27-October-2009
Spanish, , 144kb
Los acuerdos para compartir impuestos y las transferencias entre niveles de gobierno constituyen dos fuentes de financiación a nivel subcentral a menudo difíciles de separar. La línea que los separa no está trazada de manera uniforme a lo largo de los países de la OCDE o a lo largo del tiempo y las reglas establecidas en publicaciones como Cuentas Nacionales o Estadísticas de los Ingresos Públicos proporcionan una orientación
27-October-2009
Spanish, , 415kb
El presente documento analiza las tendencias y la dinámica que rige la composición de los ingresos de los gobiernos subcentrales (GSC). Entre 1995 y 2005 la participación de los GSC en el gasto público total se ha incrementado significativamente del 31 al 33 por ciento mientras que la participación de los GSC en la recaudación de impuestos ha permanecido estable alrededor del 17%, aumentando significativamente la dependencia de los
17-June-2009
English, , 97kb
Tax sharing and intergovernmental grants are two sub-central funding arrangements that are often difficult to disentangle. The dividing line is not drawn uniformly across OECD countries or across time, and rules established in National Accounts, Revenue Statistics and others give incomplete guidance. Moreover, tax sharing arrangements may differ according to how tax revenue is distributed across individual jurisdictions. In order to
10-June-2009
English, , 146kb
This paper describes the progress that has been made since 2006 in establishing statistical databases on tax autonomy and intergovernmental grants, aiming to better understand sub-central finance and intergovernmental fiscal relations. The paper is divided into two parts: a first part on taxing power of sub-central governments, and a second part on intergovernmental grants. Some of the work presented here is an update of earlier
18-May-2009
English, , 369kb
This paper analyses trends and driving forces in the revenue composition of sub-central government (SCG). Between 1995 and 2005 the share of SCG in total government spending increased significantly from 31 to 33 percent while the SCG tax share remained stable at around 17 percent, increasing SCG’s dependence on intergovernmental grants. While equal access to public services is the most common justification for such grants, the grant
18-May-2009
English, , 201kb
This pilot study presents indicators that assess sub-central government (SCG) spending power by policy area. Traditional indicators – such as the share of SCG in total government spending – are often misleading as they underestimate the impact of central government regulation on sub-central spending patterns. In order to gauge true spending power, a set of institutional indicators is established, based on a detailed assessment of
13-June-2008
English, , 791kb
This report examines the use of indicator systems for measuring and monitoring the delivery of sub-central public services. Specifically, the report aims to assess if and how central governments use such systems, the critical choices they face when designing and implementing them, and the constraints under which the systems operate. Particular attention is given to the rationale for using indicators in the context of intergovernmental
26-May-2008
English, , 446kb
This paper compares and analyses the use of market mechanisms in core sub central policy areas, namely education, health care, transport, social protection, and environment. Arrangements like tendering, outsourcing, user choice and competition, user fees and performance-related funding can help to improve quality of service provision or lower its cost. With around 32% of total public expenditure and often wide-ranging spending powers,
5-September-2007
English, , 584kb
Fiscal equalisation is a transfer of resources across jurisdictions to offset disparities in revenue raising capacity or public service cost. It covers 2.5 percent of GDP or 5 percent of total government expenditure across OECD countries. Equalisation reduces fiscal disparities by two third on average and in some countries levels them virtually out. Strong equalisation comes at a price: on average, around 70 percent of a
11-September-2006
English, , 239kb
A study of grant design that integrates both theoretical and empirical insights from the fiscal federalism literature, and information obtained directly from practitioners concerning their experiences with the implementation of different types of grants.