanciano, E., D. Previati and O. Ricci (2026), “Crypto ownership among young people: the effect of financial literacy, risk propensity and behavioural biases”, The European Journal of Finance, Vol. 32/3, pp. 399-419, https://doi.org/10.1080/1351847X.2026.2629350.
[12] Liu, A., O. Goni and A. Mitha (2021), Cryptocurrency in Africa: Alternative Opportunities for Advancing the Sustainable Development Goals?, UNDP, https://www.undp.org/africa/publications/cryptocurrency-africa-alternative-opportunities-advancing-sustainable-development-goals (accessed on 15 May 2026).
[76] Ministère des Finances (2019), Cadre réglementaire, https://www.finances.gov.tn/fr/cadre-reglementaire-5 (accessed on 9 September 2026).
[60] National Assembly of Botswana (2025), Botswana Virtual Assets Act, 2025, https://www.nbfira.org.bw/wp-content/uploads/2026/08/virtual-assets-act-2025.pdf (accessed on 12 May 2026).
[69] Nigeria SEC (2025), Overview of the SEC’s Amended Digital Assets Rules, Nigeria SEC, Lagos, https://sec.gov.ng/documents/8/Rules-on-Issuance-Offering-and-Custody-of-Digital-Assets.pdf (accessed on 13 April 2026).
[42] Nikolić, L. (2023), “Challenges of digitalization of financial transactions”, Zbornik radova Pravnog fakulteta Nis, Vol. 62/98, pp. 51-71, https://doi.org/10.5937/ZRPFN1-44231.
[45] OCCRP (2025), Nigeria Charges 53 in Global Crypto Scam, Cybercrime Ring, https://www.occrp.org/en/news/nigeria-charges-53-in-global-crypto-scam-cybercrime-ring (accessed on 19 May 2026).
[52] OECD (2026), Consumer Finance Risk Monitor 2026, OECD Publishing, Paris, https://doi.org/10.1787/61f7dbe0-en.
[53] OECD (2026), Protecting Consumers from Financial Scams and Frauds, OECD Publishing, Paris, https://doi.org/10.1787/d41817bb-en.
[23] OECD (2025), Improving the digital financial literacy of crypto-asset users, OECD Publishing, Paris, https://doi.org/10.1787/19cfecad-en.
[2] OECD (2025), OECD Economic Outlook, Interim Report September 2025: Finding the Right Balance in Uncertain Times, OECD Publishing, Paris, https://doi.org/10.1787/67b10c01-en.
[50] OECD (2024), The Limits of DeFi for Financial Inclusion: Lessons from ASEAN, OECD Publishing, Paris, https://doi.org/10.1787/f00a0c7f-en.
[22] OECD (2023), Blockchain adoption in Africa: Trends in market activity and policy development, Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development , Paris, https://rcemauritius.org/wp-content/uploads/2023/12/Blockchain-adoption-in-Africa-background-note.pdf (accessed on 8 April 2026).
[112] OECD (2023), International Standards for Automatic Exchange of Information in Tax Matters: Crypto-Asset Reporting Framework and 2023 update to the Common Reporting Standard, OECD Publishing, Paris, https://doi.org/10.1787/896d79d1-en (accessed on 27 April 2026).
[56] OECD (2023), “OECD/INFE 2023 International Survey of Adult Financial Literacy”, OECD Business and Finance Policy Papers, No. 39, OECD Publishing, Paris, https://doi.org/10.1787/56003a32-en.
[1] OECD (2022), “Institutionalisation of crypto-assets and DeFi–TradFi interconnectedness”, OECD Business and Finance Policy Papers, No. 01, OECD Publishing, Paris, https://doi.org/10.1787/5d9dddbe-en.
[25] OECD (2022), “Lessons from the crypto winter: DeFi versus CeFi”, OECD Business and Finance Policy Papers, No. 18, OECD Publishing, Paris, https://doi.org/10.1787/199edf4f-en.
[90] OECD (2022), Recommendation of the Council on High-Level Principles on Financial Consumer Protection, OECD/LEGAL/0394, https://legalinstruments.oecd.org/en/instruments/OECD-LEGAL-0394 (accessed on 6 May 2026).
[92] OECD (2020), Recommendation of the Council on Financial Literacy, OECD/LEGAL/0461, https://legalinstruments.oecd.org/en/instruments/OECD-LEGAL-0461.
[93] OECD (2018), G20/OECD-INFE Policy Guidance on Digital Financial Literacy, OECD Publishing, Paris, https://doi.org/10.1787/effe2693-en.
[30] OECD (2012), The Status of Financial Education in Africa, OECD Publishing, Paris, https://doi.org/10.1787/5k94cqqx90wl-en.
[49] OECD (forthcoming), Draft Report on the implementation of the OECD Recommendation on Financial Literacy.
[108] OECD/AUC/ATAF (2025), Revenue Statistics in Africa 2025: Commonalities and Specificities across African Revenue Classifications, OECD Publishing, Paris, https://doi.org/10.1787/8d3bf3af-en.
[66] Office des Changes (2022), Nouvelle mise en garde des Autorités financières contre l’utilisation des monnaies virtuelles, https://www.oc.gov.ma/fr/actualites/nouvelle-mise-en-garde-des-autorites-financieres-contre-lutilisation-des-monnaies (accessed on 9 September 2026).
[57] Ozili, P. (2024), Cryptocurrency regulation in Africa: advantages, motivation, regulatory models, challenges, consequences, and principles vs. rules-based regulation, University Library of Munich, Germany, https://ideas.repec.org/p/pra/mprapa/127375.html (accessed on 19 May 2026).
[41] Pazarbasioglu Ceyla et al. (2020), “Digital financial services”, https://pubdocs.worldbank.org/en/230281588169110691/digital-financial-services.pdf (accessed on 14 March 2025).
[102] Ree, J. (2023), “Nigeria’s eNaira, One Year After”, IMF Working Paper, No. WP/23/104.
[62] Republic of Ghana (2025), Virtual Asset Service Providers Act, 2025, https://repository.parliament.gh/handle/123456789/4527 (accessed on 9 September 2026).
[64] Republic of Kenya (2026), The Virtual Asset Service Providers Regulations, 2026, https://new.kenyalaw.org/akn/ke/act/ln/2026/134/eng@2026-07-22 (accessed on 9 September 2026).
[63] Republic of Kenya (2025), Virtual Asset Service Providers Act - Kenya Law, https://new.kenyalaw.org/akn/ke/act/2025/20/eng@2025-11-04#part_I__sec_2 (accessed on 11 May 2026).
[70] Republic of Rwanda (2026), Draft Law on Virtual Assets Business, https://www.parliament.gov.rw/bill-details/the-draft-law-on-virtual-asset-business (accessed on 9 September 2026).
[73] Republic of South Africa (2002), Financial Advisory and Intermediary Services Act 37, https://www.gov.za/documents/financial-advisory-and-intermediary-services-act (accessed on 9 September 2026).
[107] Reserve Bank of Zimbabwe (2022), Mid-Term Monetary Policy Statement, https://www.rbz.co.zw/documents/mps/2022/Monetary-Policy-Statement-August-2022-.pdf (accessed on 12 May 2026).
[21] Reuters (2026), Biggest African economies lead stablecoin demand growth, study shows, https://www.reuters.com/world/africa/biggest-african-economies-lead-stablecoin-demand-growth-study-shows-2026-02-18/ (accessed on 1 June 2026).
[91] Ricci, L. (2024), “Central Bank Digital Currency and Other Digital Payments in Sub-Saharan Africa”, Fintech Notes, Vol. 2024/001, p. 1, https://doi.org/10.5089/9798400273025.063.
[37] Ricci, L. et al. (2025), “Digital Payment Innovations in Sub-Saharan Africa”, Departmental Papers, Vol. 2025/004, p. 1, https://doi.org/10.5089/9798400232220.087.
[71] Seychelles FSA (2024), Virtual Asset Service Providers Act 2024, https://fsaseychelles.sc/vasp/legal-framework (accessed on 12 May 2026).
[104] South Africa Reserve Bank (2025), SARB position paper on the necessity of a retail CBDC in South Africa, https://www.resbank.co.za/en/home/publications/publication-detail-pages/Fintech/sarb-position-paper-on-the-necessity-of-a-retail-cbdc-in-south-a (accessed on 12 May 2026).
[39] South African Revenue Service (2026), Crypto-Asset Reporting Framework (CARF), https://www.sars.gov.za/businesses-and-employers/third-party-data/crypto-asset-reporting-framework-carf/ (accessed on 10 September 2026).
[40] South African Revenue Service (2018), 6 April 2018 - SARS’s stance on the tax treatment of cryptocurrencies | South African Revenue Service, Media Releases, https://www.sars.gov.za/media-release/6-april-2018-sarss-stance-on-the-tax-treatment-of-cryptocurrencies/ (accessed on 2 July 2026).
[87] Swift (2026), About ISO 20022, https://www.swift.com/standards/iso-20022 (accessed on 18 June 2026).
[3] TRM Labs (2026), 2025 Crypto Adoption and Stablecoin Usage Report | TRM Labs, TRM Labs, San Francisco, https://www.trmlabs.com/reports-and-whitepapers/2025-crypto-adoption-and-stablecoin-usage-report (accessed on 7 May 2026).
[110] TRM Labs (2022), TRM Phoenix Solves Crypto Investigators’ ‘Chain-Hopping’ Problem | TRM Labs, Company News, https://www.trmlabs.com/resources/blog/trm-phoenix-solves-crypto-investigators-chain-hopping-problem (accessed on 1 July 2026).
[54] United Nations (2026), Young People’s Potential, the Key to Africa’s Sustainable Development | Office of the High Representative for the Least Developed Countries, Landlocked Developing Countries and Small Island Developing States, https://www.un.org/ohrlls/news/young-people%E2%80%99s-potential-key-africa%E2%80%99s-sustainable-development (accessed on 28 May 2026).
[16] World Bank (2025), Remittance Prices Worldwide, World Bank Group, https://remittanceprices.worldbank.org/sites/default/files/2026-04/RPW_main_report_and_annex_Q325.pdf.
[35] World Bank (2022), “What Does Digital Money Mean for Emerging Market and Developing Economies?”, https://doi.org/10.1596/37358.
[29] World Bank (2018), South Africa - Digital Economy Diagnostic, https://documents.worldbank.org/en/publication/documents-reports/documentdetail/464421589343923215 (accessed on 12 May 2026).
[14] World Economic Forum (2024), The ZiG: Zimbabwe rolls out world’s newest currency | World Economic Forum, https://www.weforum.org/stories/2024/05/zimbabwe-zig-new-currency-inflation-dollar/ (accessed on 9 April 2026).
Annex 8.A. Summary of ongoing CBDC initiatives across Africa
Copy link to Annex 8.A. Summary of ongoing CBDC initiatives across AfricaAnnex Table 8.A.1. Overview of ongoing CBDC initiatives across Africa
Copy link to Annex Table 8.A.1. Overview of ongoing CBDC initiatives across Africa|
Jurisdiction / Institution |
Description |
|---|---|
|
BIS Innovation Hub |
Project Dunbar: a multi‑CBDC experiment led by the BIS Innovation Hub Singapore Centre, was conducted in 2021 and 2022. The South African Reserve Bank, alongside the BISIH and another three financial authorities, participated in it, which tested a common platform enabling cross‑border wholesale payments and foreign‑exchange settlement using multiple CBDCs. Technical prototypes assessed payment‑versus‑payment settlement and access models for non‑resident banks. The findings showed that multi‑CBDC arrangements are technically viable and can reduce costs, delays, and settlement risks in cross‑border payments. |
|
Botswana |
Bank of Botswana, which frames crypto-assets within a broader strategy to modernise payment systems, was in 2024 at a research phase of its CBDC. |
|
Côte d’Ivoire |
Côte d’Ivoire, alongside the other seven jurisdictions part of the Central Bank of West African States (BCEAO), was in 2024 in an analytical and preparatory phase of its CBDC initiative. |
|
Egypt |
Egypt presents a CBDC as part of its 2024–2030 economic strategy, aiming to enhance monetary policy effectiveness, accelerate digital transformation, and expand financial inclusion. The initiative is positioned as a medium‑term reform instrument. |
|
Ghana |
In 2023, Bank of Ghana completed a retail CBDC pilot assessing online and offline use cases, integration with existing payment systems, and financial inclusion impacts. Ghanaian authorities were prioritising institutional readiness and governance before proceeding towards a potential launch. |
|
Kenya |
In 2023, Central Bank of Kenya completed a public consultation and analytical assessment of CBDC applicability, evaluating its fit with its advanced digital payments ecosystem. The CBK subsequently paused development, opting to monitor global CBDC developments while focusing on alternative payment innovations. |
|
Mauritius |
Mauritius positioned CBDC as a thematic area within its forthcoming Innovation Hub, inviting project proposals to explore CBDC‑related fintech solutions ahead of the hub’s launch in 2024. CBDC activity is framed as exploratory and innovation‑driven, embedded within a broader fintech ecosystem development initiative. |
|
Namibia |
Namibia was in a preparatory CBDC exploration phase, developing a feasibility framework and roadmap following IMF technical assistance conducted in 2024 and published in 2025. Authorities were advised to refine the policy rationale, assess alternatives, and build institutional capacity before progressing towards more resource‑intensive CBDC work. |
|
Nigeria |
eNaira, the Nigerian two-tiered retail CBDC9, was fully launched in October 2021. The initial months showed modest adoption: total wallet downloads by consumers and merchants reached just over 600 thousand in December 2021, with that number barely reaching 900 thousand one year after (0.8% of Nigerian bank accounts). On average, each wallet performed one transaction every 6 months, indicating dormancy. Upon observing the flattened adoption and usage scenario, the Central Bank of Nigeria announced, in November 2025, that a different, wholesale model could be pursued in the future. The official eNaira website was, at the time of this table preparation, taken off the air. |
|
South Africa |
South Africa was part of Project Dunbar, led by the BIS Innovation Hub in 2021/2022. Additionally, the South African Reserve Bank concluded that a retail CBDC was not a short‑ to medium‑term priority, despite technical feasibility, focusing instead on payments modernisation initiatives as of 2025. The central bank shifted active exploration towards wholesale CBDC, while continuing to monitor conditions under which a retail CBDC might become necessary. |
|
Tanzania |
Tanzania was in an early research and capacity‑building phase, assessing CBDC design options, risks, and use cases through stakeholder consultations as of 2023. |
|
Uganda |
Uganda completed stakeholder consultations on CBDC and published an assessment of potential benefits and risks, positioning the project at a pre‑feasibility stage in 2025. The central bank planned a formal feasibility study to evaluate technical, legal, economic, and operational viability before any decision to proceed. |
|
Zimbabwe |
Zimbabwe developed a phased CBDC roadmap and announced plans for public consultation and consumer surveys as groundwork for potential pilot programmes in 2022. Progression towards pilots was contingent on consultation outcomes, with CBDC framed as exploratory rather than an immediate issuance priority. |
Note: This table provides a non-exhaustive list of key policy and regulatory developments in selected African jurisdictions from 2021 onwards, updated as of May 2026.
Sources: (BISIH et al., 2022[94]), BIS Innovation Hub and central banks of Australia, Malaysia, Singapore and South Africa develop experimental multi-CBDC platform for international settlements, https://www.resbank.co.za/content/dam/sarb/publications/media-releases/2022/project-dunbar-/BIS%20Innovation%20Hub%20led%20Project%20Dunbar%27s%20final%20report.pdf, (BIS Innovation Hub, 2022[95]), Project Dunbar: international settlements using multi-CBDCs, https://www.bis.org/about/bisih/topics/cbdc/dunbar.htm; (Bank of Botswana, 2024[96]), Annual Report, https://www.bankofbotswana.bw/sites/default/files/news-files/Annual%20Report%202024.pdf; (Information and Decision Support Center, 2023[97]), The Document of the Most Prominent Strategic Directions for the Egyptian Economy for the New Presidential Term (2024-2030), https://idsc.gov.eg/Publication/details/8857, (BCEAO, 2024[98]), Rapport annuel de la BCEAO, https://www.bceao.int/fr/publications/rapport-annuel-de-la-bceao-2024; (Central Bank of Kenya, 2023[99]), Issuance of Discussion Paper on Central Bank Digital Currency: Comments from the Public, https://www.centralbank.go.ke/uploads/press_releases/103592893_Press%20Release%20-%20Issuance%20of%20Discussion%20Paper%20on%20Central%20Bank%20Digital%20Currency%20-%20Comments%20from%20the%20Public.pdf; (Bank of Mauritius, 2024[100]), Media Release: The Bank of Mauritius calls for participation in projects for its Innovation Hub, https://www.bom.mu/media/media-releases/media-release-bank-mauritius-calls-participation-projects-its-innovation-hub; (Kunaratskul et al., 2025[101]), Namibia: Retail Central Bank Digital Currency Exploration and Roadmap, https://www.imf.org/en/publications/high-level-summary-technical-assistance-reports/issues/2025/02/10/namibia-retail-central-bank-digital-currency-exploration-and-roadmap-561841; (Ree, 2023[102]), Nigeria’s eNaira, One Year After, https://doi.org/10.5089/9798400241642.001, (Bank of Ghana, 2025[103]), Talk by Mr. Musa Itopa Jimoh at CEDI@60 International Currency Conference [video], https://youtu.be/67lMQ_pKk28?t=18379; (South Africa Reserve Bank, 2025[104]), SARB position paper on the necessity of a retail CBDC in South Africa, https://www.resbank.co.za/en/home/publications/publication-detail-pages/Fintech/sarb-position-paper-on-the-necessity-of-a-retail-cbdc-in-south-a ; (Bank of Tanzania, 2023[105]), Public Notice: Bank of Tanzania Progress on Central Bank Digital Currency, https://www.bot.go.tz/Adverts/PressRelease/en/2023011413181519.pdf ; (Bank of Uganda, 2024[106]), Integrated Annual Report, https://bou.or.ug/uploads/Integrated_Annual_Report_2024_2025_9bfa4a9ed6.pdf ; (Reserve Bank of Zimbabwe, 2022[107]), Mid-Term Monetary Policy Statement, https://www.rbz.co.zw/documents/mps/2022/Monetary-Policy-Statement-August-2022-.pdf
Notes
Copy link to Notes← 1. The OECD defines a crypto-asset as a digital representation of value that relies on a cryptographically secured distributed ledger or a similar technology to validate and secure transactions (OECD, 2023[112]). This chapter focuses on two types of crypto-assets, in line with definitions by the Financial Stability Board (FSB, 2020[115]; 2023[80]):
unbacked crypto-assets (hereafter, “crypto-assets”) – private digital assets protected through encryption, with a value not backed by other financial assets (for example Bitcoin and Ethereum)
“stablecoins” – crypto-assets that aim to maintain a stable value linked to other assets such as fiat currency, commodities, or in some cases other crypto-assets.
← 2. Chain-hopping can be defined as swapping of crypto-assets across blockchains, or to other assets on the same blockchain, in a systematic way with the intention of dissimulating transactions or ownership (TRM Labs, 2022[110]).
← 3. “Hot wallets” are digital wallets for holding crypto-assets that are connected to the internet, with the private access key also stored online (Coinbase, 2024[109]).
← 4. The FATF’s grey list indicates jurisdictions under increased monitoring, which are working with the Task Force to improve their anti-financial crime frameworks (FATF, 2026[58]).
← 5. The FATF’s black list enumerates jurisdictions with serious strategic deficiencies to counter financial crime, from which malicious actors have more leeway to operate. (FATF, 2026[58]).
← 6. The African average tax-to-GDP ratio in 2023, 16.1%, was significantly lower than those of Latin America and the Caribbean (21.3%) and OECD member countries (33.9%). This highlights the limited fiscal space of the continent’s governments, limiting their capacity to invest for sustainable development and long‑term social welfare (OECD/AUC/ATAF, 2025[108]).
← 7. This includes issuance, redemption, custody, governance and intermediation.
← 8. Four FSRBs are comprised of African Jurisdictions: Action Group against Money Laundering in Central Africa (GABAC), Eastern and Southern Africa Anti-Money Laundering Group (ESAAMLG), Inter Governmental Action Group against Money Laundering in West Africa (GIABA) and Middle East and North Africa Financial Action Task Force (MENAFATF) (FATF, 2026[111])
← 9. In a two-tiered retail CBDC, the general economy (all merchants and citizens) has access to the digital currency, be it through an account or a token. CBDC distribution is done by financial intermediaries – as opposed to a one-tiered retail CBDC, where the distribution is done by the central bank (BIS, 2021[114]).