The chapter reports on trends and conditions in SME access to finance for 48 countries across the OECD and beyond. It first provides a brief overview of developments in macroeconomic conditions and the business environment amid heightened uncertainty from evolving geopolitical tensions. It then analyses the provision of SME bank financing and credit conditions in 2024, complemented by the latest available data for 2025, as well as developments on asset-based finance, equity and Fintech. Trends in bankruptcies and non-performing loans, and recent developments in government policies are also assessed.
Financing SMEs and Entrepreneurs 2026
An OECD Scoreboard
Abstract
Global economic growth has demonstrated resilience in the face of a challenging economic and geopolitical environment in recent years. It remained solid in 2025, with the world economy expanding at an annual pace of 3.3% in 2025 (Figure 1.1, Panel A) (OECD, 2026[1]). Furthermore, indicators for the early months of 2026 suggest that global growth remained solid in both services and manufacturing sectors, with technology-related industrial production continuing to grow rapidly, especially in Asia and the United States. In light of the evolving conflict in the Middle East, the OECD’s March 2026 forecasts project global growth at 2.9% in 2026, before edging up to 3.0% in 2027 (OECD, 2026[1]).
In 2025, the increase in goods production and trade in anticipation of higher tariffs helped to boost economic growth rates. As a result, industrial production in the first half of 2025 grew faster than the average pace for 2024 in most economies. In the second half of 2025, global growth expanded, with activity boosted by strong AI-related investment and production, and supportive financial and fiscal conditions.
Inflation declined in most economies in 2024 (Figure 1.1, Panel B), and developments as of the end of 2025 indicated a return to target expected in almost all major economies by mid-2027. However, in the context of the energy price shocks due to the evolving conflict in the Middle East, inflation is expected to increase in 2026, before easing in 2027 with an assumed fading of energy price pressures. Nonetheless, inflation developments differ across countries. Inflation remains above central bank targets in Brazil, Mexico, Türkiye, the United Kingdom and the United States. There were also signs of a resurgence in inflation prior to the escalation of the Middle East conflict in Australia, and a pickup from moderate rates in India, Indonesia, Italy and South Africa. In contrast, inflation had returned to target and remained largely benign in the euro area as a whole, as well as in Korea and Canada (OECD, 2026[1]).
In percentages
Note: In Panel A, annual growth denotes the change over the year to the quarter shown. The global aggregates are PPP-weighted measures. The series shown in Panel B are PPP-weighted aggregates covering 36 advanced economies and 36 emerging-market economies.
Source: Panel A, OECD Interim Economic Outlook 119 database; OECD Consumer Price database; Eurostat; US Bureau of Economic Analysis; national sources; LSEG; and OECD calculations (OECD, 2026[1]).
Global trade remained heavily shaped by the implementation of tariffs throughout 2025. While US bilateral tariff rates have declined since November 2025, the overall US effective tariff rate remains well above that prevailing prior to 2025. Nevertheless, global merchandise trade continued to expand at a steady pace through the second half of 2025 (OECD, 2026[1]). However, the evolving conflict in the Middle East poses risks to global supply chains, with implications for trade.
In a context of high levels of uncertainty in trade and economic policy (Figure 1.2, Panel A), many economies have been intensifying efforts to diversify their export markets. This includes the EU-Mexico Global Agreement, signed in September 2025 and the Interim Trade Agreement between the EU and Mercosur, signed in January 2026, as well as the announcement of the conclusion of negotiations for an EU-Australia trade agreement in March 2026 (OECD, 2025[2]) (European Commission, 2026[3]) (European Commission, 2026[4]). In 2025, Canada also signed a new trade agreement with Indonesia, relaunched trade agreement negotiations with India, and launched trade negotiations with the UAE (Fasken, 2026[5]).
The impacts of higher tariff rates on businesses continue to evolve. Initially, firms relied on inventories and profit margins to cushion the impact of rising tariffs. However, there are signs that tariffs are being passed through to consumer prices, notably in durable goods with a high import content (OECD, 2025[6]). This can be particularly detrimental for countries with high shares of SMEs involved in international trade, as they are less able to absorb changes in prices compared to large firms.
Higher trade barriers and elevated policy uncertainty are weighing on business confidence and corporate investment decisions (OECD, 2025[6]). The OECD Business Confidence Index shows that in early 2025, businesses were less pessimistic compared to the previous quarter, explained by the front-loading effect, but confidence faded towards the second half of the year (Figure 1.2, Panel B). The effects of trade frictions on business investment have begun to materialise1. Businesses in Canada, the People’s Republic of China (China), and Germany2 have begun to show a decline in capital expenditure plans, particularly in exporter firms, due to trade tensions (Bank of Canada, 2025[7]) (Reuters, 2025[8]) (Reuters, 2025[9]). A survey of US businesses in April 2025 revealed that 45% anticipated reducing capital investment in the next six months due to policy uncertainty3 (Federal Reserve Bank of Atlanta, 2025[10]).
Amplitude adjusted index, long-term average = 100
Note: For Panel A, the Economic Policy Uncertainty (EPU) is based on Baker, Bloom and Davis (2016) and the Trade Policy Uncertainty (TPU) index is from Caldara et al (2019). The EPU index is a nominal GDP-weighted average of national EPU for 21 countries: AUS, BRA, CAN, CHL, CHN, COL, FRA, DEU, GRC, IND, IRL, ITA, JPN, KOR, MEX, NDL, RUS, SPA, SWE, GBR, USA. The TPU index is based on automated text searches of the electronic archives of seven newspapers. Panel B shows the OECD business confidence index (BCI), a standardised confidence indicator providing an indication of future developments in business, based upon opinion surveys on developments in production, orders and stocks of finished goods in the manufacturing sector. Other sectors (construction, retail trade and services) are not included due to poor data availability among non-EU OECD member countries and among the OECD Non-member Economies. Numbers above 100 suggest an increased confidence in near-future business performance, and numbers below 100 indicate pessimism towards future performance. The major five Asia economies include China, India, Indonesia, Japan, Korea.
Source: (Economic Policy Uncertainity, 2025[11]); Business Confidence Index (OECD, 2025[12]).
The recent increase in global energy prices and threats to supply chains are occurring at a time of above target inflation in some major economies and relatively tight labour markets. Aggregate consumer price inflation for the G20 countries will be markedly higher than previously expected in 2026, largely owing to the increase in global energy prices. The projection for headline inflation in the G20 has been revised upwards, with inflation now projected to rise from 3.4% in 2025 to 4.0% in 2026, before easing to 2.7% in 2027. Core inflation in the G20 advanced economies is anticipated to weaken from 2.6% in 2026 to 2.3% in 2027 (OECD, 2026[1]). In this context, monetary policy rate developments are becoming increasingly varied across countries. Rates remain at restrictive levels in the United States, the United Kingdom, Brazil, Mexico and Türkiye, and have recently been raised in Australia, reflecting stronger than expected inflation pressures, and Japan. In contrast, policy rates have remained unchanged in the euro area, Canada and Korea with inflation close to target and policy rates close to neutral levels. Policy rates are also at moderate levels in many other emerging-market economies, including India and South Africa, with policy decisions remaining finely balanced to minimise risks of currency volatility and keep inflation expectations well anchored (OECD, 2026[1]).
Prior to these recent developments, headline inflation had remained broadly stable in both advanced and emerging-market economies in 2024 and throughout 2025, and policy interest rates had eased in most advanced and emerging market economies (Figure 1.3). In September 2025, both the United States and Canada lowered their policy rates (Board Governors Federal Reserve System, 2025[13]) (Bank of Canada, 2025[14]), with further cuts in October and December in the US. In contrast, monetary policy in Japan led to policy rate increases in 2025. Policy rates were reduced in many emerging market economies in 2025, given contained inflation pressures, except for Brazil.
As a percent
Note: Policy interest rates in the baseline projection. Panel A shows the midpoint of the federal funds target range for the United States and the deposit facility rate for the euro area.
Source: OECD Interim Economic Outlook 119 database (OECD, 2026[1]).
As a result of lower policy rates, bank credit growth began to recover in 2025 following the decline in 2024 in the context of tight credit conditions. In Europe, financing of non-financial corporations picked up in 2025 by 0.9% in Q1 and 1.3% in Q2, after declines in 2024. Financing by loans and trade credits mainly drove corporate credit growth (ECB, 2025[15]). In the UK, total corporate bank credit4 growth strengthened in 2025, rising from 2% in January to 6% by August (Bank of England, 2025[16]) (Bank of England, 2025[17]). In Canada, the demand for credit from private non-financial corporations registered a sharp increase, reaching CAD 43.9 billion in Q2 2025, the fastest pace of borrowing since Q4 2021 (Statistics Canada, 2025[18]). Furthermore, the US dollar depreciated in 2025, contributing to easier global financial conditions in the United States and in emerging-market economies with a high share of US dollar‑denominated debt. However, since the escalation of hostilities in the Middle East, volatility in financial markets has increased markedly, financial conditions have tightened, and equity prices have decreased across countries (OECD, 2026[1]).
While lending to SMEs started to recover in 2024, outstanding stocks of SME loans broadly stagnated, signaling a reluctance by SMEs to take on external finance for investment at a time of heightened economic uncertainty. Box 1.1 explains how the Scoreboard calculates these two important indicators.
New SME lending grew in 2024, but not enough to offset previous declines
In the context of declining policy interest rates and overall corporate credit growth, the flow of loans to SMEs also increased in 2024, with the Scoreboard median increasing by 5.7%, following a 9% decline in 2023. All country groups exhibit the same trend, with the most significant increase in upper-middle-income countries, which generally exhibit more volatility in SME loan flows. The EU and non-EU high-income countries registered a more moderate increase in the flows of loans to SMEs, 5% and 2% respectively. Data on loans up to EUR 1 million (a proxy for SME loans) from the European Central Bank show that in 2024, new loans in the Eurozone amounted to approximately EUR 187 billion per annum (up from EUR 167 billion in 2023) of which more than half was made available for financing transactions of up to EUR 250 0005 (European Central Bank, 2025[19]) (European Commission, 2025[20]). When looking at the flow of loans, the countries with the highest year-on-year increases include Chile (61%), Luxembourg (27%) and Ukraine (23%). The increase in the flow of SME loans in Chile can partly be attributed to a jump from a low base. In 2022 and 2023, new lending declined by 40% and 18%, respectively, as a result of the tight financial environment (Chile country profile).
Despite a recovery in new SME lending in 2024, volumes remained lower in most countries relative to the pre-pandemic period. Box 1.2. shows SME lending flows and SME interest rates in 2019 and 2024 in Scoreboard countries, with most countries characterised by lower flows and higher rates, with some exceptions. The aggregate of new SME lending in real terms in a selected group of countries shows that volumes are 20% lower in 2024 relative to 20196.
Median year-on-year growth rate, as a percentage
Note: All data are adjusted for inflation using the GDP deflator of each country published in the OECD Economic Outlook database using base year 2007. GDP deflators for non-OECD countries were extracted from the World Development Indicators from the World Bank. Upper-middle-income countries include BRA, COL, GEO, KAZ, MEX, MYS, PER, SRB, TUR, UKR. Non-EU high-income countries include AUS, CAN, CHL, GBR and USA. EU countries include AUT, BEL, CZE, DEU, DNK, ESP, EST, FIN, GRC, HRV, HUN, IRL, LTU, LUX, LVA, NLD, PRT, SVK, SVN.
Source: Data compiled from individual country profiles.
Adjustments to control for variations in inflation
Differences in inflation levels across countries hamper the comparability of trends over time. To address this issue, most Scoreboard data presented in this chapter are adjusted for inflation when appropriate. This adjustment converts nominal (current-price) values into real (constant-price) values, helping to distinguish changes in underlying volumes from those driven by price changes, and improving comparability across countries with divergent inflation paths. For this purpose, the GDP deflator from the OECD Economic Outlook publication is used. The base year is 2007, as the time-series graphs compare median growth rates since 2008.
For the evolution of the aggregate long-term outstanding stock of SME loans, data presented is in nominal terms, given the stock nature of the indicator, and to avoid altering the recorded level through inflation adjustments.
Currency adjustments
Monetary values reported in national currencies are converted into a common currency for the purpose of aggregating country data and analysing cross-country totals. All available series are converted into US dollars (USD) using the annual exchange rate for each reference year in each country, as provided in the OECD Data Explorer exchange rate database, and from the World Bank’s World Development Indicators for non-OECD countries whose data were not available.
In recent years, higher interest rates can help explain weak growth in SME new lending in most countries, influencing the demand for financing. However, in some countries, new lending has grown even with high interest rates, suggesting a combination of factors driving SME lending patterns, including policy-driven credit mechanisms, such as credit guarantees, subsidised rates and direct lending, as well as lending maturity structures (higher shares of short-term lending).
Figure 1.5 shows SME new lending volumes against SME interest rates in 2019 and 2024 for Scoreboard countries with available data. Compared to the pre-pandemic period, most Scoreboard countries had higher interest rates (rightward) and more modest lending flows in 2024. This is the case of the majority of countries, including 12 out of 21 European countries, and other economies such as Brazil, Canada, Peru, UK and Ukraine. However, in some countries, including Greece, Kazakhstan, Latvia, Lithuania, Portugal and the Slovak Republic, new SME lending flows in 2024 were higher than in 2019 despite the rise in interest rates.
Kazakhstan experienced a substantial increase (5.7 p.p.) in new SME lending amid higher rates, with substantial public interventions sustaining SME financing through the Damu Fund, which provides partial credit guarantees, direct lending and interest rate subsidies. Data on government-guaranteed loans confirms increased levels of guarantee activity (80% increase in government-guaranteed loans between 2019 and 2024). In Greece, SME lending flows increased by 1.8 p.p. over the period, explained in part by the significant guarantee activity backed by the EIF and EIB (in 2024, guarantees amounted to EUR 152 million by EIF and EUR 550 million by EIB) (EIB, 2025[21]). The growth in lending flows in Latvia and Lithuania is smaller (less than 1 p.p.), with new guarantee initiatives contributing to the flow of lending, including EIF-backed guarantee programmes through Invest-EU (European Commission, 2023[22]) (EIF, 2023[23]).
For other countries, growth in new lending in a context of high interest rates is explained by a reduction in the average maturity (i.e. higher shares of short-term loans). These loans lead to more frequent loan renewals and originations throughout the year and thus contribute to higher lending flows. For example, in the Slovak Republic, short-term SME loans increased by 0.6 p.p. to reach 39% of all SME loans, which is high by international comparison.
As a share of GDP (y-axis), nominal rates as a percent (x-axis)
Source: Data on GDP was extracted from OECD Data Explorer national accounts database. GDP data was also extracted from the International Monetary Fund, World Economic Outlook Database, for countries with no available GDP data in the OECD database for 2024. Data on interest rates and new lending was compiled from information received from individual country Scoreboards.
However, the stock of SME loans was broadly stagnant
On the other hand, despite increases in new SME loans in 2024, the outstanding stock of SME loans in real terms remained relatively stable7 due to repayments of short-term loans in particular (OECD, 2025[24]). Figure 1.6 provides information on the evolution of SME loan stocks.
Median year-on-year growth rate, as a percentage
Note: All data are adjusted for inflation using the GDP deflator of each country published in the OECD Economic Outlook database using base year 2007. GDP deflators for non-OECD countries were extracted from the World Development Indicators from the World Bank. Upper-middle income countries exclude European countries.
While the median outstanding stock growth was slightly positive in 2024, the stock of SME loans as a share of GDP decreased for most countries (25 out of 41) in 2024 compared to 2023. The countries with the largest declines were Türkiye (‑2.2 p.p.), Peru (-1.7 p.p.) and Portugal (-1.6 p.p.) (Figure 1.7). COVID-19 loan repayments and gradual deleveraging explain in part the lower loan stocks. In the UK, despite a 13% y-o-y increase in new lending in 2024, net lending remained negative as firms continued to repay pandemic loans (UK Finance, 2025[25]). Furthermore, transparency data from the UK Department for Business and Trade also confirm ongoing repayments and the progressive removal of state guarantees under the BBLS, CBILS and CLBILS schemes (Department for Business and Trade, 2025[26]). The Bank of England agents reported in Q2 2024 that, based on discussions with at least 700 firms across the UK, firms were generally deleveraging and keen to reduce debt (UK country profile) (Bank of England Agents, 2024[27]). In Spain, the stock of loans backed by ICO COVID-19 guarantees fell 30.8% in 2024, showing a rapid wind-down of the COVID-19 guaranteed loans (Autoridad Macropridencial Consejo de Estabilidad Financiera, 2024[28]). Similarly, in France, evidence from the “Prêt garanti par l’État (PGE)” scheme shows that 73% of firms opted for the maximum maturity, which means that amortisation will continue up to 2026 (Banque de France, 2024[29]).
In addition to the repayment of COVID-19 loans, tighter credit supply in 2022 and 2023 also weighed on SME loan stocks, via a decline in new loans amid tight credit conditions (OECD, 2024[30]) (OECD, 2025[24]). A decline in loan maturities in some countries also explains the decline in the stock of loans. In 2024, 16 out of 30 countries exhibited a higher proportion of short-term loans compared to 2023.
In addition to declining maturities and repayments of COVID-19 era loans, the growth of non-bank finance8 may also explain the stagnation of SME loan volumes. There is evidence that a growing share of SMEs is turning to non-bank financial institutions9 for their borrowing needs, and financial authorities face challenges in capturing these transactions comprehensively10.
Volumes as a share of GDP
Note: The graph shows the list of countries for which data of the outstanding stock of loans are available for the three referenced years, except for Chile. In Chile, SME loans refer to loans of up to UF 18 000, making up a very small share of total corporate loans. The countries on the left-hand side of the figure registered a decline in the share of SME outstanding stock of loans over GDP between 2023 and 2024.
Source: Data on GDP was extracted from OECD Data Explorer national accounts database. GDP data was also extracted from the International Monetary Fund, World Economic Outlook Database, for countries with no available GDP data in the OECD database for 2024.
The SME loan share fell in a majority of Scoreboard countries
In 30 Scoreboard countries, the SME share of the total outstanding stock of loans declined in 2024, although in most cases this decline was small (1.6 p.p. on average) (Figure 1.8 – countries on the left-hand side of the figure). This decline reflects the trend observed in the Scoreboard median of the stock of SME loans, with deleveraging of COVID-19 era loans and tighter lending conditions in previous years.
Compared to the shares seen pre-pandemic, in 2024, 17 countries have SME loan shares below 2019 levels, with Thailand registering the highest decline in SME loan share since 2019 (25 p.p.) followed by Israel (12 p.p.) and Croatia (10 p.p.). Four countries SME loan shares on par with the pre-pandemic period, namely Canada, France, Japan, and Slovenia, while 20 countries registered higher shares in 2024 compared to the pandemic.
As a percent of total outstanding business loans
Note: The countries on the left-hand side of the figure registered a decline in the share of SME outstanding stock of loans over total stock of loans between 2023 and 2024.
Source: Data compiled from information received from individual country Scoreboards.
Long-term SME loans have declined in real terms, which may signal a weakening in SME investment
Scoreboard data from a selected group of countries indicates that long-term loans have edged down since 2021. The share of long-term SME loans in the total outstanding stock declined by 1.5 p.p. since 2021. In real terms, the aggregate of SME long-term loan volumes has fallen by 11% over the same period11. This trend is significant, as long-term loans are a critical source of financing for fixed investment, innovation and expansion.
Survey data indicate that the decline in long-term loans is partly explained by the uncertain economic environment, which is weighing on SME long-term planning and investment. For example, in New Zealand, supply-side survey data from Q3 2024 showed weaker SME demand for credit for capital expenditure, with banks indicating SMEs were waiting for more accommodative credit conditions and improvements in economic conditions before increasing long-term investments (capital expenditure) (Reserve Bank of New Zealand, 2024[31]). The Eurochambres Economic Survey 2025 also revealed lower investment expectations from SMEs in 2025 due to tight financing conditions. In addition, lower firm profits and liquidity, usually critical drivers of private business investment, were reportedly low in the last quarters of 2024, contributing to the weak expectations for investments in 2025 (Eurochambres, 2025[32]).
In addition, business statistics suggest that SME investments are declining. In Ireland, 59% of SMEs invested in capital assets in 2023, well below the pre-pandemic level of 64% (Kren et al., 2025[33]). In the UK, the SME12 share of net private sector investment fell from 48% to 38% between 2023 Q1 and 2025 Q113 (Office for National Statistics, 2025[34]).
The decline in policy interest rates in most economies helped reduce the cost of credit to SMEs, but rates remain higher compared to before the pandemic
Following the decline in policy interest rates in 2024, borrowing costs for SMEs also fell in most economies, suggesting that the easing of monetary policy has begun to trickle down to SMEs. Between 2023 and 2024, 26 countries experienced a decline in SME interest rates (Figure 1.9, countries in the left-hand side). This reduction is, however, from a relatively high base (OECD, 2024[30]) (OECD, 2025[24]). In fact, most countries with the biggest declines were those with the highest SME interest rates in 2023. This includes Hungary (down 5 p.p.) Peru (down 4 p.p.), Colombia (down 3 p.p.).
When comparing 2024 levels with the pre-COVID (2019), however, SME interest rates remain higher across the board, 2.6 p.p. higher on average across Scoreboard countries. This suggests that, while monetary easing has begun to alleviate financing costs for SMEs, the credit environment is still more restrictive than in the pre-pandemic period. This is reflected in the European Investment Bank (EIB) Investment Survey 2024, where the share of EU firms dissatisfied with the cost of finance increased from 5% in 2022 to more than 23% in 2024. The share of financially constrained firms increased from 4.7% in 2021 to 6.8% in 2024, with the share of finance-constrained SMEs at 7.6% (European Commission, 2025[20]). In Korea, the share of firms finding it more difficult to obtain bank loans rose 12.7 percentage points, to 41% in 2024, the highest since the survey began (Industrial Bank of Korea, 2025[35]).
Nominal rates, as a percent
Note: The countries on the left-hand side of the figure registered a decline in SME interest rates between 2023 and 2024. For Kazakhstan in 2023, levels are almost the same as 2019.
Source: Data compiled from individual country Scoreboards.
Interest rate spreads narrowed slightly, mainly driven by lower rates for medium-sized firms
In 2024, the median decline in SME interest rates was accompanied by a slight narrowing of the interest rate spread between SME and large firms, suggesting that the monetary policy changes affected most firms proportionately (Figure 1.10). However, there is heterogeneity among SME size classes. In Q2 2024, the credit conditions survey of the UK pointed to a slight widening in spreads for small businesses, while the spread remained unchanged for medium-sized firms (Bank of England, 2024[36]). In the EU, the decline in interest rates for loans up to EUR 250 000 (proxy of loans for smaller SMEs) in 2024 was significantly less pronounced than for loans above EUR 250 000 (European Commission, 2025[20]). In the US, in Q3 2024, only lending standards to small businesses tightened (The Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, 2024[37]). In Japan, the Bank of Japan's Tankan demand side survey showed that, between Q3 and Q4 2024, small firms reported more restrictive lending attitudes, while medium-sized firms reported unchanged lending attitudes. In the survey between Q1 and Q4 2024, small firm respondents reported a rise in interest rates throughout the year compared to medium-sized firm respondents (Bank of Japan, 2025[38]).
As credit costs continue to ease, the spread may be expected to widen. In Europe, the SAFE survey in Q1 2025 showed that while a net 12% of all firms reported a decline in bank interest rates, only a net 1% of SMEs reported such a decrease (ECB, 2025[39]). In Japan SMEs reported higher interest rates compared to large firms in September 2025 (Bank of Japan, 2025[38]).
Median nominal rates
Note: The median Interest rate spread is the difference between the median of SME interest rates and the median of interest rates for large firms.
Source: Data compiled from individual country Scoreboards. JPN, NOR, NZL, MYS, SVK, TUR, THA, ZAF, USA are omitted from the median calculation due to missing data in some years.
Collateral requirements have increased in the context of tighter credit terms and conditions
In 2024, the Scoreboard median of SMEs required to provide collateral to access loans increased to 53%, up 5 percentage points. Ten out of 17 countries showed higher shares of SMEs requiring collateral, with the highest increases seen in Canada (18 p.p.) and Lithuania (17 p.p.). The increase in collateral requirements is partly explained by banks seeking to offset falling interest rates with stricter terms and conditions, as a way to price risk in a context of economic uncertainty.
Demand- and supply-side survey data confirm this trend. In the EU, the Q1 2025 SAFE survey shows that while a net 12% of all firms reported lower interest rates, a net 13% of firms reported stricter collateral requirements (with a higher share among SMEs than large firms) (ECB, 2025[39]). Similarly, the Bank Lending Survey (April 2025) noted that easing price margins were partially offset by tighter collateral requirements (ECB, 2025[40]). In the US, according to the Small Business Lending Survey, credit standards had been tightening for 14 consecutive quarters, suggesting that banks remained cautious in approving riskier small business loans (Federal Reserve Bank of Kansas City, 2025[41]).
High collateral requirements can be particularly challenging for innovative SMEs and other firms whose balance sheets include a high share of intangible assets, or those seeking to invest in intangibles. In this context, the development of financing instruments that recognize intangible assets as collateral, such as patents, trademarks, copyrights, trade secrets and proprietary designs, can mitigate tight credit supply by widening the collateral base for firms with high shares of intangible assets or that are seeking to invest in intangibles, improving credit access for innovative SMEs.
Source: Data compiled from individual country Scoreboards.
Rejection rates declined, while the demand for credit remained broadly stable
Against the backdrop of tighter terms and conditions and still a restrictive credit environment relative to pre-pandemic, the Scoreboard median application rates remained historically weak. This aligns with survey data showing that application rates remain low compared to pre-pandemic. The SAFE survey in Q2 and Q3 2024 reported 14% and 13% of SMEs that applied for loans (compared to 17% in 2022 and 25% before the pandemic) (ECB, 2024[42]) (ECB, 2024[43]) (ECB, 2022[44]) (ECB, 2019[45]; ECB, 2019[46]).
Rejection rates also edged down in 2024, remaining at low levels. SAFE data confirm that only 6% of SMEs that considered bank loans reported facing obstacles in obtaining them (ECB, 2024[43]). This suggests that, while fewer SMEs applied, those that did were more likely to be creditworthy and able to meet stricter lending conditions. As such, the discouraged borrower effect can explain low rejection rates amid tighter credit conditions.
Data for 2025 may be expected to show an increase, due in part to higher risk perceptions on the supply side. In the Q1 2025 ECB’s Bank Lending Survey, euro area banks reported further net tightening of overall terms and conditions driven by lower risk tolerance of banks and higher perceived risks related to the economic outlook (ECB, 2025[47]). In Q1 2025 in the Euro Area, the net share of rejected loan applications increased since the second half of 2024, with the net increase being larger for SMEs than for large firms (net percentages of 10%) (European Commission, 2025[20]).
As a percent
Source: Data compiled from individual country Scoreboards.
Asset-based finance continues to demonstrate weak performance
Asset-based finance allows firms to obtain funding based on the value of specific assets, such as accounts receivable, inventory, machinery, equipment, and real estate, rather than on the basis of their credit standing. Common instruments include asset-based lending, factoring, purchase-order finance, warehouse receipts, and leasing (OECD, 2015[48]). In 2024, asset-based finance showed a mixed trend, but overall performance continues to be weak. While factoring activities continued their downward trend, declining by 3% in 2024 (compared to a drop of 1% in 2023), leasing recovered slightly, increasing by 1.6% (reversing its four-year negative trend).
In 2024, factoring activities declined in 13 out of 21 countries that reported data for this indicator, and the Scoreboard median growth rate fell. Factors Chain International (FCI), the global association of factoring, receivables and supply chain finance, documents weak but positive growth in factoring volumes in 2024, by 2.7%, based on partial information from the sector. In addition, compared to previous survey rounds, growth in factoring activities among surveyed members has slowed significantly, rising by just 3.6% in 2023 compared to 18.3% in 2022, indicating a more subdued performance relative to earlier years. Main aspects affecting the industry include higher transaction costs compared to 2023 and lack of liquidity (FCI, 2025[49]).
Leasing activities increased in 15 out of 24 reporting countries. Information from industry associations confirms positive but moderate growth in 2024, in part explained by increased uncertainty. In Europe, Leaseurope’s biannual survey reported a 5.6% year-on-year increase in new leasing activities in H1 2024. However, this growth was relatively modest compared to previous years, constrained by weaker leasing activity in some areas: real estate leasing declined by 7.2%, while equipment leasing fell by 0.5%. (Leaseurope, 2024[50]). Also, in 2024, profitability declined due in part to increased uncertainty 14. In the US, the Equipment and Leasing Finance Association (ELFA) showed modest growth in leasing activities in 2024, and its 2025 Survey indicated that just over half of companies reported higher volumes in 2024, with approval rates falling due to more cautious underwriting (ELFA, 2025[51]).
Median year-on-year growth rate, as a percentage
Source: Data compiled from individual country Scoreboards.
Equity financing grew modestly, driven by an increase in VC investments in AI
In 2024, with the continuation of a restrictive monetary policy environment and a cautious investment environment, VC investments did not grow in the first three quarters of the year but picked up in the last quarter. Eighteen out of 30 Scoreboard countries show an increase in VC investment volumes as a share of GDP, with the highest increases seen in the US, Estonia, and the UK (Figure 1.14).
As a share of GDP
Note: The countries on the left-hand side of the figure registered a decline in the share of VC investments as a share of GDP in 2024.
Source: Venture Capital (market statistics) database, OECD Data explorer.
However, the increase in VC investments in 2024 was driven principally by a surge of investments towards AI (OECD, 2025[24]). In fact, the general decline of VC investments experienced in non-AI firms left many companies at a crossroads, with many of them eager to avoid the negative consequences of down rounds15, such as dilutions for unprotected employees and investors, yet still in urgent need of additional funding.
Notably, the number of deals did not grow in proportion to volumes, with capital being concentrated into large deals for a few companies. This trend suggests a reset in start-up valuations, with smaller average deal sizes being used to fund the majority of start-ups. In the US, nearly 25% of deals in 2024 were down or flat rounds, which is the largest percentage in a decade (Pitchbook, 2025[52]). Declining valuations also impacted the exit environment, with fewer firms deciding to go public.
2025 started with similar VC investment levels to those in late 2024. Following volatility in Q2 in equity markets16, in Q3 financing conditions improved, as did investor confidence. Global venture funding rose 38% year on year, driven by megarounds (USD 500 million or more)17 in AI (Crunchbase, 2025[53]). The 2025 EIF Equity Survey, released in Q3 2025, also found that valuations began to rise. Similarly, deal making activity began to recover with investments increasing compared to the first half of the year (European Investment Fund, 2025[54]).
Despite the recent rise in valuations, the exit environment continues to be challenging (Pitchbook, 2025[55]) (Crunchbase, 2025[56]). In Europe, a difficult fundraising environment is also a contributing factor. Available information on market activity for 2025 shows that the capital raised by European VC funds is at its lowest in a decade, and less than half the amount for the same period last year. However, expectations for the exit environment going forward were more optimistic in 2025 (European Investment Fund, 2025[54]).
Despite the industry's volatility, artificial intelligence (AI) has seen remarkable growth in recent years. In 2021, VC investment in AI more than doubled to USD 156 million (Figure 1.16). In 2022 and 2023, AI VC volumes declined but less than in other sectors, which meant that the AI share of total VC investments increased (Figure 1.5) Since 2023, the share of VC investments in AI has increased exponentially. As of November 2025, 53% of all VC investments globally were directed towards AI and machine learning (ML) companies (Crunchbase, 2025[57]). Investors fear that this growth is distorting the VC market, with investment flows driving the number of companies created in this sector. In 2024, nearly one in four new start-ups were AI companies, and there are concerns that many of these companies are overvalued, with inefficiencies in the allocation of capital. Going forward, some investors expect market corrections (Pitchbook, 2025[58]).
The AI share of total investment grew at a higher rate than the share of deals. This suggests that VC investments are increasingly concentrated in fewer, larger deals, with more capital flowing to a smaller share of tech companies.
Note: 2025 refers to data up to the first half of 2025. Data as of June 30, 2025.
Source: Q2 2025 Global VC first look, (Pitchbook, 2025[59]).
When examining AI investments across regions, North America (the US and Canada) attracted the most VC capital. As of the first half of 2025, it accounted for 63% of global VC volumes going to AI and ML companies. Europe followed with 35%, and Asia with 20% (Pitchbook, 2025[59]).
The emergence of AI companies worldwide, along with their rapid traction among investors, and the positive effects of AI on productivity and economic growth, are resulting in many governments launching a series of initiatives to promote AI development and attract global investments. In the first quarter of 2025, the United States announced the Stargate Project, which aims to attract USD 500 billion in private capital for the development of next-generation AI infrastructure (Forbes, 2025[60]). This announcement was followed by the European Commission's launch of its InvestAI program, a plan to channel EUR 200 billion into AI innovation, including a new European fund of EUR 20 billion for the establishment of AI gigafactories (European Commission, 2025[61]). Additionally, France committed EUR 109 billion in investments for infrastructure projects in AI (Élysée, 2025[62]). During the same period, China announced a national venture capital guidance fund of USD 138 billion, aimed at investing in various priority sectors, including AI and quantum computing (Reuters, 2025[63]). In July 2025, the US announced the establishment of the American AI Exports Program. The Programme aims to support US AI companies by promoting an integrated American-made AI ecosystem that could be exported, rather than just individual AI components that could be outcompeted (The White House, 2025[64]) (KPMG, 2025[65]).
Fintech developments
Fintech-driven finance plays a growing role in SME access to capital, with an increasing number of Fintech firms indicating SMEs as their primary customers (Cambridge Centre for Alternative Finance, 2025[66]). Fintech is defined as digital entities offering or facilitating financial services online18. These activities are not currently captured in the Scoreboard’s standard indicators for alternative finance, which primarily monitor traditional instruments alternative to bank debt, such as leasing, factoring and venture capital. Challenges in capturing these data in the Scoreboard stem from the fact that much of Fintech activity sits outside official banking statistics. It is often fragmented across private providers and lacks consistent public reporting. To begin to address this gap, the present section draws on industry sources and surveys to shed light on recent developments in Fintech and their implications for SME access to finance.
In 2023 and 2024, the Fintech industry remained resilient despite macroeconomic volatility. In 2024, Fintech revenues (from both public and private companies) increased by 21% (up from a 13% increase in 2023). Growth has been driven mostly by private firms, with Fintech in public markets growing moderately by 3% (up from a decline of 31% in 2023) (BCG, 2025[67]). Fintech firms continue to reach traditionally underserved groups, with SMEs making up the highest share both in terms of customer base and revenue in 2023, followed by low-income individuals and women (Figure 1.16) (Cambridge Centre for Alternative Finance, 2025[68]). With adoption of AI by Fintech firms increasing markedly, implications for SME financing are likely to become significant going forward.
As a percentage
Within Fintech, embedded finance19 has seen remarkable growth in recent years, as technological advancements enable more seamless customer journeys, greater system interoperability and simplification in the provision of financial products and services. In Europe, the embedded finance market generated an estimated EUR 20 billion to EUR 30 billion in 2023, about 3% of total banking revenues20 and over the last ten years volumes grew three times as fast as directly distributed loans. From the demand side, SMEs are increasingly looking for convenience and effectively integrated finance21. From the supply side, the cost of providing embedded finance has decreased due to improvements in application programming interfaces (APIs), which facilitate system interoperability (Mckinsey, 2024[69]). In addition, wider adoption of electronic identification and the use of alternative data22 have simplified credit assessments and underwriting. Furthermore, advancements in AI and its potential to mine large datasets can further automate the credit assessment process and credit scoring, increasing efficiency and reducing costs.
In 2024, early signs of fragility were visible in SME non-performing loans (NPLs) and in bankruptcy developments. The Scoreboard median SME NPLs increased moderately by 0.4 p.p.; however, most countries (18 of 32 countries) reported declines, and the countries with higher SME NPLs reported only modest increases. In parallel, bankruptcies continued to increase and, in many cases, exceeded pre-pandemic levels. In 2024, 16 of 26 countries stood at or above their 2019 benchmark.
In contrast to larger firms, SME non-performing loans edged up in 2024
Despite a moderate increase in the Scoreboard median of SME NPLs (up 0.5 p.p.), most Scoreboard countries (18 out of 32) reported a decline in SME NPLs. The largest declines were registered in Ukraine (down 4 p.p.), although from a high base, Greece (down 4 p.p.) and Croatia (down 2 p.p.). Among the countries reporting an increase in SME NPLs, the rise has been relatively modest, ranging from a 0.17 percentage point increase in Korea, to a 3-percentage point increase in Austria (Figure 1.17).
A study from the ECB assessing credit exposure and quality of the SME portfolio across a sample of banks suggests that the SME NPL ratio remained stable at 4.78% as of Q1 2025, staying above the NPL ratio of the total non-financial corporate portfolio, which was 3.47%. The total coverage ratio for the SME portfolio in the same period was 3.02%. However, the SME exposure varies greatly across countries, with SME exposures as a share of total loans being the highest in Latvia (25%), Estonia (23%) and Portugal (22%) and lowest in Luxembourg (5%), Ireland (7%) and Slovak Republic (7%).
As a percent of total stock of SME loans
Note: The countries on the left-hand side of Panel B registered a decline in SME NPLs between 2023 and 2024. UKR is omitted from the graph for readability (NPL SME share reported at 48% in 2024 and 52% in 2023).
Source: Data compiled from individual country Scoreboards.
Bankruptcies have risen above pre-pandemic levels in many countries
In the immediate aftermath of the COVID-19 pandemic, SME bankruptcies declined markedly as a result of government support. As those measures were unwound, bankruptcy filings began to gradually normalise from historically low levels. However, the continuation of the upward trend in 2023 and 2024 suggests that in many Scoreboard countries, volumes now exceed the pre-pandemic benchmark. Figure 1.18 shows bankruptcy volumes in 2024 in relation to bankruptcy volumes in 2019 (100 equals to 2019). It shows that most countries (21 out of 32) were at or above their pre-pandemic level in 2024. The highest levels in bankruptcies vis-à-vis 2019 were registered in Germany and Colombia. In Germany, the rise in interest rates and the elimination of short-time work benefits explain the marked increase in bankruptcies (Reuters, 2025[70]). However, the broad definition of SME bankruptcy in Germany (defined as all SMEs entering bankruptcy or insolvency procedures) may have also contributed to the high index. In Colombia, the high increase in bankruptcies is in part explained by a new bankruptcy law introduced in 2024, which enhances the flexibility and efficiency of bankruptcy procedures, with a particular focus on SMEs23.
Index 2019=100
Note: In AUS, AUT, CAN, CHE, ESP, GBR, HUN, KAZ, LTU, LUX, POL, SVK, TUR, UKR, and USA, total bankruptcies are reported as a proxy for SME bankruptcies. AUS includes all corporate and business-related personal insolvencies. CAN reports all business insolvencies. CHN reports the average of SME bankruptcy (including shut-off). DEU counts SMEs entering legal proceedings due to bankruptcy or insolvency. IRL reports company liquidations rather than bankruptcies. GBR reports total new company insolvencies.
Source: Data compiled from individual country Scoreboards.
Governments are responding to the evolving context and its impacts on SME finance. Alongside longstanding interventions through guarantees and direct lending, governments are continuing to support the development of venture capital markets through direct and indirect investments, which is the special focus of Chapter 2 of this report. Furthermore, recent trends show governments prioritising and targeting support to specific challenges and segments of SMEs. This includes SMEs exposed to international trade as well as innovative SMEs and start-ups. Public support also seeks to foster the diversification of SME financing instruments and sources by enabling the implementation of tech models in asset-based financing, through the development of regulatory frameworks that provide the basis for these models to scale. Across Scoreboard countries, governments continue to promote SME investments in sustainability. More information about the policy landscape in each country can be found in the individual country snapshots.
Governments are supporting SMEs in navigating trade disruptions
SMEs are particularly vulnerable when it comes to trade disruptions, as they often have limited resources, bargaining power, capacities and networks compared to large firms. Similarly, when they try to access finance to trade, they encounter additional barriers, including higher rejection rates and credit costs compared to large firms, with around half of SMEs' trade finance applications being rejected, compared to a 7% rejection rate for multinational companies (ADB et al., IFC, WTO, 2023[71]) (WTO, 2024[72]).
As such, governments have responded to trade disruptions affecting SMEs through a combination of financial and non-financial support. Financial support included credit guarantee schemes, direct lending and working capital loans offered at favourable interest rates, and in some cases, the reduction of compliance costs for businesses engaging in cross-border trade. Non-financial support included dedicated advisory centres offering consultancy services to SMEs facing emerging trade disruptions. For example, the Spanish public bank Instituto de Crédito Oficial (ICO) launched a package in April 2025 that includes a line of credit guarantees worth EUR 5 billion for both exporter and importer companies, including SMEs affected by trade disruptions (Spain’s country profile). In Korea, the Ministry of SMEs and Startups (MSS) announced in February 2025 the Export Support Measures for SMEs and Startups to provide financial and non-financial support to help SMEs navigate the impacts of trade tensions. Non-financial support included the establishment of an Export Difficulties Reporting Center at 15 Export Support Centers to receive reports and provide consultations on emerging difficulties. Financial support included expansion of guarantees from KRW 10 billion in 2024 to KRW 30 billion in 2025. The programme also includes loans for SMEs in sectors more vulnerable to trade disruptions24 (Korean Ministry SMEs and Start-ups, 2025[73]).
In Canada, the Business Development Bank of Canada (BDC) is supporting Canadian entrepreneurs affected by new tariffs by making available up to CAD 500 million in financing. Working capital loans for up to CAD 2 million with favourable interest rates are provided to support commercially viable businesses (Canadian country profile). In the UK, as part of the Growth Guarantee Scheme, the government announced in April 2025 GBP 500 million of additional lending capacity for SMEs that may need support with cashflow issues due to changes in global tariff rates (British Business Bank, 2025[74]). The Australian Government has also abolished around 1 000 nuisance tariffs over the course of two years to streamline trade and save Australian businesses around AUD 157 million in compliance costs annually (Australian Treasury, 2025[75]). Going forward, to mitigate the negative impacts of trade disruptions on SMEs, the government considers that the policy mix will need to include policies that expand SME access to trade finance, increase awareness of benefits offered under various trade agreements and their dedicated SME chapters, and streamline cross-border procedures.
Credit guarantees and direct lending schemes are increasingly targeting start-ups and innovative SMEs
Governments are responding to emerging needs, prioritising targeted guarantees and direct lending schemes for start-ups and innovative SMEs. Support also includes match financing schemes targeting young and innovative businesses, in which loans and convertible loan notes are issued by matching private investments. In the case of guarantees, one example is the ERP-Promotional Loan for start-ups and succession program was launched in Germany in November 2024 by KfW and the German Guarantee Banks. The program includes 100% guarantees25 for start-ups and business successors. Loans are financed by KfW and cover up to 35% of eligible costs and capped at EUR 500 000 per applicant (German country profile). In Denmark, in February 2025, the Match financing scheme under EIFO was extended and made permanent. Through the scheme, EIFO issues loans and convertible loan notes by matching investments of private investors. The loans specifically target young, innovative, highly scalable enterprises. The maximum loan amount is EUR 1.1 million, and the maximum maturity is 10 years (Danish country profile) (EIFO, 2025[76]).
Alongside a trend towards targeted schemes, overall guaranteed volumes continued the three-year decline. In 2024, 20 out of 25 countries that provided data for the indicator showed declines in volumes of guaranteed loans. The Scoreboard median declined by 15% (Figure 1.19, Panel A), a similar magnitude to previous years. These declines reflect an adjustment after the large jump in pandemic era support. However, when looking at volumes as a share of GDP, many countries (14 out of 25) continue to have higher volumes compared to the pre-pandemic (2019). This shows that credit guarantees remain an important tool for governments to support SME financing across geographies, sectors, and stages of development, particularly those that may be vulnerable in periods of economic uncertainty and transition.
Source: Data compiled from the individual country Scoreboards.
Governments are introducing regulatory reforms to enable the use of technologies in the provision of asset-based finance
Multiple measures have been implemented recently by Scoreboard countries to improve SME access to factoring. This includes enabling digital infrastructures for factoring transactions and centralised invoice registries to allow parties to verify the status of receivables, reduce the risk of double financing, accurately assess credit risk, and enable AI-driven decision tools to assess financing applications more comprehensively and reach SMEs with limited credit history.
For the implementation of tech-enabled factoring models, Scoreboard countries are enacting laws to provide the basis for these models to flourish. For example, in June 2025, Ukraine adopted the Law of Ukraine On Factoring, which seeks to modernise Ukrainian factoring regulations and introduce digital tools like an electronic factoring system and electronic auctions. The Law also aims to align with international standards (Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine, 2025[77]). France implemented a full legal framework for electronic transferable records aligning with UNCITRAL MLETR principles. The implementation is expected to provide benefits across shipping, logistics, supply chain finance, and insurance, and more, through unique electronic records and auditable transaction processes (Légifrance, 2025[78]). In Georgia, a new factoring law is close to being enacted. The law addresses three challenges: legal recognition of factoring companies, the enforceability of factoring contracts regardless of clauses in underlying sales agreements, and the creation of a national invoice registry (Parliament of Georgia, 2025[79]).
Promoting SME sustainable investments continues to be central in the policy mix
In recent years, governments have developed a wide range of financial and non-financial support measures to accelerate SME investments in sustainability, targeting SMEs across the entire green supply chain, from innovators to enablers and adopters. For these purposes, public institutions are redesigning or repurposing traditional instruments to serve the sustainability-related financing needs of SMEs, including through green loans, leases, guarantees and other instruments. At the same time, there is increasing recognition that more tailored and flexible instruments may be needed to encourage SMEs to invest in sustainability. Public institutions are, therefore, also developing novel instruments like sustainability-linked loans, revenue-based financing or property-linked financing that have been designed to address specific supply- and demand-side constraints, such as high costs, cash flow pressures and collateral requirements. Through all of these interventions, financing is often paired with non-financial support to strengthen the uptake and impact of these instruments and programmes (OECD, 2025[80]).
For example, in 2024 Bpifrance launched the Green Guarantee to support ecological and energy transition projects. The guarantee is up to 80% and prioritises businesses older than one year with transition projects (Bpifrance, 2024[81]). In Mexico, NAFIN’s Eco Sustainable Credit Programme launched in 2024 facilitates SME adoption of energy-efficient technologies by channeling green loans via participating banks (with repayment terms up to eight years) and de-risking supply through NAFIN guarantees of up to 80%. Financial support is paired with technical assistance, including external energy audits to identify the most effective investment opportunities (NAFIN, 2024[82]).
The UK government launched the Growth Guarantee Scheme (GGS) in 2024 for SMEs looking to invest and grow. The scheme is the successor scheme to the Recovery Loan Scheme launched in 2021 . The GGS provides the lender with a 70% government-backed guarantee against loans or other types of finance. At the time of writing, a pilot, known as Green GGS is being run to enhance the ability of the scheme to support businesses that are investing in sustainable assets (UK Country profile).
In Greece, the Hellenic Development Bank launched in 2024 the Green Co-financing Loan Fund. The programme provides favourable loan terms for SMEs to implement green transition investments, including green mobility, energy efficiency upgrades, emissions reduction, among others. Loan amounts range from EUR 80 000 to 8 million, 40% of the capital is interest free, and there is a two-year partial interest subsidy on the remaining 60% of the capital (Hellenic Development Bank, 2024[83]).
In Hungary, the Demján Sándor Capital Programme provides capital financing between HUF 100 million and HUF 400 million, which can be used for green investments, equipment and machinery purchases, market expansion, and exports (Hungary country profile).
Prior to the conflict in the Middle East, the cost of financing for SMEs had eased gradually, in response to the decline in policy interest rates, but it remains high compared to the pre-COVID period, while lending terms and conditions have tightened. Across the range of instruments, financing growth is sluggish: the recovery in new lending is tentative, asset-based finance continues to show subdued performance, and the recovery in equity financing largely reflects a focus on AI, with growth mainly driven by large deal sizes. Furthermore, the decline in long-term loans signals weaker SME investments in an uncertain economic environment. Looking ahead, SME finance policy could usefully seek to foster SME long-term investments for competitiveness, resilience and growth, including by strengthening diversification and enabling SMEs to leverage their intangible assets to access finance.
Governments will need to continue to respond to emerging developments impacting SMEs in a context of continued economic uncertainty, by providing targeted financial and non-financial support, and working to enable the development of Fintech-driven alternative finance. Across Scoreboard countries, fostering long-term SME investments, including in sustainability, digitalisation and skills, will be important to boost SME resilience, competitiveness and growth.
The Scoreboard will continue to monitor developments in the SME financing and policy landscape to support governments in developing policies that enable SMEs and entrepreneurs to navigate and thrive in a rapidly evolving landscape.
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← 1. The experience from the US-China 2018-19 trade tensions suggests that companies exposed to higher tariffs have lower investment, employment and productivity growth (Chor and Li, 2021[84]).
← 2. In Germany, nearly 30% of companies with investment plans in the United States have postponed their projects, and 15% have cancelled them because of uncertainty surrounding U.S. tariff policy. Domestic investments are also being affected by this uncertainty. According to a survey of 1 500 companies, about 21% are delaying investments in Germany, while 8% have reported cancelled projects (Reuters, 2025[9]).
← 3. The survey was conducted to nearly 1 000 business executives between 14-25 April 2025. The question was: "How has uncertainty about tariffs, taxes, government spending, monetary policy, or regulation affected your firm's plans for hiring [investment] over the next 6 months?" (Federal Reserve Bank of Atlanta, 2025[10]).
← 4. Total corporate bank credit refers to loans to non-financial businesses, SMEs and large firms combined.
← 5. Loans other than revolving loans and overdrafts, convenience and extended credit card, new business volume to non-financial corporations with original maturity over 1 year (European Commission, 2025[20]).
← 6. The aggregate volume of new SME lending includes the data from 28 Scoreboard countries for which data is available from 2019 to 2024. Countries covered are AUT, BEL, BRA, CAN, CHL, COL, CZE, DEU, DNK, ESP, EST, GBR, GEO, GRC, HRV, HUN, IRL, KAZ, LTU, LVA, MEX, MYS, NLD, PRT, SRB, SVK, SVN and UKR. For more information on how data is adjusted, please refer to Box 1.1 or Annex A on the Methodology for producing national Scoreboards.
← 7. The inflation adjustment to this indicator may have also contributed to the stability of the Scoreboard median of stocks.
← 8. Non-bank financial institutions include investment funds, insurance companies, pension funds and other financial institutions such as money market mutual funds, hedge funds and finance companies (Financial Stability Board, 2026[91]) (Bank for International Settlements, 2025[92]).
← 9. In the UK, in 2023 and 2024, 37% of asset finance was being provided by non-bank lenders (BBB, 2025[94]). In the US, in 2022 non-bank lenders accounted for around half of new credit extended to small businesses and according to the Small Business Credit Survey, an increasing proportion of small businesses prefer non-bank finance because of the speed in decision and higher chances to being funded (Bipartisan Policy Center, 2022[87]).
← 10. The Financial Stability Board identified several data challenges that hinder authorities’ ability to effectively assess vulnerabilities in the nonbank sectors (FSB, 2025[86]).
← 11. Long-term outstanding stock of SME loans includes the data from 27 Scoreboard countries for which data is available from 2021 to 2024. Countries covered are AUT, BEL, BRA, CHL, COL, CZE, DEU, ESP, EST, GEO, HRV, HUN, ISR, IRL, ITA, KAZ, KOR, LVA, NLD, NOR, POL, PRT, SRB, SVK, SVN and UKR. For more information on how data is adjusted, please refer to Box 1.1 or the Methodological annex.
← 12. The SME definition used by the UK Office of National Statistics in this survey is firms with less than 299 employees.
← 13. Net investment is calculated by the difference between acquisitions of capital assets and proceeds from the disposal of capital assets (Office for National Statistics, 2025[34]).
← 14. Leaseurope index results in Q4 2024 showed that in the full year, European new leasing activities increased by 8% and the stock expanded by 4.3%. However, profits declined by 13.6%, explained by an increase in loan loss provisions in the first three quarters if 2024 (Leaseurope, 2025[89]).
← 15. A downround is a situation where a company’s valuation in a new financing round is lower than before (Pitchbook, 2025[93]).
← 16. In part because of the potential need to provide additional funding to existing portfolio companies as they deal with challenging economic conditions, supply chain issues, and uncertain exit strategies (KPMG, 2025[85]). In H1 2025, many investors remained cautious, funding only start-ups with strong performance and proven resilience (Crunchbase, 2025[56]) (UK Country profile), leaving behind newer and potentially riskier projects.
← 17. More than 30% of funding each quarter is going to megarounds (Crunchbase, 2025[53]).
← 18. This is the definition adopted by the Cambridge Centre for Online Alternative Finance, which is the main source for Fintech data for the Scoreboard.
← 19. Seamlessly integrating payments, lending, insurance and other financial products into non-financial platforms (World Economic Forum, 2025[88]). For SMEs, this means faster access to financing at the point of need, lower onboarding frictions when accessing credit, and tighter links between sales, settlement and financing.
← 20. Estimates by McKinsey are based on the size of the addressable embedded finance market as far as 2030. McKinsey has developed a market-sizing model that encompasses 23 countries, six industry verticals, and 25 financial services products in three core customer segments (Mckinsey, 2024[69]).
← 21. A study on B2B point-of-sale market found that in 2021, buyers would purchase four times as much directly from suppliers’ websites if the option were available.
← 22. Alternative data for credit assessments include public data sources like tax records and private sources such as account transactions and balances.
← 23. Law 2437 of 2024 introduces significant amendments to Law 1116 of 2006, which governs business insolvency and reorganization in Colombia. The amendments improve the regulatory system by offering more flexible mechanisms for debt restructuring, enhancing access to credit, and streamlining judicial processes (CMS Rodrídez Azuero, 2025[90]).
← 24. MSS will establish the K-Beauty Loan, worth KRW 20 billion, to support cosmetics production (Korean Ministry SMEs and Start-ups, 2025[73]).
← 25. The guarantee is counter-guaranteed by the Federal Government (typically at 80%).