


# Abstraction charges: how can the theory guide us ?

Antonio Massarutto  
University of Udine and IEFE-Bocconi  
[antonio.massarutto@uniud.it](mailto:antonio.massarutto@uniud.it)


Oecd Expert Meeting on “Sustainable financing for water services: from theory to practice”  
Paris, November 14-15, 2007

# Transactions along the value chain of the water sector



# Conflicting sustainability targets

- Ecological ⇔ water as a scarce environmental resource
  - Guarantee that water use < carrying capacity
  - Maintain water-associated ecosystem services
- Economic ⇔ water as a scarce resource having an economic value
  - Guarantee that available resources are allocated efficiently
  - High-value uses should have priority
- Financial ⇔ water services as economic activities
  - maintain and develop artificial assets
  - achieve financial viability
  - Cost recovery
  - Attract adequate €, technologies, skills etc into the water service
- Ethical ⇔ water as a social right
  - Satisfy basic water demands in an affordable way
  - share resources and financial costs equitably
  - decide in a democratic, transparent and accountable way




$\Delta$  costs + FCR =  $\Delta$ p  
 $\Delta$ tech =  $\Delta$ priv  
 Need for equalization


# Financial cost vs. resource cost

- Financial cost
  - opportunity cost of L and K used for providing water services
  - occurs necessarily any time a water service is needed
  - water infrastructure as imperfect public goods  $\Leftrightarrow$  no (or little) rival; high costs of exclusion
- Resource cost
  - (eventual) opportunity cost of water resource
  - depends on resource scarcity and contemporary rival demand for THE SAME water resource AT THE SAME TIME
  - = value of alternative uses that have to give up OR cost of the cheapest available resource that can substitute
  - In Europe, = 0 most of the time
- Environmental cost
  - opportunity cost of other environmental resources (eventually) affected
  - no relation with water quantity but rather on the way water is supplied and used

# Optimal allocation of water, water scarcity and resource costs



# Scarcity cost in the Jucar basin (Spain)



Source: Brouwer, 2004

# Summing FC, RC, EC ?

- The approach of the WFD
  - Full-cost recovery (FC+RC+EC)
  - Assumption that internalization of the full cost is a prerequisite of sustainable and efficient use of water
  - Assumption that under-pricing is the main cause of excess demand
- Is this the right approach ?
  - Sustainability targets are conflicting and require different approaches to pricing
  - Most part of the cost is financial and regards L/K, not water ⇔ achieving WFD targets requires investment
  - The problem with water is not its scarcity, but the fact that it is heavy and costly to mobilize

# Pricing aims and approaches

| Sustainability principle | Aim of water pricing                         | Marginal cost | Full cost | Volumetric price | Perequation Admitted |
|--------------------------|--|---------------|-----------|------------------|----------------------|
| Ecology                  | Reduce pressure on natural resources         | No            | No        | Yes (incr)       | No                   |
|                          | Encourage water-saving                       | No            | No        | Yes (incr)       | No                   |
|                          | Improve water quality                        | Yes (weak)    | No        | No               | No                   |
| Economic efficiency      | Allocate water to the most beneficial uses   | Yes           | No        | Yes              | No                   |
|                          | Avoid over-investment in facilities          | No            | Yes       | Sometimes        | No                   |
|                          | Efficient use of existing facilities         | Yes           | No        | Yes (decr)       | No                   |
|                          | Ensure x-efficiency and avoid monopoly rents | Yes           | No        | No               | No                   |
| Cost recovery            | Ensure viability of water management systems | No            | Yes       | No               | Yes                  |
|                          | Maintain asset value over time               | No            | Yes       | No               | Yes                  |
|                          | Guarantee remuneration of inputs             | Yes           | Yes       | No               | Yes                  |
|                          | Sustainable investment                       | No            | Yes       | No               | Yes                  |
| Ethical / social         | Share costs in a fair way                    | No            | Yes       | Yes              | Yes                  |
|                          | Ensure affordability for merit uses          | No            | No        | No               | Yes                  |


# Abstraction charges

- Source of revenue:
  - for the government and the general budget (eg Germany)
  - for supplying ear-marked budgets (eg France)
  - for recovering administrative cost (eg Italy, E&W)
- Environmental incentive
  - aimed at water saving
  - aimed at reducing leakage and incentivate investment for better management systems
  - aimed at addressing users to alternative sources
- Other possibilities
  - $p = RC$  as a way to compensate low-value uses that have to be phased out
  - economic instruments as a way to foster Coase-like bargaining among users / stakeholders
  - $p$  as a way to segregate high-value and low-value uses addressing them to separate systems

# Evidence of double dividends is scarce

- Difficult implementation
  - resource costs depend on rival demand on the same water resource, therefore  $p$  should vary accordingly
- The response of water demand / final users
  - elasticity depends on readily available alternatives
  - uses that are already established have a very high WTP and very low elasticity
  - incentive to water saving is scarce unless the value of the AC is very high (FC is the dominant cost)
  - depends on the structure and not on the level of tariffs
- The response of water service operators
  - depends on the possibility of pass-through on tariffs
  - trade-off between collective systems (high FC, low MC) and individual systems (high MC)
- The response of agriculture
  - very low effects until  $p < \text{“exit threshold”}$
  - if  $p > \text{exit threshold}$ , low value uses are phased out, but water demand becomes more inelastic and can even grow

# Water prices as environmental taxes



# Some suggestions

- Abstraction charges  $\neq$  magic stick
  - no invisible hand doing the job for us
  - recovering RC+EC is fascinating but not very useful
  - no guarantee that internalization of RC is strong enough for reducing demand below carrying capacity
  - pricing useful for allocating available resources in an efficient way, provided that enforcement of abstraction rights is guaranteed by other means
- Abstraction charges, as all economic incentives, have different effects according to the point of the value chain that is addressed and its incidence
- Abstraction charges (and discharge taxes) as useful ways to create ear-market budgets and gear low-cost finance of water investment