


# Marginal stability in critical network-economies

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## Context & motivations




The "**Small shocks, large business cycle**" (B.Bernanke, late 2000s chairman of the Fed) puzzle:

- ★ Aggregate (as in summed over firms) volatility however remains very high (US GDP growth since 1950  $\sim 3\% \pm 2.5\%$ )

A host of explanations has emerged:

- ★ Granularity: the fluctuations of entities (firms) with a fat-tailed distrib. do not necessarily average out (X.Gabaix)
- ★ **Propagation of shocks along the supply chain network (Acemoglu, Carvalho et al.)**

Can we have a model accounting for a propagation of shocks along the supply chain network?




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
# Modelisation



We make a distinction between **two kinds of variables**

FAST	SLOW
<ul style="list-style-type: none"><li>★ Prices of goods <math>p_i</math></li><li>★ Production of firms <math>\lambda_i</math></li><li>★ Consumption of households <math>\xi_i</math></li></ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"><li>★ Firm's technology <math>z_i</math></li><li>★ Supplier-buyer network <math>J_{ij}</math></li><li>★ Household preferences <math>\theta_i</math></li><li>★ Available labour <math>V_i</math></li></ul>


**STRATEGY:** study how the fast variables behave depending on the configuration of the slow variables.



## FIRMS

- ★  $n$  firms labelled  $i, j, k, \dots$   $\textcircled{i}$
- ★ Input-output network  $J_{ij}$ : if  $j$  is a supplier of  $i$ ,  $J_{ij} > 0$
- ★ Leontieff production function with technology  $z_i$  and exchanged quantity  $Q_{ij}$


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
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
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## HOUSEHOLD

- ★ 1 representative household (0)
- ★ Work  $J_{i0}$  provided by the household to the firms
- ★ Consumption  $\xi_i$  and preferences  $\theta_i$  for good  $i$  to define log-utility


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


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# Slow variables: the static framework





# Fast variables

In general, we expect some **dynamical evolution** for the fast variables

$$x_i(t+1) = g_i(\{x_j\}, t)$$

Dynamical evolution of prices  $p_i(t)$  and productions  $\lambda_i(t)$ ? Following **rule of thumb**

★ If a firm is profitable, it will increase its output

$$\lambda_i(t+1) = \lambda_i(t) \left( 1 + \beta \frac{P_i(t)}{z_i p_i(t) \lambda_i(t)} \right)$$

where  $P_i(t)$  is the profit of firm  $i$  at time  $t$ .

★ If a firm has excess supply, it will decrease its prices

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# Getting the causality right (1)

We want also to enforce **causality on trades and productions** i.e

- ★ Goods produced at time  $t$  cannot be bought or consumed before time  $t + 1$
- ★ Goods bought at time  $t$  cannot be used for production before time  $t + 1$

This leads to the **drop of the market clearing** hypothesis and the proper **rewriting of profit and surplus**

$$e_i(t) = \overbrace{z_i \lambda_i(t-1)}^{\text{production}} - \overbrace{\sum_j Q_{ji}(t)}^{\text{consumption}}$$
$$P_i(t) = \underbrace{\sum_j p_i(t) Q_{ji}(t)}_{\text{money earned}} - \underbrace{\sum_j p_j(t-1) Q_{ij}(t-1)}_{\text{money spent}}$$

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To enforce our dynamical rules, we need to **evaluate**  $Q_{ji}(t)$ . We do not have any information on the production target of other firms so we need an estimation

$$Q_{ji}(t) = J_{ji} \lambda_j(t) \left( \frac{\lambda_j(t)}{\lambda_j(t-1)} \right)^q, \quad q \in [-1, 1]$$

- ★  $q = -1$ , reverting behaviour,
- ★  $q = 0$ , myopic behaviour,
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Since we enforced causality on trades and productions, the evolution for prices and productions is given by

$$p_i(t+1) = h_i^p(\{p_j, \lambda_j\}, t, t-1; \{\alpha, q, z_j, J_{ij}, \theta_j\}) \quad (1)$$

$$\lambda_i(t+1) = h_i^\lambda(\{p_j, \lambda_j\}, t, t-1; \{\beta, q, z_j, J_{ij}, \theta_j\}) \quad (2)$$

over a fixed configuration of  $z_j, J_{ij}, \theta_j, \alpha, \beta \dots$





## Equilibrium and resilience

# Existence of equilibrium (1)

Does an equilibrium for prices and productions exist? If it does, coincides with the **fixed points of  $h_i^\lambda$  and  $h_i^p$** .

More intuitively, **equilibrium** is reached when both **market clearing** (zero surplus) and **null profit** are fulfilled

$$e_i(t) = 0 \iff M^t \vec{\lambda}_{eq} = \vec{\xi}_{eq}$$

$$P_i(t) = 0 \iff M \vec{p}_{eq} = \vec{V}$$

with  $\vec{V}$  vector of workforce,  $\xi$  vector of consumptions and  $M_{ij} = z_i \delta_{ij} - J_{ij}$ . **Positive solutions** iif  $\epsilon = \phi(\{z_i\}, \{J_{ij}\}) > 0$

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
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
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Quantifying the relaxation time through mathematical analysis

$$\tau_{relax}(\epsilon) \sim \left| \frac{1}{\mu_n(\epsilon)} \right|$$

# Relaxation towards equilibrium for $\epsilon > 0$




# Marginal stability

Marginal stability: **equilibrium exists** but it takes an **infinite** amount of **time** to reach it.

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and  $\tau_{relax}(\epsilon) \rightarrow \infty$  for  $\epsilon \rightarrow 0$




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


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
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- ★ For small  $\epsilon$ , nonresilient economies...
- ★ For small  $\epsilon$ , aftermaths of shocks linger and accumulate for a potentially infinite amount of time.
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## Conclusion

- ★ Here multi-firm ABM  $\longleftrightarrow$  multi-household DSGE-ABM crossover
- ★ Free evolution of supply chain network across time: how does it affect "fast" variables?
- ★ Policy making? Effects on the network (embargo, carbon footprint penalties...), effects on state variables (incentives to buy more from certain firms...)

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


# BACK-UP

$$\begin{aligned} \lambda_i(t+1) &= \lambda_i(t) - \beta \frac{\lambda_i(t)}{z_i p_i(t)} \left( \sum_{j=1}^n J_{ij} p_j(t-1) + V_i \right) \\ &\quad + \frac{\beta}{z_i} \sum_{j=1}^n J_{ji} \lambda_j(t) \left( \frac{\lambda_j(t)}{\lambda_j(t-1)} \right)^q + \beta \frac{\mu \theta_i}{z_i p_i(t)} \\ p_i(t+1) &= \alpha \frac{p_i(t)}{z_i \lambda_i(t)} \left( \sum_{j=1}^n J_{ji} \lambda_j(t) \left( \frac{\lambda_j(t)}{\lambda_j(t-1)} \right)^q + \frac{\mu \theta_i}{p_i(t)} \right) \\ &\quad + p_i(t) \left( 1 - \alpha \frac{\lambda_i(t-1)}{\lambda_i(t)} \right) \end{aligned}$$

with  $V_i = p_0 J_{i0}$  and  $\mu = \frac{1}{\sum_i \theta_i}$ .

# Relaxation towards equilibrium



**Figure:** Simulation for  $n = 100$  firms on a 3-regular network (3 neighbours),  $\alpha = 0.01$  and  $\beta = 0.05$ ,  $q = 1$ .

# Phase separation in parameter space

