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What are Europeans' views on migrant integration? An in-depth analysis of 2017 Special Eurobarometer "Integration of immigrants in the European Union"

Lenka Drazanova,
Thomas Liebig,
Silvia Migali,
Marco Scipioni,
Gilles Spielvogel

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What are Europeans' views on migrant integration?

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Contacts:
Thomas Liebig – Tel. +33 1 45 24 90 68 – Thomas.Liebig@oecd.org
Gilles Spielvogel – Tel.+33 1 85 55 45 05 – Gilles.Spielvogel@oecd.org

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Abstract

This paper provides an in-depth description of public opinion about immigrants' integration in European countries, as captured in the 2017 Special Eurobarometer on this topic. It highlights a near consensus among European respondents on the meaning of integration, but more variation across countries regarding policy options to support integration. It also shows that positive opinions about immigration are often associated with a favourable public perception of integration. Looking at the individual correlates of opinions about immigration and integration, this paper finds that actual knowledge about the magnitude of immigration is positively correlated with attitudes to immigration but not integration. In contrast, more interactions with immigrants are associated with more positive views on integration but not necessarily on immigration.

Résumé

Ce document fournit une description approfondie de l'opinion publique sur l'intégration des immigrés dans les pays européens, telle que capturée dans l'Eurobaromètre spécial de 2017 sur ce sujet. Il met en évidence un quasi-consensus parmi les répondants européens sur la définition de l'intégration, mais davantage de différences entre les pays en ce qui concerne les options politiques pour soutenir l'intégration. Elle montre également que les opinions positives sur l'immigration sont souvent associées à une perception favorable de l'intégration par le public. En examinant les déterminants individuels des opinions sur l'immigration et l'intégration, cet article révèle que les connaissances réelles sur l'ampleur de l'immigration sont positivement corrélées avec les attitudes à l'égard de l'immigration, mais pas de l'intégration. En revanche, des interactions plus fréquentes avec les immigrés sont associées à des points de vue plus positifs sur l'intégration, mais pas nécessairement sur l'immigration.

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Introduction

1. Immigration and the integration of immigrants are high on the policy agenda in many EU and OECD countries, and are frequently among the top concerns of the population. Recent joint work by the European Commission and the OECD on indicators of immigrant integration (OECD/European Union, 2018[1]) has shown that, despite some progress, the outcomes of immigrants from outside of the EU still lag largely behind those of the native-born with respect to both economic and social inclusion.

2. Ultimately, however, not only the actual outcomes of immigrants matter, but also the public perception of these. This perception may well differ from the reality. While public opinion on immigration has been long researched, public views on integration have so far remained understudied. Analysing these views is interesting for a number of reasons. First, at least with respect to socio-economic integration, public opinion can be relatively easily contrasted with actual outcomes. Second, it is plausible that views on immigrants and their integration are, to some extent, associated. However, in the context of such limited literature, this empirical question stands to be tested. Third, one might expect that what ultimately matters to the public may not be exclusively the scale of immigration, but the extent to which immigrants integrate into the host country societies.

3. In other words, it is impossible to fully understand the driving factors behind attitudes towards immigration without getting a better view of public opinions on integration. The Special Eurobarometer on the *Integration of immigrants in the European Union* (European Commission, 2018[2]) gathered, for the first time, information on public opinion across Europe on the integration of immigrants from outside of the EU. This representative survey was carried out among more than 28 000 residents in the 28 Member States of the European Union in October 2017, covering about 1 000 respondents per country. Along with rich socio-demographic information on the respondents, the survey includes, amongst other things, information about general perceptions of immigrants; knowledge about the extent and nature of immigration in the respondent's home country; views about the success in integrating immigrants and the factors which facilitate integration; as well as the obstacles that may prevent it and the measures that would support it.

4. This paper provides the first comprehensive analysis of the public opinion of Europeans regarding integration, building on the data of the 2017 Eurobarometer. The remainder of this paper is structured as follows. Section 2 provides an overview of the prior literature regarding the attitudes towards immigration and integration. Section 3 explores what integration means for Europeans, looking at different definitions. Section 4 looks at the policies that Europeans favour to promote integration, using information from the Eurobarometer and contrasting it with actual policies in place. Section 5 analyses the links between attitudes towards immigration and attitudes towards integration. Section 6 then follows with an in-depth assessment of the drivers of the attitudes towards immigration and integration. Section 7 concludes.

1. What do we know about attitudes towards integration?

5. Data on attitudes towards integration is scarce and, as a result, it is an under-researched area. While the academic literature on public attitudes towards immigration is large and ever-expanding (for an overview, see Hainmueller and Hopkins (2014[3])), the specific literature on public attitudes towards immigrants' integration is relatively limited so far. An exception is a study based on ad hoc surveys on opinions on immigrants' integration in the UK and the Netherlands (Sobolewska, Galandini and Lessard-Phillips, 2017[4]). The paper shows that citizens in those two countries have a multidimensional view of integration. Also, the authors assume that, similarly to attitudes to immigration, people are divided on their opinions regarding integration based on sociodemographic characteristics as well as 'economic and cultural ethnocentrism' (Sobolewska, Galandini and Lessard-Phillips, 2017, p. 61[4]). More broadly, data on how people perceive immigrants' integration are also scarce. A noteworthy exceptions is the Expert Council of German Foundations on Integration and Migration (SVR), which has promoted the Integration barometer in Germany since 2011 (2018[5]), an initiative recently followed also by Norway (Institute for Social Research, 2018[6])

6. The broader academic literature on public attitudes towards immigration has shown that these are shaped by a variety of factors, ranging from, *inter alia*, economic interests, to inter-personal contact, education, cultural and identity concerns, or, place of living[1]. While we briefly review each of these factors separately for presentational purposes, it is likely that they bundle together to form specific individual attitudes.

7. The literature on economic interests and concerns posits that anti-immigration attitudes derive from the perceived labour market competition triggered by immigrants and the purported fiscal burden created by low-skilled immigrants. The empirical evidence of these theoretical predictions is mixed, though.[2] While some studies have supported hypotheses related to labour market competition and fiscal burden (Facchini and Mayda, 2009[7]; Mayda, 2006[8]; Murard, 2017[9]; O'Rourke and Sinnott, 2006[10]), other contributions hint that both real and perceived labour market competition do not provide a comprehensive explanation of public opinions towards immigration (Jeannet, 2018[11]), or find support for one hypothesis but not the other (Ortega and Polavieja, 2012[12]; Naumann, Stoetzer and Pietrantuono, 2018[13]).

8. Socio-tropic concerns, broadly speaking, are instead related to the perceived cultural impact of migration in the host society. Hypotheses connected to the relationships between, *inter alia*, culture, identity, prejudices, and political ideology, have long been tested in the literature (Kessler and Freeman, 2005[14]; Lancee and Pardos-Prado, 2013[15]; Lancee and Sarrasin, 2015[16]; Pardos-Prado, 2011[17]; Sides and Citrin, 2007[18]), and there is consensus in the literature that they are predictors of individual attitudes towards immigration.

9. The empirical literature has emphasised the role of education as one of the most important individual characteristics positively related to attitudes towards migration

[1] For recent overviews, see Hainmueller and Hopkins (2014[3]); Berg (2015[60]); Eger and Bohman (2016[38]).

[2] For a recent contribution, see Valentino et al. (2019[72]).

(Hainmueller and Hiscox, 2007[19]). For instance, in a case study on Switzerland, Lancee and Sarrasin (2015[16]) shows that the positive relation between education and immigration attitudes is almost entirely due to self-selection into education. Additionally, education is likely to be related to other factors such as tolerance or political correctness (Dražanová, 2017[20]; Hainmueller and Hopkins, 2014[3]), positive attitudes towards ethnic diversity (Andriessen, 2016[21]), thus making it difficult to disentangle its effects on attitudes from other related factors.

10. When considering other individual demographic characteristics such as age, Huber and Oberdabernig (2016[22]) find that natives' positive attitudes towards immigration decrease with age in countries where immigrants are relatively more dependent on welfare when compared to natives. More in general, the literature converges on the assessment that age is negatively related with attitudes towards immigration, in line with a broader relationship between ageing and conservativism (Tilley and Evans, 2014[23]). However, it should be noted that several studies have shown that when cohort effects are controlled for, age is no longer a significant predictor of attitudes to immigration (Gorodzeisky and Semyonov, 2018[24]). Studies taking a longitudinal perspective have also highlighted how contextual circumstances when individuals grow up affect political attitudes (Jeannet and Dražanová, 2019[25]; Fuchs-Schundeln and Schundeln, 2015[26]), as in the case of experienced inequality and preferences for redistribution (Roth and Wohlfart, 2018[27]). Being foreign-born is associated with positive attitudes (Dustmann and Preston, 2006[28]).

11. Empirical contributions from different strands in social sciences have also focused on a wide set of non-economic factors influencing and shaping the formation of attitudes towards migration. These include information and media, having contacts with immigrants, political ideology and Euroscepticism, the role of psychological attitudes, and the level of perceived corruption. The exposure to media such as partisan TV channels (Facchini, Mayda and Puglisi, 2017[29]), the framing of immigrants in media and in public discourses (Blinder and Jeannet, 2017[30]; Hellwig and Sinno, 2016[31]), as well as the intensity of media discussions about immigration (Czymara and Dochow, 2018[32]; Hopkins, 2010[33]) are all factors associated with variations in attitudes towards migration. The role of misinformation in shaping individual attitudes is controversial. While some argue that the public is more informed on immigration than is commonly thought and that attitudes towards immigration are rationally motivated (Lahav, 2004[34]), others finds that overestimation of the number of immigrants lead to more restrictive attitudes towards immigration policy (Consterdine, 2018[35]). Finally, Sides (2018[36]) finds that correcting misperceptions about the size of the immigrant population does not consistently affect attitudes about immigration, and Alesina *et al* (2018[37]). show that giving the correct information on the number of migrants does not improve attitudes, while framing migrants in a positive way generates more favourable attitudes.

12. The long-lasting debate in sociology, psychology, and political science on 'contact theory' and 'group-threat theory' has had a profound effect on the literature on non-economic factors shaping attitudes on migration. According to 'contact theory', having interpersonal interactions with immigrants may reduce prejudice towards them and trigger positive feelings about diversity (Eger and Bohman, 2016, p. 879[38]). Instead, 'group-threat theory' implies that natives' negative attitudes are the result of a perceived threat from immigrants. Natives may feel that jobs, as well as their social status are threatened by immigrants[3] (Eger and Bohman, 2016, p. 878[38]). The empirical evidence on contact and

[3] Group-threat theory (Blalock, 1967[73]; Bobo, 1999[74]; Jackson, 1993[75]) would argue that when the majority group feels threatened by a minority group and regards the impact of immigrants on

group-threat theories is rather mixed and inconsistent (for a recent meta-analysis, see Pottie-Sherman and Wilkes (2017[39])). While, at country-level, the correlation between actual migrant stocks and hostility towards migrants, measured through ESS data, is relatively weak (Eger and Bohman, 2016[38]), empirical support for contact theory is found at the individual (Paas and Halapuu, 2012[40]), regional (Markaki and Longhi, 2013[41]; Weber, 2015[42]), or neighbourhood level (Chandler and Tsai, 2001[43]; Paas and Halapuu, 2012[40]). Issues of measurement arise in the identification and quantification of this relationship. For instance, what is to be decided is whether real or perceived presence of immigrants is considered[4] (Hjerm, 2007[44]).

13. Past studies also showed that place of living matters in informing attitudes towards immigration (Alba and Foner, 2017[45]). Maxwell (2019[46]) has recently portrayed Europe as a land of 'Cosmopolitan' large cities where immigration is viewed positively, and 'Nationalist' countryside, where the opposite is the case. Informatively, he shows that such division is the result of compositional effect, meaning that individuals sort themselves into cities or rural areas for demographic and cultural reasons, and this has a subsequent effect on attitudes towards immigration, which aggregates people into such geographical areas.

14. Turning to attitudes on immigration and political party-preferences, Lucassen and Lubbers (2012[47]) conclude that, on the basis of a comparative analysis of 11 European countries, 'perceived cultural ethnic threats' are more sternly associated with far-right preferences than are 'perceived economic ethnic threats'. However, issues of reverse causality are explicitly acknowledged in much of this research (for instance, see Harteveld, Kokkonen, and Dahlberg (2017[48])). The same caveat should be mentioned when interpreting the negative relationship between Euroscepticism and attitudes on migration (Visintin, Green and Sarrasin, 2018[49]), and that between psychological attitudes and anti-immigration sentiments (Yoxon, Van Hauwaert and Kiess, 2017[50]).

15. A number of studies show that replies to questions regarding opinions towards certain groups of immigrants tend to be positive – for instance, highly skilled immigrants in the US, or doctors and nurses in the UK, or people coming from countries that are considered closer on cultural grounds such as Australia (Blinder, 2015[51]; Hainmueller and Hiscox, 2010[52]; Ford, 2011[53]). In contrast, attitudes towards other groups – such as asylum seekers or irregular immigrants (Blinder, Ruhs and Vargas-Silva, 2011[54]) – tend to be more negative.

16. One aspect of the complexity of research on attitudes towards integration stems from the fact that it analyses public opinions towards immigrants' integration, which may

society as negative, then the majority develops negative attitudes toward immigrant integration, prefers assimilation (Davies, Steele and Markus, 2008[76]; Tip et al., 2012[77]; Van Oudenhoven, Prins and Buunk, 1998[78]) and decreases its support for multiculturalism. However, the causal mechanism could also work the other way around. For example, Azrout et al. (2011[63]) assume that people who view immigrants as others have a tendency to categorize everyone outside their group as others and to show a negative bias toward them.

[4] In other words, if the perceived presence of immigrants is considered, then what is measured is connected with issues of over- and under-estimation discussed before. This in turn raises the question of the links between attitudes and level of information about the issue at hand. If the real presence of immigrants is instead considered, then the issue becomes what should be measured, for instance simple size of the community, or its composition (de Blok and van der Meer, 2018[61]) , or change in time (Kaufmann, 2017[62]) and how. The overall tendency is to look at the presence of immigrants at the highest geographical resolution available.

be, at least in part, the outcome of migration policies. There is evidence that policy performance influences public attitudes towards these same policies (Van Oorschot and Meuleman, 2012[55]). Indeed, the disconnect between declared policy objectives and outcomes, and the negative impact this has on public opinions, is one of the premises of 'gap hypothesis' long formulated in migration studies (Martin, Orrenius and Hollifield, 2014[56]).

2. What does integration mean for Europeans?

17. Is there a consensus among European citizens regarding the meaning of integration of immigrants[5], or do they rather hold distinct views? Are differences of views mostly due to different conceptions across countries, or do they rather reflect differences in individual characteristics?

18. A key insight from the Eurobarometer survey is that, across countries, respondents tend to define "successful integration" in remarkably similar ways. Respondents were asked: "How important is each following for the successful integration of immigrants?", and were prompted to assign a score to nine different options, from "Not at all important" to "Very important"[6]. Looking at the average score for each item by country, there is a near consensus across countries regarding which dimensions are most indicative of a successful integration (Figure 1).

- The language dimension ("Being able to speak the country's language(s)") obtains the highest average score in 15 out of 25 countries and the second highest score in seven other countries.
- The necessity to "contribute to the welfare system by paying taxes" is ranked first in eight countries and second in 15 additional countries.
- Immigrants' "commitment to the way of life in [their destination country] by accepting the values and norms of society" is ranked third or higher in 12 countries and fourth in nine other countries.

19. There is also a relative agreement on the dimensions that do not matter much for the success of integration according to respondents: "being active in any association […] or taking part in local elections" is ranked last or before last in 23 countries, while this is the case in 16 countries for the acquisition of the destination country's citizenship.

20. In order to assess more precisely cross-country differences in the definition of integration, we control for individual characteristics, so as to compare on average similar individuals across countries. To do so, we estimated a linear regression model for each question on the meaning of integration. For all regressions, controls for individual characteristics include gender, age, country of birth, marital status, labour market status, education level, difficulties in paying bills, place of living[7], political left/right placement[8]. To control for the fact that a large number of respondents consider that many dimensions of integration are somewhat or very important (i.e. assign high scores to all options), we include the total number of points given when responding to the questions as an additional

[5] It should be noted that in the Special Eurobarometer immigrants are defined as "people born outside the European Union, who have moved away from their country of birth and are at the moment staying legally in (OUR COUNTRY). We are not talking about EU citizens, children of immigrants who have (NATIONALITY) nationality and immigrants staying illegally."

[6] See Table A.1 in the Annex for details on the question.

[7] Place of living is self-reported. The variable captures the degree of urbanization.

[8] Country-specific dummies for all the countries (omitting the constant term) are also included.

individual control[9]. The coefficients of the country dummies from these linear regression models are presented in Figure 2. The interpretation is similar to that of Figure 1, except that instead of raw average scores, dots represent net average scores for each country. In other words, these country-specific constants are indicative of cross-country average differences in the meaning of integration, after individual characteristics are taken into account.

Figure 1. Average answer to the question "How important is each of the following for the successful integration of immigrants?", by country



Note: Individual responses to each item could take one of four values: 4 - "Very important", 3 - "Somewhat important", 2 - "Not very important", 1 - "Not at all important". Each dot on the chart reflects the average score given to a specific item in a given country on this scale from 1 to 4.

21. Two results stand out: first, the cross-country consensus over the meaning of successful integration is not weakened by controlling for individual characteristics. Second, the three most important dimensions of integration according to European respondents remain the ability to speak the host country language, contributing to the welfare system by paying taxes, and a commitment to the way of life of the country.

[9] The definition of the variables is reported in Table A.1 the Annex.

Figure 2. Assessment of the importance of different factors for the successful integration of immigrants, after socio-demographic controls, by country



Note: Dots are coefficients of country dummies from linear regression models on the nine items on the meaning of integration. Each dot on the chart is the average score given to a specific item in a given country, net of the contribution of individual socio-demographic characteristics.

22. A closer look at the differences by individual socio-demographic characteristics shows that the high importance attached to the host-country language is also stable across different groups, keeping all other characteristics constant (see Figure A.1 in Annex). In other words, there are no statistically significant differences in the evaluation of the ability to speak the host-country language among different groups of individuals (here again we draw on the same regression models as those described above). The strongest deviations are with respect to the sharing of cultural traditions. Whereas the elderly and – perhaps surprisingly – immigrants themselves attach high importance to this, people at the left of the political spectrum, as well as students and the highly educated, value this factor less strongly.

3. What policies do Europeans favour to promote integration?

3.1. Perceived integration barriers

23. The survey also includes a question on the perception of respondents with respect to the integration barriers that migrants face. At the aggregate country level, the three main obstacles to integration identified by respondents are: limited efforts by immigrants, difficulties in finding a job, and discrimination against immigrants.

24. At the aggregate level, one observes more heterogeneity across countries than on the meaning of integration (Figure 3). Based on the interquartile range, the cross-country differences are particularly large with respect to the importance of four potential obstacles: discrimination against immigrants, difficulties in finding a job, limited interactions between immigrants and citizens, and negative media portrayal of immigrants. On the contrary, average responses are more similar across countries for the role of obstacles such as limited efforts by immigrants, limited access to education, healthcare and social protection, difficulties in accessing long-term permits, and difficulties in bringing in family members.

25. As was done for the different dimensions of the meaning of integration, we estimate a linear regression model for each question on the perceived integration barriers.[10] Figure 4 reports the coefficients of the country dummies from the linear regression models. When controlling for individual characteristics, cross-country differences with respect to potential obstacles to integration are strongly attenuated. For instance, limited efforts by migrants themselves are rather consistently perceived as the most important obstacle and particularly strongly so in two of the Baltic states (Estonia and Latvia). There are few exceptions, i.e. cases where cross-country differences remain even after controlling for individual characteristics. This is the case of negative media coverage in the United Kingdom where respondents rank this item above the overall European average. There are also some notable outliers with respect to difficulties in bringing family members in – with respondents in Belgium, the Netherlands and Sweden ranking this well below the overall European average. This is particularly interesting in the case of the Netherlands, which have rather restrictive policies for family reunification in the EU, requiring minimum length of residence, minimum income and minimum language skills for a large part of family migrants (OECD, 2017[57]).

[10] In all the models, controls for individual characteristics include gender, age, country of birth, marital status, labour market status, education level, difficulties in paying bills, place of living, political left/right placement. To control for the fact that a large number of respondents consider that many of the issues are obstacles to integration (i.e. assign high scores to all options), we include the total number of points given when responding to the questions as an additional individual control. Country-specific dummies for all the countries (omitting the constant term) are also included.

Figure 3. Average answer to the question "Please tell for each of the following issues if they could be a major obstacle, a minor obstacle or not an obstacle at all for the successful integration of immigrants", by country



Note: The different issues mentioned to respondents are: Discrimination against immigrants; Limited efforts by immigrants to integrate; Difficulties in accessing long term residence permits; Difficulties in finding a job; Limited access to education, healthcare and social protection; Limited interactions between immigrants and host-country citizens; Negative portrayal of immigrants in the media; Difficulties in bringing in family members.

Individual responses to each item could take one of three values: 3 - "Major obstacle", 2 - "Minor obstacle", 1 - "Not an obstacle at all". Each dot on the chart reflects the average score given to a specific item in a given country on this scale from 1 to 3.

Figure 4. Assessment of the importance of different obstacles to integration, after socio-demographic controls, by country



Note: Dots are coefficients of country dummies from linear regression models on the eight obstacles to integration. Each dot on the chart is the average score given to a specific item in a given country, net of the contribution of individual socio-demographic characteristics.

26. Looking at individual factors reveals a relatively homogeneous picture across different groups of respondents, with some notable exceptions (see Figure A.2 in Annex) Interestingly, respondents who report having difficulties to pay their bills at the end of the month are more likely to agree that immigrants suffer from difficulties in finding a job, as do the elderly. One also finds little link between the actual labour market situation for immigrants and the importance attached to the difficulties for immigrants in finding a job. This is remarkable considering the high unemployment disparities for non-EU immigrants across the EU – which ranged in 2017 from more than 30% in Greece and Spain to less than 10% in the Czech Republic, Estonia, Germany, Hungary, and the United Kingdom (OECD/European Union, 2018[1]).

27. The foreign-born themselves are less likely to agree that immigrants' limited efforts are an obstacle, but the differences are at the limits of statistical significance for non-EU foreign-born. With respect to this question, there is also a rather strong divide along political lines. The political divide is also strong regarding the importance of discrimination as an obstacle. Likewise, there is no positive association between the perception of discrimination as an obstacle and immigrants' self-reported feeling of being discriminated. As Figure 4 shows, respondents in the United Kingdom, Sweden and – to a lesser degree – France stand out with placing this factor high, whereas respondents in Latvia rank this

particularly low. At the same time, the shares of non-EU immigrants who feel discriminated against is particularly high in Latvia (with 27% of reporting this sentiment, second highest after Hungary – 31%), with shares of immigrants in Sweden and the United Kingdom reporting below the EU average (OECD/European Union, 2018[1]). However, Sweden and the United Kingdom have strong and longstanding anti-discrimination frameworks. It is thus conceivable that the high shares in the Eurobarometer 2017 reflect awareness about this issue.

3.2. Integration policy preferences

28. The Eurobarometer also asked respondents about their preferences regarding integration policy. As with respect to the opinions on the barriers to integration, there is considerable variation across countries for the policy responses[11] (Figure 5). Making integration measures mandatory is ranked highly on average, but with relatively large variation across countries, ranging from Latvia at the top to Portugal, where this measure is deemed less relevant. Instead, there is some consensus about the importance of language courses and post-arrival integration measures, as well as with respect to pre-school. Language training in the host-country language is deemed particularly important in two of the Baltic countries – Estonia and Latvia. These two countries have (together with Lithuania, which also ranks this factor relatively high) the particularity that the majority of foreign-born are from the Russian Federation.

29. Figure 6 below shows the coefficients of the country dummies from the linear regression models[12] for the variables on the policy measures perceived as important to support integration. There is much more variation with respect to pre-arrival measures – which remains also after controlling for individual characteristics. Interestingly, the two outliers here are Denmark and Sweden – the two EU countries which provide the most comprehensive post-arrival measures. Apart from these two countries, this measure is highly ranked in most countries. This is surprising, as most countries do not currently provide a lot of pre-arrival support. With respect to the right to vote, Germany and the Baltics stand out as the countries where respondents are particularly sceptic about the usefulness of this measure.

[11] Interestingly, there is also a relatively high correlation between the perceived barriers and the proposed measures. Respondents who consider discrimination to be a major barrier are more likely to favour anti-discrimination measures; the same goes for obstacles in finding a job and measures to support job finding; and for lack of interaction and measures to support intermingling. Likewise, respondents who consider lack of efforts to integrate on the side of migrants are much more likely to favour mandatory measures.

[12] In all the models, controls for individual characteristics include gender, age, country of birth, marital status, labour market status, education level, difficulties in paying bills, place of living, political left/right placement. To control for the fact that a large number of respondents agree with many different policy measures to support integration (i.e. assign high scores to all options), we include the total number of points given when responding to the questions as an additional individual control. Country-specific dummies for all the countries (omitting the constant term) are also included.

Figure 5. Average answer to the question "To what extent do you agree or disagree that each of the following measures would support integration of immigrants?", by country



Note: The different issues mentioned to respondents are: Providing integration measures in the countries of origin before immigrants arrive; better preparing the local community by providing information about immigrants and immigration; Introducing or improving integration programmes for immigrants upon arrival; offering or improving language courses to immigrants upon arrival; making integration programmes and language courses mandatory for immigrants upon arrival; supporting the enrolment of immigrants' children in preschool; providing measures for job finding; ensuring that immigrants have the same rights in practice as citizens in access to education, healthcare and social protection; promoting intermingling of citizens and immigrants in schools and neighbourhoods; giving immigrants the right to vote at local elections or maintaining this right where it already exists; introducing stronger measures to tackle discrimination against immigrants; providing more financial support to civil society organisations that promote integration.
Individual responses to each item could take one of four values: 4 – "Totally agree", 3 - "Tend to agree", 2 - "Tend to disagree", 1 - "Totally disagree". Each dot on the chart reflects the average score given to a specific item in a given country on this scale from 1 to 4.

30. The replies with respect to the usefulness of different measures also vary rather widely across groups, especially with respect to political orientations, again mirroring the pattern observed for the perceived barriers (see Figure A.3 in Annex). In particular, there is a strong difference along political orientations with respect to the usefulness of mandatory measures, even within those situating themselves broadly in the centre. For this instrument, there is also a strong divide between students and the elderly. The divide along political lines is also very pronounced regarding anti-discrimination measures, support for civil society organisations, and migrants' rights - especially the right to vote. Those situating themselves at the left of the political spectrum are much more likely to favour such measures than those at the right. Other measures, however, notably general integration

support for new arrivals, policies for job finding, pre-school and local community support, find similar levels of support across the political spectrum.

Figure 6. Assessment of the importance of different measures, after socio-demographic controls, by country



Note: Dots are coefficients of country dummies from linear regression models on the 12 obstacles to integration. Each dot on the chart is the average score given to a specific item in a given country, net of the contribution of individual socio-demographic characteristics.

4. How do European countries compare in their attitudes towards the success of migration and integration?

31. This section explores how the EU 28 countries compare in their opinions on immigration and immigrants' integration. Specifically, we focus on how the perceived integration success correlates with attitudes towards immigration, by answering the following question: *what is the relationship between perceived immigrants' integration success (at local and national level) and attitudes regarding the impact of immigrants on society in European countries?* It should be emphasized that the perception of successful integration of immigrants as well as attitudes regarding immigration in this study refer to immigrants from outside the European Union. In Eurobarometer questions, successful integration is defined at both the local and country level. Attitudes towards immigration are represented by different variables, including those capturing the perceived effects of immigration on the economic, cultural and social life of the respondent's country their country as well as attitudes regarding the overall effect of immigration on society.

32. As anticipated in Section 2, group-threat theory implies that natives who feel threatened by immigrants tend to develop negative attitudes towards immigration. Hence, empirically we would expect perceiving the integration of immigrants at the local and national level as unsuccessful to be negatively associated with attitudes regarding the impact of immigrants on the society. Symmetrically, we expect countries perceiving integration as successful to be less inclined to see immigration as a problem. The descriptive analyses performed here do not allow us to disentangle what is the direction of the relationship, that is to say whether attitudes to integration influence attitudes to immigration or vice versa. Our main purpose is therefore only to establish whether there is a significant relationship between the two types of attitudes.

33. In the first part this section, we report descriptive statistics regarding attitudes to immigration and attitudes to integration for each European country. In the second part, correlational analyses are used to examine the relationship between attitudes to integration at the local and national level and attitudes towards immigrants both across- and within-country.

4.1. Attitudes to integration and attitudes to immigration in EU countries

34. In this section, we firstly provide some insights into how attitudes to integration and attitudes to immigration are distributed across EU countries. Specifically, we utilize two variables measuring attitudes to integration – perception of the level of successful integration by immigrants at the local level and perception of the level of successful integration by immigrants at the national level. Figure 7 shows the share of population perceiving immigrants' integration as a success at country and local level across European countries. It can be observed that those countries that perceive integration not to be successful at the country level also perceive it as unsuccessful at the local level. In particular, integration is perceived as unsuccessful mostly in Central Eastern Europe, but also in Greece, Italy and Sweden.

Figure 7. Perceived immigrants' integration success at the country (left panel) and local level (right panel), by country



35. Turning to immigration attitudes, we first look at whether immigration from outside the EU is regarded as more of a problem or more of an opportunity for respondents' country[13]. In Figure 8, countries that see immigration mostly as a problem are again countries from Southern Europe such as Malta and Greece, and from Central and Eastern Europe such as Hungary and Bulgaria. Countries that perceive immigration as mostly an opportunity are Sweden and the United Kingdom.

[13] The exact wording of the variables is reported in Table A.1 in the Annex.

Figure 8. Attitudes towards immigration, by country



36. Second, we construct an index of general attitudes towards the impact of immigration on the economic, cultural and social life of their country[14]. The index is defined by averaging seven different questions on the perceived economic, cultural, and security effects of immigrants on society. Figure 9 indicates that the overall impact of immigrants on society is evaluated most positively in Sweden, Luxembourg and the Netherlands, while the most negatively in Bulgaria, Hungary and Slovakia. Separate stacked bar charts for each item constituting the index can be found in the Annex in Figure A.4.

[14] The procedure to define the index is reported in Table A.1 in the Annex.

Figure 9. Index of general attitudes to immigration, mean value by country



Note: The overall index evaluates the perceived economic, cultural, and security effects of immigrants on society, higher numbers mean more positive attitudes. The index takes values in the interval [0,4].

37. Generally, in countries where integration of immigrants is considered a success, respondents believe there is an overall positive impact of immigration on society and vice versa. One notable exception to this is Sweden. Swedes perceive the integration success rather negatively (both locally and nationally), but are remarkably positive regarding the impact of immigration on society. On the other hand, countries like Czech Republic and Slovak Republic are above the EU average when assessing the success of immigrants' integration, but are more negative regarding the impact of immigration on society compared with the rest of Europe.

4.2. Attitudes on integration and attitudes on immigration: cross-country comparison

38. This part of our analysis examines the correlation between attitudes to integration and attitudes to immigration for each EU MS. As previously mentioned, group-threat theory would suggest that a negative correlation between perceiving integration as unsuccessful and seeing immigration as a problem should be expected. Symmetrically, countries viewing immigration as an opportunity are expected to also have more positive opinions on immigrants' integration. We investigate whether this is the case in Figure 10, by comparing attitudes across EU countries. Specifically, for each country, the figure plots the relationship between the share of respondents thinking that immigration is an opportunity and the share of those seeing immigrants' integration as successful at the country and local level (top-left and bottom-left panels, respectively). Similarly, the panels on the right show the relationship between the share of those perceiving immigration as a problem and those viewing integration as successful at the country and local level. As expected, we observe a positive relationship between seeing immigration as an opportunity

and having positive opinions on immigrants' integration. Conversely, those who see immigration as a problem tend also to perceive immigrants' integration as unsuccessful.

Figure 10. Correlation between attitudes on immigration and perceived success of immigrants' integration at the country level (top panel) and perceived success of immigrants' integration at the local level (bottom panel), by country



4.3. Attitudes on integration and attitudes on immigration: a within-country comparison

39. This part of our analysis examines the association between attitudes to integration and attitudes to immigration within European countries. Figure 11 shows the correlation coefficients between perceived immigrants' integration success at the country and local level and seeing immigration as more of a problem or viewing it as more of an opportunity15. A series of Spearman rank-order correlations were conducted in each country in order to determine if there were any relationships between perceived integration success and seeing immigration as a problem or opportunity. A two-tailed test of significance indicated that in all countries analysed there was a significant negative

[15] All variables of interest are measured on an ordinal scale, thus the Spearman's rank order correlation coefficient (Spearman's rho, rS) was performed.

relationship between perceived local and national integration success and seeing immigration as a problem. The more respondents perceived integration as successful at both levels, the less they saw immigration as a problem. This is especially valid for countries like Austria, Poland, Bulgaria and Italy, but less so for Latvia. However, a similar two-tailed test of significance indicated that perceiving integration as successful by the respondents is unrelated to viewing immigration as an opportunity in many countries (Romania, Slovakia, Greece and Malta). Moreover, in many countries, seeing immigration as an opportunity is associated with perceived integration success at the country level, in contrast to the local level.

Figure 11. Bivariate correlation coefficients between perceived immigrants' integration success at the country and local level and seeing immigration as more of a problem (left panel) and seeing immigration as more of an opportunity (right panel)



40. To summarize, the cross-country analysis confirmed that perceiving integration as successful is positively associated with positive views regarding the impact of immigrants on society and seeing immigration as an opportunity and, on the other hand, negatively associated with viewing immigration as a problem. The within-country analysis also showed that the connection between attitudes to integration and attitudes to immigration varies substantially by country. Moreover, the association between attitudes to immigration and attitudes to integration varies according to the type of integration in question (whether national or local), where positive evaluation of local integration is more strongly connected to positive attitudes to immigrants than positive evaluation of integration at the national level. This appears to be because policymaking regarding immigrant integration is considerably local in Europe. Even within the same countries, local governments and large cities have different approaches to migrant integration and develop their own integration philosophies and policies (Scholten and Penninx, 2016[58]). Interestingly, the negative association between attitudes to integration and viewing immigration as a problem appears to be stronger in Central and Eastern Europe. Our analysis also revealed that within some countries the link between attitudes to integration and seeing immigration as an opportunity is very weak.

5. What drives the attitudes of Europeans towards the success of immigration and integration?

41. What are the individual drivers of attitudes towards immigration and integration? To answer this question, this section first sketches the individual profile of those having different attitudes towards immigration. Then, it analyses the individual characteristics of the respondents associated with the opinion that integration is effective, at both local and national levels. Importantly, besides respondents' demographic and socio-economic characteristics such as age and gender, education, income, labour market status, country of birth, and place of living, both analyses will include other possible factors such as the role of information regarding immigration and integration, interaction with immigrants, life satisfaction, political self-placement and discontent, corruption, and level of prejudice towards immigrants. Finally, the section highlights the differences, where present, between the individual profiles of those having positive, negative or mixed attitudes on immigration and that of those believing that immigrants' integration is successful[16].

42. The reader should bear in mind that this section does not aim to uncover causal links between respondents' individual traits and attitudes towards integration, and should not be interpreted in that sense. It should be also noticed that there is little academic, policy, or political consensus on what integration might mean or entail practically, and the variety of integration policies in Europe (not to mention variety at the global level) confirms that[17]. At the EU level, a policy coordination process has started over the last two decades aiming to tease out and measure what integration may mean (OECD/European Union, 2015[59]). However, the extent to which European citizens are aware of or share these ideas, let alone the measurements, it is not clear.

5.1. Empirical analysis

43. In the empirical analysis, we show two sets of models. In the first set, we use the survey question on perception of immigration as the dependent variable and we estimate several specifications of a multinomial logit model. We recode it to keep the distinction between positive and negative perception of immigration (immigration as an 'opportunity' or as a 'problem', respectively), and collapse all other values in an 'other' category. This 'other' category was created as its constituent parts are difficult and controversial to interpret, namely 'immigration is equally a problem and an opportunity', and 'immigration is neither a problem nor an opportunity'. In the second set, we use the variables on the perception of immigrants' integration as the dependent variables. One interesting feature of the Europeans' attitudes towards integration is the differentiation between how well they think immigrants have integrated in their local realities compared with the rest of the country. In the subsequent analysis, we recode these two variables on successful integration at local or country level as dummies[18]. We then estimate different logit models. All the model specifications include country dummies to capture country unobserved contextual

[16] For a full descriptive analysis of the survey, please see the report by the European Commission (European Commission, 2018[2]).

[17] For a comparative overview, see Martin, Orrenius and Hollifield (2014[56]).

[18] See Annex for the full list of variables as well as recoding.

factors. The description of the results is provided below. The descriptive statistics are reported in the Annex (Table A.2).

5.2. Attitudes on immigration

44. The baseline specification of the model on attitudes towards immigration includes individual demographic characteristics of the respondents (i.e. age, gender, country of birth, and marital status) as well as socio-economic ones (such as education level, labour market status and individual income[19]). The average marginal effects derived from the multinomial logit model are plotted in Figure 12 below and the detailed results are reported in the Annex (Table A.3).

Figure 12. Attitudes on immigration. Average marginal effects, baseline specification



Note: The figure plots the average marginal effects of the covariates on the probability of observing the three possible outcomes: migration is a problem, migration is an opportunity, or other. The figure plots the results reported in column 1 (Table A.3) in the Annex.

45. In the baseline specifications, individuals aged 65 and older have on average higher probability to think that immigration is a problem than individuals aged 15-29, keeping all other characteristics constant. They also have on average 6 percentage points lower probability to think that immigration is an opportunity than those aged 15-29. Similarly, they have 5 percentage points lower probability to express having a "mixed attitude" on migration (i.e. to be in the "other" outcome). Overall, individuals older than those aged 15-29 have lower probability to perceive migration as an opportunity than the youngest, and higher probability to see it as a problem or have a mixed view. Being foreign-born tends to increase the probability that immigration is perceived as an opportunity.

[19] The definitions of all the variables used in the models are given in the Annex.

46. When looking at education, it should be remembered that the thresholds for educational levels are rather arbitrary (borrowed from Eurobarometer report[20]). Those with secondary education have on average 6 percentage points lower probability than those with primary or no education to view immigration as an opportunity. They also have on average 3 percentage points higher probability to have mixed opinions on immigration than those with lower education. Respondents holding tertiary education have on average 11 percentage points higher probability to view immigration as an opportunity and 6 percentage points higher probability to have mixed opinions on immigration than those with primary or no education. On the contrary, they have lower probability to view immigration as a problem (about 18 percentage points lower). These results confirm the positive association between education and attitudes on immigration documented by the existing academic literature (Hainmueller and Hopkins, 2014[3]).

47. The unemployed have on average lower probability than those out of the workforce to perceive immigration as a problem, while they have on average higher probability than those not working to have a mixed view on immigration (about 7 percentage points). Instead, the average probability of the three outcomes (i.e. having positive, negative, or mixed attitudes on immigration) does not significantly differ between the employed and those not working. In the absence of a direct measurement of respondents' income in Eurobarometer, we used a question on difficulties in paying bills as a proxy for individual income. The results suggest that respondents not facing difficulties in paying bills have on average higher probability to have mixed opinions on immigration than those having problems in paying bills (about 11 percentage points). They also have lower probability to think that immigration is a problem (about 13 percentage points). In other words, being among those with the highest individual income tends to increase the probability of having a mixed view on immigration and to decrease the probability of perceiving it as a problem. Finally, there are no significant differences in attitudes associated with the respondents' place of living (i.e. rural areas, small or middle town, large town).

48. In the subsequent model specifications, several covariates to control for life satisfaction, political self-placement and discontent, corruption, and level of prejudice towards immigrants are included in the baseline specification. The results, briefly commented here, are shown in the Annex (see Table A.3). To test for attitudes towards migrants, we include a variable capturing the respondents' willingness to have immigrants as neighbours[21]. As expected, those individuals who are comfortable with immigrants tend to have on average higher probability to perceive migration as an opportunity (about 15 percentage points). However, this result may be upward biased due to the presence of unobserved individual characteristics influencing both attitudes towards having immigrants as neighbours and perception on immigration. Also, feedback effects may be present: perceiving immigration as an opportunity may improve psychological attitudes towards immigrants. Similarly, when introducing a control for individual life satisfaction, the results suggest that being satisfied is associated with higher probability to have positive or mixed views about immigration than being dissatisfied.

[20] Specifically, the variable on education is based on the question on the age at which the individuals stopped full-time education. For details, see Table A.1 in the Annex.

[21] We find similar results when including the other variables on attitudes towards immigrants (such as being comfortable to have immigrants as colleagues). We prefer to retain the variable on psychological attitudes towards immigrants as neighbours since it has the lowest number of missing and 'Don't know' observations.

49. Interestingly, individuals viewing themselves as informed on immigration have on average higher probability than those not informed to have positive views on immigration. Moreover, being informed is associated with lower probability to view immigration as a problem or have mixed attitudes towards immigration. Finally, Eurobarometer data also enables us to test if actual knowledge about immigration matters. We checked for this by constructing a variable measuring whether respondents were able to approximately guess the immigrant population in their country, or if they under- or overestimated it. Those who overestimate the share of immigrants have on average higher probability to view immigration as a problem than those who correctly estimate the presence of migrants (10 percentage points). Those who overestimate the share of immigrants instead have on average lower probability to view immigration as an opportunity or to have mixed views on immigration (about 5 and 4 percentage points, respectively). The results also suggest that there are no significant differences between those who underestimate and those who correctly estimate the proportion of immigrants in the population.

50. As described in the above sections, the academic literature has ascertained that attitudes towards immigration are entangled with political ideology, Euroscepticism, and feelings of political and social alienation[22]. As a proxy for political self-positioning, we use the Eurobarometer variable asking respondents to position themselves on a scale from 1 (if extreme left) to 10 (if extreme right)[23] and we compare each group to people classifying themselves as centrist. As expected, being self-positioned in the two groups on the left is associated with positive views on immigration compared with the centrist, while being self-positioned in the two groups to the right is associated with negative opinions on immigration. Interestingly, those in the far-left, centre-right and right have on average lower probability than the centrists to have mixed views on immigration. Finally, we include variables related to political alienation and perception of corruption. Feeling left out from the political arena at the EU level has been tested several times in research on populist parties' support, and has been shown to be connected with anti-immigration attitudes[24]. Indeed, those who declare that their voice counts in the EU have on average lower probability to see immigration as a problem. Perceiving corruption in the country tend to be associated with negative or mixed perceptions on immigration.

51. One of the most interesting features of the Eurobarometer ad hoc module is that it contains questions on the types of interactions respondents may have with immigrants, and with what frequency. To explore the relationships between these types of interactions and perception of immigration, we created a series of dummy variables assuming value of 1 in case of daily contact, and 0 for all the rest. The results are mixed, depending on the type of interaction considered. Having daily interaction at school or university tends to increase the probability of having a positive view on immigration (about 6 percentage points) than not having this type of interaction. Symmetrically, it tends to decrease the probability of viewing immigration as a problem, while it does not have significant relationship with having mixed views on immigration. Similar patterns are found when considering interaction with immigrants in the workplace. Having interactions with immigrants in the public services or in the neighbourhood tend to increase the probability to view

[22] Eger and Bohman (2016[38]); Hobolt and de Vries (2016[65]); Hobolt and Tilley (2016[66]); Van Hauwaert and Van Kessel (2018[67]); Stockemer, Lentz, and Mayer (2018[68]).

[23] We define a categorical variable containing five groups: individuals positioning themselves as far-left, centre-left, centre, centre-right and far-right.

[24] Hobolt and Tilley (2016[66]); Hobolt (2016[64]).

immigration as an opportunity, even though the relation is only marginally significant. Finally, having immigrants as family or friends tends to increase the average probability of seeing immigration as an opportunity (12 percentage points) than not having this type of relationships. As previously mentioned, caution in interpreting these results is needed due to the presence of, for instance, feedback effects. People perceiving immigration as an opportunity may be more inclined to have frequent personal relations with immigrants. While the literature has long emphasised the role of contact in shaping attitudes towards immigration[25], what can be observed here is that not all types of interaction seem to be associated with attitudes when several types of contact are taken into account.

5.3. Attitudes on integration

52. As for the model on attitudes on immigration, the baseline models on attitudes on integration include demographic and socio-economic characteristics of the respondents. The average marginal effects derived from the baseline specification of the logit models are shown in Figure 13 and Figure 14. The detailed results are reported in the Annex (Tables A.4 and A.5).

Figure 13. Attitudes on integration at the local level. Average marginal effects, baseline specification



[25] Levy Paluck, Green and Green (2019[69]); Pettigrew (1998[70]); van Heerden and Ruedin (2017[71]).

Figure 14. Attitudes on integration at the country level. Average marginal effects, baseline specification



Note: The figure plots the average marginal effects of the covariates on the probability of thinking that immigrants' integration at the country or local level is successful. The figure plots the results reported in column 1 in Table A.4 and column 1 in Table A.5 in the Annex.

53. At the country and local level, individuals older than 65 have on average higher probability than those aged 15 to 29 to perceive immigrants' integration as unsuccessful. Being female is positively and significantly associated with positive perception of integration at the country and local level compared with males. When compared with natives, third country nationals (TCNs) are more likely to express a positive view towards integration at the local level. At the country level, this relationship is also true for immigrants born in another EU member state.

54. Being employed or unemployed is not associated with greater probability of thinking that integration is functioning at the local level, compared with being out of the workforce. At the country level, being employed is positively and significantly related to be of the opinion that integration is successful. We observe no significant differences in attitudes on integration at the local level between respondents living in a large town, or a small or medium one, compared with those living in a rural area. Instead, living in a large city is positively and significantly associated with attitudes at the country level.

55. Individuals holding tertiary education are also more likely to have positive views regarding integration compared with those holding primary education at the local level. Holding secondary education is only marginally significantly related to having positive views on integration at the local level compared with having primary education. Turning to the country level, the relationships between education and perception of integration disappears. The variable used as a proxy for individual income is only significant for those who face no difficulties in paying bills at the local level (but not at the country level). At local level, people having comparatively high incomes tend to see integration more positively. As expected, the results suggest a strong and positive association between being

comfortable with immigrants, be it local or national, and perceiving their integration as successful.

56. When looking at the relationship between information and attitudes on integration, those respondents declaring that they are informed about immigration are more likely to perceive integration as successful, at both country and local level, than those viewing themselves as not well-informed (column 3 in Table A.4 and Table A.5). Differently from the previous model on attitudes on immigration, over- or underestimating the share of immigrants in the country is not significantly associated with perceptions on integration (column 4). Turning to the variable on political self-positioning, the results suggest that respondents self-declaring to belong to the two groups on the left, namely centre- and far-left, are more likely to report that integration at both local and national level is effective. The ones belonging to centre- and far-right, on the contrary, are less likely to report that integration is effective at the local level, but the relationship is not significant at the country level. While the direction of these relationship between ideological self-placement and attitudes towards integration go in the expected direction, the fact this relationship disappears for those self-identifying with the extreme right position is unexpected and may deserve further scrutiny in future research (column 8 in Table A.4).

57. Finally, we use perceived corruption in public institutions at different levels as proxies for policy efficacy. This allows us to understand whether opinions towards immigrants' integration policies stem from a general dissatisfaction regarding policy effectiveness. In a nutshell, the underlying assumption is that people who think that either their local or national institutions are corrupt are unlikely to believe that these very institutions manage policies effectively. At both local and national levels, perceiving that local as well as national authorities are corrupted decreases the probability of perceiving integration as successful compared with those who do not believe that corruption is a problem in the same institutions (column 5). Finally, all the variables on different types of interaction with immigrants are statistically significant and positively related to perceiving integration as a success, at both the local and country levels (column 9-13).

5.4. Attitudes on immigration and integration: a comparison

58. This section compares the individual profile of those having positive, negative or mixed attitudes on immigration and those perceiving immigrants' integration as successful, on the basis of the results presented in the previous sections. However, it should be noticed that the size of the marginal effects should not be directly compared since they are derived from different models.

59. Among the individual characteristics considered, *age* and *country of birth* follow similar patterns in the two models – those on attitudes on immigration and those on attitudes on immigrants' integration. Indeed, older individuals (those aged 65 or more) tend to have more negative views on both immigration and integration than the youngest. Foreign-born individuals have more positive perceptions on both immigration and integration than natives, although with some differences between EU-born and TCNs. The direction of the relationship between attitudes and *political self-positioning* is also similar when comparing the two sets of models. Indeed, those belonging to the far-left and centre-left have more positive views of both immigration and integration than the centrists. Symmetrically, individuals positioned in the two right groups (centre-right and far-right) tend to perceive both immigration and integration more problematic than those positioned in the centre of

the political scale[26]. In other words, self-positioning in the leftist or rightist groups tend to be associated with neat views on immigration and integration. This is also confirmed by the fact that individuals belonging to the far-left, centre-right, and far-right tend to have on average lower probability to have mixed opinions on immigration than the centrists.

60. The results hint that the following individual socio-economic characteristics are associated with attitudes on immigration and integration, albeit in a different manner. The individual level of *education* is an important factor explaining attitudes on immigration. Both secondary and tertiary-educated individuals tend to see immigration more as an opportunity or to have mixed views on immigration than those with primary or no education (symmetrically, they are less likely to perceive immigration as a problem). The relationship between education and attitudes on integration is instead more complex. While tertiary-educated tend to see integration at the local level more successful than individuals with lower education levels, education is not significant when assessing integration at the country level.

61. When considering individual *labour market status*, the results are mixed, except for attitudes on integration at the country level. In this case, the employed are more likely to perceive immigration as successful than those not working. Similarly, the results suggest that there are no significant relationships between the *place of living* of the respondents and their attitudes on immigration. Only when assessing immigrants' integration at the country level, those who live in a large city tend to have a more optimistic view on integration than those living in rural areas.

62. The association between *perceived information* – respondents believe to be informed on migration –, *actual information* – respondents correctly estimate the share of immigrants in the country – and attitudes offers interest insights. Perceived information is always positively related to attitudes. In other words, those who think to be informed tend to have positive views of both immigration and integration. When it comes to actual information, overestimating the share of migrants in the country tends to be related to negative attitudes on immigration. Instead, the assessment of immigrants' integration, be it at the local or country level, is not associated with the level of actual information.

63. Having *interactions* with immigrants is critical when assessing the success of integration at the local and country level. Indeed, respondents who have frequent contacts with immigrants (in schools or university, in the workplace, in the neighbourhood and in the public services) tend also to perceive immigrants' integration as successful. Instead, the relationship between interaction with immigrants and attitudes on immigration is less clear and it depends on the type of contact. Having interactions with immigrants in school, in the workplace and, to a lesser extent in the public service and in the neighbourhood, is associated with positive opinions on immigration. Instead, the probability of having mixed views on immigration is not significantly related to interaction with immigrants.

[26] Unexpectedly, the relationship disappears only for the far-right group when considering attitudes on integration at the country level.

Conclusions

64. This report provided the first comprehensive assessment of the attitudes of Europeans towards integration, analysing a special 2017 Eurobarometer that contained rich information on respondents' views on immigration and integration, together with comprehensive socio-economic information on respondents. After controlling for individual characteristics, a number of important findings for policy emerged.

65. The first key finding is the surprising consensus among Europeans on what successful integration means, both by respondents with very different socio-economic backgrounds and across countries. Social integration is clearly considered key, with speaking the host-country language placed first and commitment to the host country's way of life placed third. It is thus not surprising that countries increasingly focus on social integration, in addition to labour market inclusion and education. In the second place, Europeans rank the positive net contribution to the welfare state – i.e. the fiscal impact of immigration – and thus an economic factor.

66. A second important finding is that while there is a strong consensus on what successful integration means, there is somewhat less consensus on the barriers and policy responses, notably across political orientations. This is in particular visible with respect to the question of whether immigrants themselves do not do enough to integrate, where not only countries differ widely, but also different groups of respondents within countries. This is mirrored in the preferences regarding the nature of integration policies, where people at the (center-) right of the political spectrum are much more in favour of mandatory measures than those at the (center-) left. There is also significant political divide over anti-discrimination policies and support for civil society organisations, and immigrants' rights.

67. A third finding is that views on immigration and views on integration are closely correlated. At the descriptive level, perceiving integration as successful is positively associated with positive views regarding the impact of immigrants on society and seeing immigration as an opportunity and, on the other hand, negatively associated with viewing immigration as a problem. That notwithstanding, there is still a significant share of people who see immigration as an opportunity in spite of perceiving integration as unsuccessful – notably in Sweden. Likewise, many people in Central and Eastern European countries consider integration as largely successful but view migration more sceptically. Interestingly, the evaluation of integration at the local level is more strongly connected to attitudes to immigration than the assessment of integration at the national level. This suggests that promoting integration at the local level – and communicating about it – could have a strong impact on global views on immigration.

68. A fourth key finding relates to how knowledge and information about immigration is associated with attitudes. Here, a crucial distinction is between *perceived knowledge* (i.e., respondents believe to be informed on immigration) and *actual knowledge* (that is, respondents correctly estimate the share of immigrants in the country). Those who think themselves to be informed tend to have positive views of both immigration and integration. When it comes to actual knowledge, overestimating the share of immigrants in the country tends to be related to negative attitudes on migration. However, the assessment of immigrants' integration, be it at the local or country level, is not associated with the level of actual information.

69. A final important finding is about interactions between immigrants and the host society, and their association with attitudes. Respondents who have frequent contacts with immigrants consistently tend to perceive immigrants' integration as successful, while the relationship between interactions with immigrants and attitudes on immigration is less clear-cut. Promoting more interactions between immigrants and natives can thus be expected to also promote ultimately more positive views on integration.

70. These findings provide important – albeit tentative – insights for integration policy and its levers, notably with respect to promoting social integration. As the analysis has shown, social integration is considered to be the most important factor in integration for Europeans. Promoting social integration is not straightforward, however, and more research on what works in this area would be particularly welcome.

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Annex A. Additional tables and figures

Table A.1. List of variables

Eurobarometer question	Eurobarometer question	Renamed as		Recoded as
qa8_1	Generally speaking, how successful or not is the integration of most immigrants living… In the city or area where you live	Integration local	dummy	1 if "very successful" or "fairly successful". 0 if "not very successful" or "not at all successful"
qa8_2	Generally speaking, how successful or not is the integration of most immigrants living… In (OUR COUNTRY)	Integration country	dummy	1 if "very successful" or "fairly successful". 0 if "not very successful" or "not at all successful"
qa10_1-qa10_9	People have different views about what it means to be well-integrated into (NATIONALITY) society. How important is each of the following for the successful integration of immigrants in (OUR COUNTRY)? -Sharing (NATIONALITY) cultural traditions; Feeling like a member of (NATIONALITY) society -Being able to speak (COUNTRY LANGUAGE) / Being able to speak at least one of the official languages of (OUR COUNTRY); -Being committed to the way of life in (OUR COUNTRY) by accepting the values and norms of society; -Being active in any association, organisation or taking part in local elections in (OUR COUNTRY); -Contributing to the welfare system by paying taxes; -Having (NATIONALITY) friends; -Having educational qualifications and skills that are sufficient to find a job; -Acquiring (NATIONALITY) citizenship.	Meaning of integration	categorical	1 if "Not at all important". 2 if "Not very important". 3 if "Somewhat important". 4 if "Very important".
qa11_1-qa11_8	Please tell me for each of the following issues if they could be a major obstacle, a minor obstacle or not an obstacle at all for the successful integration of immigrants in (OUR COUNTRY)?	Perceived integration barriers	categorical	1 if "Not an obstacle at all"; 2 if "A minor obstacle"; 3 if "A major obstacle.

Eurobarometer question	Eurobarometer question	Renamed as	Recoded as	
	-Discrimination against immigrants; -Limited efforts by immigrants to integrate; -Difficulties in finding a job; -Limited access to education, health care and social protection; -Limited interactions between immigrants and (NATIONALITY) citizens; -Negative portrayal of immigrants in the media; -Difficulties in bringing in family members.			
qa12_1-qa12_12	To what extent do you agree or disagree that each of the following measures would support integration of immigrants? -Providing integration measures in the countries of origin before they arrive in (OUR COUNTRY) (e.g. language courses, information about destination country); -Better preparing the LOCAL COMMUNITY by providing information about immigrants and immigration; -Offering or improving LANGUAGE courses to immigrants upon arrival; -Making integration programmes and language courses MANDATORY for immigrants upon arrival; -Supporting the enrolment of immigrants' children in preschool; -Providing measures for JOB FINDING (training, job matching, guidance, recognition of qualifications etc.); -Ensuring that immigrants have the SAME RIGHTS in practice as (NATIONALITY) citizens in access to education, healthcare and social protection; -Promoting intermingling of (NATIONALITY) people and immigrants in schools and neighbourhoods; -Giving immigrants the RIGHT TO VOTE at local	Integration policy preferences	categorical	1 if "totally disagree". 2 if "tend to disagree". 3 if "tend to agree". 4 if "totally agree".

Eurobarometer question	Eurobarometer question	Renamed as	Recoded as	
	elections or maintaining this right where it already exists; -Introducing stronger measures to tackle DISCRIMINATION against immigrants; -Providing more financial support to CIVIL SOCIETY ORGANISATIONS that promote integration.			
qa_2	Generally speaking, do you think immigration from outside the EU is more of a problem or more of an opportunity for (OUR COUNTRY) today?”	Attitudes on immigration	categorical	1 if "Immigration is more of a problem". 2 if “Immigration is more of an opportunity", 3 if "Immigration is equally a problem and an opportunity". 4 if "Immigration is neither a problem nor an opportunity".
qa9_1-qa9_7	There are different views regarding the impact of immigrants on society in (OUR COUNTRY). To what extent do you agree or disagree with each of the following statements? Overall, immigrants: -Have an overall positive impact on the (NATIONALITY) economy; -Are a burden on our welfare system; -Take jobs away from workers in (OUR COUNTRY; -Help to fill jobs for which it is hard to find workers in (OUR COUNTRY); -Bring new ideas and/or boost innovation in (OUR COUNTRY); - Enrich (NATIONALITY) cultural life (art, music, food etc.); - Worsen the crime problems in (OUR COUNTRY.	Perceived impact of immigrants	Categorical	1 if "Totally agree". 2 if "Tend to agree". 3 if "Tend to disagree". 4 if "Totally disagree".
-	The index is created from 7 questions: qa9_1 - qa9_7	Index on overall impact of immigration on society	categorical	The index varies from 0–4, with higher values indicating greater positive impact of immigrants. -The coding of variables qa9_1, qa9_4, qa9_5, qa9_6 has been reversed so that higher numbers mean more positive attitudes (from 1 if "totally disagree" to 4"totally agree"). -All “don’t knows” have been coded as missing (originally coded as 5). To minimize missing observations, we allowed up to two out of 7

Eurobarometer question	Eurobarometer question	Renamed as		Recoded as
				missing responses and averaged the remaining responses from each respondent (we summed up the responses to the 7 variables and divided the sum by 7). Respondents with more than two 'don't know' answers are removed (resulting in a sample loss of 5.5 percent (1543 respondents).
d10	Gender.	Gender	dummy	1 if "man", 2 if "woman"
d11	How old are you?	Age class	categorical	1 if "15-24". 2 if "25-39". 3 if "40-54". 4 if "55 and +"
qa18_1	I am now going to ask you some questions about where you and your family were born.	Country of birth	categorical	0 if "our country or a place that is part of our country today". 1 if "Another country that is today a member of the EU". 2 if "Another country in Europe, mot a member of the EU" or " USA, Canada, Japan, Australia or New Zealand" or "Another country outside Europe"
d7	Which of the following best corresponds to your own current situation?	Marital status	categorical	1 if "(Re-)Married: without children" or "(Re-)Married: children this marriage" or "(Re-)Married: children prev marriage" or "(Re-)Married: children this/prev marriage". 2 if "Single liv w partner: without children" or "Single liv w partner: childr this union" or "Single liv w partner: childr prev union" or "Single liv w partner: childr this/prev". 3 if "Single: without children" or "Single: with children". 4 if "Divorced/Separated: without children" or "Divorced/Separated: with children" or "Widow: without children" or "Widow: with children" or "Other (SPONT.)" or "Refusal (SPONT.)"
d15_ar2	What is your current occupation?	Labour market status	categorical	1 if "Self-employed" or "Managers" or "Other white collars" or "Manual workers". 2 if "Unemployed or temporarily not working". 3 if "Students" or "Retired or unable to work through illness" or "House persons".
d8 and d11	How old were you when you stopped full-time education? How old are you?	Education level	categorical	1 if "no education" or "stopped full-time education when aged 15 or younger" or "still studying and age equals to 15". 2 if "stopped full-time education when aged 16-19" or

Eurobarometer question	Eurobarometer question	Renamed as		Recoded as
				“still studying and age equals to 16-19” 3 if "stopped full-time education when 20 or older" or “still studying and age equals or above 20”
d60	During the last twelve months, would you say you had difficulties to pay your bills at the end of the month…?	Difficulties paying bills	categorical	1 if "difficulties in paying bills last year: Most of the time". 2 if "difficulties in paying bills last year: from time to time". 3 if "difficulties in paying bills last year: almost never/never"
d25	Would you say you live in a...?	Place of living	categorical	1 if "rural area or small village". 2 if "small/middle town". 3 if "large town"
qa6_3	Would you personally feel comfortable or uncomfortable having an immigrant as your… Neighbour	Comfortable with immigrants as neighbour	dummy	1 if "totally comfortable" or "somewhat comfortable". 0 if "somewhat uncomfortable" or "totally uncomfortable"
qa16	When matters concerning immigrants are presented in the media, do you think that they are presented too positively, in an objective way or too negatively?	Media portray migrants	categorical	1 if "too positively". 2 if "objectively". 3 if "too negative"
qa4	Overall, to what extent do you think that you are well informed or not about immigration and integration related matters?	Informed on immigration	dummy	1 if "very well informed" or “fairly well informed". 2 if "not very well informed". 3 if "not at all informed"
qa3t and Eurostat	To your knowledge, what is the proportion of immigrants in the total population in (OUR COUNTRY)?	Estimate share of migrants in country	categorical	0 if "under-estimate". 1 if "correct". 2 if "over-estimate". The share of Third country Nationals at the country level are taken from Eurostat.
qb15_1	Please tell me whether you agree or disagree with each of the following? There is corruption in the local or regional public institutions in (OUR COUNTRY)	Corruption local	dummy	1 if "totally agree" or "tend to agree". 0 if "tend to disagree" or "totally disagree"
qb15_2	Please tell me whether you agree or disagree with each of the following? There is corruption in the national public institutions in (OUR COUNTRY)	Corruption country	dummy	1 if "totally agree" or "tend to agree". 0 if "tend to disagree" or "totally disagree"
qb5	How widespread do you think the problem of corruption is in (OUR COUNTRY)?	Corruption widespread	dummy	1 if "very widespread" or "fairly widespread". 0 if "fairly rare" or "very rare" or "there is no corruption"
d72_1	Please tell me to what extent you agree or disagree with each of the following statements. My voice counts in the EU	Voice counts EU	dummy	1 if "totally agree" or "tend to agree". 0 if "tend to disagree" or "totally disagree"

Eurobarometer question	Eurobarometer question	Renamed as		Recoded as
d72_2	Please tell me to what extent you agree or disagree with each of the following statements. My voice counts in (OUR COUNTRY)	Voice counts country	dummy	1 if "totally agree" or "tend to agree". 0 if "tend to disagree" or "totally disagree"
d70	On the whole, are you very satisfied, fairly satisfied, not very satisfied or not at all satisfied with the life you lead?	Life satisfaction	dummy	1 if "very satisfied" or "fairly satisfied". 0 if "not very satisfied" or "not at all satisfied"
d1	In political matters people talk of "the left" and "the right". How would you place your views on this scale?	Political group	categorical	1 if "political self-positioning 1" or "political self-positioning 2". 2 if "political self-positioning 3" or "political self-positioning 4". 3 if ""political self-positioning 5" and if "political self-positioning 6". 4 if "political self-positioning 7" or "political self-positioning 8". 5 if "political self-positioning 9" or "political self-positioning 10"
qa5_2	On average, how often do you interact with immigrants? Interaction can mean anything from exchanging a few words to doing an activity together. At a childcare centre, school or university	Contact: school	dummy	1 if "contact with immigrants at SCHOOL: daily". 0 if "contact: at least once a week" or "contact: at least once a month" or "contact: at least once a year" or "contact: less often or never" or "NA"
qa5_1	On average, how often do you interact with immigrants? Interaction can mean anything from exchanging a few words to doing an activity together. In your workplace	Contact: work	dummy	1 if "contact with immigrants in the WORKPLACE: daily". 0 if "contact: at least once a week" or "contact: at least once a month" or "contact: at least once a year" or "contact: less often or never" or "NA"
qa5_3	On average, how often do you interact with immigrants? Interaction can mean anything from exchanging a few words to doing an activity together. When using public services (e.g. hospitals, local authorities' services, public transport)	Contact: public services	dummy	1 if "contact with immigrants in the PUBLIC SERVICES: daily". 0 if "contact: at least once a week" or "contact: at least once a month" or "contact: at least once a year" or "contact: less often or never" or "NA"
qa5_4	On average, how often do you interact with immigrants? Interaction can mean anything from exchanging a few words to doing an activity together. In your neighbourhood (e.g. shops, restaurants, parcs and streets)	Contact: neighbourhood	dummy	1 if "contact with immigrants in the NEIGHBOURHOOD: daily". 0 if "contact: at least once a week" or "contact: at least once a month" or "contact: at least once a year" or "contact: less often or never" or "NA"

Figure A.1. Individual correlates of the six main factors for the successful integration of immigrants



Figure A.2. Individual correlates of the six main obstacles to integration of immigrants



Figure A.3. Individual correlates of the six main measures to support integration



Figure A.4. Perceived impact of immigrants, by country



Table A.2. Descriptive statistics

Variable	Frequency	Obs.	Variable	Frequency	Obs.
Attitudes on migration		27.164	Comfortable with immigrants as neighbour		26.772
Opportunity	0,386		Yes	0,813	
Problem	0,210		No	0,187	
Other	0,405		Informed on migration		27.734
Attitudes on integration, country level		24.628	Yes	0,382	
Successful	0,437		No	0,618	
Not successful	0,563		Estimate share of migrants		19.226
Attitudes on integration, local level		22.582	Under-estimate	0,040	
Successful	0,570		Correct	0,341	
Not successful	0,430		Over-estimate	0,619	
Gender		28.080	Life satisfaction		27.847
Female	0,518		No	0,843	
Male	0,482		Yes	0,157	
Age classes		28.080	Political self-positioning		22.383
Age: 15-29	0,200		Far-left	0,100	
Age: 30-44	0,240		Centre-left	0,240	
Age: 45-64	0,319		Centre	0,423	
Age: 65+	0,242		Centre-right	0,171	
Country of birth		28.053	Far-right	0,066	
EU-born	0,037		Voice counts in EU		26.199
Non-EU born	0,038		Yes	0,444	
Native	0,925		No	0,556	
Marital status		28.005	Corruption country		25.140
Married	0,512		Yes	0,821	
Single	0,328		No	0,179	
Other	0,159		Corruption local		25.056
Labour market status	28.080		Yes	0,801	
Unemployed	0,074		No	0,199	
Employed	0,449		Migrant as friend or family		27.939
Not working	0,477		Yes	0,405	
Education level		27.642	No	0,595	
Primary	0,176		Interact with migrants: school/univ		20.723
Secondary	0,466		Yes	0,159	
Tertiary	0,358		No	0,841	
Difficulties in paying bills		27.583	Interact with migrants in workplace		21.201
Most of the time	0,079		Yes	0,254	
From time to time	0,263		No	0,746	
Never	,658		Interact with migrants in public services		26.168
Place of living		28.063	Yes	0,160	
Rural area	0,304		No	0,840	
Small or middle town	0,436		Interact with migrants in neighborhood		26.340
Large town	0,260		Yes	0,239	
			No	0,761	

Notes: frequencies are weighted.

Table A.3. Attitudes on immigration

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)
Women							
problem	-0.0190**	-0.0148	-0.0220**	-0.00817	-0.0250*	-0.0188**	-0.0157*
	(0.00718)	(0.00807)	(0.00771)	(0.00739)	(0.0101)	(0.00654)	(0.00680)
opportunity	-0.0195***	-0.0216***	-0.0125*	-0.0245***	-0.00918	-0.0160*	-0.0234***
	(0.00580)	(0.00603)	(0.00580)	(0.00483)	(0.00752)	(0.00623)	(0.00636)
other	0.0385***	0.0364***	0.0345***	0.0327**	0.0342**	0.0347***	0.0391***
	(0.00924)	(0.00970)	(0.00930)	(0.0107)	(0.0128)	(0.00782)	(0.0102)
Age: 25-44							
problem	0.0176	0.0181	0.0200	0.00566	0.0207	0.0126	0.0104
	(0.0247)	(0.0228)	(0.0250)	(0.0241)	(0.0265)	(0.0242)	(0.0260)
opportunity	-0.0437*	-0.0432*	-0.0455*	-0.0398*	-0.0478*	-0.0379*	-0.0391*
	(0.0189)	(0.0169)	(0.0205)	(0.0188)	(0.0230)	(0.0172)	(0.0163)
other	0.0261	0.0251	0.0255	0.0342*	0.0271	0.0254	0.0287
	(0.0181)	(0.0183)	(0.0172)	(0.0173)	(0.0197)	(0.0203)	(0.0215)
Age: 45-64							
problem	0.0715**	0.0621***	0.0742**	0.0490*	0.0839***	0.0646**	0.0607*
	(0.0227)	(0.0184)	(0.0237)	(0.0208)	(0.0221)	(0.0244)	(0.0250)
opportunity	-0.0503**	-0.0470***	-0.0588**	-0.0439**	-0.0655**	-0.0461***	-0.0396**
	(0.0160)	(0.0142)	(0.0186)	(0.0149)	(0.0200)	(0.0133)	(0.0134)
other	-0.0212	-0.0151	-0.0154	-0.00511	-0.0184	-0.0186	-0.0211
	(0.0211)	(0.0205)	(0.0215)	(0.0207)	(0.0201)	(0.0269)	(0.0246)
Age: 65+							
problem	0.116***	0.0955***	0.117***	0.0917***	0.125***	0.107***	0.0999***
	(0.0153)	(0.0130)	(0.0172)	(0.0141)	(0.0184)	(0.0179)	(0.0187)
opportunity	-0.0621***	-0.0566***	-0.0706***	-0.0435**	-0.0723***	-0.0537***	-0.0503***
	(0.0132)	(0.0130)	(0.0155)	(0.0147)	(0.0162)	(0.0140)	(0.0123)
other	-0.0539***	-0.0390**	-0.0460***	-0.0482***	-0.0522***	-0.0533**	-0.0496**
	(0.0143)	(0.0135)	(0.0134)	(0.0125)	(0.0150)	(0.0200)	(0.0193)
Foreign-born (non-EU)							
problem	-0.0680	-0.0538	-0.0645	-0.0580	-0.0325	-0.0563	-0.0466
	(0.0491)	(0.0481)	(0.0466)	(0.0484)	(0.0579)	(0.0616)	(0.0517)
opportunity	0.124***	0.118**	0.113***	0.128**	0.0994*	0.102*	0.102**
	(0.0374)	(0.0381)	(0.0321)	(0.0449)	(0.0388)	(0.0443)	(0.0389)
other	-0.0559*	-0.0646**	-0.0487	-0.0699*	-0.0670*	-0.0454	-0.0554*
	(0.0258)	(0.0251)	(0.0280)	(0.0313)	(0.0310)	(0.0273)	(0.0255)
Foreign-born (EU)							
problem	-0.0993**	-0.0679*	-0.106***	-0.101***	-0.107**	-0.118***	-0.0917**
	(0.0302)	(0.0308)	(0.0286)	(0.0295)	(0.0358)	(0.0315)	(0.0328)
opportunity	0.134***	0.116**	0.129***	0.139***	0.134***	0.141***	0.121***
	(0.0338)	(0.0361)	(0.0307)	(0.0294)	(0.0292)	(0.0286)	(0.0293)
other	-0.0346	-0.0486*	-0.0223	-0.0382	-0.0274	-0.0234	-0.0292
	(0.0223)	(0.0194)	(0.0194)	(0.0314)	(0.0342)	(0.0197)	(0.0228)
Marital status: single							
problem	-0.00480	-0.00791	-0.00590	-0.0146	0.00314	-0.00148	-0.00814
	(0.0104)	(0.00962)	(0.0104)	(0.0105)	(0.0107)	(0.0103)	(0.0110)
opportunity	-0.0200**	-0.0197**	-0.0192**	-0.0121	-0.0204**	-0.0200*	-0.0151*
	(0.00666)	(0.00684)	(0.00672)	(0.00822)	(0.00782)	(0.00803)	(0.00684)
other	0.0248**	0.0276***	0.0251**	0.0266**	0.0173*	0.0215*	0.0232*
	(0.00869)	(0.00792)	(0.00941)	(0.00897)	(0.00681)	(0.00937)	(0.0101)
Marital status: other							
problem	0.00890	0.00344	0.00488	0.00716	0.0236	0.0155	0.0106
	(0.0121)	(0.0145)	(0.0124)	(0.00865)	(0.0133)	(0.0107)	(0.0109)
opportunity	-0.00123	0.00154	0.00283	-0.00321	-0.0148	-0.00631	-0.00202
	(0.00623)	(0.00815)	(0.00593)	(0.00790)	(0.00948)	(0.00552)	(0.00540)
other	-0.00767	-0.00497	-0.00772	-0.00395	-0.00882	-0.00922	-0.00854
	(0.0127)	(0.0125)	(0.0119)	(0.0100)	(0.00829)	(0.0106)	(0.0122)
Employed							
problem	0.00161	0.00216	-0.000143	0.00289	-0.00232	-0.00191	0.00315
	(0.00895)	(0.0119)	(0.00938)	(0.0113)	(0.00813)	(0.00787)	(0.00933)
opportunity	-0.0133	-0.0151	-0.0144	-0.00930	-0.0135	-0.00971	-0.0140
	(0.0103)	(0.00986)	(0.0109)	(0.0138)	(0.0143)	(0.0103)	(0.0126)
other	0.0117	0.0129	0.0146	0.00641	0.0158	0.0116	0.0109
	(0.0125)	(0.0148)	(0.0126)	(0.0141)	(0.0146)	(0.0130)	(0.0158)
Unemployed							
problem	0.0758***	0.0603***	0.0749***	0.0680***	0.0786***	0.0760***	0.0663***
	(0.0179)	(0.0144)	(0.0184)	(0.0152)	(0.0201)	(0.0189)	(0.0192)
opportunity	-0.00639	-0.00111	-0.00966	-0.0123	-0.00539	-0.0167	-0.000210
	(0.0101)	(0.00990)	(0.0108)	(0.0125)	(0.0223)	(0.0131)	(0.0111)
other	-0.0694***	-0.0591***	-0.0653***	-0.0557***	-0.0732**	-0.0593***	-0.0661***
	(0.0152)	(0.0123)	(0.0155)	(0.0141)	(0.0226)	(0.0148)	(0.0161)
Education: secondary							
problem	-0.0623***	-0.0486*	-0.0572***	-0.0455**	-0.0608**	-0.0616***	-0.0614***
	(0.0139)	(0.0202)	(0.0146)	(0.0162)	(0.0222)	(0.0127)	(0.0183)
opportunity	0.0264**	0.0260***	0.0193*	0.0193	0.0286*	0.0253**	0.0265**
	(0.00869)	(0.00760)	(0.00782)	(0.0104)	(0.0131)	(0.00832)	(0.00966)
other	0.0359*	0.0226	0.0379*	0.0261	0.0322	0.0363**	0.0349
	(0.0161)	(0.0234)	(0.0169)	(0.0193)	(0.0231)	(0.0137)	(0.0194)
Education: tertiary							
problem	-0.182***	-0.154***	-0.175***	-0.147***	-0.171***	-0.179***	-0.180***
	(0.0229)	(0.0248)	(0.0235)	(0.0250)	(0.0227)	(0.0207)	(0.0285)
opportunity	0.113***	0.105***	0.0988***	0.0915***	0.111***	0.114***	0.113***
	(0.0178)	(0.0179)	(0.0151)	(0.0129)	(0.0212)	(0.0204)	(0.0234)
other	0.0686**	0.0482	0.0761**	0.0557*	0.0601*	0.0650***	0.0667*
	(0.0247)	(0.0255)	(0.0246)	(0.0268)	(0.0296)	(0.0186)	(0.0292)
Paying bills difficulties: from time to time							
problem	-0.110***	-0.106***	-0.108***	-0.0976***	-0.0948***	-0.104***	-0.0992***
	(0.0183)	(0.0180)	(0.0190)	(0.0204)	(0.0191)	(0.0202)	(0.0203)
opportunity	0.0212	0.0197	0.0209	0.0109	0.00190	0.0154	0.0120
	(0.0177)	(0.0183)	(0.0169)	(0.0169)	(0.0228)	(0.0175)	(0.0187)
other	0.0889***	0.0862***	0.0867***	0.0867***	0.0929***	0.0882***	0.0872***
	(0.0207)	(0.0219)	(0.0207)	(0.0236)	(0.0203)	(0.0215)	(0.0224)
Paying bills difficulties: almost never/never							
problem	-0.139***	-0.117***	-0.136***	-0.122***	-0.110***	-0.136***	-0.124***
	(0.0220)	(0.0207)	(0.0231)	(0.0229)	(0.0181)	(0.0237)	(0.0238)
opportunity	0.0241	0.0162	0.0216	0.0175	-0.000643	0.0251	0.0176
	(0.0141)	(0.0151)	(0.0133)	(0.0151)	(0.0148)	(0.0150)	(0.0154)
other	0.115***	0.101***	0.114***	0.105***	0.110***	0.111***	0.107***
	(0.0236)	(0.0237)	(0.0232)	(0.0258)	(0.0129)	(0.0244)	(0.0220)
Place of living: small/middle town							
problem	-0.0102	-0.00661	-0.00800	-0.00972	-0.0170	-0.0157	-0.00865
	(0.0122)	(0.0132)	(0.0119)	(0.0119)	(0.0120)	(0.0147)	(0.0118)
opportunity	0.00392	0.00266	0.00198	0.00586	0.00911	0.00576	0.00597
	(0.0118)	(0.0126)	(0.0123)	(0.00966)	(0.0169)	(0.0104)	(0.0114)
other	0.00631	0.00395	0.00602	0.00386	0.00787	0.00999	0.00269
	(0.0161)	(0.0168)	(0.0165)	(0.0132)	(0.0203)	(0.0155)	(0.0167)

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)
Place of living: large town							
problem	-0.00683	0.00463	-0.00661	-0.00372	-0.0191	-0.00765	-0.00416
	(0.0144)	(0.0133)	(0.0138)	(0.0147)	(0.0205)	(0.0146)	(0.0165)
opportunity	0.0256	0.0203	0.0242	0.0261	0.0307	0.0211	0.0251
	(0.0186)	(0.0190)	(0.0173)	(0.0135)	(0.0291)	(0.0167)	(0.0194)
other	-0.0188	-0.0249	-0.0176	-0.0223	-0.0116	-0.0135	-0.0210
	(0.0238)	(0.0229)	(0.0229)	(0.0202)	(0.0322)	(0.0243)	(0.0258)
Comfortable with immigrants as neighbour							
problem		-0.338***					
		(0.0383)					
opportunity		0.151***					
		(0.0105)					
other		0.187***					
		(0.0321)					
Informed on immigrasion							
problem			-0.0477***				
			(0.00949)				
opportunity			0.0921***				
			(0.00774)				
other			-0.0444***				
			(0.00564)				
Media porray immigrans objecively							
problem				-0.240***			
				(0.0117)			
opportunity				0.0918***			
				(0.0133)			
other				0.148***			
				(0.0141)			
Media porray immigrans negaively							
problem				-0.304***			
				(0.0186)			
opportunity				0.153***			
				(0.0221)			
other				0.152***			
				(0.0107)			
Under-estimate share immigrans in country							
problem					-0.0249		
					(0.0216)		
opportunity					0.0176*		
					(0.00864)		
other					0.00726		
					(0.0168)		
Over-estimate share immigrans in country							
problem					0.101***		
					(0.0138)		
opportunity					-0.0587***		
					(0.0112)		
other					-0.0419***		
					(0.00961)		
Corrupsion counry							
problem						0.0723***	
						(0.0212)	
opportunity						-0.0336*	
						(0.0166)	
other						-0.0387*	
						(0.0166)	
Voice counts EU							
problem							-0.132***
							(0.0281)
opportunity							0.0821***
							(0.0112)
other							0.0504
							(0.0284)
Observasions	26288	25246	26034	23374	18452	23802	24783

Notes: average marginal effects from multinomial logit models are reported. *, **, *** denote significance at 10%, 5%, 1%, respectively. Robust standard errors clustered at the country level. All models include country dummies and a constant term. Reference categories for the covariates are: Gender: Man; Age class: 15-24; Country of birth: native; Marital status: married; Labour market status: out of workforce; Education level: primary or no education; Difficulties paying bills: most of the time; Place of living: rural area; Media porray migrants: too positively; Not comfortable with immigrants as neighbour; Not informed on immigration; Correctly estimate share of immigrants in country; Corruption local: no; Voice does not count EU.

Table A.3. Attitudes on immigration (continued)

	(8)	(9)	(10)	(11)	(12)	(13)	(14)
Women							
problem	-0.0156*	-0.0251***	-0.0235**	-0.0154*	-0.0129	-0.0179*	-0.0240**
	(0.00703)	(0.00699)	(0.00773)	(0.00652)	(0.00704)	(0.00736)	(0.00849)
opportunity	-0.0214***	-0.0170**	-0.0142*	-0.0184**	-0.0227***	-0.0213***	-0.0159*
	(0.00612)	(0.00659)	(0.00601)	(0.00630)	(0.00504)	(0.00571)	(0.00645)
other	0.0369***	0.0421***	0.0376***	0.0337***	0.0356***	0.0392***	0.0399***
	(0.00908)	(0.0105)	(0.0102)	(0.0100)	(0.00998)	(0.0102)	(0.0102)
Age: 25-44							
problem	0.0102	0.0161	0.0115	0.00112	-0.0135	0.0120	0.00899
	(0.0246)	(0.0240)	(0.0228)	(0.0226)	(0.0221)	(0.0260)	(0.0250)
opportunity	-0.0395*	-0.0395*	-0.0360*	-0.0486*	-0.0225	-0.0362*	-0.0365*
	(0.0191)	(0.0154)	(0.0167)	(0.0200)	(0.0163)	(0.0169)	(0.0183)
other	0.0292	0.0235	0.0245	0.0475*	0.0360	0.0242	0.0275
	(0.0186)	(0.0203)	(0.0183)	(0.0191)	(0.0200)	(0.0203)	(0.0190)
Age: 45-64							
problem	0.0617**	0.0682*	0.0600*	0.0564*	0.0385	0.0670**	0.0630**
	(0.0224)	(0.0269)	(0.0238)	(0.0241)	(0.0207)	(0.0221)	(0.0218)
opportunity	-0.0446**	-0.0468***	-0.0383**	-0.0376	-0.0290*	-0.0417**	-0.0409**
	(0.0159)	(0.0127)	(0.0146)	(0.0194)	(0.0147)	(0.0151)	(0.0157)
other	-0.0171	-0.0213	-0.0217	-0.0189	-0.00955	-0.0253	-0.0221
	(0.0212)	(0.0261)	(0.0225)	(0.0232)	(0.0234)	(0.0215)	(0.0208)
Age: 65+							
problem	0.107***	0.109***	0.0877***	0.109***	0.0920***	0.107***	0.112***
	(0.0158)	(0.0202)	(0.0144)	(0.0163)	(0.0148)	(0.0155)	(0.0166)
opportunity	-0.0577***	-0.0562***	-0.0364***	-0.0378*	-0.0262	-0.0485***	-0.0528***
	(0.0135)	(0.0134)	(0.0108)	(0.0172)	(0.0227)	(0.0137)	(0.0139)
other	-0.0491***	-0.0529**	-0.0513***	-0.0716***	-0.0658***	-0.0581***	-0.0593***
	(0.0146)	(0.0186)	(0.0125)	(0.0137)	(0.0196)	(0.0127)	(0.0139)
Foreign-born (non-EU)							
problem	-0.0741	-0.0695	-0.0390	-0.0569	-0.0541	-0.0601	-0.0683
	(0.0479)	(0.0497)	(0.0490)	(0.0477)	(0.0548)	(0.0490)	(0.0496)
opportunity	0.128***	0.137**	0.102**	0.110***	0.101**	0.111**	0.121***
	(0.0369)	(0.0491)	(0.0346)	(0.0325)	(0.0363)	(0.0402)	(0.0326)
other	-0.0535*	-0.0675**	-0.0526*	-0.0536*	-0.0464	-0.0509*	-0.0531
	(0.0254)	(0.0224)	(0.0269)	(0.0265)	(0.0310)	(0.0241)	(0.0273)
Foreign-born (EU)							
problem	-0.0971***	-0.0720*	-0.0446	-0.108**	-0.0852*	-0.0971**	-0.0998**
	(0.0291)	(0.0337)	(0.0301)	(0.0367)	(0.0408)	(0.0330)	(0.0360)
opportunity	0.134***	0.121***	0.0869**	0.133***	0.129***	0.131***	0.125***
	(0.0342)	(0.0334)	(0.0308)	(0.0391)	(0.0320)	(0.0335)	(0.0350)
other	-0.0365	-0.0495**	-0.0423	-0.0251	-0.0441*	-0.0338	-0.0254
	(0.0224)	(0.0178)	(0.0235)	(0.0205)	(0.0211)	(0.0215)	(0.0209)
Marital status: single							
problem	-0.0102	0.00973	-0.00194	-0.0131	-0.00952	-0.00446	-0.00735
	(0.0108)	(0.0103)	(0.00945)	(0.0148)	(0.0114)	(0.0107)	(0.0106)
opportunity	-0.0175*	-0.0295***	-0.0207***	-0.0106	-0.0153*	-0.0180**	-0.0180**
	(0.00708)	(0.00672)	(0.00563)	(0.0106)	(0.00663)	(0.00611)	(0.00592)
other	0.0277**	0.0198*	0.0227*	0.0237*	0.0248**	0.0225**	0.0253**
	(0.00884)	(0.0100)	(0.00884)	(0.0102)	(0.00825)	(0.00860)	(0.00848)
Marital status: other							
problem	0.00115	0.0173	0.0101	0.00734	0.0176	0.0109	0.0116
	(0.0111)	(0.0100)	(0.0113)	(0.0156)	(0.0135)	(0.0124)	(0.0116)
opportunity	0.00240	-0.0135	-0.00340	-0.00507	0.000560	-0.00198	-0.00496
	(0.00586)	(0.00864)	(0.00560)	(0.00666)	(0.00667)	(0.00631)	(0.00704)
other	-0.00355	-0.00378	-0.00669	-0.00227	-0.0182	-0.00893	-0.00660
	(0.0123)	(0.0131)	(0.0127)	(0.0171)	(0.0152)	(0.0133)	(0.0154)
Employed							
problem	0.00617	0.00470	0.00141	0.00380	0.0124	-0.00123	0.00363
	(0.00988)	(0.00679)	(0.00797)	(0.00955)	(0.00940)	(0.00788)	(0.00962)
opportunity	-0.0157	-0.0154	-0.0128	-0.00178	-0.0127	-0.0117	-0.0142
	(0.0108)	(0.0102)	(0.0107)	(0.0148)	(0.0130)	(0.0105)	(0.0113)
other	0.00954	0.0107	0.0114	-0.00202	0.000271	0.0129	0.0105
	(0.0138)	(0.0141)	(0.0126)	(0.0160)	(0.0188)	(0.0111)	(0.0133)
Unemployed							
problem	0.0594***	0.0735**	0.0732***	0.0801***	0.0798***	0.0811***	0.0759***
	(0.0157)	(0.0239)	(0.0209)	(0.0166)	(0.0215)	(0.0183)	(0.0189)
opportunity	0.00125	-0.0143	-0.00439	0.00972	0.00813	-0.00608	-0.00812
	(0.00989)	(0.0193)	(0.0121)	(0.0162)	(0.0195)	(0.00972)	(0.0135)
other	-0.0606***	-0.0592***	-0.0688***	-0.0898***	-0.0880***	-0.0750***	-0.0678***
	(0.0130)	(0.0151)	(0.0158)	(0.0145)	(0.0191)	(0.0167)	(0.0140)
Education: secondary							
problem	-0.0576***	-0.0620***	-0.0529***	-0.0370*	-0.0390*	-0.0537**	-0.0576***
	(0.0151)	(0.0164)	(0.0133)	(0.0168)	(0.0169)	(0.0175)	(0.0165)
opportunity	0.0257**	0.0223	0.0187*	0.0232	0.0259	0.0230*	0.0236*
	(0.00885)	(0.0118)	(0.00776)	(0.0121)	(0.0133)	(0.00969)	(0.00933)
other	0.0319	0.0397**	0.0341*	0.0138	0.0131	0.0306	0.0340
	(0.0171)	(0.0125)	(0.0161)	(0.0173)	(0.0182)	(0.0199)	(0.0191)
Education: tertiary							
problem	-0.173***	-0.170***	-0.157***	-0.153***	-0.162***	-0.177***	-0.180***
	(0.0241)	(0.0180)	(0.0204)	(0.0216)	(0.0242)	(0.0246)	(0.0235)
opportunity	0.110***	0.103***	0.0942***	0.110***	0.114***	0.113***	0.114***
	(0.0187)	(0.0191)	(0.0162)	(0.0201)	(0.0195)	(0.0203)	(0.0173)
other	0.0625**	0.0669**	0.0630**	0.0429	0.0481	0.0642*	0.0661**
	(0.0242)	(0.0223)	(0.0234)	(0.0231)	(0.0284)	(0.0268)	(0.0243)
Paying bills difficulties: from time to time							
problem	-0.0779***	-0.0965***	-0.111***	-0.109***	-0.118***	-0.108***	-0.115***
	(0.0200)	(0.0164)	(0.0186)	(0.0197)	(0.0212)	(0.0176)	(0.0189)
opportunity	0.00690	0.00754	0.0191	0.0343	0.0356*	0.0194	0.0317*
	(0.0182)	(0.0252)	(0.0179)	(0.0197)	(0.0181)	(0.0186)	(0.0154)
other	0.0710***	0.0890***	0.0922***	0.0749**	0.0826***	0.0887***	0.0832***
	(0.0215)	(0.0219)	(0.0207)	(0.0243)	(0.0223)	(0.0211)	(0.0202)
Paying bills difficulties: almost never/never							
problem	-0.0929***	-0.125***	-0.143***	-0.139***	-0.139***	-0.133***	-0.144***
	(0.0202)	(0.0211)	(0.0244)	(0.0245)	(0.0266)	(0.0211)	(0.0224)
opportunity	0.00209	0.0159	0.0261*	0.0329*	0.0333*	0.0191	0.0314*
	(0.0163)	(0.0174)	(0.0132)	(0.0154)	(0.0159)	(0.0161)	(0.0139)
other	0.0908***	0.109***	0.117***	0.107***	0.106***	0.114***	0.113***
	(0.0211)	(0.0229)	(0.0242)	(0.0236)	(0.0261)	(0.0221)	(0.0224)
Place of living: small/middle town							
problem	-0.00784	-0.0151	-0.00834	-0.0104	-0.00920	-0.0117	-0.0151
	(0.0120)	(0.0154)	(0.0115)	(0.0114)	(0.00873)	(0.0102)	(0.0105)
opportunity	0.00310	0.00329	0.00382	-0.00150	-0.00137	0.00528	0.00487
	(0.0117)	(0.0126)	(0.0115)	(0.0165)	(0.0131)	(0.0126)	(0.0123)
other	0.00474	0.0118	0.00453	0.0119	0.0106	0.00638	0.0103
	(0.0164)	(0.0145)	(0.0173)	(0.0173)	(0.0151)	(0.0161)	(0.0155)

	(8)	(9)	(10)	(11)	(12)	(13)	(14)
Place of living: large town							
problem	-0.00771	0.00757	-0.00144	-0.00825	-0.00823	-0.00263	-0.00626
	(0.0149)	(0.0167)	(0.0131)	(0.0146)	(0.0135)	(0.0101)	(0.0102)
opportunity	0.0266	0.00902	0.0210	0.0192	0.0211	0.0215	0.0198
	(0.0187)	(0.0211)	(0.0175)	(0.0232)	(0.0245)	(0.0212)	(0.0175)
other	-0.0189	-0.0166	-0.0195	-0.0110	-0.0128	-0.0189	-0.0135
	(0.0249)	(0.0267)	(0.0235)	(0.0227)	(0.0208)	(0.0233)	(0.0221)
Life satisfaction							
problem	-0.113***						
	(0.0194)						
opportunity	0.0566***						
	(0.0134)						
other	0.0561***						
	(0.0148)						
Political group: far-left							
problem		-0.0781***					
		(0.0225)					
opportunity		0.118***					
		(0.0194)					
other		-0.0404*					
		(0.0180)					
Political group: centre-left							
problem		-0.101***					
		(0.0127)					
opportunity		0.0861***					
		(0.0103)					
other		0.0152					
		(0.0130)					
Political group: centre-right							
problem		0.0873***					
		(0.0250)					
opportunity		-0.0316**					
		(0.0113)					
other		-0.0557**					
		(0.0215)					
Political group: far-rights							
problem		0.135**					
		(0.0451)					
opportunity		-0.0291*					
		(0.0143)					
other		-0.106**					
		(0.0381)					
Immigrants as family or friend							
problem			-0.157***				
			(0.0138)				
opportunity			0.120***				
			(0.00882)				
other			0.0368*				
			(0.0160)				
Interact with immigrants in school/univ							
problem				-0.0648**			
				(0.0230)			
opportunity				0.0700***			
				(0.0150)			
other				-0.00622			
				(0.0168)			
Interact with immigrants in workplace							
problem					-0.0574*		
					(0.0237)		
opportunity					0.0708***		
					(0.00935)		
other					-0.0134		
					(0.0212)		
Interact with immigrants in public services							
problem						-0.0283	
						(0.0213)	
opportunity						0.0326*	
						(0.0130)	
other						-0.00427	
						(0.0250)	
Interact with immigrants in neighbourhood							
problem							-0.0240
							(0.0265)
opportunity							0.0453*
							(0.0186)
other							-0.0214
							(0.0199)
Observations	26173	21357	26203	19456	19935	24648	24805

Notes: average marginal effects from multinomial logit models are reported. *, **, *** denote significance at 10%, 5%, 1%, respectively. Robust standard errors clustered at the country level. All models include country dummies and a constant term. Reference categories for the covariates are: Gender: Man; Age class: 15-24; Country of birth: native; Marital status: married; Labour market status: out of workforce; Education level: primary or no education; Difficulties paying bills: most of the time; Place of living: rural area; Life dissatisfaction; Political group: centre; Not interact daily with immigrants in: school/univ; workplace; public services; neighbourhood.

Table A.4. Perception of integration as a success at the country level

	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	11	12	13
Gender: woman	0.0217*	0.0155	0.0256**	0.0138	0.0172	0.0138	0.0202*	0.0927*	0.0275**	0.0168	0.0236*	0.0192*	0.0235*
	(0.0113)	(0.0122)	(0.0105)	(0.0121)	(0.0109)	(0.0104)	(0.0111)	(0.0546)	(0.0115)	(0.0114)	(0.0122)	(0.0114)	(0.0123)
Age class: 30-44	0.000197	-0.00109	-0.000565	0.00498	0.00732	0.000125	0.00458	-0.0748	0.00510	0.00709	0.0179	0.00253	0.00592
	(0.0221)	(0.0206)	(0.0232)	(0.0272)	(0.0229)	(0.0219)	(0.0217)	(0.150)	(0.0199)	(0.0251)	(0.0233)	(0.0232)	(0.0230)
Age class: 45-64	-0.0428**	-0.0346*	-0.0477**	-0.0419**	-0.0422*	-0.0379**	-0.0353*	-0.213*	-0.0299	-0.0254	-0.0219	-0.0373*	-0.0369*
	(0.0188)	(0.0181)	(0.0203)	(0.0193)	(0.0219)	(0.0179)	(0.0184)	(0.121)	(0.0187)	(0.0200)	(0.0193)	(0.0205)	(0.0191)
Age class: 65+	-0.0614***	-0.0470***	-0.0666***	-0.0653***	-0.0551***	-0.0511**	-0.0536***	-0.266***	-0.0325*	-0.0440**	-0.0373*	-0.0523***	-0.0543***
	(0.0172)	(0.0162)	(0.0182)	(0.0224)	(0.0184)	(0.0211)	(0.0191)	(0.1000)	(0.0181)	(0.0202)	(0.0220)	(0.0166)	(0.0183)
Country of birth: foreign, EU	0.137***	0.127***	0.131***	0.128***	0.124***	0.116***	0.142***	0.584***	0.110**	0.117***	0.162***	0.139***	0.136***
	(0.0330)	(0.0337)	(0.0351)	(0.0268)	(0.0274)	(0.0376)	(0.0336)	(0.125)	(0.0339)	(0.0208)	(0.0301)	(0.0269)	(0.0266)
Country of birth: foreign, TCN	0.184***	0.155***	0.175***	0.184***	0.152***	0.167***	0.183***	0.729***	0.139**	0.167***	0.142***	0.174***	0.175***
	(0.0352)	(0.0325)	(0.0368)	(0.0473)	(0.0444)	(0.0369)	(0.0339)	(0.153)	(0.0340)	(0.0397)	(0.0400)	(0.0356)	(0.0339)
Marital status: single	0.00396	0.00811	0.00352	0.00874	0.00637	0.00410	0.00718	0.00763	0.00301	0.00831	0.000738	-0.00107	0.00676
	(0.0155)	(0.0160)	(0.0153)	(0.0190)	(0.0149)	(0.0152)	(0.0149)	(0.0672)	(0.0148)	(0.0141)	(0.0194)	(0.0154)	(0.0147)
Marital status: Other	0.00548	0.00928	0.00819	0.00765	0.00891	-0.00197	0.0124	-0.000320	0.00311	0.0156	0.00936	0.000757	0.000594
	(0.0150)	(0.0131)	(0.0149)	(0.0184)	(0.0161)	(0.0150)	(0.0158)	(0.0870)	(0.0153)	(0.0166)	(0.0166)	(0.0134)	(0.0153)
Labour market status: employed	0.0222**	0.0205**	0.0230*	0.00495	0.0261**	0.0218*	0.0190*	0.160***	0.0222**	0.0285**	0.0110	0.0201*	0.0172
	(0.0112)	(0.00952)	(0.0124)	(0.0135)	(0.0106)	(0.0125)	(0.0114)	(0.0479)	(0.0102)	(0.0121)	(0.0173)	(0.0117)	(0.0116)
Labour market status: unemployed	-0.0226	-0.0180	-0.0232	-0.0101	-0.0366***	-0.0184	-0.0123	-0.0562	-0.0214	-0.0256	-0.00444	-0.0258	-0.0321*
	(0.0158)	(0.0164)	(0.0160)	(0.0202)	(0.0120)	(0.0127)	(0.0156)	(0.104)	(0.0150)	(0.0203)	(0.0253)	(0.0187)	(0.0185)
Education level: secondary	0.0207	0.00568	0.0181	0.0206	0.0133	0.0211	0.0181	0.116	0.0127	0.00564	0.0258	0.0186	0.0191
	(0.0207)	(0.0268)	(0.0201)	(0.0222)	(0.0224)	(0.0244)	(0.0221)	(0.0904)	(0.0201)	(0.0161)	(0.0206)	(0.0245)	(0.0231)
Education level: tertiary	0.0308	0.000296	0.0215	0.0209	0.0127	0.0312	0.0245	0.0753	0.00916	0.00227	0.0260	0.0256	0.0267
	(0.0269)	(0.0279)	(0.0251)	(0.0259)	(0.0261)	(0.0286)	(0.0285)	(0.100)	(0.0244)	(0.0259)	(0.0276)	(0.0289)	(0.0287)
Difficulties paying bills: from time to time	0.00857	0.00834	0.0108	0.00559	0.00364	-0.00488	-0.0150	0.0582	0.00562	0.0227	0.0392	0.0101	0.0142
	(0.0307)	(0.0293)	(0.0311)	(0.0302)	(0.0314)	(0.0308)	(0.0316)	(0.132)	(0.0313)	(0.0363)	(0.0331)	(0.0309)	(0.0326)
Difficulties paying bills: Almost never/never	0.0314	0.0173	0.0325	0.0320	0.0241	0.0196	-0.00368	0.165	0.0318	0.0507	0.0537*	0.0317	0.0385
	(0.0273)	(0.0255)	(0.0286)	(0.0292)	(0.0277)	(0.0289)	(0.0291)	(0.126)	(0.0277)	(0.0343)	(0.0316)	(0.0260)	(0.0269)
Place of living: Small/middle town	0.00193	0.00125	0.00146	0.0132	0.0108	0.00314	0.00195	0.0682	0.00217	-0.00036	-0.00669	0.00151	0.000669
	(0.0205)	(0.0189)	(0.0195)	(0.0218)	(0.0200)	(0.0198)	(0.0200)	(0.0847)	(0.0195)	(0.0232)	(0.0216)	(0.0202)	(0.0212)
Place of living: Large town	0.0558***	0.0473**	0.0560***	0.0662***	0.0621***	0.0557***	0.0578***	0.220**	0.0516***	0.0485*	0.0527**	0.0510***	0.0472***
	(0.0192)	(0.0196)	(0.0189)	(0.0254)	(0.0192)	(0.0208)	(0.0192)	(0.0937)	(0.0184)	(0.0258)	(0.0260)	(0.0189)	(0.0182)
Comfortable with immigrants as neighbour	0.283***												
	(0.0171)												
Informed on immigration		0.0658***											
		(0.0159)											
Under-estimate share of immigrants in the country			0.000304										
			(0.0284)										
Over-estimate share of immigrants in the country				-0.0215									
				(0.0252)									
Corruption local					-0.0703***								
					(0.0116)								
Voice counts in EU						0.114***							
						(0.0151)							
Life satisfaction:							0.0888***						
							(0.0144)						
Political group: far-left								0.270**					
								(0.120)					
Political group: centre-left								0.189**					*
								(0.0671)					
Political group: centre-right								-0.194**					
								(0.0798)					
Political group: far-right								-0.208					
								(0.155)					
Migrant as family or friend									0.150***				
									(0.0179)				
Interact with immigrants in school/univ										0.0968***			
										(0.0183)			
Interact with immigrants in workplace											0.0630***		
											(0.0244)		
Interact with immigrants in public services												0.0433***	
												(0.0137)	
Interact with immigrants in neighbourhood													0.0554***
													(0.0179)
Observations	23,884	23,116	23,690	17,409	21,892	22,733	23,782	19,767	23,805	17,849	18,244	22,555	22,692

Notes: average marginal effects from logistic regressions are reported. *, **, *** denote significance at 10%, 5%, 1%, respectively. Robust standard errors clustered at the country level. All models include country dummies and a constant term. Reference categories for the covariates are: Gender: Man; Age class: 15-24; Country of birth: native; Marital status: married; Labour market status: out of workforce; Education level: primary or no education; Difficulties paying bills: most of the time; Place of living: rural area; Media portray migrants: too positively; Not comfortable with immigrant as neighbour; Not informed on immigration; Correctly estimate share of immigrants in country; Corruption local: no; Voice does not count EU; Life dissatisfaction; Political group: centre; Not interact daily with immigrants in: school/univ; workplace; public services; neighbourhood.

Table A.5. Perception of integration as a success at the local level

	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	11	12	13
Gender: woman	0.0226***	0.0140*	0.0264***	0.00967	0.0201***	0.0168*	0.0198**	0.0212**	0.0276***	0.0228**	0.0221*	0.0218**	0.0257***
	(0.00838)	(0.00808)	(0.00839)	(0.00909)	(0.00725)	(0.00906)	(0.00821)	(0.00928)	(0.00845)	(0.00992)	(0.0115)	(0.00854)	(0.00740)
Age class: 30-44	0.0167	0.0147	0.0183	0.0294	0.0285	0.0170	0.0236 -	0.00386	0.0276	0.0208	0.0378**	0.0208	0.0190
	(0.0189)	(0.0183)	(0.0208)	(0.0242)	(0.0207)	(0.0165)	(0.0192)	(0.0287)	(0.0173)	(0.0195)	(0.0157)	(0.0180)	(0.0197)
Age class: 45-64	-0.00901	0.00380	-0.0131	0.00662	0.00518	-0.00112	0.00220	-0.0166	0.00953	0.00509	0.0162	-0.00463	-0.00438
	(0.0142)	(0.0111)	(0.0164)	(0.0122)	(0.0143)	(0.0125)	(0.0151)	(0.0243)	(0.0129)	(0.0173)	(0.0128)	(0.0151)	(0.0155)
Age class: 65+	-0.0521***	-0.0337**	-0.0583***	-0.0325**	-0.0377**	-0.0407**	-0.0409**	-0.0563***	-0.0126	-0.0416**	-0.0217	-0.0417*** -	0.0448***
	(0.0148)	(0.0156)	(0.0150)	(0.0151)	(0.0160)	(0.0193)	(0.0167)	(0.0183)	(0.0151)	(0.0200)	(0.0221)	(0.0144)	(0.0141)
Country of birth: foreign, EU	0.0628	0.0514	0.0594	0.0403	0.0343	0.0392	0.0681*	0.0339	0.0298	0.0454	0.0613	0.0609*	0.0591
	(0.0398)	(0.0396)	(0.0420)	(0.0385)	(0.0403)	(0.0461)	(0.0394)	(0.0355)	(0.0402)	(0.0313)	(0.0414)	(0.0340)	(0.0363)
Country of birth: foreign, TCN	0.0981***	0.0601***	0.0938***	0.0624***	0.0873***	0.0843***	0.0967***	0.0836***	0.0488**	0.0875***	0.0701***	0.0924***	0.0909***
	(0.0198)	(0.0162)	(0.0206)	(0.0229)	(0.0238)	(0.0226)	(0.0177)	(0.0151)	(0.0207)	(0.0231)	(0.0241)	(0.0201)	(0.0201)
Marital status: single	-0.0216	-0.0156	-0.0216	-0.0102	-0.0117	-0.0194	-0.0155	-0.0257	-0.0241*	-0.0246*	-0.0272	-0.0229	-0.0235
	(0.0147)	(0.0162)	(0.0143)	(0.0198)	(0.0126)	(0.0148)	(0.0143)	(0.0170)	(0.0139)	(0.0145)	(0.0166)	(0.0140)	(0.0147)
Marital status: Other	-0.0238	-0.0204	-0.0192	-0.0250*	-0.0237	-0.0301	-0.0131	-0.0323	-0.0279	-0.0327*	-0.0433**	-0.0301*	-0.0329*
	(0.0196)	(0.0169)	(0.0194)	(0.0146)	(0.0180)	(0.0230)	(0.0210)	(0.0259)	(0.0196)	(0.0168)	(0.0172)	(0.0181)	(0.0192)
Labour market status: employed	-0.0147	-0.0227	-0.0149	-0.0349*	-0.0131	-0.0169	-0.0196	-0.00239	-0.0155	-0.0178	-0.0231	-0.0148	-0.0181
	(0.0205)	(0.0205)	(0.0203)	(0.0190)	(0.0190)	(0.0229)	(0.0211)	(0.0192)	(0.0194)	(0.0216)	(0.0245)	(0.0205)	(0.0204)
Labour market status: unemployed	-0.0329	-0.0354	-0.0353	-0.0317	-0.0356	-0.0264	-0.0161	-0.0237	-0.0332	-0.0491	-0.0285	-0.0324	-0.0425
	(0.0297)	(0.0308)	(0.0275)	(0.0440)	(0.0306)	(0.0287)	(0.0298)	(0.0369)	(0.0280)	(0.0368)	(0.0359)	(0.0306)	(0.0309)
Education level: secondary	0.0300*	0.0173	0.0299	0.0140	0.0258	0.0275	0.0250	0.0328*	0.0209	0.0226	0.0387**	0.0299*	0.0282*
	(0.0164)	(0.0226)	(0.0155)	(0.0194)	(0.0197)	(0.0202)	(0.0171)	(0.0174)	(0.0158)	(0.0149)	(0.0160)	(0.0168)	(0.0168)
Education level: tertiary	0.0731***	0.0393*	0.0615***	0.0280	0.0655***	0.0710***	0.0637***	0.0577***	0.0458**	0.0537**	0.0784***	0.0733***	0.0709***
	(0.0215)	(0.0209)	(0.0200)	(0.0187)	(0.0232)	(0.0231)	(0.0221)	(0.0216)	(0.0190)	(0.0252)	(0.0277)	(0.0204)	(0.0210)
Difficulties paying bills: from time to time	0.0487	0.0393	0.0455*	0.0390	0.0361	0.0231	0.00825	0.0496*	0.0388	0.0533*	0.0618**	0.0428	0.0459
	(0.0271)	(0.0275)	(0.0265)	(0.0313)	(0.0310)	(0.0275)	(0.0264)	(0.0290)	(0.0268)	(0.0281)	(0.0280)	(0.0272)	(0.0291)
Difficulties paying bills: Almost never/never	0.0987***	0.0743***	0.101***	0.0806***	0.0888***	0.0789***	0.0496**	0.0996***	0.0978***	0.113***	0.112***	0.0977***	0.105***
	(0.0233)	(0.0236)	(0.0239)	(0.0268)	(0.0247)	(0.0245)	(0.0223)	(0.0258)	(0.0241)	(0.0262)	(0.0272)	(0.0245)	(0.0248)
Place of living: Small/middle town	-0.0130	-0.0145	-0.0159	-0.0111	-0.00195	-0.0125	-0.0137	-0.0111	-0.0143	-0.00426	-0.0161	-0.0114	-0.0164
	(0.0243)	(0.0221)	(0.0234)	(0.0198)	(0.0224)	(0.0236)	(0.0237)	(0.0184)	(0.0223)	(0.0288)	(0.0251)	(0.0243)	(0.0239)
Place of living: Large town	-0.0194	-0.0294	-0.0198	-0.0379	-0.0164	-0.0196	-0.0155	-0.0358	-0.0254	-0.0136	-0.0195	-0.0274	-0.0329
Comfortable with immigrants as neighbour	0.367***												
	(0.0130)												
Informed on immigration		0.0665***											
		(0.0146)											
Under-estimate share of migrants in the country			0.0171										
			(0.0143)										
Over-estimate share of migrants in the country				-0.0147									
				(0.0186)									
Corruption local					-0.0508**								
					(0.0209)								
Voice counts in EU						0.126***							
						(0.0150)							
Life satisfaction							0.122***						
							(0.0151)						
Political group: far-left								0.0384***					
								(0.0146)					
Political group: left								0.0458***					
								(0.0147)					
Political group: centre-right								-0.0581***					
								(0.0164)					
Political group: far-right								-0.138***					
								(0.0366)					
Migrant as family or friend									0.186***				
									(0.0194)				
Interact with immigrants in school/univ										0.102***			
										(0.0229)			
Interact with immigrants in workplace											0.0842***		
											(0.0222)		
Interact with immigrants in public services												0.0421***	
												(0.0121)	
Interact with immigrants in neighbourhood													0.0666***
													(0.0183)
Observations	21,905	21,801	21,729	15,804	20,158	20,894	21,816	18,241	21,896	16,586	16,912	20,826	21,003

Notes: average marginal effects from logistic regressions are reported. *, **, *** denote significance at 10%, 5%, 1%, respectively. Robust standard errors clustered at the country level. All models include country dummies and a constant term. Reference categories for the covariates are: Gender: Man; Age class: 15-24; Country of birth: native; Marital status: married; Labour market status: out of workforce; Education level: primary or no education; Difficulties paying bills: most of the time; Place of living: rural area; Media portray migrants: too positively; Not comfortable with immigrant as neighbour; Not informed on immigration; Correctly estimate share of immigrants in country; Corruption local: no; Voice does not count EU; Life dissatisfaction; Political group: centre; Not interact daily with immigrants in: school/univ; workplace; public services; neighbourhood.