Since Russia launched its full-scale aggression against Ukraine in February 2022, the OECD has deepened its co-operation with Ukraine, building on three decades of work. Principally through its Ukraine Country Programme, the OECD supports Ukraine, now a prospective member of the Organisation, on a wide range of policy areas.
During the OECD Secretary General's visit to Ukraine in February 2023, an OECD-Ukraine Liaison Office opened in Kyiv, having commenced operations in Paris in June 2022. The Office, co-financed by the governments of Poland and Lithuania, with additional support from Latvia and the Slovak Republic, is currently based at the Embassy of the Slovak Republic to Ukraine.
The Office's primary mission is to support OECD initiatives by facilitating engagement with key stakeholders on the ground and helping to implement the Country Programme. It also ensures that the Country Programme is fully aligned with the Ukraine Plan. Being based in Kyiv allows the staff to maintain direct communication with the representatives of the Government of Ukraine, while enabling efficient co-ordination with OECD members and other international organisations. This approach maximises synergies and minimises duplications, ultimately benefiting Ukraine.
Contact us:
OECD-Ukraine Liaison Office Contact
34 Yaroslaviv Val, Kyiv, Ukraine
Email: [email protected]
Tel: +380 44 272 00 42
The disruption of the education of millions of Ukrainian children demands policy action. Two OECD initiatives look at what Ukraine's policy makers can take from other countries' experiences and draw on data on Ukrainian refugees to launch a new interactive dashboard.
> Learning During Crisis: Insights for Ukraine From Around the World: How can other countries' educational experiences support Ukraine's children – and bolster the re-modelling of an education system fit for the future?
> Ensuring Continued Learning for Ukrainian Refugee Students (interactive dashboard): explore the OECD's dashboard based on data taken by OECD countries that have sought to integrate Ukrainian refugees in their education systems
Russia's war of aggression against Ukraine has had profound effects on the maritime sector. It has directly affected maritime transport in the Black and Azov seas and is likely to have further structural impacts on shipping routes and maritime decarbonisation.
Many Ukrainian refugees are expected to want to return home when the situation permits. A dual intent integration approach could prepare for both indefinite stay as well as for the possible return of refugees.
The influx of highly qualified refugees from Ukraine has posed unique challenges for Recognition of Prior Learning (RPL) policies and practices in host countries. What RPL measures did OECD countries implement to ensure a swift continuation of learning.
This paper provides an overview of the efforts initiated by OECD countries to employ Ukrainian teachers, while identifying the obstacles which persist such as qualifications recognition, training gaps, and language barriers.
How should policymakers assess global value chain risks? A new OECD paper looks at the economic dependencies and implications for policy.
Many of the 4.7m refugees registered in the EU by mid-November have high formal qualifications, but early employment has been in low-skilled jobs – putting the challenge of skill transferability under scrutiny.
Destroyed lives, destroyed homes, and destroyed infrastructure are the immediate consequences of Russia’s war of aggression against Ukraine.
The war also imperils the world’s economic recovery from the COVID-19 pandemic: inflation, food security, energy security and further supply-chain pressures are among the challenges policy makers worldwide must tackle.
As the global ramifications of the war continue to unfold, the OECD continues to bring together its latest insights, analysis, and data on the policy challenges ahead.
A simulated 40% reduction in bilateral trade with Russia in all goods and services would have a notable negative real income effect on households in some European G7 countries in the medium term. However, households in Russia would have to withstand a significantly larger negative impact – roughly double the effect of eliminating oil dependency on Russia.
At least 70% of Russia’s imports of, among other items, electronics, motor vehicles and parts, machinery and equipment, chemicals, and business services are from the G7, Europe and Australia. Together, restrictions on exports to Russia from these countries would have an almost 50% larger impact on Russian household income than if these countries restricted imports from Russia.
This also highlights an important point: the benefits of trade – and here the harm potentially inflicted with trade sanctions – is at least as much about Russia's imports as it is about its exports.