

Box I.8. Linguistic competence and integration into the labour market*Theme box on the Integration of Immigrants*

Proficiency in the language of the host country is an essential factor in the successful integration of immigrants into the labour market. This facilitates communication at the workplace and is a condition of access to the information network (access to job vacancies, social exchanges, labour laws...). The acquisition of linguistic skills is dependant on numerous elements, such as the length of stay, age at the time of migration, the level of educational attainment of the migrant and his/her parents, whether or not there is a large ethnic group in the area of residence or whether there is any link between the mother tongue and the language of the host country. (see for example Dustman, 1994, in Germany; Carliner, 1995, in the United States; Chiswick and Miller, 2000, in Canada; Shields and Price, 2001, in the United Kingdom; Chiswick, Lee and Miller in Australia).

Since the pioneer work of Reimers (1983) and Grenier (1984), up to the more recent studies undertaken by Chiswick and Miller (2002), most studies identify a significant and positive impact, on a comparable scale, of the effects of linguistic competence on employment and the conditions of pay.¹ However, all things being equal, it must be noted that immigrants capable of expressing themselves, who are able to write and understand the language of the host country, will receive a salary of at least 10% higher than those who lack these competencies. This result is confirmed if we take into consideration the bias of selective recruitment and the problems of evaluating linguistic ability. In the case of Israel, several studies present estimations of salary differences of over 20% (*e.g.* Berman *et al.*, 2000; Chiswick, 1998). Besides, mastering the language of the host country seems equally to facilitate access to the labour market as well as positions of responsibility (Minns, 1999; Miller and Neo, 1997; Koussoudji, 1988).

Linguistic competence exerts, nevertheless, an impact of a certain importance according to gender (*i.e.* notably in the case of women – Shields and Price, 2001; Beiser and Hou, 2000; Chiswick and Miller, 1999), depending on the origin of the immigrants (*e.g.*, more notably for Cubans and Portoricans than for Mexicans in the United States – Reimers, 1983), according to level of education (*i.e.* illustrating a phenomenon of complementarity between education and linguistic competence – Chiswick and Miller, 2002), relative to the place of residence (*i.e.* higher in urban areas than in rural zones – McManus, 1990) or relative to the size of the ethnic group (*i.e.* decrease in importance when the ethnic group is a large one; MacManus, 1990). Finally, some authors find that familiarity in speaking the language is more important than competency in reading and writing (Chiswick, 1991), while some place a high emphasis on the role of writing (Gonzales, 2000; Dustman, 1994) other recognise the cross-effect (*e.g.* the necessity of reading and speaking well – Chiswick and Miller, 1999).

1. Hayfron (2001) in the case of Norway as well as Cornelius and Tsuda (2002) for Japan are, to our knowledge, the only two studies which do not find a link between the linguistic competence of immigrants and their labour market performance. The representative element of the data used in these two studies must, however, be viewed with caution.

several countries of East and South-East Asia and are based on information collected within the framework of the Annual Workshop on international migration and the labour market (Tokyo 4-5 February 2002). This workshop was organised by the Japanese authorities with the participation of the ILO and the OECD. Concerning migration in Central and Eastern Europe, the focus is on trends in migrations flows from and in this region as well as on the impact of the EU enlargement on migration.

1. Recent developments in migration flows within East and South-East Asia⁶

a) Background and major recent trends

The fragility of East and Southeast Asian economies was revealed in the aftermath of the terrorist

attacks on the World Trade Center in New York on September 11 2001. Just as they appeared to be recovering from the effects of the 1997 Asian financial crisis, these economies were once again thrust into an environment of declining regional and global demand. There are, of course, significant variations but most Asian economies had resumed growth by 1999 and several, including Hong Kong, Singapore, Korea and Malaysia had achieved rapid growth by 2000 (see Table I.19). Then came a rapid reversal. In 2001, Singapore was in its first recession since independence; Hong Kong, too, experienced negative growth and Japan, which had never really recovered from the collapse of its bubble economy in 1989, was in full recession. Even Chinese Taipei, which had avoided the worst effects of the Asian financial crisis, appears to be entering a period of slower growth. Only Korea may be on a more sustained course to recovery.

Table I.19. **Real GDP growth in selected Asian countries and in Australia, 1996-2001**

	Percentages					
	1996	1997	1998	1999	2000	2001
Chinese Taipei	6.1	6.7	4.6	5.4	5.9	-1.9
Hong Kong (China)	4.5	5.0	-5.3	3.0	10.5	0.1
Japan	3.5	1.8	-1.1	0.7	2.4	-0.4
Korea	6.8	5.0	-6.7	10.9	9.3	3.0
Singapore	7.7	8.5	-	6.9	10.3	-2.0
Indonesia	8.0	4.5	-13.2	0.9	4.8	3.3
Malaysia	10.0	7.3	-7.4	6.1	8.3	0.4
Philippines	5.8	5.2	-0.5	3.3	4.0	3.4
Thailand	5.9	-1.4	-10.8	4.4	4.6	1.8
China	9.6	8.8	7.1	7.8	8.0	7.3
Vietnam	9.3	8.2	4.4	4.7	6.1	6.8
Australia	4.0	3.5	5.4	4.5	3.4	2.4

Sources: Asian Development Bank, *Key Indicators of Developing Asian and Pacific Countries, 2002* and OECD *Economic Outlook*, No. 71, June 2002.

Even during the brief recoveries in economic growth in the aftermath of the Asian financial crisis, unemployment proved persistent and rose markedly in the renewed downturn in 2001. It is now at all-time highs in the recent histories of Hong Kong, Singapore and Chinese Taipei with no suggestion of a reversal in the immediate future (see Table I.20). The structural adjustments that these tiger economies and Japan are undergoing that have seen an export of labour-intensive manufacturing and an increasing reliance on high-tech industries, underlies this persistence of unemployment. While labour deficits emerge in modern sectors, labour surpluses increase in more traditional sectors.

The East and Southeast Asian economies under consideration are all characterized by movements both into and out of their respective territories. It is altogether too simple to conceptualize economies into sending and receiving areas. All have inflows as

well as outflows, although the composition and relative volume of the flows vary. For example, the Philippines can be considered as a country of emigration par excellence with over 7 million of its citizens living or working overseas, but that country, too, also imports highly skilled migrants to assist in certain key sectors of the economy. In 1999, there were almost six thousand foreign workers in the Philippines, the majority of whom were Japanese executives, a tiny number compared with the number of emigrants but nevertheless significant for the local economy. Indonesia also follows this general pattern, while Thailand and Malaysia both import and export large numbers of workers and Japan, Korea, Chinese Taipei, Singapore and Hong Kong are all economies of net immigration.

Any population movement in Asia has to be placed in its demographic context of declining fertility in the region. Fertility levels have fallen

Table I.20. **Unemployment rates in selected Asian countries and in Australia, 1996-2001**

	Per cent of total labour force					
	1996	1997	1998	1999	2000	2001
Chinese Taipei	2.6	2.7	2.7	2.9	3.0	4.4
Hong Kong (China)	2.8	2.2	2.7	2.9	3.4	6.7
Japan	3.4	3.4	4.1	4.7	4.7	5.0
Korea	2.0	2.6	6.8	6.3	4.1	3.5
Singapore	3.0	2.4	3.2	4.6	4.4	5.0
Indonesia	4.9	4.7	5.5	6.4	6.1	-
Malaysia	2.5	2.6	3.2	3.4	3.1	3.7
Philippines	8.6	8.7	10.1	9.7	12.0	-
Thailand	1.1	0.9	3.4	3.0	2.4	-
China	3.0	3.1	3.1	3.1	3.1	3.6
Vietnam	5.9	6.0	6.9	6.7	6.4	-
Australia	8.2	8.3	7.7	7.0	6.3	6.7

Sources: Asian Development Bank, Asia Recovery Information Centre and OECD *Economic Outlook*, No. 71, June 2002.

Table I.21. **Total fertility rates in selected Asian countries, 1980, 1990 and 1999**

	Births per woman		
	1980	1990	1999
Chinese Taipei	2.5	1.8	1.6
Hong Kong (China)	2.0	1.3	1.0
Japan	1.8	1.5	1.5
Korea	2.6	1.8	1.6
Singapore	1.9	1.7	1.5
Indonesia	4.3	3.0	2.6
Malaysia	4.2	3.8	3.0
Philippines	4.8	4.1	3.3
Thailand	3.5	2.2	1.9
China	2.5	2.1	1.9
Vietnam	5.0	3.6	2.3

Sources: Asian Development Bank, *Key Indicators of Developing Asian and Pacific Countries*, 2001.

precipitously in Japan and most of the Chinese culture areas (see Table I.21). With the exception of China itself, these areas tend to be the destinations for migration as economies come to terms with very slow growth in their labour forces. Conversely, those countries with higher fertility tend to be areas of origin of migration.

The stock of foreign workers has increased steadily throughout the 1990s in Japan, Hong Kong, Singapore, Chinese Taipei and Korea (see Table I.22). Among these countries, only in Korea can an "Asian financial crisis" effect be seen, with a sharp reduction in the number of foreign workers during 1998. The situation among those economies lower down the development hierarchy is different.

There, the crisis effect was more marked in population migration with the numbers of foreign workers declining in Malaysia and Thailand as well as in Indonesia. Here, however, considerable caution needs to be used in the interpretation of the available figures. In contrast to Japan and the tiger economies, data-gathering systems are not as well developed in those Southeast Asian nations. More important, is the fact that the long land and sea borders, so common in that part of the region, are difficult to control adequately and it is easy for people to cross from one country to another without detection. Undocumented movements account for a very significant proportion of total international migration among the large countries of Southeast Asia and it is difficult to know to what extent the figures provided represent the real situation.

The summary figures on foreign workers in Asian countries have been subdivided as far as possible to indicate three sub-classes: the legal and highly skilled; the legal unskilled; and the undocumented unskilled. These data are not available for all countries and again it must be emphasized that differences in definition and coverage make ready comparison deceptive. Nevertheless, general trends can be identified with respect to the various categories. It should be pointed out that for Hong Kong there is a class of immigrant that is virtually unique among the countries under consideration. This covers one-way permit holders from China who are granted residence rights in the Special Administrative Region (SAR). Essentially, this category refers to a family reunification or settlement programme with

Table I.22. **Stocks of foreign workers in selected Asian countries, 1996-2001**

	Thousands					
	1996	1997	1998	1999	2000	2001
Chinese Taipei	–	245.7	255.6	278.0	326.5	–
Hong Kong (China) ¹	164.3	171.0	180.6	193.7	216.8	–
Japan ²	610	630	660	670	710	–
Korea ²	210.5	245.4	157.7	217.4	285.5	330.2
Singapore	–	–	–	530.0	612.2	–
Indonesia ³	24.9	24.4	21.3	14.9	16.8	–
Malaysia ²	745.2	1 471.6	1 127.7	818.7	799.7	805.0
Philippines ³	4.3	6.1	5.3	6.0	–	–
Thailand ²	1 033.9	1 125.8	1 103.5	1 089.7	1 102.6	–
China ³	80	82	83	85	–	60
Vietnam ³	–	–	–	–	30	–

Note: Official estimates.

1. Foreign domestic workers only. There are no stock figures for the highly skilled workers.

2. Includes estimates of undocumented workers.

3. Foreign experts, primarily professionals, highly skilled workers and teachers.

Source: National Statistical Offices.

the majority entering the city under this category as either minor children or spouses of Hong Kong men. Their number is currently set at 150 a day.

It is worth reiterating that many of those who leave Asian economies as immigrants or as more or less permanent settlers are highly skilled. Almost one third of the emigrants from Hong Kong to Australia and one seventh of immigrants arriving in Canada in the early 1990s were holders of a university degree. The fact that many choose not to become permanent immigrants but become either return migrants, migrants to third country destinations or transnational circulators after obtaining a new citizenship does not invalidate the essentially longer-term intent of this migration flow. While these groups will not be entirely ignored in the following discussion, the focus will be more on highly skilled worker and student flows.

b) *Flows of highly skilled workers: must we speak about brain drain?*

During the second half of the 1990s, Asians made up between one third to two fifths of settler arrivals to Australia and a significant trend has been the substantial shift towards skills and business migration and away from family-based criteria. Canada was the pioneer of managing its migration through a points-based system of selection and now takes over a quarter of its total intake from just two countries, China and India. The United States, while still maintaining its emphasis in its immigration on family reunification, has adjusted its intake to increase the proportion of independent, qualified and business immigrants.

Quite apart from these trends in long-term immigration policy an equally significant shift has been towards admitting increasing numbers of workers to North American countries and Australia under some form of temporary admission programme. In the United States, the numbers admitted under the H-1B programme, introduced in 1992 with an annual ceiling of 65 000. The ceiling was increased to 115 000 in 1999 and then again to 195 000 between 2001 and 2003 showing the marked growth in importance of this channel. China, India, Japan and the Philippines accounted for almost two thirds of the 65 000 intake in 1999, with India accounting for the vast majority. Migrants who enter with a H-1B visa are entitled to remain in the United States for up to six years. Australia, too, appears to have shifted towards a greater reliance on temporary entrants who may, in

the late 1990s, have reached over 400 000, or 2-3% of the resident population.

While destination countries have increased their intake of the highly skilled through shifts in settler intake and by developing shorter-term entry programmes, the countries of origin can consider the loss of personnel not to be in their best interests. The so-called “brain drain” has tended to be seen as negative for countries of origin. It has to be considered however in the context of “brain gain” and “brain exchange”. It is important to bear in mind that the total number of highly skilled who are moving in, among and from Asian countries is quite small relative to the total populations of the economies concerned and even relative to the available pool of skilled labour itself.

Nevertheless, the movement of small numbers of highly qualified people can have a significant impact on particular sectors of the labour market and on social and economic development, particularly in the context of an increasing competition for skills in the globalised economy. The debate can perhaps be best illustrated by examining the movement of students from Asian economies to tertiary institutions overseas. The United States has for long been the principal destination with 30% of the 34 232 foreign students in 1954/55 coming from Asian countries. By 2000/01, there were 547 867 foreign students registered in degree-granting institutions in the United States, with seven of the leading eight sources of the students being Asian countries (see Table I.23). Nearly 21% came from China and India alone.

Taking the example of Chinese Taipei, it can be seen that relatively few students returned during the early period of student migration overseas in the 1960s and 1970s. The numbers of those returning accelerated throughout the 1980s until the mid-1990s when government subsidies for return were removed and many returnees, coming back on their own account, may not have registered. Thus, the more recent data are not strictly comparable. Nevertheless, it seems clear that, by the 1990s, development in Chinese Taipei had reached the level where significant numbers of students returned and fewer chose to leave in the first place, being able to receive a quality education at home. Only 937 students returned to Chinese Taipei in 1980 compared with some 6 510 in 1994 and the return rate in 1988 was estimated at around 32%, three times the return rate in 1980.

While many highly skilled migrants may have returned to Chinese Taipei, or to Korea, return rates

Table I.23. **Stocks of students in degree-granting institutions in the United States, 1954/55, 1974/75 and 2000/01**

Top 15 countries of origin as ranked in 2000/01
Thousands

	1954/55	1974/75	2000/01
China	–	–	59.9
India	1.7	9.7	54.7
Japan	1.6	5.9	46.5
Korea	1.2	3.4	45.7
Chinese Taipei	2.6	10.3	28.6
Canada	4.7	8.4	25.3
Indonesia	–	–	11.6
Thailand	–	6.3	11.2
Turkey	–	–	11.0
Mexico	1.2	4.0	10.7
Germany	0.8	–	10.1
Brazil	–	–	8.8
United Kingdom	0.7	2.8	8.8
Malaysia	–	–	8.1
Hong Kong (China)	–	11.1	7.8
Other countries	6.9	31.4	199.1
Total	21.4	93.3	547.9

Source: Institute of International Education, *Report on International Educational Exchange*, 2002 and various years.

for countries at lower levels of development such as Malaysia and China appear to be much lower. Perhaps about 14% of Chinese students to the United States returned during the period 1978-1999. Whether these countries will follow a similar path to the tiger economies and see greater numbers of returnees over time remains to be seen. The Asian financial crisis did affect the numbers of students going overseas, however, with reduced government grants and personal finances among the middle classes bringing about either a reduction or very slow growth in the number of students from Malaysia, Thailand and Indonesia.

Paradoxically, the rate of creation of domestic talent, or the increase in the proportion of the highly educated so necessary for development, may be related to the possibilities for emigration that exist from an economy. People deliberately choose to pursue education specifically because it will give them a greater chance of emigrating. Thus, some loss of skilled personnel may be in the best interests of an economy as it is a factor in the generation of overall human capital. Where the loss, however, is greater than either the supply or the net exchange, then negative consequences may be more apparent, giving rise to the interesting idea that there may be an "optimal level of emigration". Be that as it may, ILO studies suggest that two-way skill mobility, that

is, the exchange of brains, make an economy more attractive for foreign investment than in cases where there is no emigration of the educated at all.

The loss of skilled personnel cannot be seen, however, simply in economic terms; there are significant social impacts. For example, the loss of large numbers of nurses from the Philippines has almost certainly led to a deterioration in health services in that country. Over 70% of the annual number of 7 000 nurses who graduate each year leave the Philippines and there are an estimated 30 000 unfilled positions in government and private sectors, particularly in rural areas.

Centres for the training of brains are evolving within the Asian region itself. Japan traditionally has been a magnet for students from other Asian countries, particularly China in the early years of the last century, and universities in Hong Kong and Singapore have emerged as centres of excellence in their respective regions. Satellite campuses of core western universities are proliferating throughout the region and a series of centres in China are emerging as significant destinations for students. For example, there were 78 812 foreign students in Japan in 2001, up from 51 047 in 1997, some 44 711 in China in 1999, 23 000 in Malaysia in 2000 and 7 300 in Chinese Taipei in 2000. The majority of these students come from other Asian countries. Thus, the creation of brains is increasingly occurring within the region. A key policy issue will be how to retain this talent within the region.

c) *Flows of unskilled workers*

In terms of numbers, unskilled workers make up the largest number of migrant workers in the Asian region. There are two principal components; documented workers, or those moving through formal legal channels to fill specific jobs under contract, and undocumented workers. It should be emphasized, however, that in both of these streams, the documented and the undocumented, educated, even skilled people may be moving to undertake unskilled jobs (for example the case of domestic workers to Hong Kong).

Asian economies have emerged as labour-deficit areas over the last 10-15 years and several have seen a transition from areas of net-emigration to areas of net-immigration. The pattern of the legal importation of workers over the second half of the 1990s has been one of sustained growth in Chinese Taipei, Hong Kong and Japan and of growth punctuated by the Asian financial crisis in Korea, Malaysia and

Thailand. In the latter cases, the stock of legal workers declined somewhat from 1997-1998 but resumed an upward course quite quickly in Korea and Malaysia. The official data suggest that the number of legal migrants stabilized in Thailand, but at a considerably lower level than before the crisis. The onset of the recession in 2001 has seen lower numbers of unskilled workers in Chinese Taipei but not in Hong Kong. In early 2002, there are reports of large numbers of Indonesians being expelled from Malaysia, either those who are found to be illegally in the country or those whose contracts have expired. Malaysia would like to reduce its dependence on workers from Indonesia who can easily "disappear" into the local population and increase recruitment of workers from a greater diversity of sources. Given Malaysia's geography, and the demography of neighboring countries, any such policy would not appear to have a high probability of success.

Many of the high-tech industries that East Asian economies are promoting, for example, also require substantial numbers of unskilled workers who are involved with packaging and dispatch of high-tech products. These activities are low-paid, involve long hours are boring and involve hard work that an increasingly highly educated local labour force is unwilling to undertake.

Several of the East and Southeast Asian countries are still significant suppliers of unskilled workers through official labour recruitment programmes, both government and private. The Philippines, Indonesia, Thailand and China all fall into this category. China sends workers to some 181 countries and territories, plus large numbers to regional fishing fleets. In November 2001, China had 460 000 workers abroad who were involved with contracts worth USD13.3 billion in 2001. The Philippines is the country of origin of workers par excellence, with some 866 590 workers overseas in 2001, up from 837 020 in 1999. The numbers of Filipinos employed in Asia, however, actually declined over this period, with markets in Europe and the Middle East compensating for these losses. Remittances from these workers that pass through official channels were estimated to have exceeded USD 6 billion in 2000 although this figure was down from a record USD 6.8 billion in 1999. Thailand, perhaps because of its greater reliance on Asian markets, particularly Chinese Taipei, saw a slight decline in the number of workers overseas from 202 416 in 1999 to 193 041 in 2000. Thai workers overseas remitted some USD 1.5 billion in 2000. As emphasized earlier, a

considerable amount of the monies remitted passes through informal channels as do many of the workers themselves.

d) *Foreign workers in an irregular situation*

The total numbers of undocumented workers are much more significant in the countries of South-east Asia than they are in East Asia. Also, the data on those who entered illegally or who entered legally and overstayed their visas or changed their designated terms of entry are likely to be much more reliable for economies in the latter region than for Southeast Asian countries.

The numbers of illegal entrants to Hong Kong, primarily from China, who were caught and deported declined markedly from 14 892 in 1998-99 to only 4 397 in 1999-2000 – a far cry from the tens of thousands of would-be entrants to the city of just a few decades ago. The creation of widespread opportunities in the Pearl River delta region and continued tight control along the border have all but eliminated irregular migration as a major policy concern in the SAR. In Singapore, too, the number of illegal immigrants apprehended declined sharply from 23 000 in 1998 to 16 500 in 2000. The principal reason given for the decline is the Asian financial crisis although, like the relationship between Hong Kong and Shenzhen, the creation of intervening opportunities for migrants across the causeway in Malaysia surely played a part.

In Chinese Taipei, on the other hand, rising illegal migration from China appears to be a growing problem. It is estimated that just over half of all those who enter legally into Korea as trainees "disappear" into the wider labour force and become overstayers. Korea, the worst affected of the original tiger economies, saw a sharp reduction in undocumented workers from 148 048 in 1997 to 99 537 in 1998 following an amnesty for illegal workers that allowed them to leave the country without paying a fine. As the Korean economy resumed rapid growth the number of undocumented workers, too, accelerated markedly from 1998 to reach 250 756 in November 2001.

Estimates of up to 1.43 million illegal migrants have been made for Malaysia before the onset of the financial crisis. Official estimates of illegal migration in Malaysia are based on annual apprehensions that are difficult to translate into stock estimates. Since 1997, however, the numbers of those apprehended under the *Ops Nyah* exercises have increased and it would seem doubtful that the

number of those eluding capture and residing illegally in Malaysia had declined. The social distance between certain Indonesian groups, such as the Minangkabau of Sumatra, for example, and ethnic Malays in peninsular Malaysia is much less than between the Minangkabau and the Javanese of the capital, Jakarta. In both peninsular Malaysia and East Malaysia, there are virtually invisible minorities from neighboring countries.

Similarly, in Thailand, the data on the numbers of undocumented workers appear to be distinctly “spongy”. Under the new Prime Minister, Taksin Shinawatra, a concerted effort has been made to register undocumented workers and by the end of October 2001, 562 527 workers had registered for legal work permits, although it was estimated that a further 300 000-400 000 undocumented workers remained in the country. Despite statistics to show that 319 629 workers were arrested in 1999 and 444 636 in 2000 these apprehensions do not seem to have decreased significantly the numbers of undocumented workers in the country.

e) Main themes of migration policies

Two generalisations can be advanced in terms of policy response in the Asian region: first, that the responses have been various depending upon the priority of each economy and, second, that there is little evidence to suggest that any policy intervention has been effective in controlling numbers or managing migration in desired directions over anything but the immediate short term. Clearly, policies vary depending on whether they are directed towards receiving workers or sending workers overseas. If we examine policies directed at receiving migrants, of the countries participating in the discussions only Australia could be said to have a well-developed policy that essentially achieves its objectives. The Australian policy is well described in Hugo but, because of its settler tradition, cannot be used as a model for the majority of Asian countries at this stage of their development. Apart from Hong Kong's policy to allow the entry of one-way permit holders from China, no Asian country actively seeks immigrants *sensu stricto* or extends the benefits of citizenship to foreigners. Those few examples, such as Singapore's policy to bring skilled and semi-skilled workers from Hong Kong in the early 1990s or Thailand's assimilation of long-term migrants from Vietnam in the late 1990s, were all limited target and short term. Singapore and, from February 2002, Hong Kong both have investor programmes that grant

permanent residence to those willing to invest large sums of money in the economies. In the case of Hong Kong, some USD 830 000 is required, a considerably larger sum than investor programmes in Canada or Australia. Policies in Asian economies are designed essentially to deal with workers, not immigrants. And the worker policies implemented are still strongly biased towards the unskilled, leaving vague or unstated any policy towards the attraction or retention of the highly skilled.

Within Asia, the general approach is to welcome and encourage highly skilled migrants but to discourage or closely control unskilled workers. Policies for the latter often stipulate ceilings on intake, sectors in which foreign workers can be employed and terms and conditions of employment. Japan only laid down the basic principle for a migration policy as recently as August 1999 and even then it only addressed skilled migrants leaving unskilled workers for future careful study. The policies can be project-specific or of limited life. For example, the policy to allow workers into Hong Kong for the construction of the airport indeed terminated with the completion of the project in March 1999 and the General Labour Importation Scheme, introduced in May 1989 to allow employers to bring in up to 14 700 workers was wound down after a review in 1995. Local legislators and union leaders were instrumental in opposing the scheme in the face of rising domestic unemployment.

In other economies, policies are aimed fundamentally at dealing with undocumented migrants. Thailand has seen the evolution of a series of policies that attempted to regularize the number of foreigners already working illegally in the country. From virtually a total ban on foreign workers, Thailand has moved through identifying particular parts of the country, and particular sectors of the economy, where foreigners would be permitted to work, to the present policy that is countrywide and that includes 10 general types of business occupations. Chinese Taipei, Japan, Malaysia, Korea and Singapore all have policies that have been implemented at one time or another to deal with the issue of undocumented migrants. Policies to return migrants forcibly to their home areas appear to have had little more than short-term impact and can be expensive. Again, amnesties have met with limited success. The substitution of newly unemployed domestic labour for foreign labour is unrealistic as the domestic employed are often to be found in other parts of the country from where foreign labour is employed and,

more importantly, the domestic unemployed are unwilling to undertake the kinds of jobs that foreign labour is willing to do. Policies like the current Thai policy, that seek to register all those already working in the country without threat of deportation, are more realistic. The likely impact of that policy on the volume and direction of future migration is, however, unknown. It seems probable that, as in the case of skilled migration, countries need to plan for the exchange of unskilled migrant workers, facilitating their circulation between origins and destinations.

Three other types of migrant worker policy are relevant to the region. The first relates to emigrant worker policy or attempts by countries of origin to seek out markets for their workers. In the wake of the Asian financial crisis, for example, Thailand sought to find countries that could absorb the newly unemployed. Vietnam plans to increase its export of workers, skilled and unskilled, to 100 000 by 2005 and provide a special fund for their training and loans for prospective migrant workers.

The second type of policy refers to the protection of migrants: to ensure that they are accorded the same rights and privileges as local workers and to guarantee that they are not discriminated against because of citizenship or ethnicity. To achieve this objective, countries need to become party to international conventions aimed at protecting migrant workers and their families, the elimination of child labour and the suppression of trafficking. Clearly, these objectives are of greater importance to countries of origin of migrants but their implementation lies in the hands of destination countries. The Philippines, in particular, has worked extensively, though not always successfully, through international forums to reach agreements on the protection of the large number of its workers overseas.

The third and last type of policy deals with issues of return and reintegration. Migrant workers accustomed to regular employment or high wages relative to their areas of origin may face problems of adaptation and re-integration when they either return, or are returned, home. They may not find employment or remuneration at levels similar to those overseas and their overseas experience may not be relevant, recognized or even applicable. Although the cases of forced return may pose greater problems of readjustment than for those

who have returned voluntarily, both can and do experience difficulty. It is not only the migrant worker who returns home; those from settler societies, too, go back to retire after a working life in Australia, Canada or the United States.

2. Trends in migration flows in Central and Eastern Europe

Many OECD member countries count among their population a significant number of immigrants from Central and Eastern Europe (CEEC) and other countries of the Community of Independent States (CIS). The pending membership of certain CEECs to the European Union is raising concern over increasing flows from the CEECs and towards member countries of the European Union. However, this apprehension seems unjustified as demonstrated by the majority of studies analysing the prospective migratory flows as a result of the enlargement of the European Union (see the 2001 Edition of *Trends in International Migration*, p. 72). Moreover, certain CEECs have progressively become countries with significant immigration flows.

Ten years after the political changes in Central and Eastern Europe, we can take stock of migration trends in the region (see for detailed presentation of trends in migration flows in Central and Eastern Europe the 2001 Edition of *Trends in International Migration*, pp. 68 to 76). Analysis is complicated by the difficulty of collecting reliable data in countries undergoing far-reaching economic and administrative reforms, and also by the diversity of economic and social conditions in the region, including the countries of the former Yugoslavia and the CIS. This diversity accounts to a considerable degree for the nature and scale of East-West movements and those within and towards the region. The following analysis brings out a number of trends with regard both to East-West movements and to the characteristics of flows within the zone. The political and economic changes in 1990 led to sizeable migration movements and to concerns over the possibility of large-scale population transfers. These concerns have not been materialised. Although emigration flows continue, notably towards Western Europe, it would appear that the Central and Eastern European countries (CEECs) are becoming the theatre of much more complex movements than a straightforward westward flow towards the European Union and North America.

a) Development of emigration flows towards the European OECD countries, the United States, Canada and Australia since 1990

Shortly after the opening of the borders, East-West migration flows motivated by economic, political or ethnic reasons intensified. Throughout the 1990s, flows of ethnic minorities into Western Europe largely went to Germany (around 220 000 *Aussiedler* came from Poland, Russia and Romania annually between 1991 and 1995). Since 1996, there has been a constant decrease and the 95 000 ethnic Germans who arrived in 2000 were almost uniquely coming from the former Soviet Union. Similar movements were recorded in Turkey (more than 120 000 Bulgarian nationals), Finland (around 20 000 persons of Finnish origin from Russia and Estonia since 1989) and Hungary (more than 100 000 Hungarians from Romania, the Slovak Republic, the Ukraine and Voivodina since 1990).

However, total entries of permanent immigrants from CEECs, as a percentage of total immigration flows, have fallen since 1991 in Denmark, France, the United Kingdom, the Netherlands and Sweden. The fall in emigration to OECD countries in most cases is very marked for Polish, Romanian and Bulgarian citizens. More recently, there has been a decline in the number of immigrants from the former Yugoslavia. The nature of emigration also seems to be changing. Its chief feature is now short and frequent movements related to (seasonal) employment opportunities.

The largest emigration flows during the 1980s were from Poland (with some 800 000 people leaving the country, chiefly for Germany) and Romania (300 000 Romanians left, chiefly to Hungary and the United States). With the exception of inter-German migration, flows from other countries in the region were on a lesser scale. These movements largely concerned ethnic minorities: around 500 000 people of German ethnic origin (*Aussiedler*) and Hungarian minorities were involved here.

A number of countries in Western Europe and North America have been longstanding hosts for most of the communities of Central and Eastern Europe (see Table I.24). Links with established emigrant communities may accordingly explain the direction, nature and size of the post-1989 East-West flows.

Among the OECD European member countries, Germany is the principal host country for nationals

of the CEECs, the former Yugoslavia and the former Soviet Union with a total of 1.45 million. They represented 20% of the resident foreign population in 2000. They are also quite numerous in Austria (around 370 000, or nearly 70% of the resident foreign population), and to a lesser degree in Italy (around 305 000, or nearly 22% of the total). In 2000, a very large number of nationals of the former Yugoslavia reside in Western Europe (nearly 1.2 million in Germany, more than 334 000 in Switzerland), as are the Poles (nearly 300 000 in Germany, over 50 000 in France). In Australia, among the top five groups of immigrants born in Central and Eastern Europe, those from the former Yugoslavia are estimated around 210 000 followed by the Poles (68 000). In Canada, the latter are the most numerous (almost 194 000), followed by residents originating from the former Yugoslavia and Russia. In the United States, immigrants born in the former USSR represent the first nationality (almost 400 000), followed by the Poles and the former Yugoslavia (see Table I.24).

The decline in the number of migrants from the CEEC, the former Yugoslavia and the former USSR in some OECD countries is mainly due to the number of immigrants originating from the region who have acquired the nationality of the receiving country. Table I.25 shows that in Hungary, more than 91% of new acquisitions of Hungarian nationality are citizens from Romania, the former Yugoslavia and the former USSR. In Germany, this percentage is around 71% and includes, in addition, citizens from Poland and Romania. Sweden has registered a large proportion (42%) of acquisitions of nationality from citizens originating from Bosnia Herzegovina, the former Yugoslavia, Romania and Poland. Among the new acquisitions of nationality in Italy, citizens from Romania, Albania, Poland and the former USSR represent almost one fourth of the total.

Of the officially recorded emigration flows from the Baltic States, those to the OECD countries are increasing as a proportion of the total, although not in absolute terms. Poland is a major destination for migrants from Lithuania; Finland, Germany and the United States for Estonia; the United States, Germany and Israel for Latvia and Lithuania. However, overstayers by nationals of the Baltic States are apparently numerous, particularly in some European countries, and hence the actual distributions could be very different. For example, whereas between 1991 and 1999 fewer than 30 Lithuanians

Table I.24. **Top five nationalities of citizens from Central and Eastern Europe residing in selected OECD countries, 2000**
Thousands

Foreign citizens from Central and Eastern Europe in some European OECD countries					
Austria (foreign workers)		Czech Republic		Germany	
Fed. Rep. of Yugoslavia	75.6	Ukraine	50.2	Fed. Rep. of Yugoslavia	662.5
Bosnia Herzegovina	37.4	Slovak Republic	44.3	Poland	301.4
Croatia	24.6	Poland	17.1	Croatia	216.8
Former Yug. Rep. of Macedonia	4.2	Russian Federation	13.0	Bosnia Herzegovina	156.3
		Bulgaria	4.0	Russian Federation	115.9
Total foreigners	242.2	Total foreigners	201.0	Total foreigners	7 296.8
<i>Above countries (% of total foreigners)</i>	58.6	<i>Above countries (% of total foreigners)</i>	64.0	<i>Above countries (% of total foreigners)</i>	19.9
<i>Total foreign workers (as a % of total labour force)</i>	10.5	<i>Total foreigners (% of total population)</i>	2.0	<i>Total foreigners (% of total population)</i>	8.9
Hungary (1999)		Italy		Netherlands (1999)	
Romania	48.6	Albania	142.1	Fed. Rep. of Yugoslavia	7.2
Former Yugoslavia	15.3	Romania	68.9	Bosnia Herzegovina	6.1
Ukraine	7.6	Former Yugoslavia (others)	40.0	Poland	5.6
Slovak Republic	4.1	Poland	31.4	Russian Federation	3.3
Russian Federation	3.8	Former Yug. Rep. of Macedonia	22.0	Croatia	1.6
Total foreigners	127.0	Total foreigners	1 388.2	Total foreigners	651.5
<i>Above countries (% of total foreigners)</i>	62.5	<i>Above countries (% of total foreigners)</i>	21.9	<i>Above countries (% of total foreigners)</i>	3.7
<i>Total foreigners (% of total population)</i>	1.3	<i>Total foreigners (% of total population)</i>	2.4	<i>Total foreigners (% of total population)</i>	4.1
Sweden		Switzerland			
Fed. Rep. of Yugoslavia	20.2	Fed. Rep. of Yugoslavia	190.7		
Poland	16.7	Former Yug. Rep. of Macedonia	55.9		
Bosnia-Herzegovina	22.8	Bosnia Herzegovina	44.3		
Croatia	7.5	Croatia	43.6		
Russian Federation	5.7	Poland	4.0		
Total foreigners	477.3	Total foreigners	1 384.4		
<i>Above countries (% of total foreigners)</i>	15.3	<i>Above countries (% of total foreigners)</i>	24.5		
<i>Total foreigners (% of total population)</i>	5.4	<i>Total foreigners (% of total population)</i>	19.3		
Immigrants born in Central and Eastern Europe in some OECD countries					
Australia		Canada (1996)		United States (1990)	
Former Yugoslavia	210.0	Poland	193.4	Former USSR	389.9
Poland	68.3	Former Yugoslavia	122.0	Poland	388.3
Former USSR	54.9	Former USSR	108.4	Former Yugoslavia	141.5
Hungary	28.0	Hungary	54.2	Hungary	110.3
		Former CSFR	41.2	Romania	91.1
Total of foreign-born	4 517.3	Total of foreign-born	4 971.1	Total of foreign-born	19 767.3
<i>Above countries (% of total foreign-born)</i>	8.0	<i>Above countries (% of total foreign-born)</i>	10.4	<i>Above countries (% of total foreign-born)</i>	5.7
<i>Total foreign-born (% of total population)</i>	23.6	<i>Total foreign-born (% of total population)</i>	17.4	<i>Total foreign-born (% of total population)</i>	7.9

Sources: Australia: estimates made by the Australian Bureau of Statistics; Austria: work permits; Censuses for Canada and the United States, residence permits for Italy and population registers for the other countries.

were recorded as having settled in the United Kingdom, during the year 2000, more than 1 351 were deported.

Germany is traditionally the most important destination for emigrants from Poland and the inflows have increased during the last ten years. More than 62% of all legal immigrants in Greece in 2000 were from Albania (131 600), making Greece the biggest

receiver of immigrants of one single CEEC nationality. Germany is also a very important destination for migrants from Russia (27 800), Bosnia Herzegovina (10 300) and the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (87 800). Italy appears as another popular destination for migrants from the CEECs in 2000: Albanians (31 000), followed by Romanians (20 100), Poles (7 000) and Ukrainians (5 300). People from Russia are the main immigrant group in Finland in 2000 as

Table I.25. **Foreigners residing in some Central and Eastern European countries, by major nationality, latest available year**

Bulgaria (2000)			Czech Republic (2000)			Hungary (1999)		
	Thousands	%		Thousands	%		Thousands	%
CIS	34.9	34.5	Ukraine	50.2	25.0	Romania	48.6	38.2
EU	18.5	18.2	Slovak Republic	44.3	22.0	Former Yugoslavia	15.3	12.0
Europe (other)	10.1	10.0	Vietnam	23.6	11.7	Germany	8.5	6.7
Middle East	10.1	10.0	Poland	17.1	8.5	China	7.7	6.0
Asia	6.3	6.2	Russian Federation	13.0	6.5	Ukraine	7.6	6.0
Africa	5.9	5.9	Germany	5.0	2.5	Slovak Republic	4.1	3.2
America	3.3	3.3	Bulgaria	4.0	2.0	Russian Federation	3.8	3.0
Central Europe	2.6	2.6	Belarus	3.8	1.9	Poland	2.5	2.0
Australia	0.1	0.1	Fed. Rep. of Yugoslavia	3.7	1.8	Vietnam	2.2	1.7
			China	3.6	1.8	Bulgaria	1.3	1.0
Others	9.4	9.3	Others	36.4	18.1	Others	26.8	21.1
Total	101.3	100.0	Total	201.0	100.0	Total	127.0	100.0
% of total population		1.2	% of total population		2.0	% of total population		1.3
Poland (1999)			Romania (2000)			Slovak Republic (1997)		
	Thousands	%		Thousands	%		Thousands	%
Ukraine	7.0	16.4	Republic of Moldova	8.2	11.8	Czech Republic	5.8	23.3
Russian Fed.	4.4	10.4	China	7.1	10.2	Ukraine	3.5	14.1
Vietnam	3.3	7.6	Turkey	7.0	10.0	Poland	2.8	11.3
Belarus	2.3	5.4	Italy	5.3	7.6	Former Yugoslavia	2.0	8.2
Germany	1.9	4.5	Greece	5.0	7.2			
Fed. Rep. of Yugoslavia	1.6	3.8	Syria	3.3	4.8			
United States	1.4	3.2						
Armenia	1.3	3.1						
Bulgaria	1.2	2.8						
France	0.8	2.0						
Others	17.5	40.9	Others	33.6	48.5	Others	10.7	43.1
Total	42.8	100.0	Total	69.4	100.0	Total	24.8	100.0
% of total population		0.1	% of total population		0.3	% of total population		0.5

Sources: Data for Poland is estimates on the basis of the Ministry of the Interior's Registers; figures for Romania correspond to the number of persons who hold a temporary residence visa (valid for at least 120 days). For the other countries, data is issued from population registers and is the number of foreigners who hold a permanent or a long-term residence permit.

they accounted for 27% of total entries of immigrants. The next largest groups were Swedes at 7.7% and Estonians at 7.2%, while all other individual nationalities accounted for considerably smaller percentages.

b) Trends in intra-regional migration

One of the characteristics of migration movements in Eastern Europe is the persistence of significant intra-regional flows. Some trends stem from the liberalisation of trade in 1990 and border readjustments (movements of ethnic minorities), while others highlight the economic dimension of migration flows within the region (movements of labour, irregular flows).

As in the case of East-West migration flows, those within the CEECs, brought about by the opening of the borders in 1990, were initially composed of persons with family links with the host country and the movement of ethnic minorities. These were largely Hungarian (originating from Romania and the Slovak Republic), Polish (from Ukraine, Kazakhstan and Siberia) and Bulgarian (from the former Soviet Union). The readjustment of the borders in the region (in the former Yugoslavia, CSFR and Soviet Union) also led to population movements. The split of the Czech and Slovak Republics in 1993 led to substantial exchanges (around 20 000 people entered the Czech Republic from the new Slovak Republic between 1994 and 1999, and 8 000 moved in the other direction). Emigration of Russian

nationals continues to be observed today in the Baltic countries.

Hungary reports an increase in inflows of Hungarian ethnic minorities. The flows reached a high level in 1999, particularly for people from Romania and the Ukraine. The increase may be explained by the apprehension that Hungary will shortly introduce the admission rules applied in the EU, which are restrictive for Romanian and Ukrainian nationals.

Roma minorities are present in most countries in the region and flows both to Western Europe and within Central Europe were very substantial once borders opened; they have since fallen considerably overall. At the same time, countries such as Finland saw numbers of Roma migrants rise in 1999 (1 500 from Slovakia and 300 from Poland). A number of countries (the Czech Republic, the Slovak Republic, Bulgaria and Hungary) are conducting active programmes to integrate Roms socially and economically, often with funding under programmes by the European Union (PHARE) and/or the Council of Europe. Such investments may, over the long term, mean that they settle permanently. But Roms are frequently marginalised and their living conditions are deplorable. They often live on the edges of larger towns (Romania, Hungary, Bulgaria, the former Yugoslavia, and the Czech Republic) or in villages entirely inhabited by Roms (Bulgaria, Romania).⁷ In the majority of cases, Gypsies have a level of education much lower than the rest of the population and are more vulnerable to unemployment. A degree of rejection by the rest of the population renders the success of active policies targeted towards this group more difficult. As a result, these minorities are still much inclined to emigrate.

Annual intra-regional migrant flows are generally modest, varying between around a hundred persons in Bulgaria to a few thousand in the Czech Republic. Hungary, however, attracted well over 10 000 immigrants from other CEEC countries in 1999. Part of these movements appears to be triggered by historical ties. The greater part of migrant movements from the Slovak Republic and within Europe were to the Czech Republic, although the movements of Czechs have decreased dramatically after the split of the Federation in 1993. Likewise, in the Czech Republic, in 1999, the biggest group of migrants were Slovaks, followed by Ukrainians; Russians took a fifth place (after Vietnamese). In

Hungary, similarly to previous years, most immigrants in 1999 arrived from neighbouring countries – predominantly Romania – and most of them were ethnic Hungarians. In 2000, around 61 000 Bulgarians of Turkish origin emigrated to Turkey.

Likewise, the return migration of the so-called “Russian speaking population” – Russians, Belarusians, Ukrainians – although diminishing, remains the dominant component of emigration flows from the Baltic States. In the case of Latvia, after a decline from 80% to 70% during 1998, the proportion fell to 67% in 1999; in the case of Lithuania, the corresponding figures were 60%, 55% and 48%. Detailed data on the ethnic composition of Estonia’s emigration flows were not made available in 1997 and in 1999; in 1998, those leaving for either Russia, Belarus or the Ukraine accounted for approximately 60% of the total.

The inflow of persons to Poland underwent a noticeable change in 2000. The number of arriving foreign visitors declined, breaking with a long lasting past trend. This is mainly caused by a decline in the number of short-time visitors arriving from borderlands of relatively well-off countries (Germany, the Czech Republic and Slovakia) for whom Poland is an attractive shopping destination. This more than offsets a growing numbers of petty traders and occasional irregular workers coming from Belarus and the Ukraine where the economies are weak. However, the number of long-term arrivals of citizens from Belarus and the Ukraine grew strongly by 28% and 17%, respectively. Citizens from CEECs form, together with Vietnamese, the bulk of the long-term arrivals in Poland.

In CEECs, the main groups of residing foreigners originate from the CIS region, accounting for a large percentage of the total foreign population (see Table I.25). However, while citizens from CIS countries are currently the largest group of permanently residing foreigners, their share is expected to decrease, reflecting the decline in foreign trade and economic relations with the CIS countries. In the Czech Republic, Ukrainian and Slovak citizens accounted in 2000 for 25% and 22%, respectively, whilst Germans accounted for less than 3%. Czech and Ukrainian citizens accounted for 23% and 14% respectively in the Slovak Republic. The share of Romanians and former Yugoslavia citizens in Hungary accounted in 1999 respectively for 38% and 12% of the total foreign population.

c) *Trends in asylum seekers*

Border openings gave rise to important movements of asylum seekers, which was later increased by the conflict in the former Yugoslavia. The movement of refugees from the former Yugoslavia peaked between 1992 and 1993, but still continues to Germany, Switzerland, Austria, Norway and Canada. Many migrants from Kosovo have since returned home. Within Central and Eastern Europe itself, there is currently an increase in the transit flows of people coming from outside the region and seeking to enter Western Europe. A substantial part of this is irregular migration. These flows eventually leading to Western European countries were at the root of significant changes in the process of dealing with examination of asylum requests in most Western countries between 1993 and 1997 and in 2001.

Important differences exist between countries as to the nationality of asylum seekers from Central and Eastern Europe and the CIS. In Belgium, for example, the number of applicants from Russia has increased significantly in the last two years. In Finland, most applications came from Poland, the Slovak Republic and Russia. Sweden saw an increase in the number of applications, from 11 300 to 16 300 in 2000, the bulk of the increase (3 800) being on account of Bosnians. In Norway the bulk of the asylum seekers from Croatia, Bulgaria and Russia appear to have been lured by travel agencies specialising in “asylum tours”. Such agencies advertise generous benefits for asylum seekers in Norway, easy-to-get well-paid jobs and long processing times that guarantee at least a year’s lawful residence. Almost all Bulgarian asylum seekers in 2001 came in chartered bus tours in the time span of a few weeks between the end of June and the beginning of July. Their applications were deemed to be unfounded, and by the end of September all of them had been returned to their home country. The authorities thereby sent the signal, in particular to the people of Central and Eastern Europe, that although Norway may need foreign labour and although labour immigration may be encouraged, the asylum route is not the way to go for job seekers. The applications of Bulgarians and Croatians have since been processed in an accelerated procedure. Most applications are rejected, and more accurate information about the prospects for a successful asylum application is distributed through local media.

In Austria there is a marked difference in the procedures for refugee intakes from Kosovo and Bosnia Herzegovina. While Bosnians had hardly

registered as asylum seekers – they were called war-refugees rather than asylum seekers – Albanian Kosovars tended to choose the asylum route. The issue of settlement in Austria is in the forefront with Kosovars, while repatriation had been the general understanding when Bosnians entered a couple of years earlier. As it turned out, hardly any Bosnians returned to their country of origin, while most Albanians tended to return.

d) *Illegal migrant flows and border crossings*

While the influx of Kosovars in Italy ended after 1999, irregular immigration continued along the southern and south-eastern coasts, and many of those arriving requested asylum. Almost all of the persons landing on the Italian coast (more than 80%) were citizens from the Balkan region; in 9 out of 10 cases their immigration was undocumented. These immigrants requested asylum and moved northwards into the richer parts of Italy and often, but not always, to other countries.

Many foreign workers take advantage of Italy’s large informal seasonal economy and then return to their countries. This is particularly true for Eastern Europeans who come from countries for which no visa is required to enter the Schengen area – Poland, the Czech Republic, Slovakia. For many migrants seeking to enter Western Europe or North America, the CEECs constitute a stage on their journey. Most of these migrants are documented, having entered as tourists, businessmen or students. Due to their common border with Germany, the countries most affected by this are Poland and the Czech Republic. Hungary is also a transit country, on account of its borders with Austria. Bulgaria is a transit country for migrants seeking to enter Greece, as well as those seeking to reach other parts of Western Europe. Transit migration encourages the development of illegal immigration and employment in a number of the CEECs. These migrants come from neighbouring countries such as Turkey, Albania or the former Yugoslavia, but also from Asia (Bangladesh, India, Afghanistan, Iran, Iraq).

The German border police intercepted 28 500 illegal immigrants in 2001. Nearly 20% came from Romania and the former Yugoslavia. Illegal crossings are concentrated on the borders with Poland, the Czech Republic and Austria but a large proportion have been in transit from other countries, as organised by traffickers. In the case of the Slovak Republic, inflows prevail at the Hungarian and Ukrainian borders, outflows dominate at the Czech, Austrian and Polish borders. The main countries of

origin of illegal migrants are the former Yugoslavia, Afghanistan and Romania. Overall, South Asian migrants seem to be dominating the illegal flows.

In 2000, two-thirds of all registered illegal border crossings in Hungary were attempts to leave the country, indicating Hungary's transit role in illegal migration. A contributing factor might be that migrants from Romania, the former Yugoslavia and the former Soviet Union can easily enter Hungary legally, but find it difficult to get the necessary visas to the West. The largest group among more than one hundred nationalities who were caught crossing the Hungarian borders illegally was Romanians, followed by people from the former Yugoslavia.

In other cases, transit is carried through legal channels. In Austria, until 1989, asylum seekers and refugees (the majority from Eastern Europe) used Austria as a stepping stone for emigration to the traditional immigration countries overseas. Austria never conceived of itself as a settlement country for refugees. In 1999, as the number of asylum applications had reached record levels and affected integration of immigrants. Asylum seekers tended to leave again in larger numbers, in particular to other countries within Europe (two-thirds of all outflows). However, in 2000, 4 000 or 81% of the 5 900 refugees leaving Austria travelled to the United States, perhaps reflecting stricter admittance practices in other European countries.

e) Developments in labour migration

Some Western European countries make significant use of workers from the CEECs. Most initial work permits in Finland in 2000 (over 78%) were granted for temporary work, most applicants from neighbouring areas, above all Russia and Estonia (over 70% of initial work permits). Altogether, Russians and Estonians accounted for almost 74% of temporary workers; these were largely seasonal workers for agriculture and horticulture, especially strawberry pickers.

In Austria, the proportion of persons from CEECs in initial work-permit applications is increasing (by 21% on 1999), most importantly from Hungarians. In 2000, around 30% (7 500) came from CEECs, in particular from Hungary (2 700), the Slovak Republic (2 000), Poland (1 400) and Romania (700). Of the remaining 18 400 short-term foreign work permits, the major share went to citizens of the former Yugoslavia. Of all permanent licence holders, the proportion of citizens of CEECs has been rising from the early 1990s to 1998. Increasing intra-regional opportunities within the CEEC caused the recent decline.

In the case of the Czech Republic, the highest numbers of economic migrants are Slovaks, taking advantage of the special conditions to access the Czech labour market. Second and third most important foreign workers are Polish and Bulgarian. In Hungary, more than 15 000 Romanians and around 4 400 Ukrainians had work permits and formed the largest groups among the foreign labour force. Fourth after the Chinese came the Czechs, whose share is growing. The number of Polish workers in the Hungarian labour market has dropped drastically.

f) EU enlargement and the impact on migration

Ten CEECs are currently candidates for the next stage of European Union enlargement in 2005: Cyprus, the Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Malta, Poland, Slovak Republic and Slovenia. Other countries in the region will be included in subsequent waves of enlargement.

Recent discussions of enlargement among current EU members show that a number of them are apprehensive about inflows of CEEC workers after enlargement, under the principle of free movement of persons (see Box I.9). Accordingly, the accession treaties for the first wave of countries are likely to include a transitional clause, meaning that workers from CEEC countries cannot freely enter the labour market throughout the Union. Other countries, like Norway, look to CEECs for help in alleviating their labour shortages. Some estimates, however, indicate that the countries joining the European Union may well experience return movements by their nationals resident in the West. Net East-West flows could accordingly be smaller, or indeed negative, after the CEECs join the European Union (see for more detail *Migration Policies and EU enlargement. The Case of Central and Eastern Europe*. OECD, Paris 2000).

Conclusion

The movement of asylum seekers and migrants from the former Yugoslavia to Western European countries has diminished in recent years, and quite spectacularly in some countries, but continues to be – in 2000 – a major source of migrants for many OECD countries. Illegal border crossings account for a significant part of total movements of CEEC citizens, particularly in Hungary, Germany, Poland and Greece.

Clearly, East-West migration flows persist but inflows into most CEECs have increased and diversified. Most of these countries are becoming a prime

