



Recruiting Immigrant Workers SWEDEN



Recruiting Immigrant Workers: Sweden 2011

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Foreword

This review of Sweden's labour migration policy is the first of a series to be conducted by the Secretariat, as a follow-up to the 2009 High-Level Policy Forum on International Migration which included the presentation of a road-map for managing labour migration. The rationale for this initiative was the growth in labour migration observed in many countries in the recent past and the likelihood that recourse to further labour migration would increase in the context of demographic ageing. Many countries prior to the current economic crisis had made substantial changes to labour migration policies with a view to facilitating recruitment from abroad. With the introduction of these changes, more prominence was accorded to the question of their effectiveness and more broadly, to the objectives of labour migration policy in general.

The central objective of labour migration policy is to help meet those labour market needs which cannot be satisfied through tapping domestic labour supply in a reasonable time-frame, without adversely affecting the domestic labour market and without hindering development prospects in vulnerable origin countries. Although the objective itself can be easily stated, specifying the criteria for assessing the success of policy in achieving it is a complex matter. It involves evaluating how well labour market needs have been identified and whether migration has had an impact on the labour market, both of which are analytically difficult.

Nonetheless, there is a widespread interest in the effectiveness of labour migration policy which is unlikely to diminish in the near future. Although the economic crisis has put a damper on labour migration movements, it did not stop them entirely, and it is expected that recourse to labour migration will be necessary once a solid recovery gets underway.

It is in this context that Sweden requested that the OECD review its new labour migration policy introduced in December 2008. The thematic review of labour migration in Sweden presented in this volume is the first of a series of country studies of labour migration policies. Two more are currently planned (Germany and Belgium) and it is hoped that others will follow. These reviews address the question of whether labour migration policy is *effective* in meeting labour market needs without adverse effects, and whether

the policy is *efficient*. As Sweden introduced a major reform of its labour migration management policy in 2008, the Review also examines the impact of this reform on flows to Sweden and on access to recruitment from abroad by employers.

To address these questions, the review aims to analyse two key areas: *i)* the labour migration system and its characteristics, in terms of both policies in place and the labour migrants who arrive; and *ii)* the extent to which it is responding to the needs of the domestic labour market, as well as its impact on the latter.

The focus in this review, as in those which will follow, is specifically on *discretionary* labour migration, that is, those labour migration movements over which policy has direct, immediate oversight. Chain and family migration accompanying or following discretionary labour migration will be considered as well, but the role of family migrants in the labour market rarely enters the picture explicitly in deciding whether to admit a worker or not. Other movements – including humanitarian migration and movements in the context of free-circulation agreements – will not be analysed except indirectly insofar as the presence and activity of these other categories of migrants affect the nature and extent of labour market needs and the recourse to recruitment from abroad by employers.

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Table of contents

Assessment and Recommendations	11
<i>Bedömning och rekommendationer</i>	17
<i>Évaluation et recommandations</i>	23
Chapter 1. Introduction	31
Chapter 2. Context for labour migration in Sweden	35
Labour market characteristics	36
Demographic challenges on the horizon	37
Structural limits to recruitment from abroad	38
Notes	39
References	39
Chapter 3. Migration to Sweden	41
Migration to Sweden in recent years	42
Migration to Sweden in international comparison	49
Note	53
References	54
Chapter 4. The evolution of Swedish labour migration policy	55
History of labour migration policy	56
Current migration policy	63
Employer and trade union opinions	66
Comparing Sweden's new policy with that of other OECD countries	67
Notes	70
References	72

Chapter 5. Impact of the Swedish policy reform	73
Changes in overall flows to Sweden	74
Changes in labour migration flows	75
Changes in the gender and age composition of labour migrants	77
Longer permit duration	78
Changes in sector of employment of labour migrants pre- and post-reform	81
Changes in seasonal workers	82
Use of new opportunities to change status	83
Changes in nationality of labour migrants	86
Changes in employers requesting workers from outside the EU/EFTA	89
Changes in characteristics of firms hiring labour migrants	92
Changes in wages of newly employed residents working in firms hiring labour migrants	95
Notes	100
References	102
Chapter 6. Evaluating the new Swedish labour migration policy	103
Effectiveness	104
Does demand for workers from abroad reflect demand in the labour market?	104
Occupations of labour migrants under the new system	106
Have labour migrants filled labour shortages?	106
Contribution of labour migrants to employment by occupation	111
Do small businesses have equal access to recruitment from abroad?	116
Efficiency: procedures in practice	116
Are sufficient safeguards in place?	126
Notes	129
References	130
Chapter 7. Drawing lessons from Sweden's labour migration policy	131
Annex A. Abbreviations	135
Annex B. Characteristics of labour market tests in different countries	137
Annex C. Application forms for Swedish work permits and offers of employment	139
Annex D. STATIV database	149
Annex E. Shortage occupation list for in-country changes in Sweden (1 April 2011)	151
Annex F. Supplementary tables on occupations in Sweden	153

Figures

Figure 2.1	Dependency ratio in Sweden, 1950-2050, and age structure of the population.	37
Figure 3.1	Legal permanent-type international immigrant flows by category of entry, 2002-09, per thousand persons in the resident population . .	49
Figure 3.2	Distribution of the components of change (Δ) in employment, 2005-08, selected OECD countries	51
Figure 3.3	Permanent-type immigration relative to the average size of a single-year cohort 20-24, 2004-09.	53
Figure 5.1	Age of primary applicants for work-related permits, 2005-10, and the age distribution of the Swedish workforce, 2003.	78
Figure 5.2	Distribution of duration of permits, first permits and renewals, pre- and post-reform, in days.	80
Figure 5.3	Percentage of labour migrants employed in the top-7 recipient sectors of activity, by sector and by arrival pre- and post-reform . . .	81
Figure 5.4	Region of residence, non-EU labour migrants in 2009, by year of arrival, and population	90
Figure 5.5	Employee size distribution of firms recruiting labour migrants, pre-reform (2006-08) and post-reform (2009)	93
Figure 6.1	Private sector job openings and applications for first non-seasonal work permit, Sweden, Q1/2005-Q1/2011	105
Figure 6.2	Australia: vacancies, and applications to hire foreign workers, January 2003-December 2010	105
Figure 6.3	Distribution of occupations of labour migrants, 2009-11, by shortage ranking	110
Figure 6.4	Occupations of labour migrants, by cumulative entries 2009-11 relative to total employment 2009, according to surplus/shortage ranking on the Occupational Barometer	113
Figure 6.5	Rejection rates for different work visas/permits, 2010	119
Figure 6.6	Distribution of processing time, applications for first work permits, 2005-11.	120
Figure 6.7	Average processing time by permit and application types, 2005-11, in days	121
Figure 6.8	Minimum processing time, in days, work permits with a job offer, selected OECD countries, 2010	122
Figure 6.9	Minimum processing time, in days, seasonal work permits, selected OECD countries, 2010	123
Figure 6.10	Comparative permit costs, non-seasonal work permits/visas, by type, 2010	124
Figure 6.11	Comparative permit costs for seasonal workers, by type, 2010. . . .	125
Figure F.1	Age distribution of employed people in Sweden, by occupation, for the top-5 occupations attracting labour migrants, 31 December 2010 (thousands) – SSYK3	156

Figure F.2	Age distribution of employed people in Sweden, by occupation, for the top-5 occupations attracting labour migrants, 31 December 2010 (thousands) – SSYK4.	157
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Tables

Table 3.1	Stocks of foreign-born population by country of birth, percentage of the population, 2000-09.	43
Table 3.2	Distribution of foreigners who arrived in 2006-08, registered as residents in 2009, by migration category.	44
Table 3.3	Characteristics of permanent residents, by citizenship and migrant category, 2009.	45
Table 3.4	Permanent and temporary permits issued in 2000-08, by category.	46
Table 3.5	Overall migration flows, by categories (labour, asylum, family, free movement), for 2005-10.	47
Table 3.6	Labour migration flows by permanent vs. temporary, relative to total labour force and employment, and as a percentage of permanent flows, 2009.	50
Table 4.1	Pre-2008 policy, recommendations of the KAKI Commission (2006) and 2008 reform.	62
Table 4.2	Summary of labour migration restrictions (employer recruitment from abroad for non-seasonal work).	68
Table 5.1	Labour migration flows, by categories, 2005-10, published figures.	75
Table 5.2	Work-related permits issued under the old and new labour migration system, 2005-09.	76
Table 5.3	Work permits, by primary applicants and family members, 2005-11.	77
Table 5.4	Primary applicants for work-related permits, 2005-11, by gender. ...	78
Table 5.5	Duration of permit granted to labour migrants, in months, excluding accompanying family, 2005-11.	79
Table 5.6	Final validity date of permits held by non-seasonal labour migrants arrived in 2009, by occupational level.	81
Table 5.7	Seasonal workers, 2009 and 2010, and repeat and return rates.	82
Table 5.8	First work permits by prior status, 1 January 2009-25 May 2011. ...	84
Table 5.9	Status change from study to work, 2009-11, by occupation.	85
Table 5.10	Nationality of new work-permit holders, 2005-11.	87
Table 5.11	Employers applying for first work permits, by date of decision, 1 January 2005-31 March 2011.	91
Table 5.12	Distribution of labour migrants, by number of work permits issued to the employer, 2005-11.	92
Table 5.13	Characteristics of firms employing (and not employing) labour migrants, pre- and post-reform.	94

Table 5.14	Comparison between firms that started recruiting labour migrants after the reform and those who recruited before and after, by firm size, in 2009	94
Table 5.15	Change in total employment of residents between 2008 and 2009, by firm size and recruitment of labour migrants	95
Table 5.16	Average annual wages of newly recruited residents in firms recruiting labour migrants, by firm size	98
Table 5.17	Wage differential of newly recruited residents in firms recruiting labour migrants, controlling by various characteristics, OLS regression	99
Table 6.1	Top occupational group (SSYK3) of recipients of work permits, 2009-11	107
Table 6.2	First non-seasonal permits delivered under the shortage list, 2009 to 25 May 2011	109
Table 6.3	Inflow by occupation 2009-11, relative to total employment in 2009 (SSYK3)	112
Table 6.4	Inflow of IT specialists/Computer experts	115
Table 6.5	Acceptance and refusal of permit applications, first permits (primary and family), 2005-11	116
Table 6.6	Rejection of permit applications in 2009-25 May 2011, by reason . .	117
Table 6.7	Proportion of employed highly-qualified individuals in low- and medium-skilled jobs in Sweden, by citizenship and migration category (non-EU), 2009	128
Table B.1	Comparison of labour market tests in different countries (length and characteristics)	137
Table F.1	Permit holders arriving between 1 January 2009 and 25 May 2011 and still holding a valid permit on 25 May 2011, by category of entry, year of entry and occupation	153
Table F.2	Top occupational group (SSYK4) of recipients of work permits, 2009-11	154
Table F.3	Inflow by occupation 2009-11, relative to total occupation in 2009 (SSYK4)	155

Assessment and Recommendations

Sweden reformed its labour migration policy in 2008, as the result of a debate over labour shortages.

Sweden introduced a radical reform of its labour migration management policy at the end of 2008. The main impetus for the reform was concerns regarding population ageing and shortages of workers.

Sweden is facing the retirement of the baby-boom generation, and youth cohorts will be smaller than retiring cohorts in the next decades. Increasing concern about future labour shortages led over the past decade to considerable debate over recruitment from abroad, culminating in the 2008 reform.

Sweden's new demand-driven labour migration policy is the most open in the OECD.

Sweden has introduced an almost entirely demand-driven system, where employers may recruit workers from abroad for any occupation, as long as they nominally advertise the job beforehand and guarantee respect for wage and conditions in prevailing collective contracts. Given the absence of skill requirements, salary thresholds, and limits on the number of permits issued and the renewability of permits, Sweden appears to have the most open labour migration system among OECD countries. This replaced a system that was very restrictive, in which trade unions had, and used, an informal veto on recruitment.

The reform also opened opportunities for status changes.

Under the current system, students with a job offer and candidates brought for an interview and hired into shortage occupations may obtain a work permit in Sweden without returning home first but they must first find a job. Rejected asylum seekers who worked while awaiting a decision may also change status.

Sweden's system relies on employer good faith to give preference first to resident workers and is relatively simple, fast and inexpensive for employers.

The system places faith in employers and assumes a preference on their part for resident workers, because of the higher costs and delays associated with recruiting from abroad. Employers are required to advertise the job for at least ten days, but they are not required to interview or respond to any candidates who might contact them. Employers also have to submit the offer of employment to the relevant trade union, which verifies that the stated wages and working conditions are consistent with the prevailing collective bargaining agreement or industry standard.

Compared to other countries, Sweden treats applications for work permits quickly, and charges relatively low fees. On-line application accelerates the procedure. However, the duration of processing rose in 2011 as applications increased, suggesting that the system may have to be reinforced to cope with rising demand.

There has not been a boom in entries, but this may be due to the crisis and to the novelty of the system.

Despite the very open nature of the new migration system, there has been no massive increase in inflows, whether overall or of lesser-skilled migrants. This may be a tentative sign that this very open regime may be workable in the Swedish context, but it is not certain that it is transferable elsewhere, in particular because of the role of the unions. However, it should also be stressed that the reform was introduced during a recession and potential immigrants and employers may learn more about the weak points of the system over time, so some closer monitoring is advisable as the economy moves out of recession.

The reform has opened up recruitment for firms and occupations which may have been previously excluded.

A large number of employers in restaurants, hospitality and personal care, who would not have been able to easily use the previous regime, now recruit labour migrants from abroad. The number of employers using the system more than doubled between 2008 and 2010. Most of these firms had not used the system previously. Many more recruiters are smaller firms, and many more firms bring a small number of labour migrants. However, outside of universities, the public sector is not using the labour migration channel to recruit, and large businesses bringing in many foreign workers still dominate.

Half of entries, and most longer-term entries, are for non-shortage occupations.

Most movements continue to be temporary, but only about 50% of recruitments are for occupations on the status change shortage list, and these are disproportionately for short-term stays. An increasing number of labour migrants are going into elementary occupations. It would be good to use the shortage list if not in the approval process itself, as a monitoring tool, *e.g.* to see why occupations not on the list are being recruited for (*e.g.* regional shortage, ethnic businesses, non-surplus occupations), and the sectoral and collective bargaining coverage of non-shortage occupations. This should be cause for concern, since there is no obvious reason *a priori* why there should be an increase over time in recruitment for low-skilled non-shortage occupations.

The permit system is not a barrier to high-skilled immigration.

However, barriers to employment of the qualified – such as recognition of qualifications and language skills – appear more of an obstacle to recruiting skilled workers than the current permit system. This suggests that under current labour market conditions, Sweden may not benefit significantly from introducing a points-based supply-driven system or other form of job-seeker visa.

Labour migration contributes little to total employment, except in a few occupations.

Labour migration flows remain small relative to total employment entries. For a handful of occupations, labour migration does provide a relevant part of incoming workers. However, short stays by many labour migrants make their impact smaller. Only in the arts, in computing professions and in food processing is labour migration contributing significantly to total employment.

Labour migrants work in higher-wage firms, but this is less true since the reform.

Wages by recruiting firms are higher than in non-recruiting firms (except in small firms), but the wage difference for resident workers between recruiting and non-recruiting firms has gone down in relative terms compared with the old regime. This is not a negative sign, given that there are many new and smaller firms which have never recruited before, but needs to be watched. The situation in small and/or non-unionised firms in particular need to be examined more closely, in particular to see if such firms are recruiting more often in non-shortage occupations.

Post-arrival verification could be improved.

The role of unions in verifying the wages and working conditions of job offers is important, but the absence of any follow-up on the offered wages and working conditions could be a weakness of the system where union coverage is limited. Whether the system should incorporate provision for transmission to the SMB of the actual signed contract for confirmation, and communication of any renegotiation of the contract in the initial permit period, should be considered. The wage data in the offer of employment could be stored in the SMB database as it would be useful for monitoring.

Status-change channels are restrictive.

The criteria for both international students and refused asylum seekers seem overly restrictive, particularly for graduating students, who must invest time and effort in finding a job before graduation. One in three students change status to work in less-skilled occupations, so the system is not working entirely as a channel for skilled migration.

Intra-corporate transfers may represent an unfair advantage for large enterprises.

Although the system is based on the assumption that recruitment from abroad is more expensive than recruitment in Sweden, recruitment costs and delays are shorter for intracorporate transfers than they are for recruiting firms which have a purely domestic presence, even if the entire pay package for such transfers (including housing benefits, etc.) is required to be equivalent to Swedish wages in that occupation. Facilitation measures for ICTs would thus argue in favour of higher fees for persons in this group.

The system does not appear in conflict with development assistance objectives.

So far, the migration reform does not seem to put more strain on the development prospects of poor sending countries. Few long-term resident migrants from developing countries are employed in Sweden in the type of occupations critical for the development of their home countries (in particular, in education and health). In addition, most highly-skilled migrants from developing countries (largely engineers and computing programmers) are recruited for short-term assignments, which provides the opportunity to increase both economic and knowledge transfers to their origin countries.

Data collection is still partial.

Information on the wage conditions in the offer of employment and the educational characteristics of labour migrants is generally included in the application form but not monitored. Closer attention to the characteristics of labour migrants and to the contracts they receive would improve understanding of their potential contribution to growth, including by their accompanying family members. An increase in on-line applications would make obtaining this additional data relatively inexpensive.

Recommendations

A. Use the shortage list more broadly to support the labour migration system in meeting demand

- Monitor the level of applications by occupation using the Occupational Barometer shortage indicator, as well as the level of applications for elementary occupations.

B. Improve the permit processing system

- Encourage on-line filing to accelerate processing and improve data collection.
- Ensure that education, occupation, region of employment and offered wage data of applicants, where provided, are included in the database.
- Change the fee structure so that longer-term permits cost more for employers and paper applications cost more for applicants, and invest revenue in processing capacity to meet demand.

C. Limit over-qualification of foreign workers

- Introduce a job-search visa for graduating students.
- Avoid introducing a supply-driven “points system” for selecting job-seekers to admit from abroad.

Recommendations *(continued)*

D. Reinforce mechanisms for ensuring employer compliance, in particular for occupations not generally considered to be in shortage

- Since changes in employer in the first two years require approval by the Migration Board, any changes within the first two years to the wages and conditions specified in the offer of employment should also be communicated to the Migration Board.
- Improve post-arrival verification, especially at permit renewal, checking respect of the offer of employment including through payslips or income tax declarations.
- Monitor the level of applications by workplaces not covered by collective bargaining or non-unionised.

E. Improve equal footing in recruitment for small firms, non-immigrant firms and the public sector

- Better identify and monitor the use of intra-corporate transfers to ensure that lower total labour costs for labour migrants do not represent a disincentive to hiring from within Sweden, especially within the IT sector.
- Consider more active assistance for small enterprises looking for workers abroad in shortage occupations.

Bedömning och rekommendationer

År 2008 reformerade Sverige sin politik avseende arbetskraftsinvandring till följd av en debatt om brist på arbetskraft.

I slutet av 2008 genomförde Sverige en genomgripande reform av regelverket kring arbetskraftsinvandring. Den främsta drivkraften bakom reformen var oro över en åldrande befolkning och brist på arbetskraft.

Sverige står inför en situation där babyboom-generationen är på väg att bli pensionärer och där ungdomsgrupperna under de närmaste decennierna kommer att bli mindre än pensionärsgrupperna. En ökad oro över framtida brist på arbetskraft har under det senaste decenniet lett till livliga diskussioner om rekrytering från utlandet, vilket kulminerade i 2008 års reform.

Sveriges nya efterfrågestyrda system för arbetskraftsinvandring är det mest öppna i OECD.

Sverige har infört ett nästan helt efterfrågestyrt system där arbetsgivare kan rekrytera personal från andra länder oavsett yrke, förutsatt att tjänsten först har varit utannonserad under en nominell period och att lön och anställningsvillkor inte är sämre än gällande kollektivavtal eller praxis inom branschen. Då det inte finns några färdighetskrav, lönetrösklar eller begränsningar i antalet utfärdade tillstånd eller deras förnybarhet, tycks Sverige ha det öppnaste systemet för arbetskraftsinvandring av alla OECD-länder. Det ersatte ett system som var mycket restriktivt i vilket fackföreningarna hade, och använde, en informell vetorätt för rekrytering.

Reformen öppnade också möjligheter för statusbyten.

I det nuvarande systemet kan studenter med ett anställningserbjudande samt arbetssökande som kallats till en intervju och anställts i bristyrken beviljas ett arbetstillstånd i Sverige utan att först återvända hem, men de måste först hitta ett arbete. Asylsökande som fått avslag och som arbetat medan de väntat på beslut kan också ändra status.

Sveriges system bygger på tron att arbetsgivaren kommer att ge företräde till inhemsk arbetskraft och är relativt enkelt, snabbt och billigt för arbetsgivaren.

Systemet litar på arbetsgivarna och utgår ifrån att de ger företräde till arbetstagare som redan bor i landet, på grund av de högre kostnader och dröjsmål som följer med att rekrytera från ett annat land. Arbetsgivarna måste annonsera ut tjänsten under minst 10 dagar, men behöver inte intervjua eller besvara eventuella sökande som kontaktar dem. Arbetsgivarna måste också lämna in anställningserbjudandet till relevant fackförening, som ska yttra sig över om angivna löner och arbetsvillkor motsvarar gällande kollektivavtal eller branschstandard.

Jämfört med andra länder behandlar Sverige ansökningar om arbetstillstånd snabbt och tar ut relativt låga avgifter. Online-ansökningar påskyndar förfarandet. Handläggningstiderna förlängdes dock under år 2011 då antalet ansökningar ökade, vilket tyder på att systemet kanske måste förstärkas för att kunna hantera ökad efterfrågan.

Det har inte skett någon kraftig ökning av arbetstillstånd, men det kan bero på den ekonomiska krisen och att systemet är nytt.

Trots den stora öppenheten i det nya migrationssystemet har det inte skett någon större ökning i inflödet, varken totalt sett eller av mindre kvalificerad arbetskraft. Det kan vara ett trevande tecken på att detta mycket öppna system kan fungera i ett svenskt sammanhang, men det är inte givet att det går att överföra till andra länder, särskilt med tanke på fackföreningarnas roll. Det bör dock poängteras att reformen infördes under en lågkonjunktur och att potentiella arbetskraftsinvandrare och arbetsgivare med tiden kanske lär sig mer om systemets svaga punkter. Därför rekommenderas en noggrann övervakning då ekonomin är ute ur lågkonjunkturen.

Reformen har gett möjlighet till rekrytering till företag och yrken som tidigare kan ha varit uteslutna.

Ett stort antal arbetsgivare inom sektorerna hotell, restaurang och personlig omvårdnad, som inte utan vidare kunde använda det tidigare systemet, rekryterar nu arbetskraft från utlandet. Antalet arbetsgivare som använder systemet har mer än fördubblats mellan år 2008 och 2010. Merparten av dessa företag hade inte använt systemet tidigare. Betydligt fler rekryterare är småföretag och många fler företag tar in ett litet antal arbetskraftsinvandrare. Den offentliga sektorn, med undantag för universiteten, använder dock inte möjligheten till rekrytering genom arbetskraftsinvandring. Stora företag som tar in många utländska arbetstagare dominerar fortfarande.

Hälften av arbetstillstånden och de flesta längre tillstånd gäller yrken där det inte råder brist på arbetskraft.

De flesta tillstånden är fortsatt tillfälliga, men endast omkring 50 procent av rekryteringarna gäller yrken på listan över bristyrken och av dessa gäller oproportionerligt många kortvariga tillstånd. Andelen arbetskraftsinvandrare som arbetar i lågkvalificerade yrken ökar. Det skulle vara bra att använda bristlistan som ett övervakningsverktyg, om inte i själva tillståndsprocessen så till exempel för att se varför man rekryterar till yrken som inte finns med på listan (t.ex. regionala brister, etniska företag, yrken utan överskott) och i vilken utsträckning yrken som inte är bristyrken omfattas av kollektivavtal. Detta borde vara källa till oro eftersom det inte finns någon uppenbar anledning a priori till varför rekrytering inom lågkvalificerade yrken där det inte råder brist ökar. Hinder mot att anställa kvalificerad arbetskraft, som till exempel erkännande av kvalifikationer och språkkunskaper, tycks dock vara ett större hinder mot att rekrytera kvalificerad arbetskraft än det aktuella tillståndssystemet. Detta tyder på att Sverige i nuvarande arbetsmarknadssituation kanske inte har någon större nytta av att introducera ett poängbaserat, utbudsstyrt system eller andra typer av visum för arbetssökande.

Arbetskraftsinvandringen bidrar inte mycket till den totala sysselsättningen, utom i ett fåtal yrken.

Inflödet av arbetskraftsinvandrare är fortfarande litet i förhållande till den totala sysselsättningen. I en handfull yrken utgör arbetskraftsinvandring en relevant del av arbetskraften, men då många arbetskraftsinvandrare

endast stannar under kort tid är deras inverkan mindre. Det är endast inom konstnärliga yrken, livsmedelsproduktion och bland dataspecialister som arbetskraftsinvandringen bidrar väsentligt till den totala sysselsättningen.

Arbetskraftsinvandrare arbetar i företag med högre löner, men detta gäller i mindre utsträckning efter reformen.

Lönerna inom de rekryterande företagen är högre än i företag som inte rekryterar arbetskraftsinvandrare (med undantag för småföretag), men löneskillnaden för den inhemska arbetskraften mellan rekryterande och icke-rekryterande företag har relativt sett minskat jämfört med det gamla systemet. Detta är inte ett negativt tecken, med tanke på att det finns många nya och mindre företag som inte har rekryterat arbetskraftsinvandrare tidigare, men det behöver hållas under uppsikt. Förhållandena i små företag och/eller företag med oorganiserad arbetskraft bör undersökas närmare, särskilt för att se om dessa företag oftare rekryterar inom yrken som inte har brist på arbetskraft.

Kontrollen efter ankomst skulle kunna förbättras.

Fackföreningarna har en viktig uppgift i att kontrollera löner och anställningsvillkor i anställningserbjudandena men det kan vara en svaghet i systemet att det inte förekommer någon uppföljning av erbjudna löner och villkor i företag med begränsad facklig närvaro. Man bör överväga om systemet ska innehålla en bestämmelse om att ett undertecknat anställningsavtal ska lämnas till Migrationsverket som bekräftelse och meddelande om eventuell omförhandling av avtalet under den första tillståndsperioden. Löneuppgifterna i anställningserbjudandet skulle kunna lagras i Migrationsverkets databas då det skulle underlätta uppföljningen.

Möjligheterna till statusbyte är restriktiva.

Kriterierna för både internationella studenter och asylsökande som fått avslag tycks alltför restriktiva, särskilt för studenter, som måste lägga tid och kraft på att hitta ett arbete innan de avlägger sin examen. En av tre studenter ändrar status för att arbeta i mindre kvalificerade yrken, så systemet fungerar inte helt som en kanal för kvalificerad arbetskraft.

Företagsinterna förflyttningar kan innebära en orättvis fördel för stora företag.

Systemet bygger på antagandet att rekrytering från utlandet är dyrare än rekrytering i Sverige, men rekryteringskostnader och dröjsmål är mindre för företagsinterna förflyttningar inom internationella företag än för att rekrytera till företag med enbart inhemsk närvaro, även om det fullständiga lönepaketet vid sådana förflyttningar (inklusive bostadsförmåner osv) måste motsvara svenska löner. Det enklare förfaringssättet för företagsinterna förflyttningar skulle därför vara ett argument för högre avgifter för personer i denna grupp.

Systemet tycks inte strida mot mål för utveckling.

Hittills tycks inte arbetskraftsinvandringsreformen innebära ökad belastning på fattiga avsändarländerns utvecklingsmöjligheter. Få utlänningar från utvecklingsländer anställs i Sverige i yrken som är avgörande för utvecklingen av deras hemländer (i synnerhet inom utbildning och hälsovård). Dessutom rekryteras flertalet högutbildade utlänningar från utvecklingsländer (huvudsakligen ingenjörer och dataspecialister) för kortare uppdrag, vilket ger möjligheter för ökad överföring av både pengar och kunskap till deras ursprungsländer.

Informationsinsamlingen är fortfarande ofullständig.

Uppgifter i anställningserbjudandet om lönevillkor och arbetstagarens utbildning ingår i allmänhet i ansökningsformuläret men följs inte upp. Större fokus på arbetstagarnas egenskaper och på de anställningsvillkor de får skulle förbättra kunskapen om deras potentiella bidrag till tillväxten, även avseende medföljande familjemedlemmar. En ökning av elektroniska ansökningar skulle göra det relativt billigt att samla in sådana ytterligare uppgifter.

Rekommendationer

A. Använd listan över bristyrken i större utsträckning så att arbetskraftsinvandrings-systemet kan leda till att efterfrågan tillgodoses

- Bevaka antalet ansökningar utifrån yrke med hjälp av Yrkesbarometerens bristindex samt antalet ansökningar som avser lågkvalificerade yrken.

B. Förbättra ansökningsprocessen

- Uppmuntra till elektroniska ansökningar så att ansökningsprocessen påskyndas och insamlingen av information förbättras.
- Säkerställ att uppgifter om sökandes utbildning, yrke, arbetsort/-region och vilken lön som har erbjudits, när så anges, registreras i databasen.
- Ändra strukturen för ansökningsavgifterna så att tillstånd för längre tidsperioder blir dyrare för arbetsgivarna och pappersansökningar blir dyrare för de sökande och investera intäkterna i handläggningskapacitet för att möta efterfrågan.

C. Begränsa överkvalificerade utländska arbetstagare

- Inför en tillståndsform för arbetssökande studenter efter avslutade studier.
- Undvik att införa ett utbudsdrivet "poängsystem" för att välja ut och bevilja tillstånd till arbetssökande i utlandet.

D. Förstärk mekanismerna som säkerställer att arbetsgivare följer reglerna, i synnerhet inom yrken där det generellt inte anses råda brist

- Eftersom byte av arbetsgivare under de första två åren kräver Migrationsverkets godkännande bör Migrationsverket även få information om eventuella förändringar av den lön och de villkor som anges i anställningserbjudandet under de första två åren.
- Förbättra kontrollen efter ankomst, särskilt om tillståndet ska förlängas, för att kontrollera att anställningserbjudandet respekteras, bland annat lönespecifikationer eller inkomstskattedeklarationer.
- Bevaka antalet ansökningar som avser arbetsplatser som inte omfattas av kollektivavtal eller är fackligt organiserade.

E. Se till att förutsättningarna för rekrytering är likvärdiga för små företag, företag som inte drivs av invandrare och offentlig sektor

- Förbättra kartläggningen och kontrollen av nyttjandet av företagsinterna förflyttningar för att säkerställa att lägre arbetskraftskostnader för arbetskraftsinvandrare inte utgör ett skäl mot att anställa arbetskraft i Sverige, särskilt inom IT-sektorn.
- Överväg ett mer aktivt stöd till små företag som söker arbetskraft utomlands inom bristyrken.

Évaluation et recommandations

En 2008, la Suède a réformé sa politique en matière de migrations de travail sous l'effet des préoccupations relatives aux pénuries de main-d'œuvre.

Fin 2008, la Suède a procédé à une réforme complète de son régime de gestion des migrations de travail. Cette réforme était principalement motivée par les problématiques relatives au vieillissement de la population et à la pénurie de main-d'œuvre.

La Suède doit faire face au départ en retraite de la génération du baby boom et, dans les prochaines décennies, les cohortes de jeunes seront moins nombreuses que les cohortes d'adultes partant à la retraite. Ces dix dernières années, les préoccupations croissantes quant à d'éventuelles futures pénuries de main-d'œuvre ont suscité d'importants débats sur l'embauche de travailleurs étrangers, qui ont abouti à la réforme de 2008.

La nouvelle politique de la Suède en matière de migrations de travail, déterminée par la demande, est la plus ouverte de toute la zone OCDE.

La Suède a adopté un système déterminé presque entièrement par la demande, qui permet aux employeurs de recruter des travailleurs étrangers quelle que soit la profession concernée, à condition de publier l'offre d'emploi à l'avance et de veiller au respect des conditions de salaire et de travail prévues dans les conventions collectives en vigueur. En l'absence de critères de qualifications, de seuils de salaire et de limites au nombre de permis octroyés et aux possibilités de renouvellement des permis, la Suède apparaît comme le pays le plus ouvert de la zone OCDE en matière de migrations de travail. Le système en vigueur avant la réforme était très restrictif et permettait aux syndicats d'opposer un veto informel aux embauches.

La réforme a aussi créé de nouvelles possibilités de changement de statut.

Dans le cadre du système actuel, les étudiants bénéficiant d'une offre d'emploi et les candidats qui se rendent en Suède pour un entretien et sont embauchés dans une profession touchée par une pénurie de main-d'œuvre peuvent obtenir un permis de travail en Suède sans avoir à retourner d'abord dans leur pays d'origine, à condition qu'ils trouvent un emploi. Les demandeurs d'asile déboutés qui travaillent pendant l'attente de la décision les concernant peuvent également changer de statut.

Le système suédois fait confiance à l'employeur pour accorder, dans un premier temps, la préférence aux travailleurs résidents. Il est en outre relativement simple, rapide et économique pour les employeurs.

Le nouveau système repose sur la confiance accordée aux employeurs, qui sont censés privilégier les travailleurs résidents dans la mesure où le processus de recrutement à l'étranger est plus long et plus coûteux. Si l'employeur est tenu de publier l'offre d'emploi pendant au moins 10 jours, il n'est pas obligé d'accorder un entretien ni de répondre à tous les candidats qui le contactent. Les employeurs doivent également soumettre l'offre d'emploi au syndicat compétent, qui s'assure que la rémunération et les conditions de travail stipulées sont conformes à la convention collective en vigueur ou aux pratiques du secteur.

Par rapport à d'autres pays, la Suède traite rapidement les demandes de permis de travail, pour un coût relativement bas. La procédure est encore plus rapide avec les demandes en ligne. Néanmoins, la durée du traitement s'est allongée en 2011 sous l'effet de la hausse des demandes, ce qui laisse à penser qu'il pourrait être nécessaire de renforcer le système afin de faire face à une demande croissante.

Aucun afflux massif de travailleurs migrants n'a été enregistré, ce qui pourrait toutefois s'expliquer par la crise économique et la nouveauté du système.

En dépit du caractère très ouvert du nouveau système de gestion des migrations, on n'observe aucun afflux massif de travailleurs étrangers, quelles que soient leurs qualifications. Cette situation porte donc à croire que ce régime très libéral pourrait fonctionner dans le contexte de la Suède mais il est loin d'être certain qu'il puisse être appliqué dans d'autres pays, notamment en raison du rôle des organisations syndicales. Cependant, il convient aussi de souligner que la réforme a été mise en œuvre en

période de récession : les candidats à l'immigration et les employeurs pourraient découvrir les failles du système par la suite, ce qui signifie qu'une surveillance plus étroite est recommandée au cours de la période de redressement économique.

La réforme a offert de nouvelles possibilités de recrutement aux entreprises, tout en ouvrant le système à des professions qui auraient été exclues auparavant.

Un grand nombre d'employeurs répartis dans les secteurs de la restauration, de l'hôtellerie et des soins à la personne, qui n'auraient pas été en mesure d'utiliser facilement l'ancien système, recrutent désormais des travailleurs étrangers. Ainsi, entre 2008 et 2010, le nombre d'employeurs ayant recours au nouveau système a plus que doublé. La plupart de ces entreprises n'avaient jamais utilisé ce système auparavant. Les petites entreprises sont de plus en plus nombreuses à recruter des travailleurs étrangers et on observe un nombre croissant d'entreprises faisant venir un petit nombre de travailleurs de l'étranger. Toutefois, en dehors des universités, le secteur public n'a pas recours aux migrations de travail pour recruter et ce sont les grandes entreprises qui embauchent de nombreux travailleurs étrangers qui restent prédominantes.

La moitié des embauches, et la plupart des embauches de longue durée, concernent des professions qui ne sont pas touchées par les pénuries de main-d'œuvre.

La majorité des mouvements migratoires demeurent temporaires mais 50 % environ seulement des embauches concernent des professions figurant sur la liste des pénuries de main-d'œuvre, et concernent de façon disproportionnée des séjours de courte durée. Un nombre croissant de travailleurs migrants occupent des professions élémentaires. Il pourrait être utile d'utiliser la liste des pénuries de main-d'œuvre comme un outil de suivi non pas dans le cadre du processus d'octroi des permis de travail mais, par exemple, pour déterminer pourquoi les entreprises recrutent dans certaines professions qui ne figurent pas dans la liste (pénurie régionale, professions non excédentaires), ainsi que pour analyser la répartition sectorielle et la couverture conventionnelle des professions qui ne sont pas touchées par une pénurie de main-d'œuvre. Cela devrait être un motif de préoccupation car il n'y a aucune raison évidente pour laquelle il devrait y avoir une augmentation au fil du temps dans le recrutement de professions peu qualifiées qui ne sont pas en pénurie.

La contribution des migrations de travail à l'emploi total est limitée en dehors de certaines professions.

Les flux de travailleurs migrants demeurent limités par rapport au total des entrées dans l'emploi. Néanmoins, dans quelques professions, les migrations de travail fournissent une part importante des nouveaux travailleurs. Il faut noter que de nombreux travailleurs migrants ne s'installent que pour des séjours de courte durée, ce qui limite leur impact. C'est uniquement dans les professions artistiques, dans l'informatique et dans l'industrie alimentaire que les migrations de travail contribuent de manière significative à l'emploi total.

Le système du permis de travail n'est pas un obstacle à une immigration de travailleurs qualifiés

Les obstacles à l'emploi des travailleurs qualifiés – tels que la reconnaissance des qualifications et des compétences en langues – sont plus élevés que dans le système de permis de travail qui existe actuellement. Dans les conditions du marché du travail qui prévalent en Suède, le pays n'a peut-être pas grand intérêt à introduire un système de points basé sur l'offre ou une autre forme de visa d'embauche.

Les migrants travaillent dans des entreprises qui offrent de meilleurs salaires, ce qui tend toutefois à se démentir depuis la réforme.

Les salaires proposés par les entreprises qui recrutent sont supérieurs à ceux pratiqués dans celles qui n'embauchent pas (à l'exception des petites entreprises), mais l'écart de salaire pour les travailleurs résidents entre les entreprises qui embauchent et celles qui n'embauchent pas a diminué en valeur relative par comparaison avec l'ancien système. Il ne s'agit pas d'un signal négatif, étant donné que les embauches sont effectuées par de nombreuses entreprises jeunes et de plus petite taille qui n'avaient jamais utilisé le système auparavant, mais il convient d'être vigilant. Il faut notamment accorder une attention plus particulière aux entreprises de petite taille et/ou non syndiquées, pour déterminer par exemple si ces employeurs embauchent davantage dans des professions qui n'accusent pas de pénurie de main-d'œuvre.

Les procédures de vérification après l'installation pourraient être améliorées.

Les syndicats ont un rôle important à jouer dans la vérification des conditions de salaire et de travail proposées dans les offres d'emploi. L'absence de suivi en cas de présence syndicale limitée pourrait donc s'avérer un point faible. Il faudrait donc envisager d'intégrer au système la possibilité de transmettre au Conseil suédois des migrations le contrat signé, à des fins de confirmation et de communication de toute renégociation du contrat au cours de la période initiale du permis de travail. Les données relatives au salaire figurant dans l'offre d'emploi pourraient être archivées dans la base de données du Conseil des migrations, afin de faciliter le suivi.

Les filières qui permettent de changer de statut sont restrictives.

Les critères appliqués aux étudiants étrangers et aux demandeurs d'asile déboutés semblent trop restrictifs, notamment pour les étudiants sur le point d'obtenir leur diplôme, qui doivent consacrer du temps et des efforts à la recherche d'un emploi avant d'être diplômés. 1 étudiant sur 3 change de statut pour travailler dans une profession moins qualifiée, ce qui signifie que le système ne favorise pas uniquement les migrations de travailleurs qualifiés.

Les transferts internes pourraient représenter un avantage déloyal pour les grandes entreprises.

Bien que le système repose sur l'hypothèse selon laquelle le recrutement à l'étranger est plus coûteux que l'embauche de travailleurs résidents, les coûts et les délais sont moindres pour les transferts à l'intérieur d'une même société que pour les entreprises purement nationales, même si la rémunération globale applicable lors de ces transferts (comprenant notamment l'aide au logement, etc.) doit être équivalente aux rémunérations pratiquées en Suède. Au vu des mesures de facilitation dont bénéficient le secteur des technologies de l'information et des communications, les transferts effectués dans ce secteur devraient être davantage taxés.

Le nouveau système ne semble pas entraver les objectifs d'aide au développement.

Jusqu'à présent, la réforme de la politique migratoire ne semble pas peser sur les perspectives de développement des pays pauvres d'origine.

Les immigrants résidents de longue durée issus de pays en développement ne sont pas nombreux à occuper en Suède des emplois stratégiques pour le développement de leur pays d'origine (notamment dans l'éducation et la santé). Par ailleurs, la majorité des immigrants hautement qualifiés en provenance de pays en développement (ingénieurs et développeurs informatiques principalement) sont embauchés dans le cadre de missions de courte durée, ce qui permet d'accroître les transferts économiques et de savoir vers leur pays d'origine.

La collecte de données n'est pas exhaustive.

En règle générale, les informations relatives aux conditions salariales stipulées dans l'offre d'emploi et au niveau d'instruction des travailleurs migrants sont incluses dans les formulaires de candidature mais ne font pas l'objet d'un suivi. Une attention accrue aux caractéristiques des travailleurs migrants et aux contrats qu'on leur propose permettrait de mieux appréhender leur contribution potentielle à la croissance, notamment s'agissant des membres de la famille qui les accompagnent. Un recours croissant aux formulaires de demande électronique des permis de travail permettrait de diminuer le coût d'obtention de ces données complémentaires.

* * *

Recommandations

A. Utiliser la liste des professions en pénurie de manière plus générale pour aider le système migratoire à satisfaire la demande

- Surveiller le niveau des demandes par profession en utilisant l'indicateur de pénurie Baromètre Professionnel, ainsi que le niveau des demandes pour les professions élémentaires.

B. Améliorer le système de traitement des permis

- Encourager le dépôt en ligne pour accélérer le traitement et améliorer la collecte des données.
- S'assurer que l'éducation, la profession, la région d'emploi et les données sur les salaires proposés aux candidats, lorsqu'elles sont fournies, sont inclus dans la base de données.
- Modifier la structure des frais de sorte que les permis à long terme soient plus coûteux pour les employeurs et les demandes sur papier plus coûteuses pour les candidats, et investir les revenus dans la capacité de traitement pour répondre à la demande.

C. Limiter la surqualification des travailleurs étrangers

- Introduire un visa de recherche d'emploi pour les étudiants diplômés.
- Éviter d'introduire un « système de points » axé sur l'offre pour sélectionner les demandeurs d'emploi venant de l'étranger.

D. Renforcer les mécanismes pour assurer la conformité de l'employeur, en particulier pour les professions qui ne sont pas généralement considérées comme étant en pénurie

- Étant donné que les changements d'employeur dans les deux premières années doivent être approuvés par l'Office des migrations, tout changement au cours des deux premières années de la rémunération et les conditions spécifiées dans l'offre d'emploi doit également être communiqué à l'Office des migrations.
- Améliorer les vérifications post-arrivée, particulièrement au renouvellement du permis, en vérifiant le respect de l'offre d'emploi notamment par le biais de fiches de paie ou de déclarations de revenus.
- Surveiller le niveau des demandes par les entreprises qui ne sont pas régies par une convention collective ou sans syndicats.

E. Améliorer l'équité dans le recrutement pour les petites entreprises, les entreprises qui n'appartiennent pas aux immigrés et le secteur public

- Mieux identifier et surveiller l'utilisation des transferts intra-entreprises pour s'assurer que les coûts de main-d'œuvre inférieurs pour les travailleurs migrants ne découragent pas l'embauche en Suède, notamment dans le secteur des TI.
- Envisager une aide plus active pour les petites entreprises qui cherchent des travailleurs à l'étranger pour des professions en pénurie.

Chapter 1

Introduction

In December 2008 Sweden liberalised its labour migration law to an open demand-driven system. Employers can recruit any non-EU third country national from abroad for any skill level, provided they have advertised the position beforehand and prevailing contractual conditions in that occupation are respected. This review analyses the impact of the reform, as well as the efficiency and the effectiveness of the new labour migration system in Sweden.

At the end of 2008, Sweden reformed its labour migration policy from what was in practice one of the most restrictive policies in the OECD to one of the most liberal. Employers may now recruit foreign workers from abroad for any full-time position, at any skill level, as long as they have nominally advertised the position and as long as they respect prevailing contractual conditions for the occupation in question. The reform was not especially controversial, as most stakeholders had confidence in the good faith of employers and in oversight by trade unions.

Across the OECD, no other country has such an open demand-driven system, where employers are essentially left to judge their own needs for recourse to labour from abroad, with only minimal verification. There are a number of reasons one could advance against such a system. Oversupply might negatively affect the local workers, above all for the least educated and most vulnerable. The incentive for Swedish workers to invest in training might fall if returns to education decrease with increasing competition. Unscrupulous recruiters might take rents from aspirant workers, offering spurious contracts or illegal conditions. Prior immigrants may use the channel to bring in friends and relatives, for whom opportunities are lacking. Workers recruited from abroad may lose their jobs and end up as net recipients of social benefits. The performance of the Swedish regime under such liberal conditions is of particular interest and one principal focus of this review will be to assess this to see what lessons it could provide for other OECD countries who might be considering a shift towards a more liberal labour migration system.

The review assesses the impact of the reform, from several perspectives, as well as the overall functioning of the system (effectiveness and efficiency).

The impact of the reform is assessed through changes in the magnitude and composition of labour migration flows, and the characteristics of employers who have recourse to foreign labour recruitment. The review examines also if firms recruiting labour migrants offer lower wages to resident workers. To what extent do these wage differentials depend on the specific characteristics of the firm and its workforce composition? Did this differential wage change after the reform? The analysis compares wages of resident workers hired by firms hiring labour migrants, with wages of those who work in comparable firms with no labour migrants.

The analysis of the overall functioning of the labour migration management system in Sweden assesses whether the system is effectively and efficiently

reaching its stated objectives. As far as *effectiveness* is concerned, the review primarily examines labour migration flows relative to labour demand (vacancies); the occupations and characteristics of labour migrants, and the characteristics of recruiting employers. To assess *efficiency*, the review examines the procedural aspects of the system, including processing times and costs.

The new Swedish labour migration system, as will be seen, is a liberal one, and the existence and functioning of safeguards for the domestic labour market is of particular interest. The question of equity in access to recruitment from abroad – whether all employers have comparable access to the labour migration channel – is also addressed.

Policy changes can have an effect on the flows and the characteristics of labour migrants, and one might expect this to be the case, in the context of the new regime in Sweden.

Chapters 2 and 3 of the report look at the context in Sweden. Chapter 4 is an overview of the history of migration in Sweden, in terms of stocks, flows and policies, and how these flows and policies compare with those in other OECD countries. Chapter 5 examines the impact of the reform on flows, on the characteristics of labour migrants, on the sectors in which they are recruited, and on the characteristics of firms recruiting from abroad. Following this, Chapter 6 assesses the efficiency of the system and the effectiveness of the safeguards in place, following the approach outlined above. The review closes with a series of recommendations for Sweden and conclusions to be drawn for other OECD countries.

Chapter 2

Context for labour migration in Sweden

Sweden, a country with a strong welfare state and export oriented economy, has a relatively high participation rate and a low unemployment rate, although the recent economic crisis has hit the country hard. Future demographic challenges will put pressure on the labour market, as the Swedish labour force is expected to shrink. Labour migration can play a role in this context where labour shortages are likely to arise, although to a limited extent.

Sweden is a country of 9.4 million inhabitants with a strong welfare state and an export-oriented economy. Relative to other OECD countries, Sweden has a relatively high tax wedge, a high level of employment protection, and relatively large wage compression. Spending on active labour market policy is well above the OECD average, especially for the unemployed and for job training. The share of workers who are members of a trade union is among the highest in the OECD, and the coverage of collective bargaining agreements exceeds 90%. The social partners play a key role in many areas of policy development and implementation.

Labour market characteristics

The labour force consists of about 5 million workers. It is characterised by relatively high participation rates, about 90% for age 25-54 and 74% for age 55-64 in 2009, and an unemployment rate that has been higher than that of other Northern European countries (except Finland) since the early-to-mid nineties. In particular, in 2010 its youth unemployment rate reached 20% for 20-24 year-olds, notably higher than that in Denmark and Norway. The current (Q2 2011) Swedish harmonised unemployment rate was 7.6% in compared with an OECD average of 8.2%.

The recent economic crisis hit Sweden hard: Sweden's GDP (in current prices and PPP) fell 5% in 2009, and unemployment rose from 6.2% in 2007-08 to 8.4% in 2010. Job losses were concentrated in certain sectors, especially manufacturing and industry. Employment in industry (excluding construction) fell by more than 12% between 2008 and 2010.


Recent immigrants – and their children – have low labour force participation and low employment rates in Sweden, as in many European OECD countries. In Sweden, the labour market outcomes of immigrants have not been good – they are among the worst in the OECD – and have not improved much in recent years (OECD, 2007). In 2009, the foreign-born in Sweden had an employment rate 12 points lower than that of the native-born, one of the largest gaps in the OECD, and their unemployment rate was 8 percentage points higher.

Demographic challenges on the horizon

Notwithstanding the current poor employment situation, demographic developments are starting to put pressure on the labour market, and the Swedish labour force is expected to shrink in the future.

Sweden has enjoyed many years of growth in its working-age population and labour force, and even in 2010 the average size of a single-year age cohort in the age range 20-24, the age at which most Swedes enter the labour force, was 126.4 thousand (2010), compared with a corresponding average for the cohort 60-64 (Sweden's retirement age is 65) of 122.8. Within a decade, however, this situation will change. The post-war baby boom cohort in Sweden is moving toward retirement and in less than ten years the size of the age cohorts entering working age will be more than 10% smaller than those going into retirement. Youth cohorts entering the working-age population will be particularly small in the next two decades (Figure 2.1A). This has direct consequences on the size of the working-age population and on the dependency ratio (Figure 2.1B).

Figure 2.1. **Dependency ratio in Sweden, 1950-2050, and age structure of the population**



Note: The dependency ratio is the number of people not of working age for each person of working age. The “elderly” in this graph are considered those over 65 years of age.

Source: Statistics Sweden.

One solution to a shrinking working-age population is to increase labour force participation among under-represented groups. In Sweden, labour force participation among women and among older people, two groups with lower labour force activity in many OECD countries, are already very high. In addition, participation rates among these groups were rising prior to the crisis. Hence, Sweden has less of a domestic labour reserve to cope with population ageing than most other OECD countries.

The 2009 Labour Force Projections, prepared by Statistics Sweden using 2007 as a baseline and containing projections to 2030, uses a conservative estimate of net migration,¹ of 30-40 000 in 2009-11 (actual figures for 2009 were over 60 000), declining to 18 000 by 2030. The Projection includes the disclaimer that it is difficult to predict the impact of the change in migration policy, but the assumption is that labour migration will continue to be demand-driven and subject to EU community preference. More importantly, as the projections acknowledge, the composition of flows, by category, country of birth and duration of stay, are not taken into account.²

Structural limits to recruitment from abroad

One of the main obstacles to labour migration is the difficulty in matching demand – employers in one country – with supply – potential workers in another. While highly educated and mobile workers may be able to make contact with employers and present themselves and their qualifications through the internet, less skilled workers may not be easily evaluated at a distance. Large companies might overcome this obstacle, but for smaller companies with no presence abroad, international recruitment is fraught with risk. While Sweden's public employment service still play a role in matching supply and demand, many jobs are filled through informal contacts and internal information in the workplace. For small enterprises, formal channels for international recruitment, especially for low-skilled jobs, are limited. International recruitment agencies are generally reluctant to mediate requests for a limited number of low-skilled workers from abroad – unless they are unscrupulously taking rents – because the margins tend to be small and the costs higher. Sweden's PES does not currently help employers find workers outside the European Union.

A high level of employment protection exists in Sweden, which may make employers reluctant to offer long-term contracts to workers they do not know. Short-term contracts, however, may not be sufficient to attract workers from far away.

Language may be another constraint to recruitment from abroad. Swedish is little-spoken outside of its national boundaries, and thus Sweden cannot count on a natural basin of workers who can be recruited immediately into a job which requires interaction in Swedish. While many Finns speak or learn Swedish, and Danes and Norwegians can learn Swedish quickly, anyone coming from outside these countries must generally go through a learning process. While English could be used as a transition language in some workplaces, as is already the rule in multinational corporations, language remains a serious barrier for most potential labour migrants to Sweden.

Notes

1. Outmigration from Sweden is significant, at 40-50 000 in 2009-10, of which about half were Swedish citizens.
2. While the labour force participation of the foreign-born is projected to rise in the main SCB scenario, the increase does not take into account a possible increase in labour migration (with consequent higher participation rates among migrants). The participation rate for the foreign-born in the scenario is based on current participation rates for the foreign-born in Sweden.

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OECD (2007), *Jobs for Immigrants Vol 1. – Labour Market Integration in Australia, Denmark, Germany and Sweden*, OECD Publishing, Paris, pp. 251-287.

Chapter 3

Migration to Sweden

Sweden has a large stock of migrants – about one in seven residents – half of whom have acquired Swedish citizenship. Yet among OECD countries, Sweden had one of the lowest levels of discretionary labour migration relative to population and employment, and most migration to Sweden in recent years has been through family and humanitarian channels. The employment outcomes for non-labour migrants have been poor.

This chapter presents the context of migration to Sweden in recent years as well as the characteristics of its current immigrant population.

Migration to Sweden in recent years

Information on migration to Sweden and the characteristics of migrants is available from different sources (see box below).

Box 3.1. Sources for data in Sweden

The two main data sources used to characterise labour migrants in Sweden are the Swedish Migration Board (SMB) permit database and the STATIV register-based database. The SMB permit database used for this review contains all permits issued for labour reasons (including family permits associated with a work permit) from 1 January 2005 until 25 May 2011. These data include all labour permits issued or refused over the period, as well as processing times, renewals, etc. Nevertheless, only age, gender and country of birth are recorded as individual characteristics; data on expected wages are not available. Occupation is only available for approved primary work permits from 2009. A separate file, covering permits up to 31 March 2011, has been used in this review to look at permit requests by employer. This file, however, contains only the employer name, which was subject to transcription errors, and did not contain all characteristics of the applicant, nor could it be linked to the other SMB file. The SMB also publishes reports on its website, covering permits issued for all purposes; these publicly released data cover non-work-related categories as well as work-related permits, and may not agree exactly with the permit database used in this review. Series starting before 2005 also use previously published data from the SMB.

STATIV is a longitudinal database constructed from several data registers in Sweden by Statistics Sweden. It includes the entire population resident in Sweden on the 31st of December of each year. Migrants are included in the database if they hold a valid permit of residence of at least one year's duration on the 31st of December. Migrants with short-term permits are thus excluded. This database contains information on educational attainment, the sector of employment, the occupation, the earnings and the employer, among other characteristics, of all residents in Sweden, both natives and permanent migrants. See Annex D for further details on coverage and variable definitions in STATIV.

Box 3.1. Sources for data in Sweden *(continued)*

The employer identifier allows the study of labour migrant recruitment at the firm level. It makes it possible to compare firms that recruit labour migrants and those that do not, as well as firms which started recruiting labour migrants after the reform of the labour migration law and those who were recruiting already before the change of the law.

A comparison between the number of permits issued in 2009 and the number of migrants resident in Sweden in 2009 who arrived that same year shows that about two-thirds of all migrants are identified in STATIV. In the case of labour migrants, out a total of 7 615 non-seasonal permits issued in 2009, about half of them are accounted for in the register, corresponding to persons with a work permit who arrived in 2009.

Stock of immigrants in Sweden

In 2009, the stock of foreign-born accounted for 14% of the Swedish resident population, up from 11% in 2000. More than half were naturalised citizens of Sweden. The top-5 countries of birth for the foreign-born in 2008 were Finland, the countries of the former Yugoslavia, Iraq, Poland and Iran.

Table 3.1. **Stocks of foreign-born population by country of birth, percentage of the population, 2000-09**

	2000	2005	2009
Australia	23.0	24.2	26.5
Austria	10.4	14.5	15.5
Belgium	10.3	12.1	..
Canada	17.4	18.7	19.6
Chile	..	1.5	2.1
Czech Republic	4.2	5.1	6.4
Denmark	5.8	6.5	7.5
Estonia	18.4	17.5	16.6
Finland	2.6	3.4	4.4
France	10.1	11.0	11.6
Germany	12.5	12.6	12.9
Hungary	2.9	3.3	4.1
Ireland	8.7	12.6	17.2

Table 3.1. **Stocks of foreign-born population by country of birth, percentage of the population, 2000-09** (*continued*)

	2000	2005	2009
Israel	32.2	29.1	26.2
Luxembourg	33.2	35.0	36.9
Mexico	0.5	0.6	0.8
Netherlands	10.1	10.6	11.1
New Zealand	17.2	20.3	22.7
Norway	6.8	8.2	10.9
Portugal	5.1	6.3	6.3
Spain	4.9	11.1	14.3
Sweden	11.3	12.5	14.4
Switzerland	21.9	23.8	26.3
Turkey	2.0	..	..
United Kingdom	7.9	9.4	11.3
United States	11.0	12.7	12.5

Source: OECD International Migration Database (2011). For details on estimation methods, please refer to www.oecd.org/migration/foreignborn. Information on data for Israel: <http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/888932315602>.

It is possible to classify the stock of foreign residents in Sweden (about half the immigrant population) by category of entry (labour, family, etc.). To reduce the effect of naturalisation, one can restrict the analysis to *recent arrivals*, since most immigrants to Sweden have to wait four or five years to request naturalisation. The distribution by category of entry for recent immigrants of working age (16-65) is shown in Table 3.2. For non-EU citizens,

Table 3.2. **Distribution of foreigners who arrived in 2006-08, registered as residents in 2009, by migration category**

Citizenship	Migration category						Total
	Labour	Family	Asylum	Study	Other	Unknown	
Non-EU citizenship	3.7%	49.4%	32.7%	10.1%	0.3%	3.8%	106 720
EU citizenship	30.5%	20.4%	0.0%	3.1%	3.2%	42.7%	32 138
EU-A8 citizens	43.0%	24.5%	0.0%	1.8%	1.8%	29.0%	15 719

Note: STATIV database, Statistics Sweden. This table includes only foreign nationals registered as residents in 2009 aged 16 to 65.

most (about half) of those who arrived in 2006-08 came through family migration channels, and about one-third through asylum channels. Less than 4% were recorded as labour migrants. Information on EU citizens who arrived in 2006-08 is less complete, but most were labour migrants, followed by family; this was particularly true for nationals of the 2004 accession countries.

Characteristics of labour migrants in comparison with natives and other migrants

The number of non-EU citizens registered as labour migrants among permanent residents of Sweden in 2009 was small – about 7 000 (Table 3.3). The group had very different characteristics compared with other migrants and Swedish citizens. Labour migrants were on average younger than natives

Table 3.3. Characteristics of permanent residents, by citizenship and migrant category, 2009

	Country of birth		Citizenship			Migrant type (non-EU)				
	Native-born	Foreign-born	Swedish	EU	Non-EU	Labour	Family	Asylum	Study	Other
Age	40.5	40.7	40.7	41.1	35.4	35.7	33.7	35.2	28.9	38.1
Women (%)	49%	51%	49%	48%	48%	24%	59%	37%	30%	39%
Low education (%)	20%	25%	20%	20%	31%	4%	33%	43%	0%	24%
Medium education (%)	54%	45%	53%	42%	35%	15%	34%	33%	33%	35%
High education (%)	26%	30%	26%	38%	33%	80%	33%	24%	67%	41%
Gross salary (SEK)	213 943	139 455	207 735	156 877	82 129	282 845	66 685	50 190	30 476	71 658
Total income (SEK)	254 535	180 455	249 099	197 808	104 034	327 174	84 236	67 670	34 062	130 843
Registered employment (%)	73%	53%	71%	54%	34%	65%	33%	25%	14%	44%
Registered unemployment (%)	4%	13%	5%	7%	24%	1%	22%	47%	4%	12%
Number of observations	5 042 719	990 207	5634 377	183 991	214 558	7 115	99 806	58 185	14 731	940

Source: STATIV database, Statistics Sweden, 2009. Permanent residents in Sweden aged 16 to 65. Migrants include only those arrived prior to 2009.

and were mostly men (76%). Their average educational level was much higher than other migrants and natives. Around 80% of labour migrants had a high educational level (ISCED 5 or 6).

This highly-selected group of labour migrants had higher earnings than other migrant groups or the native-born (Table 3.3). Their registered employment rate was higher than other migrant types (asylum, family) and their registered unemployment was much lower, even lower than that of natives.¹

Pre-reform migration flows into Sweden: categories

In recent decades, migration to Sweden mostly occurred outside of labour market channels. The main categories of permanent permits were refugees, family reunification, and EU citizens. Only 1% of those granted permanent residence in 2000-03, for example, were granted residence for labour market reasons (Table 3.4). This does not mean that others did not enter the labour market. In fact, some of the other permits – especially those for EU citizens – may have been driven by labour market demand, and many of the other recipients – of humanitarian and family permits, largely – went into the labour market.

Table 3.4. **Permanent and temporary permits issued in 2000-08, by category**

Year	Category					
	Permanent permits		Temporary permits – Employment			Total
	Labour market reasons	Non-labour market	Temporary placement	International exchange	Seasonal	
2000	433	44 731	7 700	10 800	6 400	24 900
2001	442	44 063	8 000	7 700	7 100	22 800
2002	403	44 261	7 200	6 000	7 100	20 300
2003	319	46 538	7 500	6 000	7 300	20 800
2004	209	44 803	6 500	3 800	5 000	15 300
2005	294	61 734	5 075	2 354	496	7 925
2006	350	81 650	5 674	2 620	70	8 364
2007	542	85 458	6 959	2 672	2 358	11 989
2008	796	89 204	9 970	3 258	3 747	16 975

Source: Swedish Migration Board (SMB) and Labour Market Board (LMB) data used in parliamentary report (SOU, 2005:50, p. 213) for 2000-04, and OECD SOPEMI report data for 2005-08. Permanent/temporary definitions follow the Swedish permit categories used during these years. 2004 data on non-labour market permits are based on the SOPEMI report for Sweden, excluding students and temporary workers.

Sweden has seen increasing inflows since 2005 in most categories of entry reported by the SMB (Table 3.5). Note that this includes the labour migration category, which includes temporary and permanent flows, and was increasing

Table 3.5. Overall migration flows, by categories (labour, asylum, family, free movement), for 2005-10

Category	2005	2006	2007	2008	2009	2010
Labour	5 985	6 257	9 859	14 513	21 582	21 584
Attachment/Family	22 713	27 291	29 515	33 687	34 704	25 076
Relatives	19 904	22 869	21 284	22 519	24 809	21 460
Refugee family	2 004	3 799	7 691	10 665	9 273	3 166
Adopted children	805	623	540	503	622	450
Refugees and others	8 859	25 096	18 414	11 237	11 265	12 130
Convention refugees	790	963	1 113	1 934	1 824	2 304
Need of protection	1 174	3 728	10 208	5 278	6 164	6 814
Distressing circumstances ¹	2 487	3 657	3 938	1 571	995	860
Quota refugees	1 263	1 626	1 845	2 209	1 936	1 786
Temporary permits	635	299	124	64	146	57
Permits under temporary law	2 510	14 823				
Other permits ²			1 186	181	200	309
Students	6 837	7 331	8 920	11 186	13 487	14 188
EU/EES	18 069	20 461	19 387	19 398	17 606	18 480
Workers	7 414	9 020	8 189	7 881	5 857	6 984
Self-employed ³	1 257	1 144	695	488	418	522
Relatives	4 736	5 679	6 350	6 748	6 562	6 032
Students	3 986	3 489	2 825	2 953	3 230	3 365
EU long-term residents ⁴		263	322	303	393	450
Sufficient funds ⁵	676	866	1 006	1 025	1 146	1 127
Total	62 463	86 436	86 095	90 021	98 644	91 458

1. Humanitarian reasons, for the period 2005 to 31 March 2006.

2. Permits to enforcement matters and in some cases extensions.

3. Including the provision of services 2005-08.

4. 3rd-country nationals permanently resident in another EU country.

5. A person with sufficient means to support themselves, for example pensioners.

Source: Swedish Migration Board (SMB), published figures.

in 2007 and 2008 before the new Swedish regime was introduced. The main category of entry to Sweden is family reunification. Family includes relatives of Swedish citizens and of residents in Sweden and is primarily family formation. Labour flows have become even more important since the reform and are now the second category of inflows, although many of these are temporary stays, including seasonal workers. Free-movement migration from other European Union countries is the third category; between one-third and one-half of these flows are for employment reasons, according to the SMB.

Refugees have long been one of the main categories for entry into Sweden, but the flow has declined somewhat in recent years after a peak in 2006. A significant part of family flows are also directly related to refugees. Finally, the student flow to Sweden had been steadily increasing until 2010.

Flows into Sweden: Characteristics of the migrants

The main countries of origin of immigrants to Sweden in 2000-08 were Iraq, Denmark, Poland, Finland, Norway, Germany, Thailand, Somalia, China (excluding Hong Kong), Iran, United Kingdom and Turkey. For most EU countries, however, except Poland, outflows of nationals were also high, so *net* migration over the period was more significant for the non-EU countries listed, as well as Serbia, the Russian Federation, Afghanistan and Bosnia. The main countries of origin of immigrants to Sweden under family reunification and formation prior to the reform were Iraq, Somalia, Thailand and the former Yugoslavia. Between 2000 and 2008, women accounted for 48.5% of immigrants to Sweden.

As noted in Table 3.3, the labour market outcomes of immigrants to Sweden have been poor, except for labour migrants. Participation rates have been well below that of native Swedes, and unemployment has been much higher, especially for immigrants from Africa and the Middle East (OECD, 2007).

Pre-reform labour migration flows into Sweden: Categories of entry

The labour flows into Sweden under the pre-2008 system in absolute terms and relative to total permanent inflows are shown in Table 3.4. Permanent flows for labour market reasons were limited, with only a few hundred entries annually, although temporary labour migration was much more significant.

Starting in 2004 temporary and seasonal flows appear to decline, but this is attributable to EU workers no longer needing work permits, with the Swedish decision to open the labour market to citizens of the new EU countries. Seasonal workers from Poland, for example, were no longer counted as


temporary labour migrants with work permits. In addition, as it became simpler to hire workers from the new EU member countries, employers favoured them over non-EU workers. It was not until 2007 that non-EU workers appeared as seasonal workers again.

While EU workers figured in seasonal work, the enlargement did not lead to very large inflows of other workers to Sweden (Doyle *et al.*, 2006). The number of work permits issued to citizens of the eight countries joining the European Union in 2004 rose from about 3 800 to about 5 200 between 2003 and 2004. A much larger proportional increase was seen in the number of family members of EU citizens, which jumped from about 400 to about 1 700 over the same period. Doyle *et al.* (2006) attribute the low level of flows to Sweden – relative to the United Kingdom and Ireland – to several factors: a Swedish labour market offering few vacancies even in a time of low unemployment; a low propensity to emigrate to Sweden by workers in the source countries; and a language-related preference for the UK and Ireland.

Migration to Sweden in international comparison

Compared with other OECD countries and relative to its population, migration to Sweden has been high over the past decade (Figure 3.1).

Figure 3.1. Legal permanent-type international immigrant flows by category of entry, 2002–09, per thousand persons in the resident population



Source: OECD International Migration Database.

Comparing Swedish labour migration flows to those in other OECD countries

While total migration flows have been high, Sweden has not been a major recipient of labour migration flows. In fact, compared with other OECD countries, it has had very low flows, both in terms of the overall

employment and as a proportion of total flows (Table 3.6). The new policy has somewhat increased labour migration flows, both as a percentage of total flows and in absolute terms, and labour flows now account for about 4% of total permanent inflows to Sweden, four times higher than under the previous

Table 3.6. Labour migration flows by permanent vs. temporary, relative to total labour force and employment, and as a percentage of permanent flows, 2009

	Total labour flows (permanent + temporary)	Permanent labour flows	Temporary labour flows	Permanent labour flows
	Per 1 000 civilian employment	Thousands	Thousands	% of permanent flows
Australia	34.0	52	320	23.4
Austria	3.6	1	14	1.2
Belgium	2.9	7	6	19.6
Canada	13.9	64	169	25.4
Denmark	3.8	7	4	17.2
Finland	9.8	2	23	8.8
France	1.3	22	12	12.6
Germany	9.1	18	331	9.1
Ireland	1.6	3	na	7.9
Italy	7.3	130	35	35.2
Japan	2.5	23	134	35.7
Korea	5.6	104	27	74.9
Netherlands	2.9	11	14	12.1
New Zealand	45.2	12	86	24.6
Norway	6.3	3	13	6.2
Portugal	4.3	18	3	30.5
Russian Federation	na	43	1.010	14.3
Spain	5.8	102	6	30.6
Sweden	4.6	3	18	3.8
Switzerland	19.5	3	87	2.4
United Kingdom	8.9	142	114	35.8
United States	3.7	66	451	5.8
OECD	9.4¹	832	2.877	19.8

1. Average of above countries, unweighted.

Source: OECD International Migration Database.


system. Sweden has seen rising labour migration during the economic crisis, at the same time as a world-wide economic slowdown put a brake on labour migration in other OECD countries. Nonetheless, Sweden remains below the OECD average in terms of labour migration as a component of total permanent migration flows.

To better assess the magnitude of labour migration flows, it can be compared to the size of total employment. Sweden also has comparatively low labour migration flows measured relative to total employment (Table 3.6). The countries where labour migration was highest relative to total employment in 2009 were New Zealand (45 per 1 000 employed), Australia (34), and Switzerland (20). For New Zealand and Australia, temporary labour migration flows were high largely due to the Working Holiday Maker programme in both countries, and to seasonal work (New Zealand) and temporary skilled work (Australia). In Switzerland, intra-corporate transfers accounted for a large proportion of the temporary inflows. In Canada (14 incoming workers per 1 000 employed), the large temporary worker programme accounts for many entries.

Demographic data and the contribution of migration to the working-age population

Just prior to the economic crisis, immigration was not the main driver behind employment growth in Sweden. In fact, among OECD countries, Sweden is grouped with those countries where increased employment rates among residents accounted for most of the increase in employment between 2005 and 2008 (Group C in Figure 3.2). This distinguishes Sweden from those countries (Group A) where immigration provided most of the increase in employment.

Figure 3.2. **Distribution of the components of change (Δ) in employment, 2005–08, selected OECD countries**



Source: European Labour Force Survey (Eurostat); United States: Current Population Survey (March supplements); Australia: Labour Force Survey.

The size of a single-year cohort between 20 and 24 years of age in Sweden in 2009 was about 120 000 individuals. Permanent migration (see Box 3.2 for an explanation) stood at about 70 000 in 2009. Of this, most (about 60 000) consisted of immigrants between the age of 18 and 64. About one in three people entering the working-age population in Sweden is arriving from abroad (Figure 3.3).

Box 3.2. Underlying policy concepts

A number of terms underlying international migration movements (OECD, 2009) will be used repeatedly throughout this document.

Non-discretionary migration refers to movements which are not entirely subject to policy decisions and over which governments have little control. Non-discretionary migration includes movements of nationals and migration under international commitments such as free-movement areas. Other forms, such as foreign family members of citizens, are also generally unrestricted. More restrictions may be placed on family migration sponsored by resident foreigners, although human rights and international treaties limit the restrictions which can be placed. *Discretionary migration* is that which is subject to policy decisions, such as labour migration, or selective migration programmes ranging from points-based recruitment to refugee resettlement to visas granted by lottery.


A second distinction is between *demand and supply-driven labour migration*. The former is contingent on requests from the employer, usually subject to occupation, skill, numeric, and contractual criteria. The second is where the host country invites and admits immigrants based on their characteristics and presumed employability, even in the absence of a job offer.

A third distinction is between *temporary and permanent migration*. This refers not to the intention or behaviour of the migrant, but to the duration of the permit they are granted. Here, temporary migration is considered to be migration subject to a permit or status which does not allow indefinite renewal or permanent stay. Such permits are commonly used for short-term or seasonal work. On the other hand, migrants may be considered permanent if they hold a limited-duration permit allowing indefinite extension or conversion into a permanent permit (or naturalisation). This definition differs from the UN definition, which is based exclusively on permit duration, regardless of renewability.

However, discretionary labour migration – here, first work permits valid for at least one year, issued to non-EU citizens – still accounted for only 6% of total permanent working-age flows. Most of the inflow in Sweden remains family reunification to Swedes and to refugees, and migration by EU citizens.

As mentioned above, labour force participation among family members and refugees has historically been quite low in Sweden. Increases in the working age-population driven by these categories will not produce corresponding increases in employment unless integration outcomes improve significantly.

Figure 3.3. Permanent-type immigration relative to the average size of a single-year cohort 20-24, 2004-09



Note: The average size of a single-year cohort is obtained by dividing the total cohort aged 20-24 by five.

Source: OECD (2011), International Migration Outlook, based on *OECD Database on International Migration and World Population Prospects, the 2008 revision*, UN Population Division.

Note

1. The definitions of employment and unemployment differ from those in Labour Force Surveys, as STATIV data come from information in administrative registers. Registered employment corresponds to those individuals judged to have performed at least one hour of work per week during the month of November of each year. Registered unemployment corresponds to those individuals enrolled as unemployed at the Employment Service on the 31st December of each year. For further information, see Box 3.1 and Annex C.

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Chapter 4

The evolution of Swedish labour migration policy

From 1972 to 2008, Sweden maintained a restrictive policy on labour migration. The 2008 reform was the result of almost a decade of debate and institutional discussion. The 2008 law allows employers to recruit for any occupation, and grants renewable permits to all incoming labour migrants, with the possibility of permanent residence after four years. The trade unions provide an opinion on whether the job offer conforms to the prevailing Swedish wage and conditions, but they no longer hold a veto over the employer request. The absence of a cap on entries or sector restrictions, and the nominal nature of the labour market test, make Sweden's new policy more open than those of most other OECD countries.

This chapter is an overview of the history of migration in Sweden, in terms of stocks, flows and policies, and how these flows and policies compare with other OECD countries.

History of labour migration policy

Swedish labour migration policy has undergone two major post-war reforms: the first in the late 1960s and early 1970s, with the imposition of restrictions; and the second in December 2008, with a substantial opening, involving a number of key actors (see Box 4.1).

Box 4.1. Key actors in Swedish labour migration policy

A number of key actors are involved in managed migration policy in Sweden.

The national and county Labour Market Boards (LMB)* were part of the *Arbetsmarknadsverket* (AMV) labour market service. These structures have been replaced by the Swedish public employment service (PES), *Arbetsförmedling* (AF). There are 320 branch employment offices in Sweden. The PES plays a role in the migration system in two points: it publishes job openings on its *Platsbanken* listing; and it draws up the occupational shortage list used for in-country work permit issuance. Although the PES provides technical assistance and capacity building to PES in developing countries, it does not conduct recruitment in third countries.

The Swedish Migration Board (SMB) or *Migrationsverket* is an agency, dependent on the Ministry of Justice, charged with administering the migration system in Sweden. The Minister of Justice holds the portfolio in general for migration and asylum policy.

Social partners comment on the shortage list drawn up by the PES. In addition, trade unions play a role in the approval procedure, providing a non-binding opinion on employer contract conditions. Trade unions also play a role in compliance, monitoring sites where they have a presence for violations of employment or working conditions.

The Swedish Parliament also occasionally establishes Commissions to explore specific issues and propose legislation.

* *Arbetsmarknadsstyrelsen* (AMS).

During the post-war expansion, Swedish industry suffered from labour shortages – especially in low skilled work. The post-war policy developed slowly, with trade unions involved in the discussion along with employers and the government from the start. As in several other European countries, labour recruitment was centralised and managed by the government, in the framework of bilateral agreements (the first were signed with Italy and Hungary in 1947). Trade unions managed to require foreign workers to join and stay in the relevant union during their stay in Sweden; this requirement was in place until 1965. Trade unions had to approve recruitment from abroad. While the Swedish government did support such a recruitment approach, and continued to sign bilateral agreements, throughout the 1950s, most immigration was from the 1954 Nordic common labour market countries, predominantly Finland. Trade unions exercised a *de facto* veto – their opinion was required, and although it was nowhere written that their opinion was binding on the Labour Market Board, consolidated practice treated a negative union opinion as a veto (Knocke, 2002). Unions tended to reject low-skilled migrants, but generally agreed to the admission of skilled workers. In the mid-1960s, as Yugoslavians, Greeks and Turks arrived in large numbers as tourists and stayed for employment, policy shifted, with trade unions pushing for a rule in 1967 that required foreign workers to have arranged employment, a work permit and housing *prior* to arrival. These requirements were codified in the 1968 immigration law. Large numbers of workers still continued to arrive in Sweden through this controlled system until the unions adopted a more restrictive stance, in 1972, to reject almost all applications for foreign workers.¹

The recession which followed the first oil price shock in the early 1970s consolidated this union attitude, and the social partners agreed on the imposition of a restrictive policy to protect the domestic labour market and limit international recruitment of workers, a policy which remained in place until recently.

Labour migration policy prior from 1972 to December 2008

From the early 1970s to 2008, Sweden allowed two types of labour migration: *i*) short-term employment to meet shortages which could not immediately be filled by local workers; and *ii*) permanent status offered to those in highly specialised occupations.

The National Labour Market Board (LMB) examined the situation in the labour market and, in principle, consulted with the County Labour Market Boards. The LMB also issued general guidelines. Before the LMB did so, employer and employee organisations had the opportunity to state an opinion. The practice of considering the labour union veto as a binding one continued.

Temporary workers were classified into three categories: temporary hires; international exchange; and seasonal workers:

- *Temporary hires* were only authorised in areas where no Swedish labour was available, and were meant to meet short-term needs until the Swedish training system could produce a local substitute, or where the work to be done was of a short-term nature. In practice, only occupations for which there was persistent and demonstrable difficulty in finding workers were considered admissible. This included fitters, specialist technicians, artists and athletes.² For all categories of employment, the permit was granted on condition of an offer of employment and pre-arranged housing. Permits were granted for a duration of up to 18 months. An additional six-month extension could be granted under exceptional circumstances. At the end of this period, foreign workers were expected to leave Sweden. Between 2000 and 2004, an average of 7 400 non-EU labour migrants were admitted annually on temporary work permits (Table 3.4).
- The rules for hiring under *international exchange* were similar, but the maximum duration was 48 months. International exchanges covered executives and highly specialised personnel working for multinational corporations, university professors and researchers.³ There was no labour market test, but the trade unions provided an opinion. At the end of the maximum stay, if the worker was sufficiently specialised or of strategic importance, the employer could try to obtain a permanent residence permit. However, the granting of such a permit was by no means guaranteed.
- *Seasonal workers* could be approved for up to three months (April–October inclusive), in most cases by the competent county LMB following a labour market test, and were exempt from residence permit requirements. Seasonal workers were authorised on the basis of a written contract and demonstrated housing; workers could change employers but not occupation.

Permanent permits were issued to the most qualified workers, generally those with skills not readily available in Sweden, holding open-ended contracts with relatively high salaries. While they were granted labour market mobility right from the start, the expectation was that they would remain with the employer who recruited them. Between 2005 and 2008, about 15% of permanent permits were issued to employees recruited by universities and research institutes. Large Swedish companies were also sponsors for many permits (the top-5 employers, all well-known Sweden-based international companies, accounted for about 10% of permanent permits). Still, most permits were issued in small numbers to a wide range of ICT, industrial and professional services employers, reflecting the specialised jobs for which they

were allowed. A handful of permits (about 2%) went to ethnic restaurants, presumably for expert chefs.

Permits for *self-employment* were granted to third-country nationals who could demonstrate at least 50% ownership of a Swedish company (business-owner) or who, based on solid entrepreneurial experience abroad, proposed starting or operating a business in Sweden and provided a detailed business plan. The application was assessed by the Swedish Migration Board. The first self-employment permit was valid for one year at a time within a two-year probationary period, after which permanent residence could be granted if the business was operating as planned and generating sufficient income. Despite being one of the most open policies in the OECD, it attracted few entrepreneurs: on average, 66 business-owners/self-employed migrants annually over the period 2002-08 (including renewals).

One category which is impossible to identify in existing statistics is *intra-corporate transfers* (ICTs). Companies apply for ICTs using the same standard application form and process, although they are exempt from the requirement to advertise the job. ICTs accounted for a significant number of temporary placements under the old system. One large company, perhaps the largest single employer of ICTs, was bringing in more than 1 000 ICTs on short-term contracts in a single year.⁴

Parliamentary commissions begin to explore reform in the early 2000s

The 2008 change in Swedish labour migration policy represented the culmination of almost a decade of policy discussion.

By the late 1990s, the government acknowledged concern over demographic forecasts of a falling working-age population, a rising dependency ratio (Figure 2.1B) and specific labour shortages reported by certain industries. Although perceptions of labour shortages were exacerbated by the boom in the IT sector, which sparked a short-lived and world-wide race for computer programmers and IT specialists, concern centred on the longer-term demographic prospects.

The government invited the Swedish Migration Board and the Labour Market Board to investigate mechanisms for increasing labour immigration without legislative change. The joint report for the Foreign Affairs Ministry, submitted in 2000 and presented in Parliament in April 2001, projected labour shortages in a number of sectors (Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 2000). Their report also proposed bilateral agreements with sending countries for recruitment for skilled occupations, which was not followed up. The proposals led to changes in the Aliens Act granting exemptions from labour permits for certain artists and athletes, as well as specialists within international corporations working in Sweden for a maximum of one year. These changes took effect on 1 April 2002.

From the start, the social partners staked out positions regarding reform. While the trade union confederation LO expressed its determination to maintain an influential voice in any labour migration system, the employers' federation SN presented its own proposal for a job-search visa with no union control over hiring decisions or work permits (Bucken-Knapp, 2009). The SN proposal included full labour market mobility for those who found a job in Sweden (Ekenger and Wallen, 2002). The SN proposed opening the Swedish labour market to future EU member countries in 2003, even before their accession, and the creation of a three-month job-search visa for third-country nationals. During this debate, LO stated that demographic trends showed that labour migration would not have to be considered until 2007, and announced its opposition to any opening towards more migration until then.

The LO policy paper (Andersson and Petersson, 2003) noted that even with full implementation of activation policies, demographic pressure and rising dependency ratios would still make international recruitment necessary. LO, however, wanted to ensure that international recruitment did not lead to unfair competition, by guaranteeing that immigrants were protected on the labour market through indefinite contracts, mobility and safety of status even if unemployed, access to training, and oversight. LO also proposed a labour market opinion, to be provided by the county LMB, with approval contingent not just on a job offer but on a judgement that the occupation was in shortage. A report in 2004 further underlined that LO considered migration acceptable and positive if proper labour market safeguards were in place (LO Steering Committee, 2004).

The EU enlargement in 2004 required a decision on access to the Swedish labour market for citizens of the acceding countries. The Swedish government in February 2002 appointed a special inquiry to study EU enlargement and the free movement of labour. The recommendation of the Commission, in January 2003, was not to implement transitional measures. The structural characteristics of the Swedish labour market, the difficulty to compete on wages and the limited low-skilled sector, were expected to protect Sweden from a mass influx. However, the Commission was concerned about the risk of “social dumping” (where employers subcontract to foreign employers with lower social costs or total labour costs) and “welfare tourism” (where individuals change countries to take advantage of more generous social benefits, such as health care or disability and unemployment insurance). The Commission therefore recommended granting permits only for full-time employment at prevailing wages. While the ruling Social Democrats favoured a transitional permit regime – a one-year permit after which those with employment would receive the same treatment as “old” EU citizens – it was unable to achieve a majority in Parliament and Sweden ended up as one of the very few EU members which applied no transitional measures.

The LO union was not opposed to opening to new EU workers, concentrating on the broader goal of maintaining its strong voice over the Swedish labour market. Their main concern was over posted workers and false self-employment, neither of which were covered by transitional measures.

Before the EU question had been resolved, the centre-right parties, along with the Greens, pushed to create a Parliamentary Committee to examine and propose reform of the policies for admission of non-EU workers, for both short- and long-term labour needs. While the Social Democrats, who were governing in minority, had wished to limit the mandate of the inquiry to whether or not additional labour needs existed, the Committee was charged with recommending a policy to create “broader labour migration from outside the EU/EEA”. The Committee for Migrant Workers (KAKI, according to its Swedish acronym⁵) was constituted by government directive in February 2004, and granted two extensions to allow revision of an interim report.⁶

Findings of the KAKI Commission: the 2006 report

The committee published its proposal in October 2006 (SOU, 2006). The committee report reflected the priorities of the Social Democrats, but also presented countering viewpoints on the arguments for and against opening to labour migration. The recommendation was that the LMB verify the shortage prior to approving recruitment; for shortage sectors, a job-search visa was proposed. Permits would be valid for two years and renewal allowed if the migrant was still employed in the same occupation, although the second permit would grant mobility among occupations within a sector. The housing requirement would be lifted, although a minimum salary would be necessary.

The publication, however, followed elections in which the Moderate Party achieved a majority and replaced the SDP minority government. The report’s recommendations were partially incorporated by the new government in a reform introduced in 2007,⁷ which kept many but not all of the KAKI recommendations (Table 4.1). The reform was approved and took effect in December 2008.

In July 2009, the government appointed another Parliamentary Committee to examine the connection “between circular migration and development” (the Committee was called CiMU, after its Swedish acronym). The CiMU identified factors influencing migrants’ opportunities to move between Sweden and their countries of origin, and presented proposals to facilitate such movement, on the principle that it supports development of Sweden as well as sending countries (SOU, 2011). The Committee reviewed a number of issues related to the implementation of the labour migration policy and proposed recommendations for changes.

Table 4.1. **Pre-2008 policy, recommendations of the KAKI Commission (2006) and 2008 reform**

Under 1968 and later regulations (2005 Framework Law 2005:716)			Recommendation of the KAKI Commission	2008 reform
Permit	Duration	Category		
Permanent residence for employment	No limits	Limited to people with specific qualifications with permanent employment	No Change	Eliminated
			Job-search visa	Not accepted
Temporary residence for employment	18 months; a six-month extension possible	Temporary shortage– persons with qualified education and experience	LMT, up to 24 month first permit, renewable, change of status after 48 months. Occupational restriction. LMT for employer change (first permit); occupation change (later permits)	Accepted
Family members of work-permit holders	Linked to worker	Family members of workers	Should be granted labour market access	Accepted
Seasonal work permit	Three months	Seasonal workers in Agriculture, garden and forestry sectors	No Change	Special regime eliminated
Temporary residence permit: international exchange (ICT)	48 months	International exchange and specialists within companies/concerts	Impose a LMT	Not accepted
Temporary residence permit: international exchange – Interns	18	Interns/Trainee	No Change	No Change
Temporary residence permit: International exchange – Au pair	12	Au-pairs	No Change	No Change
Students		Students	Should be able to change to work permits after having completed equivalent of six months study in Sweden	Accepted
Rejected asylum seekers		Rejected asylum seekers	Should be able to change to work permits if they have worked six months (no LMT)	Accepted

Note: LMT: Labour market test.

Current migration policy

The law which took effect on 15 December 2008, allows employers to recruit for any occupation, and grants renewable permits to all incoming *labour migrants*, with the possibility of permanent residence after four years.

Current procedure in Sweden

According to the current law, employers may recruit anyone for any occupation, provided that they publish the job offer prior to making the request, and that wage and salary conditions are in line with collective agreements or prevailing practice within the profession or sector. The employee must also earn a sufficient income by Swedish standards from the offered employment, with the effective minimum wage is at least SEK 13 000/month (ca. EUR 1 420). This wage is below the lowest collective agreement and would only be accepted if the applicant has a part-time employment. The labour market test, ten days publication on the Swedish job bank (*Platsbank*) system, or with the European Public Employment Service (EURES) system, is required, although some alternative advertisement may be accepted. Employers are not required to hire or even to interview candidates responding to the announcement, nor to explain why they did not hire these candidates. Employers of intra-corporate transfers, whose workers are already employed within the company, are exempt from the labour market test. Most seasonal workers are employed as posted workers by companies outside of Sweden, so they too are not subject to the labour market test.

In the Swedish system, the worker applies at the relevant Swedish mission abroad (see Annex C). In addition to general questions asked of all visa applicants, applicants have to provide details on their employer (name, contact, and address), salary (who pays it, and how much) their job (duties and hours), other compensation. Other details, on housing and how they found the job, may be provided but are not mandatory. The worker must also provide information on education (duration and date) and past work experience (employer, position and dates). This information is used by the Swedish Mission to evaluate the application, but much of this information is never entered into the database, so no record exists of the educational characteristics of applicants or their work histories.

Applications for a work permit must include the Employer's offer of employment (*Anställningserbjudande*). Employers complete a form (see Annex C), that contains information on the employer, the job, and the wages and conditions. If the job is subject to the labour market test, employers must include the confirmation number from publication with the Swedish Job Bank or EURES, or may advertise elsewhere, although this alternative is rarely used. If the job has not been advertised, the employer must explain why.

The worker applies, either at the SMB in Sweden for certain categories or at the Swedish mission in another country. The application process can be done entirely online, with all application steps by employers and migrant workers possible through the Swedish Migration board website (the offer of employment is scanned and attached to the on-line form). About four in ten applicants apply on-line. If filed at a Swedish mission, the application is forwarded to the SMB. The SMB processes the applications and performs all necessary checks, including a consultation with the unions regarding the wage and salary conditions of the offer of employment.

The application fee is paid at the beginning of the process, and may be paid by the employer or the employee; it is generally the latter, since employers do not enter into direct contact with the SMB or the Swedish consular representation at any point in the process. The possibility to pay on-line does allow employers to pay directly if they so wish, and they may decide to reimburse the worker at their own discretion. The amount is SEK 2 000 for a work permit (about EUR 220), and SEK 1 000 (EUR 110) for extensions involving the same occupation or the same employer. Fees do not vary according to salary or duration of stay.

Workers recruited must pick up a visa in their home country or country of residence. Change of status inside Sweden is only for workers who came to Sweden to meet a potential employer – *e.g.* for a job interview – and are then hired into occupations on the national shortage list maintained by the SMB and updated twice annually. Even within this list, the employer must demonstrate that a delay related to visa formalities will cause damage to the business. The restriction prevents use of tourist visas as “job-search” visas.

Wage and salary conditions need to meet the standards under the collective bargaining agreements or prevailing practice within the profession or sector. Trade unions have a right to express an opinion on the wage and salary conditions of the wage offer. Employers are encouraged to ask trade unions for an opinion on the wage and conditions of the contract, even if it covers positions outside collective bargaining agreements. The practice of treating the union opinion as binding, however, has ended. The Swedish Migration Board may ask the union for an opinion if it is not provided with the application, but can approve a permit even if unions do not approve its conditions, as the union opinion is non-binding.

Family members of work-permit holders receive unlimited labour market access, and once issued a permit may work in any occupation without approval by the SMB. This is a formalisation of previous policy, under which family members of work-permit holders were generally granted labour market access even if this was not guaranteed by the legislation.

Provisions for specific categories under the current legislation

Students may switch into the work-permit category once they have completed the equivalent of six months university credit. There are no special provisions for graduating students, who must comply with the same conditions as any other applicant, although in-country status changes are allowed.

Asylum seekers are not allowed to apply for a work permit until their refugee status has been determined, although they may be authorised to work while their application is pending. *Rejected asylum seekers* may, however, apply for a work permit if they have been working for at least six months while awaiting a decision; they must file an application to “change queues” within two weeks of receiving a rejection of their asylum request.

The employers of *seasonal workers* (largely berry-pickers) are subject to specific regulations imposed following the 2008 reform. Starting in 2011, employers must have a subsidiary office registered in Sweden, demonstrate their ability to pay workers, even if the season is poor, and present payslips from prior years to receive new authorisation. They are not required, however, to secure housing for the workers or to guarantee their return. Foreign businesses hiring to a Swedish company are exempt from the labour market test.

Intra-corporate transfers are, as noted above, exempt from the labour market test, but the total salary and benefits package must meet Swedish standards for wages and enable the worker to earn his or her own living (in practice about EUR 1 420, as noted above). The trade union must be given the opportunity to provide an opinion on the contract.

Workers who lose their job while holding a work permit must inform the SMB. They have three months to find a new job; their new employer must be approved through the same process as a recruitment from abroad (*i.e.* advertisement and verification of contract conditions). If they do not find a job within three months, or if they have no offer of employment when their permit expires, they must leave Sweden. If the primary permit-holder loses his or her permit through unemployment, so do all dependents. If a dependent is employed, he or she may become the primary permit-holder, subject to minimum income requirements.

The initial work-permit duration is up to two years or the duration of the contract, whichever is shorter. The permit is renewable, contingent upon employment. After four years, labour migrants can apply for permanent residence permits. Workers may continue to work pending renewal of their permit, if they have worked for at least six months. Anyone in Sweden under the old system was allowed to renew his or her permit under the new rules.

The policy for *self-employment and entrepreneurs* remained the same as under the old system, with the possibility of permanent residence after two years for those whose businesses support them and their families. There is no special scheme for investors who must either create a firm in Sweden or be employed by a business in Sweden.⁸

A final form of intra-European labour migration is that of the *posted worker*.⁹ Posted workers should receive wages and be subject to the working conditions of the country in which they are posted, but are subject to social contributions and the social security regime (including, for example, workplace disability insurance) of the country from which they are “posted”. About 20 000 intra-EEA workers per year were posted to Sweden in 2007-09.

While the SMB approves employer requests, neither the Migration Board nor the Labour Market Board plays an active role in recruitment. Swedish authorities do not participate in identifying candidates from abroad, for example by organising selections or maintaining lists of eligible candidates.

The Swedish authorities do take some active steps, however, to publicise Sweden as a destination for talent. The Swedish Institute established the website www.workinginsweden.se as part of a general approach to marketing a positive image of Sweden. The website includes detailed information, in English and other languages, regarding life in Sweden and labour market conditions and regulations. It outlines, in English, the steps to be followed by a potential immigrant to be recruited as a worker and brought to Sweden, from where to look for a job, how to apply for a permit online and what to do in order to move to Sweden.

Employer and trade union opinions

Representatives of employers state that the change in policy is a substantial improvement. Refusal rates have not risen sharply (see below), so their favourable opinion of the reform suggests that employers knew not to offer jobs in certain occupations under the old system. Under the pre-2008 system, applications were not accepted for many positions, and the local LMB, as well as trade unions, often discouraged requests prior to application. The process took several months, and the LMB would reject applications if they judged there were unemployed people available locally, even if the firm found these candidates unsuited. Still, the small increase in applications does not suggest a pent-up demand under the old system.

Employers of ICTs note that while they are treated differently by the SMB, there is no official separate application form or indication that the offer of employment is for an intra-corporate transfer. The trade union opinion cited on the standard application form thus represents a complication for

employers, since the trade unions do not accept that the base salary of ICTs is below that of Swedish minimum standards and employers must explain this when providing an offer of employment.

The trade unions are generally unhappy with the loss of their effective veto over recruitment from abroad. However, they find the ten-day EURES listing to be sufficient. The white-collar union reports negotiation during the approval phase, with the union “bargaining up” the stated wages of qualified workers requested by employers.

Comparing Sweden’s new policy with that of other OECD countries

Sweden’s policy is more open than that in most other OECD countries and gives employers more recruitment opportunities from abroad. Table 4.2 summarises the restrictions in the labour migration policies of a number of OECD countries. Most OECD countries restrict non-seasonal labour migration to skilled occupations, and only a few allow recruitment of workers for low-skill occupations, usually with numerical limits. Of the countries listed, a dishwasher or cleaner, for example, could in principle only be recruited in Canada, the Czech Republic, Finland, France, Italy, Spain, and Sweden. Among these countries, however, approval may be difficult, with rigorous labour market tests and review by the authorities (as in Canada, the Czech Republic, Finland, France and Spain).

In other countries without a skill requirement, an annual cap is placed on entries. The available allotment may be oversubscribed, or be opened once or twice annually. In Italy, for example, in 2011, there were so many applications filed on the first day that only those filed on-line in the first few seconds were considered. In Greece, although there is no cap, requests must be filed more than a year in advance. This leaves Sweden as the only OECD country where vacancies in low-skill occupations can reliably and quickly be filled with workers recruited from abroad. For skilled occupations, most OECD countries grant employers more options to recruit from abroad, although the definition of “skilled” varies among countries, and annual caps may be in place.

The labour market test and review of applications

An additional restriction is the requirement to conduct a labour market test (LMT), wherein the employer must publish the job offer, locally, nationally, or within the free mobility area. Table B.1 shows the characteristics of this requirement in different OECD countries, for the relevant permit types. In some countries – notably Ireland and the United Kingdom – the mandatory advertising period has been extended in recent years. In several countries, a shortage occupation list provides an exemption to the labour market test.

Table 4.2. **Summary of labour migration restrictions (employer recruitment from abroad for non-seasonal work)**

Country	Occupation restriction	LMT	Cap	Limit to duration
Australia (TFW)	Skilled	No	No	No
Belgium	Skilled	Yes	No	No
Canada (TFW)	No*	Yes	No	Yes
Canada (Permanent)	Yes	No	Yes	No
Czech Republic	No	Yes	No	No
Denmark	Skill/Salary	Yes	No	No
Finland	No*	Yes	No	No
France	No	Yes*	No	No
Germany	Skill/Salary	Yes	No	No
Greece	No	Yes	No	No
Ireland	Skill/Salary	Yes	No	No
Israel	Sector	No	Yes	Yes
Italy	No	Yes	Yes	No
Japan	Yes	No	No	No
Korea	Sector	Yes	Yes	Yes
Netherlands	No	Yes*	No	No
New Zealand (TFW)	Yes	Yes**	No	No
New Zealand (Permanent)	Yes	Yes	Yes	No
Norway	Skilled	No	Yes	No
Poland	Skilled	Yes	No	No
Portugal	No	Yes	Yes	No
Spain	No	Yes	No	No
Sweden	No	Yes	No	No
Switzerland	Yes	Yes	Yes	No
United States (H-1B)	Yes	Yes	Yes	No
United States (EB)	Yes***	Yes	Yes	No
United Kingdom	Skilled	Yes	Yes	No

Notes: *: LMT for low-skilled is very restrictive. ** Only for low-skilled. *** Very low cap for low-skilled occupations. TFW: Temporary foreign worker.

Source: National information.

The labour market test may not, as in Sweden, represent a real restriction. In most cases, employers are not required to actually interview any candidates who respond to the job listing. There are several exceptions. In Spain, employers must interview candidates sent by the PES, although they may reject them. In the United States, employer applicants for H-2B temporary non-agricultural workers must justify why they have not hired any workers available locally. The US H-2A temporary agricultural programme is unique among temporary worker programmes in that the labour market test continues after the worker arrives: the job must remain advertised for the first half of the employment contract, and any qualified local worker must be hired if he or she applies. The foreign worker would have to return home.

In many OECD countries, the PES reviews requests to recruit foreign workers without a mandatory publication period; this is the case, for example, in Norway, France and Luxembourg. If the employment services conclude that no local candidate is available, they approve the application.

In all OECD countries, employer requests to recruit a worker from abroad are reviewed by the authorities responsible for immigration, often in consultation with the authorities responsible for employment. In a few cases, other stakeholders are also involved, for example, the trade unions, as in Sweden. In Denmark, trade unions are consulted when requests are made, except for occupations on a national shortage list. They exercise a de facto veto power similar to that previously wielded by unions in Sweden. In Spain, trade unions are involved in determining the list of occupations on the shortage list, which in turn provides exemptions from the LMT.

Supply-driven labour migration systems

Sweden chose *not* to implement a supply-driven migration system, where candidates would be selected on the basis of certain characteristics and allowed to move permanently or conditionally to Sweden. Australia, New Zealand and Canada admit a large part of permanent migrants through such selection, although these countries have, in recent years, been giving greater emphasis to prior job offers. Denmark has instituted a 12-month “Green Card”, for selected qualified candidates, to allow them to search for a job in Denmark. Austria has introduced a similar permit in 2011. The United Kingdom has long had a visa for highly skilled migrants without a job offer, although it sharply restricted its programme in 2011. The Netherlands has a highly-educated job-search permit, which allows qualified applicants to enter the Netherlands and seek appropriate work.

There is no guarantee under supply-driven systems that high-skilled migrants will work in high-skilled occupations. Initial findings from Denmark showed that most Green Card beneficiaries were not working in skilled occupations. The

United Kingdom had also found, in an audit, that more than half of those high-skilled migrants for whom occupational data were available were working in unskilled employment. In Canada, declining employment outcomes of skilled migrants – many were working in jobs for which they were overqualified – led the government to restructure its skilled migrant programme to favour applicants with a job offer or an occupation in high demand.

One safeguard against such high-skilled or high-educated selected migrants ending up in low-skilled jobs is to make their stay contingent on finding and keeping a high-skilled job. The Netherlands requires that job-seekers under its scheme find “knowledge-migrant” jobs, in approved occupations and with approved employers. Austria, too, does not allow extension of the permit unless the job found is a high-skilled job.

As for entrepreneurs and the self-employed, Sweden maintains one of the most open policies for those wishing to start a business (OECD, 2011).¹⁰ Capital requirements and job-creation requirements are modest.

Sweden, in conclusion, applies few of the restrictions regarding recruitment from abroad which prevail in most OECD countries. There is no numerical limit, no occupational restriction, no educational minimum. (There is a minimum salary requirement, based on a living wage). Besides publication of the job listing, there is no verification that the employer has attempted to recruit in Sweden or in the European Union. The system relies in large part on the good faith of Swedish employers and the idea that there is no advantage to them of recruiting from abroad over hiring someone already in the Swedish labour market.

Notes

1. The LO union, in February 1972, sent a circular to its local branches instructing them to reject requests for foreign workers. The decision preceded the oil crisis; Knocke (2002) attributes the union position to changes in tax laws providing incentives for women to enter the labour market.
2. While artists and athletes are admitted temporarily in all countries for performances and competitions, here the reference is to artists and athletes employed by Swedish institutions or teams. In Sweden, artists staying up to two weeks per year and athletes staying up to three months per year are exempt from the permit requirement, although many do obtain a permit even for very short stays.

3. This category also included au pairs, who were granted a shorter maximum stay, and were subject to regular labour law.
4. The work performed by short-term intra-corporate transfers is considered to be intra-firm service provision, which is international trade (in services). According to transfer pricing guidelines concerning such intra-firm trade, “the charge for intra-group services should be that which would have been made and accepted between independent enterprises in comparable circumstances” (OECD, 2010).
5. *Kommittén för arbetskraftsinvandring*.
6. Government Directive 2004:21 (19 February 2004) created the KAKI; Directives 2005:22 and 2006:13 granted extensions.
7. *Nya regler för arbetskraftsinvandring*, 2007/08:147, published 29 April 2008.
8. Two shorter-term work programmes are in place. Sweden has bilateral agreements for Working Holiday Makers with Australia, Canada, New Zealand and South Korea, although inflows to Sweden under these temporary youth exchange programmes are marginal. Sweden also admits au pairs. This programme, which has been problematic in other Nordic countries where it has been used as a channel for low-wage domestic work, remains limited in Sweden.
9. Under Council Regulation 1408/71 and later decisions, especially Directive 96/71/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 16 December 1996 concerning the posting of workers in the framework of the provision of services, 2001/891/EC of the Administrative Commission of the European Communities on Social Security for Migrant Workers, and the EU Directive on Services (2006/123/EC).
10. Since it is the SMB which decides on the business plan, however, discretionary treatment of applications may be more strict than the policy allows. The recent Committee on Circular Migration proposed shifting evaluation to a new independent body, as part of a policy to increase migration by entrepreneurs (SOU, 2011).

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Chapter 5

Impact of the Swedish policy reform

Overall, Sweden's new labour migration regime has not led to a boom in labour migration, although the number of new non-seasonal labour migrants to Sweden increased in 2009, and rose further in 2010 and 2011.

The reform allowed recruitment for lesser-skilled jobs in occupations and sectors in which labour migrants had not previously come, especially restaurants and hospitality and cleaning. The average permit duration is now longer, and the stay rate is higher, although seasonal work remains significant.

The reform has reinforced some migration channels to Sweden from origin countries and opened new ones as well. In addition, the reform allows rejected asylum seekers and students already in the country to change status.

The reform opened labour migration to a wider range of firms. While far more firms now recruit, most labour migrants are still brought in by the largest employers, especially multinationals, IT consultancies, and seasonal labour providers.

There is no evidence that labour migration undercuts the wages of prior residents.

In order to analyse the impact of the reform described above, this chapter examines the changes in labour migration flows and the characteristics of labour migrants using permit data from the Swedish Migration Board and register data from STATIV (see Box 3.1 for a discussion of data sources).

Changes in overall flows to Sweden

Sweden has seen increasing inflows since 2005 in most categories of entry (Table 3.5). The main category of entry to Sweden is family formation (immigration of spouses for or following marriage) and family reunification, which includes the foreign spouses and minor children of Swedish citizens and residents of Sweden. Labour flows have become more important since the reform and are now the second category of inflows, although many of these involve temporary stays. The labour flows were already starting to show sizable increases in 2007 and 2008 before the introduction of the reform. Free-movement migration from other European Union countries is the third category; between one-third and one-half of the latter flows are for employment reasons.

The student flow to Sweden had been increasing steadily until 2010. In 2011, the imposition of tuition fees for third-country (non-EU) nationals has led to a sharp decline in applications. According to the Swedish National Agency for Higher Education (VHS), applications for master's level programmes fell from 96 000 to 28 000 from 2010 to 2011, and admitted applicants fell from 19 100 to 8 100. In international programmes, where applications fell from 43 700 to 7 900 from 2010 to 2011, admitted applicants fell from 5 400 to 1 900. These programmes attract largely students from abroad; Sweden is not in the top-10 countries of origin for applicants. Further, many of those accepted have not enrolled, so student flows should decline in future years. Current students are exempted from the new fees, and the renewal rate for current international students has increased, as students avoid leaving Sweden or suspending their studies so as to keep their tuition fee exemption.

Refugees have long been a leading category for entries into Sweden, although the flow has declined somewhat in recent years.

Changes in labour migration flows

Labour migration flows can be broken down by subcategory of admission (Table 5.1). Once seasonal workers are excluded, the number of foreigners admitted for employment (permanent and temporary) was very low prior to the reform. Between 2008 and 2010, however, the number of foreign workers admitted almost tripled, to about 1 foreign worker for every 480 people employed in Sweden. Many of the workers were admitted for short-term contracts, however, so their role in total employment was not as great as the number of admissions suggests.

Table 5.1. **Labour migration flows, by categories, 2005-10, published figures**

Category	2005	2006	2007	2008	2009	2010
Non-seasonal workers	2 639	3 497	2 471	3 761	7 615	9 493
Relatives ¹					3 628	5 211
Visiting researchers ²	341	377	396	613	933	883
Seasonal work permits ³	496	70	2 358	3 747	7290	4508
Trainees / au pair	609	592	587	653	650	493
<i>of which au-pair⁴</i>	235	214	216	197	199	
<i>of which trainees</i>	374	378	371	456	451	
Artists	878	1 080	1 045	1 117	637	244
Other ⁵	526	571	644	875	829	752
TOTAL	5 985	6 257	9 859	14 513	21 582	21 584

1. This category did not exist 2005-08.
2. Visiting researcher with work permits 2005-08; EU Directive from 2009.
3. Labourers in agriculture, horticulture and forestry (2009-10) are considered “Seasonal Workers” as 95% of them have permits of less than 102 days.
4. Au-pair data provided to Helle Stenum by SMB.
5. Professional sports, youth and others.

Source: Swedish Migration Board (SMB), published data.

The categories of permits were changed in 2008 with the policy change (Table 5.2). Under the old system, most new work permits and extensions were granted following a positive opinion from the local LMB, although a large number of permits (general statement) were issued without consulting the local LMB but through national consultation. Few permits were granted to family members of workers.

Table 5.2. **Work-related permits issued under the old and new labour migration system, 2005-09**

Shaded cells indicate permits categories which do not exist in the relevant year

Permit type		SMB code	2005	2006	2007	2008	2009	2010	01 Jan 2011-25 May 2011
Pre-reform	Kinship ties husband/wife/child under 18	B	233	361	385	546	82	10	5
	Ties, previous stay in Swe., Swedish-born, etc.	B3	16	16	10	10	24	0	0
	1st permit as per general statement	C3	1 329	1 705	2 040	6 748	1		
	1st permit after County LMB statement	C4	3 884	3 957	5 001	6 485	1		
New categories created post-reform	Extended permit as per general statement	C5	475	636	582	839			
	Extended permit after County LMB statement	C6	1 120	1 139	1 111	1 547			
	Visiting student – 1st residence permit	D	56	94	78	47	8	4	2
	Visiting student – extended residence permit	E	58	68	78	64	15	2	1
	Extensions (for work permits C0-C9)	X	1 253	1 364	1 227	1 624	4 321	4 816	3 339
	Ties other kin joint household (s.5 ss.3a 1st 2)	B4	0	0	4	2	0	0	0
	5 kap. 3 § 1 (EC-directive)	B5	0	1	2	5	1	2	0
	B6 5 kap. 3 a § 1 (national)	B6	0	0	1	2	0	0	0
	Work employee, applicants outside Sweden	C0					13 728	12 664	5 287
	Work employee asylum, applicants inside Sweden	C7					424	469	166
	Work employee visa, applicants inside Sweden	C8					74	43	33
	Work employee former students, applicants inside Sweden	C9					405	454	308
	Close relative to visiting researcher	CA					575	536	270
	Relatives of self-employed persons	CB					274	117	61
	Self-employed persons	CF				(108)	27	85	34
	Parents/children workers	CG					2 776	4 417	3 397
	Au pair (international exchange)	CH					192	200	44
	Professional athletes/coaches	CI					298	275	131
	Trainees (international exchange)	CP					444	286	153
	Visiting researchers EU	CR					18	584	361
	Artists (international exchange)	CU					515	242	252
	Youth exchange (international exchange)	CW					228	288	149

Source: Swedish Migration Board (SMB) permit database, 25 May 2011.

One substantial and immediate effect of the policy change was a sharp increase in the number of accompanying family members receiving permits which allow labour market access (Table 5.3). The number of first family permits jumped from 580 in 2008 to 3 760 in 2009. These permits allow unrestricted labour market access, but do not require employment. In any case, just over half were issued to people of working age. There is no direct information available on how many recipients of work permits actually found jobs, nor the occupations in which they worked. Little is known of the characteristics of accompanying family migrants. Nevertheless, in the past, when flows were largely non-labour, few family migrants worked – of all permanent residents that came to Sweden for family reasons before 2009, only 33% had registered employment in 2009 (Table 3.3).

Table 5.3. Work permits, by primary applicants and family members, 2005-11

Year	Total	Primary applicants	Family members	Of which, family members age 16-64
2005	7 338	7 081	257	48.5%
2006	7 965	7 564	401	55.6%
2007	11 131	10 702	429	60.6%
2008	16 282	15 702	580	56.9%
2009	12 906	9 146	3 760	54.3%
2010	16 174	11 069	5 105	52.5%
2011 (to 25/5)	10 563	6 802	3 761	50.8%

Source: Swedish Migration Board (SMB) permit database, 25 May 2011.

Changes in the gender and age composition of labour migrants


About three out of four primary applicants for work permits are men (Table 5.4), and the proportion rose following the reform. One factor explaining this distribution is the predominance of men in the main occupations of labour migrants.

Most of the recipients of work permits are young (Figure 5.1). 75% are between 22 and 40 years of age, and about half are between 25 and 35 years old. The introduction of the new system – and the concurrent economic crisis – did not substantially change the age distribution of labour migrants, and the median age has remained at about 31-32 years. This is about ten years younger than the average age of the Swedish-born in the workforce.

Table 5.4. **Primary applicants for work-related permits, 2005-11, by gender**

Year	Men	Women	Total	% Men
2005	5 695	2 430	8 125	70
2006	6 221	2 669	8 890	70
2007	7 177	2 861	10 038	71
2008	13 177	4 076	17 253	76
2009	15 709	3 625	19 334	81
2010	14 801	3 855	18 656	79
2011 (to 25/5)	6 913	2 075	8 988	77

Source: Swedish Migration Board (SMB) permit database, 25 May 2011.

Figure 5.1. **Age of primary applicants for work-related permits, 2005-10, and the age distribution of the Swedish workforce, 2003**

Source: Swedish Migration Board (SMB) permit database, 25 May 2011.

Longer permit duration

The duration of work permits granted ranges significantly (Table 5.5). The duration appears to reflect the limits imposed by legislation and the nature of employment contracts offered. Both under the old and new labour migration systems, many permits were/are issued for short periods. These consist of short-term intracorporate transfers (ICTs) and a high frequency of seasonal permits (many of which are issued for 90-102 days, placing them in the 3-6 month category). Employers may also offer initial short-term contracts which give them more flexibility in laying off workers if they do not meet expectations.

The legislation allows employers to offer such short-term contracts, and employment protection in Sweden is relatively strong, which may discourage longer term contracts. This may explain the frequency of short-term initial permits, which are subsequently renewed for longer periods. Thanks to rather restrictive employment protection, a worker who has been employed for at least two years with the same employer will generally have a permanent contract.¹

Table 5.5. Duration of permit granted to labour migrants, in months, excluding accompanying family, 2005-11

Year	<3	3-5	6-11	12	13-24	>24	<=1 year	>1 year
2005	15.4%	15.5%	29.6%	23.8%	14.5%	1.1%	84%	16%
2006	13.2%	18.0%	25.5%	21.7%	19.1%	2.5%	78%	22%
2007	27.4%	15.4%	22.0%	17.6%	15.2%	2.4%	82%	18%
2008	14.1%	37.1%	19.0%	12.8%	15.1%	1.8%	83%	17%
2009	14.3%	39.9%	14.9%	8.0%	22.5%	0.3%	77%	23%
2010	7.8%	31.0%	15.0%	9.8%	35.9%	0.6%	64%	36%
2011 up to 25 May	4.7%	8.7%	18.7%	9.8%	57.1%	0.9%	42%	58%


Source: Swedish Migration Board (SMB) permit database, 25 May 2011.

The reform led to a shift in the most frequent permit duration from 12 to 24 months. The number of short-term contracts remained high in 2009, although the proportion of longer term contracts – 12-24 months – rose as the possibility was introduced to issue two-year permits upon arrival. In 2011, the number of two-year permits rose significantly, to 36%, and for the first five months of 2011, prior to the arrival of seasonal workers, rose to 57%.

Renewals tend to be granted for longer stays (Figure 5.2). Under the old system, the most common permit durations were 3-4 and 12 months; under the new system it is 4 months (for seasonal agricultural workers) and 24 months. The distribution for renewals is different: renewals under the old system were mostly for one-year periods, while the new system has allowed a large number of two-year renewals to be granted as well.

Labour migrants that entered in 2009 to work in low- and medium-skilled occupations under the new system usually had contracts of longer duration than those in high-skilled occupations. Only 20% of low- and medium-skilled had permits valid up to 2010, compared to 63% for the high-skilled (Table 5.6). In addition, a higher proportion of labour migrants in medium- and low-skilled occupations had their contracts renewed, holding valid work permits up to 2012 and 2013. While the number of low and medium-skilled migrants is relatively small compared to the high-skilled, their situation should be monitored closely in the future, in particular if they continue to hold permits longer.

Figure 5.2. **Distribution of duration of permits, first permits and renewals, pre- and post-reform, in days**



Note: Seasonal = SSK occupation 921.

Source: Swedish Migration Board (SMB) permit database, 25 May 2011.

Table 5.6. Final validity date of permits held by non-seasonal labour migrants arrived in 2009, by occupational level


Occupational level	2009	2010	2011	2012	2013	Total	Total number of permits
High-skilled	30%	33%	25%	8%	4%	100%	5 253
Medium-skilled	10%	11%	55%	14%	10%	100%	2 154
Low-skilled	4%	16%	56%	11%	13%	100%	757
Total	22%	26%	36%	10%	6%	100%	8 164

Source: Swedish Migration Board (SMB) permit database, 25 May 2011.

Changes in sector of employment of labour migrants pre- and post-reform

An alternative source of information for sector and occupation of labour migrants is the STATIV database.² This refers to permanent residents in Sweden only, and is available for those who were resident in December of each year (see Box 4.1 for more details). Labour migrants who arrived prior to the reform (2006-08) were working in 2009 largely in high-tech industries (computer and related activities, research and development and other business activities), as well as retail trade (see Figure 5.3). Those sectors continued to be the main recruiters of those permanent labour migrants who arrived in 2009, although retail trade grew in importance (almost one in four labour migrants arriving in 2009 work in that sector). The main declines were in

Figure 5.3. Percentage of labour migrants employed in the top-7 recipient sectors of activity, by sector and by arrival pre- and post-reform



Source: STATIV database, Statistics Sweden.

computer activities and communication equipment manufacturing. The latter sector was surpassed by construction, wholesale and health services among the 2009 permanent labour migrants. This may reflect changes in economic opportunities following the economic crisis with job losses in manufacturing, as much as the impact of the reform.

Changes in seasonal workers

Because of their importance, seasonal workers deserve a separate discussion. Identification of seasonal workers in Sweden is difficult, since they receive the same permit as any other foreign worker recruited by a Swedish employer. For the purposes of this review, seasonal workers are defined as labourers in agriculture, horticulture and fisheries staying in Sweden for 102 days or less.³ In principle, Swedish legislation makes a distinction between stays under three months and those longer than three months, which require a residence permit, so the permit durations for seasonal workers are often a few days longer than this limit. The duration of stay of seasonal workers averages to less than 1 400 full-year equivalents in 2009 and 2010.

Seasonal workers come from several countries (Table 5.7): Thailand (79%), followed by Ukraine (9%), China (6%) and Vietnam (5%). All of these workers were sponsored by fewer than 50 employers; most were sponsored by just a handful of employers. For example, in 2009 and 2010, 75% of all seasonal workers were employed by just five employers.

Table 5.7. Seasonal workers, 2009 and 2010, and repeat and return rates

Nationality	2009	2010
Thailand	5 940	3 191
Viet Nam	166	359
China	238	421
Bangladesh	0	281
Ukraine	797	206
Others	2	13
Total	7 143	4 471
% of which were returnees	28%	32%
As a % of those who had worked the previous year	53%	20%

Source: Swedish Migration Board (SMB) permit database, 25 May 2011.

Of the 7 143 workers in this category in 2009, 28% were returning workers – *i.e.* they had held a permit in Sweden the previous year. Since the number of seasonal workers increased, from just under 3 800 in 2008, this means that more than half of the seasonal workers from 2008 returned in 2009. Such a high return rate suggests that the seasonal programme is relatively attractive for its participants. The increase drew in many first-time workers. When the number of seasonal workers dropped in 2010 to 4 500, many (four out of five) did not return, although whether this was because they were not able to, or did not wish to, is unclear. The nationalities of seasonal workers also shifted somewhat, as China, Bangladesh and Vietnam increased in importance. Most seasonal workers are recruited in the home country by foreign companies and hired by a Swedish company, which exempts them from the labour market test.⁴

The 2010 berry-picking season was poor, and a number of workers were laid off by their employers and stranded in Sweden without the means to return home. This prompted some changes to the seasonal programme in 2011, meant to shift some of the risk of a poor berry-picking season from the worker to the employer and ensure that employers pay workers regardless. Seasonal workers can be employed by a Swedish company, in which case they are covered by the collective contract for the Swedish Association of Forestry and Agricultural Employees, with a full-time minimum monthly salary of SEK 16 372 (EUR 1 790). Most employees, however, are hired to Swedish companies and are subject to the collective contract with a full-time minimum salary of SEK 17 730 (EUR 1 940).

Use of new opportunities to change status

The reform opened up the possibility for certain categories of residents in Sweden to apply for work permits: rejected asylum seekers, and those on other valid visas (*e.g.* visas issued to candidates for job interviews). Students may now change status for work in any occupation. But few (7%) of the recipients of work permits have been recruited in-country from these categories (Table 5.8). Rejection rates are much higher (see below) for in-country applications than for applications from abroad, suggesting that many applicants do not meet the necessary criteria.

The use of the *shortage list* to receive the permit in Sweden has been quite limited – about 150 recipients in the first 28 months under the new system. Use of this status change fell from 2009 to 2010 – from 90 to 40 – suggesting that job-seekers in shortage occupations are not visiting Sweden for job interviews. High rejection rates of almost 50% – most for “overall assessment” – suggest that many applications did not meet the basic criteria, either because the visa issued was not eligible for status change or because the employer did not demonstrate that a delay in hiring would cause damage to the business.

Table 5.8. **First work permits by prior status, 1 January 2009-25 May 2011**

Place of application	Prior status	Applications	Share of total applications	Permits granted	Share of total permits granted
In Sweden	Rejected asylum seeker	1 787	5.0%	1 059	3.1%
	Student	1 379	3.9%	1 167	3.4%
	Other visa, applying under shortage list	292	0.8%	150	0.4%
Abroad		31 999	90.2%	31 681	93.0%
Total		35 457	100.0%	34 057	100.0%

Source: Swedish Migration Board (SMB) permit database, 25 May 2011.

The number of *rejected asylum seekers* who have changed status is higher – about 1 050. This represents a small fraction of the total rejected asylum seekers over that period (15 000 in 2010 alone). However, as the KAKI pointed out in its report, in 2005 most of the asylum seekers with labour market access did not hold jobs (about 10% were employed), and would not have been eligible for this status change. The number of status changes by asylum seekers has been steady since the reform, suggesting that the reform has not been an incentive for more asylum seekers to seek employment, even if a job can provide an additional possibility to stay in Sweden if the asylum request is rejected. The low number of applicants may also reflect the worsening employment situation in Sweden in 2009. The high rejection rate for status change by rejected asylum seekers (40%) is due principally to insufficient employment conditions, such as wages or work hours, or to missing the deadline for application (two weeks after the asylum claim is rejected) or insufficient work history (less than the six months required). The Committee on Circular Migration and Development (CiMU), in its final report (SOU, 2011), proposed relaxing these conditions, to 4 weeks for filing an application and to three months prior work history.⁵

The occupations taken up by rejected asylum seekers using this channel are not skilled: about half are medium-skill occupations, and half are elementary occupations, and only one in five are occupations considered to be in shortage (Table F.1).⁶ The distribution by skill level and the extent of presence on the shortage list thus differ significantly from what is observed for recruitments from abroad. This is to some extent to be expected, in light of the characteristics of asylum seekers, their lack of Swedish experience and, when highly educated, their lack of documented or recognised qualifications. On the other hand, asylum seekers accepted under the above provisions are all employed and must remain so if their (temporary) residence permits are to be renewed and if they are to be eligible for permanent status after four years.

About 1 100 *students* changed status to workers in the period covered. It is not possible to know if these were graduating students or students who abandoned their studies. Under the current legislation, students may change status after accumulating the equivalent of six months of credits, but must find a job *before* they graduate if they wish to change status. This is in contrast to the trend in most OECD countries, where graduating students are generally granted 3-12 months to find employment after graduation. In 2011, the CiMU proposed granting a six-month permit to graduating students to allow them to seek work, but this proposal has not been adopted yet.

Students changing status either go into skilled or elementary occupations, with few going into medium skill occupations. The occupations into which students are moving (Table 5.9) suggest that while the status change is allowing a large number of students to move into skilled occupations, many – more than one in three – leave student status for employment in elementary occupations, primarily in restaurants and hospitality. It is not possible to assess the course of study for these labour migrants prior to changing status, nor if they completed their degree prior to changing status. However, nationality appears to play a role in the kind of occupations students enter. The change into skilled occupations is frequent for citizens of OECD countries, Chinese, Indian and Iranian students. For students from Bangladesh, it is into low-skilled occupations. For other nationalities – Pakistan, Iraq – the status change is a mix of both skilled and unskilled occupations. Those who switch into less skilled occupations appear to be more likely to stay in Sweden for a longer period than those who switch into skilled occupations. Of those who changed status from study to work in 2009, skilled occupations accounted for just one in four permit holders still in Sweden on 25 May 2011 (Table F.1).

Table 5.9. **Status change from study to work, 2009-11, by occupation**

Occupation	Number	Percentage
Legislators, senior officials and managers	14	1.20
Professionals	487	41.80
Technicians and associate professionals	130	11.16
Clerks	49	4.21
Service workers and shop sales workers	62	5.32
Skilled agricultural and fishery worker	4	0.34
Craft and related trades workers	12	1.03
Plant and machine operators and assemblers	8	0.69
Elementary occupations	399	34.25
Total	1 165	100

Source: Swedish Migration Board (SMB) permit database, 25 May 2011.

In summary then, both the refused asylum seeker and the international student entry routes are bringing in proportionally far more persons in elementary occupations than does recruitment from abroad (excluding recruitment for seasonal work). None of these occupations are in shortage, but all persons recruited into these occupations must be working in accordance with Swedish wages and working conditions. Whether these represent genuine labour needs on the part of businesses is an open question. Although the numbers remain small, there seems no reason *a priori* why students should be so over-represented in low-skilled jobs compared to persons recruited from abroad. A closer look at these entry routes and at recruitment into elementary occupations in general thus seems warranted.

Changes in nationality of labour migrants

The main countries of origin of work-permit holders between 2005 and 2011 were India, Thailand, China, Ukraine, the United States and the Russian Federation (Table 5.10). Thai and Ukrainian workers have come to Sweden to work primarily in seasonal agricultural occupations. Other nationalities largely reflect the same main drivers of the work-permit scheme prior to 2009: short-term skilled work in software, engineering and management. Many of these workers were from OECD countries (especially the United States, Australia, Canada and Japan).

The main origin countries for migrants entering under the new work-permit system since 2009, excluding seasonal workers, were India (17%), China (12%), Turkey (6%) and the United States (5%). Overall, annual inflows increased by 160% compared with the annual average of the preceding four years (Table 5.10). Some nationalities saw much greater increases in the post-reform period. Among those nationalities for which more than 200 entries were registered in 2009-11, some of the largest increases over the previous four years were for Vietnam (700%), Mongolia (which had been absent), Iraq (25 times higher), Bolivia (17 times higher), Bangladesh (420%), Syria (822%), Egypt (640%) and Turkey (450%).

Notable is the increase in labour migration by persons from Iraq, Syria and Turkey, groups which already have a significant presence in Sweden. This may suggest that employers are recruiting through immigrants already present in Sweden or indeed, employed in the enterprise, or the recruiting employers are owners of ethnic businesses. For increases in flows from countries with a limited presence (Bolivia, Egypt, Mongolia), the recruitment channels are less evident. Are the employers hiring in response to spontaneous applications to offered jobs? To answer this question, the OECD is launching a survey of businesses which have offered employment to labour migrants under the new system.

Table 5.10. Nationality of new work-permit holders, 2005-11

Nationality	2005	2006	2007	2008	2009	2010	-25/5/2011
India	1 000	1 309	1 828	2 994	2 072	1 949	985
China	553	882	1 620	2 048	1 112	1 303	743
Turkey	101	117	153	151	349	764	391
Ukraine	590	468	2 237	1 350	552	561	464
United States	735	802	740	792	453	535	266
Syria	26	32	30	44	151	394	280
Russian Fed.	480	455	446	405	353	391	205
Iraq	5	6	19	31	159	375	263
Thailand	347	111	279	4 016	262	375	201
Iran	42	84	143	134	182	362	253
Australia	311	382	392	377	248	304	160
Canada	287	282	244	292	316	291	104
Pakistan	59	86	92	217	158	223	172
Serbia	133	153	263	230	214	207	151
Mongolia	2	1	5	3	50	163	148
Egypt	18	23	29	41	54	160	191
OECD	1837	2022	1939	2079	1623	2180	1094
Non-OECD	5244	5542	8763	13623	7523	8889	5708
Total	7 081	7 564	10 702	15 702	9 146	11 069	6 802

Note: The change in Ukrainian and Thai workers is explained by the exclusion of seasonal workers in 2009-10. An analysis of the employer name database for 2007-08 shows how much of the flow for Ukrainians and Thai workers was driven by seasonal employment. For example, 92% of work permits for Thai workers were granted for seasonal work in 2008. About 65% of work permits issued to Ukrainian workers in 2007-08 were for seasonal work.

Source: Swedish Migration Board (SMB) permit database, 25 May 2011.

One large community in Sweden with a significant increase in labour migration is from Iraq; however, about one-third of the increase was due to in-country applications by rejected Iraqi asylum seekers, rather than applications from abroad. Most of the other Iraqis came to work in small retail and hospitality businesses. Labour flows from Iran also increased – with 90% of new workers coming from abroad – into a wide variety of businesses and occupations, from low-skilled service jobs to professional and academic jobs. The increase in Turkish workers appears to be driven by the hospitality industry, which offered jobs to more than half the Turkish labour migrants recruited after the reform.

Other nationalities with many immigrants already in Sweden did not see an increase in labour migration. Work-related flows from the non-EU countries of the former Yugoslavia, which had been a major source of total inflows over the preceding decade, increased less than the average. Somalia, a major sending country of asylum flows, does not figure significantly in the labour migration flows to Sweden; this may also be attributed to the lack of Swedish representation in Somalia itself and the consequent difficulty in issuing visas.

By allowing employers to recruit from abroad with no skill or numerical restrictions, the Swedish policy created a channel through which immigrants may bring people they know from their origin countries. One question is whether this channel substitutes for family reunification (for first-degree relatives) and for asylum seeking (for others unable to use family reunification channels). Because family and asylum flows are so much larger than labour migration flows, this question is difficult to answer. Asylum flows remain much higher than labour migration flows for most nationalities (Somalia, Serbia, Iraq, Afghanistan, etc.). Family reunification is largely through family formation, and also far exceeds labour migration flows from the main sending countries. Syria is one country for which labour migration flows are becoming higher than other flows, with recruitment largely into restaurant jobs, perhaps related to the established Syrian community in Sweden. For India, too, labour migration flows exceed asylum and family reunification flows but, as noted, most Indians stay only for a short-term period.

In light of the characteristics of employers and occupations noted above, and especially the increased inflows into low skill occupations in restaurants, food processing and personal care, an additional question is whether immigrant-run businesses operating restaurants, entertainment and personal-care businesses may be driving some of the change in migration flows. A review of employer names suggests that, to some extent, such businesses are in fact using the new system and have accounted for some of the increase in applications from 2009 to 2010. “Ethnic” restaurants and businesses are frequent among employers in these occupations. It is not possible, however, on the basis of employer names, to establish how much of labour migration is into businesses owned by immigrants. The asylum seeker channel also is responsible for some of the increase of certain nationalities in elementary occupations.

To some extent, the new system has opened Sweden to flows from countries which did not previously send immigrants to Sweden. Certainly, the increase in Vietnamese, Mongolians and Bolivians appears to herald new migration channels, since these nationalities were not present in large numbers in previous years. Vietnamese immigrants, who previously came largely as seasonal workers, now also work in a wide range of occupations,

from IT workers and engineers to manicurists, and in Thai, Japanese and (less frequently) Vietnamese restaurants. Mongolians are also largely employed in low-skill jobs in Asian restaurants. Bolivians appear to have entered largely through sponsorship by cleaning companies.

One question for a liberal labour migration system is whether it is recruiting skilled workers from developing countries which can ill-afford to lose such vital workers especially if specialised in health and education. This does not appear to be the case in Sweden, where labour migrants from developing countries are rarely recruited into these occupations.⁷ Most migrants from developing countries employed in skilled occupations are working short-term in technology and engineering, and would represent skill circulation more than brain drain.

In summary, the labour migration reform has seen both increase labour flows from countries with a significant pre-reform presence in Sweden, but also the appearance of new countries of origin. The recent reform has clearly created opportunities for recruitment and migration that were not present before.


Regional distribution of labour migrants pre- and post-reform

According to the STATIV registry, most of the labour migrants reside in urban areas. Around half of all labour migrants are in Stockholm, which has only 22% of the population (see Figure 5.4). All other regions attract fewer migrants than their share of the total population, although 13 out of 18 small regions saw their share of labour migrants increase. The geographical distribution of labour migrants has not changed much after the reform. Skåne, in the south of Sweden, saw its share of labour migrants decline, possibly in relation to the characteristics of the industries in this region.

Changes in employers requesting workers from outside the EU/EFTA

Has the reform changed the number and nature of recruiting employers? Although the number of labour migrants to Sweden was relatively small compared with many other countries, a total of about 15 000 employers offered contracts to workers from outside the EU/EFTA in 2005-11. This number should be compared with the total number of about 250 000 enterprises with at least one employee in Sweden. Further, a number of families and self-employed are represented among those who applied to recruit foreign workers. In light of these considerations, and the six-year period considered, the actual percentage of employers who offered contracts to foreign workers could be estimated at no more than 5%.

Figure 5.4. **Region of residence, non-EU labour migrants in 2009, by year of arrival, and population**



Source: STATIV database, Statistics Sweden, 2009. Population data: SCB.

The reform has led to an increasing number of firms applying to recruit workers from abroad (Table 5.11). The number of employers offering jobs to labour migrants more than doubled from 2008 to 2010. In addition, many of these employers had not recruited labour migrants under the old system.

Notwithstanding this trend, in Sweden, a small number of employers are responsible for most of the permits issued. The largest sponsor, a telecommunications company, sponsors more than 7% of non-seasonal work permits. A handful of IT companies, including consulting companies, bring in many workers: the top-5 IT consultancies together account for more than one out of eight work permits before the reform and one in ten after. A single engineering company accounts for 4% of post-reform work permits. Universities remain steady users of the labour migration channel, with a slight increase (about 10%) in the number of employees sponsored.

Table 5.11. Employers applying for first work permits, by date of decision, 1 January 2005-31 March 2011

Year	Number of firms recruiting	Of which had previously recruited
2005	1 918	27%
2006	1 748	32%
2007	1 858	34%
2008	2 196	21%
2009	3 860	25%
2010	4 987	38%
2011 (to 31/3)	1 353	27%
Total (for all years)	14 817	

Source: Swedish Migration Board (SMB) employer permit database, through 31 March 2011.

Much of the labour migration to Sweden in recent years has been driven by intra-corporate transfers, most of which are short term. One large Swedish multinational company, the largest single user of recruitment from abroad (10% of all permits in 2005-08), brought in about 1 300 workers in 2009, of which only about 80 were expected to stay more than 12 months.

Nonetheless, while only about 18% of employers have sponsored just one work permit since 2005, this increases to 38% for those applying after the reform, suggesting that employers seeking to recruit one or several workers are now applying in greater numbers (Table 5.12). In fact, more than three-quarters of the post-reform employers brought in only one to five workers, compared with less than one in four prior to the reform. Still, labour migrants work largely for employers with many labour migrants. One in four work for an employer who has brought in at least 500 labour migrants since 2005. Employers who recruited many workers under the old system continue, but the reform has not led to new firms applying for large numbers of labour migrants.

One concern with the introduction of the new system was the potential for abuse by small marginal businesses with no union employees and outside of coverage by collective bargaining agreements; although such businesses have sponsored some permits, there has not been a boom in this sector.

Outside of the university and research sector, the public sector is not a major user of the permit system. A very small number of workers have been recruited by local authorities and by hospitals. This is despite the fact that the public sector employs almost one in three workers in Sweden, mostly in municipalities. This may be explained by the fact that there are few public sector jobs in shortage. Among jobs generally in the public

Table 5.12. **Distribution of labour migrants, by number of work permits issued to the employer, 2005-11**

Total number of permits sponsored by firm	Recruitment between 2005-08	Only recruited post-2009
1	11%	38%
2	5%	16%
3	3%	10%
4	3%	9%
5	2%	5%
6-9	6%	9%
10-24	9%	8%
25-49	7%	4%
50-99	5%	2%
100-199	7%	0%
200-499	9%	0%
500-999	17%	0%
1000-1999	10%	0%
2000-4999	7%	0%
Total	100%	100%

Source: Swedish Migration Board (SMB) database with employer name. Total number of permits delivered (no seasonal workers, first permits only).

sector, only nursing, psychologists, preschool teachers, and vocational high-school teachers appear on the 2011 shortage list. There may be qualification recognition issues, and for some occupations such as nurses, competition from other countries is intense, making recruitment more difficult.

The culture and entertainment industry is a major user of the labour migration system, although the average permit duration of performers and workers is generally lower than for other employers.

Changes in characteristics of firms hiring labour migrants

Small and medium-sized enterprises are much more likely to hire labour migrants after the reform (Figure 5.5). Almost 40% of the total number of firms recruiting labour migrants in 2009 had less than ten employees (compared with 27.6% before the reform). Nevertheless, big firms continue to be the main recruiters of labour migrants in terms of the total number of permits (as suggested by the employer data above).

Figure 5.5. Employee size distribution of firms recruiting labour migrants, pre-reform (2006-08) and post-reform (2009)



Source: STATIV database, Statistics Sweden, 2006-09. Unweighted average, that is, each recruiting firm is counted once.

Firms that hire labour migrants are bigger than those that do not hire them, both prior to the reform (2006-08) and after the reform (2009) (see Table 5.13). In addition, native workers employed in those firms are more educated than those working in firms that do not recruit labour migrants and earn higher salaries as well. Nevertheless, after the reform many more small and medium-sized businesses recruited labour migrants. Their native workforce had lower educational levels and earned lower wages than in firms which recruited labour migrants prior to the reform.

After the reform, new firms that had not previously recruited labour migrants started doing so. Around half of the total number of firms recruiting labour migrants had not previously done so over the 2005-08 period, and they recruited around one third of the total number of labour migrants (Table 5.14). About half of these firms were small businesses (less than ten employees), compared with 26% for firms that continued to recruit after the reform. These small businesses were concentrated in the retail trade sector.

Firms that recruited labour migrants only after the reform tended to be firms where total employment of residents was increasing as well (Table 5.15). It is no surprise that labour migrants are recruited into firms that are expanding total employment. Larger firms, which had also recruited labour migrants in the past, tended to see employment levels fall, in line with the general trend in Sweden for 2009.

Table 5.13. **Characteristics of firms employing (and not employing) labour migrants, pre- and post-reform**

	Firms not recruiting labour migrants		Firms recruiting labour migrants	
	2006-08	2009	2006-08	2009
Average characteristics of natives:				
Age	42	42	40	39
Women	42%	42%	39%	39%
Low education	17%	15%	11%	17%
Medium education	62%	62%	43%	46%
High education	21%	22%	47%	37%
Gross annual salary (SEK)	240 915	253 064	346 952	296 348
Firm size:				
10th percentile	2	2	3	3
25th percentile	3	3	8	5
50th percentile	5	5	33	16
75th percentile	12	12	129	70
90th percentile	30	28	523	271
Number of observations	706 339	235 734	4 078	2 676

Source: STATIV database, Statistics Sweden, 2006-09. Unweighted average, that is, each recruiting firm is counted once.

Table 5.14. **Comparison between firms that started recruiting labour migrants after the reform and those who recruited before and after, by firm size, in 2009**

Firm size	Recruiting labour migrants before and after the reform				Started recruiting labour migrants after the reform			
	Total number of firms	Total number of labour migrants	Average number of labour migrants per firm	Percentage labour migrants in workforce	Total number of firms	Total number of labour migrants	Average number of labour migrants per firm	Percentage of labour migrants in workforce
2-9	346	501	1.4	29.3%	698	842	1.2	26.4%
10-19	170	288	1.7	12.4%	210	252	1.2	8.7%
20-49	208	457	2.2	6.8%	212	295	1.4	4.4%
50-249	351	866	2.5	2.2%	192	383	2.0	2.0%
250 or more	237	1 796	7.6	0.6%	52	136	2.6	0.5%
Total	1 312	3 908			1 364	1 908		

Source: STATIV database, Statistics Sweden, 2009.

Table 5.15. Change in total employment of residents between 2008 and 2009, by firm size and recruitment of labour migrants

	Firms with no labour migrants in 2009	All firms with labour migrants in 2009	Firms that started recruiting labour migrants only after the reform
2-9	2%	2%	11%
10-19	1%	5%	12%
20-49	-1%	3%	10%
50-249	-1%	-4%	10%
250 or more	-2%	-2%	13%

Source: STATIV database, Statistics Sweden, 2008-09.

In summary, firms recruiting labour migrants are larger in size and have a more skilled resident labour force than those not recruiting labour migrants. The reform, however, has allowed many small and medium-sized enterprises to start recruiting labour migrants. These new firms usually recruit one or two labour migrants and are located in different sectors than the firms that used the labour migration channel before and after the reform,

Changes in wages of newly employed residents working in firms hiring labour migrants

The objective of this section is to analyse the relation between labour migration and the wage and salary conditions of residents. Labour migrants are potentially the group of migrants most likely to affect residents' wage prospects, as they have much higher participation and employment rates than other types of migrants (see Table 3.3). In addition, these migration flows are under direct oversight via labour migration policies and governments can adapt their policies to manage these labour flows. A lesser degree of discretionary power exists with other types of migration flows, including free circulation, refugee and asylum seeker flows.

There is a large literature on assessing the impact of migration on wages, although empirical analyses focused on the impact of labour migration alone are more limited (see Box 5.1). In this Review, our analysis will focus on the relation between the wage conditions of new recruits from the resident population and the recruitment of labour migrants. Firms that recruit new employees have more flexibility to modify wage conditions and thus they are where an effect of migration on wages might be first observed. Wages of employed persons, for example, do not generally fall except possibly when they change jobs.⁸

Box 5.1. Assessing the impact of labour migration on the wages of natives

Overall, the empirical literature on the effects of immigration on native wages in most OECD countries has generally found no effect on average (or only a very small one); a negative effect on the least educated, especially prior immigrants; and a positive effect on the more educated native population (e.g. Borjas, 2003; Card, 2005; Ottaviano and Peri, 2006; Manacorda *et al.*, 2006; Dustmann *et al.*, 2008a).¹

However, this literature has never looked specifically at the discretionary labour migration component. Standard labour force surveys and census databases do not distinguish discretionary labour migrants from other migrants. This lack of available data makes it difficult to focus specifically on the labour migration component only. In addition, all types of migrants have access to the labour market at some point, independent of their entry visa. Recent examples where almost all migration is employment-related are limited, and in these cases, migration has not been managed, but has occurred either through free movement or through unregulated (*i.e.* illegal) flows.²

In order to assess the impact of labour migration, it will be necessary to compare the observed changes in employment and wages of natives to the changes that would occur if migration did not take place. These counterfactual outcomes are not observed, and thus it is not straightforward to obtain a reliable estimate of its impact.

Two solutions used in the literature to avoid these problems are to divide the labour market in segments, either by geographical areas or by skills and compare the labour market changes between those segments that experienced immigration from those that did not.

The division in geographical areas might not be adequate as discretionary labour migrants do not locate randomly across localities but cluster in those where there is more labour demand for them. In addition, inflows of labour migrants can certainly affect the inflows and outflows of natives and other migrant groups. The use of historical migrant settlements as potential instruments for contemporary discretionary labour migration flows will not be adequate in this case, as the two might not be related. Even if they were, they would also be correlated to non-discretionary migrant flows, rendering them a biased instrument in any regression analysis.

The division of the labour market by skill levels would not be suitable either to analyse the impact of discretionary labour migration. Even if the division in education-experience cells is not affected by the problem of outflows of natives or migrants in response to the new discretionary labour migrants, the assumption that migrants and natives are perfect substitutes is not satisfactory. Indeed, natives and migrants often perform complementary tasks (Ottaviano and Peri, 2006). In addition, migrants suffer more occupational downgrading than natives (OECD, 2007).

Finally, the aggregated effects of labour migration in the local economy in Sweden might be diluted given that its flows are quite small relative to the overall workforce.

1. See Dustmann *et al.* (2008b) for an extensive review of the literature on the impact of migrants on native labour market outcomes.

2. One possible exception is H-1B visas and their impact on the US science and engineering, including native employment and wages (Zavodny, 2003; Kerr and Lincoln, 2010).

The identification of this type of migration and differentiation from other migration flows such as asylum, family reunification or free-movement migration is not possible in standard labour force surveys and census databases. However, register-based data from STATIV allow this categorisation of inflows.

As noted, labour migrant flows are quite small relative to the overall workforce. Thus, the overall aggregated effects of labour migration in the labour market are likely to be diluted. However, the effects, if they exist, are likely to be more visible among *new* hirings, who must bargain their wages,⁹ than they are of persons who continue to be employed, whose wages do not generally fall, although they may experience slower wage growth.

Thus, those residents that are “newly employed” in a particular firm might be more likely to be affected by the presence of labour migrants. Using two subsequent waves of data, *newly employed* individuals are identified as those employed in year t that either changed employer or in the previous year $t-1$ were unemployed, inactive or not resident in Sweden.¹⁰

The evaluation of the medium and long-term impacts of the reform, in particular relating to labour market outcomes of residents, will only be possible in some years time, as information on labour market outcomes is only available until 2009, the first year after the reform. Nevertheless, it is already possible to compare the wages of newly recruited residents of firms recruiting (and not recruiting) labour migrants.

The average wages of newly recruited residents in those firms recruiting labour migrants were higher than those working in firms not recruiting them both before and after the migration reform – Table 5.16 – (except for small firms after the reform). However, the wage premium for those newly recruited residents working in firms recruiting labour migrants was reduced in 2009. The largest declines in the salary ratio were seen in smaller firms – those with 2-49 employees. For small firms (between two and nine employees), this premium even became negative. This is probably attributable to the changing characteristics of the firms recruiting under the new system (productivity, etc.).

Many factors explain this wage differential among firms recruiting labour migrants and those which do not: differences in sector, labour force composition, productivity, etc. However, the positive premiums persist even after controlling for the average characteristics of the newly recruited residents (age, education), time effects or firm’s sector and size (see Table 5.17). A newly recruited resident worker for a firm that recruits labour migrants earns on average a 10.5% higher salary than a resident working in a firm that does not recruit them. This premium might not be directly related to the fact that the firm is recruiting labour migrants, but reflect other differences like productivity. Nevertheless, it shows that those firms recruiting labour migrants do not offer lower wages to residents.

In addition, there seems to be no significant wage difference between those newly recruited residents in firms recruiting labour migrants after the reform and those who were hired before, after controlling for sector, time effects, firm size and workforce characteristics. Nevertheless, new firms that started recruiting labour migrants only after the reform do offer significantly lower wages even after controlling for sector and other characteristics. Closer monitoring of those firms might be advisable in the coming years, as the full impact of the reform unfolds.

Table 5.16. Average annual wages of newly recruited residents in firms recruiting labour migrants, by firm size

Firms with no labour migrants in 2009		Firms with labour migrants in 2009					
				Among which, firms that started recruiting labour migrants only after the reform			
2006-08	SEK	SEK	Ratio labour/ No labour 2006-08	SEK	Ratio labour/ No labour 2006-08		
2-9	224 878	230 064	102%	210 214	93%		
10-19	228 794	273 041	119%	234 423	102%		
20-49	238 623	289 416	121%	248 099	104%		
50-249	263 362	311 618	118%	258 627	98%		
250 or more	277 574	334 809	121%	265 594	96%		
2009	SEK	SEK	Ratio labour/ No labour 2009	Ratio 2009/2006-08	SEK	Ratio labour/ No labour 2009	Ratio 2009/2006-08
2-9	221 701	210 511	95%	93%	195 954	88%	95%
10-19	238 886	259 294	109%	91%	234 670	98%	96%
20-49	251 326	283 968	113%	93%	248 194	99%	95%
50-249	278 135	323 239	116%	98%	305 787	110%	112%
250 or more	310 786	314 695	101%	84%	324 491	104%	109%

Source: STATIV database, Statistics Sweden, 2006-09.

Table 5.17. **Wage differential of newly recruited residents in firms recruiting labour migrants, controlling by various characteristics, OLS regression**

	Log wage (1)	Log wage (2)	Log wage (3)	Log wage (4)	Log wage (5)	Log wage (6)
Firm recruits labour migrants (yes=1)	0.353** (0.026)	0.181** (0.025)	0.078** (0.025)	0.104** (0.025)	0.079** (0.025)	0.105** (0.025)
Firm recruits labour migrants Post-Reform (yes=1)	-0.267** (0.038)	-0.129** (0.036)	-0.092* (0.036)	-0.023 (0.036)	0.08 (0.061)	0.077 (0.059)
Firm recruits labour migrants only post-reform (yes=1)					-0.223** (0.063)	-0.130* (0.062)
Share low educated		-0.656** (0.008)	-0.651** (0.008)	-0.526** (0.008)	-0.651** (0.008)	-0.526** (0.008)
Share high educated		0.399** (0.006)	0.378** (0.006)	0.295** (0.006)	0.378** (0.006)	0.295** (0.006)
Female		-0.355** (0.005)	-0.364** (0.005)	-0.191** (0.006)	-0.364** (0.005)	-0.191** (0.006)
Age		0.016** (0.000)	0.016** (0.000)	0.011** (0.000)	0.016** (0.000)	0.011** (0.000)
Firm size: 10 to 24			0.205** (0.006)	0.186** (0.006)	0.205** (0.006)	0.186** (0.006)
Firm size: 25 to 100			0.242** (0.008)	0.196** (0.008)	0.242** (0.008)	0.196** (0.008)
Firm size: 101 to 1000			0.286** (0.015)	0.197** (0.014)	0.284** (0.015)	0.196** (0.014)
Firm size: 1001 or more			0.335** (0.053)	0.229** (0.052)	0.322** (0.053)	0.221** (0.052)
Constant	12.043** (0.003)	11.654** (0.008)	11.627** (0.008)	12.076** (0.050)	11.627** (0.008)	12.077** (0.050)
Includes time effects	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Includes sector effects	No	No	No	Yes	No	Yes
Number of observations	331 464	331 142	331 142	331 053	331 142	331 053
R-squared	0.001	0.081	0.088	0.124	0.088	0.124

* p<0.05, ** p<0.01

Source: STATIV database, Statistics Sweden, 2006-09.

The correlation between the presence of newly recruited labour migrants in a particular firm and the wages of newly recruited residents in that firm cannot be fully interpreted as a causal relationship. These associations might not capture only the presence of labour migrants. Simultaneous inflows and outflows of residents and other type of migrants (family, free movement, students, etc.) might confound the effect of labour migrants' presence. A potential correlation between demand conditions and immigrant employment might induce a spurious positive correlation between those firms that hire more migrants and the wages of residents (even after controlling for time and sector effects). For example, labour migrants are usually admitted in response to labour market needs and are often employed in occupations where there are actual or anticipated shortages.

Notes

1. In management systems where renewal processing times are long, employers may have an incentive to offer longer term contracts to avoid the bureaucracy and costs of prolonged renewal. This does not appear to be the case in Sweden, as workers may remain employed while renewal requests are pending.
2. As noted (see Box 4.1), STATIV only includes migrants who intend to stay for more than one year and who have permits compatible with that intention. All STATIV-based tabulations are restricted to this population.
3. The 102 day cut-off was chosen because while a seasonal stay is generally at most three months, permit validity includes up to two weeks additional time, and many workers had a permit valid for 90-102 days; about 95% of all agricultural labourers (SSYK 921) had a stay of less than 103 days.
4. In such cases, the employer of seasonal workers is a company in, for example, Thailand which hires workers there and brings them to Sweden, where they are paid locally by a Swedish-registered subsidiary.
5. The long prior employment period required paradoxically favours those whose asylum claim was not treated quickly and who had more time to accumulate the qualifying months of employment, and more rapid processing of requests will affect the pool of potential status-changers. From an employer standpoint, offering the possibility of status change may make asylum-seekers in general more attractive as workers, since there is less risk of losing the employee if the asylum applications is denied.
6. Note that none of the elementary occupations are on the shortage list.

7. Because education data are not available for most post-reform labour migrants, however, it is not possible to determine whether labour migrants trained in their home countries are working in Sweden in low-skill occupations.
8. Although they might experience lower wage growth, the effect might be watered down.
9. The wages are subject to minimum collective bargaining standards, but the wages of hires may be bargained downwards towards the minima in the face of competition.
10. Most “newly employed” individuals will be correctly identified, but some errors could arise. Some individuals might be not correctly identified as newly employed if they arrived in $t-1$ in Sweden but were not considered residents at that time; or if they were unemployed in t and in $t-1$ but worked in between, or if their company number was not declared in either t or $t-1$.

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Chapter 6

Evaluating the new Swedish labour migration policy

The Swedish labour migration policy seems to effectively meet labour market needs without adverse effects. Almost half of the labour migrants coming to Sweden went into occupations that were in shortage. Chief among these is the IT sector, which attracts a large number of short-term labour migrants, including intra-corporate transfers. Recruitment from abroad is only a small part of total hiring in Sweden, and does not closely correspond to total job openings.

The new system is providing skilled workers in occupations in shortage, but also an increasing number of workers in low-skill occupations. The faith in employers appears to be largely justified until now, although some vulnerability in the system could be addressed, especially in monitoring workplaces not covered by collective bargaining, and marginal businesses.

Fees associated with a work permit are low in international comparison, and processing times are shorter than in other countries, although they rose as more applications were filed. The refusal rate, low in international comparison, also rose, suggesting closer scrutiny of applications, or more marginal applications, especially those for low-skill occupations and in small businesses.

The evaluation of the Swedish policy is based on the questions presented at the outset of the review: whether labour migration policy is *effective* in meeting labour market needs without adverse effects, and whether the policy is *efficient*. The question of whether there are adequate *safeguards* will also be covered.

Effectiveness


In order to answer the question of effectiveness, this section examines whether demand for workers from abroad follows demand in the Swedish labour market, as measured through private sector job openings; which occupations recruit labour migrants, and whether these are in shortage; and the contribution of labour migrants to employment in these occupations.

Does demand for workers from abroad reflect demand in the labour market?

Figure 6.1 plots the quarterly number of private-sector job openings and applications for a first work permit from non-EU/EFTA foreigners. Under the prior system, employers were able to recruit only for occupations which were approved after a strict review by trade unions. The relationship between applications and job openings is not a direct correspondence, although a positive correlation is suggested. To some extent, applications to recruit do not follow the trend in job openings until 2008. From 2009, the demand increases as the new system is introduced in the midst of a jobs crisis, and then starts to follow the vacancy trend more closely.¹


For comparison, figures for vacancies and requests for temporary foreign workers in Australia show a close correlation between the two (Figure 6.2). With the exception of a spike due to programme changes, applications reflect trends in the labour market. One noteworthy difference is that Australian employers perceive the temporary work programme as one of the standard channels for meeting labour demand, in contrast to Sweden where, except for a few employers and occupations, recruitment from abroad was not a typical response to labour shortage in the past.

Figure 6.1. Private sector job openings and applications for first non-seasonal work permit, Sweden, Q1/2005-Q1/2011



Source: Swedish Migration Board (SMB) permit database, SCB (private sector job openings). Figures for Q2 in 2005-08 are corrected to remove seasonal workers (from SMB published data). Figures for 2009-10 exclude seasonal workers (by occupation SSYK 921).

Figure 6.2. Australia: vacancies, and applications to hire foreign workers, January 2003-December 2010



Note: The Subclass 457 Visa Applications are for skilled temporary work. The ANZ advertisement index tracks job vacancies. The spike in mid-2007 is due to the imposition of stricter eligibility criteria, which led some employers to anticipate their applications.

Source: Department of Immigration and Citizenship Australia.

Occupations of labour migrants under the new system

While no occupational information is available in the Swedish Migration Board permit database prior to 2009, restrictions on the characteristics of labour migrants largely limited admission to skilled occupations. Since the reform lifted what amounted to a ban on recruitment for lower-skilled jobs, an increasing number of workers have been admitted with these occupations (Table 6.1). From 9% in 2009, the proportion of workers in elementary occupations has risen to 16%; the proportion of medium-skill occupations increased from 26% to 38%.

The main group remains “labourers in agriculture, horticulture, forestry and fishing”. This corresponds largely to seasonal berry-pickers and other agricultural workers. In 2009, 95% of all permits in this occupation were issued for less than 102 days. These workers were admitted as seasonal workers under the old system.

Computer specialists are the main group after seasonal workers, and largely reflect the use of short-term workers from outside the European Union on projects, within a multinational corporation, through a contract service provider, or by a Swedish employer. Engineers, fourth and seventh on the list, also often fall into this category. The number of skilled professionals recruited remained steady between 2009 and 2010.

Occupations for which a growing number of foreign workers are being recruited, and which were restricted under the pre-reform system, include housekeeping and restaurants, cleaners, and kitchen/restaurant helpers. The top-4 low-skilled service professions saw an increase in work permits of about 60% between 2009 and 2010.

Skilled industrial workers accounted for about 8% of workers admitted. The health sector is less represented, covering only 2.5% of all occupations, largely in less-skilled caretaking positions.²

Have labour migrants filled labour shortages?

To what extent have entries under the new system been recruited into shortage occupations? An analysis can be conducted using the official shortage list for migration by means of status changes (see Box 6.1). It uses a four-digit occupation code (using the SSYK classification). The data currently available for the occupation of workers recruited from abroad do not always match this level of detail, so it is not possible to assess exactly how many workers have been admitted for shortage occupations. Still, using the available occupation data, occupations on the shortage list do figure prominently among the occupations of admitted workers. Many of the main occupations admitted include “Computer systems designers, analysts and programmers”, architects, civil engineers, and cooks and chefs.

Table 6.1. **Top occupational group (SSYK3) of recipients of work permits, 2009-11**

Code	Occupational group	2009	2010	1 Jan 2011- 25 May 2011	Total
1-3	Skilled occupations	64.3%	52.5%	46.2%	55.0%
4-8	Medium skilled occupations	26.4%	33.5%	38.0%	32.2%
9	Elementary occupations	9.3%	14.0%	15.8%	12.8%
213	Computing professionals	3 069	3 006	1 562	7 637
512	Housekeeping and restaurant services workers	1 021	1 294	832	3 147
347	Artistic, entertainment & sports assoc. profession	897	760	453	2 110
214	Architects, engineers and related professionals	812	726	396	1 934
912	Helpers and cleaners	405	670	485	1 560
913	Helpers in restaurants	267	604	483	1 354
311	Physical and engineering science technicians	615	475	207	1 297
241	Business professionals	281	287	180	748
712	Building frame and related trades workers	225	263	227	715
741	Food processing and related trades workers	146	364	200	710
611	Market gardeners and crop growers	184	241	224	649
245	Writers and creative or performing artists	283	202	69	554
513	Personal care and related workers	145	239	154	538
341	Finance and sales associate professionals	138	193	154	485
123	Other specialist managers	167	180	110	457
514	Other personal services workers	90	146	129	365
522	Shop and stall salespersons and demonstrators	61	128	123	312
131	Managers of small enterprises	57	93	129	279
723	Machinery mechanics and fitters	82	119	76	277
914	Doorkeepers, newspaper & parking deliverers, etc.	71	107	87	265
413	Stores and transport clerks	57	110	80	247
614	Forestry and related workers	63	56	115	234
713	Building finishers and related trades workers	76	90	60	226
231	College, university and higher education teaching professionals	59	105	39	203
721	Metal moulders, welders, sheet-metal workers, etc.	44	100	46	190
222	Health professionals (except nursing)	65	73	51	189
613	Crop and animal producers	31	79	70	180
312	Computer associate professionals	77	54	42	173
	<i>Other</i>	1 008	1 277	821	3 106
	Total	10 496	12 041	7 604	30 141
921	Agricultural, fishery and related labourers	7 267	4 531	97	11 895
	Total	17 763	16 572	7 701	42 036

Source: Swedish Migration Board (SMB) permit database, 25 May 2011. Figures cover only permits for which occupational data was available. Seasonal workers (921) are excluded from the skill distribution analysis at the top of the table.

Box 6.1. The shortage list in Sweden

In accordance with the Aliens Ordinance (Chap. 5 §12) since 2008 the Swedish public employment service (PES) is required to compile a list of occupations in which there is great demand for labour. The PES must give associations of employers and employees the opportunity to comment on this list. The list is then forwarded to the Swedish Migration Board (SMB). The SMB uses the list to issue work permits to third country nationals in Sweden as visitors, who would otherwise have to return home and apply at the Swedish representation in their home country, but the list plays no other role in determining the right to obtain a work permit in Sweden.

The PES uses a pre-existing and long-standing methodology and list, the “Occupational Barometer”, for the list provided to the SMB. The Barometer covers all of Sweden and is updated twice a year. The Barometer maps about 200 frequently-occurring occupations on the Swedish labour market, covering about 80% of total employment. The specific occupations have been selected to serve as a basis for occupational guidance in the PES, and change over time, with a small number of occupations added or removed with each review. Because the Barometer is meant for career guidance, very few elementary occupations are included.

The Occupational Barometer identifies recruitment problems and surpluses of jobseekers in each occupation, using the four-digit occupation (SSYK) code, through a survey sent to all Swedish PES branches. For occupations relevant in the local area covered, the branches indicate the degree of surplus or shortage expected in one year (six-point scale), and the expected change in recruitment needs in one year (a five-point scale from increasing to same to decreasing). The list, then, is compiled not on the basis of vacancy and unemployment data, but is based on the collective judgments by each local PES. The PES recalculates responses and produces a weighted national average of surplus or shortage for each occupation, using a five-point scale (1=huge surplus, 5=huge shortage). These are then informally discussed by the social partners and experts.

The list supplied to the SMB consists of the occupations that have a labour shortage of at least 3.3 (between *shortage* and *severe shortage*) in the Occupational Barometer. The only difference between the Occupational Barometer and the list provided to the SMB is that additional comments received from the social partners are taken into account for the latter list. Social partners have commented occasionally, and their requests to strike several occupations from the list were accepted, although no objections were raised in the most recent (April 2011) consultation.

The number of occupations on the SMB shortage list varies over time. The first list (winter 2008) contained 77 occupations, cut to 34 in Spring 2009. The numbers have since risen, to 43 in autumn 2009, and 64 in Spring 2010, which represented 24% of total employment (2009) in Sweden. There are 72 occupations on the current list (May 2011). The shortage list is published, in English, on the Swedish Institute’s “Working in Sweden” website.

While the official Swedish shortage list – used for status changes but subject to many restrictions – brings few (0.4%) labour migrants into Sweden, overall, about 43-48% of the labour migrants entering Sweden were recruited into shortage-list occupations (Table 6.2). Compared with Swedish-born workers, then, labour migrants are disproportionately employed in shortage occupations, although there appears to be a small decline in the percentage in 2011. However, the average duration of stay for skilled workers, such as those on the shortage list, is much shorter than for elementary occupations not included on the list: while two out of three workers in elementary occupations received a permit for the maximum possible duration, two years, less than 20% of professionals and technicians received a two-year permit, with most holding a permit valid for less than a year.

Table 6.2. **First non-seasonal permits delivered under the shortage list, 2009 to 25 May 2011**

Year	Missing occupation data	Occupations not on the shortage list	Occupations on the shortage list	% of occupations on the shortage list	Total
2009	973	4 256	4 008	48%	9 237
2010	1 395	5 085	4 651	48%	11 131
2011 (up to 25 May)	831	3 449	2 565	43%	6 845
Total	3 199	12 790	11 224	47%	27 213

Note: Includes occupations for which full SSYK4 code was available and recoded occupations from SSYK3 to SSYK4 based on intra-occupational distribution (i.e. the distribution of SSYK4 occupations within an SSYK3 category). Shortage list used is the April 2011 list.

Source: Swedish Migration Board (SMB) permit database, 25 May 2011.

This analysis follows, in a certain sense, the reverse of the methodology used to determine shortage lists. Shortage lists based on objective criteria are generally based on vacancy rates (OECD, 2008). In France, the shortage list is based on jobs for which the ratio of unemployed to vacancies is 0.9 or less for at least one year. A similar formula is used in Spain, although the list is then discussed with the social partners. In the United Kingdom, the Migration Advisory Committee (MAC) uses a more detailed algorithm, with 12 indicators of vacancies, wages and employment as parameters. The MAC identifies occupations where labour migration is presumed not to have a negative effect on labour market conditions. The MAC then, like the Swedish Occupational Barometer, also takes into account softer evidence ranging from training data to stakeholder claims. Shortage lists in other countries – used for other purposes – tend to be more restrictive. The MAC list in 2008 covered occupations which represented only 2.5% of employment, while the Spanish and French lists in


the same period covered occupations with even less share of employment. Any expanded use of the Swedish shortage list should involve a review of the restrictiveness of the shortage list.

The Occupational Barometer (see Box 6.1) allows for an analysis of the occupations of labour migrants according to the degree of surplus and shortage. However, many elementary and medium skilled occupations in which labour migrants are employed (see *e.g.* Table F.2) are not ranked in the Barometer, and their exclusion from consideration suggests that they are not in shortage. These occupations account for about one-third of labour migration.

The distribution of occupations which are ranked on the Barometer indicates that most of the remaining labour migration is into occupations which are not in severe surplus (Figure 6.3). Most of the labour migrants are employed in occupations just above the cut-off (3.3) for the shortage list. However, for those labour migrants with permits valid for longer stays, including renewals, there are a much greater number of occupations in surplus, including many with a clear surplus. For shorter stays, almost half (48%) of occupations were unranked; this reflects the relative importance of unranked entertainment and sports occupations. For longer-term stays, 28% were unranked, largely in elementary occupations.

Figure 6.3. **Distribution of occupations of labour migrants, 2009-11, by shortage ranking**

for occupations included on the Barometer and duration of total permit validity in that occupation



Note: Arbetsförmedlingen. Rankings are for the Spring 2010 or most recent Occupational Barometer. Where multiple rankings are provided for the same SSYK4 code, the main occupation is used. Excludes seasonal workers (by occupation SSYK 921). Excludes occupations not ranked by the Occupational Barometer (48% of short stays and 28% of longer stays).

Source: Swedish Migration Board (SMB) permit database, 25 May 2011.

Contribution of labour migrants to employment by occupation

Labour migration flows can be measured against total employment, as in Table 6.3 to provide a benchmark for the magnitude of flows and their potential contribution to total employment. As noted, the best measurement of labour migration flows would be against entries into the occupation, or turnover, but this analysis is not possible due to lack of available data. As a substitute, and to provide a context for understanding the inflow by occupation of labour migrants, flows can be measured relative to the stock of total employment in occupations. Table 6.3 compares inflows by occupation to total employment in Sweden, for the top-12 non-seasonal occupations of labour migrants by three-digit (a) code. The analysis is also done for four-digit occupations (Table F.3).

Recruitment from abroad to Sweden is not evenly distributed among occupations, but is highly concentrated in a few occupations. The top-5 occupations account for 53% of inflows but 8% of total employment in Sweden. The top-12 occupations account for 75% of labour migrants and 30% of Swedish employment.

The inflows relative to total employment are low. The annualised number of all labour migrants holding permits between January 2009 and May 2011 was equivalent to 0.3% of total employment – or 1.3% for the top-12 occupations. Even for those occupations attracting the most inflows, the relative size was limited. For computing professionals, annual inflow was equivalent to 3.5% of total employment in 2009. In housekeeping/restaurant services, it was 2.5%, and in food processing, 5.8%.

This comparison overestimates the contribution of labour migrants in these occupations, since many labour migrants are in Sweden on short-term permits, and flows are not equivalent to new additions to the workforce. To provide a rough indication of the full-year equivalent of these inflows, by occupation, of labour migrants, the permit durations for each occupation were summed for the period 1 January 2009-25 May 2011 and annualised. The resulting full-year equivalent (FYE) estimate is shown in the last column of Table 6.3. For computer professionals, the FYE was less than half the annual number of permits. For the lower skilled occupations, the FYE is somewhat closer to the number of entries, reflecting the longer permit duration. Workers recruited for less skilled occupations stay for longer, so the flows more accurately reflect the contribution to employment in that occupation.

Inflow relative to employment is significantly and positively correlated with the shortage ranking of occupations on the Occupational Barometer (Figure 6.4), although this excludes occupations not ranked on the Barometer (38% of the total). As noted above, entries are small relative to total employment. In most occupations where there is a surplus in the labour market, labour migrants

are not entering in large numbers relative to total occupation. However, those in surplus occupations tend to have longer permit durations and therefore contribute more to employment in these occupations.

The reform has clearly increased the number of labour migrants entering less skilled occupations. This is evident from the STATIV data. Although occupation information is missing for many labour migrants, especially in 2009, available data show a shift in the composition of labour migrants from 2007-08 to 2009, from 76% high-skilled to 48% high-skilled, and 7% low-skilled to 18% low-skilled. According to permits issued, the trend towards more elementary occupations continued.

The entry of labour migrants for elementary occupations in which there is a surplus is a possible point of concern, since there may be a risk of migrants substituting for less educated natives or prior immigrants in these jobs. Some of

Table 6.3. **Inflow by occupation 2009-11, relative to total employment in 2009 (SSYK3)**


SSYK3 Code	Occupation	Total employment 2009	Average annual entries 2009-25 May 2011	Average annual entries as % of total employment	Full-year equivalent (FYE)
213	Computing professionals	92 280	3 189	3.5%	1 465
512	Housekeeping/restaurant svc workers	53 285	1 314	2.5%	912
347	Artistic, entertainment, sports ass. prof.	15 081	881	5.8%	203
214	Architects, engineers & rel. prof.	76 471	808	1.1%	335
912	Helpers and cleaners	67 589	651	1.0%	480
913	Helpers in restaurants	57 574	565	1.0%	384
311	Physical and eng. science technicians	117 600	542	0.5%	230
241	Business professionals	100 205	312	0.3%	158
712	Building frame and rel. trades workers	91 427	299	0.3%	173
741	Food processing/related trades workers	9 331	297	3.2%	211
611	Market gardeners and crop growers	16 175	271	1.7%	102
245	Writers and creative/performing artists	38 142	231	0.6%	48
	<i>Subtotal</i>	735 160	9 361	1.3%	4 701
	<i>Other</i>	3 190 605	3 227	0.1%	2 469
	Total	3 925 765	12 587	0.3%	7 170

Note: Total employment is measured as at least four hours worked in the occupation by an individual in November 2009, so there is a seasonal effect. FYE: Full-year equivalent – the duration of validity of permits issued by occupation, for 1 January 2009 to 25 May 2011, annualised.

Source: Swedish Migration Board (SMB) and Swedish Statistical Office (SCB).

Figure 6.4. Occupations of labour migrants, by cumulative entries 2009-11 relative to total employment 2009, according to surplus/shortage ranking on the Occupational Barometer

The size of the circle represents the number of entries



Note: Excludes seasonal workers (by occupation SSYK 921). Covers only occupations included on the Barometer (62% of occupations). Rankings are for the Spring 2010 or most recent Occupational Barometer. Where multiple rankings are provided for the same SSYK4 code, the main occupation is used.

Source: Swedish Migration Board (SMB) permit database, 25 May 2011; Swedish Statistical Office (SCB) total employment by occupation, 2009; Swedish PES (*Arbetsförmedlingen*) Occupational Barometer.

these occupations are taken up by rejected asylum seekers. On the other hand, if these occupations are in businesses where Swedish workers are unlikely to be employed – especially ethnic restaurants or businesses, where low-skilled Swedish workers are not perfect substitutes for immigrants – then labour migration into surplus elementary occupations may reflect the evolution and expansion of ethnic enterprises. The question then becomes whether expansion in the future will continue to be biased in favour of low-skilled jobs, a trend which is at odds with that of the economy as a whole.

Do occupations for which there are numerous recruits from abroad have a large retiring cohort?

Information on exits (to retirement, unemployment or other) from occupations might provide one indicator of demand. Since these data were not available for this analysis, another possibility is to look at age cohorts within the top occupations into which labour migrants are recruited, to see if retiring cohorts are large. In Sweden, the age distribution is skewed towards younger workers in the top-5 occupations into which labour migrants are recruited (Figure F.1). Only *helpers in restaurants* is not skewed towards younger workers (Figure F.1,

Panel E). These do not seem to be occupations where retiring cohorts are driving demand for new workers. However, particularly for lesser-skilled jobs, immigrants may be recruited into occupations which are being vacated by *younger* workers or are less attractive to them.

This is even clearer when the four-digit occupations are examined (Figure F.2). For cleaners, and to some extent for cooks, there are large older cohorts in the occupation, but for the other occupations the age distribution skews towards younger workers.

Focus on IT specialists and comparison with other countries

The main occupation for which Sweden recruits from abroad – excluding seasonal work – is computer programmers. This occupation also represents a significant part of flows in other OECD countries. The United States Government Accountability Office (US GAO, 2011) conducted a similar analysis for the principal occupations for H-1B temporary skilled employment visa holders. The GAO found that H-1B flows added a substantial part to the IT workforce (an average of 3% from 2004-08). Some of these were short stays, but most H-1B holders stay for an extended period. Given the limited entries into the domestic IT workforce (which is largely composed of older workers), H-1B inflows represent a significant part of annual entries into the sector.

In 2009, in Sweden, there were about 92 000 “Computer professionals”.³ About 2 200 computer specialists entered Sweden as labour migrants in that year, equivalent to about 2.4% of total employment in the occupation. However, entries may be for short-term employment. Nonetheless, Table 6.4 gives a rough idea of the extent to which labour migration is providing labour to the IT industry in Sweden and several other countries for which similar data are available.

The inflow rate of IT specialists in Nordic countries and in the United States, countries for which roughly comparable data are available, is much smaller than total employment (1.4-2.6% in 2009). Comparing inflows of foreign workers with the stock of employment, however, conceals the extent to which labour migration is providing *entries* into the occupation. While it is not possible to obtain inflow data, foreign workers represent a much larger proportion of new entries into the occupation. The flows in Table 6.4 do not distinguish between short-term and long-term stays, so it is impossible to measure the total contribution of foreign workers to employment. In the Nordic countries, many stays are short-term, so the inflows do not contribute much to the permanent workforce in the occupation. In Sweden, some IT workers may stay for a longer period. Of those who arrived in early 2009, for example, about 30% still held a valid work permit in the occupation after two years. If this is indicative of the stay rate, labour migrants will represent a significant part of new entries into IT occupations in Sweden.

Table 6.4. **Inflow of IT specialists/Computer experts**

	2008	2009	2010	As a percentage of total employment in the occupation (2009)
Sweden		2 202	2 208	2.4%
Denmark	568	1 096	911	2.5%
Norway	1 274	955	616	1.5%
United States (H-1B) (FY)	58 074	29 793		1.4%

Note: Norway: inflows in “Consulting related to ICT”. Denmark: inflows of IT specialists, stock employed in codes 213, 312. Statistics Denmark occupation codes 213, 312. Sweden: total employment from SCB using SSYK3 codes 213,312. United States: FY, H1B flows. The GAO (2010) compares flows to “Systems analysts, programmers and other computer workers”. Using the corresponding BLS code (15-1000), the figure for 2008 is 1.7% (2.8% according to GAO which does not report the classification used).

Source: National statistics.

A better method to evaluate the relative importance of labour migration for specific occupations is to measure it against forecasts job creation and replacement. Some indication of this is possible in the United States, where the Bureau of Labor Statistics (BLS) provides a forecast of demand. For the computer-related workers in Table 6.4, the BLS forecasts an average annual need for about 60 000 new workers between 2009 and 2018. This suggests that the H-1B visa has been bringing foreign workers equivalent to between half and all of the demand for new employment in computers.

One reason for which the BLS forecasts this level of demand in the profession is the relatively high age of workers in the occupational category. The same is not true in Sweden, where the age distribution of computing professionals is skewed towards younger workers (Figures F.1 and F.2). Inflow into this occupation through labour migration does not seem to be driven by replacement of retiring cohorts. Still, the Swedish employment service forecasts that departures from this occupation will rise from about 1 100 to 1 400 annually in the next few years (no forecasts on entries are made). The short average duration of stay by computer professionals – about six months – and the prevalence of intra-corporate transfers may reflect that labour migration in this occupation is meeting specific and occasional demands for technical services by businesses in Sweden and for just-in-time specialised skills by multinational enterprises, rather than long-term employment needs. On the other hand, it may reflect rotation of lower cost programmers from abroad. Recruitment patterns and salaries – for foreign workers and for residents – in this occupation should be monitored more closely to understand what is driving this mobility.

Do small businesses have equal access to recruitment from abroad?

As mentioned above, one challenge in labour migration systems is ensuring that all employers have equal access to recruitment from abroad and this may be a particular challenge for small firms. The reform in Sweden has increased the number of small firms hiring labour migrants, and increased the number of firms using the system to apply for small numbers of workers. This reflects in part the greater number of “ethnic” restaurants recruiting migrants. It is less clear if small businesses outside the hospitality sector are able to access recruitment, and if small businesses owned by Swedish employers without access to an immigrant network are equally able to find workers abroad.

Efficiency: procedures in practice

The openness of a migration policy is not measured only in terms of the possibility to recruit, but also in terms of the chance that an application will be approved, the duration of the process, and the direct and indirect costs of applying. The next section examines the Swedish procedures and compares them to those in other OECD countries.

Rejection rate

Rejection rates are low in Sweden. The rejection rate of first-permit applications over the 2009-11 period was less than 11% (Table 6.5). In 2009-10, with the introduction of the new system and an economic downturn in Sweden, the rejection rate rose above 7% (or 10.8% if seasonal work permits are excluded). The rejection rate, excluding seasonal permits, has remained at 9-10% in 2010-11. However, this represents a substantial increase compared with the 5-6% average rejection rate observed in the two years before the reform was introduced.

Table 6.5. **Acceptance and refusal of permit applications, first permits (primary and family), 2005-11**

Decision	2005	2006	2007	2008	2009	2010	2011 (to 25 May)	Total
Granted	7 338	7 965	11 131	16 282	12 906	16 174	10 563	82 359
Refused	623	680	688	896	1 560	1 608	1 149	7 204
Total	7 961	8 645	11 819	17 178	14 466	17 782	11 712	89 563
Refusal rate	7.8%	7.9%	5.8%	5.2%	10.8%	9.0%	9.8%	8.0%

Source: Swedish Migration Board (SMB). Seasonal workers, for whom the refusal rate is almost 0%, are excluded in 2009-11.

The increase in the rejection rate following the change in the Swedish system is not easy to explain. Because no occupation data are available for rejected applications, it is not possible to examine the rejection rate by occupation. An examination of employer names, however, suggests that a significant part of the increase was due to applications from a limited number of employers – cultural or social organisations, or small enterprises in services – filing bundles of applications together, and having all the requests rejected as not credible. Such applications, as well as those by small businesses employing workers in less skilled jobs, were not often filed under the old system, which discouraged such attempts.

Between 2005 and 2009, the rejection rate for those resubmitting an application after their first application was refused was 44%. For those who were accepted, renewals were easier: the rejection rate for subsequent applications – returns, renewals and extensions – was only 1.2%.

On-line filing since the reform was used in 38% of the cases, a slight increase compared to the past. The acceptance rate for on-line applications (96%) is slightly higher than for those filed on paper (90%).

The SMB provided the reason for rejecting permit applications for a subset (about half) of the rejected applications post-2009 (Table 6.6). The

Table 6.6. Rejection of permit applications in 2009–25 May 2011, by reason

Method	Code	Number	%
Deficient employment conditions	Z1	633	28.7
Overall assessment	Z4	631	28.6
Other reasons	Ö	369	16.7
Employer not completed on form	Z6	318	14.4
Community preference not fulfilled	Z2	139	6.3
Missing passport	Z5	48	2.2
More than two grounds	U	43	2.0
Unclear identity	OI	12	0.5
Lack of higher education credits	Z3	6	0.3
Conditions of conduct not fulfilled	V	2	0.1
Age conditions not fulfilled	Å	2	0.1
Other reasons + Unclear identity	ÖI	1	0.1
	Total	2 204	100
<i>Unknown reason for refusal</i>		2 165	
Total		4 369	

Source: Swedish Migration Board (SMB) permit database, 25 May 2011.

main reasons were insufficient contractual conditions – *i.e.* insufficient wages for the occupation or insufficient hours to meet the minimum standard – and overall assessment – *i.e.* a general evaluation which found the application patently unfounded. Each of these represented 29% of the rejections for which the motivation was reported.

The rejection rate for large businesses is much lower than those for small businesses. Using the employer name database, it is possible to estimate rejection rates for applications filed. Large Swedish multinationals have a rejection rate of less than 1% prior to the reform, and even lower after. Well-known IT consultancies also had rejection rates of less than 1%. Most of the rejected applications were sponsored by small businesses, associations and individuals. While the nationality and country of birth of the owner of the sponsoring business is unknown, it appears from the names of the business that rejections are concentrated in small businesses often operated by immigrants: restaurants, cleaners, newspaper kiosks. Small restaurants had a rejection rate of about 15% under the old system, and about 11% under the new system. Massage parlours had a rejection rate of about 15%. The rejection rate is also high for religious groups, associations, clubs and NGOs. Individuals also had a higher-than-average rejection rate.


Rejection rates: an international comparison

One indicator of the openness of labour migration systems is the acceptance and rejection rate for applications. This is quite variable among permit categories and between countries (Figure 6.5). These figures, however, mask whether employers are discouraged from applying in the first place. A high rejection rate may also reflect a low threshold for application (*e.g.* simple applications and no or low fees), or it may reflect unclear regulations. Economic circumstances will also affect rejection rates; the high rejection rate in Spain, for example, is related to the poor employment situation in 2010. Sweden, where the rejection rate is on average about 9% for non-seasonal work, is around the average.

Processing time and costs

The average processing time for an application is around three to four weeks. All parties involved in the process acknowledge an increased efficiency and reduced processing time post-2008 compared with the previous system, at least until 2010. A rise in the number of applications in 2010 and early 2011, on the other hand, led to an increase in processing time, from a median of 30 days in 2010 to 42 days in 2011 (Figure 6.6). More significantly, in 2011 one in four first work-permit applications took more than 100 days to be processed. Processing times for permits for family members of workers are longer.

Figure 6.5. Rejection rates for different work visas/permits, 2010




Note: Figures for the Netherlands and Sweden are for 2009. Sweden excludes agricultural labourers (for whom the rejection rate is less than 1%). HS: High Skilled. WP: Work Permit. GC: “Green Card”. Dom: Domestic. SM: Skilled Migrant. WTR: Work to Residence. RSE: Regional Sponsor. EB2/3: Permanent Residence for Employment. Hungary: first permits and renewals. Germany: rejection rate for first permits and renewals, only at Employment Agency, effective rate for work permits is much higher.

Source: National authorities.

Figure 6.6. Distribution of processing time, applications for first work permits, 2005-11

The box shows the range in which *the middle 50%* of applications are processed.
The thick line indicates the median.



Note: Data exclude seasonal permits in 2009-11.


Source: Swedish Migration Board (SMB), 25 May 2011.

A large number of permits are processed very quickly: in 2009, one in four permits was issued in less than seven days. In 2010, a quarter of applications were processed in less than 11 days. In the first half of 2011, this rose to 17 days. Processing time can be reduced either through the use of immigration consultants – private agencies handling procedures – or by large enterprises with frequent recourse to foreign workers. In both cases, applications are pre-screened by the agency and employer, and bundled for faster processing. These consultants and enterprises also enjoy direct contacts with the SMB office processing the application which provides more rapid turn-around and a channel to quickly resolve questions or supply missing documents.

There is a significant difference in processing time according to how the application is filed – whether on-line or with a paper application – and the category of application. If all the documents are in order and the online application system has been used, processing times in 2009-10 were just 3-4 weeks (Figure 6.7), although this rose to more than 40 days in 2011. Paper filing takes much longer, at least twice as long for work applications and as much as four times as long for applications for a permit by family members of primary applicants.

Figure 6.7. Average processing time by permit and application types, 2005-11, in days

Light bars indicate 2005-08; dark bars indicate 2009-11



Source: Swedish Migration Board (SMB), 25 May 2011.


Processing times: a comparative analysis

In addition to other obstacles, hiring a worker from abroad implies extra time for processing the application and approval and often the payment of fees. While the time to process an employer's application to recruit a worker from abroad in Sweden is lower than that in most other countries (Figure 6.8), for Swedish employers it does add a month to the hiring time compared with hiring locally. The labour market test (LMT) in Sweden, at ten working days, is one of the shorter LMT periods imposed, although many countries do not impose a LMT at all. The longest LMT is in the United States for applications for permanent residence, although most applicants are already in the United States under a different visa – often the H-1B visa – and employed by their sponsor.

The figure does not capture the total time an employer is likely to have to wait in many countries. Sweden, like most countries without a cap, allows continuous applications throughout the year. For a number of countries in Figure 6.9, however, there are calendar constraints on applications, as mentioned above, with a cap which may run out in a matter of weeks, as was the case for H-1B visas in the United States in the mid-2000s, or in a matter of seconds, as was the case in Italy in 2011. In these countries, wait times will be longer than processing times for many employers, as they must delay their applications until quotas are opened.


In general, the processing time for seasonal workers is less than for other workers (Figure 6.9).

Figure 6.8. Minimum processing time, in days, work permits with a job offer, selected OECD countries, 2010



Note: HS: High Skilled. WP: Work Permit. GC: “Green Card”. Dom: Domestic. SM: Skilled Migrant. WT: Work to Residence. RSE: Regional Sponsor. EB2/3: Permanent Residence for Employment. TFW: Temporary foreign worker. Sweden: 75% of permits are processed in more than the “minimum” time. United Kingdom: time for processing 65% of applications (commitment). New Zealand: 63% are processed by the time shown. Australia: Median processing time. “Average (Total)” refers to average processing time, where available.

Figure 6.9. **Minimum processing time, in days, seasonal work permits, selected OECD countries, 2010**



Note: SWP: Seasonal Work Permit. RSE: Registered Seasonal Employer. Sweden and Spain are the average processing time.


Fees: a comparative analysis

Another potential obstacle to recruitment lies in the fees levied by governments, whether paid by the worker or by the employer. Where fees are imposed on –and effectively borne by – the employer, these may represent a disincentive to hiring from abroad. High fees on applicants may make the country less attractive to workers.

The cost of obtaining a work permit varies across the OECD and according to the type of work permit (Figure 6.10). In many OECD countries, fees are applied on a cost-recovery basis, and are intended to cover the operating costs related to administering immigration services and enforcement. In most cases, fees are below USD 700, a fraction of the annual salary to be earned by the worker, and do not represent a major disincentive to long-term recruitment.

Most fees, whether for workers or employers, do not depend on the salary paid. France and Israel are the only OECD countries in which the fee is related to wages. For salaried workers, France imposes a fee of EUR 70 on the worker and an employer levy equivalent to 60% of one month's salary, up to 2.5 times the minimum wage; the maximum a French employer has to pay is about USD 4 500, for a worker earning more than USD 7 700 monthly. In Israel, fees on employers are meant to discourage hiring construction and agricultural workers from abroad, and are consequently very onerous: for the former, the entry fee is about USD 4 900, and a 15% levy on gross wages is taken every month. For agricultural workers, the fee is USD 450 for entry, and the levy is 10% of gross wages per month. Israel has increased fees in

Figure 6.10. **Comparative permit costs, non-seasonal work permits/visas, by type, 2010**
In USD




Note: HS: High Skilled. WP: Work Permit. GC: “Green Card”. Dom: Domestic. SM: Skilled Migrant. WTR: Work to Residence. RSMS: Regional Sponsor. EB2/3: Permanent Residence for Employment. TFW: Temporary foreign worker. For most countries, consular visa fees are not included (e.g. for European Schengen countries, the EUR 60 standard visa fee is not included, nor are consular visa fees for Australia and New Zealand). France: calculated range using 2011 SMIC. Israel: calculated using 2009 average wage in agriculture and construction.

an attempt to encourage employers to hire domestically, but the main effect has been to push employers to recover their costs through illegal employment practices (OECD, 2011). The only other OECD country where fees are used to discourage the hiring of foreign workers is the United States with respect to the H-1B and L1 visas. Businesses which are considered “dependent” on these visas pay a higher fee than other applicants.⁴ The United States also charges a levy to employers using the H-1B programme – between USD 750 and 1 500 – specifically to subsidise training courses for US workers and offset supposed negative effects.

In Australia, employer-nominated and regional-sponsored migrants, who are selected on the basis of a job offer in a skilled occupation or by a region based on their occupation, pay fees according to their English skills. Those who do not speak English pay about USD 7 230 more than those who are proficient in English; dependents with poor English skills also pay an additional fee. Other countries with high fees charge them for high-wage jobs (Ireland’s Green Card) or job-search visas for the skilled (Denmark’s Green Card).

Sweden’s fee of SEK 2000, about USD 315, places it among the countries charging lower fees. It is paid by the worker on applying. As such, it is certainly not a factor discouraging employers from hiring from abroad. Sweden applies the same fee for seasonal workers; here, it is in the upper range of seasonal permit fees (Figure 6.11), even if the season is no longer – and often shorter – than in other countries.

Figure 6.11. **Comparative permit costs for seasonal workers, by type, 2010**



Note: SWP: Seasonal Work Permit. SWP-Bilat refers to costs under bilateral agreements. SWP-S: Special Employer. Germany: Croatian workers only. If not indicated here, seasonal costs are usually identical to those for standard work permits.

In conclusion, if there are obstacles to recruitment from abroad in Sweden, they are not to be found in the administrative costs or duration of processing of applications, or in the likelihood of approval. Sweden's system is relatively quick and inexpensive, although performance has deteriorated in early 2011 in response to more applications. As the Swedish system is based on an assumption that Swedish employers will generally prefer to hire locally rather than recruit from abroad, because of higher costs and delays, it does not place major procedural obstacles to recruitment from abroad. Other obstacles outside the scope of action of the authorities may be much more important: for example, the difficulty in identifying suitable candidates abroad; the absence of workers with Swedish language skills; problems in the recognition of foreign qualifications.

Are sufficient safeguards in place?

A final point is whether safeguards are in place against abuse and exploitation of labour migrants. These would consist in verification, before and after arrival, of the legitimacy of the offer and the respect of the conditions of employment.

Post-arrival verification mechanisms

Apart from the verification carried out in connection with the renewal of a work permit there is no formal post-arrival verification mechanism. The system has been criticised by the trade unions arguing that the terms in the offer of employment which is reviewed by the trade union may not be the same terms that apply when the worker arrives in Sweden and takes up employment. Workers have little incentive to report such cases, as it may result in their permit being revoked. While they may be able to contest non-payment of wages in Swedish court, this will not protect them from losing their permit if there are such grounds. The employer is of course expected to follow through on the submitted offer of employment. A work contract can, however, under Swedish law, be renegotiated at any time.

After entry, the inspection system in Sweden is based on trade union oversight. There is no labour inspectorate in Sweden that ensures respect of labour laws. Although Swedish workers are highly unionised (about 68% trade union membership), it is difficult for trade unions to play a role in monitoring employers and workplaces not covered by collective contracts. There is no formal mechanism for oversight, a difficulty recognised by both employers and the trade unions. Under the prior system, trade unions were very restrictive in the applications they approved. The informal veto they formerly held was used to block recruitment by firms in which they had little oversight. Trade unions do attempt to monitor hiring of foreign workers

by employers outside collective contracts; many small employers in hotels and restaurants, gardening, agriculture, forestry and subcontracting to local government are outside of collective contracts. Unions may use high turnover as an indicator of possible poor working conditions, but they have no direct oversight of non-union worksites.

Intra-corporate transfers – a special case

Intra-corporate transfers are held to salary requirements under collective contracts or prevailing wages in the occupation. While the employee is not required to be paid under a Swedish contract, the total compensation package (salary and benefits) be at least equal to the minimum collective agreement, or what is customary within the profession/sector, and must enable the worker to earn his/her own living (in practice at least SEK 13 000 per month).

Most intra-corporate transfers are brought to Sweden for a short duration and receive a salary from their home country. For Indians and other ICTs coming from low-salary countries, for example, the home-country salary is less than the SEK 13 000 in practice required for labour migrants in order to earn their own living, and certainly below the salary required under the Swedish collective contract in the relevant occupation.

Protection against brain waste of qualified immigrants

One recurring issue in the labour market integration of immigrants is overqualification. Immigrants – and those with an immigrant background – tend to have more difficulty finding an appropriate job, and this tends to be more common for the more qualified.

Sweden continues to have a problem with overqualification of its foreign-born population. In 2009, about 38% of employed foreign-born university-educated immigrants were employed in low- or medium-skill jobs, which is 2.2 times the overqualification rate for the native-born (Table 6.7). A recent survey of qualified Swedes of immigrant background (Jusek, 2011) found that 45% of those employed were working in occupations where their skills were not used, or in occupations which did not match their skills. This is not the case for labour migrants who – at least, prior to the reform – had a lower overqualification rate than native-born Swedes. Labour migrants can select among job offers and need not apply for or accept jobs that do not recognise or reward their qualifications.

Workers recruited from abroad may not face the same overqualification issue since they are brought to fill specific positions. A recent audit by the Swedish Auditing Office (Riksrevisionen, 2011) found that recognition of qualifications obtained abroad was a lengthy process (150-170 days, on

Table 6.7. Proportion of employed highly-qualified individuals in low- and medium-skilled jobs in Sweden, by citizenship and migration category (non-EU), 2009

		Percentage	Ratio compared to native-born
Country of birth	Native-born	16.9%	-
	Foreign-born	37.7%	2.2
Citizenship	Swedish	19.0%	1.1
	EU	28.6%	1.7
	Non-EU	47.0%	2.8
Migrant type (non-EU)	Labour	14.1%	0.8
	Family	63.3%	3.7
	Asylum	78.3%	4.6
	Study	34.3%	2.0
	Other	46.4%	2.7

Source: STATIV database, Statistics Sweden, 2009. Highly-qualified individuals have education level ISCED (5/6). Low and medium skilled jobs correspond to occupations 4 to 9 (SSYK one-digit classification).

average) and could be significantly improved. This is certainly a barrier to the employment of professionals (physicians and any other regulated profession), but less of a barrier to international recruitment of skilled workers in unregulated trades. Most skilled workers hired from abroad in Sweden are in fact in unregulated professions.

The situation may be different for foreign graduates from Swedish universities, however, who must quickly find work – in any occupation, as long as it meets the basic requirements in terms of salary and conditions – in order to remain in Sweden. The pressure to find employment may push foreign graduates into the first job they find, rather than the most appropriate match. More than 40% of Swedish graduates have not started working in the six months following graduation;⁵ foreign graduates would have to leave in such a situation. A degree from a Swedish university may not mean language proficiency, and this too would have an effect on employment opportunities.⁶

The large number of students acquiring work permits for low-skilled jobs should raise questions about this channel. Changes in the tuition scheme for third-country nationals may also affect this channel in the future.

Notes

1. If job listings with the PES are infrequent, mandatory PES job advertisement prior to recruitment from abroad may, if recruitment is significant, inflate vacancy data based on PES job listings, with job listings reflect employer intention to recruit from abroad rather than vacancies in general. In the Swedish case, however, the scale of job vacancies is about 50-100 times greater than the number of permit applications, eliminating any such effect,
2. Analysis by more detailed occupational group (Table F.2) confirms the above analysis. Computer systems designers, analysts and programmers are the main group recruited, followed by cooks and helpers in the hospitality industry. Bakers, home-care workers, and hairdressers are all on the increase, while engineers are less often recruited.
3. This is based on the occupational register, and reflects anyone, including foreigners with a permit for at least one year, who worked at least one hour in SSYK3 occupation code 213 in the month of November 2009. The total thus excludes foreign-workers with permits valid for less than 1 year.
4. The higher fee (additional USD 2 000 for each H-1B and 2 250 for each L-1) applies to companies with 50 or more employees in the United States, with more than 50% of their workers in the United States in H-1B or L non-immigrant status.
5. The figures are for 2003, as reported in Statistics Sweden, Focus on Business and Labour Market, Spring 2011, p. 18
6. While the scientific literature in most Swedish university courses includes many English-language texts, most international students are in courses which are nominally taught in Swedish. Still, some courses may be accessible even without Swedish skills, and students may finish their studies with limited Swedish-language skills.

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Chapter 7

Drawing lessons from Sweden's labour migration policy

Sweden provides an example of a country where a sudden easing of restrictions on labour migration has not led to a boom in demand. Most employers still seem to be reluctant to use international recruitment, despite the relatively simple, inexpensive and rapid process. While wages of natives do not appear to have been affected, there is increasing recruitment for low-skilled jobs for which no local shortage is apparent. The transferability of the Swedish system to other countries may be limited due to the characteristics of co-operation among social partners and the Swedish labour market itself.

The new Swedish labour migration system places no restrictions on the occupations for which workers may be recruited from abroad. In addition, the labour market test which is required of employers is a nominal one, involving the advertising of jobs for two weeks, with no obligation to recruit residents of Sweden who respond. The principal requirement is that the wages and working conditions for recruited migrants must be in accordance with Swedish standards. A number of lessons may be drawn from the experience in Sweden since the implementation of this reform.

The first lesson is that a shift from a restrictive system to one driven exclusively by employer demand with a minimal verification that the demand is legitimate does not necessarily lead to an explosion in labour migration. This was not an obvious conclusion, but it does appear to be holding.

The second lesson is that the assumption by the Swedish authorities of a natural preference of employers for locally available employees seems to be borne out by the experience since the introduction of the reform. The Swedish authorities have taken steps to reduce the costs and duration of the procedure, and to make it transparent and simple. Refusal rates are also relatively low. Thus, recruitment from abroad seems a relatively easily accessible alternative to hiring locally. Despite this, inflows of labour migrants have remained relatively modest. Other factors therefore, such as the immediate availability of workers resident in Sweden, language and cultural skills, recognition of qualifications, and other considerations would appear to generally outweigh any perceived advantages in recruiting from abroad.

The assumption that employers will have a natural preference for local workers is predicated on their having to pay labour migrants wages similar to those for comparable workers in Sweden. A number of safeguards are in place to review the wage levels of labour migrants before entry, and most workplaces are monitored by trade unions. This helps ensure that the natural preference of employers for locally available workers is not undercut by lower wages, rent-taking or exploitation. The evidence suggests that wages do not appear to have deteriorated as a consequence of liberalisation. There has been an increase in the number of labour migrants going into low-skill occupations, both from abroad and through the asylum and student channels, and while this is still limited compared to total employment, it should be monitored in the future. This is all the more the case since the incidence of recruitment for such jobs appears to be increasing with each year since the implementation of the reform.

There may be limits, however, to the transferability of the Swedish system. The involvement of trade unions in both the initial evaluation and in enforcement of labour law after entry is possible only in an environment in which there is a certain level of trust and history of collaboration among the social partners. The broad coverage of collective bargaining contracts and the presence on-site of union representatives adds a layer to compliance mechanisms. This sort of formal involvement by trade unions in the verification of offered labour contracts and in the post-hiring monitoring of employers who recruit may not be possible in many OECD countries.

Sweden, in the permit-assessment process, collects information which could be used more systematically in diagnosing possible problems downstream. Data on the occupations for which labour migrants enter the country and the wages they receive can be monitored to guarantee that safeguards are indeed working. The collection of data in permit processing and its use in monitoring is a practice that would be transferable to systems in many other countries.

Annex A

Abbreviations

AF	<i>Arbetsförmedling</i> (Swedish PES)
AMV	<i>Arbetsmarknadsverket</i>
AMS	<i>Arbetsmarknadsstyrelsen</i>
BLS	Bureau of Labor Statistics
CiMU	Committee on Circular Migration and Development
EU/EEA	European Union/European Economic Area
EU/EFTA	European Union/European Free Trade Association
EURES	European Public Employment Service
FYE	Full-year equivalent
ICT	Intra-Corporate transfers
ISCED	International Standard Classification of Education
KAKI	Committee on Labour Migration to Sweden
LMB	Labour Market Board
LMT	Labour Market Test
LO	Swedish Trade Union Confederation
MAC	Migration Advisory Committee
PES	Public Employment Service
SCB	Statistics Sweden
SDP	Social-Democratic Party
SEK	Swedish krona

SMB	Swedish Migration Board
SN	Confederation of Swedish Enterprises (<i>Svenskt Näringsliv</i>)
SOU	Swedish Government Official Reports (<i>Statens offentliga utredningar</i>)
SSYK	Four-digit occupation code
STATIV	Longitudinal database developed by Statistics Sweden for integration studies
TFW	Temporary foreign worker
VHS	<i>Verket för Högskoleservice</i> , Swedish National Agency for Higher Education

Annex B

Characteristics of labour market tests in different countries

**Table B.1. Comparison of labour market tests in different countries
(length and characteristics)**

Country	Programme	Duration (days)	Labour market test characteristics	Shortage list
Australia	Work permit	n.a.	Must attempt to recruit locally. Verification of prevailing wage.	
Belgium	Low-skill work permit	60-135	PES. Only for recruitment under bilateral agreements.	
Canada	TFW NOC 0/A	14	National Job Bank OR "recruitment activities consistent with the practice within the occupation"	
Canada	TFW NOC B	14	National Job Bank AND "recruitment activities consistent with the practice within the occupation"	
Canada	TFW C/D; SAWP	14	National Job Bank AND at least one of: newspapers, community and/or internet.	
Czech Republic	Work permit	30	PES	
Denmark	Work permit	n.a.	Job must be full-time (37h/wk), social partners must confirm shortage	
France	Seasonal agricultural	-	Publication with the public employment service	
	Permanent workers	-	Advertise with PES AND apply for discretionary review	
Finland	Permanent workers	14	PES	Y
Germany	Work permit	1-28	PES. Local PES decide on publication time for each request, on average two to four weeks	
Ireland	Work permit	54	Vacancy must be advertised with FÁS/EURES for at least eight weeks AND in local/national newspapers for six days	
Italy	Work permit	21	PES	

Table B.1. **Comparison of labour market tests in different countries (length and characteristics)** *(continued)*

Country	Programme	Duration (days)	Labour market test characteristics	Shortage list
Korea	Employment permit system	3	Listing of at least three days (newspaper) or seven days (public employment service) or one month (other means), following check on unemployment of Koreans in sector.	
Netherlands	Work permit	35	PES (Centre for Work and Income) must approve employer request.	
New Zealand	Recognised seasonal employer	n.a.	Must advertise position locally and take "all reasonable steps" to recruit locally.	
New Zealand	Temporary work permit	14	"Genuine attempt" to recruit suitable resident workers. Bona fides test. 14-day labour market test only for low-skilled jobs.	
Norway	Work permit	n.a.	Labour market assessment (LMA), from the PES (NAV). Exemption for seasonal agricultural quota	
Poland	Work permit	-	PES and local media.	
Portugal	Work permit	30	PES/EURES	
Spain		15	Employers must interview candidates sent by PES although they may reject them.	Y
Slovak Republic	Work permit	30	PES	
Sweden	Work permit	10	PES/EURES	
Switzerland	Work permit	21	Cantonal PES and Federal approval	
Turkey	Work permit	30	PES listing	
United States	H-2A (Agr.)	35	Employer must hire local workers even if they apply during the first half of the foreign worker's contract.	
United States	H-2B (Temp.)		Labour certification following advertisement of job (at least ten days with public agency and three days in private press), and justify any rejection of candidates.	
United States	EB2/3	60	Average LMT time	
United Kingdom	Tier 2 work permit	28	"Resident Labour Market Test" – PES and other advertisements	Y

Note: EURES: European Employment Service. PES: Public employment service. n.a.: Not applicable. (-): Data not available.

Source: National information.

Annex C

Application forms for Swedish work permits and offers of employment

Additional forms at *www.migrationsverket.se/info/1074_en.html*

Received by Swedish mission abroad



149011

Received by Swedish Migration Board

Application for Swedish work permit – for applicants outside Sweden

File number	Initials
-------------	----------

You should use this form if you are not in Sweden when you apply for a work permit and if you are NOT a citizen of the EU/EEA or Switzerland.

If you intend to work longer than three months in Sweden, you must also apply for a residence permit. Note: When you apply for the first time, the main rule is that you should apply for and have the permit granted before you enter Sweden.

If you are going to work in Sweden for less than three months and are required to have a visa, you must also apply for a visa using form MIGR 119031 "Application for Schengen Visa." You must submit your applications for a visa and a work permit to a Swedish mission abroad.

It is important that your application is complete so that the Migration Board can process it as quickly as possible. Processing of your application will be delayed if the Migration Board requires supplementary information afterwards. Therefore, complete the questionnaire on page four carefully and append the documents listed there.

Most applicants are required to pay a fee when they apply for a residence and work permit.

You can apply for a residence and work permit electronically on our website. (You cannot apply for a visa electronically.) More information is available on our website www.migrationsverket.se.

I am applying for a work permit to work as a

- ☐ (state occupation) (CA0)
- ☐ professional athlete/coach (CI)
- ☐ performing artist (CU)

I have a Swedish work permit and wish to extend it to work as a

- ☐ (state occupation) (CAX)
- ☐ athlete/coach (CIX)
- ☐ performing artist (CUX)

☐ I am also applying for a residence permit

I plan to work in Sweden from (YYYY-MM-DD)

until (YYYY-MM-DD)

I plan to arrive in Sweden (YYYY-MM-DD)

Personal details

Last name (family name)		Former last name	
First names (all given names)		Citizenship	Citizenship at birth
Date of birth (year, month, day, Swedish ID digits, if applicable)	Sex ☐ Male ☐ Female	Are any of your relatives applying for a permit with you? (Co-applicants must submit a separate application) ☐ No ☐ Yes	
Place of birth	Country of birth	Mother tongue	
Marital status ☐ Single ☐ Married* ☐ Divorced ☐ De facto spouse ☐ Widow/widower		Other languages	

*Registered partners are considered to be married.

MIGR 149011 rev.2.110131

Passport details

☐ National passport ☐ Other passport (state type)		Passport number
Passport issued by	Date	Valid until
Do you also have a permit to live (stay) in another country? ☐ No ☐ Yes, country:		If yes, state validity dates (starting and ending)

Address in country of origin/residence

c/o	Street address	
Post code and city	Country	
E-mail address	Telephone	

Intended home address in Sweden

c/o	Street address
Post code, city	

Previous contacts with Sweden

Have you applied to enter Sweden before? ☐ No ☐ Yes, year	Have you been in Sweden before? ☐ No ☐ Yes	When were you last in Sweden? From until
--	---	---

Previous stays in other Schengen states

1. Country and dates (from and until)	2. Country and dates (from and until)
3. Country and dates (from and until)	4. Country and dates (from and until)

Husband/wife/de facto spouse – personal details (All co-applicants must complete a separate application)

Last name	Last name at birth	
First names (all)	Sex ☐ Male ☐ Female	Date of birth (year, month, day)
Citizenship	Citizenship at birth	
Current address (street, city and country)		Also applying ☐

Children – personal details (All co-applicants must complete a separate application)

Last name, first name	Date of birth	Citizenship	Also applying
			☐
			☐
			☐
			☐
			☐
			☐

NOTE: Your husband, wife or de facto spouse and children must apply on form MIGR 132011 "Application for permit for family members of employees/visiting researchers/athletes/self-employed persons".

Other information I wish to provide in my case

Address to which I wish the decision to be sent

State the embassy/consulate to which the decision should be sent

--

Remember to complete the questionnaire, which is part of the application**Signature**

I affirm that the information I have provided is true and correct.

Place and date	Signature (for minor children, signature of legal guardian)
----------------	---

For use of the Swedish mission abroad

Application and questionnaire reviewed by
Notes, if any

Questionnaire

Application for Swedish Work Permit – for applicants outside Sweden

Personal details

Last name	First names (all)	File number
Citizenship	Date of birth/Swedish personal identity (ID) number (year, month, day, Swedish ID digits, if applicable)	

Employment in Sweden

Employer/client in Sweden		
Employer contact person		E-mail address
Street address		Telephone
Post code	City	Fax
Workplace address (if other than the above)		
Describe your job duties		
Which employer (in Sweden or abroad) pays your salary?		
What is your monthly salary (before tax)?		How many hours a week will you be working?
Are you paid any other compensation/subsistence/per diem? ☐ No ☐ Yes		If yes, state amount
Do you have housing in Sweden? ☐ No ☐ Yes	If yes, state address	
How did you find out about the job in Sweden? (Skip this question if you are being transferred within a corporation)		

Previous education and employment (Skip this section if you are applying for an extension of your work permit)

Education up to and including upper secondary level	Number of years	Graduation/leaving year
University/college education (state level)		
Vocational training		
Previous employers/clients	Position	Term of employment

Other information you wish to provide in your case

Documents you must append to the application

- ☐ Copy of a passport showing your identity, the dates of validity and any permits to stay in a country other than your country of origin.
- ☐ Receipt showing that you have paid the application fee (only if the application is submitted directly to the Migration Board in Sweden)

You must also append the following documents if you are an**Employee**

- ☐ Offer of Employment (MIGR 232011). Your employer can download the Offer of Employment form from the Migration Board website www.migrationsverket.se

Performing Artist

- ☐ Offer of Employment (MIGR 232011). Your arranger can download the Offer of Employment form from the Migration Board website www.migrationsverket.se
- ☐ Contract specifying artist's fees, tour plan and the dates for the term of the contract. The contract must be signed by you and the arranger.

Professional Athlete/Coach

- ☐ Contract specifying salary and the dates for the term of the contract. The contract must be signed by you and the athletic club.

Inkom utlandsmyndighet/Received by Swedish mission abroad



Inkom Migrationsverket/Received by Swedish Migration Board

232011

Anställningserbjudande/Offer of Employment

Bilaga till "Ansökan om tillstånd för att arbeta i Sverige"/
Annex to "Application for Swedish work permit"

(Används även när personer som är anställda utomlands ska arbeta i Sverige)/
(Also to be used when people who are employed abroad will work in Sweden)

Myndighetens anteckningar/The authority's notes	
Dossiernummer	Signatur

OBS! Läs de gula rutorna innan du fyller blanketten

Anställningserbjudandet fylls i av arbetsgivare i Sverige som erbjuder arbete till personer som är medborgare i ett land utanför EU/EES och Schweiz. Formuläret används även när personer som är anställda utomlands ska utföra arbete för en uppdragsgivare i Sverige. Uppdragsgivaren här i landet ska underteckna och försäkra att uppgifterna är riktiga.

Anställningserbjudandet är en del av arbetstagarens ansökan om tillstånd för att arbeta i Sverige och ska användas vid första ansökan och vid ansökan om förlängning. Uppgifterna är en förutsättning för att Migrationsverket ska kunna pröva ansökan. **Det är därför viktigt att blanketten är komplett ifyllt.** Det innebär bland annat att arbetsgivaren ska ha med ett yttrande från den berörda fackliga organisationen, det vill säga den organisation som organiserar det aktuella yrket. Om verket måste begära in kompletterande uppgifter fördröjs handläggningen.

Anställningserbjudandet ska skickas till arbetstagaren som sedan ska bifoga det till sin ansökan. Arbetstagaren kan ansöka om uppehålls- och arbetstillstånd elektroniskt på vår webbplats. En komplett elektronisk ansökan prioriteras på så sätt att handläggningstiden blir kortare.

Om anställningserbjudandet gäller flera personer med samma arbetsvillkor och arbetsuppgifter ska en huvudperson anges på detta formulär och övriga på en separat lista, blanketten "Namnlista", nr 234011.

OBS! Huvudregeln är att arbetstagaren första gången ska ansöka om och få tillståndet beviljat innan han eller hon reser in i Sverige.

Mer information finns på vår webbplats www.migrationsverket.se.

Uppgifter om arbetstagaren/Details of employee

Efternamn/Last name (family name)		Förnamn (samtliga)/First names (all given names)	
Medborgarskap/Citizenship	Födelsedatum (ev. personnummer)/Date of birth (YYYY-MM-DD, Swedish personal identity ID number if applicable)	Kön/Sex ☐ Man/Male ☐ Kvinna/Female	
Examen/utbildning (ange i klartext)/Degree/education (plain explanation)			
Arbetserbjudandet gäller/The Offer of Employment includes (antal) personer/(number of) persons		☐ Ansökan omfattar flera personer. Jag bifogar blanketten Namnlista/This application includes several persons and the form Namnlista is attached	

Uppgifter om arbetsgivaren/uppdragsgivaren i Sverige/Details of the employer/client in Sweden

Företagets namn/Company name		Gatuadress/Street address	
Postnummer och ort/Post code and city		Organisationsnummer/Corporate identification number	
Kontaktperson/Contact person	Telefon/Telephone no	Mobiltelefon/Mobile no	
e-postadress/e-mail address			

Anställningserbjudande/Offer of employment

2

Uppgifter om arbetet/Details of the job

Här ska du beskriva och uppgge den Yrkesklassificering som arbetet har. Yrkesklassificeringskoden (SSYK) ska ha minst tre siffror. Du hittar SSYK-koder i <u>Statistiska centralbyråns (SCB) yrkesregister/See Statistics Sweden Schedule of Codes</u>	
Yrkesklassificering/Occupation Classification	
Yrke i klartext/Occupation (plain explanation)	SSYK-kod (minst tre siffror)/SSYK-code (at least three figures)
Beskrivning av arbetsuppgiften/Description of the job	

Uppgifter om anställningen/Details of the employment

Här ska du ange om personen är anställd i Sverige eller utomlands samt under vilken tid anställningen/uppgiftet pågår. Om det är frågan om en nyrekrytering ska du också ange hur och när du annonserade tjänsten samt uppgge referensnummer eller ID-nummer för annonsen. Om du inte har annonserat tjänsten ska du ange varför.	
Anställda i Sverige/Employees in Sweden	
Anställningen avser (Ange datum AAAA-MM-DD)/The employment concerns (state date YYYY-MM-DD)	
☐ Tillsvidareanställning från och med/Permanent employment from ☐ Tidsbegränsad anställning från och med/Fixed-term employment from till och med/until	
Ange var och när arbetet har annonserats/The job was advertised in the, date	Annons-ID (Platsbanken) eller referensnummer (EURES)/Advertise-ID (Platsbanken) or referens number (EURES)
Om arbetet inte annonserats, ange varför/if not advertised, state the reason	
Anställda utomlands/Employees outside Sweden	
☐ Anställning hos en arbetsgivare utanför Sverige som ingår i samma koncern som företaget i Sverige från och med/Employment with an employer outside Sweden performing work for a Swedish client/employer Den utländska arbetsgivarens namn/Name of the foreign employer Arbetet beräknas pågå från och med/Fixed-term employment from till och med/until	
☐ Anställning hos en arbetsgivare utanför Sverige och utför arbete åt en svensk uppdragsgivare/arbetsgivare från och med/Employment with an employer outside Sweden performing work for a Swedish client/employer Den utländska arbetsgivarens namn/Name of the foreign employer Arbetet beräknas pågå från och med/Fixed-term employment from till och med/until	
För kulturarbetare/artister	
OBS! Kulturarbetare och artister ska bifoga underskrivet kontrakt och turnéplan./NOTE: Cultural workers and artists must attach signed contract and tour plan.	
☐ Antal faktiska arbetsdagar (gäller endast för kulturarbetare och artister)/Number of actual working days (only for cultural workers and artists) dagar/days	

Anställningserbjudande/Offer of employment

3

Uppgifter om anställningsvillkor/Details on terms of employment

Här ska du ange uppgifter om arbetets omfattning i procent, grundlön per månad, eventuella tillägg och trakamenten samt den sammanlagda inkomsten per månad. Du ska här också ange om företaget har kollektivavtal och vilket fackförbund som företaget i så fall har tecknat kollektivavtal med samt datum då avtalet undertecknades.

Lön och arbetets omfattning/Salary and extent of work (%)			
Arbetet är heltid (100%) / The job is full-time (100%)			
Grundlön före skatt (kr/månad) / Base salary before tax (SEK/month)	Eventuella OB-tillägg (kr/månad) / Any supplement for inconvenient hours	Eventuellt trakamente (kr/månad) / Any allowances for expenses (SEK/month)	Sammanlagd inkomst/månad / Total income (SEK/month)
Arbetet är deltid (ange % av heltid) / the job is part-time (indicate % of full-time)			
Omfattning % / Extent %	Grundlön före skatt / Base salary before tax (SEK/month)	Eventuella OB-tillägg / Any supplement for inconvenient hours (SEK/month)	Eventuellt trakamente / Any allowances (SEK/month)
			Sammanlagd inkomst/månad Total income (SEK/month)

Kollektivavtal/Collective agreement

Omfattas den sökande av kollektivavtal? / Is the applicant covered by a collective agreement

☐ Ja/Yes, ange det fackförbund kollektivavtalet är tecknat med / If you answer yes, state the union the collective agreement is signed with från och med / from (datum/date)

☐ Nej/No

Uppgifter om anställningsvillkor, fortsättning/ Details on terms of employment, continued

För att Migrationsverket ska kunna bevilja arbetstillstånd måste arbetsgivaren ha ett försäkringsskydd som lägst motsvarar det som finns i svenska kollektivavtal. Svenska kollektivavtal innehåller nedan listade försäkringsområden. Här ska du ange vilket/vilka bolag du tecknat försäkringar med. Endast i de fall det inte går att teckna försäkring innan den sökande kommit till Sverige ska du ange det bolag du avser att teckna försäkring med. Ange då orsak under "Övriga upplysningar".

Försäkringar som finns eller som jag kommer att teckna när arbetstagaren kommer till Sverige/ Insurances available or that I will take out when the employee arrives in Sweden

Ange arbetstagarens försäkringsskydd och försäkringsbolag / State the employee's insurance cover and insurance company

Finns/ Available	Ska tecknas/ Will be taken out	
☐	☐	Sjukförsäkring hos / Health insurance with
☐	☐	Trygghetsförsäkring vid arbetsskada hos / Insurance for occupational injury with
☐	☐	Livförsäkring hos / Life insurance with
☐	☐	Tjänstepensionsförsäkring hos / Pension insurance with

Övriga upplysningar

Övriga upplysningar/Other information

Underskrift av arbetsgivare/uppdragsgivare/Signature of employer/client

Här ska du som arbetsgivare/uppdragsgivare försäkra att de uppgifter som du har lämnat är riktiga. Anställningserbjudandet ska skickas till arbetstagaren som sedan bifogar det till sin ansökan.

Jag försäkrar att de uppgifter jag lämnat är riktiga / I declare that the information I have provided is accurate

Ort och datum/Place and date

Namnteckning/Signatur

Namnförtydligande/Printed name

Yttrande från berörd facklig organisation/Opinion from relevant union

Yttrandet är en del av anställningserbjudandet. Det är arbetsgivaren som i första hand ska skaffa yttrandet från den fackliga organisationen. Organisationen bedömer om de erbjudna anställningsvillkoren är i nivå med de villkor som följer av kollektivavtal eller praxis inom yrket eller branschen.

Om arbetsgivaren ber om yttrandet ska anställningserbjudandet skickas tillbaka till arbetsgivaren som skickar det vidare till arbetstagen. Det är arbetstagen som ansöker om tillståndet. Om Migrationsverket ber om yttrandet ska det skickas tillbaka till Migrationsverket.

Uppgifter om den fackliga organisationen/Details of the union

Organisation/Name of the organization	
Kontaktperson/Contact person	Telefonnummer/Telephone number

Den fackliga organisationens yttrande/The trade union's statement

Arbetstagens namn	
Uppgift om kollektivavtal/Details about collective agreement ☐ Arbetsgivaren har tecknat kollektivavtal med/The employer has signed a collective agreement with (ange fackförbund/state union) från och med/from (datum/date)	
Den fackliga organisationens bedömning/The trade union's opinion ☐ Villkoren är <u>inte sämre</u> än de villkor som följer av kollektivavtal eller praxis inom yrket eller branschen/The conditions <u>are not worse</u> than the conditions stipulated under collective agreements or practice within the profession or industry ☐ Villkoren <u>är sämre</u> än de villkor som följer av kollektivavtal eller praxis inom yrket eller branschen/The conditions <u>are worse</u> than the conditions stipulated under collective agreements or practice within the profession or industry.	
Motivering/Statement ☐ Lönen är sämre/The salary is lower Lönenivå enligt avtal/norm är/Salary conditions according to agreement/norm are kr/månad för heltid/SEK/month for full-time ☐ Försäkringar är sämre/Insurances are worse Kommentari/Comment	
☐ Den fackliga organisationen avstår från att yttra sig/The union refrains from commenting Ange orsak/State reason	
Ytterligare kommentarer/Additional comments:	
Underskrift av den fackliga organisationen/Signature of the union	
Ort och datum/Place and date	Facklig representant/Union representative
	Namnförtydligande/Printed name

Bilagor/Attachments

- ☐ Namnlista/Name list
☐ Övrigt/Other

Annex D

STATIV database

The STATIV database is constructed by Statistics Sweden from several administrative data registers in Sweden. It covers the entire population registered as resident in Sweden on the 31st of December of each year. The quality of coverage of the database thus depends on the over- or under-coverage of the population register. Under-coverage of newborns or the over-coverage due to deaths is small, although over-coverage of individuals who left country without de-registering from the public records is somewhat higher (estimated around 35 000 in 2004), but concerns mostly Swedish citizens (SCB, 2011).

A migrant is considered resident in Sweden only when he or she has a valid permit of residence of at least one year of duration on the 31st of December. For the migrant population, thus, STATIV covers those migrants with permits of long-duration (“permanent migrants”), as seasonal workers and those with permits of duration shorter than one year are not considered as resident population in Sweden.

Registered employment corresponds to those individuals judged to have performed at least one hour of work per week during the month of November of each year.

Registered unemployment corresponds to those individuals enrolled as unemployed at the Employment Service on the 31st December of each year.

Gross salary corresponds to the annual gross salary received in Swedish krona (SEK).

Total income corresponds to annual net employment income plus business income in Swedish krona (SEK).

Reference

SCB (2011), *Dokumentation av databasen STATIV*, SCB, Stockholm.

*Annex E***Shortage occupation list for in-country changes in Sweden
(1 April 2011)**

Accountants	Earth-moving and related plant operators
Agricultural- or industrial-machinery mechanics and fitters	Electrical engineers and Electrical technicians
Agronomy and horticultural technicians	Electronics mechanics, fitters and servicers
Architects	Emergency Care nurses
Bakers, pastry-cooks and confectioners	Engineers – heating, plumbing and ventilation
Blacksmiths and forging-press workers	Floor layers
Bookkeepers	Geriatric nurses
Bricklayers, stonemasons and tile setters	IT strategist/ IT analyst
Bus drivers	Locksmiths
Civil engineering technicians	Locomotive-engine drivers
Civil engineers – building and construction	Machine-tool, CNC operators
Civil engineers – electric power	Meat preparers
Civil engineers – Electronics and telecommunications	Mechanical engineering technicians
Civil engineers – Mechanical	Metal moulders
Commercial sales representatives	Midwives
Computer systems designers, analysts and programmers	Mining engineers, metallurgists and related professionals
Concrete worker	Motor vehicle mechanics and fitters
Cooks/Chefs	Motorised farm and forestry plant operators
Crane operators	Nurses – operating room
Dental hygienists	Nurses – pediatric
Dentists	Nurses – psychiatric care
Doctors	Nurses – public health
	Nurses – x-ray

Pharmacists	Ship's engineers
Plumbers	Special education teachers
Preschool teachers	Structural-metal preparers and
Psychologists	erectors
Rail and road construction workers	Surveyors
Roofers	Tool-makers and related workers
Senior high school teacher in	Truck mechanics
vocational subjects	Varnishers and related painters
Sheet-metal worker	Veterinarians
Sheet-metal workers	Welders and flame cutters

*Annex F***Supplementary tables on occupations in Sweden****Table F.1. Permit holders arriving between 1 January 2009 and 25 May 2011 and still holding a valid permit on 25 May 2011, by category of entry, year of entry and occupation**

Category of permit	Year	Occupations on the shortage list		Occupations not on the shortage list			Total
		Skilled	Medium skilled	Skilled	Medium skilled	Elementary	
Workers from abroad	2009	605	700	606	423	258	2 610
	2010	1 812	1 739	1 196	1 206	974	6 928
	2011 (up to 25 May)	1 353	1 171	915	1 248	915	5 607
	<i>Total</i>	3 770	3 610	2 717	2 877	2 147	15 141
Rejected asylum seekers	2009	2	92	8	117	185	403
	2010	2	92	9	193	267	563
	2011 (up to 25 May)	3	35	5	56	106	205
	<i>Total</i>	7	219	22	366	557	1 172
Students changing status	2009	93	7	67	44	151	362
	2010	168	14	83	54	182	502
	2011 (up to 25 May)	151	8	78	19	116	372
	<i>Total</i>	413	28	228	117	449	1 236
Total	2009	700	799	680	585	594	3 376
	2010	1 983	1 845	1 288	1 452	1 422	7 993
	2011 (up to 25 May)	1 507	1 213	998	1 323	1 138	6 184
	<i>Total</i>	4 191	3 857	2 966	3 360	3 154	17 549

Source: Swedish Migration Board (SMB) permit database, 25 May 2011, including SSYK3 codes reallocated to SSYK4 codes, by annual proportion.

Table F.2. **Top occupational group (SSYK4) of recipients of work permits, 2009-11**

SSYK4 Code	Occupational group (SSYK4) * Indicates inclusion in Occupational Barometer	2009	2010	1 Jan 2011- 25 May 2011	Total
2131*	Computer systems designers, analysts & programmers	2 299	1 906	1 053	5 258
5122*	Cooks	965	1 249	798	3 012
9130*	Helpers in restaurants	262	590	478	1 330
9122*	Helpers & cleaners in offices, hotels & other establishments	259	460	411	1 130
3473	Street, nightclub & related musicians, singers & dancers	367	381	235	983
2144*	Electronics & telecommunications engineers	311	297	162	770
7412*	Bakers, pastry-cooks & confectionery makers	125	340	189	654
3474	Clowns, magicians, acrobats & related ass. professionals	285	147	148	580
6112*	Horticultural & nursery growers	143	163	188	494
3114*	Electronics & telecom. engineering technicians	247	163	83	493
5133*	Home-based personal care & related workers	119	210	140	469
3475	Athletes, sports & related ass. professionals	217	202	47	466
2139*	Computing professionals not elsewhere classified	207	140	91	438
5141*	Hairdressers, barbers, beauticians & related	82	137	116	335
2145*	Mechanical engineers	125	127	65	317
9121	Domestic helpers & cleaners	123	166	14	303
7129	Building frame & related trades workers not elsewhere classified	110	88	75	273
2413*	Market research analysts & related professionals	90	105	72	267
3415*	Technical & commercial sales representatives	76	112	75	263
2143*	Electrical engineers	134	71	39	244
6140*	Forestry & related workers	63	56	115	234
4131*	Stock clerks & storekeepers	48	104	75	227
3115*	Mechanical engineering technicians	114	79	26	219
7231*	Motor vehicle mechanics & fitters	56	89	73	218
2149*	Engineers not elsewhere classified	98	72	44	214
2419	Business professionals not elsewhere classified	86	66	46	198
9141	Newspaper & package deliverers	40	88	62	190
2310*	College, university & higher education teaching professionals	55	95	36	186
	<i>Others</i>	2 412	2 828	1 916	7 156
	Total	9 518	10 531	6 872	26 921
9210	Agricultural, fishery and related labourers	7 264	1 173	95	8 532
	Grand Total	16 782	11 704	6 967	35 453

Source: Swedish Migration Board (SMB) permit database, 25 May 2011. Totals are lower than the analysis of SSYK3 occupations because of missing data.


Table F.3. **Inflow by occupation 2009-11, relative to total occupation in 2009 (SSYK4)**

SSYK4 Code	Occupation	Total employment 2009	Entries 2009- 25 May 2011	Entries as % of total employment	Full-year equivalent (FYE)
2131	Comp. sys. design, analysts, programmers	71 445	5 258	7.4%	1 465
5122	Cooks	31 996	3 012	9.4%	912
9130	Helpers in restaurants	57 574	1 330	2.3%	384
9122	Helpers & cleaners in offices, hotels etc.	66 058	1 130	1.7%	480
3473	Street/club etc. musicians, singers & dancers	1 683	983	58.4%	203
2144	Electronics and telecom. engineers	17 818	770	4.3%	335
7412	Bakers, pastry, confectionery makers	4 966	654	13.2%	211
3474	Clowns, magicians, acrobats & rel. ass. profs	99	580	585.9%	203
6112	Horticultural and nursery growers	2 297	494	21.5%	102
3114	Electronics & telecom. eng. technicians	16 902	493	2.9%	230
5133	Home-based personal care & rel. workers	147 995	469	0.3%	158
3475	Athletes, sports & rel. ass. professionals	5 042	466	9.2%	203
	Subtotal	423 875	15 639	3.7%	4 886
	Other	3 501 890	14 502	0.4%	2 284
	Total	3 925 765	30 141	0.8%	7 170

Note: Totals are lower than the analysis of SSYK3 occupations because of missing data.


Source: Swedish Migration Board (SMB) permit database, 25 May 2011.

Figure F.1. Age distribution of employed people in Sweden, by occupation, for the top-5 occupations attracting labour migrants, 31 December 2010 (thousands) – SSYK3



Source: Swedish Statistical Office (SCB), 31 December 2010, SSYK3 occupation codes 213, 214, 512, 912, 913. Top-5 excludes seasonal agricultural labourers.

Figure F.2. Age distribution of employed people in Sweden, by occupation, for the top-5 occupations attracting labour migrants, 31 December 2010 (thousands) – SSYK4



Source: Swedish Statistical Office (SCB), 31 December 2010, SSYK4 occupation codes 2131, 5122, 9130, 9122, 3473 (Entertainers=Street, nightclub and related musicians, singers and dancers). Top-5 excludes seasonal agricultural labourers.

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SWEDEN

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Contents

Assessment and Recommendations (English, French, Swedish)

Chapter 1. Introduction

Chapter 2. Context for labour migration in Sweden

Chapter 3. Migration to Sweden

Chapter 4. The evolution of Swedish labour migration policy

Chapter 5. Impact of the Swedish policy reform

Chapter 6. Evaluating the new Swedish labour migration policy

Chapter 7. Drawing lessons from Sweden's labour migration policy

Related reading

International Migration Outlook (2011)

International Migration Outlook (2009)

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