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Trust: What it is and Why it Matters for Governance and Education

Lucie Cerna

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TRUST: WHAT IT IS AND WHY IT MATTERS FOR GOVERNANCE AND EDUCATION

Education Working Paper No. 108

Lucie Cerna

This Working Paper was prepared for the Governing Complex Education Systems (GCES) project and explores why trust matters for policymaking and governance. It examines the different types, roles and measurements of trust, and where trust fits within current governance issues. More specifically it analyses the relationship between trust and different elements including complexity, asymmetries, cooperation/collaboration, accountability and professionalization. The paper also provides some empirical examples from education governance and identifies several research gaps on trust.

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ABSTRACT

Trust is indispensable for social and economic relations; it is the glue that holds organisations together and appears to work somehow mysteriously. Overall, trust is a ubiquitous ingredient in policymaking and implementation across many governance systems including education, whether it concerns accountability mechanisms, capacity building or strategic thinking. Yet our understanding, conceptualisation and measurement of these issues remain limited. This working paper asks the question: *what is trust and how does it matter for governance, especially in education systems?* It explores why trust is key for policymaking and where it fits within current governance issues. The paper examines different definitions of trust, presents various ways of measuring trust and discusses some of their benefits and limitations. It proposes a definition of trust made up of three parts: trust as an expectation, a willingness to be vulnerable and a risk-taking act. The paper then presents a simple model of trust and governance and reviews the relationship between trust and different elements in education systems, such as complexity, asymmetries in information and power, collaboration/cooperation, monitoring and accountability, and professionalisation. It concludes with some policy findings and identifies several research gaps.

RÉSUMÉ

La confiance est un élément indispensable des relations sociales et économiques. Véritable ciment des organisations, elle semble fonctionner mystérieusement. Globalement, la confiance est un ingrédient omniprésent dans l'élaboration et la mise en œuvre des mesures d'action publique dans de nombreux systèmes de gouvernance, y compris dans le domaine de l'éducation, qu'il s'agisse des mécanismes de responsabilisation, du renforcement des capacités ou de la réflexion stratégique. Or, notre compréhension, notre conceptualisation et notre évaluation de ces questions restent limitées. Le présent document de travail pose la question suivante : *qu'est-ce que la confiance et quelle est son importance pour la gouvernance, en particulier dans les systèmes d'éducation* ? Ce document examine les raisons pour lesquelles la confiance est primordiale pour l'élaboration des mesures d'action publique et à quel niveau elle s'inscrit dans les questions actuelles de gouvernance. Ensuite, il aborde les différentes définitions de la confiance et présente plusieurs manières de mesurer la confiance tout en évoquant leurs points forts et faibles. Il propose une définition de la confiance en trois parties : la confiance comme une attente, une volonté d'être vulnérable et un acte de prise de risque. Enfin, ce document présente un simple modèle de confiance et de gouvernance et analyse la relation entre la confiance et des éléments différents des systèmes d'éducation, comme la complexité, les asymétries d'information et de pouvoir, la collaboration/coopération, la surveillance et l'obligation de rendre des comptes, et la professionnalisation. Il termine par quelques conclusions pour l'action publique et identifie certaines lacunes dans la recherche.

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GLOSSARY

Accountability: refers to holding those actors delivering governance to the society to be accountable for their actions.

Agency costs: costs to the principal of an agency relationship (see *Agency theory* below). They are composed of: *(1)* the monitoring expenditures by the principal designed to limit the deviating activities of the agent, *(2)* the bonding expenditures by the agent to guarantee not to take certain actions which would harm the principal or to ensure that the principal will be compensated if he does take such action and *(3)* residual loss (i.e. cost of agency relationship).

Agency theory: based on a contractual relationship between one party (i.e. the principal), who delegates certain tasks to another party (i.e. the agent). The goal is to design a contract that minimises the costs to the principal of this agency relationship (i.e. agency costs).

Asymmetry of information: exists because the principal does not have complete information on the competence of the agent or the amount of effort invested by the agent to the tasks. Without any information asymmetry, there would be no agency costs.

Asymmetry of power: exists because one of the partners has more power than another one and can use it to his/her benefit. This complicates governance problems.

Benevolence: confidence that a person or group will protect one's well-being and interests.

Calculus-based trust: trust emerges when the trustor perceives that it is in the trustee's rational interest to perform a beneficial action. The incentives for the trustee may come from the existence of deterrence but also due to credible information on the intentions or competence of another agent.

Collective trust: trust that groups have in another party (individuals, other groups or organisations)

Competence: when a person is dependent on another and some level of skill is involved in fulfilling an expectation, a person who means well but does not have the competence cannot be trusted.

Confidence: used when risk to trustor is low. It does not require a previous engagement on the trustee's part, recognising and accepting that risk exists (in contrast to trust).

Cooperation/collaboration: refers to a mutually beneficial and well-defined relationship between two or more organisations (or individuals or institutions) to achieve common goals.

Deterrence-based trust: emphasises utilitarian considerations that enable one party to believe that another will be trustworthy because the costs of sanctions for breaching trust are greater than any potential benefits from opportunistic behaviour.

Generalised trust: trust towards strangers arising when a community shares a set of moral values in such a way that it creates expectations of regular and honest behaviour. It is extended to people on whom the trusting party has no direct information.

Honesty: refers to character, integrity and authenticity.

Horizontal accountability: assumes non-hierarchical relationships. It is directed at how schools and teachers conduct their profession and/or at how schools and teachers provide multiple stakeholders with insight into their educational processes, decision-making, implementation and results.

Incentive: something which motivates individuals/agents to take a particular course of action.

Individual trust: trust that an individual has in another party.

Institutional trust: Institutional factors can act as broad support for trust that sustains further risk taking and trusting behaviour. It analyses the degree in which individuals have confidence in institutions such as the parliament, the government, the police and the military.

Interpersonal trust: based on face-to-face contacts, long-term acquaintance and mutual reliable credentials.

Monitoring: one action or mechanism that stakeholders can use to hold other actors accountable for their actions. It refers to a continuing function which seeks to provide the main stakeholders of an ongoing project or programme with early indications of progress, or lack thereof, in the achievement of results.

Multiple stakeholder accountability: means of generating trust in the community. Schools are accountable to learners, parents, stakeholders and the community at large.

Openness: extent to which relevant information is shared and actions and plans are transparent.

Organisational trust: trust (of a trustor) in an organisation (the trustee). It refers to the positive expectations individuals have about the intents and behaviours of multiple organisational members based on organisational roles, relationships, experiences and interdependencies.

Particularised trust: takes place in face-to-face interactions and can be thought of as reputation. It is based on a personal association with the trustee and can be extended to easily comprehended groups (e.g. family, friends and colleagues).

Professional accountability: means of trusting teachers by fostering teacher professionalism, developing professional standards, promoting collaboration and professional learning communities and updating pedagogical knowledge of teachers.

Relational trust: emerges from repeated interactions over time between trustor and trustee. It can also refer to an organisational property whose constitutive elements are socially defined in the reciprocal exchanges which take place in a school community.

Reliability: extent to which one can rely upon another for action and goodwill.

Transaction cost: cost incurred during transactions between stakeholders, such as costs of negotiating and writing contracts, monitoring contractual performance, enforcing contractual promises and addressing breaches of contractual promises.

Trustworthiness: refers to honesty, authenticity and integrity of people's actual behaviour. It is the ability and willingness to go beyond material self-interest to take into account more altruistic, other-regarding motives of justice, loyalty, legitimate conduct and friendship.

Vertical accountability: is top-down and hierarchical. It enforces compliance with laws and regulation and/or holds schools accountable for the quality of education they provide.

INTRODUCTION

"Trust is the glue that holds an organisation together" (Forsyth, Adams and Hoy, 2011: 111). As the quote suggests, trust is an important binding agent in society. Even though everyone knows what it is, articulating a precise definition and measuring trust is no simple matter as it can be both an emotion and a rational decision (Palaszkiewicz, 2011), and also depends on the context.

Trust "appears to work somewhat mysteriously" (Uslaner, 2000: 569). But how mysterious is it really? What can be said about its underlying mechanisms? This is an important question to consider, as trust is a ubiquitous ingredient in policymaking and implementation, whether it concerns accountability mechanisms, capacity building or strategic thinking. Some scholars have argued that more trusting societies reach compromises on major issues of public policy - including education - more readily (Putnam, 1993; Uslaner, 2002). Trust is often considered one, if not the key component for policy reform for different policy areas. This paper seeks to answer the question: *what is trust and how does it matter for governance, especially in education systems?*

Trust is indispensable for social and economic relations. In times when crisis response and reforms are on the agenda, governments are increasingly under pressure to implement more efficient and effective policies and accountability mechanisms while at the same time trying to maintain and rebuild the trust of their citizens. Trust is thus an important variable in policymaking across a variety of policy areas, including education. In Finland, for example, the trust in teachers is so strong that school inspections do not even take place – instead, the system functions by trusting in a high level of professionalism and professional ethics of teachers and school leaders. In many other countries, school inspections are a tool of quality control that could be interpreted as a lack of trust in schools and practitioners. Similarly, autonomy in curriculum design and planning could indicate trust in school leaders and municipal authorities (Burns, 2012).

While there is general agreement on the importance of trust, the question of definition and measurement is much more difficult. Broadly, trust can be regarded as the degree to which a trustor perceives a trustee as trustworthy (Bryk and Schneider, 2002). But to what form of trust (such as interpersonal, organisational or institutional) does it refer? Do existing surveys and barometers really capture trust or are they actually only measuring proximal issues like confidence and missing the larger order issue of trust as a whole?

Many uncertainties also arise regarding the role of trust in governance, for instance: is there a greater need for trust in complex governance systems than in simple, linear systems? Why might that be? Perhaps, higher trust levels are necessary in complex systems due to the number of stakeholders involved, who interact in complex ways. However, the complexity of governance systems might reduce trust levels as reliance on complex governance itself may signal a lack of trust to exchange partners.

Trust in complex systems is an important issue for many policy fields including education. The question arises whether education policy is a special field since trust levels towards education systems tend to be higher than towards national governments and many other public sectors (see Figure 1). More specifically, in 2013, average confidence was the highest in local police (71%), followed by health care (68%), education (66%), the judicial system (52%) and the least in national government (41%).

Figure 1. Confidence in different segments of government, average (percentage)



Note: The wording of the questions varied. Data for healthcare are from 2008. Figure includes available OECD and non-OECD countries.
Source: Gallup World Poll, 2013.

This paper proceeds in the following way. The first section discusses why trust matters in policymaking and governance. The second examines different definitions of trust, presents various ways of measuring trust and discusses some of their benefits and limitations. The third section proposes a simple model of trust and governance and discusses topics associated with governance in education systems, such as complexity, asymmetries in information and power, collaboration/cooperation, monitoring and accountability, and professionalisation. The last section concludes and identifies some research gaps. An *Appendix* provides detailed information on existing surveys and barometers of interpersonal and institutional trust.

WHY TRUST MATTERS

There is an acknowledgement in the literature that trust is important in governance, for several reasons (see Klijn, Edelenbos and Steijn, 2010).[1] First, trust reduces transaction costs which are costs incurred during an economic exchange, such as communication and informational costs, legal fees and enforcement costs (Maccoby, 1998; Rousseau et al., 1998). Trust decreases the risk inherent to transactions and cooperative relations since it creates greater predictability for exchanges between two parties (Kramer and Tyler, 1996). In situations where the actors trust each other, the likelihood of unexpected interactions as a consequence of opportunistic behaviour is smaller. This could be an important advantage in complex governance systems, where the involvement of multiple stakeholders increases the burden of coordination, opens the possibility for more conflict of interest and increases economic costs by making possible false starts and errant programmes.

Second, trust increases the probability that actors will invest their resources, such as money and knowledge, in cooperation, which creates stability in the relationship and provides a stronger basis for cooperation[2] (Deutsch, 1958; Nooteboom, 1998; Parker and Vaidya, 2001; Ring and Van de Ven, 1992; Sako, 1998). In governance networks, the complexity of decision-making and multiplicity of actors require investments in forming and maintaining relations (Agranoff and Mcguire, 2003). Trust can stimulate that investment and the effort actors put in those relations.

Third, trust can facilitate innovation because it can reduce uncertainty about opportunistic behaviour. This is important in a high stakes and traditionally risk adverse field like education. Trust increases the feeling that other actors will exercise their goodwill in the joint search for innovation solutions and creates safe spaces for innovative approaches and the exchange of ideas (e.g. Chiles and McMackin, 1996; Deutsch, 1973; Lundvall, 1993; Nooteboom, 2002b,2010; Parker and Vaidya, 2001; Ring and Van de Ven, 1992; Shockley-Zalabak, Ellis and Winograd, 2000; Woolthuis, 1999; Zand, 1972). In many cases, vertical integration, where research is performed "in-house", is chosen to incentivise innovation, but it tends to reduce differences in ideas and expertise, which has a negative effect on future innovation. However, research shows that vertical integration is not necessarily an option in governance networks (Koppenjan and Klijn, 2004). This means that trust as a horizontal coordinating mechanism is one of the few options left for fostering innovation (Klijn, Edelenbos and Steijn, 2010: 198). In the quest for innovation, there is more need and more room for trust (Nooteboom, 2010).

Consensus building is also necessary for innovation in teaching methods and arrangements. Trust in the education system impacts not only the functioning of the system, but also the actions of individual actors. It can be a cause, an effect or a moderator. For example it facilitates: *(1)* consensus building across

[1] Other arguments have been proposed for why trust matters. For instance, trust can make a difference in learning and exchange of information (see Edelenbos and Klijn, 2006; Lundvall, 1993; Nooteboom, 1998; Sorensen and Torfing, 2007*),* as well as social capital (see Fukyama, 1996; Guiso et al., 2011; Herreros, 2004; Herreros and Criado, 2008; Putnam, 1993,2000; Scrivens and Smith, 2013; Uslaner, 2002*).* On the cognitive and affective processes that make individuals trust others, see Allison and Messick, 1990; Kramer, 1999; Messick and Liebrand, 1995; Parks and Komorita, 1997; Uzzi, 1997.

[2] Both points two and three are called "hold-up problems" (see Che and Sákovics, 2008). It means that two people try to invest jointly in something, knowing that if the other person walks out, the investment is lost.

multiple stakeholders and different levels of government, *(2)* the functioning, status and professionalisation of teachers and school leaders and *(3)* the educational planning of students and their parents (Burns, 2012). Research indicates that different forms of trust support the work of teachers and schools' effectiveness, improvement and reform, and affect teacher's job satisfaction as well as orientation towards innovation[3] and professionalism (e.g. Bryk and Schneider, 2002; Forsyth, Adams and Hoy, 2011; Goddard, Tschannen-Moran and Hoy, 2001; Hoy and Tschannen-Moran, 1999; Louis, 2007; Smith, Hoy and Sweetland, 2001; Tierney, 2006; Tschannen-Moran, 2009; Van Maele and Van Houtte, 2012).

Even though trust levels are generally high, Figure 2 shows that institutional trust in education systems varies widely. In 2013, Ireland, Iceland and Finland had the greatest confidence in their education system with over 80 per cent, whereas the Russian Federation, Greece, Brazil and Chile had the lowest levels with around 45 per cent. Some of this difference could be due to the local versus national division of governance, as respondents might think about their local school rather than national politicians at higher levels. Comparing two points in time, 2005 and 2013, confidence levels in education system decreased significantly[4] in some countries (e.g. Brazil, Chile, New Zealand, Portugal and the Russian Federation) and increased significantly in others (e.g. Estonia, Finland, Germany, Indonesia, Israel, Italy, the Netherlands, Poland, Turkey and the United Kingdom). In the other countries, levels stayed more or less the same.

Figure 2. Confidence in education system (percentage)



Notes: Missing data for some countries for 2005. Data for Australia, Canada, Chile, the Czech Republic, Estonia, Germany, Hungary, Iceland, Israel, the Netherlands, Poland, Portugal, the Russian Federation, the Slovak Republic, Sweden, Turkey, the United Kingdom and the United States are from 2006. Data for the Czech Republic are from 2012.
Source: Gallup World Poll, 2013.

Despite the aforementioned benefits of trust, "trust is neither normatively good nor bad, it is neither a virtue nor a vice" (Levi, 1998: 81). Many individuals treat trust as something good and desirable, but it is

[3] For example, in schools with high teacher collegial trust, teachers are more oriented towards innovation as they are more willing to try new practices and are more open to change (Bryk and Schneider, 2002; Moolenaar and Sleegers, 2010; see also Louis, 2007).
[4] Significant indicates that change was at least ±5%.

not necessarily clear why this should be the case. Trusting may have productive consequences for an individual, yet may or may not be beneficial to his/her society. For instance, Langfred (2004) finds that trust can lead to a performance loss as too much trust can be harmful in self-managing teams with high levels of individual autonomy. This contradicts views in which trust is always regarded as a benefit to teams and organisations. Active distrust (to be distinguished from simple lack of trust or mistrust[5]) may be a normatively appropriate response. Progress has been made in some scientific and medical domains over the last century – for example hospitals reviewed procedures after every incident (Cannon and Edmonson, 2005) and professionals engaged in active distrust of each other, leading to important advancements in medical practices. When important interests diverge, such as between workers and management, a good reason exists to be wary of each other (Levi, 1998). Distrust can even be a basis for efficient organisation (see Gambetta, 1993). Therefore, trust is not a simple "either/or" matter because the degree to which one trusts another varies along a continuum of intensity (Williams, 2001: 379). In addition, as O'Neill (2013) argues in her TED talk, the important question is when to trust and whom to trust, and not trust *per se*. This has also consequences for measurement questions.

[5] Mistrust and distrust are often used as synonyms. However, distrust can be defined as a "lack of confidence in the other, a concern that the other may act so as to harm one, that he does not care about one's welfare or intends to act harmfully, or is hostile" (Grovier, 1994: 240). Mistrust in a general sense means unease toward someone or something.

DEFINITIONS OF TRUST

Trust is a rather elusive concept. It can be an expectation, an interaction, a belief, an emotion or a social coordination mechanism. Approaches focusing on individual behaviours, such as rational choice theory, depict strategic and calculative notions of trust (Gilson, 2003; Lyon, 2000). Trust is viewed as a means of reducing the complexity and risks that come from the autonomy and freedom of others. In contrast, affective understandings consider trust as emotionally based and rooted in assumptions of shared moral values (Bloom, Standing and Lloyd, 2008: 2078). Here, emotional and social influences affect trust decisions and differ by context (see Granovetter, 1985; Kramer, 1999).

"Articulating a precise definition of trust is no simple matter" (Hoy and Tschannen-Moran, 1999: 185). As Levi (1998: 78) argues, "trust is a holding word for a variety of phenomena that enable individuals to take risks in dealing with others, solve collective action problems or act in ways that seem contrary to standard definitions of self-interest". That is why Seppänen, Blomqvist and Sundqvist (2007) find that there are major inconsistencies in the conceptualisation, operationalisation and measurement of trust. Hence, from a policy and governance view, a consensus definition is needed.

Coming up with a consensus definition is not an easy task though. For this purpose, the paper proposes a definition made up of three constituent parts: trust as "an expectation, a willingness to be vulnerable and a risk-taking act" (McEvily et al., 2003: 93; see Figure 3). More specifically, trust is an *expectation* that other members of the community will behave in a cooperative and honest way (Fukuyama, 1996; also Hoy and Kupersmith, 1985; Van Houtte, 2007), a "*willingness to be vulnerable* based on the confidence that the other party is benevolent, reliable, competent, honest and open" (Hoy and Tschannen-Moran, 1999: 189) and a dynamic process in which parties are involved in a series of interactions which require some *risk-taking* or faith (Becerra and Gupta, 1999; Tierney, 2006). Characterised as a process, trust as an expectation is perceptual or attitudinal, trust as a decision reflects free will or intentionality and trust as an action indicates a behaviour manifestation (McEvily et al, 2003: 93, see Figure 3).

Figure 3. Three constituent parts of trust



Source: Dietz and Den Hartog, 2006: 564, based on McEvily et al, 2003.

The education literature mostly focuses on the facet of trust as a decision, or the "willingness to be vulnerable based on the confidence that the other party is benevolent, reliable, competent, honest and open" (Hoy and Tschannen-Moran, 1999: 189) (see Box 1).

Box 1. Five facets of trust

The five facets of trust (i.e. benevolence, reliability, competence, honesty and openness) approach has been developed within the school context. It provides a definition of how (groups of) school members have trust in other school members or in the school organisation (Forsyth, Adams and Hoy, 2011; Hoy and Tschannen-Moran, 1999; Van Maele and Van Houtte, 2009).

- *Benevolence* is the confidence that the trusted person or group will protect one's interests. People depend on the goodwill of others (Forsyth, Adams and Hoy, 2011: 18).
- *Reliability* is the extent to which one can rely upon another for action and goodwill. It is important to combine reliability with benevolence. Reliability indicates a sense of confidence that one's needs will be met in positive ways (Forsyth, Adams and Hoy, 2011: 18). For instance, teachers rely on students to apply their best effort and complete assignments (Goddard, Salloum and Berebitsky, 2009).
- *Competence* refers to the ability to achieve desired outcomes. A person who means well but does not have the competence cannot be trusted, especially in the case of dependency and the involvement of some level of skill in the fulfilment of an expectation (Forsyth, Adams and Hoy, 2011: 19; see also Baier, 1986; Butler and Cantrell, 1984; Mishra, 1996).
- *Honesty* refers to character, integrity and authenticity. Truthful statements conform to "what really happened" from that person's perspective and when one's word about future actions is kept (Forsyth, Adams and Hoy, 2011: 18). Most scholars see honesty as a key ingredient of trust (Cummings and Bromiley, 1996).
- *Openness* is the extent to which relevant information is shared, and actions and plans are transparent. Openness makes individuals vulnerable because it signals a kind of reciprocal trust – a confidence that information revealed will not be exploited and that recipients can feel the same confidence in return (Forsyth, Adams and Hoy, 2011: 19). Openness in the relationships between teachers and the principal as well as openness in relationships among teachers are both closely related to the degree of trust in the school (Forsyth, Adams and Hoy, 2011: 8).

Forms of trust: interpersonal, organisational and institutional trust

Forms of trust (Table 1) differ widely, ranging from interpersonal, to organisational and institutional trust (Giddens, 1990; Granovetter, 1985; Luhman, 1979; Nooteboom, 2002a). Interpersonal trust is based on "face-to-face contacts, long-term acquaintance and mutual reliable credentials" (Bahre and Smets, 1999: 53). It can be divided into particularised and generalised trust (Uslaner, 2000). Particularised trust takes place in face-to-face interactions and can be thought of as reputation. It is based on a personal association with the trustee and can be extended to easily comprehended groups (e.g. family, friends and colleagues) (Stolle, 2002). Generalised trust is trust towards strangers arising when "a community shares a set of moral values in such a way as to create regular expectations of regular and honest behaviour" (Fukuyama, 1996). It is extended to people on whom the trusting part has no direct information (Bjørnskov, 2006; Freitag and Bühlmann, 2009).

Some studies have looked at *interpersonal* trust within educational settings (e.g. Adams and Christenson, 2000; Daly, 2009; Moolenaar and Sleegers, 2010; Van Houtte, 2007; Van Maele and Van Houtte, 2011). Many schools have weak levels of interpersonal trust among adult employees, even if some small groups of teachers might have high trust (Goddard, Tschannen-Moran and Hoy, 2001; Louis, 2007). Interpersonal trust can take place in different forms: between principal and teacher, teacher and teacher, professionals and parents, and professionals and students.[6]

For instance, Forsyth, Adams and Hoy (2011) focus on *collective trust*[7], which is the trust that groups have in individuals and in other groups. Both principals and teachers play an important role in schools, and thus their trust is a key factor (Goddard et al., 2001; Hoy and Kupersmith, 1985; Smith, Hoy and Sweetland, 2001). Studies indicate that when principals are trustworthy, they set a tone that influences how teachers relate to one another, and that where teachers are trustworthy with one another, they are more likely to extend that trust to their students (Tschannen-Moran, 2009).

Others (e.g. Bryk and Schneider, 2002) have focused on *relational* trust, which is an organisational property whose constitutive elements are socially defined in the reciprocal exchanges that take place in a school community. It is achieved through a complex web of social exchanges, often in instances where the parties have unequal or asymmetrical power relationships. To some extent, it links interpersonal trust with organisational trust.[8]

Organisational trust refers to trust (of a trustor) in an organisation (the trustee). It is defined as positive expectations individuals have about an organisation (see Luhmann, 1979; Misztal, 1996). Trust can be experienced differentially by employees with different networks and experiences (Shockley-Zalabak, Ellis and Winograd, 2000). The focus here lies on intra-organisational trust (within an organisation), though other forms also exist such as inter-organisational trust (between organisations). Schools are organisations and thus the work of schools is highly dependent on the establishment of trusting relationships (Bryk and Schneider, 2002). Nonetheless, some argue that research conducted in non-educational organisations cannot be simply extended to schools as the relationships between stakeholders are particular and schools operate under complex task contexts (Bidwell, 1970; Ingersoll, 2005). The input, processes and output of schooling are difficult to standardise (e.g. students enter with varying degrees of background and motivation), hence such task complexity leads to a strong interdependence among the different groups of school members (Van Maele, Forsyth and Van Houtte, 2014).

Institutional trust refers to trust in institutions and focuses on the systemic level. It analyses the degree to which individuals have confidence in institutions such as the parliament, the government, the police and the military. Institutions may boost levels of trust because they structure behaviour of individual actors, which enhances predictability and order (Eshuis and van Woerkum, 2003: 383). A few recent studies have

[6] This could also be considered as a type of organisational trust since the trustor and trustee both take up organisational roles. It depends on whether student's trust in the teachers at school is based on face-to-face interactions and acquaintance with all teachers, or rather on perceptions related to the organisational role of all the teachers in school.

[7] Trust of a school member (individual trust) or a group of school members (collective trust) in another group of school members (or the school leader) could also be classified as organisational trust.

[8] Another two concepts important for the analysis of education systems are *organic* and *contractual* trust. Organic trust is "predicated on the more or less unquestioning beliefs of individuals in the moral authority of a particular social institution, and characterises closed, small-scale societies'' (Bryk and Schneider, 2002: 16). In contrast, contractual trust is weakly vested in moral-ethical relations. "The terms of the contract spell out a scope of work to be undertaken by the parties involved'' (Bryk and Schneider, 2002: 17). If the terms of the contract are violated, lawsuits follow. Dworkin and Tobe (2014) argue that the shift from organic to contractual trust within the education system, prompted by an increasing school accountability system, has led to decreased levels of trust of teachers in other school members and increased levels of teacher burnout.

examined institutional trust in education (e.g. Forsyth, Adams and Hoy, 2011; Wermke, 2014). An example is the level of parents' trust in the school system. For instance, Wermke (2014) finds that trust in education (be it school communities or school systems) is embedded in nation-specific cultures and traditions, and mediated by them. This leads to different trust patterns in which teachers are socialised.

Table 1. Forms of trust

	Interpersonal trust		Organisational trust	Institutional trust
	Particularised	*Generalised/social*		
Definition	Face-to-face interactions Based on reputation	Trust towards strangers No direct information about people	Trust in an organisation, employees' willingness to be vulnerable to their organisation's actions	Trust in institutions
Key characteristics	Based on sum of common experiences between parties; Emotional attachment and intimacy Knowledge about the other's integrity and values Informal control through reputation and sanctions embedded in networks	Does not hinge upon specific situations Deals with unknown groups and/or strangers Existence of fundamentally shared values and norms of behaviour Experience of repeated interpersonal interaction with different groups Confidence in functioning of societal institutions (formal and informal)	Further differentiated into intra-organisational and inter-organisational trust Order is important, so is social environment of employees	Characteristics of a trusting relation are likely to be specific to the type of actions being considered Takes into account trust in systems over which the government may only have partial control
Examples	Trust in family, friends, colleagues	Trust in other citizens	Trust of parents in the school organisation	Trust in government, parliament, police, legal system, education system

Trust over time

Trust changes over time – developing, building, declining and even resurfacing in long-standing relationships (Rousseau et al., 1998; see also Child, 1998; Lewicki and Bunker, 1996; Sako, 1998). Overall, trust is incremental, dynamic and continuous (Lewicki et al., 1998; Zucker 1986) – a party's trust in another goes up and down, or is enhanced or damaged, in large part according to what the other party does. As a result, tracking shifts in trust within a specific relationship over a significant period provides richer evidence than one-off snap-shots that are prone to distorting the impact of recent events (Dietz and Den Hartog, 2006: 571).

Time is an important component because it is required for repeated transactions, which develop bonding between actors, generate trust and lead to lasting relations (Nooteboom, 1996: 988). Some forms of trust require familiarity and mutual understanding, and thus depend on time and context such as the stakes involved, the balance of power in the relationship, the perception of the risk level and available alternatives to the trustor (Mayer, Davis and Schoorman, 1995: 727; Nooteboom, 1996: 993). Trust evolves within a relationship as the parties interact (Boyle and Bonacich, 1970).

The form of trust can change throughout a relationship between the trustor and trustee based on their experience. Calculative[9] trust can become interpersonal trust, whereas institutional trust can facilitate formulating both calculative and interpersonal trust. For example, a parent might expect teachers in general to be knowledgeable and fair, and see a weak teacher as an exception – unless s/he experiences several weak teachers in a row (Louis, 2007: 3).

The type of trust and mistrust can also change over time (see Figure 4). In the context of education, Hargreaves et al. (2009) argue that trust has evolved through four stages across many education systems in OECD countries. The first stage of change in the 1970s was characterised by passive trust where parents unconditionally trusted professionals with their children. It was defined by innovation and generous state funding but did not develop parallel systems of professional responsibility, accountability and consistency. In the second stage in the 1980s, a period of active mistrust followed since the public looked to external accountability instruments to guarantee commitment and quality. Educators in other jurisdictions were subjected to growing political control, public scepticism and market competition. Progress in measured results secured public confidence in the education profession in the third stage in the 1990s. Here, high levels of public confidence in educators were promoted, creativity, complexity, innovation and teamwork was emphasised, and networks and data were used to drive reform through recalcitrant systems and educators. The fourth stage in the 2000s developed active trust between professionals, parents and community members working together. This stage valued data as well as teachers' professional judgement and balanced targeted interventions in children's areas of academic weaknesses along with more mindful approaches to teaching and learning that develop creativity, innovation and soft skills (Hargreaves et al, 2009: 62-74).

[9] Trust emerges when the trustor perceives that it is in the interest of the trustee to perform a beneficial action. The incentives may originate from the existence of deterrence but also due to credible information on the intentions or competence of another agent (Rousseau et al., 1998: 399).

Figure 4. Four stages of change



Source: Adapted from Hargreaves et al., 2009.

As Dasgupta (1988: 50) argues, trust may be a "fragile commodity", hard to construct and easy to destroy (see also Barber, 1983). In processes of change, breakdowns in trust that disrupt change can occur at any point, but may be particularly common around the issues of (mis)understanding (what the change is about, and its purpose), performance (what behaviours and outcomes will be expected) and closure (how will the success of the change be assessed, and when) (Ford and Ford, 1995). Breakdowns are especially pertinent at times of reform and policy change since many such instances are unsuccessful, at least in the first instance. Trust grows or breaks down according to "relational signalling": people interpret conduct as signals of underlying intentions and inclinations, and change their own behaviour on the basis of it. For instance, Chile has been so paralysed over a breakdown in trust between students and the government that education reform has become the political priority of the new government's agenda. The main rationale for distrust was a concern over fairness in the education system. If passed, the new legislation would change the funding of schools, end state subsidies of private schools and eliminate selective entrance policies.

Breakdowns in trust can have severe implications beyond the immediate consequence of disrupting change. For example, when trust breaks down between administrators and teachers, it can lead to suspicion and psychological withdrawal. One example from the United States highlights this point. There reform programmes accompanied by a push to standards-based accountability have led to a decline in teacher trust in other school members and to an increase of teacher burnout levels (see Dworkin and Tobe, 2014). In the case of teachers and students, a breakdown in trust can result in a cycle of punishment and withdrawal or rebelling, which can hinder the cognitive and social-emotional development of students (Tschannen-Moran, 2014). To avoid such breakdowns, it is important to facilitate open communication and cooperation, and prevent the abuse of power (Nooteboom, 2010).

Measurement of trust

How can trust be measured? This is an important but challenging task. The concept of trust has some quantifiable elements (depending on the definition) but also some non-quantifiable ones. To start off, terms such as trust, confidence and trustworthiness are often used interchangeably in the literature, but there are nuances between them which have consequences for measuring trust.[10] Therefore, it is important to highlight what exactly is analysed and then measured.

There are different ways to measure trust, by counting the frequency of trusting behaviour, considering the extent of trusting behaviour or using surveys to measure trusting attitudes – the most common method (Moellering, 2006: 135). However, in most cases, these methods are only proxies of trust. Since trust is often defined as an expectation about the behaviour of others (Nooteboom, 2002b: 6), this should be reflected in the measure of trust (for instance, through surveys).

A number of surveys and barometers (such as Edelman, Eurobarometer, European Social Survey, Gallup, International Social Survey Programme, Pew and World Values Survey) focus on interpersonal trust, trust in institutions in general, or more specifically on trust in national government, education system, local police, business or media. The *Appendix* at the end of this paper examines existing surveys and trust scales, and discusses their strengths and weaknesses.[11]

There are significant differences among the surveys and barometers in terms of their: *(1)* frequency of collecting data, *(2)* coverage of countries, *(3)* respondents, *(4)* sampling methodology, *(5)* wording of trust in government questions and (6) the response categories (scales) attached to those questions (OECD, 2013b). Response items also vary from simple yes and no (Gallup) to the use of 7-point scales (Edelman). According to the OECD (2013b), there are several caveats to the use of these surveys. *(1)* The impact of the respondents' characteristics and attitudes on their perception of government – this is why representativeness of the survey of the country's population is important, *(2)* differences between citizen and business perceptions as well as their drivers, which are usually measured separately, and *(3)* cultural differences in the general attitude towards government across countries – therefore in international comparisons change in trust levels over time should be compared instead of levels of trust (OECD, 2013b).

[10] *Trustworthiness* can be defined as "the ability and willingness to go beyond material self-interest to take into account more altruistic, other-regarding motives of justice, loyalty, legitimate conduct and friendship" (Nooteboom, 2010: 5). Put simply, trustworthiness is a quality that the trustee has, while trusting is something the trustor does (Dietz and Den Hartog, 2006: 559). *Confidence* is used when the risk to the trustor is low (Levi, 1998). While both trust and confidence refer to expectations that may lead to disappointment, Luhmann (1988) argues that trust differs from confidence since it requires a previous engagement on a person's part, recognising and accepting that risk exists (Mayer, Davis and Schoorman, 1995: 713).

[11] For a more elaborate discussion, the Public Governance and Territorial Development Directorate (GOV) at the OECD has done some preliminary work on this issue (see GOV/PGC(2013)1 and GOV/PGC(2013)1/ANN1; OECD 2013a; 2013b; 2013c).

TRUST, GOVERNANCE AND EDUCATION SYSTEMS

This section builds upon the definition of trust as three constituent parts (Figure 3) and proposes a simple interactive model on trust and governance. This model is then used to structure the discussion around several governance elements that are important for trust in education systems, such as complexity, asymmetries, cooperation/collaboration, monitoring and accountability, and professionalisation.

Model of trust and governance

Trust plays a crucial role in governance structures, but individual and contextual characteristics of people that interact in transactions also matter (Becerra and Gupta, 1999: 192). The model below (see Figure 5) illustrates the complex relationship between trust and other factors. Trust, composed here of the three components, can be influenced by impersonal and individual factors. These affect different governance elements such as complexity, asymmetries, cooperation, monitoring and accountability, and professionalisation.

On the left side of the model (*input*) are impersonal and individual characteristics which feed into trust formation. Among these count the trustor's predisposition to trust; trustor's character, motives, abilities and behaviour; nature of trustor-trustee relationship; situational/ organisational/ institutional constraints; and other contextual factors. In Figure 5, the first three are depicted in a lighter colour as the link between these factors and governance is weaker than for the latter two. There is a large literature on the input part, so this paper cannot engage with it to a great extent (for more information, see Becerra and Gupta, 1999; Dietz and Den Hartog, 2006). In the middle of the model are the three constituent parts of trust depicted as a *process*. Trust is an expectation, a willingness to be vulnerable and a risk-taking act (Figure 3).

These parts feed into the right side of the model (*output*) which portrays different governance elements that apply to education systems including complexity, asymmetries, cooperation, accountability and professionalisation. This is not an exhaustive list, but is meant to illustrate some key elements that impact education governance. Trust may lead to smaller challenges of complexity, smaller asymmetries of power and information, greater cooperation/collaboration, lower monitoring costs and greater professionalisation. Nonetheless, as the next sections will show, this relationship between trust and individual governance elements is often not straightforward and findings are mixed. The last component of the interactive model depicts a feedback cycle from governance facets to individual and impersonal characteristics of trust formation.

Figure 5. Model of trust and governance



Source: Adapted from Dietz and Den Hartog, 2006: 564 and Becerra and Gupta, 1999: p. 193.

Many of the existing studies consider the impact of trust on individual governance facets (e.g. accountability, collaboration), but little is known about how these individual governance elements interact among each other. For instance, systemic complexity can affect asymmetries, cooperation, accountability and professionalisation, all under the realm of trust. Hence there can be multiple interactions which are difficult to capture and are not heavily researched. Therefore, for simplicity reasons, the following sections break down the elements into small pieces and analyse how trust impacts individual facets of governance. The discussion will specify which form of trust (i.e. interpersonal, organisational or institutional) is analysed when applicable.

Complexity

In complex governance structures, trust plays an important role. Kaput et al. (2005) identify some core components of a complex system: *(1)* The interconnected components' behaviour is not explained by the properties of the components, but rather emerges from the interaction of the components; *(2)* the system is non-linear and relies on feedback to mould and shape its evolution; and *(3)* the system operates on multiple time-scales and levels simultaneously (cited in Snyder, 2013).

Puranam and Vanneste (2009) examine the relationship between trust and governance complexity. The functioning of the system and possibility for reform will be difficult in complex systems without a certain level of trust. However, the nature of complex systems, with their large and shifting number of stakeholders and constantly changing interactions, might make building and nurturing trust more difficult than in systems with more linear connections between the stakeholders. Overall, the empirical evidence in the literature has been mixed – some authors report a negative relationship between trust (or its proxies such as repeated interactions) and governance complexity, i.e. higher trust decreases governance complexity (see Banerjee and Duflo, 2000; Corts and Singh, 2004; Crocker and Reynolds, 1993; Gulati, 1995; Kalnins and Mayer, 2004; Parkhe 1993). Others find a positive relationship – higher trust leads to higher complexity and encourages the use of formal governance mechanisms (Luo, 2002; Mayer and Argyres, 2004; Poppo and Zenger, 2002; Ryall and

Sampson, 2009; Zaheer and Venkatraman, 1995), and some indicate no relationship at all (Mellewigt, Madhok and Webel, 2007).

One reason why evidence on the relationship between trust and governance has been rather inconclusive is that it varies according to the form of trust. *Interpersonal* trust enables people to live in risky and uncertain situations (Mayer, Davis and Schoorman, 1995). Higher trust can decrease the amount of complexity because it reduces the number of options that individuals perceive as feasible and allows them to anticipate the behaviour of contracting partners (Barber, 1983; Casadesus-Masanell, 2004; Lewis and Weigert, 1985; Luhmann, 1989; Lukas and Walgenbach, 2010).

Moving to *organisational* trust, a number of conditions determine the need for trust, such as the complexity of the organisation's primary task and the interdependence of groups (Costa, 2003; Forsyth, Adams and Hoy, 2011). Complex organisations, where individuals have a high degree of autonomy, are more likely to need higher levels of trust compared to organisations with routine and simple work (Tierney, 2006: 42). In a similar vein, complex networks where power resources are diffused among actors and interdependent relations are strongly present also require trust (Edelenbos and Klijn, 2007: 26). Leaders can build trust when they act in ways that reveal them as trustworthy to others in the organisation, but it takes time to implement strategies to increase cooperation and predictability in complex organisations (Forsyth, Adams and Hoy, 2011: 111).

In terms of *institutional* trust, some flexibility in complex governance arrangements is needed because high degrees of centralisation and formalisation hinder the emergence of trustworthy behaviour such as delegation and open communication due to rigid rules (Creed and Miles, 1996).

Puranam and Vanneste (2009: 24) provide another reason why findings on trust and governance complexity have been mixed. They argue that existing studies fail to distinguish between three types of co-existing relationships between trust and governance, and they depict these relationships in a theoretical model. It would be helpful to test these relationships empirically.

1. The presence of trust may increase the effect of governance on exchange performance, i.e. complementarity (Poppo and Zenger, 2002). When trust is present, an imperfect contract offers more protection than when trust is absent since trust can act as glue that fills the gaps.

2. Governance can decrease the level of trust between exchange partners through direct or indirect crowding out (Malhotra and Murnighan, 2002). The level of trust in the relationship can be diminished when the partners rely on complex governance since it may signal a lack of trust to exchange partners.

3. Ex ante (i.e. pre-existing) trust in a relationship may influence the choice of level of governance complexity (Gulati, 1995). Complex governance and trust can allow exchange partners to overcome the coordination challenges and incentive conflicts created by change.

The link between trust and complexity also plays out in education systems. Researchers and policy makers have highlighted the increasing complexity of education systems throughout the developed world for some time now (Halász, 2003; Hodgson, 2000; OECD, 2007) and have attributed it to a number of simultaneous factors, including rapidly changing and spreading ICTs, the internationalisation of education, the growing diversity of stakeholders' preferences and expectations, more decentralised and flexible governance structures and the increased importance of additional layers of governance (see Fazekas and Burns, 2012).

Governments in most OECD countries have increased school autonomy and stimulated demand sensitivity. Combining these new governance regimes with increasingly individualised, informed and demanding populations is expected to lead to an increase in complexity and the importance of diverse local contexts (GCES, 2014). But ministries of education remain responsible for ensuring high quality, efficient, equitable and innovative education. This is reinforced by increased visibility of

national performance and greater focus on education for building a strong knowledge economy (GCES, 2014). However, the combination of greater complexity in governance systems on the one hand and higher demands for accountability on the other, create challenges for governments and stakeholders alike (GCES, 2014). Trust can play a key role in reconciling these at times opposing goals by bringing benefits to the relationship and increasing cooperation between stakeholders, rather than creating conflict.

In times of major structural changes, strong interpersonal and organisational trust in schools becomes important to constructively engage teachers in collective decision-making. For example, in the 1990s Chicago schools tried to increase academic achievement through a number of innovative policies, such as the decentralisation of school governance: decisions over budget and staffing were transferred from the central office to locally elected school boards (Luppescu et al., 2011). As a result, schools were given flexibility to formulate and execute their own improvement strategies. In schools where trust was low, there was sustained controversy around resolving even relatively simple organisational concerns (Bryk and Schneider, 2002). Box 2 presents another example from Ontario, where trust in the competence of teachers enabled considerable improvements without the need for outcome-based accountability. However, it also showcases the difficulties of building and sustaining trust among education professionals.

Box 2. Ontario: trusting teachers to do the right thing

The Ontario *Student Success/Learning to 18 Strategy* was an initiative implemented between 2003 and 2012 to improve education outcomes. Canada is a highly federated system, and education is the sole responsibility of ten provinces and three territories. The central provincial government and locally-elected school boards then share responsibility. To increase student outcomes and equity among students, Ontario introduced a reform which combined greater centralised accountability with more school-level control for school improvement, but with a strong effort to build capacity among teachers, and to generate teacher engagement in the improvement strategy.

Ontario identified key nodes by asking for feedback from all stakeholders and at all levels, through various forums and panels. Ministers and deputy ministers met regularly with provincial officers, teachers and principals, and outreach programmes were launched to parents and community groups to outline the key goals of the programme and processes by which they would be achieved. This approach created the necessary flexibility to implement innovative processes. Major investments in capacity-building and trust-building in the field were linked with strong central leadership.

Teachers were included in negotiations and discussion on the reform agenda in order to build a sense of shared understanding among key stakeholder groups. The reformers abstained from implementing punitive accountability, performance pay and competition among schools. Instead, Ontario balanced administrative and professional accountability. The general assumption was that teachers are professionals who are trying to do the right thing and performance problems are more likely to happen due to lack of knowledge rather than lack of motivation. The government showed trust in the competence and professionalism of the teaching force, which was important for repairing the rupture developed between the profession and the government before the reform (OECD, 2010).

Overall, the Ontario strategy has improved graduation rates and reduced number of low-performing schools. The results in PISA are more mixed and there has been some increase in literacy scores, but numeracy scores have declined from 2003 to 2012. More recently, there has been also a breakdown of communication between stakeholders when teachers' unions walked out of negotiations and went on strike to protest against government proposals. Therefore, despite some positive results of the Ontario Strategy, the example highlights the difficulty to sustain trust over time in complex systems.

Source: OECD, 2010; 2014b.

Asymmetries of information and power

Asymmetries of information and power are challenges inherent in a principal-agent relationship (such as between a voter and a politician) in agency theory. *Agency theory* is based on a (contractual) relationship between one party (i.e. the principal), who delegates certain tasks to another party (i.e. the agent) when the execution of these tasks cannot be perfectly monitored. Such relationships have a degree of *information asymmetry*. For instance, information asymmetries are part of health care markets, which are characterised by high levels of uncertainty. Patients have much less information than physicians and thus knowledge is a commodity which patients buy from doctors (Arrow, 1963; Haas-Wilson, 2011).[12] There is an unequal relationship between experts and clients which the former may exploit in their own interest (Bloom, Standing and Lloyd, 2008: 2077). Uncertainty exists due to inexperience and difficulty in predicting the effectiveness of medical treatment, both on the part of patients and physicians (Haas-Wilson, 2011). It is also possible that asymmetries of information may cause consumers to choose inferior services (Lubienski, 2007), though some argue that it only takes a small group of informed consumers to be active in a market in order for competition to drive quality improvements for all (see also Walberg and Bast, 2003).

Some scholars (such as Arrow, 1963) propose that trust can be a means to manage such problems of information asymmetry. It decreases transaction costs of external monitoring and is essential for transactions that cannot be properly managed by explicit contracts (Davies and Dibben, 2011; see also Becerra and Gupta, 1999). The difference in information between two individuals in a trusting relationship has some implications for trust development. For example, if the supervisor has more access to information about the ability, benevolence and integrity of the subordinate than the other way round, the supervisor will likely develop trust in the subordinate more quickly than the subordinate will develop trust towards the supervisor (Schoorman, Mayer and Davis, 2007: 351).

Besides information asymmetry, there is also *asymmetry in power* between actors. Shapira (2000) argues that such asymmetries complicate governance problems. Time constraints and bounded rationality reduce the efficacy of control mechanisms as control can only be sub-optimal under imperfect conditions and with limited rationality (Shapira, 2000: 53). Others argue that the relation between power and (organisational) trust is indirect (Fox, 1974; Sydow, 1998).

Power and trust are often regarded as substitutes (Luhman, 1998), but complex inter-organisational practices are more complicated. Power does not need to substitute or even destroy trust, but in some ways, it may increase trust and hence lead to an even more powerful position in a network. For instance, Young and Wilkinson (1989) suggest that more powerful firms seem to be more trusting and confident of other organisations' trustworthiness because of their size and market position. In addition, they argue that more interdependent organisations tend to develop higher trust levels between them because they recognise the power over each other (Young and Wilkinson, 1989). Others mention that power can be hidden behind a façade of trust and a rhetoric of 'collaboration', which can be used to promote vested interests by manipulating weaker partners (Hardy, Phillips and Lawrence, 1998: 65). In such cases, only the dominant partner benefits from the advantages of the cooperation or interaction.

Similar to other policy areas, education systems suffer from asymmetries of information and power. This means that certain stakeholders have more information than others and they may use this favourable position to their own advantage. The process can take place across a range of areas, including unequal access to decision-making bodies, information asymmetries and the narrowing of the agenda to suit the stronger stakeholders (Hooge, Burns and Wilkoszewski, 2012: 14).

For instance, teachers as the experts have more information than parents as the clients. While high-income and highly educated parents can choose whether to follow the teachers' advice, poor

[12] But patients have more information about their behaviour and medical situation than health insurance providers.

parents have to trust teachers' efforts. However, teachers in turn depend on parental support to be successful in their work, and they need parents to signal to their children that the teacher can be trusted (Bryk and Schneider, 2002).

Unequal positions of power among the school, parents and community members can enable more powerful stakeholders to dominate weaker ones. The education ministry and district officials in some countries have more power than principals, principals hold authority over teachers, local school professionals in turn hold status over parents, while teachers have power over students.[13] For instance, Kochanek and Clifford (2014) have analysed districts in the United States. Their findings indicate that upper-level district administrators served as gatekeepers for people and information entering the policymaking process, and they also sought input from recognised experts with credentials. In addition, trust has been an influential factor governing the types of individuals and information entering into policy discussion.

Bryk and Schneider (2002) argue that this power asymmetry might be significant in most urban contexts, where poor parents have few individual options if school professionals fail to advance learning opportunities for their children (see Box 3). However, no one person exercises absolute power. Even principals remain dependent on both parents and teachers to achieve success in their work (Bryk and Schneider, 2002: 128).

Box 3. Chicago: School Reform Act

One example is the 1988 Chicago School Reform Act, which sought to redress the power imbalance between poor parents and school professionals by devolving authority and resources to local school councils. The local school councils had the power to hire the principal, allocate financial resources and make decisions about curriculum and other academic matters. A reshaping of the power distribution structured by governance reforms could renew interpersonal and organisational trust within school communities and lead to improvements in student learning. However, communities with active residents in local organisations and with schools facing fewer social problems were more likely to show improvements.

Source: Bryk and Schneider, 2002; Luppescu et al, 2011.

In the context of power asymmetry, more powerful actors are usually expected to initiate action to reduce the vulnerability experienced by others in order to build trust between stakeholders. For example, school professionals should also be leaders as there is a strong power imbalance between them and poor parents (Bryk and Schneider, 2002). The actions taken by principals play a key role in developing and sustaining trust between stakeholders in a school (for instance, by creating a parent center at the school or designing parent and family programmes in response to local needs) (Bryk and Schneider, 2002). Asymmetries of information and power affect not only the development of trust, but also the need for cooperation and the choice of accountability mechanisms.

Cooperation/collaboration

In complex systems with many opposing goals as well as asymmetries between stakeholders, trust can facilitate, solidify or improve the performance of cooperation. It reduces uncertain actions of other actors, as well as transaction costs involved in decision-making and organising (Edelenbos and Klijn, 2006: 31; see also Putnam, 1993; Ring and Van de Ven, 1992; Woolthuis, 1999). Kramer and Tyler (1996) and others (e.g. Elangovan and Shapiro, 1998; Gambetta, 1988; Kramer and Cook, 2004; Luhmann, 1988; Klijn and Teisman, 2000; McAllister, 1995) have analysed how trust enables cooperative behaviour to emerge. However, trust remains vulnerable to opportunistic behaviour in a one-sided trust relationship and can be damaged when it is advantageous to do so (Edelenbos and

[13] The only symmetric relationship is between teachers, though major interdependency exists among a faculty which necessitates trust (Bryk and Schneider, 2002).

Klijn, 2007: 33). Some amount of distrust is useful for keeping partners sharp in their cooperative relationship (Sydow, 1998). This indicates that trust is not always beneficial for partnerships, in contrast to what most of the literature emphasises. For example, Moolenaar et al. (2014: 222-223) examine trust in social networks and find that "in order to encourage professional communities and nurture trust, it is more important to focus on building relationships across the whole team than small-scale one-on-one relationships that carry the risk of damaging trust by highly closed reciprocal relationships".

According to Mattessich and Monsey (1992), collaboration and trust are often reciprocal processes. Collaboration "is a mutually beneficial and well-defined relationship entered into by two or more organisations [or individuals or institutions] to achieve common goals" (Mattessich and Monsey, 1992: 11). It takes place between partners who choose whether to participate, thus it is unlikely that collaboration, without coercion, will develop without at least some trust since it involves the investment of time and energy (Tschannen-Moran, 2001). Such sharing creates interdependence between participants which they want to avoid unless they trust their collaborative partners.

The empirical evidence of the link between collaboration and trust is limited but significant. (Organisational) trust was found to facilitate a manager's willingness to use participative management practices in a business context. Where trust was absent, managers were less likely to include organisational participants in significant decisions and to benefit from their insights and perspectives (Rosen and Jerdee, 1977). The level of trust also mattered for the effectiveness of a working group. In low trust groups, interpersonal relationships interfered with and distorted perceptions of the problem, while high trust groups solved problems more effectively. When employees (such as teachers) are satisfied with their level of involvement in decision-making, it may lead to greater (organisational) trust in those in leadership roles (e.g. principals) (Tschannen-Moran, 2001: 315). However, it is also possible that those in leadership roles reap greater benefits through greater involvement of employees in decision-making, than the other way around. This highlights uncertainty about the relationship between trust and involvement.

In education systems, cooperation and collaboration play out in different ways and at different levels. Bryk and Schneider (2002) find that high levels of trust between teachers and other teachers, teachers and students, teachers and parents and all groups and the school principal in schools affect school reform, collaboration, leadership and achievement including student scores and schooling[14] (see also Bjørnskov, 2009; Daly, 2009; Datnow and Park, 2014; Forsyth, Adams and Hoy, 2011).

In schools with high levels of trust in the principal, teachers and clients, parents are more likely to be included in school-level decision-making (Tschannen-Moran, 2001: 324). When students and parents are trusted by principals and teachers, it is more likely that the principal will collaborate with teachers and with parents on school-level decisions and that teachers will collaborate with one another on classroom-level decisions (Tschannen-Moran, 2001: 327). But the relationship between trust and collaboration in schools is not always straightforward.

An atmosphere of trust creates significant benefits for schools, such as the ability to create more honest forms of collaboration between the principal and teachers, between teacher colleagues and between parents and the school (Tschannen-Moran, 2001: 314; see also Epstein, 1986). Collaborative processes are increasingly needed as part of reform efforts in schools, but genuine collaboration will not take place if people involved do not trust each another (Tschannen-Moran, 2001: 314). Faculty trust in colleagues also facilitates collaboration among teachers and teachers' professional orientation (Tschannen-Moran, 2001; 2009). Trust has been called "the backbone of strong and sustainable professional learning communities in schools" (Hargreaves, 2007: 187). Teachers need to engage in reflective dialogue and collaborate on student learning in such learning communities (Van Maele, Forsyth and Van Houtte, 2014). The following example from Alberta illustrates this point (Box 4).

[14] Dincer (2011: 1097) shows that, in the United States, more trust increases time in school (more precisely, a 25 percentage point increase in trust raises the average years of schooling by about 1.5 months).

Box 4. Alberta: trust, communication and professional learning communities

The *Alberta Initiative for School Improvement* (AISI) was implemented from 1999 to 2013 to produce a system-wide educational change through innovation and improvement at the local level. Alberta allocated two percent of its education budget to AISI. Through this initiative, teachers in 95 per cent of the province's schools were engaged in designing and then evaluating their own innovations in teaching and learning. The provincial government and the teachers' union (Alberta Teachers' Association) supported and initiated this project. As a condition of involvement, teachers were required to share what they had learned with other local and national schools.

Many schools used the AISI budget to purchase teachers' time to spend with other teachers inquiring into practice together. In the later years of AISI, many of the projects focused specifically on building professional learning communities. The time and expectation for teachers to collaborate on improving professional practice was resourced on a continuous basis so that it became a major part of the work of teaching and of the definition of what it meant to be a professional. The initiative invested high trust in the professional judgments of teachers and principals.

The school improvement initiative became a success, due to a degree of mutual trust within schools between principals and teachers, in communities between schools and parents, and in the province between districts and the provincial government. The AISI partnership resulted in the building of trust, collaboration, and teamwork among the education partners. Nonetheless, the programme was discontinued due to budget cuts, thus it is unclear whether the success achieved under AISI could be sustained

Source: Hargreaves et al, 2009.

A common misconception is that once non-cooperation or untrustworthy behaviour is observed, a return to the cooperative or trust solution is not possible, but there is some empirical evidence that trust in different forms can be rebuilt (Jonker et al., 2004; Schweitzer et al., 2006). For example, trust could be enhanced by greater communication and transparency between different stakeholders (Carless, 2009: 86). Building trust, however, is a lengthy and difficult process, and it is the result of cooperation and a condition for it. Therefore, it is useful to "select conditions that are conducive to the emergence of trust, such as placing not too much focus on mistrustful means of governance" (Nooteboom, 1996: 989). Policy makers can play an important role in creating conditions which facilitate the emergence of trust. For instance, Cosner (2009) argues that principals in the United States who emphasise teacher interaction and collaboration complained about insufficient time to actually interact and build collegial trust. Principals then changed structures in order to increase interaction time, for example, by rethinking the daily schedule at school, organising more meetings and introducing a teacher room.

Monitoring and accountability

In a principal-agent relationship, asymmetries of information and power as well as cooperation/collaboration are closely linked with monitoring and accountability. Trust can play an important role in these relationships. *Monitoring* is one action or mechanism that stakeholders (such as voters, parents) can use to hold other actors (such as elected officials, school principals, teachers) accountable[15] for their actions. It refers to a continuing function which seeks to provide the main stakeholders of an ongoing project or programme with early indications of progress, or lack thereof, in the achievement of results (World Bank, 2007).

Monitoring reduces uncertainty about efforts of those involved and helps to build a record of the agent's behaviour because it provides possibilities for assessment and thus forms a basis for trust (Eshuis and van Woerkum, 2003: 384). It can serve as surveillance and control (Ostrom, 1990; Polman, 2002), but also function as a learning tool (Eshuis and van Woerkum, 2003: 385). Monitoring

[15] Accountability refers to "holding those actors delivering governance to the society to be accountable for their actions" (Pierre and Peters, 2005: 5).

helps to track achievements by regular collection of information and ensure accountability (World Bank, 2007).

But monitoring is not always the solution because it is costly and can have perverse effects on incentives if it is badly implemented (e.g. Holmstrom and Milgrom, 1991). Moreover, monitoring can actually create a system of distrust between stakeholders. For example, such distrust emerges when stakeholders perceive monitoring as infringing on their autonomy and feel that control is only in place because they are not trusted. As a result, a system of distrust can develop, which can further decrease the intrinsic motivation of stakeholders (see Cialdini, 1996; Enzle and Anderson, 1993).

In low trust and highly monitored environments, staff are reluctant to take risks (Giddens, 1990) or admit mistakes for fear of appearing incompetent (Reina and Reina, 2006, in Carless, 2009: 79). This stifles innovation. Thus accountability under these conditions is an alternative to trust, and efforts to strengthen accountability can lead to weakened trust (Trow, 1996: 3). An example of the *Norwegian Pupil's Survey* illustrates this point. The survey is mandatory for all students in levels 7 and 10, and the first year of upper secondary level, and considers the participation in assessment. However, municipalities, school leaders and teachers engage with the survey data differently (Rambøll, 2013). If any quality control system is introduced to monitor teachers' assessment practices, it could be interpreted as implying distrust and harm teachers' creativity, motivation and self-respect. In contrast, if teaching quality is poor, public trust in schools may decrease (Hopfenbeck et al., 2013). Thus it is challenging to choose the appropriate degree of monitoring.

Some scholars argue that a presence of control as part of monitoring suggests the absence of trust (Creed and Miles, 1996; Rousseau et al., 1998). This means that control mechanisms are put in place when distrust between stakeholders exists. On the other hand, Goold and Campbell (1987) and Goold and Quinn (1990) claim that control under the right circumstances can increase trust, for instance when tasks involved are programmable, standardised and outcomes can be measured and/or evaluated (Forsyth, Adams and Hoy, 2011). However, it depends on whether formal (or the legalisation of rules) or non-formal control (through social interactions, values and norms) dominate.

Trust, for example, can bolster an efficient system of social (non-formal) control where extensive supervision of individuals' work is not required and shirking behaviour remains minimal (Bryk and Schneider, 2002). Others argue that only formal control is at odds with trust or obviates its need (Bachmann, 2006). Still others propose that formal control increases the likelihood of trust (Sitkin, 1995) when an enabling structure for trust formation among interdependent groups in schools is provided but without restricting legitimate autonomy and flexibility. Some even argue that trust is only diminished when the type of control used is not well matched with the organisation's complexity, outcome uncertainty or behaviour observability (Kirsch, 1996). Hence it also depends on the conventions around control that determine the levels of trust between actors involved. Different types of control might be necessary at different stages of the process. For example, formal control mechanisms may be more helpful at the outset of implementation, but less needed as the intervention progresses (Forsyth, Adams and Hoy, 2011).

In complex education systems, characterised by multilevel governance, multiplication of actors and stakeholders and increasing emphasis on performance and efficiency, balancing accountability and trust is a delicate act (see Box 5). The status, professionalism and accountability of teachers are highly interlinked elements. Trust is a critical factor associated with the effective response of school districts to demands for greater quality and accountability (Louis, 2007). Teacher performance is increasingly tied to student outcomes. However, some research on teamwork indicates that the more team members trust one another, the less they choose to monitor one another, and when this condition is combined with high levels of individual autonomy, performance can suffer (Langfred, 2004). Policy makers need to make informed decisions about autonomy, trust and accountability because they have long-term effects. School leaders need to view trust as the bridge that reform must be carried over, as educational change is difficult to do in low-trust settings (Hargreaves, 2002; Louis, 2007). For instance, reform programmes in the United States accompanied by a push to standards-

based accountability have led to a decrease of teacher trust in other school members and to an increase of teacher burnout levels (see Dworkin and Tobe, 2014). A similar example is provided by accountability reforms implemented in Wales, which increased accountability with formative assessment and evaluations, but led to an erosion of trust. As a results, Wales' chances to achieve academic excellence have been negatively impacted (OECD, 2014c).

Box 5. Norway: balancing trust and accountability

Norway's educational governance is highly decentralised, with 428 municipalities and 19 counties acting as school owners, which vary considerably in size, number of schools and competence at the municipal level. The Ministry of Education and Research is in charge of national education policy, while the school owners implement education activities, organise and operate school services, allocate resources, and ensure quality improvement and development of their schools.

Balancing trust and accountability has been a challenge in the Norwegian context. While high trust in the system exists, there are relatively few accountability mechanisms. As a result, few incentives (or sanctions) are in place for actors, creating problems for long-term implementation in the face of resistance. For example, the *Assessment for Learning* (AfL) programme aims to improve assessment practices in Norwegian schools (years 1-12). School leaders have to involve teachers in the process of developing school cultures based on a real understanding of the intentions or principles of AfL (Hopfenbeck et al. 2013). Clear communication between the different levels and a high degree of trust amongst all stakeholders are necessary for a successful implementation of the programme.

Source: Hopfenbeck et al, 2013.

"The principal-agent problem provides a rationale for accountability: if stakeholders - be they parents, local firms, or policy makers - have difficulty monitoring the activities of schools, then educators might behave in a manner contrary to the interests of these stakeholders" (Figlio and Loeb, 2011: 386). Hence more effective monitoring of educators could result in improved student outcomes.

Accountability per se can be positive since it protects against irresponsibility and provides checks or controls which may raise quality of the procedures (Sztompka, 1999). For instance, Bjørnskov (2012) illustrates that high levels of trust could lead to higher accountability since decisions have to be responsive to the preferences of the population. This follows on Putnam (2000: 46) who argues that more civic-minded citizens are better at holding politicians accountable and politicians are thus more likely to "temper their worst impulses than force public protests". Some form of accountability can have a positive impact on trust.

In education systems, two types of accountability mechanisms are common: vertical and horizontal accountability (Figure 6). *Vertical accountability* is top-down and hierarchical – it enforces compliance with laws and regulation and/or holds schools accountable for the quality of education they provide. *Horizontal accountability* assumes non-hierarchical relationships – it is directed at how schools and teachers conduct their profession and/or at how schools and teachers provide multiple stakeholders with insight into their educational processes, decision-making, implementation and results (for more information, see Hooge, Burns and Wilkoszewski, 2012).

Figure 6. Horizontal and vertical accountability



Source: Hooge, Burns and Wilkoszewski, 2012.

In complex education systems with diversified structures and new stakeholders, it could be beneficial to complement vertical accountability structures with horizontal ones. Differently performing schools may need different accountability systems (see Hooge, Burns and Wilkoszewski, 2012). There are two ways to promote governance arrangements in education which generate trust: professional accountability and multiple stakeholder accountability (in the horizontal strand). *Professional accountability* means trusting teachers by fostering teacher professionalism, developing professional standards, promoting collaboration and professional learning communities, and updating the pedagogical knowledge of teachers. Trusting teachers also implies developing trust in the unique nature of the pedagogical relationship in which teachers and learners engage, which is also based on some degree of autonomy (Hooge, Burns and Wilkoszewski, 2012).

Multiple stakeholder accountability means generating trust in the community. Schools are accountable to learners, parents, stakeholders and the community at large. They need to establish a relationship, obtain support and engage in capacity building. Processes of collective learning and feedback generate trust in the community. It is important to recognise different interests and needs among stakeholders, allow enough time to develop a trusting relationship and clarify roles and purposes such that all actors feel responsible (Hooge, Burns and Wilkoszewski, 2012). Multiple accountability aims to increase legitimacy and trust from local community through the processes of learning and feedback that it entails (De Vijlder and Westerhuis, 2002; Hooge and Helderman, 2008). Hence the choice of accountability mechanisms can impact the level of trust between stakeholders.

The Polish case study (Box 6) highlights that there is a fine balance between trust and accountability which can be facilitated by the professionalisation of teachers. These elements are explored further in the next section.

Box 6. Poland: reform of the school inspection system

The case study examines the implementation of an education reform in 2009, which changed the way in which pedagogical supervision, especially school inspection, is conducted in Poland. The main goal of the reform was to combine internal and external evaluation in school supervision practice, in particular *(1)* monitoring compliance with the law, *(2)* supporting the work of schools and other education institutions, as well as teachers in performing their activities and *(3)* undertaking evaluation of education institutions.

The reform placed greater emphasis on collaboration among stakeholders, intending to establish a sustainable culture of cooperation to support new processes. However, there were several challenges associated with the reform. For instance, there was no common understanding of reform goals by the stakeholders, and led to conflict in the implementation process. In addition, local authorities and headmasters played power games around the reform, and teachers were reluctant to collaborate.

While internal evaluation can increase accountability and serve as a way to gain knowledge to improve the system, teachers can perceive the process as permanent scrutiny and thus as a vote of distrust in the work of the individual teacher. The new evaluation system can be seen as a loss of control or a means of punishment rather than improvement. That is why it is important to increase the professionalisation of the teaching profession to strengthen teacher's self-efficacy and out-of-class influence.

Source: Mazurkiewicz, Walczak and Jewdokimow, forthcoming.

Professionalisation

The previous section highlighted the importance of professional accountability in trusting teachers by developing teacher professionalism and collaboration (Tschannen-Moran, 2001). Professionalism is defined as efficiently rendering a specialist service based on a body of knowledge (Morris, 2004). It refers to strategies employed by members of an occupation in seeking to advance their status, salary and conditions (Hoyle, 1975: 315). Teacher professionalism is constantly changing and being redefined (Helsby, 1999), in part due to increased control by governments (Hargreaves, 1994) or changing demands on teachers (OECD, 2013e). Professionalisation as a process is about being delegated sufficient trust to be accorded self-governing status (Morris, 2004). It involves giving the teaching force increasing responsibility for scrutinising and evaluating the practices of its members (Morris, 2004, see also Elliott, 2004).

Trust affects professionalisation in education systems in different ways. In schools with high trust, teachers feel more responsible for defining the nature and content of their work and are more likely to invest themselves in the operations of the school (Goddard, Salloum and Berebitsky, 2009). However, it is no longer the case that teachers say: "trust me, I'm a professional" (Morris, 2001). Due to various modernisations of the teaching profession, professional accountability has started to play a larger role, perhaps at the expense of autonomy (Hoyle and Wallace, 2005). Grace (1987: 221) argues that:

> The ethic of legitimated teacher professionalism involves an implicit understanding between organised teachers and agencies of the state in education in resolving their conflicting interests and concerns. In effect it is an understanding which involves, at the surface level, the idea that teachers will accept their legitimated realm, their sphere of proper professional activity, as within the classroom and the school system and the state, for its part, will grant them a measure of trust and autonomy, professional salaries and occupational securities and professional respect and dignity.

There are two images of teachers as professionals. The first form of teacher professionalism considers the teacher as "a trusted servant rather than an empowered professional" (Avis, 2003: 329). Teachers act within a performance management environment and evidence-informed research shapes pedagogic practice (Avis, 2003: 329). In search of greater accountability, governmental policies have produced systems of managerial control that have led to a culture in schools and other education

institutions in which trust is no longer seen as the foundation of professional ethics. Teachers are said to be motivated by extrinsic rewards and the teaching act is considered to be technical and instrumental. Some argue that "the only acceptable form of accountability is a measure of compliance with the individual employment contract" (Codd, 1999: 202). In a similar vein, Morris (2004: 106) suggests that "if there is not widespread trust in the competence and overall professionalism of teachers, and/or if the profession does not, or is not permitted to, hold its members accountable, then their performance will be increasingly monitored and judged by agencies established outside the profession – mostly by the state."

In contrast, the second form considers teaching as a learning profession in which teachers continually seek to develop professionally and add to their pedagogical knowledge in order to improve teacher quality (for more information, see Guerriero, forthcoming). This is especially important in times of ageing teaching workforces, high attrition rates of new teachers and teacher shortages in particular areas. Teachers also increasingly need to develop new competences in order to help students acquire 21st century skills (e.g. collaboration, problem-solving, communication and creativity), ensure social cohesion and the well-being of all students, participate in more distributed school leadership and management roles in response to greater decentralisation and school autonomy (OECD, 2013e). Professional standards and profiles for the teaching profession are being redefined to keep abreast of the great complexity in the 21st century and accommodate the need for continuous learning and development (OECD, 2013e: 280).

The strengthening of a culture of trust in education requires a form of accountability which supports rather than diminishes the professionalism of teachers. This implies a form of 'smart accountability' that fosters trust and professionalisation (see Sahlberg, 2007) by recognising the ethical obligation on the part of professionals to offer an account of (or a justification for) their actions. The moral agency of the professional is also fully acknowledged (Codd, 1999: 203). Similarly, Brien (1998) argues that cultivating a culture of trust can promote ethical conduct indirectly by providing an ideal of professionalism.

Low trust between teachers (and also between teachers and school principals) presents a significant barrier to the establishment of new norms of professionalism and collaboration. In contrast, when teachers trust each other, they are more likely to respect colleagues as exercising professional judgement and demonstrating a commitment to students, whereas where teachers do not perceive their colleagues as behaving in a professional manner, they are less likely to trust them (Tschannen-Moran, 2009). The following Finnish and Norwegian examples (Boxes 7 and 8) highlight this relationship.

Box 7. Finland: trust and professionalisation

Finland serves as a good example of the link between trust and professionalisation. The education system was highly centralised until the early 1990s: central agencies regulated schools and teachers were subject to a dense network of rules and orders. However, a gradual shift towards trusting schools and teachers began in the late 1980s and the era of a trust-based school culture started some years later. Trust in teachers and school principals by parents, students and the authorities was key for reforming the education system and smart accountability (OECD, 2004: 176).

Under the reformed system, the government has granted teachers greater autonomy regarding the curriculum and accountability once teachers' quality has improved. But without high trust levels, it would not have been possible to reduce the detail of the curriculum specification and eliminate test-based accountability (Tucker, 2011).

Overall, the culture of trust means that education authorities and political leaders believe that teachers, principals, parents and their communities know how to provide the best possible education for their children (OECD, 2014a). Trust can only flourish in an environment built upon honesty, confidence, professionalism and good governance (Sahlberg, 2010). However, other contextual factors might contribute to the high trust in Finland, such as the homogenous society, particular history, and societal values (see Lewis, 2005).

Box 8. Norway: trust, professionalism and appraisal system

Another example examines the link between trust and professionalism in the case of Norway. The 2013 report on Teachers' Summit (OECD, 2013f) highlighted that to improve teaching practice, it was necessary to develop a clear and transparent link between performance appraisal and professional development opportunities. Otherwise, appraisal processes would not be taken seriously or be met with mistrust by teachers (Danielson, 2001; Milanowski and Kimball, 2003; Margo et al, 2008). A review on the evaluation and assessment system in Norway demonstrates this link. Norwegian teachers were generally seen as trusted professionals among different stakeholders. They received autonomy to decide on the teaching content, materials and methods. Teachers were given considerable scope to exercise their professionalism and benefit from a high level of trust among students, parents and communities in general. Since teachers were seen as trusted professionals, they were eager and willing to receive feedback and the appraisal system of teachers by school leaders was well accepted.

Nevertheless, even highly trusting countries like Norway have recently experienced a break down in trust when nearly 8,000 teachers went on strike in summer of 2014 over policy proposals that were considered to lead to too much reporting, workload and bureaucracy in schools. More specifically, teachers perceived the demands of employers' associations (for municipalities and counties) that they should spend 7.5 hours in schools every day as mistrust in their professional judgment. Instead, teacher unions demanded that teachers needed to manage parts of their own working hours to have flexibility in their duties and responsibilities as professionals. In the end they succeeded in their demands (Education International, 2014).

Source: Nusche et al, 2011; Education International, 2014.

CONCLUSION AND RESEARCH GAPS

This paper sought to answer the questions: *what is trust and how does it matter for governance, especially in education systems?* It has provided an overview of definitions of trust and measurement of trust. The paper has also presented a model of trust and governance and reviewed the relationship between trust and different governance elements in education systems. The last section brings the different parts together and identifies the main research gaps.

Despite difficulties of definition and measurement of trust, the paper has highlighted that trust is important for public policy and governance. In education systems, trust is a key component that helps coping with complexity. It facilitates cooperation between stakeholders and reduces information and power asymmetries. Trust is central to smart accountability systems and a high level of professionalism. As with all complex systems, one element cannot be changed without others to follow. Feedback loops can then create vicious or virtuous cycles. Elements such as cooperation, smart accountability, professionalism and trust can positively reinforce each other. The more difficult question is how to build trust when it is not present in the first place. Trust does not just magically appear, but it takes time to develop.

As Fullan (2011: 16) notes, "if you want to break the cycle of distrust you have to respect others before they have earned the right to be respected, and then do the things that build competencies and trust over time". For example, Finland and Singapore began whole system reforms in education forty years ago, without having a respected teaching profession (Fullan, 2011). But their goal was to build such a system. The strategy of developing teaching profession is important for other countries seeking to reform their education systems. Even when trust is low, teachers need to be given respect to do their job and then trust will follow.

However, trust is not a panacea for all policy challenges. In fact, as the paper has discussed, sometimes distrust between stakeholders may be useful for efficient organisation and lead to innovation. Trust moves along a continuum of intensity. Hence, there are no one-size-fits-all solutions and context matters. Nonetheless, drawing on the literature, the paper proposes some tentative findings, which should be examined further.

- Trust is an important ingredient for policymaking and implementation, innovation and social and economic interactions in general.

- Trust is necessary for increased collaboration between stakeholders, accountability as a way of improvement, greater professionalisation, coping with complexity and the reduction of asymmetries.

- Conditions that are conducive to the emergence of trust should be selected, such as not placing too much focus on mistrustful means of governance. This can create positive feedback effects and lead to virtuous cycles.

- Trust takes time to develop, but can break down easily. Facilitating open communication, transparency and cooperation, and prevent the abuse of power can avoid breakdowns in trust.

- A whole system reform of education systems cannot take place without a respected and trusted teaching profession. To build trust, respect in the profession (or stakeholders in general) is the first step, trust and competencies will follow over time.

Since little is still known about the exact mechanisms of trust and how trust is linked with different governance elements, the following sections highlight some research gaps. First, the wealth

of definitions of trust contributes to limited and often conflicting findings. This is also linked to the lack of appropriate data on trust and education. As with all surveys, it is not clear whether respondents think about their local school when answering a question on education systems, or whether they have the whole system, including the education ministry, in mind. Surveys also use confidence, trust and satisfaction almost interchangeably which can affect participants' responses. New metrics on trust are needed that use a consistent definition and are designed more comprehensively.

Second, most of the literature on trust and education focuses on interpersonal or organisational trust, but little is known about institutional trust in education systems. For instance, the level of trust in education systems is relatively high when compared to trust in national government (see Figure 1). Several reasons are possible, for instance, the education system benefits from a high level of professionalism and professional ethics of teachers and school leaders. Another reason may be that respondents trust institutions at lower levels of governance (such as their local school) more than those at the national level, which tend to be far removed from their everyday lives. However, these reasons need to be examined further since there is no clear understanding of why citizens trust some institutions more than others.

Third, a related gap concerns the variety in education trust levels across countries. For example, why is trust in the Finnish education system much higher than in the Greek system? What governance choices (such as decentralisation, type of institutions, market mechanisms) facilitate high levels of trust? Why does trust change over time across countries? This would require some detailed studies on particular countries which reflect the complexity of education systems and influences from beyond the sphere of education like cultural context. It would be useful to analyse different cases. Additional research should also propose a dynamic model of how trust breaks down, how it can be restored and sustained in complex systems, such as education. Our knowledge of these processes is limited to date.

Fourth, on a more general level, it is important to examine how the level of trust varies between countries with different institutional set-ups (e.g. Anderson et al., 2005; Boix and Posner, 1998; Freitag and Bühlmann, 2009; Kumlin and Rothstein, 2005; Lijphart, 1999; Neller, 2008; Norris, 1999; Powell, 2000; Rothstein and Uslaner, 2005). "Institutions shape values, norms, perceptions and habits through socialisation mechanisms and make people inherently trustworthy and trusting" (Freitag and Bühlmann, 2009: 1539). Institutions which follow a consensus logic promote generalised trust, especially those characterised by power sharing, the integration of minorities and the reduction of cultural, social and political distances (Freitag and Bühlmann, 2009: 1539). In contrast, policymaking in majoritarian countries is much more volatile which can make trust-building more difficult (Freitag and Bühlmann, 2009). Nevertheless, it is possible that this relationship is reversed, thus the role of institutions on trust should be examined in further research.

Fifth, the paper has focused on some key factors that impact trust and complex governance. There is still limited knowledge on the effect and direction of the relationship between trust and these facets (such as complexity, asymmetries, cooperation, accountability and professionalisation). For instance, do higher trust levels lead to more or less governance complexity? Does more complexity lead to higher or lower levels of trust? How does accountability affect professionalisation in terms of trust? It is also not clear how different governance elements are interlinked. For example, how does trust affect different degrees of complexity, and how does complexity impact the level of asymmetries, cooperation, accountability and professionalisation? The literature mostly examines the relationship of one or two governance aspects with trust (e.g. complexity, cooperation and trust). In response to this gap, some scholars (e.g. Puranam and Vanneste 2009) have attempted to present a theoretical model of governance complexity and trust, which examines the levels of trust and how they affect costs and benefits of governance as well as governance complexity. This paper has proposed a simple model of trust and governance which highlights different relationships between trust and various governance elements. These models are yet to be tested across a variety of policy areas, including education, in order to determine how they apply to real world situations.

In conclusion, trust plays a significant role in governance systems and the interactions between stakeholders, yet our understanding, conceptualisation and measurement of these issues remains limited. While the paper has highlighted a number of facets of trust and governance (such as complexity, asymmetries, cooperation/collaboration, monitoring and accountability, and professionalisation), the above mentioned research gaps have important implications for policy makers. It is difficult to design and implement policies to maintain or restore trust when the governance mechanisms behind trust building are unclear, data is incomplete and research findings are inconclusive.[16] Therefore, it would be fruitful to explore some of these aspects in the future. This paper has provided a first step in that direction.

[16] In this aim, the OECD-wide *Trust Strategy* seeks to provide guidance to countries on restoring trust. Its main objective is to generate policy recommendations, supported by data, analytical work drawing on country experiences and policy dialogue.

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APPENDIX: SURVEYS, BAROMETERS AND TRUST SCALES OF TRUST

Edelman Trust

The Edelman Trust barometer (carried out by the public relations firm Edelman) measures trust in media, institutions, business and NGOs across 25 countries since 2001. The barometer survey consists of 20-minute online interviews and samples 26,000 general population respondents with an oversample of 5,800 respondents of informed publics aged 25-64. All informed publics meet the following criteria: college-educated; household income in the top quartile for their age in their country; read or watch business/news media at least several times a week; follow public policy issues in the news at least several times a week. The survey question is: "Please indicate how much you trust that institution to do what is right using a 9-point scale where one means that you "do not trust them at all" and nine means that you "trust them a great deal".

Figure A.1. Trust in national government index (2011-2013)



Source: Edelman Barometer.

For instance, in 2013, the highest trust levels were noticeable in China, Sweden and India, whereas the lowest ones were in Russia, Japan and Brazil. It is also evident that trust levels vary slightly over time (see Figure A.1). However, one of its limitations is that it oversamples for informed public (i.e. college-educated and well-off respondents) and is thus not representative of the population as a whole. The 2012 wave was the first one where the general public was also surveyed in a representative fashion.

Eurobarometer

Since 1974, the Eurobarometer (Standardbarometer) is conducted every six months among the European Union member states, as well as some accession countries, though questions related to trust have only been included since 2003 (OECD, 2013c). The Eurobarometer poses several questions related to trust: trust in European institutions, trust in national government, trust in national Parliament and trust in local/regional authorities. The question is: "I would like to ask you a question about how much trust you have in certain institutions. For each of the following institutions, please tell me if you tend to trust it or tend not to trust it." The respondents are confronted with a binary choice per institution. About 1,000 respondents for each country are interviewed. The limit of this barometer is that there is an emphasis on institutional trust and only European countries take part in this survey.

Figure A.2 shows that trust in the EU is higher than trust in national parliaments and national governments across all European Union member states. However, over time, trust has declined across all three categories since autumn 2004 (despite a peak in spring 2007).

Figure A.2. Trust in EU, national parliaments and governments (2004-2014)



Note: Question: "For each of the following institutions, please tell me if you tend to trust it or tend not to trust it."" Aut. refers to autumn, sp to spring wave of the Eurobarometer.

Source: Eurobarometer, 2014.

Figure A.3 adds another dimension of trust (local/regional authorities) and compares 2008 with 2013. It shows that trust across all four institutions has declined from 2008 to 2013. Nonetheless, trust in local/regional authorities and in the European Union tends to be higher than in national government and national parliament.

Figure A.3. Trust in institutions, 2008 and 2013



Source: Eurobarometer.

European Social Survey (ESS)

The ESS asks a similar question on generalised trust as the General Social Survey and World Values Survey: "Generally speaking, would you say that most people can be trusted, or that you can't be too careful in dealing with people?" There are also several questions asking about institutional trust, where respondents have to score six institutions: country's parliament, legal system, police, politicians, political parties, European Parliament and United Nations.

By the time of writing, six waves have been conducted since 2002 in 36 countries though only 22 countries have been included from the start. The sample size is around 1,500 respondents (less for countries with fewer than two million inhabitants). The survey is limited to European countries.

Figure A.4 depicts institutional trust, considering trust in the police, legal system, national parliament, politicians and European Parliament. Comparing 2002 and 2012, the figure suggests that average trust in institutions decreased significantly across all five areas.

Figure A.4. Average trust in institutions, 2002 and 2012



Source: European Social Survey.

Gallup

Gallup conducts a poll on confidence in a wide range of institutions (including public schools). It is run yearly since 2006 across about 140 countries. Most questions ask about "Do you have confidence in national government [judicial systems and courts, local police forces, healthcare or medical system]". A two-point scale is used: yes/no or satisfied/not satisfied. There is one question on satisfaction with the education system. The question is: "In the city or area where you live, are you satisfied or dissatisfied with the educational system or the schools?" However, satisfaction does not necessarily mean trust. The data is also fragmented and not all years are available for all countries (OECD, 2013c). In addition, sample sizes are limited to around 1 000 persons in each country.

Analysing change over time across different segments of government (see Figure A.5), it seems that confidence levels in education remained more or less constant between 2005 and 2009 (as did military, local police and media), while confidence in judicial system, health and national government increased significantly (at least five per cent) in the same period. Overall, the lowest levels were registered for media and national government.

Figure A.5. Confidence levels in different segments of government, average (percentage)



Notes: Average percentages of positive answers reported (margin of error 5%)
N=18-19 (2005), N=25-27 (2009); averages for "Trust in Health" based on smaller country sample, N=14 (2009)

Source: World Gallup Survey.

General Social Survey (GSS)

The General Social Survey (GSS) monitors societal change within the United States and compares the United States to other nations. The GSS asks the same question as the World Values Survey (discussed below): "Generally speaking, do you think that people can be trusted?" Respondents can answer either "most people can be trusted" or "can't be too careful". The survey measures people's expectations of others' trustworthiness. Figure A.6 below indicates that interpersonal trust levels tend to be on average 38% (with a minimum of 32% in 2012, and a maximum of 48% in 1984).

Figure A.6. Interpersonal trust



Source: General Social Survey.

The GSS has evoked similar criticism as World Values Survey (discussed below). Reeskens and Hooghe (2008) argue that the GSS question is neither a valid nor a reliable measure of trust. The question is rather imprecise, the possible answers are not mutually exclusive and only one item is considered to be a reliable measurement (Glaeser et al., 2000; Miller and Mitamura, 2003; Yamagishi, Kikuchi and Kosugi, 1999). The question measures people's expectations of others' trustworthiness (see Naef and Schupp, 2009). But respondents have the choice between trust and caution and not between trust and distrust or between cautious and incautious behaviour (see Yamagishi, Kikuchi and Kosugi, 1999). An additional challenge is that answers may differ depending on whether people understand "most people" in the question as meaning acquaintances or strangers (Reeskens and Hooghe, 2008).

For the United States, Figure A.7 indicates that confidence levels in schools and education system have not changed significantly (at least by 5%) between 1998 and 2008. This corresponds with findings of other surveys that confidence levels have remained more or less constant (though some exceptions exist, as the previous Gallup Survey results show). Nonetheless, respondents generally show considerable levels of confidence in schools and education system in the United States.

Figure A.7. Confidence levels in school and education system, United States



Source: General Social Survey.

International Social Survey Programme (ISSP)

The International Social Survey Programme (ISSP) issues thematic surveys. Questions on trust (e.g. trust in politicians, trust in people) are included in the Module on 'Role of Government' (1985, 1990, 1996 and 2006). The questions specifically relating to trust are: "Most civil servants can be trusted to do what is best for the country" and "There are only a few people I can trust completely". Figure A.8 below shows the percentage change in trust in civil servants between 1996 and 2006. It indicates that trust in civil servants increased in several countries (such as Switzerland, the United States and Sweden), while it decreased in others (e.g. Japan, Russia, Israel and Poland).

Figure A.8. Trust in civil servants, percentage change between 1996 and 2006



Note: Question: "Most government administrators (civil servants) can be trusted to do what is best for the country."

Source: International Social Survey Programme.

While the ISSP covers around 21 countries, one of its disadvantages is that the module on the role government is presented in long intervals, and has only limited questions on trust.

Pew

The Pew Research Centre for the People and the Press has conducted several surveys on trust in government, with a time span of 1958 to present. The US-focused question is “trust government in Washington to do the right thing”. The national sample is around 1,500 respondents. There has been one instance (in 2007) where a Pew Global Attitudes survey on trust was conducted. The question asked participants in 47 countries: “Please tell me how much you agree or disagree with – most people in this society are trustworthy”. Respondents could answer on a 4-point scale: “completely agree, mostly agree, mostly disagree, completely disagree”. China and Sweden exhibited the highest levels of social trust at that point. The disadvantage is that there is only one year where this question was asked across a wide range of countries. The figure below shows that the highest levels of trustworthiness were noted in China, Sweden and the Canada, whereas levels were low in Italy, Brazil and Chile.

Figure A.9. Survey on trustworthiness across selected countries (2007)



Note: "Completely agree" and "mostly agree" categories were combined to "agree", while "mostly disagree" and "completely disagree" were combined to "disagree".

Source: Pew Spring 2007 Survey.

Trust scales

To provide an example of measures of trust among school members, trust scales were developed by Hoy and Kupersmith (1985). The originally 14 items were later expanded to 48 survey items by Hoy and Tschannen-Moran (1999).[17] Items were developed to assess the five elements of trust mentioned before (i.e. benevolence, reliability, competence, honesty and openness). Included are "the principal is unresponsive to teachers' concerns", "teachers in this school are reliable", "teachers in this school are suspicious of students" and "teachers can count on parents in this school". Teachers were asked to indicate the extent to which they agreed with the items. The trust scales include a six-point Likert response set from strongly agree to strongly disagree. Hoy and colleagues consider three dimensions of faculty trust (through the Omnibus T-scale)[18]: trust in the principal, trust in colleagues and trust in clients (students and parents). Other scales (e.g. on student trust) are presented in Forsyth, Adams and Hoy (2011).While trust scales are a welcomed development in the field of education, it is not clear how comparable these scales are across countries and over time.

World Values Survey (WVS)

The WVS has carried out five waves of surveys by time of writing this paper – the sixth wave to be released in 2014. It covers more than 90 countries. Trust is calculated in each country as the share of respondents to the question ("Generally speaking, do you think that people can be trusted?") who agree that "most people can be trusted" rather than the alternative that "you can't be too careful in dealing with people" (Inglehart, 1997; see also Knack and Keefer, 1997; Zak and Knack, 2001). There is a four-point scale of answers: "a great deal", "quite a lot", "not very much" and "not at all".

To start off, some general measurements of interpersonal and then institutional trust are presented. Figure A.10 below demonstrates that respondents tend to trust their family, people they

17. The newest data can be found at: www. waynekhoy.com/faculty_trust.html

18. The Omnibus T-Scale is a short operational measure of three dimensions of (faculty) trust (i.e. trust in the principal, trust in colleagues, and trust in clients - students and parents), which can be used for either elementary or secondary schools.

know personally and their neighbourhood much more than people they meet for the first time and people of another nationality or religion. This corresponds with findings in the literature that interpersonal ties and repeated interactions between people play an important role in increasing trust levels.

Figure A.10. Interpersonal trust



Source: World Values Survey, 2006-2007.

Turning from interpersonal to institutional trust, Figure A.11 shows that confidence levels in institutions underwent fairly minor changes (except for police) over the two periods under investigation.

Figure A.11. Confidence in institutions, average



Source: World Values Survey.

However, there are several problems with this survey. The OECD (2013c) remarks that there is only one data point per survey, when data is available. Several countries also only have one data point across several survey waves (OECD, 2013c). Beugelsdijk (2006) argues that, instead of measuring trust, the WVS measure may proxy the well-functioning of institutions.

Putnam (2000) also cautions about the wording of the WVS question on trust. He argues (2000: 137-138) that the meaning of the responses remains unclear in one respect. "If fewer respondents say 'most people can be trusted' that could mean (1) the respondents are actually reporting that honesty is rarer these days, (2) other people's behaviour has not really changed, but we have become more paranoid, or (3) neither our ethical demands nor other people's behaviour has actually changed, but now we have more information about their treachery, perhaps because of more lurid media reports".

It is not clear to respondents whom to trust, in which situations or under which circumstances. This ambiguity could make it rather difficult for people to answer the question – it thus might pick up culturally specific perceptions of the context or echo passing phenomena such as anxiety following adverse media reports (Bjørnskov, 2006: 3).

Comparison of surveys

	Survey level							Question level							
	scope	**# of relevant waves**	**earliest year**	**latest year**	**time of data collection**	**# countries**	**# countries OECD**	**Relevant Questions (short)**	**Relevant Questions (literal)**	**Scale**		**# data points available**	**earliest wave available**	**latest wave available**	**missing wave(s)**
Gallup World Poll	World	8	2005	2013	same year	38	30	Confidence in Media		binary	yes (1) / No (0)	162	2005	2011	
								Confidence in Education		binary	yes (1) / No (0)	238			
								Confidence in Health		binary	yes (1) / No (0)	112	2005	2010	
								Confidence in Police		binary	yes (1) / No (0)	231			
								Confidence in Military		binary	yes (1) / No (0)	228			
								Confidence in Judicial System		binary	yes (1) / No (0)	231			
								Confidence in National Government		binary	yes (1) / No (0)	233			
International Social Survey Programme (ISSP) - Role of Government	World	2	1996	2006	2005-2008 for wave of 2006; 1993-1996 for wave of 2006	21	17	Trust in Civil servants	Most government administrators (civil servants) can be trusted to do what is best for the country.	5-scale, ordered	strongly disagree (0), strongly agree (1), neither (2), agree (3), strongly agree (4)	42	1996	2006	
								Trust in MPs	People we elect as MPs try to keep the promises they have made during the election.	5-scale, ordered	strongly disagree (0), strongly agree (1), neither (2), agree (3), strongly agree (4)	42	1996	2006	
European Social Survey (ESS)	Europe	6	2002	2012	same year	31	23	Trust in …	please tell me on a score of 0-10 how much you personally trust each of the institutions I read out. 0 means you do not trust an institution at all, and 10 means you have complete trust. Firstly…		No trust at all (0) - Complete Trust (10)				
								Trust in country's parliament	*… [country]?s parliament?*	11-scale, metric	see above	144			
								Trust in the legal system	*… The legal system?*	11-scale, metric	see above	144			
								Trust in the police	*… The police?*	11-scale, metric	see above	144			
								Trust in politicians	*… politicians?*	11-scale, metric	see above	144			
								Trust in the European Parliament	*… The European Parliament?*	11-scale, metric	see above	144			
								State of education in country nowadays	please say what you think overall about the state of education in [country] nowadays?	11-scale, metric	Extremely bad (0) - Extremely good (10)	144			
								State of health services in country nowadays	please say what you think overall about the state of health services in [country] nowadays?	11-scale, metric	Extremely bad (0) - Extremely good (10)	144			
								Most people can be trusted or you can't be too careful	generally speaking, would you say that most people can be trusted, or that you can't be too careful in dealing with people? Please tell me on a score of 0 to 10, where 0 means you can't be too careful and 10 means that most people can be trusted.	11-scale, metric	You can't be too carfeul (0) - Most people can be trusted (10)	144			

	Survey level							Question level							
	scope	**# of relevant waves**	**earliest year**	**latest year**	**time of data collection**	**# countries**	**# countries OECD**	**Relevant Questions (short)**	**Relevant Questions (literal)**	**Scale**		**# data points available**	**earliest wave available**	**latest wave available**	**missing wave(s)**
Eurobarometer	Europe	20	2003	2014	same year	34	22		I would like to ask you a question about how much trust you have in certain institutions. For each of the following institutions, please tell me if you tend to trust it or tend not to trust it.						
								Trust in National Government	*The (NATIONALITY) Government*	binary	Tend not to trust (0), Tend to trust (1)	593			
								Trust in National Parliament	*The (NATIONALITY PARLIAMENT) (USE PROPER NAME FOR LOWER HOUSE)*	binary	Tend not to trust (0), Tend to trust (1)	593			
								Trust in European Union	*The European Union*	binary	Tend not to trust (0), Tend to trust (1)	606			
								Trust in Local/Regional Authorities	*Regional or local public authorities*	binary	Tend not to trust (0), Tend to trust (1)	368	2008	2014	
World Values Survey	World	5	1981-84	2005-07	same year	87	26	Trust in people	Generally speaking, would you say that most people can be trusted or that you need to be very careful in dealing with people?	binary	Can't be too careful (0), Most people can be trusted (1)	207			
								Trust in …	I now want to ask you how much you trust various groups of people: Using the responses on this card, could you tell me how much you trust…		Do not trust them at all (0), Do not trust them very much (1), Neither trust nor distrust them (2), Trust them a little (3), Trust them completely (4)				
								Trust Your family	*Your family*	5-scale, ordered	see above	67	1989-93	2005-07	1994-97, 1999-04
								Trust Your neighborhood	*Your neighborhood*	5-scale, ordered	see above	88	2005-07	2005-07	
								Trust People you know personally	*People you know personally*	5-scale, ordered	see above	87	2005-07	2005-07	
								Trust People you meet for the first time	*People you meet for the first time*	5-scale, ordered	see above	87	2005-07	2005-07	
								Trust People of another religion	*People of another religion*	5-scale, ordered	see above	87	2005-07	2005-07	
								Trust People of another nationality	*People of another nationality*	5-scale, ordered	see above	87	2005-07	2005-07	
									I am going to name a number of organisations. For each one, could you tell me how much confidence you have in them: is it a great deal of confidence, quite a lot of confidence, not very much confidence or none at all?		None at all (0), Not very much (1), Quite a lot (2), A great deal (3)				
								Confidence Education System	*Education System*	4-scale	see above	102	1989-93	2005-07	1994-97, 1999-04
								Confidence The Press	*The Press*	4-scale	see above	201			
								Confidence The Police	*The Police*	4-scale	see above	199			
								Confidence Parliament	*Parliament*	4-scale	see above	199			
								Confidence Social Security System	*Social Security System*	4-scale	see above	102	1989-93	2005-07	
								Confidence The Government	*The Government*	4-scale	see above	182			
								Confidence Justice System	*Justice System*	4-scale	see above	164			1999-04
								Confidence The European Union	*The European Union*	4-scale	see above	133			

	Survey level							Question level							
	scope	**# of relevant waves**	**earliest year**	**latest year**	**time of data collection**	**# countries**	**# countries OECD**	**Relevant Questions (short)**	**Relevant Questions (literal)**	**Scale**		**# data points available**	**earliest wave available**	**latest wave available**	**missing wave(s)**
General Social Survey	USA	23	1972	2012	same year	1	1	Trust in people	Generally speaking, would you say that most people can be trusted or that you can't be too careful in dealing with people?	3-scale, ordered	Can't be too careful (0), People can be trustet (1), Depends (2)	25			
								Confidence in Education System	I am going to name some institutions in this country. As far as the people running these institutions are concerned, would you say you have a great deal of confidence, only some confidence, or hardly any confidence at all in them? Confidence in Education System"	3-scale, ordered	A great deal (1), Only some (2), Hardly any (3)	27	1973	2012	1985
								Confidence in Schools and Educational System	"How much confidence do you have in. . . Schools and the educational system"	5-scale	Complete Confidence (1), A great deal of confidence (2), Some confidence (3), Very little confidence (4), No confidence at all (5)	3	1991	2008	1993, 1994, 1995, 1996, 1997, 1999, 2000, 2002, 2004, 2006
								Confidence in courts and legal system	"How much confidence do you have in. . . Courts and legal system"	5-scale	Complete Confidence (1), A great deal of confidence (2), Some confidence (3), Very little confidence (4), No confidence at all (5)	3	1991	2008	1993, 1994, 1995, 1996, 1997, 1999, 2000, 2002, 2004, 2007
Pew Research Center's Global Attitudes Project	World	1	2007	2007	same year	46	14	Trust in People	Please tell me how much you agree or disagree with -- Most people in this society are trustworthy	4-scale	Completely agree (3), Mostly agree (2), Mostly disagree (1), Completely disagree (0)	46			
Edelman Trust Barometer	World	13	2011	2014	preceding year	25	15	Trust in institutions	Below is a list of institutions. For each one, please indicate how much you trust that institution to do what is rightusing a 9-point scale where one means that you "do not trust them at all" and nine means that you "trust them a great deal".	9-scale, metric	do not trust them at all (0), Trust them a great deal (9)				
								Trust in Government	… THE GOVERNMENT	9-scale, metric	see above	60			
								Trust in Business	… BUSINESS	9-scale, metric	see above	40	2012	2014	