This chapter closes the report by examining how the growth and diffusion of space activities create systemic vulnerabilities that require policy attention. It looks more closely at risks related to orbital sustainability, market concentration, supply chains and critical materials, the resilience of satellite signals and the environmental externalities of intensified space activity.
The Space Economy at a Glance 2026
Abstract
Space systems have become critical to modern economies, public services and key infrastructures. They support science, communications, positioning, navigation and timing, weather forecasting, disaster response, transport, agriculture, finance and defence. As reliance on these systems grows, disruptions to space infrastructure can have wider economic and societal impacts.
The vulnerabilities examined in this chapter are diverse and should not be treated as a single category of risk. They differ in their causes, time horizons, affected actors and policy responses. Five broad types can be distinguished:
Safety and sustainability risks, including orbital congestion, collision risks, space debris and the long-term usability of Earth’s orbits.
Market risks, including concentration in launch capacity, constellation-scale infrastructure and key space-enabled services, which may create strategic dependencies for governments, firms and users.
Industrial supply-chain risks, including dependence on specialised components, materials, qualified suppliers and critical inputs such as radioisotopes.
Security and resilience risks, including cyber vulnerabilities, jamming and spoofing of satellite signals, interference with critical services and the need for continuity arrangements in downstream sectors.
Externalities of space activity, including impacts on astronomy, dark and quiet skies, radio-frequency environments, hazardous substances and the upper atmosphere.
Several of these risks are becoming more prominent as space activity expands. The space environment is increasingly contested, with jamming and spoofing of satellite navigation signals raising concerns in aviation, maritime transport and telecommunications. Although this chapter does not examine security and defence issues in depth, malicious interference, dual-use capabilities and geopolitical tensions form part of the resilience context for civil and commercial space systems.
Other pressures relate to the wider effects of orbital activity. Large constellations can affect optical and radio astronomy through satellite trails and radiofrequency interference and contribute to the loss of dark and quiet skies needed for science and biodiversity. These issues are distinct from, but connected to, orbital congestion and space traffic management. Atmospheric impacts are also emerging, as satellite and rocket re-entries can inject metals and other materials into the upper atmosphere (OECD, 2023[1]). While the scale and long-term effects remain uncertain, rising launch and re-entry rates point to the need for stronger evidence and responsible mitigation.
These vulnerabilities are interrelated but require different policy responses. Orbital debris calls for collective rules, operational co-ordination and responsible behaviour by operators. Market concentration requires monitoring of dependencies, procurement choices, interoperability and contestability. Supply-chain risks call for granular mapping, diversification and access to specialised inputs. Signal-resilience risks involve cybersecurity, redundancy and preparedness among users. Distinguishing between these vulnerabilities helps clarify where national policy action is needed, where international co-operation is indispensable and where better evidence is still required.
Each of these vulnerabilities is addressed in turn in this chapter.
The first set of vulnerabilities relates to the safety and long-term viability of orbital environments, an issue covered in depth in OECD work on the sustainability of Earth’s orbits (OECD, 2022[2]; 2024[3]). Earth’s lower orbits are becoming increasingly crowded, but congestion is not evenly distributed. Active satellites are concentrated in a limited number of orbital bands, especially where latency, coverage, mission requirements and atmospheric drag conditions are favourable. As discussed in Chapter 3, low-earth orbit constellations and non-geostationary filings are major drivers of current and prospective demand for orbital capacity. The concentration is particularly visible between 400 and 600 km altitude, where communications satellites benefit from low latency and where the existing debris population is comparatively lower than in some higher orbital bands (Figure 4.1).
The challenge is therefore not only the total number of satellites, but their clustering at specific altitudes and orbital shells. Communications satellites, earth observation systems and other constellation-based services often seek similar operational conditions. This can increase collision-avoidance requirements, spectrum co-ordination needs and operational complexity, particularly as multiple large constellations scale up simultaneously (OECD, 2022[2]; 2024[3]).
This concentration of active satellites also interacts with the debris environment. Space debris refers to non-functional, human-made objects in orbit or re-entering the atmosphere, including fragments.1 It has accumulated since the first orbital launch in 1957 and results from routine operations, accidents, explosions and collisions. The persistence of debris varies significantly by altitude. As shown in Figure 4.1, the population of debris objects above 700 km changed little between 2023 and 2025. At these higher altitudes, natural orbital decay – whereby objects gradually lose altitude and eventually burn up in the atmosphere – can take centuries or even thousands of years. At lower altitudes, decay is faster and may take decades, months or even days, depending on orbital conditions.
Distribution of satellites and debris objects across low-earth orbits, 2022 and 2025
Notes: Payloads in this figure refer to space objects (e.g. satellites, space probes) designed to perform a specific function in space, excluding launch functionality. Manoeuvrable payloads typically have an orbit control system (i.e. propulsion system).
Source: ESA (2026[4])and (2023[5]), Annual Space Environment Report https://www.sdo.esoc.esa.int/environment_report/Space_Environment_Report_latest.pdf.
Manoeuvrable satellites can reduce some operational risks by conducting collision-avoidance manoeuvres and clearing their orbit at end of life. However, this depends on satellite design, operator practices, access to timely tracking information and effective co-ordination. Even in lower orbits where natural decay is faster, rising satellite density can increase collision-avoidance burdens and create new operational and governance challenges.
The debris population is large and only partly observable. Around 45 860 objects are regularly tracked, while models estimate about 54 000 objects larger than 10 cm, 1.2 million objects between 1 and 10 cm, and 140 million objects between 1 mm and 1 cm (ESA, 2026[4]). Even small debris objects below 1 cm can damage spacecraft at orbital velocities, and most objects are too small to track operationally.
According to simulations by the European Space Agency, the debris population may become self-generating in some orbital regions: collisions among existing objects can create further debris even without additional launches (ESA, 2026[4]). This is the so-called Kessler syndrome, first described in the late 1970s. In the worst case, debris accumulation in certain orbital regions could reduce their usability or increase operating costs substantially (Figure 4.2).
Number of cumulative collisions in the low-earth orbit in the simulated scenarios of long-term evolution of the space environment
Source: ESA (2026[4]), Annual Space Environment Report 2026, https://www.sdo.esoc.esa.int/environment_report/Space_Environment_Report_latest.pdf.
Space debris already affects operations. The International Space Station has conducted more than 40 debris avoidance manoeuvres with crew on board since 1999. Large constellation operators also report rapidly growing numbers of collision-avoidance manoeuvres. SpaceX reported that its Starlink satellites performed more than 300 000 collision-avoidance manoeuvres in 2025, up from around 200 000 in 2024, a rise of roughly 50% in one year. Comparable public reporting across operators remains limited, making it difficult to assess system-wide operational burdens and trends.
Debris mitigation therefore requires more than post-mission disposal rules. It depends on satellite reliability, end-of-life disposal, passivation of rocket bodies, collision-avoidance co-ordination, data sharing, active debris removal, and internationally aligned norms for responsible behaviour. The growing diversity of operators makes transparency and common reporting practices increasingly important.
Market concentration can become a vulnerability when governments, firms or users depend on a small number of providers for services that cannot be readily substituted. Access to space provides one example. As shown in Chapter 2, participation in space activities has broadened significantly, with 109 countries having placed at least one satellite in orbit by end-2025, supported by CubeSats, commercial rideshare services and more accessible satellite technologies. Demand for launch services is also expected to remain strong over the coming decade, driven by both institutional and commercial users.
However, the expansion of space participation has not been matched by an equivalent diversification of launch supply. Global launch activity increased sharply between 2020 and 2025, although estimates vary depending on the treatment of failed attempts and test flights. Based on one commonly used metric, orbital launch activity rose from 114 attempts in 2020 to around 325 launches in 2025. The number of active launch providers also increased to more than 20 organisations (Table 4.1).
Yet effective launch supply, particularly among high-cadence providers, remained highly concentrated. In 2025, SpaceX, China Aerospace Science and Technology Corporation (CASC), Rocket Lab and Roscosmos together accounted for more than four-fifths of orbital launches, with SpaceX alone representing around half of the global total.2
Note: Active launch providers are organisations that conducted at least one orbital launch attempt during the year, including unsuccessful attempts. Providers are grouped at the launch-service or national launch-system level where appropriate; organisations developing launch vehicles but not conducting an orbital attempt during the year are excluded.
Source: OECD analysis.
The gap between emerging launch capabilities and launch services available at scale has implications for competition, resilience and assured access to space. Policy approaches should therefore consider not only the emergence of new launch systems or maiden flights, but also providers’ ability to sustain reliable operations at scale, the availability of effective alternatives for satellite operators, and potential vulnerabilities associated with reliance on a limited number of high-cadence providers.
Space manufacturing supply chains have traditionally been characterised by low production volumes, high levels of specialisation and demanding qualification requirements. Components must often withstand launch vibration, extreme temperature changes, vacuum and radiation. The list of qualified suppliers can therefore be limited, and substitution can be slow because of safety, reliability and certification requirements (OECD, 2014[6]; Altana, 2026[7]).
Recent developments may increase exposure to supply-chain risks. Higher launch and production volumes increase demand for equipment and raw materials. At the same time, spacecraft and launch technologies are renewed more frequently and increasingly use technologies similar to those found in terrestrial high-tech markets. The growing use of commercial off-the-shelf components can reduce costs but may also expose the sector to competition for inputs from larger industries.
Critical and strategic materials are a particular concern. Space systems require specialised metals, minerals, gases, electronics, batteries, optical instruments, solar cells and structural alloys. For several materials used in space systems, production is highly concentrated, increasing exposure to disruptions, export restrictions or bottlenecks affecting specific grades, components or processing stages (Figure 4.3). Space systems rely on a broad range of critical minerals across launchers, spacecraft and ground-linked subsystems. Launcher and spacecraft structures, propulsion and thermal-control systems use materials such as titanium, aluminium, nickel, niobium, molybdenum, rhenium and platinum group metals, reflecting requirements for strength, heat resistance and performance under extreme operating conditions. Power subsystems depend on gallium, germanium, indium and silver for high-efficiency solar arrays, as well as lithium, nickel, cobalt and graphite for batteries. Electronics require gallium and germanium compounds, tantalum capacitors, tungsten, hafnium and noble gases. Sensors, optics and communications systems, including detectors, infrared optics, lasers and antennas, rely on germanium, indium, tellurium and rare earth elements. Overall, these materials are central to the performance, reliability and resilience of space systems, but they also expose the sector to supply-chain concentration, price volatility and strategic dependency risks.
Source: Expanding on Maury-Micolier et al. (2022[8]), “Criticality assessment of the EU space systems’ supply chains”, https://indico.esa.int/event/416/contributions/7279/attachments/4854/7549/20221011_CSID_criticality%20assessment%20space%20supply%20chain_vf%20(1).pdf.
Determining dependencies in the space sector requires granular supply-chain mapping. A raw material may be refined and processed in multiple ways, and shortages may concern specific grades, by-products or components rather than the raw material alone (Carrara et al., 2023[9]). The small size of the space sector can make stockpiling easier in some cases, but it can also reduce purchasing power and visibility compared with larger industrial sectors. Shortages can exist for very specific grades (e.g. nickel and titanium) or for by-products of other production streams (germanium, gallium). The supply chain is complex and the substitution of products can be long and challenging due to safety and certification procedures.
Figure 4.3 shows a simplified overview of the critical and strategic materials needed in specific space systems – each column ranked from top to bottom in terms of the number of inputs. On the left side, phosphorus, titanium, cobalt, lithium and rare earth elements are used in the highest number of systems. On the right side, structural alloys, electronics and batteries, optical instruments and solar cells require the highest variety of critical material inputs. It is worth noting that this list does not account for input intensity or potential substitute materials.
For 14 out of the 29 products on the list of selected critical materials used in space manufacturing, metals, minerals and gases, one economy (mostly China) accounts for at least two-thirds of global production in 2025 (Figure 4.4). For 16 products, three producers accounted for 85% of production or more (USGS, 2026[10]). At first glance, the 2035 outlook for mineral supply shows that supply gaps are narrowing, with copper as a major exception (IEA, 2025[11]). However, in terms of diversification, the growth in refined critical minerals has been driven almost entirely by top producers, meaning that the geographic concentration of refined products has increased across nearly all critical minerals.
Share of world production
Notes: For columns in red, China is the lead supplier. 1. Refers to refined production.
Source: Based on data from USGS (2026[10]), Mineral Commodity Summaries 2026, https://pubs.usgs.gov/periodicals/mcs2026/mcs2026.pdf.
Radioisotopes for space exploration are also in short supply. Radioisotope power systems can provide reliable heat or electricity for missions where solar power is insufficient or unavailable, but out of the more than 3 000 known radioisotopes, only a very limited number of radioisotopes are adapted for use in space, considering their half-life, radiation emission, power density, fuel form, cost and availability (National Research Council, 2009[12]; Dustin and Borrelli, 2021[13]). Only 22 radioisotopes have half-lives between 15 and 100 years, preferred for NASA missions (National Research Council, 2009[12]). Plutonium-238 has been widely used by the United States, but supply declined after Cold War production facilities closed and has only recently been rebuilt. Americium-241 is being explored as an alternative by Europe and some commercial actors, while other candidates have limitations related to half-life, shielding, safety or availability (Oak Ridge National Laboratory, 2023[14]).
In their comparative study of radioisotopes for space, Dustin and Borelli (2021[13]) identified americium-241 as the best alternative to plutonium-238. India used americium-241 in its Chandrayaan-3 lunar mission. The European Space Agency is also opting for this radioisotope in the development of their own radioisotope thermoelectric generators. The US startup Zeno is using americium-241 to develop commercial radioisotope power systems for space. Compared with plutonium-238, americium-241 is cheaper and more readily available, as it is recovered from civil plutonium waste. It has a considerably longer half-life (432 years compared to 88 years) which could be a drawback or an advantage, depending on the mission duration. Finally, it has higher gamma radiation, requiring more shielding, but emits less neutrons. Strontium-90 and Curium-244 are other possible candidates in terms of technological readiness, availability, safety and thermal output, but their short half-life (28 and 18 years, respectively), limits their applicability (Dustin and Borrelli, 2021[13]).
Space-based systems are designed to resist the multiple stresses of launch as well as the extreme temperature fluctuations and radiation of the space environment, and are, to a significantly lesser extent, shielded against minor collisions with debris. However, they are generally less protected against malicious acts. Civilian spacecraft follow predictable, publicly available, orbital paths and can be destroyed or blinded by physical anti-satellite weapons (Froehlich, 2021[15]). Several economies have demonstrated anti-satellite capabilities in recent years, including China, India, the United States and Russia.
Furthermore, electronic attacks such as jamming and spoofing can interfere with the signals to and from a satellite, and in this way disrupt operations or send fake signals. Finally, ground systems, satellites or end-user equipment can all be the targets of cyberattacks.
As the importance of space systems grow, so do the number of incidents and their potential impact, as illustrated by different examples.
In Russia’s war of aggression against Ukraine, a cyberattack targeting Viasat’s KA-SAT fixed broadband network led to widespread network outages in Central and Eastern Europe on the day of the invasion, as the attack knocked out thousands of modems communicating with the geostationary satellite. Government users were not affected (Viasat, 2022[16]).
The European Organisation for the Safety of Air Navigation (EUROCONTROL) reports that GNSS radio-frequency interference reports affecting European air transport have increased from 249 in 2021 to 5 624 in 2025, as shown in Figure 4.5.
Recent evidence suggests that GNSS interference is also conducted from satellites, not only from terrestrial sources (Clements, 2026[17]),
The integrity of the satellite imagery supply chain is also vulnerable to malicious attacks. Several earth observation satellites critical for both national and global disaster management send unauthenticated or decryptable signals, making images susceptible to spoofing attacks for “malicious misdirection” (Salkield et al., 2023[18]). Data can be intentionally intercepted or tampered with when communicating with ground stations at various geographic locations, subject to growing scrutiny and importance. As part of the growing trend of digital disinformation, the trust in satellite data can be eroded by fake, misinterpreted or intentionally misrepresented imagery. For example, in 2025 there were several examples of deepfake satellite imagery used to exaggerate the effect of military strikes in ongoing conflicts.
Number of EUROCONTROL Voluntary ATM Information Reports on GNSS radio-interference cases
Source: EUROCONTROL (2026[19]), “Performance review report 2025: an assessment of air traffic management in Europe”, https://www.eurocontrol.int/sites/default/files/2026-03/eurocontrol-performance-review-report-2025.pdf.
A final example concerns terrestrial infrastructures vulnerabilities. In 2022, one of the two undersea fibre-optic cables linking the SvalSat ground station in Svalbard to mainland Norway was damaged, leaving one of the world’s largest commercial satellite ground stations without full redundancy for 11 days. SvalSat hosts more than 150 antennas used by public and private space organisations and supports major Earth observation and weather missions, including Landsat and Copernicus. The incident was not attributed to a malicious act; the cause remains undetermined, and damage to undersea cables can also result from natural causes or accidental interference, including from fishing activities.
The expansion of the space economy creates important opportunities for innovation, connectivity, scientific discovery and public services, but it also makes resilience, sustainability and responsible use of orbital resources central policy concerns. The vulnerabilities discussed in this chapter are mutually reinforcing. Expanding constellations increase demand for orbital capacity and traffic co-ordination; concentration in launch and constellation services can create strategic dependencies; supply-chain risks can affect the development and maintenance of critical capabilities; and environmental, security and signal-resilience risks can undermine trust in space-enabled services.
Because these vulnerabilities differ in nature, policy responses also need to be differentiated. Orbital congestion and debris require collective rules, operational co-ordination, data sharing and responsible behaviour by operators. Market concentration calls for monitoring of dependencies, procurement choices that preserve contestability and resilience, and interoperability or open standards where appropriate. Supply-chain risks require granular mapping, diversification of suppliers and secure access to specialised inputs, including critical materials and radioisotopes. Signal-resilience and environmental risks require stronger evidence, preparedness, cybersecurity, mitigation practices and continuity arrangements for critical services.
Resilience also needs to be embedded beyond space policy itself, in the many downstream sectors that depend on space-based infrastructure. This includes contingency planning for GNSS and communications disruptions, cybersecurity and signal-resilience measures, alternative capabilities where necessary, and stronger user awareness of both the benefits and limits of space-enabled services. Countries will continue to compete in space, but they also share a common interest in preserving safe, sustainable and reliable access to space for economic, scientific and societal benefit.
References
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← 1. The Inter-Agency Space Debris Coordination Committee defines space debris as “all man-made objects including fragments and elements thereof, in Earth orbit or re-entering the atmosphere, that are non-functional” (IADC, 2007[20]).
← 2. Active launch providers are defined here as organisations that conducted at least one orbital launch attempt during the year, including unsuccessful attempts. The classification includes commercial firms, government agencies, and state-owned enterprises. Under this definition, the 25 orbital launch providers identified in 2025 were: Arianespace, Blue Origin, China Academy of Science (CAS) Space Technology Co., Ltd., China Aerospace Science and Technology Corporation (CASC), China Rocket, ExPace, Firefly Aerospace, Galactic Energy, Gilmour Space Technologies, INNOSPACE, the Iranian Aerospace Force, iSpace (Interstellar Glory), Isar Aerospace, Israel Aerospace Industries, Indian Space Research Organisation (ISRO), Korea Aerospace Research Institute (KARI), LandSpace, Mitsubishi Heavy Industries, Northrop Grumman, Orienspace, Rocket Lab, Roscosmos, Space Pioneer, SpaceX, and United Launch Alliance (ULA).