

Senior Officials from the Centres of Government Network

High level meeting
1-2 December 2021

SESSION NOTES



THE GOVERNMENT
OF THE GRAND DUCHY OF LUXEMBOURG
Ministry of State

Session 1 – building government capacity to address global challenges

Global issues are a prominent part of national policies

1. Many of the policy challenges faced by OECD countries at the domestic level are increasingly global in nature and will only be effectively addressed through collective responses grounded in international co-operation. These global challenges include addressing the climate and biodiversity crisis, navigating the digital transformation, tackling global pandemics, managing global value chains of essential goods, fighting criminal transboundary networks, and a growing number of other critical issues.

2. In the present system of global governance, addressing global challenges starts at the national level. National governments have the mandate, resources, and primary responsibility to initiate global action, build coalitions of like-minded countries, engage with stakeholders, negotiate international agreements, and finance and implement practical action. International engagement and co-operation have increased significantly in recent decades, with each ministry, agency and even structural units collaborating with their peers in other countries. The role of foreign services has evolved more incrementally, and we are seeing some new approaches, for example in the establishment of Tech Ambassadors. Nonetheless, we need to question whether governments have yet fully developed the capacities and institutional set-ups required to successfully plan and implement public policies that address global issues.

3. Recent evidence from Korea, Spain and Sweden demonstrates that, while most of their populations believe mitigating climate change will improve the lives of people and agree that debt can be used for this purpose, they are not willing to support future-oriented climate policies as they have little confidence in their governments to deliver in a meaningful way (Fairbrother, 2021^[1]). Despite the fact that globalisation has dramatically changed the way we produce and consume, the mechanics and capacities of governments have stayed largely national. Considering the increasingly important nature of many global challenges, leaving them unaddressed effectively runs the risk of undermining citizen's trust in government, particularly among youth and younger generations, who will shoulder the heaviest burdens of unfolding crises in the future.

4. Centres of government, who serve the government as a whole, have a critical role to play in both steering action on the most significant global issues affecting countries and reporting back to citizens on progress made. Governments need to invest in a range of capabilities, including building international influence, developing the right skills and networks to collaborate internationally, enabling access to and sharing of data across governments, adopting new collaborative decision-making models, and establishing the institutional mechanisms to connect domestic and international policy agendas.


5. The COVID-19 crisis has both prompted progress in building these capacities and exposed significant weaknesses. Outward-looking governments can build on the momentum for effective multilateralism to confront the pandemic to step up action to tackle other pressing global challenges.

The role of the centre in identifying, mitigating, and addressing complex challenges

6. In a 2017 OECD survey on the organisation and functions of centres of government, respondents classified international co-ordination and international policy issues as a mostly 'shared' responsibility between themselves and other institutions, with foreign ministries taking the lead (OECD, 2018^[1]). On risk management, while 83% of centres responded that they assumed some degree of responsibility for the task, with over a third assuming primary responsibility, the most common functions for the centre remained at the reactive end of the scale, focused on the co-ordination of government operations in the event of a crisis (OECD, 2018^[2]). Less than one-third of centres surveyed had a role in scenario planning based on identifying and analysing novel, unforeseen or complex crises (OECD, 2018^[2]).

7. The capacity of government to manage risk was tested during the COVID-19 crisis. Central government institutions had to rapidly redesign processes for decision making and cross-governmental policy co-ordination during the start of the pandemic, as pre-existing structures were not always fit for addressing the multidimensional impacts of the crisis. Most OECD countries adapted the capacities and or the responsibilities of their centres of government (Figure 1) to better meet the challenge. Among the 26 OECD countries for which data are available, 77% of centres supported more cross-ministerial co-ordination activities, 73% involved more stakeholders in co-ordination meetings, and 46% enacted new protocols to support better data management.

Figure 1. Changes in centres of government during COVID-19 and planning of the recovery



Source: Presentation created for Government at a Glance 2021 using data from OECD (2021), Building a Resilient Response: The Role of Centre of Government in the Management of the COVID-19 Crisis and Future Recovery Efforts

8. Many countries also responded to the COVID-19 crisis with a renewed effort at international co-operation, triggering the rapid creation of new global governance bodies and interoperable systems. A clear example of this is the European Union Digital COVID Certificate (EUDCC) initiative. After being piloted in European Union and European Economic Area countries in July 2021, dozens of third-party countries have since joined the EUDCC gateway, meaning that the EUDCC is accepted for travel to these countries and that their local COVID certificates are accepted for travel into the EU. However, while there might be increasing awareness that domestic rule-making should take international considerations into account, this is not often put into practice. Recent OECD evidence shows that less than one-fifth of OECD members systematically reflect international dimensions in domestic rule-making.¹

¹ OECD (2021), *OECD Regulatory Policy Outlook 2021*, OECD Publishing, Paris, <https://doi.org/10.1787/38b0fdb1-en>.

9. There is an opportunity for governments to harness the evolution and innovation of government mechanisms during the COVID-19 crisis for better mitigating and managing other global challenges that are similar in nature. The climate and digital transitions provide further examples where the complexity and uncertainty of issues at stake and the confluence of interests to grapple with underline the need for governments to develop the right capabilities. Locking in lessons and drawing on partnerships made during the COVID-19 crisis can help governments to build more resilient economies and societies in the long term.

Government capacities required for effective action on global challenges

10. There are several core public governance functions and enablers that need to be transformed for governments to effectively address complex and multifaceted global issues. They can be grouped into three broad categories – steering and building consensus and trust, mobilising tools and investing in the workforce, and adapting institutions.

11. Centres of government are well placed to play a leading role in **steering and building consensus and trust on global issues**. Global challenges often have no clear-cut solutions, span multiple domains, and involve a variety of stakeholders with contending interests. Leadership in the form of a shared strategic vision outlining how it fits in the global agendas of other countries and organisations, including how that vision translates into economic and social decisions and behaviours at an individual, institutional, and societal level, can serve as a roadmap for all involved stakeholders.

12. It is no surprise that tackling global challenges requires governments to engage with a wide range of stakeholders, including both the public and private sectors. Tech and energy companies are among key actors for the digital transformation and the climate transition, respectively. Moreover, the scale of transformations and complexity of trade-offs involved in addressing global challenges requires governments to promote a two-way dialogue that promotes citizen participation in the decision-making process. Engaging citizens in the policy cycle in a meaningful way will help to demonstrate that global co-ordination will lead to better domestic outcomes for citizens, build trust in public institutions and strengthen the democratic mandate for governments to act on global commitments. Effective public communication that is transparent, inclusive, and responsive can help to facilitate this process.

13. Governments can also **mobilise various tools in their existing toolkits to address global challenges**. For example, for a number of global challenges, there are opportunities to use budgeting and tax policy tools to prioritise expenditure and boost investments to meet national and global targets (e.g., green budgeting). Policy coherence and co-ordination across national borders has been essential and well considered for decades in tax policies. The recent global agreement among 137 countries and jurisdictions to address tax challenges arising from the digitalisation of the economy is the most recent example of a joint approach to solving a global challenge. Sharing the lessons drawn from policy evaluation among countries and at international level can strengthen the global response to challenges.

14. Improving data governance at both national and international levels by agreeing on standards to ensure interoperability and establishing mechanisms for safe cross-border data exchanges is critical to governments' ability to identify, understand, and address any global challenge. Trusted digital identity will be decisive for global public service provision.

15. The rapid internationalisation of markets, goods, and flows as well as common threats such as COVID-19 presents unprecedented challenges to policy makers and regulators that cannot be dealt with unilaterally. By applying a stronger, more systematic international lens in their rulemaking practices, governments will be better equipped to learn from each other, and when needed, develop co-ordinated and consistent regulatory responses while preserving their national prerogatives.

Box 1. Country examples for good practices in promoting international regulatory co-operation

In **Canada**, international regulatory co-operation is formally embedded in its overarching regulatory policy framework, the Cabinet Directive on Regulation, which requires regulators to assess opportunities for co-operation and alignment with other jurisdictions, domestically and internationally, in order to reduce unnecessary regulatory burden on Canadian businesses while maintaining or improving the health, safety, security, social and economic well-being of Canadians, and protecting the environment. The Treasury Board Secretariat, a central oversight body in Canada, has 16 full-time employees responsible for supporting and co-ordinating efforts to foster international and domestic regulatory co-operation. This team works with regulators to ensure that they meet their obligations under the Cabinet Directive on Regulation and lead Canada's participation in different regulatory co-operation forums. The Treasury Board Secretariat also works closely with Global Affairs Canada to negotiate regulatory provisions in trade agreements.

In **New Zealand**, international regulatory co-operation considerations are embedded in core documents, including the Government Expectations for Good Regulatory Practice and the Government's Regulatory Management Strategy. Responsibility for oversight and promoting consideration of international regulatory co-operation is shared across several agencies: the Treasury's lead agency on good regulatory practice; the Ministry of Business, Innovation and Employment, taking the lead on promoting international regulatory coherence; and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade which acts as lead advisor and negotiator on trade policy and provides advice on the process for entering into international treaties.

Source: OECD (2021), International Regulatory Co-operation, <https://doi.org/10.1787/5b28b589-en>.

16. Governments must **invest in the talent management of their public workforce**, as the highly complex and technical nature of many global challenges requires public servants to be able to manage fast-shifting, complex policy priorities while having a global mind-set that allows them to influence and work together with peers on the international stage. Talent attraction and retention are also key to increasing the competencies of the civil service.

Box 2. Country examples for investment in global competencies of public workforces

In **Korea**, the Ministry of Personnel Management runs an overseas learning and development programme for central government civil servants that aims to foster a public workforce that is proficient in international affairs and apt to respond to the needs of future society. The programme is categorised into long-term (six months or longer) and short-term (less than six months) courses. Most notably, the long-term programme offered for high-ranking civil servants (director or director general level) cultivates the international competency of officials responsible for various international conferences and negotiations, with the aim of producing civil servants with international expertise by geographical region and policy area. Training takes place in foreign government institutions, international organisations, overseas graduate schools and research institutes. This programme is run in addition to secondment arrangements with various international organisations.

In the **Netherlands**, civil servants need to show mobility before advancing to senior civil service positions. Using a situation-dependent approach, one of the four mobility options considered is international placement. The Netherlands have also initiated an academy for international affairs, which

offers international education and training for central governments civil servants. Civil servants with an international focus in their work from all ministries can apply. Besides international competencies, this also promotes the whole-of-governments approach and network.

Source: Ministry of Personnel Management, Korea, <https://www.mpm.go.kr/mpm/info/infoEdu/eduPolicy03/eduLong/eduLong02/>; Ministry of the Interior and Kingdom Relations, the Netherlands.

17. Finally, governments can **adapt institutional mechanisms** to better address global challenges. For example, the interlinkages between global action and the domestic policy agenda require institutions at the centre of government to co-ordinate closely with the foreign affairs function. As global issues, such as digital transformation, require a whole-of-government response, vertical and horizontal co-ordination are critical. In order to achieve results on fast-evolving global issues, public administrations need institutional entrepreneurship and appropriate governance mechanisms that allow collaboration and experimentation; risk management, and, for instance, outcome-based procurement.

18. The nature of global challenges also calls for exploring innovative approaches to cross-border collaboration. Governments need to recognise their role in the global community and work with other governments and private sector stakeholders to co-design and empirically test innovative policy solutions to global challenges. Cross-border experimentation, for instance through international “regulatory sandboxes”, allows knowledge-sharing across jurisdictions by producing robust datasets for comparative analyses and evidence-based results to inform and scale successful public policy solutions. Such kinds of institutional entrepreneurship and governance mechanisms can also lay the groundwork for mission-oriented innovation, a purpose-driven approach where the public sector takes an active role in convening and co-ordinating actors around complex, cross-sectoral issues that cannot be solved by individual actors alone.

Box 3. Global Innovation Collaborative's Creative Cities as an example of innovative cross-border collaboration

The Global Innovation Collaborative is a network and platform for collaboration through which city governments from around the world launch open innovation competitions where solutions are deployed in local testbeds. Its mission is to leverage collective intelligence to produce new ideas and stimulate shared learning, with the goal of accelerating the economic recovery from COVID-19 and creating more resilient and sustainable cities. While policy responses to the pandemic have varied across countries at the national level, cities of similar sizes and socio-economic conditions have realised that they face similar challenges related to economic recovery, and face common long-term challenges beyond the pandemic.

Advantages include larger datasets to test innovations thanks to the sharing and pooling of key data for specific issue areas, greater cost efficiencies through shared procurement and economies of scale and improved shared learning opportunities. Beyond collaborating with participants and innovators, mayors and local government officials also co-operate with private sector actors that contribute to the funding and scaling of projects, and provide technical support and in-kind resources. The strength of the initiative ultimately lies in the ability of all partners to safely share data, learn from each other and collaborate in the development process of these innovations.

The platform's first and current Creative Cities challenge focuses on boosting the recovery of creative sectors in Berlin, London, New York and Paris. It is currently in its co-creation phase, with winners to be announced in December 2021.

Source: OECD Observatory of Public Sector Innovation (2021), "Achieving Cross-Border Government Innovation: Surfacing Insights and Experimenting Across Borders."

19. As the challenges facing governments become increasingly global, the need to secure the enforcement of transnational agreements, such as environmental targets, has also grown. New capabilities of justice systems to address transboundary impacts, coupled with more responsive and effective access to justice in these areas of growing concern, are essential tools for governments to maintain the trust of their citizens in their ability to handle such large challenges.

Key questions for discussion

- How can centres of government add value for meaningful international co-operation in national policy making?
- What new capacities and practices have emerged during the COVID crisis in the roles of centres of government to handle the global aspects of the pandemic (co-operation across centres of government in various countries, sharing of data across governments, new units and services in charge of collaboration with other countries)?
- What good approaches exist for better integrating the resources of foreign services and other public institutions in addressing global issues in policymaking?
- How have countries co-operated with the private sector and civil society to achieve global outcomes?

Session 2 - navigating the climate transition from the Centre

Climate change as an existential and democratic imperative

20. Momentum and urgency to address climate and other environmental pressures are building. The latest Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) Report calls climate change “widespread, rapid, and intensifying” (IPCC, 2021^[1]). Countries will continue to face substantial risks of major shocks, including frequent and intense climate hazards, which will be more severe the greater the level of warming. Faced with this stark reality, citizens are increasingly expressing their desire for governments to make climate change a priority. In 2021, 87% of Europeans agreed that tackling climate change should be a priority to improve public health, and 75% believed their national governments were not doing enough to tackle the issue (European Commission, 2021^[2]).

21. **But consensus around the urgency to tackle climate change is far from sufficient to ensure a successful climate transition.** Democratic governments face a number of challenges in addressing long-term, complex and interconnected issues, including short-termism driven by electoral cycles, difficulties in promoting evidence-based policies due to undue influence in policy making, the proliferation of mis- and disinformation, and the sheer breadth of climate-related evidence. Climate policy requires complex trade-offs and citizens will support policy action on climate if they trust that the costs are being fairly distributed. Much of the success of climate policies hinges on citizen’s trust in institutions and in governments’ ability to address the climate challenge. Trust levels and effective action on climate are interdependent – failure by governments to address environmental threats and reduced transparency in decision making around them could further erode trust in public institutions.

22. Against this backdrop, centres of government have a unique role to play in helping governments navigate the climate transition. The recent COP26 called for a “whole-of-government” and “whole-of-society” approach to climate action. Centres of government have a key role to play in setting the priorities and path forward, implementing changes in the machinery of government to deliver on green and building trust.


Making climate a priority in the midst of other challenges competing for attention

23. Not allowing climate action to be eclipsed by more immediately pressing matters is a major challenge for governments across the world. In today’s world of competing, interconnected and constantly evolving policy challenges, government focus can easily shift to address more immediate concerns. Centres of government play a particularly important role in leading the process of strategic prioritisation. This is critical to ensure the best use of the tools available to achieve the structural changes needed for the climate transition, such as greenhouse gas emission targets, taxes, green budgeting, regulation, infrastructure governance, and green procurement. Moreover, policies designed to mitigate climate change and steer societies and economies towards a green transition necessarily intersect with a wide variety of policy areas.

24. This tension is exemplified by post-COVID-19-recovery plans. 48% of surveyed governments indicated building a green economy was one of their top three priorities, however an overwhelming 78% of respondents suggested restoring growth to pre-pandemic level was also in the top 3 (see Figure 2).

Figure 2. Government priorities in support of the COVID-19 recovery effort

Percentage of governments for which each area is among their top three priorities




Note: Includes data from centres of governments in Belgium, Canada, Chile, Colombia, the Czech Republic, Denmark, Estonia, Finland, Germany, Hungary, Iceland, Israel, Italy, Korea, Latvia, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Mexico, Norway, Poland, Portugal, Sweden and Turkey.

Source: OECD (2021), Building a Resilient Response: The Role of Centre of Government in the Management of the COVID-19 Crisis and Future Recovery Efforts.

25. While government priorities on climate and COVID-recovery are not necessarily in opposition, governments have struggled to promote synergies and ensure that the overall net effect of recovery plans on climate protection will be positive. As a result, green recovery measures are only a small component of total COVID-19 spending (only 21% of recovery spending, or only around 4% of the USD 17 trillion rescue and recovery spending combined) and significant funds are still allocated to measures with likely environmentally negative and mixed impacts (see Figure 3).

Figure 3. Funding allocated to recovery measures by environmental impact (in USD Billion)



Note: NGEU (*NextGenerationEU*) refers to the share of recovery allocation at EU level earmarked for climate-related investments but not yet allocated to EU Member States.

Source: [OECD Green Recovery Database \(2021\)](#)

26. Several OECD countries have taken important steps to grant the issue of climate change horizontal importance across government decision-making in initiatives spearheaded by centres of government (see Box).

Box 4. Country approaches to help prioritise climate action

Austria has developed a climate strategy 2050, through which “legal projects at the federal and provincial level are to be subject to a mandatory climate review in order to prevent undesired adverse effects on the climate”.

New Zealand has taken numerous steps towards prioritisation of climate action. In 2019 it established the Climate Change Commission, an independent entity that develops and publishes five-year emissions budgets and potential transition pathways to meet them, leading towards the legislated goal of net zero emissions of long-lived gases by 2050. The Government is required to create and publish its plans to respond to the Commission’s budget by the end of March 2022. New Zealand also introduced a mechanism in November 2019 to ensure decision-making across all policy fields reflects climate objectives. All Cabinet decisions that will have a significant impact on New Zealand’s greenhouse gas emissions are being measured, monitored and reported on. The “[climate implications of policy assessment](#)” (CIPA) examines *ex ante* whether a policy proposal of a central government agency intends to reduce greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions or would generate significantly high emissions.² Climate change was also defined as one of only five priorities in the 2021 budget.

Sweden has created an 'Environmental Management System' at the Government Offices, which aims to include environmental considerations in all government action. This provides an instrument to streamline and facilitate environmental efforts in an organisation, integrating environmental considerations in normal operations by identifying and taking account of the environmental effects of decisions during their preparation.

Changes in the machinery of government can support the design, implementation and evaluation of climate policies

27. The Paris Agreement marked a shift in the centre of gravity of climate governance by placing ‘nationally determined contributions’ at the core of the global collective response. This turning point at the global level coincides with a proliferation of legislation, strategies and organisational structures to tackle climate change at the national level. Despite these trends, systematic comparative studies on how states organise themselves internally to address climate change and fulfil their global commitments are lacking.

28. Even so, it is possible to assess and identify trends and patterns surrounding climate governance by focusing on the institutional mechanisms in place to perform **three core functions of climate governance (see Table 1)**:

- **Set and steer** the overall national strategy for climate change action: Institutions steering and formulating climate change strategy range from highly embedded sectoral approaches, to top-down centralised bodies.
- **Co-ordinate** those actions horizontally across central institutions: The implementation of activities and climate action across stakeholders and agencies requires great levels of effective co-ordination. While in some countries the lead institution is the primary body tasked with co-

² Concretely, the CIPA mechanism leads to an automatic assessment of proposals with a direct impact on greenhouse gas emissions that is likely to be equal to or above 0.5 million tonnes CO₂-e within the first ten years of the proposal period. For forestry related proposals, this threshold is at or above 3 million tonnes of CO₂-e within the first 30 years of the proposal period.

ordination, a variety of other institutional arrangements can support these policy and planning processes.

- Fulfil international commitments with respect to **monitoring, reporting and verification (MRV)**: Global agreements and the commitments they entail have been a driving force in the reengineering of machineries of government.

29. These different functions are interdependent and thus can be pursued by the same institution. Nonetheless, these distinctions serve to convey trends and patterns in climate governance in a coherent manner.

Table 1. Typology of the core functions of climate governance with references to country examples

Core function of climate governance	Institutional mechanism			
<p>Set and steer overall national strategy for climate change action</p>	<p>Units situated within the CoG:</p> <p>A number of countries have established units to coordinate the climate agenda within the CoG. For example, Singapore has established a National Climate Change Secretariat in Singapore under the Prime Minister's Office. In Korea, the Office for Government Policy Coordination led the government-wide initiative for the launch of the Climate Change Task Force in 2015.</p>	<p>Dedicated commissions or boards:</p> <p>Countries have also established dedicated commissions, for example the <i>Conseil de défense écologique</i> (national defence council) in France, or the Comité de Concertation in Belgium.</p>	<p>Dedicated ministry of the environment:</p> <p>Ministries of environment have traditionally taken the lead in this area. For example the Colombian Ministry of Environment or the Ministry of Environment and Water in Bulgaria.</p>	<p>Other line ministries: In some countries climate strategies are characterised by a highly embedded and sectoral approach, in which the impulse for climate strategies stems mainly from line ministries.</p> <p>Climate policy in Australia for example is led by the Ministry of Industry and supported by a large number of agencies and organisations.</p>
<p>Coordinate actions horizontally across central institutions</p>	<p>Special advisors/Policy managers to coordinate climate action across governmental bodies. The United States for example, has created two high-level positions, namely the administration's Special Presidential Envoy for Climate and the National Climate Advisor.</p>	<p>Permanent intergovernmental committees or commissions are one of the most routine coordination mechanisms used to promote cohesive action. This model exists for example in Denmark, Finland, Germany, Ireland, Italy and the Netherlands (Russel, Castellari et al, 2020).</p> <p>In the United States, a National Climate Task</p>		<p>Creation of Climate "focal points" within line ministries and government agencies.</p>

		Force bringing together 21 public bodies.	
	Embeddedness of the MRV system in national decision-making		
Monitoring, reporting and verification	Integrated within decision-making at the national level , goes beyond supranational commitments about MRV under the UNFCCC and the European Union.	Fulfil supranational commitments about MRV under the UNFCCC and the European Union.	Do not fulfil supranational commitments about MRV under the UNFCCC and the European Union.

30. While formal institutional mechanisms for co-ordination can be helpful, changes in structures do not necessarily lead to behavioural changes if incentives to co-ordinate on climate change are not developed in parallel. Formal structures and mechanisms need to be complemented with other routines or techniques of engagement, such as requirements for *ex ante* policy analysis, performance management, knowledge portals, consultation groups and bodies, all of which are tools usually developed by centres of government.

Building trust through open communication and integrity in climate governance

31. Building public ownership and support is one of the key roles that governments can take to deliver on climate goals. Meaningful stakeholder participation should also be encouraged in the policy cycle, not only because it can help to build trust in public institutions and strengthen the democratic mandate for government to act on climate commitments, but also ensure greater effectiveness of the policies themselves.

32. Centres of government in particular are well placed to translate complex policy narratives into compelling communication outputs to prevent and react to the spread of mis- and dis-information. To respond to such efforts, highlighting scientific consensus can be one of the means to counter misinformation and raise public acceptance related to climate change. Other efforts include building constructive and transparent relationships with online platforms and fact-checkers; expanding media and information literacy efforts; advancing the understanding of the scientific data and trade-offs faced in the climate discussion; supporting public participation and fact-based journalism; and building a common narrative to inform citizens and channel them to trusted information and data sources. A good example of this is the EU Council's "Taking the Lead on Climate Change" campaign as it presents a clear source of information on the facts, effects, actions and next steps regarding climate change in Europe (OECD, Forthcoming).

33. The design and implementation of climate policies needs to take into account lobbying and other influence practices which can mis- or dis-inform the public, governments and investors. A wide range of economic sectors and industries have a stake in the outcome of climate policy debates and negotiations. With little transparency on who is behind groups who are questioning established climate science or have funded mis-represented climate-related campaigns, citizens may be confused and misled further undermining trust in government (OECD, Forthcoming).

34. Governments can consider several policy options to ensure greater transparency and integrity in climate governance. Lobbying registers can scale up lobbying disclosure requirements to include information on the objectives of lobbying activities, the beneficiaries, the targeted decisions and the types of practices used, including the use of social media as a lobbying tool. Key public officials involved in climate decision-making processes could make their diaries or agendas public. Governments could also mandate *ex post* disclosures of how legislative or regulatory decisions were made. The information

disclosed can include the identity of stakeholders met, public officials involved, the object and outcome of their meetings, and an assessment of how the inputs received were factored into the final decision.

Box 3. Approaches for greater transparency in lobbying

In Spain, the agendas of elected members of the government have been published on the government website since 2012. The agenda lists daily the visits and meetings in which members of the government participate. Each item discloses at least:

- the minister in charge, and other minister(s) assisting
- the time of the meeting
- the organisation met or visited.

In October 2020, the Boards of both Houses of the Spanish Parliament adopted a Code of Conduct for members of the Congress and the Senate, which requires the publication of the senators' and deputies' agendas, including their meetings with lobbyists. An agenda section is available on the webpage dedicated to each deputy.

Source:

<https://www.oecd-ilibrary.org/docserver/c6d8eff8-en.pdf?expires=1637338124&id=id&accname=ocid84004878&checksum=9E9A159E8ABC23A4003BB4FE65457A43>

Key questions for discussion

- What are the most difficult issues centres of government face in steering the climate transition?
- Which policy-making instruments can be used for reducing a short-term focus on decisions?
- How can we help key decision makers overcome opposition from vocal minority interests?
- What has worked in terms of public communication and engagement on climate?

