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Foreword

The OECD's Development Assistance Committee (DAC) is the key forum of bilateral donors accounting for over 90% of world ODA.

Work undertaken by the DAC provides information, insights and results on development co operation issues. The OECD Journal on Development regroups a cross-selection of recent material which the development community at large should find informative and pertinent. Generally, the work published in the Journal is the product of the DAC or its working parties and networks. It may also emerge from DAC forums and seminars.

Each year, the first issue of the Journal carries the annual Development Co-operation Report (DCR) of the DAC Chair. A frequent component of subsequent issues of the Journal are DAC Peer Review reports.

In order to achieve its aims the OECD has set up a number of specialised committees. One of these is the **Development Assistance Committee**, whose members have agreed to secure an expansion of aggregate volume of resources made available to developing countries and to improve their effectiveness. To this end, members periodically review together both the amount and the nature of their contributions to aid programmes, bilateral and multilateral, and consult each other on all other relevant aspects of their development assistance policies.

The members of the Development Assistance Committee are Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Japan, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, the United Kingdom, the United States and the Commission of the European Communities.

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Part 1

Encouraging Effective Evaluation of Conflict Prevention and Peacebuilding Activities: Towards DAC Guidance

Abstract: This report outlines an approach for developing guidance on evaluating conflict prevention and peacebuilding activities. First, the report specifies which types of work can be considered conflict prevention and peacebuilding activities, distinguishing between conflict sensitivity and conflict prevention and peacebuilding work. The challenges of evaluating in this field are discussed and recommendations are made on key concepts and important elements for the process, including conducting a conflict analysis; examining theories of change; understanding impacts; programming to support evaluation; and choosing evaluation methodologies and approaches.

The report also looks at the applicability of existing DAC tools, and adapts the DAC Criteria for Evaluating Development Assistance to the conflict prevention and peacebuilding field. Finally, it outlines the next steps for the DAC Networks in developing guidance.

Acknowledgements: This paper is a result of a joint project of the DAC Network on Conflict, Peace and Development Co-operation and the DAC Network on Development Evaluation. The report was prepared by Mary B. Anderson, Diana Chigas and Peter Woodrow of CDA Collaborative Learning Projects (CDA), based in Cambridge, Massachusetts, USA. The two Networks received and commented on this document prior to its publication. The findings of this research are being used in the preparation of draft DAC guidance, which will be completed by the two networks in the autumn of 2007. The guidance will be used for evaluations in the field during a one year application phase, then revised and finalised at the end of 2008. Any comments or queries should be addressed to <dacevaluation.contact@oecd.org>.

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Executive Summary

The changing nature of war and the astoundingly high human, societal and financial costs of recent violent conflicts – coupled with a growing sense that such suffering and devastation could be avoided or at least mitigated – have led to a marked increase in conflict prevention and peacebuilding activity. The past decade has seen growing numbers of individuals, governments, international organisations, civil society groups and research institutions devote their efforts, intelligence and financial resources to interventions intended to avert or end violent conflict. At the same time, concern has grown over the effectiveness of such efforts.

Two Networks of the OECD Development Assistance Committee (DAC) – Development Evaluation and Conflict, Peace and Development Co-operation (CPDC) – sensed this growing unmet need for direction, among their members as well as other actors in the conflict prevention and peacebuilding fields. In response, they launched an initiative to develop forthcoming DAC guidance on evaluating conflict prevention and peacebuilding activities. The overall objective of this two-year process has been to help improve evaluation practice and thereby support the broader community of experts and implementing organisations in their efforts to enhance the quality of conflict prevention and peacebuilding interventions.

CDA Collaborative Learning Projects (CDA) was asked to draft this report with a fourfold aim: to establish greater clarity with regard to conflict prevention and peacebuilding definitions; to review standards against which to evaluate conflict prevention and peacebuilding activities; to identify the distinguishing characteristics and special considerations of the resulting evaluations; and to outline key potential elements those evaluations could include. The research is based on an examination of evaluation and policy documents and interviews with evaluation specialists, donor representatives, multilateral organisations and programme implementers, including non-governmental organisations (NGOs). CDA also participated in a DAC meeting in Paris in October 2006 and the joint workshop of the two DAC networks in Oslo in December 2006. The report therefore represents a useful step in the larger process of developing thoroughly tested and practical conflict prevention and peacebuilding evaluation guidance.

The main audiences for this report are the evaluation and policy staff of donor agencies, conflict prevention and peacebuilding field practitioners and other relevant donor government personnel. Nonetheless, many other actors in the conflict prevention and peacebuilding and evaluation fields will find the information contained herein useful as well.

Summary of general findings

Defining conflict prevention and peacebuilding

Through comparative analysis of activities across contexts and times, CDA found that a policy or approach that was labelled conflict prevention and peacebuilding in some places often was not seen as conflict prevention and peacebuilding elsewhere. Theories of peacebuilding and conflict resolution abound, but each has been disproved as often as it has been proved. Donors also differ in their interpretations of what conflict prevention and peacebuilding is. The confusion over definitions of conflict prevention and peacebuilding leads many to assume (falsely) that by being “conflict-sensitive” they are *ipso facto* also doing peacebuilding work.

Furthermore, many people assume that advances in critical structural areas also contribute to the reduction of conflict and the promotion of peace. Many donor-funded programmes and policies are undertaken on the assumption that progress towards liberalisation, economic growth, prosperity, human rights and democracy contribute to peace. Evidence shows that while some of those efforts do contribute to peace, others have negative or negligible effects on conflict.

Given this confusion, CDA suggested the following definition of conflict prevention and peacebuilding as the basis for guidance:

Conflict prevention and peacebuilding interventions are efforts that adopt goals and objectives aimed at preventing conflict or building peace; they are usually (but not always) focused on a particular conflict zone – an area threatened by, in the midst of, or recovering from serious intergroup violence.¹

Using an intervention's goals and objectives as the determining criteria for delineating conflict prevention and peacebuilding boundaries helps to clarify the difference between "conflict-sensitive programming" and conflict prevention and peacebuilding activities. All efforts undertaken in a conflict area should be conflict-sensitive (aware of how they affect the dynamics of conflict). Interventions intended to prevent conflict and build peace must also be accountable for their impact on the specific factors that drive and shape that conflict.

Conflict prevention and peacebuilding evaluations

Scope – When a policy or programme adopts goals to make a difference in the key driving factors² of conflict, it becomes a legitimate subject for conflict prevention- and peacebuilding-focused evaluating. Donors may also decide to examine the impacts on peace of interventions that do not have conflict prevention and peacebuilding goals, because those efforts nonetheless have the potential for influencing the factors driving conflict. In settings vulnerable to conflict, policy makers may wish to ensure that all interventions are consistent with the effort to prevent violence. Thus, even efforts that were not originally intended to address conflict may be examined for their actual or potential impacts, using conflict prevention and peacebuilding evaluation criteria.

Conflict analysis and theories of change – Policy makers, practitioners and donors agree that in order to be effective, conflict prevention and peacebuilding activities must be based on an analysis of the key driving factors of and actors within the conflict. There is also growing agreement that evaluators of conflict prevention and peacebuilding should use such an analysis as the basis for evaluations. Based on that analysis, conflict prevention and peacebuilding programme strategies or theories of change describe the way practitioners and policy makers believe a particular activity will contribute to achieving peace (or conflict prevention). These underlying theories need to be uncovered, described and tested during evaluation.

1. There is no internationally agreed definition of the term "violence". The term "intergroup violence" is used here to distinguish the intentional and illegitimate use of armed force, including both inter- and intra-state conflicts, from other types of violence such as criminal activity and interpersonal violence. While some conflict prevention and peacebuilding activities may address such forms of violence, this research deals primarily with intergroup violence (war).

2. Key driving factors are major elements that contribute to the conflict, without which the conflict either would not exist or would be significantly different. These can be long-term structural issues, more immediate triggers or anything in between, as identified by people in the situation.

Impacts – There are wide differences of opinion about what is meant by impacts in the context of conflict prevention and peacebuilding evaluations. Many think that impacts are beyond the immediate outcomes of conflict prevention and peacebuilding programming, occurring “at a higher level” and over the long term. In the view of the CDA team, this preoccupation with the remoteness of impacts can mistakenly divert evaluation attention away from assessing the many effects (intended or not) of conflict prevention and peacebuilding programmes. Evaluations should take account of individual programme impacts and cumulative, multi-programme impacts at the strategic or policy level. Both long- and short-term impacts should be examined, with a focus on impacts on the conflict.

Special problems, conditions and expectations of conflict prevention and peacebuilding evaluations – There is broad evidence that evaluating conflict prevention and peacebuilding faces special challenges, including: the political nature of peace processes; the potentially problematic role of partner governments; unclear or unspecified goals of conflict prevention and peacebuilding activities; implicit and unarticulated (as well as untested) theories of change; the importance of processes as well as outcomes and impacts; and the emotional and ideological commitments of conflict prevention and peacebuilding advocates and programmers.

Evaluation as an intervention – Because a conflict prevention and peacebuilding evaluation occurs in the context of conflict, its approaches and processes are effectively interventions in the conflict. Evaluators who do not know how to engage with conflict dynamics in positive ways (lacking conflict sensitivity and know-how) may do harm as they evaluate a programme. Conflict prevention and peacebuilding evaluators must act in accordance with the field’s established principles and be sure that they have thoroughly analysed the conflict context.

Approaches and methodologies for evaluations – There is no one “right” methodology to address all the special circumstances and conditions of conflict prevention and peacebuilding. There are, however, common principles that should be followed, *inter alia*: inclusiveness; testing of the underlying theory of change; use of a mix of both qualitative and quantitative methods; attention to unexpected impacts; and ethical standards for approaching informants and handling the reporting of findings within conflict environments.

Adaptation of the DAC Criteria to conflict prevention and peacebuilding – DAC’s Criteria for Evaluating Development Assistance,³ with additional information from the OECD/DAC “Glossary of Key Terms in Evaluation and Results Based Management”, have been adapted to serve as the basis for conflict prevention and peacebuilding evaluation guidance. All activities (projects, programmes, country strategies, interventions and policies) should be examined using these criteria. Specific questions linking each criterion to conflict prevention and peacebuilding issues were also developed. The criteria are: Relevance/Appropriateness; Effectiveness; Efficiency; Impact; Sustainability; Linkages (replacing “Connectedness”); Coverage; and Consistency with conflict prevention and peacebuilding values. There is disagreement over whether Coherence should be considered a criterion; some feel much more evidence is needed to establish whether coherence contributes to conflict prevention and peacebuilding effectiveness. Nor is there full consensus on adding Consistency and Coverage, which could be covered by other criteria.

Skills and tools necessary for conflict prevention and peacebuilding evaluators – Three qualifications appear to be of particular importance for evaluator teams: i) knowledge of evaluation methods; ii) knowledge of the conflict prevention and peacebuilding field (including the state of the art and the skills required for performing conflict analysis); and iii) an appropriate and conflict-sensitive style of working (being comfortable working in dangerous situations, having interpersonal approaches that are transparent, being gender- and culturally sensitive, and possessing skills for managing conflict and tension).

3. DAC Criteria for Evaluating Development Assistance, <http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/15/21/39119068.pdf>

Additional issues regarding conflict prevention and peacebuilding evaluations

Joint evaluations – Joint evaluations (involving several donors and programmes) should be promoted because they can generate a fuller picture to establish whether various interventions “add up”. Cumulative evaluations look more broadly at many (or even all) interventions in a particular conflict zone to assess the combined impacts of those multiple efforts, often from a strategic level. It is necessary to manage the internal politics, individual interests and diverse needs of multiple actors in order to ensure that the added-value of a joint perspective is sufficient to justify any added costs. Finally, when joint evaluations are performed, it is critical to include local people so that “external agendas” (i.e. those of donors) do not distort internal concerns and the evaluation will be useful and relevant.

Partner country roles – The role of partner countries in conflict prevention and peacebuilding evaluation requires additional considerations, in light of the potential involvement of government, or parts of government, in the conflict itself. Government co-sponsorship of an evaluation is inappropriate if the government is party to the conflict. Considerations for defining the role of the partner countries in a conflict prevention and peacebuilding evaluation should be based on an analysis of the potential for bias or the appearance of bias in the evaluation and the potential impact of government involvement in an evaluation on the conflict.

Development and use of indicators – As mentioned above, there is no single proved methodology for preventing violence and building peace. This reality led many with whom CDA spoke to be concerned by recent donor emphasis on establishing standard (or universal) conflict prevention and peacebuilding indicators, specifying detailed logframe analyses of intended activities, and linking evaluations to funding decisions. Many note that they now see evaluations as existing “only” or “primarily” to meet a donor requirement.

Given the reality of what we do not know, conflict prevention and peacebuilding evaluations in the coming years should be directed toward gathering evidence and learning from it, and on testing and challenging commonly held theories and assumptions about peace and conflict, rather than on establishing fixed universal indicators of peace/conflict. Clarity on indicators (and whether or not they can be generalised in a useful way) may emerge in the process, but the focus and approach at this time should avoid over-specification of anticipated indicators as benchmarks for evaluation. Upcoming conflict prevention and peacebuilding evaluations should focus on gathering experience and analysing it cumulatively and comparatively across contexts, to improve our collective learning.

A final note: keeping it simple – People involved in conflict prevention and peacebuilding activities commonly speak about how complicated conflict is, and therefore how complicated peacemaking is. But some of the practitioners with whom CDA spoke noted that the conflict prevention and peacebuilding field is probably over-complicating issues, and that doing so provides an excuse for ineffectiveness and lack of accountability. They urged that conflict prevention and peacebuilding evaluations avoid long, complex discussions of the context, as these impede analysis of the effectiveness of efforts. Evaluations should focus on how conflict prevention and peacebuilding interventions interact with the key factors and actors that drive the conflict. Simplicity would then be achieved without denying the complexity of conflict causes and dynamics.

Future OECD/DAC actions and next steps

1. *Producing draft guidance* – As stated earlier, this report is intended to contribute to the drafting of guidance for the evaluation of conflict prevention and peacebuilding programmes and policies. To that end, a wide group of donor representatives and practitioners were consulted during the

drafting of this report and at a special workshop. The feedback received will be incorporated into the future guidance document.

2. *Donor experimentation with evaluations* – The resulting draft guidance could then be used as the basis for a concerted effort by donors to implement evaluations of as many conflict prevention and peacebuilding programmes as possible over the next two years, with careful documentation of the processes used, the Terms of Reference (TOR),⁴ the lessons learned about the evaluation process and programme content issues. This effort should include the experimentation with joint and cumulative evaluations noted above, but also application of the guidance to single-programme evaluation efforts.
3. *An evaluation of evaluations* – The accumulated evaluations from the experimentation in Point 2 could provide the basis for a comparative evaluation of conflict prevention and peacebuilding evaluations, in order to learn what kinds of evaluation have proved useful and which evaluation processes and methods produced those lessons.
4. *Annual review of conflict prevention and peacebuilding evaluations* – In order to facilitate learning about evaluations, the OECD/DAC could convene an annual session to examine a set of evaluations performed during the previous year, perform cross-case analysis, and derive ongoing lessons to inform subsequent evaluations.
5. *Policy review* – Over time, the review of a range of interventions will provide evidence that should inform a review of the policies of individual donors, as well as OECD/DAC policies and guidelines.

4. Terms of Reference (TOR) is a written document presenting the purpose and scope of the evaluation, the methods to be used, the standard against which performance is to be assessed or analyses are to be conducted, the resources and time allocated, and reporting requirements. Two other expressions sometimes used with the same meaning are “scope of work” and “evaluation mandate” (OECD, 2002).

Introduction

How effective is the international community, acting in partnership with local groups, in preventing conflict and building peace? Impressive successes in some places are counterbalanced by devastating failures in others. Recognising these failures, more and more individuals, agencies, universities and governments have, over the past decade, devoted their efforts, intelligence and financial resources to interventions intended to avert or end violent conflict. As the body of experience – both positive and negative – has grown, so have attempts to evaluate and learn from it, and thereby to improve conflict prevention and peacebuilding effectiveness.

In late spring of 2006, two Networks of the Development Assistance Committee of the OECD – the Network on Development Evaluation and the Network on Conflict, Peace and Development Co-operation – asked CDA Collaborative Learning Projects (CDA) to help them develop an approach to guiding evaluations of conflict prevention and peacebuilding activities. This work was to follow and build on a review of conflict prevention and peacebuilding evaluations carried out for the DAC networks by the Fafo Institute for Applied International Studies (Taylor *et al.*, 2005), during 2005-06, as well as earlier seminal work commissioned by the Utstein group (Smith, 2004a). The Fafo report clarified a number of issues embedded in conflict prevention and peacebuilding policies and programmes and in evaluations of these, and pointed towards a more appropriate and robust conflict prevention and peacebuilding evaluation approach.

CDA's challenge was to take the next steps in helping to develop this approach, by establishing greater clarity with regard to conflict prevention and peacebuilding definitions; reviewing standards against which to evaluate conflict prevention and peacebuilding activities; identifying the distinguishing characteristics and special considerations of conflict prevention and peacebuilding evaluations; and outlining key potential elements those evaluations could include. The main audience for the resulting guidance was identified as the policy and field staff of donor agencies and other relevant parts of donor governments. The overall objectives were to help improve evaluation practice and, in so doing, to support the broader community of experts and implementing organisations in their efforts to enhance the quality of peace practice.

In addition, the DAC networks asked CDA to augment the present report with specialised applications (called “drill-downs”) of specific areas of conflict prevention and peacebuilding work, such as security sector reform, dialogues and training. Once draft guidance has been developed, the DAC also plans to undertake field tests to inform further refinements. This report therefore represents an intermediate step in the larger process of developing appropriate, tested and usable conflict prevention and peacebuilding evaluation guidance.

Based on the Terms of Reference (TOR) provided by the two DAC networks (see Annex 8), CDA carried out interviews and reviewed a range of conflict prevention and peacebuilding documents and evaluations completed after the Fafo review, as well as donor policy papers. CDA also helped organise two workshops on the application of evaluation guidance to two specialised sub-fields: security sector reform (held in Birmingham, United Kingdom) and political dialogues (held in Cambridge, Massachusetts). Finally, CDA staff participated in the DAC meeting in Paris in October 2006 and the joint meeting of the two DAC networks in Oslo in December 2006.

Interviews

Following conversations with the Steering Group and OECD Secretariat, CDA conducted 28 interviews. Among the interviewees were evaluation specialists (5), donor representatives (members of the Steering Group and other staff of DAC members) (8), a private donor (1), multilateral organisations (4 + a team), and programme implementers (10). Ten different countries were represented in the group, although eight interviewees were Americans and eight British (or working for a UK organisation). Only four people represented societies in conflict in Africa and the Middle East. A full list of those interviewed is presented in Annex 1.

Although a common set of questions was used for the interviews,⁵ in most cases wide-ranging conversations regarding evaluation of conflict prevention and peacebuilding programmes were pursued. Without exception, the interviewees were eager to talk about this topic and offered many ideas and opinions. The findings from the interviews are presented in various places throughout this document.

Document review

CDA's document review was designed to build on the work done for the Utstein Report and by Fafo rather than to repeat it. Additional documents identified related closely to the issues posed in the TORs for this report, mostly produced after the Fafo review. Categories of documents reviewed included:

- Conflict sensitivity literature, including Peace and Conflict Impact Assessments (PCIAAs) and other selected conflict analysis tools, as well as reflections on their usefulness.
- Recent conflict prevention and peacebuilding literature, particularly those items that analyse the boundaries of the fields and evidence of varying approaches.
 - Evaluation literature, including:
 - Most significant change literature.
 - Goal-free evaluation literature.
 - Focus-structured comparisons.
- Theory-based evaluation literature.
- Literature on how to assess when circumstances are improving [*e.g.* Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) in Iraq].
- Meta-evaluations, especially those of DAC donors not yet covered by Utstein or Fafo.

Other evaluations, assessments and case studies identified by our interviewees as especially useful/instructive.

The overall purpose of the literature review was threefold: to expand understanding of the state of the art of evaluations; to explore a broad set of potential approaches to conflict prevention and

5. Interview questions are available on request.

peacebuilding evaluations; and to consider evaluation methodologies from other fields for conflict prevention and peacebuilding. The general bibliography can be found in Annex 2.

Policy documents

A number of donor policy documents relating to conflict prevention and peacebuilding were also reviewed (see Annex 3 for a list). Surprisingly, it proved difficult to locate all pertinent donor documents. This is because conflict prevention and peacebuilding policy articulations appear in different places in these documents: some were found in papers issued by ministries of foreign affairs, and others in sections of policy papers dealing with development co-operation, development assistance or humanitarian assistance.

In addition to requesting policy papers directly from donors, web sites of the majority of DAC members were examined for any mention of conflict or peace in the papers issued by either their foreign ministries or their development agencies. The majority of conflict prevention and peacebuilding policy statements found were included in development policy papers, reflecting a common tendency among donors to connect their aid policies and their peace policies. More recent policies often dealt with “whole of government”, the Three Ds (development, diplomacy and defence), and “coherence,” which intends to ensure consistency among the various branches of donor governments that deal with regions of poverty and/or conflict. Some policies also reflect recent efforts of donors to co-operate with each other in development, conflict prevention and peacebuilding (and evaluation of efforts in these fields). Review of the policies and subsequent discussions led to the view that evaluation of such interventions must include consideration of interactions between policies and on-the-ground activities, both to assess whether policies are applied in a consistent manner, and to provide feedback regarding the effectiveness of the policies themselves by judging the success or failure of efforts undertaken to implement them.

The wealth of thought and experience gathered through these interviews and document and policy reviews provided the CDA team with an extensive overview of current understanding about how to prevent conflict and promote peace. In addition, over the past five years, CDA has been involved with many international and local partners in a collaborative learning project called Reflecting on Peace Practice (RPP); this report also draws directly on that project. Using these sources, the CDA team has identified the salient issues that must be addressed in any evaluation.

Organisation of this report

Section I, “An Overview of Conflict Prevention and Peacebuilding Activities”, takes the idea of the palette of potential conflict prevention and peacebuilding activities suggested by the Utstein Report as a point of departure, and then moves forward with a pragmatic boundary definition of these activities based on the goals and objectives of the policy or programme.

Section II, “Conflict Prevention and Peacebuilding Evaluations: Special Issues”, discusses a range of topics that should be considered in evaluations (outlined in the Terms of Reference provided to CDA). The section reviews what emerged from the aforementioned interviews, document and policy reviews and RPP.

Section III, “Relevance of Existing DAC Evaluation Tools”, reviews existing DAC evaluation criteria, tools and guidance, and the Active Learning Network for Accountability and Performance (ALNAP) criteria derived from them, and analyses their usefulness and relevance for programming. While the tools suggest a number of pertinent approaches, the special conflict prevention and peacebuilding conditions reviewed in Section II necessitate some adaptation of these criteria for evaluations.

Finally, Section IV, “Recommendations and Main Findings”, outlines key elements in programme design, evaluation planning and the evaluation process, suggesting guides for the processes, methodologies and standards of future conflict prevention and peacebuilding evaluations. The report ends with comments about how to move from this discussion toward draft DAC guidance.

Several appendices are attached. Most of these are referred to in the text, as they provide more background or greater detail. Annex 7, however, stands on its own, as it contains two examples of how to apply the general overview provided to specific areas of conflict prevention and peacebuilding work – i.e. training and political dialogues.

I. An Overview of Conflict Prevention and Peacebuilding Activities

A. The problem: Blurred boundaries and lack of definitional consensus

A comparative analysis across contexts and times shows that a policy or approach that has been labelled as conflict prevention and peacebuilding in some places is not seen as such elsewhere. Theories of peacebuilding and conflict resolution abound, but each is disproved as often as proved. Overall, many activities that are taken up with good intentions are classified automatically as conflict prevention and peacebuilding.

The “palette” outlined in the Utstein report represents one way to define the broad range of activities that can be labelled “conflict prevention and peacebuilding” (Smith, 2004a). This palette was derived from the (limited) set of programmes and policies nominated by the four countries and then reviewed in the Utstein process. It did not purport to present a comprehensive definition of the limits/boundaries of the label. However, the four categories of conflict prevention and peacebuilding programming proposed in the Utstein report – and included in the palette – have been found to serve as a useful way to organise a listing of intervention modalities, to which other programming types can be added. The four Utstein categories were: socio-economic foundations; security; political framework; and reconciliation and justice.

The CDA team has reviewed various other documents that attempt to list conflict prevention and peacebuilding programming types, and used that information to propose some refinements and additions to the Utstein palette. These are presented in Annex 4, which also presents an approach to clarifying which conflict prevention and peacebuilding interventions (projects, programmes, whole-country strategies and policies) should be held accountable to conflict prevention and peacebuilding evaluation criteria – in other words, where to apply (eventual) DAC evaluation guidance.

In dealing with this question, CDA identified a need to distinguish two other questions that are often mixed: i) What are the differences between programmes that are and are not conflict prevention and peacebuilding? and, ii) What are the differences between effective and ineffective conflict prevention and peacebuilding programming? Table 1.1 makes the distinction.

The three columns are delineated by the differences between what is and is not conflict prevention and peacebuilding. Three basic types of efforts are suggested (projects, programming, policies): i) interventions that clearly intend to have a direct impact on the conflict and peace – “pure” conflict prevention and peacebuilding programmes; ii) interventions whose primary objectives are not related to peace and conflict (they are usually development and/or humanitarian relief), but which may have inadvertent effects on conflict dynamics; and iii) interventions that have both conflict prevention and peacebuilding and other objectives. Of course, the question of whether a policy or programme is effective or not (i.e. whether it falls in the upper or lower row of the matrix) is the main purpose of a conflict prevention and peacebuilding evaluation or review process. This report – and the forthcoming DAC guidance – will provide specific criteria by which to make such judgements.

Note that the top of the matrix also suggests that *all* interventions should be held to conflict sensitivity standards (discussed further below). The second row from the top shows that the interventions in the first two columns – which have articulated conflict prevention and peacebuilding goals and

objectives – should be held to conflict prevention and peacebuilding evaluation criteria, including those in the middle column that might be development or humanitarian relief programmes. Development and humanitarian interventions that fall in the far right column may or may not be held accountable to conflict prevention and peacebuilding criteria – a discretionary matter taken up further in Annex 4.

Table 1.1. **Applying conflict prevention and peacebuilding evaluation guidance: Conflict sensitivity, objectives and effectiveness**

All held to conflict sensitivity criteria			
Held to conflict prevention and peacebuilding criteria		Discretionary application of conflict prevention and peacebuilding criteria	
	Primarily conflict prevention and peacebuilding objectives	Mixed conflict prevention and peacebuilding and other objectives	Primarily other (non-conflict prevention and peacebuilding) objectives
Effective efforts	Intervention has goals for exerting a positive effect on key conflict dynamics, does so well, and is conflict-sensitive.	Intervention attempts to achieve both conflict prevention and peacebuilding and other (development, relief, governance...) goals, does so well, and is conflict-sensitive.	Intervention does not attempt to address conflict dynamics directly, is effective in its own domain, and is conflict-sensitive. (May also have an inadvertent positive effect on peace.)
Ineffective efforts	Intervention has goals for exerting a positive effect on key conflict dynamics, but misses the mark and/or fails to be conflict-sensitive.	Intervention attempts to achieve both conflict prevention and peacebuilding and other (development, relief, governance...) goals, but misses the mark and/or fails to be conflict-sensitive.	Intervention does not attempt to address conflict dynamics directly, is ineffective in its own domain and/or fails to be conflict-sensitive. (May have an inadvertent negative effect on peace.)

Of course, within a specific conflict context most donors are funding efforts that fall into most or all of the columns in the matrix above. In other words, they are funding “pure” peacebuilding policies and programmes as well as a variety of development and humanitarian initiatives that may or may not incorporate peacebuilding or conflict prevention objectives.

At a strategic level, then, the donor must determine how to assess the effectiveness of the entire suite of interventions funded. The matrix above may help sort out the different types of interventions and how they could be evaluated. Multi-donor evaluations and/or country studies will face the same issue at a strategic level: what are the cumulative impacts of multiple interventions by multiple donors at various levels and across several sectors? If such a country study were restricted to purely peacebuilding efforts, the task might be simplified, but it might also miss important dynamics in relation to the peace process. Stated another way: at a strategic level, all interventions in a conflict context should be held accountable for their effects on the conflict, whether or not they have adopted specific peacebuilding objectives. This is closely associated with the DAC Criterion of Relevance, discussed elsewhere in this report.

An additional challenge when defining the boundaries of conflict prevention and peacebuilding arises when both claims and assumptions have not been proved.

Some interventions proceed on the unexamined *assumption* that they are conflict prevention and peacebuilding. In this category we find statements such as, “All poverty reduction promotes peace” or “Women are crucial to peace” or “Working with youth is essential for building peace.” It is often naively assumed that any programme that does good in a context of conflict contributes to peace. However, there is clear evidence that this is not the case. “Good” activities, undertaken singly or in collaboration, do not inevitably support conflict prevention or peacebuilding. “Doing good” or “doing good things” does not necessarily contribute to an effective peacebuilding strategy.

Efforts that *appear*, on the surface, to be peacebuilding must also be held accountable for their actual effects in a particular context at a particular time. For example, one can imagine that under certain circumstances, establishment of a truth and reconciliation process (normally accepted as an important element of transitional justice, and therefore of peacebuilding) might not contribute to achieving durable peace or could even have a negative impact. In contrast, interventions that are not typically labelled as peace work, such as building a road or providing secure access to electrical power, may in fact have a major impact on conflict dynamics and could therefore be considered under the conflict prevention and peacebuilding activities umbrella.

Still other interventions *claim* that they are building peace or preventing conflict, when in fact they may have no discernable impact on peace or conflict dynamics. The motivations for such claims vary widely. Some respond to donor funding criteria by adding a “conflict prevention and peacebuilding” component or title. Others really *do* wish to promote peace but, for a variety of reasons, are doing (often perfectly good) work that has essentially no influence on the actual conflict. Such an activity may still benefit from a conflict prevention and peacebuilding evaluation approach, but it is likely that stated objectives and underlying strategies will have to be re-examined in order either to focus efforts on other positive (non-conflict prevention and peacebuilding) goals, or to redesign the programme to directly address relevant peace and conflict issues more effectively.

The most frequently confused programming thrust is institutional development (democracy and governance, anti-corruption, parliamentary capacity-building, etc.), which is assumed by its very nature to contribute to peace. In persistent humanitarian crises, there are also frequent attempts to combine peacebuilding work with physical assistance to refugees, internally displaced persons (IDPs) and other war victims. Many such programmes are driven by relatively unexamined and unarticulated assumptions about linkages between development outcomes and peace. Further guidance is needed on strategies for understanding these causal relationships and evaluating the links between various development intervention impacts and conflict.

Whether interventions that claim or assume that they are contributing to peace actually do so or not is clearly the key question of conflict prevention and peacebuilding evaluations. Some programmes may turn out to be effective in conflict prevention and peacebuilding terms while others may be shown to be effective for other goals but not for peace. Whether working with (for example) poverty, women or youth is effective for building peace will likely depend on the context and on an analysis of the key driving factors of conflict. If it is effective work but does not contribute to peace, it can be justified for other reasons; it would not, however, be judged as successful against conflict prevention and peacebuilding criteria alone.

Many interventions with mixed programme approaches appear on the Utstein palette but clearly are not entirely conflict prevention and peacebuilding. For instance, whether an employment programme or human rights programme is conflict prevention and peacebuilding will depend on its stated programme goals and the context.

B. Defining conflict prevention and peacebuilding for evaluation purposes

As noted above, both donors and practitioners seek more clarity about what is and is not included in conflict prevention and peacebuilding. From the CDA team’s interviews and document reviews and its own experience regarding conflict prevention and peacebuilding interventions, it is possible to derive pragmatic definitional clarity:

“Conflict prevention and peacebuilding” activities are efforts that adopt goals and objectives aimed at preventing conflict or building peace; usually (but not always⁶) focused on a particular conflict zone – an area threatened by, in the midst of, or recovering from serious intergroup violence.

The range of issues discussed above (the context, the programme approach, the intermingling of multiple programme agendas) make setting predetermined boundaries difficult, as they would either be inapplicable to all contexts or so broad as to be unclear. This leaves us with the *nature of the intervention* and its *goals and objectives* as the critical consistent factors that determine whether an activity can be classified as a conflict prevention and peacebuilding intervention. When a policy or programme adopts goals to make a difference in the key driving factors of conflict, it becomes a legitimate subject for a conflict prevention and peacebuilding evaluation – that is, it can be assessed to determine whether or not it achieves its intended impacts on peace or the prevention of violent conflict.

Consideration of the conflict context and an examination of an effort’s goals, objectives and design features provide the best basis for ascertaining what are and are not conflict prevention and peacebuilding activities. Merely having such goals does not determine whether an intervention is *effective* according to conflict prevention and peacebuilding evaluation criteria. (The criteria for evaluating effectiveness are discussed in Section III.)

Donors may also decide to exercise their option to examine the impacts on peace of various interventions that do not have conflict prevention and peacebuilding goals, because those efforts have the potential for influencing the driving factors of conflict in a conflict-affected or conflict-prone zone. The closer look at several programme issues that follows will illustrate this distinction, as well as demonstrate the discretionary application of conflict prevention and peacebuilding criteria in an evaluation.

A dialogue programme among the leaders of four contending political parties – each with its own armed militia – aimed at building relationships, identifying common goals and initiating informal negotiations leading to official negotiations would fall into the first column of the matrix above. Its goals indicate the intention to produce a significant impact on peace. Such a programme would always be held accountable to conflict prevention and peacebuilding evaluation standards.

A women’s health programme that aims to make improvements in child health, nutrition, women’s access to services and health education would normally be considered a straightforward development effort (in the far right column of the matrix), and an evaluation would apply standard development evaluation techniques. However, if such a programme is undertaken in a conflict zone and adopts programme goals aimed at fostering greater co-operation among women from conflicting groups in order to contribute to peace, it qualifies as a conflict prevention and peacebuilding programme (falling in the central “mixed” column of the matrix). In that case, the programme could be evaluated for: achievements of the primary programme objectives (increasing women’s access to health services, improving child health, etc.); the programme’s conflict sensitivity; and also its performance in contributing to conflict prevention and peacebuilding specifically. While the core five DAC Evaluation Criteria would be applied in any case, evaluating conflict prevention and peacebuilding performance specifically may include additional criteria (as outlined in Section IV).

Similarly, a police reform programme may be part of an effort to strengthen the rule of law in a country. Falling into the far right column, it may not require a conflict prevention and peacebuilding evaluation if it is implemented in a country where the risks of conflict are negligible. If, however, the

6. For instance, the land mines campaign and other issues of global policy making that affect the dynamics of many conflicts are not necessarily located only in conflict zones.

programme is also designed to mitigate significant risks of violent conflict by reducing discrimination in the application of justice or by increasing access to justice by disadvantaged minorities, then it would move to the centre column and a conflict prevention and peacebuilding evaluation would be relevant.

In both of these cases – the women’s health programme and the police reform effort – even if donors or other interested groups have no explicit goals in relation to conflict or peace (i.e. they are in the far column), they may decide to apply conflict prevention and peacebuilding evaluation criteria. At first glance this might appear “unfair”. Why would donors hold a programme that did not aim to affect peace accountable to a peacebuilding standard?

They might do this for several policy-related reasons. First, they might wish to examine in depth the impacts of *any/all* interventions on conflict dynamics, especially if the donor’s overall goal is to influence the driving factors of conflict. For instance, large-scale economic programmes may have a profound influence on a conflict in certain settings, and it would be worthwhile to understand those effects. Second, in fragile states or settings found to be vulnerable to conflict (that is, where early warning data predict that violence might break out), policy makers may wish to harness most/all intervention tools available to support the effectiveness of violence prevention efforts. Finally, conflict analysis might reveal that certain issues, such as discrimination by police forces, are particularly relevant to the driving forces of conflict, and so make it relevant to evaluate the impacts of such programmes regardless of their original stated objectives.

See Annex 4 for a summary of the principles guiding the discussion above.

C. Clarifying the difference between conflict sensitivity and conflict prevention and peacebuilding

The confusion of definitions leads many to assume (falsely) that by being “conflict-sensitive,” they are *ipso facto* also doing peacebuilding work. Using the intervention’s goals and objectives as the determining criteria for conflict prevention and peacebuilding boundaries helps to clarify the essential difference between conflict-sensitive policies and programming and conflict prevention or peacebuilding efforts. It is clear that not all initiatives undertaken in an area of conflict are conflict prevention and peacebuilding initiatives.

For example, humanitarian assistance to war victims is intended to alleviate human suffering rather than to build peace. However, because experience shows that every programme carried out in a conflict context becomes a part of that context – and therefore also a part of the conflict – such programmes must be accountable for their inadvertent side effects on the conflict. For any programme undertaken in a conflict area, therefore, conflict sensitivity is essential to understanding these side effects and ensuring that they are positive rather than negative. The Do No Harm framework was developed precisely as a conflict sensitivity tool to enable such analysis with regard to programme impacts on intergroup “dividers and connectors”.⁷

All efforts (policies, programmes, projects) carried out either in a conflict area or in relation to a conflict must be conflict-sensitive. That is, they must analyse how their presence and actions will affect

7. This strategy for analysis broadly characterises the context of conflict as containing two sets of factors: dividers and connectors. Connectors are positive factors for peace and cohesion. Dividers are negative factors or tensions that may lead to violent conflict or weaknesses in a community’s ability to resolve conflicts nonviolently. Categories useful for disaggregating these factors include: systems and institutions, attitudes and actions, values and interests, experiences, symbols and occasions.

the local dynamics of the conflict. Interventions that intend to prevent conflict and build peace must, in addition to being conflict-sensitive, be accountable for their relevance and appropriateness to the specific factors that drive and shape that conflict. Here it is important to note that non-conflict prevention and peacebuilding efforts must be conflict-sensitive, while conflict prevention and peacebuilding initiatives must be *both* conflict-sensitive *and* accountable to conflict prevention and peacebuilding evaluation criteria.

D. Particular challenges of conflict prevention

Much has been written about the notion of conflict prevention – or more precisely, the prevention of armed/violent conflict. Theorists posit a difference between “operational prevention”, which usually entails some form of crisis intervention, and “structural prevention”, which aims at transforming key social/economic/political factors that, if left unaddressed, could lead to violent conflict in the future. Some of the dimensions of the two categories are presented in Table 1.2 below.

The operational prevention side is easier to manage from an evaluation perspective, as the tools and actors are relatively limited and the goals clearer. On the other hand, few such efforts have been subjected to thorough evaluation, partly because the interventions are often undertaken separately and behind the scenes by government actors in a highly political environment. Nevertheless, it should be relatively easy to develop clear criteria for evaluating the effectiveness of operational prevention efforts.

Table 1.2. Operational vs. structural prevention

Operational prevention	Operational prevention	Structural prevention
Time frame	Urgent, crisis-oriented	Longer term
Actors	Diplomats (bilateral and multilateral), military, civil society, international organisations	Wide range of potential actors: multilateral, governmental, civil society
Approaches & tools	Crisis intervention; quiet diplomacy; political pressure; threats of military intervention or economic sanctions; dialogue and negotiation between conflicting parties	Democratic institution-building; relationship-building; prejudice reduction; power-sharing arrangements; reduction of social and economic inequalities; promotion of rule of law; security sector reform; education; etc.

Structural prevention poses three problems in relation to classification.

First, the category can include all modes of international assistance by a multitude of actors at all levels, hence creating a truly fuzzy boundary. The modes of intervention in structural prevention include economic development; democratic governance/political development; security; intergroup relations; justice/rule of law; human rights; and construction of a culture of peace.⁸ Donors and programme implementers tend to lump all these into the conflict prevention and peacebuilding basket and to subject them to conflict prevention and peacebuilding evaluation criteria, without considering which programmes ought to be held to such standards under which circumstances.

Second, much of the programming focused on structural change challenges existing power structures, and therefore generates tension. Each of the modes of intervention may, depending on how it is performed, actually create conflict, at least in the short term. This goes beyond the issue of conflict

8. Many of these are included in the Utstein report’s palette.

sensitivity, which largely asks how a programme is implemented (who is hired, who benefits, who is legitimised, etc.). Rather, this broad agenda of structural change by its very nature tends to generate friction, because it challenges the prevailing structures of power and privilege. Promoting human rights, encouraging participatory democratic mechanisms and redressing economic disparities will spark tension and sometimes even violence, because the success of such measures poses a threat to powerful people. This suggests that such programmes need to anticipate the conflicts that are apt to arise, and build conflict management mechanisms into their programme designs (an approach that extends beyond conflict sensitivity), if they are to be effective conflict prevention and peacebuilding programmes.

Finally, people assume (falsely) that (all) advances in critical structural areas (democratisation, economic development, rule of law, etc.) will also contribute to reducing conflict and promoting peace. Many donor-funded programmes and policies are undertaken on the assumption that progress towards liberalisation, prosperity, human rights and democracy (as defined in Western/Northern agendas) will contribute to peace.⁹ Many people assert, almost as a matter of faith, that poverty reduction will also reduce conflict. Similarly, democratic governance structures are assumed to mitigate violence. In fact, the evidence shows that some of these efforts make a positive contribution while others have a negative effect or miss the mark in relation to conflict. All such assumptions, and the programmes that are based on them, should be subject to rigorous scrutiny in a conflict prevention and peacebuilding evaluation.

E. A core set of conflict prevention and peacebuilding activities

The CDA team has considered the question of whether there are any kinds of programmes that must *always* be considered to be peacebuilding (or conflict prevention) by definition. If so, these would form a core set of conflict prevention and peacebuilding programme types. The team found a few programmes that should always be accountable to conflict prevention and peacebuilding evaluation criteria, because they occur in the context of conflict *and* incorporate broader peacebuilding goals.

Some of these take place in a so-called “post-conflict”¹⁰ setting: demobilisation, disarmament and reintegration (DDR); demobilisation, disarmament, rehabilitation and reintegration (DDRR); recovery, return and reintegration (RRR); and transitional justice programmes (truth and reconciliation commissions, war crimes tribunals, etc.). Peacekeeping operations are most often undertaken in a prevention mode as well.

Thus a fundamental policy question is whether all DDR, transitional justice and post-conflict peacekeeping programmes should automatically be judged according to how well they address the underlying conflict dynamics and contribute to Peace Writ Large.

Evidence shows that a high percentage of the armed conflicts around the world are repeat rounds of violence from previous conflagrations and are attributable to the failure of the peace process to address the key driving factors of conflict (Collier *et al.*, 2003). As a matter of policy, then, should post-conflict programmes of *all* types be designed to contribute to peace? Should they include peacebuilding goals, and then be held accountable in an evaluation as to how well they accomplish them? There is strong evidence to suggest that such interventions should always be held to conflict prevention and peacebuilding criteria. Similarly, evaluations of all development interventions in fragile states judged to be conflict-prone ought to assess the impacts of the interventions on the risks of violent conflict.

9. Such an assumption is an example of a theory of change, described later in this report and in Annex 6.

10. “Post-conflict” is almost always a misnomer: while the war/violence may have ceased and a political settlement achieved, the underlying conflict dynamics are seldom addressed.

II. Conflict Prevention and Peacebuilding Evaluations: Special Issues

A. Framing issues: Conflict analysis, demystifying impacts, considering indicators

Conflict analysis is central

Evaluations in all fields benefit from baseline data or other concrete knowledge about the circumstances in which programming has occurred. In conflict prevention and peacebuilding, there is strong agreement among policy makers, practitioners, donors and academics that programming must be based on real understanding of the conflict which the intervention intends to affect. There is also growing agreement that conflict prevention and peacebuilding evaluators need that understanding as the basis for assessing an effort's relevance. As there is strong evidence that conflict analysis is essential for performing effective work, the CDA team finds such analysis equally essential for effectively evaluating conflict prevention and peacebuilding.¹¹

Many people carry out “context analysis” believing it to be “conflict analysis”. A context analysis seeks a broad understanding of the entire political, economic and social (historical, environmental, etc.) scene. A conflict analysis is more narrowly focused on the specific elements of that broader picture that may trigger or propel the conflict. The latter may indeed include a range of political, economic, social, historical and other factors, but it focuses on the ones that currently directly influence the shape and dynamics of a conflict. The point is that not everything in a context is equally relevant to a conflict. While all aspects of a context may interact with a conflict, not all are useful prospects for conflict prevention and peacebuilding work. Therefore, based on its reviews, the CDA team found that it is important to make a clear distinction between these two analytical frameworks as a step toward improving the effectiveness – and understanding of effectiveness – of conflict prevention and peacebuilding programming.

Some interviewees noted that use of Peace and Conflict Impact Assessments (PCIAAs) tends to diffuse programmers' focus to a wider range of contextual factors that may or may not be immediately pertinent to preventing or resolving a given conflict. Some felt that PCIAAs “generate lots of lists” of socio-economic-political-historical-etc. factors affecting conflict; on the other hand, they offer little direction on how to prioritise these factors and translate them into an analysis that is relevant and provides guidance on intervention strategies targeting the key driving factors of a conflict. The process of analysing conflict can and should also include identification of the factors that are contributing positively to progress towards peace, as these often provide a base upon which to build additional initiatives.

Another misdirection of conflict analysis concerns “root causes”. Practitioners and academics noted that it is important to gain an understanding of the origins of a conflict, which are typically embedded in structures, institutions and history. However, the problem raised in interviews is that a focus on the original (as some interpret “root”) causes can distort later understandings. Interventions that might have been highly useful in the early months of a war may be irrelevant or counterproductive after a war has continued for three or four years, because the factors and dynamics change constantly. To the extent that

11. Conflict sensitivity also requires at least a basic conflict analysis, such as the “dividers/connectors” analysis from the Do No Harm framework.

root cause analysis focuses attention on long-standing issues to the exclusion of proximate, new and emerging ones, it can prove detrimental to effective programming. Of course, if long-standing structural issues remain critical factors, they must be included in current analyses and strategising.

Effective conflict prevention and peacebuilding work requires a focused understanding of both the specific factors currently pertinent to that specific conflict zone, and the specific actors who are engaged in conflict or who must be engaged in ending conflict. It is important that evaluators understand these factors about conflict in order to assess how well a programme relates to a particular conflict at a particular time. They must either perform or have access to a valid, up-to-date conflict analysis.

Demystifying impacts

There was broad agreement that attempts to assess the impacts (as opposed to outputs or outcomes) of programmes pose special problems. Some feel such assessments are not even possible or desirable because they attempt to measure effects that are “too remote” or raise expectations of impact “too high.” Much of the literature as well as many interviewees noted wide differences of opinion about what is actually meant by impacts. Most agree that impacts go beyond the immediate outcomes of programming, that they occur “at a higher level”, and that they refer to longer-term effects rather than near-term outcomes. Most felt that it is difficult to attribute impacts to specific conflict prevention and peacebuilding activities. An experienced evaluation expert commented on this debate:

In some cases, the view that impacts must occur at high levels and be clearly attributable may be grounded in a specialised interpretation of impact assessments as evaluations that rely on randomised control trials [RCTs] or other experimental or quasi-experimental evaluation techniques designed to measure the difference between results with and without the intervention (counterfactual analysis). Such an interpretation is not defensible, given that the scope for RCTs is very narrow and that other methods for acquiring valid evaluation evidence exist.¹²

The dictionary definition of “impact” is simple: “the influence, effect or impression of one thing on another.” This straightforward definition reveals the reality that impacts always happen. Some may be important and others trivial, but impacts are not always elusive and unreachable or impossible to find and assess. They happen as a result of any action or any programme. They are everyday occurrences and they are fit for evaluation.

In its “Glossary of Key Terms in Evaluation and Results Based Management” (OECD, 2002 in Annex 3), the DAC defines impacts as “positive and negative, primary and secondary, long-term effects produced by a development intervention, directly or indirectly, intended or unintended” (p. 24). This understanding of impacts has implications both for programming and for evaluations. It discourages the idea that it is not possible to see impacts until after a long time has passed – an assumption that too often makes it acceptable to ignore immediate results and remain unaccountable for how conflict prevention and peacebuilding interventions actually relate to Peace Writ Large.

In the view of the CDA team, the confusion and disagreements surrounding terminology (outputs, outcomes and impacts) and the common preoccupation with the “remoteness” of impacts must not divert evaluation attention from assessing the many effects of conflict prevention and peacebuilding programmes on the conflict, whether intended or not. Evaluations should take account of individual programme impacts and cumulative, multi-programme impacts at the strategic or policy level. These are, as the DAC definition notes, primary and secondary, direct and indirect, positive and negative, intended and unintended.

12. Robert Piccioto, former Director of Evaluation at the World Bank, comment to the authors.

Not all effects are equally worth investigating for a conflict prevention and peacebuilding evaluation. The most important effects to investigate are those that relate in non-trivial ways to the conflict and to its key elements. Every component of a programme will have impacts on the conflict. A clear definition of conflict-relevant impacts (and not just outcomes or outputs) should make them easier to identify and assess, for both programmers and evaluators. To ignore them or to assert that they cannot be identified would be to miss much of what an evaluation should trace.

For clarity in conflict prevention and peacebuilding evaluations, the following definition is proposed:

“Impacts” are the results or effects of any conflict prevention and peacebuilding intervention that lie beyond its immediate programme activities or sphere and constitute broader changes related to the conflict.

The challenge of these findings to donors is clear. In order to assess the impacts of interventions, they must not only assess direct and intended effects, but also determine whether those effects have an important impact on the conflict dynamic, as identified in a valid conflict analysis. Too often, funding is based on an international policy agenda rather than the realities of a particular conflict.

For example, much conflict prevention and peacebuilding funding in Kosovo focused on the return of refugees and IDPs, an effort that reflected international commitment to non-complicity in ethnic cleansing. A review of the effectiveness of these programmes with regard to conflict prevention and peacebuilding (rather than returns) found that they completely “missed the mark” by ignoring the key driving factors of the conflict, which remains the unresolved political status of Kosovo (CDA, 2006).¹³ Similarly, programmes in Israel/Palestine, Kosovo and Sri Lanka based on the “contact theory” (that engaging groups in joint dialogue or co-operative activities will result in improved intergroup relations) should be evaluated for their relation to the real drivers of conflict in these areas. Assessments should examine how policy, funding, programme design and implementation can link for greater effectiveness vis-à-vis the driving factors.

Considering conflict prevention and peacebuilding indicators

The CDA team found widespread dissatisfaction with and concern over the usefulness and appropriateness of having indicators assess conflict prevention and peacebuilding effectiveness. This did not reflect a resistance to being held accountable for results, or to collecting information about the changes connected with an intervention. Rather, it stemmed from experience that the tools for developing indicators and the indicators themselves, as used in the design and evaluation of programmes and policies, are frequently unhelpful since they often do not provide an accurate picture of the changes and are rarely accompanied by qualitative assessments of the operations under evaluation or their context.

Many people were concerned about the drive to develop universal indicators in the conflict prevention and peacebuilding field, especially in relation to Peace Writ Large. There is still too much debate about what “peace” is to strictly define indicators of progress toward that goal. Furthermore, “universal” indicators may simply not be relevant or useful in a particular context.

13. In consultations with a wide range of people in communities, as well as in focused workshops bringing together international and local NGOs and international organisations, IDP and return issues were perceived to be a secondary factor that fed or reinforced nationalism and extremism. Indeed, the attention and funding channelled to return issues were seen as having exacerbated a driving factor of conflict: feelings of injustice and resentment among Kosovo-Albanians, who perceived an imbalance of aid toward minorities at the expense of their own development.

Still, many said they find it easy to identify valid indicators in context once they have gained a good understanding of the conflict and robust and clear goals. Some have found it possible to identify categories of impacts for different kinds of activities and for different sectors. A few of these indicator categories were identified in the DAC workshops on dialogue and security sector reform, organised as part of this project for the DAC.

In the CDA Reflecting on Peace Practice (RPP) project, participants produced a list of Criteria of Effectiveness that provides a framework for assessing whether individual and cumulative efforts contribute to conflict prevention and peacebuilding. Some peace practitioners and donors have found these useful. CDA is working with a number of partners to test and refine these to incorporate additional learning. The current RPP Criteria of Effectiveness can be found in Annex 5.

Another concern is related to the potential “straitjacketing” effect of indicators. Some people were concerned that attempts to identify trackable indicators caused programmers to focus on small objectives and to undertake activities that were limited in relation to the large conflict, and therefore unlikely to have significant impacts on conflict prevention or peacebuilding. Others were concerned that agencies adapt programmes to fit pre-set indicators, and therefore that these programmes did not respond to changing circumstances. Several field practitioners claimed that specifying indicators in the design phase of a project did in fact limit their ability to respond flexibly and effectively to the dynamics of the conflict, making their programmes rigidly pursue inappropriate directions. Still others supported the use of indicators to monitor changes but not for evaluation. In addition, there is widespread belief that local peace (“peace writ little”) will contribute to Peace Writ Large, and can provide reliable indicators of progress towards peace. In fact, there is no evidence to support this belief.

Many people raised doubts about the quality of indicators for measuring outcomes and impacts in the conflict prevention and peacebuilding field in particular. Some felt that indicators are often limited to outputs – such as number of meetings, number of trainees, etc. – and do not indicate any changes that occur as a result of the activities. Where indicators of outcome or impact were identified, several examples were cited where these did not accurately represent the phenomenon they sought to measure in a particular context. While such issues are not particular to this field, the challenges of measuring outcomes and impacts seem particularly difficult in the complex, fluid contexts of conflict environments. In Kosovo for example, freedom of movement of minorities was used as an indicator of security. Later research discovered, however, that improvements in freedom of movement reflected neither real improvements in security nor improvements in minorities’ sense of security. Similarly, a DDR programme used the number of soldiers demobilised as an indicator of impact. Yet this indicator is at best an output indicator: it does not necessarily show an improvement in security. Nor does it reflect the possibility that former combatants would re-mobilise if their economic and social circumstances did not improve or if political conditions deteriorated.

Finally, many were concerned that, in part because of the use of logframes, there is an overemphasis on quantifiable indicators even though conflict prevention and peacebuilding often involves non-quantifiable outcomes and impacts.¹⁴ Social science research has reliable tools for assessing the quality of social relations. These could be utilised in monitoring and evaluating conflict prevention and peacebuilding interventions to complement quantitative measures. Indicators and logframe tools thus may be used effectively, but the use of qualitative measures should be encouraged as well as a more

14. According to the OECD DAC “Glossary of Key Terms in Evaluation and Results Based Management” (2002 in Annex 3), a “logical framework” or logframe is a management tool used to improve the design of interventions, most often at the project level. It involves identifying strategic elements (inputs, outputs, outcomes, impact) and their causal relationships, indicators, and the assumptions or risks that may influence success and failure. It thus facilitates planning, execution and evaluation of a programme or activity.

flexible and evolving notion of indicators, some of which may be determined by participants in the peacebuilding process.

B. Special problems, conditions and expectations

There is broad evidence that evaluating conflict prevention and peacebuilding raises questions beyond the framing issues discussed above. While not unique to the field, these present special challenges to evaluators and should shape their work.

The political nature of peace processes and, hence, conflict prevention and peacebuilding work

All international assistance indirectly affects and is affected by political realities within the locales where aid operations take place. War and violence are shaped by political forces, so that any efforts to address conflicts must attempt to reshape those forces. Many colleagues familiar with conflict prevention and peacebuilding evaluations commented that those evaluations are inevitably influenced by political (with a small “p”) and Political (with a capital “P”) considerations.

Examples of the small “p” political factors important to such evaluations include the choice of evaluators (especially local team members who are themselves part of the conflict environment); the choice of evaluation methodology; choices regarding whom to interview and whom not; and the terminology employed in interviews and analyses.

The big “P” Political impacts cited included necessary interactions with diplomats and foreign ministries – which often entails overcoming communication barriers and differences in organisational cultures. Conflict prevention and peacebuilding work is also influenced by the individual foreign policy agendas under which donor and other governments operate, and by the difficulty of bringing the various foreign policy instruments into alignment within a single government (not to mention across multiple governments). There are also political barriers to assessing impacts honestly and openly. As these small and large factors affect the work, they also affect evaluation of that work.

Relationship with partner governments

The role of a partner government in a conflict prevention and peacebuilding evaluation can also be problematic. The CDA team’s review of evaluation approaches raised questions about whether and how evaluators can or should interact with local authorities and national governments. Governments are often directly involved in the conflict. Thus, conflict prevention and peacebuilding programmes often seek not to co-operate with and strengthen governments, but to engage them – along with the “opposition” – in dialogue and political negotiation toward a peaceful settlement. While most agree that partner governments should be involved in evaluations, many advised against the government’s taking a lead role or full partnership in conflict prevention and peacebuilding evaluations. The concerns are similar to those expressed about participatory evaluations: if the government receiving assistance for conflict prevention and peacebuilding activities is a part of the conflict, then partnership with government in evaluation can bias the evaluation and have negative impacts on the conflict itself. Conversely, the evaluation may also exert an influence on the political dynamics and, as a result, influence the conflict (“Hawthorne effect”) by involving contending forces in ways that enhance their legitimacy.

Unclear and unspecified goals

Many people noted that conflict prevention and peacebuilding interventions are markedly less clear about their goals and objectives than other types of programming. One person interviewed said that the

articulation of goals has become increasingly vague and “watered down,” as donors have pushed for ever greater specificity in objectives and indicators and have asked for prompt evaluation of achievements (within a one-year time frame, for example). Many conflict prevention and peacebuilding programmes state objectives in output terms (number of dialogue sessions held, number of people trained, etc.) or in outcome terms (more independent contacts between the two hostile groups; number of child soldiers finding long-term non-military employment), but do not consider the relationships of these to broader impacts or to the larger conflict, i.e. Peace Writ Large.

Implicit and unarticulated (as well as untested) theories of change

There is strong evidence that both conflict prevention and peacebuilding policies and programmes are based on (or reflect implicit) theories or assumptions about what produces change and how peace is achieved. That is to say, policies and programmes all have a “logic” regarding what kinds of interventions produce what kinds of results and how these results are related to peace. A generic way of stating a conflict prevention and peacebuilding theory of change is: “If we do X [action], it will result in Y [progress towards peace].”

For instance, a programme focused on grassroots organising for peace might espouse the theory: “By mobilising enough people to pressure our politicians, we can induce them to negotiate for peace.” An initial assessment of this theory would explore whether the targeted politicians are responsive to public pressures. It would ask: what is most likely to influence the specific leaders to change their positions and approaches to peace? Is grassroots mobilisation the most effective route to change? What is the potential for mobilising people? (Do people live in fear? Are the consequences of open dissent too high?) A later evaluation would examine how the theory played out in the actual circumstances. Was the programme really able to promote change in the way that it envisioned? Did the programme succeed in mobilising peace advocacy groups? What was the impact on political leaders? Did this turn out to be an effective theory of change?

There are many such theories of change (or theories of peacebuilding); most conflict prevention and peacebuilding policies and programmes are combinations of two or more. Annex 6 provides a more extensive explanation of theories of change and a listing of those used most often. Each has some merit, capturing some reality that – in certain circumstances – has validity. However, experience shows that there is no universally applicable theory of change or theory of peace.

Many conflict prevention and peacebuilding evaluations are also driven by implicit theories and assumptions about how peace occurs. One evaluation expert noted that, “Ninety per cent of evaluations done by peacebuilders reassert assumptions.” A threefold challenge to these evaluations is, therefore, to make such theories explicit; to avoid reasserting the evaluators’ own pet theories; and to test the theories underlying the programme in relation to the specific conflict. This issue returns in Section IV, where there is a call for explicit exploration of the theories of change in the context of an evaluation. Also, considerable knowledge about security and development has accumulated in recent decades; reliable policy research should be taken into account.

Evaluation of programme processes as well as outcomes and impacts

Many documents and interviewees make the point that much of peace work involves processes. One of the main criticisms of the current state of the art of conflict prevention and peacebuilding evaluations is that many assessments do not address the processes employed and encouraged by programming.

There are two aspects to this issue. First, because all conflict prevention and peacebuilding interventions are undertaken in a “stream” of other events (the dynamics of the conflict and the other

ongoing conflict prevention and peacebuilding activities), no intervention stands alone. Evaluations of activities therefore need to take account of how they fit into this “stream.”

Second, many feel that evaluations should also assess the consistency of the means and ends of a programming approach and operations, including consistency with the values that underlie peacebuilding work. In other words, such assessments should examine whether or not i) the procedures and practices of the effort are conflict-sensitive (it is amazing how many programmes that claim to be conflict prevention and peacebuilding in their intent actually exacerbate intergroup tensions by their design or implementation); ii) the implementation staff employ appropriate work styles when interacting with parties of the conflict and to each other; and iii) the activities are inclusive, transparent, and balanced/unbiased.

Emotional/ideological commitments of conflict prevention and peacebuilding advocates and programmers

Conversations and literature reviews, as well as reviews of field programming, reveal the strong commitment that those who engage in conflict prevention and peacebuilding bring to their work. This commitment is admirable and often the source of courage, insight and dedicated involvement. However, emotional commitment can complicate attempts to carry out objective evaluations of strategies, policies, processes, outcomes and impacts. People believe so strongly in what they are doing and that it is right to be doing it, that they find it difficult to take a hard look at the work through rigorous evaluation. Remarkably, in this aspect the conflict prevention and peacebuilding field differs from most others – including humanitarian assistance, where people are also often motivated by deep moral concerns. This is because the ideological commitments of conflict prevention and peacebuilding programmers are embodied in their implicit theories of peace, which drive their programming and may be threatened by in-depth assessment of their work. Humanitarians generally agree on the basic approaches to their work and the relationship between their work and desired outcomes. Conflict prevention and peacebuilding practitioners very often do not.

Fortunately, many peacebuilding practitioners balance their belief in the rightness of the work with a sharp awareness that peace is not achieved quickly and that we need to improve how we work. This shared sense underpins the practitioners’ support for finding appropriate evaluation methods.

Evaluations of conflict prevention and peacebuilding as interventions

Since conflict prevention and peacebuilding evaluations occur in the context of conflict, it follows that the approaches and processes of the evaluation are themselves interventions that may impact the conflict or recovery. This can best be understood by thinking of the effects of certain questions on people’s perspective with regard to their conflict. It is possible to ask questions in such a way that distrust and hostility towards the “other side” is reinforced. It is also possible to ask questions in ways that enable people to step back and gain new insights into the driving factors of their conflict that may be helpful in its resolution. Moreover, the process of evaluation may put people in danger. Several evaluators spoke of incidents where someone they had questioned in the course of their evaluation work had been arrested or otherwise threatened.

Evaluators who do not know how to engage with conflict dynamics in positive ways may in fact do harm as they evaluate a programme. For this reason, all evaluators must be briefed about issues that are especially sensitive and that they may not be aware of. Further, conflict prevention and peacebuilding work and evaluations demand a means-ends link. To perform effective conflict prevention and peacebuilding work, many say, evaluators must act in accordance with the field’s established principles, both individually and institutionally. The same holds for evaluations.

C. Methodological issues in conflict prevention and peacebuilding evaluations

Reviews of literature and conversations brought to light a number of factors that may affect the methodology used in conflict prevention and peacebuilding evaluations.

Evaluation approaches and methods

Both the Fafo study and CDA's interviews and literature review suggest that a results-based framework is the most prevalent approach to design, monitoring and evaluation used in conflict prevention and peacebuilding by donors, development and humanitarian agencies and (increasingly) by conflict resolution agencies and evaluation consultants. The use of a results-based design, monitoring and evaluation process is seen by some people as a major improvement in practice. At the same time, several people noted that these frameworks are sometimes not used properly. Some claim that results-based frameworks may not be fully appropriate in conflict prevention and peacebuilding evaluations because:

- The highly structured format of the framework leads programme designers to focus on filling in the boxes, at the expense of careful analysis and articulation of the programme theory. Further, the indicators developed from this process are not always reliable.
- These frameworks tend to reinforce linear causal relationships between outputs, outcomes and impact, and do not capture feedback loops or the effects of external factors.
- Goals are often vague or too grandiose to permit assessment of impact. For instance, a goal of “improving inter-community relations” sets the bar unrealistically high, and is not specific enough – what aspect of relations? what improvement means? etc. – to permit rigorous assessment. Therefore, the indicators developed in programme design to measure progress towards these goals are not robust.
- Assumptions are not articulated thoroughly and are often related to implementation of the programme (for instance, conflict is cited in the “risk analysis” section of the logframe as a threat to the project).
- They lead to an overemphasis on quantifiable indicators.
- Design and evaluation are not adequately linked to analysis of the conflict (just as the work itself is not), leading to a focus on a project rather than overall goals.
- They do not adequately allow for evaluation of unplanned but potentially significant impacts.

Scope and level of evaluation

There is widespread agreement that conflict prevention and peacebuilding evaluations focused at the project level often fail to address impacts on Peace Writ Large. The Utstein report suggests that impact assessment should be removed from project evaluation and conducted instead at the “strategic” level, exploring whether the intervention strategy as a whole is working. Many advocate focusing project evaluations on contributions to “peace writ little” rather than Peace Writ Large. They argue that impact evaluations should assess the cumulative effects of multiple conflict prevention and peacebuilding efforts at the level of the larger conflict. Such evaluations would analyse a set of conflict prevention and peacebuilding programmes in relation to the myriad other dynamics going on in the society that affect these efforts and the likelihood of achieving peace. Indeed, many are eager to find ways of evaluating at

the broadest and most inclusive level of analysis. They stress that if a conflict is between two nation states, the level of analysis should be regional or even global; if the context is primarily a civil war, the level of analysis should be national.

The question of shifting the focus of evaluation of programme impacts to the “strategic” level raises two concerns. First, the term “strategic” is being used in several different ways: to refer to the level of evaluation (often meaning country level); to refer to the quality and relevance of the evaluation itself; and to refer to the programme theory of an agency or an intervention.

Second, some people note that evaluating a project only at the project and, in many cases, local level misses the relationship of activities at that level with activities at higher, national, or regional levels. Local conflicts are often interconnected with larger driving factors and interests. For example, one person reported that in a mediation process he was involved with, local people were checking regularly by mobile phone with people in the capital city regarding their positions in negotiating what was ostensibly a “local” conflict. At the same time, impacts at the local level may not be indicative of impact on the driving factors of conflict. For example, a large evaluation of a complex initiative designed to bring together people from conflicting groups on common projects found that the initiative did have some success in helping people deal with conflicts that originated at the local level; however, it had no effect on problems that originated at the national level that were the major drivers of violent conflict.

The conclusion from all these concerns is that an evaluation must examine the interactions among different levels and explore the (implicit or explicit) theories about how efforts to induce changes at the different levels interact. Thus, guidance will have to distinguish between evaluations of individual interventions and evaluations at the higher plane of country strategies. In principle both types of evaluation are needed, in order to illuminate local-national-regional-global interactions, and to ensure that there is no “disconnect” between micro and macro findings. Furthermore, conflict analyses should address the interaction among interventions, their consistency and linkages. At the same time, the limitations of evaluations of individual interventions, absent comprehensive assessments of the full range of interventions in the conflict zone, must be acknowledged.

Data collection

Not all data collection methods are useful or relevant for evaluations. For example, people note the practical and ethical difficulties of conducting controlled studies of conflict prevention and peacebuilding activities, even if this would generate the most “valid” results. Similarly, household surveys can provide important information (and are underutilised), but aggregation of data collected at the individual or household level may not accurately reflect broader achievements/impacts. While many programmes focus on the individual level, there is strong evidence that these do not necessarily “add up” – they cannot be aggregated in a simple way to ascertain the broader effects. Changes in multiple individuals’ attitudes and values, for instance, may not be indicative of systemic change.

A number of special issues regarding the collection of reliable data arise in the conflict prevention and peacebuilding field. These include the following:

Access – Because the setting of conflict prevention and peacebuilding work is politically fraught, there are often obstacles limiting evaluators’ access across conflicting groups. When there is a political motivation for limiting information and assessment, programme staff, policy makers and/or local authorities may block access to certain regions or groups.

Bias – Many people with whom an evaluator speaks will almost inevitably be biased because they are associated with a particular group, or because they have a personal interest in the outcome. Conflict

prevention and peacebuilding evaluators need to be able to identify such biases and develop methods for obtaining valid assessments from a variety of more or less biased informants. Just as conflict prevention and peacebuilding work requires that peace practitioners recognise and accept the validity of many perspectives and “truths” (there is no one “truth” in a conflict), it is important for conflict prevention and peacebuilding evaluators not to accept (or construct) one truth. Again, this argues for detachment in carrying out a conflict analysis. Good conflict analysis requires an evaluator to weigh diverse judgements and to take account of the full range of perspectives available, in order to assess the way a programme may be interacting with and addressing the varied “truths” of opposing sides. In addition, many people noted that evaluations often rely on information only from individuals or groups who know or have participated in a conflict prevention and peacebuilding programme, or from people in one geographic area, such as capital cities. Therefore, evaluators need to develop and use appropriate methods of gathering information that reflect the differing perspectives on the conflict, including those stemming from geographic differences.

Security/Safety – Access may be limited by security considerations. Where there is conflict there is danger, both to evaluators and to those with whom they interact. Danger to evaluators may limit access to people and areas and lead to incomplete or biased evaluations. Several people spoke of having potential interviewees refuse to meet with them due to safety considerations.

Trauma – Some people raised problems associated with questioning traumatised people about programmes. Their responses may worsen the bias problem and reopen painful events that exacerbate mental anguish. Hence, the guidance should incorporate pertinent ethical principles.

Participatory methods

There was wide variation in opinion regarding whether and how to engage local people in evaluations. Some said it is always critically important to involve a range of local actors, as a way of ensuring that the analysis of the conflict – and therefore, analysis of the effectiveness of a conflict prevention and peacebuilding activity – is accurate. Some believe participatory evaluation methods increase local ownership, and improve the quality of indicators as well as interpretation and analysis of data. Those who took this position recognised that conflict prevention and peacebuilding evaluations are interventions (as described above). Some believe that the evaluations should include a capacity-building component to increase local ownership and leave a legacy beyond the life of an intervention or evaluation. It was also noted that participatory assessments are not aimed primarily at evaluation *per se*, but rather at building trust and ownership in a peace process.

Others, however, stressed the potential for biased and distorted findings that could arise from participatory evaluation methodologies, when local people are themselves involved in a conflict. One person strongly felt that participatory evaluations should not automatically be assumed to be the best. He suggested that future evaluations should explore whether and how participatory methodologies affect the quality and results of conflict prevention and peacebuilding evaluations in particular contexts.

Joint evaluations and cumulative impacts

Many feel that joint evaluations provide the best way of assessing the cumulative and overall impacts of international programming in a single conflict context. They believe that joint evaluations can address broader impact questions; increase the potential for objective and independent review, given the wider variety of viewpoints brought to the effort; facilitate mutual learning; reduce conflicting messages to recipient countries; encourage more harmonised and co-ordinated policies; and reduce the evaluation costs to partner countries. Increasing emphasis on sector-wide approaches, harmonisation of aid efforts and joint assistance strategies makes joint evaluations even more appealing, as it is difficult in conflict prevention and peacebuilding contexts to distinguish between different individual agencies’ impacts.

At the same time, as the DAC “Guidance for Managing Joint Evaluations” (OECD, 2006 in Annex 3) notes, there are a number of challenges in implementing joint evaluations, including the fact that processes for co-ordinating joint work can be complicated and costly in terms of logistics and management; the need to reconcile differing methodologies; and the need to accommodate the varying political agendas of different donors. Joint evaluations may be difficult where the programmes and policies to be evaluated represent a variety of theories of change. There is also a danger that the focus of donor energy on working together can subvert local ownership of the evaluation process.

III. Relevance of Existing DAC Evaluation Tools

The CDA team looked at two existing DAC guides for evaluation to consider their relevance to issues and approaches in evaluating conflict prevention and peacebuilding activities: DAC's "Guidance for Evaluating Humanitarian Assistance in Complex Emergencies" and the DAC Criteria for Evaluating Development Assistance. It also reviewed the ALNAP¹⁵ adaptation of the DAC Criteria to humanitarian assistance.

A. Guidance for evaluating humanitarian assistance in complex emergencies

There are similarities in the context – and hence in evaluation considerations – between humanitarian assistance in complex emergencies and conflict prevention and peacebuilding programming.

Two other factors raised in the humanitarian guidance are equally important in conflict prevention and peacebuilding evaluations. First is the parallel need for a clear statement of objectives as the basis for assessment of a programme's effects. However, whereas in humanitarian evaluations cause and effect links are clearly understood, when evaluating conflict prevention and peacebuilding interventions the objectives would themselves need to be examined in order to determine whether or not they are the "right" objectives – that is, do they make sense in relation to the current conflict? In contrast, evaluations of humanitarian interventions seldom ask in the same way whether the supply of food or medical care is "right" when people are hungry or injured.

Second, in both types of intervention, policy evaluations should take precedence over project evaluations. The focus on "what happened?" and "why?" rather than linear cause and effect is as essential to understanding the cumulative impacts of multiple conflict prevention and peacebuilding efforts as it is to understanding the overlapping forces that shape impacts of humanitarian assistance.

But there are also significant differences between the two that limit the direct applicability of the humanitarian assistance evaluation guidance to conflict prevention and peacebuilding evaluations. They include the political nature of conflict prevention and peacebuilding work and its evaluation (as mentioned previously); the fact that a conflict prevention and peacebuilding evaluation is itself an intervention in a conflict context (though this can be true for humanitarian assistance); issues regarding determination of the suitable unit of analysis; and the non-aggregation of individual effects.

An additional difference is the fact that humanitarian assistance involves the delivery of cash or material goods, often into a conflict environment. Conflict prevention and peacebuilding activities seldom involve the transfer of tangible resources, and when they do this is not the primary goal of the work. Interventions that involve "only" meetings, training, dialogue, mediation and other efforts to shift the range of conceivable political options differ greatly from those aimed toward meeting people's physical

15. "ALNAP" refers to the Active Learning Network for Accountability and Performance in Humanitarian Action, an international interagency forum working to improve the quality and accountability of humanitarian action; it is based at the Overseas Development Institute in London.

needs, particularly in terms of measurability and attribution. The primary goals of humanitarian assistance activities are socio-economic, while within conflict contexts the main challenge is to remain conflict-sensitive (though interventions do of course make positive and negative contributions to peace as well).

This last difference is well captured by the expressions “working in” conflict versus “working on” conflict. The difference is a powerful one; evaluations of the two types of work assess very different things. Conflict prevention and peacebuilding evaluations must consider whether the activity has affected key driving factors of the conflict, not simply whether the activity was conflict-sensitive.

As mentioned above, the review of conflict prevention and peacebuilding evaluation approaches also raised questions about whether and how evaluators of peace activities can or should interact with local authorities and national governments. Because government authorities are often directly involved in the dynamics of conflict, the ways in which programming and evaluation interact with them are important.

B. The DAC Evaluation Criteria

The original five DAC Criteria for Evaluating Development Assistance are Relevance, Effectiveness, Efficiency, Impact, and Sustainability. These criteria were adapted by OECD in 1999 to apply to assessments of humanitarian assistance efforts, and further refined by ALNAP in 2006. The resulting DAC/ALNAP Criteria are: Relevance/Appropriateness, Connectedness, Coherence, Coverage, Efficiency, Effectiveness and Impact (OECD, 1999 in Annex 3) (Beck, 2006 in Annex 2).¹⁶ A number of interviewees felt that the five DAC Criteria for Evaluation Development Assistance are too broad for conflict prevention and peacebuilding evaluations. However, most felt that these two sets of criteria are both useful and can be adapted for use in that area.

In interviews and subsequently in the Oslo experts’ meeting with representatives from both DAC networks and others, a number of adaptations were suggested. There was a general sense in Oslo that it should be possible to maintain the original DAC Criteria as the basis for conflict prevention and peacebuilding evaluations rather than invent new specific criteria. Other participants suggested additional criteria.

The paragraphs that follow summarise the thinking (including areas of both agreement and disagreement) about criteria that emerged during the Oslo meeting. Section IV presents the proposed DAC Criteria for Conflict Prevention and Peacebuilding Evaluation that resulted, along with associated specific evaluation questions.

Relevance/Appropriateness – Participants in the Oslo meeting agreed that the Relevance/Appropriateness criterion is central to conflict prevention and peacebuilding interventions and evaluations. For emphasis and clarity, however, the criterion should have a strong conflict prevention and peacebuilding focus. Therefore, the questions to be asked by evaluators are: Is the intervention based on an accurate analysis of the conflict, and does it therefore address key driving factors or key driving constituencies of the conflict? Is it working on the right issues in this context at this time? Is the theory of change on which the activity/policy is based a logical or sensible one in this context at this time?

It should be noted that Relevance/Appropriateness of conflict prevention and peacebuilding efforts at all levels not only might but should change over time, as circumstances in the conflict change. The questions above referring to “at this time” are essential aspects of assessment. An effort that may be

16. Quotations used below on the meaning of each criterion all come from the 2006 ALNAP document.

relevant at one time may be completely irrelevant, or counterproductive, at another time in a conflict. Therefore, in testing for Relevance/Appropriateness, a conflict prevention and peacebuilding evaluator would also be assessing the responsiveness and flexibility of any policies or programmes.

Effectiveness – This dimension is essentially the same as with a development programme. Using the DAC Criterion, evaluators would ask: “Has the programme achieved its stated (or implicit) purpose, or can it reasonably be expected to do so, on the basis of its outputs?” To sharpen the criterion for conflict prevention and peacebuilding programmes, many urged that the Effectiveness question be explicitly related to the Relevance criterion – that is to say, an assessment of effectiveness should explore how the stated objectives contribute to peacebuilding and conflict prevention. This would mean that even if a programme or policy is “effective” in achieving some of its original, stated objectives (developmental, humanitarian, etc.), if it is not relevant specifically to the issues of the conflict, it would not be considered effective in terms of conflict prevention and peacebuilding objectives.

Efficiency – Adapting the Efficiency Criterion for conflict prevention and peacebuilding poses challenges. For DAC, Efficiency “measures the outputs – qualitative and quantitative – achieved as a result of inputs”, including a hypothetical comparison of possible alternative approaches that could have been used to achieve the same outputs. For conflict prevention and peacebuilding efforts it is critical not to limit an assessment to “outputs” but to focus on the relationship of the outputs to the driving factors of conflict (or likely conflict). It is possible simply to ask how many people were trained through a conflict prevention workshop (outputs) and whether they claim that the workshop changed their perspectives (outcomes). However, a conflict prevention and peacebuilding evaluation must also ask whether or not such a workshop, and the resultant change, had anything to do with the actual issues that underlie the conflict or the strategies needed to induce change. One could change many attitudes and still have no significant effect on a conflict, and thus be judged inefficient in a conflict prevention and peacebuilding evaluation.

In discussing the application of the Efficiency Criterion to conflict prevention and peacebuilding, participants asked how one might calculate the costs or benefits of conflict prevention. In Oslo, some people noted that it is difficult to assign value to the benefits of a non-occurrence – i.e. that war did not happen. Similarly, there is little agreement on a way to assess how much peacebuilding costs. Most agreed that we do not have sufficient evidence to guide judgements regarding the relative value of different approaches measured against the resources expended, so it is difficult to establish a standard for assessing the relative costs of outcomes and impacts.

Others emphasised that the problems faced in assessing an activity based on the Efficiency Criterion are not limited to the conflict prevention and peacebuilding domain, and that the best approach is to relate actual and comparative costs: how does this particular programme or policy approach compare in costs to other options for achieving the same goal? They felt that this question should be included in any conflict prevention and peacebuilding evaluation. To be sure, the costs of conflict prevention and conflict management are often miniscule when compared with the costs of violent conflict, by almost any measure. But this fact should not justify an attitude of “it does not cost much, so why hold it to efficiency standards?” Not all conflict prevention activities are successful, so economy of resource use and selection of cost-effective intervention strategies are as important in the conflict prevention and peacebuilding domain as in development interventions.

Impact – As noted above in Section II.A, there is some confusion surrounding the definitions and dimensions of conflict prevention and peacebuilding impacts. DAC and ALNAP apply the Impact Criterion to the “wider effects” of an effort. They include differential effects in this assessment; for example on women and men, or other sub-groupings. Everyone agrees that it is critical for evaluators of conflict prevention and peacebuilding to look for and assess impacts. Again, based on the evidence observed, the

CDA team feels strongly that this criterion should apply not only to long-term effects but also to immediate impacts, with an emphasis on the conflict dynamics. There was general agreement that the criterion is of particular importance in conflict prevention and peacebuilding, as it relates to unexpected side effects of programmes and policies in that area, both positive and negative. The focus of an assessment of Impact would be established by the conflict analysis. Not all impacts are of interest to a conflict prevention and peacebuilding evaluator; the emphasis should be on those that relate specifically to intergroup relations and to the driving factors of the conflict.

For further discussion of impacts see the Reflecting on Peace Practice (RPP) project's criteria in Annex 5.

Sustainability – The original DAC Criterion of Sustainability, as applied to development efforts, does not appear in the later DAC and ALNAP guides for humanitarian assistance. In conflict prevention and peacebuilding policy and programme design documents, there is a great deal of discussion about Sustainability as “ownership” of peace processes. However, conflict prevention and peacebuilding programme planners seldom consider the likelihood that when an effort is effective, there will be some people in any conflict setting who may attempt to spoil it. Evaluations should therefore examine the ways in which an activity has or has not anticipated and addressed those factors or individuals who will try to undo its effectiveness.

The other aspect of Sustainability for conflict prevention and peacebuilding is analogous to the sustainability of development efforts. A conflict prevention and peacebuilding evaluation should assess the degree to which the impetus or momentum of any effort has become integrated into local processes. This is what people refer to when they look for local people's “ownership” of peace processes. Questions to be asked include: Will a new institution designed to address conflicts survive? Will hard-won improvements in intergroup relationships persist in the face of challenges? Will the parties to a negotiated agreement honour and implement it? Will the resources necessary for implementation be forthcoming from national or international sources?

Connectedness – In humanitarian aid, the Criterion of Connectedness replaces that of Sustainability. It refers to the long-term impacts of short-term interventions, specifically to the longer-term (developmental and other) effects of immediate, life-saving humanitarian activities. For conflict prevention and peacebuilding, it is also useful for an evaluation team to assess the likely longer-term effects of efforts. However, these considerations can well be covered under the Criterion of Impact discussed above. Therefore, some Oslo workshop participants suggested that this criterion, borrowed from humanitarian evaluations, is not necessary for conflict prevention and peacebuilding, provided that it is embedded in Relevance or Impact.

However, most participants felt that it was important to reinterpret the Criterion of Connectedness to refer to the linkages between conflict prevention and peacebuilding activities (at different levels – micro-macro, across sectors, etc.). Interpreted in this way, Connectedness is an important measure for assessing conflict prevention and peacebuilding work. There is evidence (through the RPP project) that linkages among individual/personal changes and socio-political changes are critical for cumulative effectiveness; it is therefore necessary to develop a criterion that captures whether or not an effort has explicitly established such linkages. In fact the Criterion should be called *Linkages*, to avoid confusion with ALNAP's very differently defined term “Connectedness”.

Coherence – As noted above, the adapted DAC and ALNAP Criteria for humanitarian action has added the criterion of Coherence. This refers to assessing activities undertaken by a range of actors (security, development, trade, military) to ensure that there is consistency and that all take account of humanitarian and human rights considerations.

In Oslo, there was a great deal of discussion about the appropriateness of the Coherence Criterion for conflict prevention and peacebuilding. Some felt strongly that if Coherence is not actively and continuously pursued in conflict prevention and peacebuilding work, activities will be constantly undermined or undone by approaches and actions undertaken by other branches of government, or other donors and partners. That is, Coherence was taken to mean “whole-of-government”, “Three Ds/3Ds” (diplomacy, defence and development), and “harmonisation” and alignment among partners within and across the governments concerned. Given the “strategic gap” identified in the Utstein report, some argued that assessment of Coherence with long-term development would be essential for the assessment of Effectiveness and Impacts of conflict prevention and peacebuilding interventions, from a Peace Writ Large perspective.

Others disagreed. They noted that while a lack of co-ordination, outright competition and contradiction often do appear to weaken the potential effects from multiple efforts, this does not necessarily mean that attaining coherence is desirable, particularly if actions are aligned in the wrong direction. As one person put it, “Coherence for development or security represents a hypothesis of change, rather than being proven always to contribute to more positive impacts on peace.” His point was that conflict prevention and peacebuilding evaluators should look for and gather evidence regarding the extent to which alignment of actors’ work does or does not support conflict prevention and peacebuilding effectiveness. To establish Coherence as a criterion against which to assess conflict prevention and peacebuilding activities would be to assume that Coherence always contributes to achieving results.

Specifically, two possible negative effects were noted. First, if external actors align all their policies and efforts, this could (and in some cases has) lessened the “ownership” by local actors of conflict prevention and peacebuilding work. A question for further exploration and analysis in evaluations, therefore, was suggested: *whose* Coherence is to be assessed, and how, for improved conflict prevention and peacebuilding results? Second, there is some evidence that attempts to align conflict prevention and peacebuilding work with military and foreign policy efforts tends to submerge that work into the foreign policy/military agendas of one or more donors, thus distorting the analysis. Some noted that those who work in the development and peace sides of donor governments do not have any mandate to insist on Coherence among all other branches of government. Hence, evaluations that attempt to look for such Coherence could run into barriers of access and agreement (although this in itself could be informative).

Coverage – Within the humanitarian sphere, Coverage refers to whether all those in need have access to humanitarian assistance. Some people felt that Coverage was of particular importance in assessing policy-level conflict prevention and peacebuilding efforts. It may also apply, however, to programme efforts as well. An evaluator might ask: “Do donor policies effectively cover all conflicts or does donor funding adequately extend to all areas where conflicts occur? Or, are there still ‘hidden conflicts’ that receive little or no international attention?” This criterion would also apply to conflict prevention efforts, to assess whether sufficient attention was being paid to emerging violence.

Consistency with conflict prevention and peacebuilding values – Many people felt that this is one other criterion necessary for assessing conflict prevention and peacebuilding, one not sufficiently covered by DAC and ALNAP. In interviews, a number of people told of conflict prevention or peacebuilding activities in which the project staff were insensitive to others, biased in their judgements, and disrespectful of people with different opinions or approaches. For many, the behaviour of these individuals contradicted the intent of their programming to such a degree that the programme was undermined. In the RPP learning process also, the importance of using means that do not work at cross-purposes with peacebuilding ends came up repeatedly as an important factor affecting the quality and impacts of conflict prevention and peacebuilding efforts.

A second aspect of Consistency raised by a number of people has to do with the importance of conflict sensitivity for conflict prevention and peacebuilding efforts. Again, people cited instances in which an activity that was intended to have a positive effect had inadvertently exacerbated intergroup divisions and antagonisms, thus worsening relations and triggering further violence. For example, a democracy-building effort might concentrate on redressing previous social or political exclusion. But, by concentrating on equal access to power, the effort might threaten those who currently hold power and exacerbate tensions between the ethnic groups that they represent. In a violence prevention context, the challenge would be to mitigate a factor (exclusion) that could eventually lead to violence, while avoiding approaches that might precipitate backlash and violence in the shorter term.

IV. Recommendations and Main Findings

Part 1 of this section suggests an overall approach to programme design and the elements essential to preparing evaluations of conflict prevention and peacebuilding activities. Part 2 lists the steps necessary in actually conducting the evaluation. The section includes recommendations from the CDA team that build on the more detailed discussions presented in Sections I, II and III. The ordering and relative importance of elements outlined here will vary according to the context and evaluation goals; listings should therefore not be viewed as consecutive steps. Although the two parts of the section are presented separately for clarity, it should be kept in mind that planning and conducting evaluations are inherently interrelated processes. Suggestions for future development of DAC guidance are also included.

1. Preparing the Evaluation

A. Getting programme design right: An aid to good evaluation

This report has not focused on effective programme design *per se*. However, there is consensus among donors and practitioners that good work at the design stage contributes greatly to achieving the learning goals of monitoring and evaluation systems. Based on the interviews and literature, several design elements can be identified that increase the effectiveness of the intervention itself and aid in its evaluation:

- A rigorous conflict analysis.
- A well-articulated theory of change.
- Well-formulated goals, objectives (linked at different levels) and activities that are relevant to the conflict (i.e. that address its key driving factors).¹⁷
- A process that integrates monitoring and evaluation from the beginning.

Many organisations lack sufficient resources to complete the steps outlined above. This leads to the recommendation below.

Recommendation:

Donors should encourage and indeed fund an inception phase of programming. This phase would provide time and resources for conflict analysis, for developing and testing goals and theories of change, and for formulation of appropriate monitoring and evaluation systems.

17. The CDA team found that if programme designers are able to formulate precise goals and specific objectives, it becomes relatively straightforward to develop good indicators.

Box 4.1. Guiding principles for evaluations

- A conflict prevention and peacebuilding evaluation is itself an intervention in a conflict context and should respect the same principles of conflict sensitivity as any other intervention.
- From the beginning, an evaluation process should incorporate a plan for engaging specific audiences/constituencies regarding the findings, results, recommendations and/or lessons.
- An evaluation should contribute to a learning process that influences policy and programme (re)conceptualisation and/or (re)design.
- The first deliberate judgement of an activity should be at the proposal stage: assessment of a proposal for funding should employ criteria similar to those that will be used to evaluate the proposed activity during and after implementation.

B. Setting up the evaluation

A number of issues must be addressed when organising and conceptualising an evaluation exercise and drafting the relevant TORs. The recommendations that follow take the form of sets of questions to be answered. Ultimately, DAC guidance needs to provide advice on these issues, where possible. This section is intended for use by donor desk officers or others responsible for initiating an evaluation effort.

Deciding on the purpose and dimensions of the evaluation

The primary purpose of evaluations is to promote *learning* as well as *accountability*, so that the work of donors and implementing practitioners continually improves in effectiveness. To fulfil the learning purpose, an evaluation, review or assessment of a programme or policy should not be seen primarily as a written report. (It appears that most evaluation reports are read by very few people.) Instead, donors, evaluators and implementing organisations should incorporate more opportunities for presentation and discussion – of findings, recommendations and learning – with key audiences, including partner country representatives. Evaluations should engage a wide range of stakeholders in a mutual learning process that involves as many people as practicable and contributes to improving practice.

Different types of learning and feedback are possible, based on the given stage in a programming cycle:

- Monitoring systems collect information on key indicators over time, and provide a regular stream of feedback allowing for mid-course corrections (though that is not the only basis for redesign). Such systems can be a good way to keep track of rapidly changing conflict contexts.
- Mid-course evaluations or reviews assess a programme or policy in progress and likely to continue for some (often unstated) period, again either substantiating the prevailing design or establishing the basis for redesign/redirection, as well as providing early lessons.
- End-of-programme or end-of-policy evaluations provide an opportunity to assess the results and more substantial lessons learned from the intervention(s).
- A self-evaluation or internal review is sometimes appropriate in an evaluation process. This process of self-examination can be useful for an implementation team (at the project or programme level,

or at the donor or whole-of-government strategic level). Intervention efforts often use the process as a simple means of mid-course review, but it can also be incorporated as one step in a larger evaluation exercise. Various tools and methods for self-evaluation exist, including participatory approaches that engage the implementation team in a group reflection process; individual survey/reflection exercises; and surveys, questionnaires and focus groups for and composed of direct programme participants.

Learning goals and the structure of the evaluation process also shift depending on the level of the evaluation – e.g. individual programmes, a specific sector, the cumulative impacts of multiple programmes in the same conflict zone, or broader policies.

Evaluation and mid-term reviews can be performed at a range of intervention levels: discrete projects; programmes (often comprised of several projects); country strategies (usually by a single donor); policy (application of a donor policy across several contexts); and a variety of multi-donor combinations in single or multiple contexts. The focus and structure of an evaluation effort will change considerably at these different levels.

Developing and institutionalising monitoring systems is deemed very important for ongoing learning for, and adaptation of, conflict prevention and peacebuilding interventions. The data gathered in a monitoring process can be valuable for evaluators. Several interviewees warned, however, that monitoring is not evaluation – even if the purposes are related – and that, even if the data are valuable, they cannot be relied upon unquestioned but must be verified and triangulated.

Finally, donors and practitioners are interested in different levels of assessment. Some evaluations simply ask whether a programme delivered what was planned (outputs) – and so serve practically an accounting or auditing function. Others look at the programme's proximate outcomes (direct effects on participants, etc.); still others seek to assess programme impacts on the broader society. The impact level is emphasised here, as this poses the greatest challenge for donors and their partners and is the highest priority for learning in the conflict prevention and peacebuilding field.

Recommendation:

The Terms of Reference should reflect decisions regarding the purposes and dimensions of the evaluation, among many other aspects. Specifically, the following questions should be considered:

- Why is this evaluation being conducted at this time? Is it truly an evaluation, or is the intent to set up or review a monitoring system? If it is an evaluation, is it a mid-term review or a summative evaluation?
- What is the purpose of the evaluation? Is it mostly about accountability (performance against objective within budget) or about programme effectiveness and/or impacts?
- If the main concern is about uses of funds and performance of activities, what main lines of inquiry will the evaluation take? (See sub-section 2.D below.)
- If the main concern is about effectiveness and impact, what are the main lines of inquiry?

Clarifying projected uses of the evaluation

The purpose and dimensions of an evaluation are closely linked to its ultimate anticipated uses. Design and execution should be guided by a thorough understanding of what the evaluation will be used for.

Recommendation:

It is important to consider the following:

- How will the evaluation be used? For programme or policy redesign? Renewed funding decisions? For the design of future similar programmes or policies?
- Who are the audiences for the findings, and how will they be engaged? What steps have been taken to make such engagement effective?
- How will the results be communicated, and to whom?
- What are the roles of partner country officials or other groups receiving the findings?
- What strategies will encourage use of the findings and lessons by donors and practitioners?
- What is the plan regarding presentation and discussion of findings, recommendations and learning with key audiences, such as field staff and managers of the implementing organisation; partner organisations; key local officials; donor representatives in the field; and headquarters staff of the donor and implementing organisation?
- What are the appropriate venues for an open exchange of ideas for programme redesign (goals, objectives, strategies, theories of change, activities)? As a practical matter, how will the findings feed into programme redesign and/or policy making?

Deciding on level and scope

Evaluation of conflict prevention and peacebuilding at the strategic level, as defined in the Utstein report, asks “whether the intervention strategy as a whole is working” (Smith, 2004a, p. 14). Projects, as well as programmes and policies, can and should be evaluated at this level. Specifically, in addition to assessing the implementation and management of projects, evaluators should always ask whether the interventions have or are connected to a strategy that is based on a reasonable theory of change in the particular conflict.

Recommendations:

The following questions must be discussed:

- What is the “level” of the evaluation? (Community level, a focus on specific institutions, or a national or regional level?)
- How far along the “results chain” (outputs à outcomes à impacts) will the review/evaluation reach? Will the evaluation look for immediate and longer-term impacts on programme participants, on institutions, on the larger society and/or on broad conflict dynamics? How will it do so?

For single-donor efforts, will the exercise assess:

- A single project?
- Several projects comprising a programme?

- The entire range of programmes by a single donor in a particular country or region (“country strategy review”)?
- A particular type of programme implemented in multiple contexts (e.g. police reform programmes in six countries)?
- The application and implementation of a specific donor policy within a single context or across multiple contexts?

For multiple donors undertaking a joint evaluation effort, will the exercise assess:

- Selected programmes of multiple donors in the same context?
- All programmes by multiple donors in a conflict context (i.e. the “country strategy” of multiple donors)?
- How will the joint effort be organised and funded?

Considering approaches and methodologies

While there is no one “right” methodology to address all the special conditions of conflict prevention and peacebuilding, a number of evaluation approaches may be appropriate in a particular circumstance (Church and Rogers, 2006). It is worthwhile to explore the applicability and efficacy of evaluation approaches that do not require the generation of indicators, such as “most significant change”, “theory-based evaluation”, “goal-free evaluation” and participatory evaluation. These may prove more useful than indicator-based approaches, such as the logframe and results framework. Depending on the context, objectives and scope of the evaluation, some options include:

- *Results-based evaluation approaches*, which assess whether interventions have achieved planned results (outputs, outcomes or impacts).
- *Goal-free evaluation approaches*, in which the evaluator examines the actual results, outcomes and impacts of interventions rather than verifying achievement of expected results or pre-stated objectives.
- *“Most significant change” approaches*, which use participants’ stories to identify the impacts of the intervention. Participants are invited to write stories of “significant change” and then participate in dialogue (within a group) about them, to make explicit what individuals and the wider group define and value as “significant change”.
- *Action evaluation*, in which the evaluator works with the intervention team, participants and donors in an iterative process throughout the life of an intervention to define goals, examine assumptions and values underlying those goals, and define and implement methods for testing whether the goals are being met.
- *Theory-based evaluation*, which documents the assumptions implicit in a programme design and identifies the data required to test these assumptions. This approach can work both with the activity itself (how the effort will contribute to the overall goals) and with the implementation theory (the assumptions underlying the detailed implementation choices regarding participants, issues, locations, timing, etc.). Given the importance of articulating and testing theories of change, there was a strong suggestion in Oslo that theory-based evaluation would be relevant for testing

programme and intervention theories. It is recommended that a theory-based approach be included in the pilot testing of future guidance, to gather further evidence about its use in conflict prevention and peacebuilding.

This is not an exhaustive list, and approaches may be combined to meet the needs of a specific evaluation. As yet, no methodology is foolproof for conflict prevention and peacebuilding.

Recommendations:

The advantages and disadvantages of a particular approach to evaluation should be weighed, taking into account the purposes and questions of the evaluation, the context in which it is taking place, and its scope, budget and timing.

Although different approaches may be used for conflict prevention and peacebuilding evaluation, there are common principles that should be followed in order to strengthen the validity and rigour of the evaluation:

- *Inclusiveness* – Methodologies should be rigorous about including the full range of points of view. In particular, evaluations should include perspectives both from within and outside the capital, as well as the perspectives of the variety of groups and sub-groups (actors and their constituencies) involved in the conflict, even if the interventions work only with one side. Some sampling methodologies – random sampling, for instance – fail to be fully inclusive. Where data collection is difficult because of lack of access or security concerns, other methods – including consulting with “proxies” – should be employed to ensure inclusion of perspectives from all sides of a conflict.
- *Testing the theory of change* – Methodologies should generate specific data/evidence that tests the assumptions comprising the theory of change embedded in the conflict prevention and peacebuilding activities: their *relevance* to the conflict and the context; and their *plausibility*, i.e. whether the evaluated activity’s strategies, outputs and outcomes are likely to lead to desirable impacts on the nature of the conflict and its drivers.
- *Mixed-method approaches* – The evaluation should draw on both qualitative and quantitative methods and evidence. Single-method evaluations are not adequate for conflict prevention and peacebuilding analysis.
- *Rigour of evidence* – The data and information used should be triangulated where possible. Information sources should be transparent and reliable.
- *Unexpected impacts* – Processes and techniques for identifying and assessing both planned and unplanned or unexpected impacts, both positive and negative, should be used.
- *Ethics* – Ethical issues that may arise during the evaluation should be addressed at the outset, in the Terms of Reference.¹⁸ Articulating ethical standards for the evaluation can help manage the politics of an evaluation (both with a little “p” and with a capital “P”) and protect the evaluation from political pressures that may undermine its validity and usefulness.

18. While as yet there are no fully agreed, binding ethical standards for evaluation, the ethical principles of a number of national and regional evaluation associations are quite similar, in effect representing growing agreement.

With regard to the use of participatory evaluation, donors and evaluators should consider when and how to involve local people – from government to beneficiaries and others – in the design of the evaluation, based on:

- The degree of politicisation and polarisation in the situation and the degree to which a shared definition of the problem exists. That is, is it possible to define a set of indicators, criteria or domains for change that is shared by all major groups of stakeholders?
- The power relations among the various parties and their relation to the programme. What is the danger that one perspective or group will dominate the process of defining indicators or evaluating success?
- Is it possible to access all relevant stakeholder points of view at all critical stages of the participatory process? Are all sides able to participate – if not equally, at least in a substantial and meaningful way – in the evaluation?

Much has been written about evaluation methods. Hence, DAC guidance should refer to relevant sources but need not repeat all of the wisdom and best practices provided in various evaluation manuals. Future guidance should indicate the strengths and weaknesses of different approaches to evaluation as an aid to choosing a methodology for specific conflict prevention and peacebuilding evaluations. A brief overview of “pros” and “cons” of various approaches is contained in *Designing for Results*, the guide to evaluation of peacebuilding by Church and Rogers (2006), and these could be developed further during the guidance piloting phase and afterward.

Taking timing and logistical issues into consideration

With regard to timing, there was wide agreement among those consulted that end-of-project evaluations are often not useful and likely to be ignored/filed away (i.e. not used for learning). Many urge that monitoring and evaluation be carried out “just in time”, “constantly” or “frequently”. Evaluation should be performed so as to inform policy discussion and/or indicate programme adjustments for improved effectiveness. Many linked the process of evaluation to the dynamics of a conflict itself, which requires constant reassessment and changes in approach.

Recommendation:

Factors to consider regarding the conditions for evaluation should include the following:

- What is the current stage in the planning/implementation cycle of the conflict prevention and peacebuilding programme or policy? Is this a timely moment for rethinking directions and strategies?
- Will conflict prevention and peacebuilding policy makers or programmers be able to make the changes needed? Do they know that change is needed?
- What is happening in the conflict? Have there been recent changes in the dynamics that call for rethinking programmes?
- In what stage is the conflict cycle? How do the political and security conditions influence the prospects for evaluation?
- In what stage is the programming cycle? Has the intervention effort been in place long enough to provide useful experience and learning?

- Is this an appropriate moment for the proposed exercise, in terms of programme development, implementation, etc.?
- How long has it been since any previous evaluation or review was performed?
- Are there any logistical issues that must be taken into consideration (security restrictions, weather patterns, major national holidays, access to transport, etc.)?
- How will the evaluation be funded and managed?

Developing Terms of Reference

All of the considerations and questions outlined above will have implications for the development of Terms of Reference (TORs) for the evaluator or evaluation team. Future DAC guidance should provide sample TORs. Among the many important details to be included, TORs should specify:

- The kind of exercise expected: mid-course review, final evaluation, etc.
- The level of analysis expected: project, programme, country strategy, multi-donor, etc.
- Whether to assess outputs, outcomes, and/or impacts.

Selecting an evaluator or evaluation team

The extent of evaluators' experience with conflict prevention and peacebuilding varies greatly. Some interviewees voiced strong reservations about their competence while others expressed warm appreciation for their skills and motivations. Three qualifications seem particularly important for evaluators to have: i) knowledge of evaluation methods; ii) knowledge of the conflict prevention and peacebuilding field; and iii) an appropriate style of working. In general, most people who provided input to this report feel that a team needs to have complementary skills, and that people who are themselves knowledgeable conflict prevention and peacebuilding practitioners are critically important to the quality of evaluations.

Questions to ask while selecting evaluators include:

- What are the necessary attributes (skills, experience, relationships) of an evaluator or evaluation team, given the purposes of the evaluation and the main lines of inquiry?
- In particular, does the team have demonstrated knowledge of the conflict prevention and peacebuilding field and practice; the ability to perform conflict analysis; experience with relevant evaluation approaches and methods; experience in the country/region involved; language skills?
- What is the working style of prospective evaluators? Do they: i) demonstrate skills and comfort working in potentially dangerous and politically sensitive situations in a calm, non-threatening manner; ii) employ interpersonal approaches that are transparent and trusting, and that evoke trust; and iii) exhibit skills for managing conflicts and tension?

Recommendations:

At a minimum, as conflict prevention and peacebuilding grounding, evaluators need:

- To know the “state of the art” in the conflict prevention and peacebuilding field under examination, as well as the cautions about how various activities do and do not “add up” to real impacts on the broader peace and security situation.
- To recognise that a conflict prevention and peacebuilding evaluation is itself an intervention, so that they approach their task mindful of the effects their work will have on moving toward peace or away from conflict.
- Knowledge of and skills in developing conflict analyses and evaluation methods.

At a minimum, in terms of style, evaluators need:

- Ability and comfort working in dangerous situations (calm, non-threatening, not overly adventurous).
- Interpersonal approaches that are transparent and trusting, that evoke trust, and that are gender- and culturally sensitive.
- Skills for managing conflict and tension.

C. Additional issues to consider

Joint evaluations

Joint evaluations (across several donors and programmes) should be promoted because they can generate more learning about whether things “add up”. Cumulative evaluations look more broadly at many (or even all) interventions in a particular conflict zone to assess the combined impacts from those multiple efforts. At the same time, the politics of multiple actors will need to be handled carefully so as not to confuse and weaken evaluation and to ensure that the learning is sufficient to justify the extra costs.

A number of practical suggestions are contained in the DAC Network on Development Evaluation working paper, “Joint Evaluations: Recent Experiences, Lessons Learned and Options for the Future” (OECD, 2005a in Annex 2) as well as in the DAC “Guidance for Managing Joint Evaluations” (OECD, 2006 in Annex 3). A facilitator might be added to the evaluation team to assist the actors in defining questions and terms of reference, and to deal with the differences in approach, methodology and focus that may arise during the course of a joint evaluation. Finally, when joint evaluations are performed, it is critical to include local people so that “external agendas” (i.e. donor agendas) do not overwhelm partner country interests and local concerns.

Partner country roles

The role of partner countries in evaluation requires additional considerations in light of the potential involvement of government, or parts of government, in the conflict itself. The question is not whether the government ought to participate, but how. Co-sponsorship of an evaluation is inappropriate if the government is party to the conflict. Considerations for defining the role of the partner countries should be based on an analysis of the potential for bias or the appearance of bias in the evaluation and the potential for government involvement in evaluation to impact the conflict itself.

Development and use of indicators

There is no single proved methodology for preventing violence and building peace. This reality led many with whom the CDA team spoke to be concerned by recent donor emphases on establishing

standard (or universal) conflict prevention and peacebuilding indicators, specifying detailed logframe analyses of intended activities and linking evaluations to funding decisions. Many note that they now view evaluations as carried out “only” or “primarily” to meet a donor requirement.

Given the extent of unknown variables, evaluations in the coming years should be directed toward gathering evidence and learning from it, and on testing and challenging commonly held theories and assumptions about peace and conflict, rather than on establishing fixed universal indicators of peace/conflict. Clarity on indicators (and whether or not they can be generalised in a useful way) may emerge in the process, but the focus and approach at this time should avoid over-emphasis on indicators as the benchmark for evaluation.

Because the state of the art of conflict prevention and peacebuilding programming is not settled, upcoming evaluations should focus on gathering experience and analysing it cumulatively and comparatively across contexts, to improve our collective learning.

2. Conducting the Evaluation

What follows is a summary of the elements necessary in conducting an evaluation of conflict prevention and peacebuilding activities. Included are the recommended key steps and important considerations for evaluators and their partners working in the conflict prevention and peacebuilding field. Part 2 also addresses next steps in improving practice in conflict prevention and peacebuilding evaluation in general, and in developing DAC guidance in particular.

Although the suggested elements are presented in a linear fashion, an evaluation may implement them in a different order. Those designing each exercise will select those elements most relevant to their situation and then develop an appropriate sequence.

A. Obtain or perform a conflict analysis

Evaluators should begin by conducting a conflict analysis. This will serve as the (necessary) basis for determining the relevance and impacts of the policy/programme. Such an analysis provides an understanding of the key driving factors and actors of the conflict, and how they interact. If the programme has been updating a conflict analysis on a regular basis, and if the evaluator finds that analysis accurate, it can be used in lieu of the evaluator producing his/her own analysis.

A conflict analysis is distinct from a context analysis.

A **context analysis** seeks to understand, broadly, the entire political, economic and social (historical, environmental, etc.) scene.

A **conflict analysis** concentrates on the elements of the broad picture that propel the conflict. It includes political, economic, social and historical (etc.) factors, but focuses on those that directly influence the shape and dynamics of the conflict.

A conflict analysis should:

- Include all perspectives of all contending parties.

- Identify key driving factors of the conflict (major contributing elements, without which the conflict either would not exist or would be significantly different; these can be long-term structural issues, more immediate triggers or anything in between, as identified by people in the situation).
- Identify positive factors in the situation and/or actors exerting an influence towards peace – which can, in many cases, serve as the basis for further peace initiatives.
- Show the dynamics/relationships among the driving factors.
- Differentiate which factors are more and less important to the conflict.
- Include a stakeholder and key actor analysis (people/constituencies that perpetuate or mitigate the conflict).
- Reflect the current stage of and evolving trends in the conflict.

Ideally, programme designers will have performed a conflict analysis during the design phase. Unfortunately, that ideal is only rarely realised. If an original analysis exists, it can serve as one form of baseline, enabling comparison with a current conflict analysis. Otherwise evaluators can perform a current analysis, and through the data collection process determine what the conflict situation was at the beginning of the programme, to develop a basis for comparison.

The level of effort devoted to a conflict analysis must be scaled to the scope of the evaluation or review. The evaluation of a single project or a relatively contained programme may call for a short and simple analysis exercise, while that of a whole range of programmes in the same context or a whole country study would warrant more resources devoted to producing a fuller conflict analysis. At the relatively simple end of the spectrum, peace practitioners and evaluation teams have shown that it is possible to produce a valid analysis in a few days of effort, with data collection activities and participatory processes spread over a couple of weeks.¹⁹ More extensive analysis processes take several weeks and involve larger teams of researchers. CDA recommends that DAC guidance should describe how to conduct a conflict analysis – including both the short-and-simple and more comprehensive versions – and refer to various templates and models used by donors.

A conflict analysis can in itself be a politically charged effort, and therefore must adhere to conflict sensitivity guidelines. It is not always possible to get all competing perspectives (from the different parties or people who can represent those views) in the same room at the same time. It is however possible, by talking with the different people separately, to gain an understanding of the different views of the conflict.

It is not necessary to gain consensus on the nature of the conflict. The contending groups will not agree on what the conflict is about. The conflict analysis can and should incorporate contrasting perspectives.

Conflict analysis must also be performed at the level appropriate to the peacebuilding intervention. That is, if the programme focuses on a particular province or sub-region, it is important to understand the conflict dynamics at that level while also analysing the impacts of other levels (national to local, regional to national, etc.) on programme decisions. If the effort has addressed mainly national level dynamics, the analysis should concentrate at that level but also show how local-level and regional factors influence the national level. A strategic-level evaluation, country study, or assessment of multiple government initiatives

19. See for instance Woodrow, 2006.

(by for example defence, development and foreign affairs) would require an analysis that covered aspects relevant to that level of focus.


People from the situation may identify external factors that influence the conflict. Examples include the impacts of international assistance (emergency aid, development, peacebuilding), trade (legal or illegal, i.e. arms traffic), actions or policies of neighbour states (safe haven for armed movements, incursions, etc.) and other actions by the international community (embargoes/sanctions, direct support to rebel movements or to a repressive government, UN resolutions, etc.).

B. Identify intervention goals and assess the theory of change

Determine the intended positive direction of the peacebuilding intervention. It will be important to understand what positive conditions the intervention or programme hopes to create – a specific future vision (beyond generalities) of a durable peace. Such a future vision, when contrasted with the current situation (as described in the conflict analysis), can clarify “peacebuilding deficiencies” or gaps²⁰ (Figure 1) that in turn form the basis for strategy formation.

Some activities will already have an explicit vision built into their design. Others will either be less explicit or deliberately avoid any such statements, for political or diplomatic reasons. It is possible and important for an evaluator to elicit the future vision as part of the evaluation process, especially in discussions with the implementation team.

Figure 4.1. **Mapping conflict prevention and peacebuilding goals and strategies**



It is also important to identify and assess the underlying theory of change of the intervention, whether at the strategic or programme level. The theory of change represents how the interveners (policy makers, programme designers, implementers) assume that their strategies can bring about their goals (vision of peace) in this context. A generic way of stating a conflict prevention and peacebuilding theory of change is: “If we do X [action], it will result in Y [progress towards peace].” Theories of change are embedded (often implicitly) in intervention strategies at the project, programme, whole-country and policy levels.

20. The definition of “peacebuilding deficiencies” or gaps illustrated in Figure 1 is adapted, with some changes in terminology, from “Thoughts about Relevance”, a short paper based on the Peace and Conflict Assessment methodology of BMZ, described in “Sector Strategy for Crisis Prevention, Conflict Transformation, and Peacebuilding in German Development Cooperation” (BMZ, 2005).

An evaluation must consider whether the effort is progressing towards the planned goals – in other words, whether the theory of change is proving correct. (See Annex 6 for a more complete explanation of theories of change, including illustrative examples.)

While there are numerous, common “generic” theories or general hypotheses regarding how change/peace occurs, which can be fairly easily listed, an evaluator must work with implementers to identify the *specific* theories embedded in the design of the intervention in question, and determine whether the assumptions have proved true.

C. Gather and analyse data/information

Obtain the “story” of the programme, including people’s own explanations of why it unfolded the way it did. Gather information from i) programme documents and reports, ii) monitoring data (if available) and iii) interviews with programme staff, partner organisations, local/national officials, participants, the appropriate stakeholders and relevant members of the public.

Evaluation itself must be recognised and carried out as the intervention it is. Data collection in particular can exert negative or positive effects on the conflict. Participatory data collection may prove valuable, but should be used with caution because of the potential partisanship of many local people and the dynamics of power and dominance in conflict settings.

D. Examine the effort against various criteria

Explore the peace effort (project, programme, policy, country strategy, multi-donor effort) against criteria. Each evaluation effort must determine the most important criteria and the detailed questions (lines of inquiry) that are most appropriate for the type of intervention, the stage of implementation, and other political and organisational factors. Application of relevant criteria is a central element of an evaluation. (See Annex 4 for a discussion of the types of intervention that are considered conflict prevention and peacebuilding.)

The criteria listed here below are adapted from the standard five DAC Evaluation Criteria (Relevance, Effectiveness, Efficiency, Impact and Sustainability) and the adapted DAC/ALNAP Criteria for assessing humanitarian assistance efforts (Relevance/Appropriateness, Connectedness, Coherence, Coverage, Efficiency, Effectiveness and Impact).

They constitute a “menu” of potential lenses through which the intervention can be viewed. The CDA team felt that some of them are *essential* to evaluating conflict prevention and peacebuilding efforts, while others are optional. The criteria will vary in their applicability to specific evaluations. For instance, issues of Coverage and Coherence might be most useful for strategic or policy-level evaluations. In addition to the criteria presented below, the RPP “Criteria of Effectiveness/Impact” can be used to help determine whether any conflict prevention and peacebuilding activity, large or small, is having a positive impact on Peace Writ Large (see Annex 5).

The DAC criterion that refers to means-ends consistency should always be used to assess gender and other inclusiveness, as well as cultural sensitivity, for all interventions. In addition, for many interventions, criteria of gender inclusiveness and impacts, cultural sensitivity and conflict sensitivity, should also be applied.

Below, specific questions have been added to illustrate how each criterion might apply to a conflict prevention and peacebuilding evaluation. The questions linked to the suggested criteria should be viewed as illustrative/explanatory. Each evaluation exercise will need to generate a set of specific questions appropriate to its circumstances.

The DAC Criteria, as adapted for evaluating conflict prevention and peacebuilding activities, are:

Relevance/Appropriateness:

- Is the conflict prevention and peacebuilding intervention based on an accurate analysis of the conflict?
- Does it therefore address key driving factors or key actors in the conflict?
- Is it working on the right issues in this context at this time (i.e. is it up-to-date)?
- Is the theory of change on which the activity/policy is based a logical or sensible one in this context at this time?
- Has the effort responded flexibly to changing circumstances over time?

Effectiveness:

- Has the intervention achieved its stated (or implicit) purpose, or can it reasonably be expected to do so on the basis of its outputs?
- Are the stated goals and objectives relevant to issues central to the conflict?
- Is the effort achieving progress in a reasonable time frame? Is it possible to accelerate the process? Should the effort be slowed down for any reason?

Efficiency:

- Does the intervention deliver its outputs and outcomes in an efficient manner (results against costs)? By what qualitative or quantitative measures?
- How does this particular programme or policy approach compare in terms of cost to other options for achieving the same goal?

Impact:

“Impacts” are the results or effects of any conflict prevention and peacebuilding intervention that lie beyond its immediate programme activities or sphere and constitute broader changes in the conflict. (See further discussion on assessing impacts in the sub-section on results chains below.)

- *For individual projects/programmes/policies:* What are the primary and secondary, direct and indirect, positive and negative, intended and unintended, immediate and long-term, short-term and lasting effects of the effort? Does the activity impact significantly on key conflict or peace factors?
- *For multi-programme and multi-donor evaluations:* What are the combined and cumulative effects, primary and secondary, direct and indirect, positive and negative, intended and unintended,

immediate and long-term, short-term and lasting, of the multiple efforts? How do these impact key conflict or peace elements?

Sustainability:

- Will new institutions designed to address conflicts survive? Are they being used?
- Will hard-won improvements in intergroup relationships persist in the face of challenges?
- Will the parties to a negotiated agreement honour and implement it? Are effective mechanisms in place to facilitate implementation?
- Will the resources necessary for implementation be forthcoming from national or international sources?
- Have those who benefit from ongoing conflict or who would resist movement towards peace (“spoilers”) been addressed adequately?

Linkages (replaces “Connectedness”)

- Are individual and grassroots projects or programmes linked to higher levels (national, regional) and to parallel efforts in other domains (micro-macro, across sectors)?
- Do country-level initiatives account for regional/international dimensions of the conflict or link to efforts that do so?
- Do interventions focused on key decision makers or power brokers link effectively with efforts to engage larger populations and constituencies – and *vice versa*?
- Are efforts aimed at promoting individual changes in behaviour, skills and attitudes linked with change efforts at the socio-political level?
- Are different efforts contradictory or undermining each other?

Coverage:

- Do donor policies effectively cover all conflicts, or does donor funding adequately reach all areas where conflicts occur?
- Are there “hidden conflicts” that receive little or no international attention?
- Is sufficient attention being paid to emerging violence and conflict prevention in potentially violent regions?

Consistency with conflict prevention and peacebuilding values:

- Are implementation staff members sensitive to others, unbiased in their judgements, and respectful of people with different opinions or approaches?
- Are the means of the intervention consistent with peacebuilding ends? For instance, are agencies that promote participatory processes taking decisions in participatory ways themselves? Are

interventions that promote multi-ethnicity or intergroup dialogue practicing those principles in their management of the intervention?

- Is the intervention conflict-sensitive, or does it inadvertently exacerbate intergroup divisions and antagonisms?

Coherence:

Participants in the DAC networks are currently not in full agreement regarding the appropriateness of Coherence as a criterion for evaluating conflict prevention and peacebuilding interventions. Therefore, the following questions are intended as a framework for gathering additional evidence on this issue:

- Are efforts to co-ordinate/align conflict prevention and peacebuilding programming or policies (across agencies, donor governments, partner governments) resulting in improved effectiveness and greater positive impacts on peace, or not?
- What are the effects – positive and negative – on conflict prevention and peacebuilding activities of “whole-of-government” approaches and policy alignments among diplomacy, security, development and other branches of donor governments?
- How do co-ordination efforts affect local ownership of peace processes (by partner government officials, civil society actors, etc.)?

E. Analyse the results chain²¹

Analyse the information gathered and assess the effort’s outputs, outcomes and impacts (as appropriate for the evaluation’s objectives and scope) by following the widely accepted “results chain”. Assessment of impacts requires special consideration (as mentioned above).

Outputs – To what extent has the programme delivered the planned activities, services and products? If it has not, why not? What unplanned outputs has it delivered?

Outcomes – What are the immediate/proximate results of the programme – on direct participants, beneficiaries, partners, institutions, policies, etc.?

Impacts – How is the intervention already affecting the broader society and the broader conflict, and what are likely future impacts?

Assessment of impact should refer back to the conflict analysis: how has the situation changed over time, and what is the likely contribution of the conflict prevention and peacebuilding intervention to those changes?

Evaluators should identify and assess impacts on the issues or factors that are key to the conflict. They should also discuss likely (or verifiable) longer-term, more substantive impacts that can be seen to contribute to the larger peace, as indicated by assessment of the relevance and plausibility of the theory

21. A results chain is the causal sequence for an intervention that stipulates the necessary sequence to achieve desired objectives – beginning with inputs, moving through activities and outputs, and culminating in outcomes, impacts, and feedback (OECD, 2002 in Annex 3).

of change. It is not necessary to hold a conflict prevention and peacebuilding effort to an ultimate standard of “achieving peace”, but the evaluation should identify the effects of the intervention on the conflict environment.

In evaluating the impacts of a conflict prevention and peacebuilding effort, it may be more feasible to determine whether the evaluation object is making a *contribution* to positive change, rather than trying to show direct, individual *attribution* for larger observed changes. The latter may in fact be the result of a composite of multiple interventions and other external factors.

F. Assess for conflict sensitivity

As noted elsewhere in this report, all programmes operating in a conflict context must be held accountable for conflict sensitivity. Therefore, an evaluation should use the Do No Harm framework or a similar tool to assess that dimension.

G. Examine the relationship to policies

Determine what policies (country strategies, broader policy statements, specific approaches to conflict prevention and peacebuilding) apply to the intervention being evaluated. Do the activities that are the focus of the evaluation square with the relevant policies? If the project is judged successful yet does not comply with policies, what does this suggest regarding the effectiveness and relevance of the policies themselves? If the evaluation assesses multiple interventions in the same conflict zone, to what extent do they all comply or not with the policies? What does the success or failure of an activity suggest about the policy? (For instance, if the interventions comply with the policy yet appear to fail, what are the implications for the policy?)

H. Engage in a learning process

Implement the plans (determined in the preparation stage) for follow-up and dissemination of lessons learned. The evaluator/evaluation team may play specific roles in this process, but normally follow-up is mainly the responsibility of the person or unit that commissioned the evaluation.

Box 4.2. Future DAC actions and next steps in developing guidance

1. *Producing draft guidance* – As stated earlier, this report is intended to contribute to the drafting of guidance for evaluation of conflict prevention and peacebuilding programmes and policies. To that end, it should be used to elicit consultation with and feedback from a wide group of donor representatives and practitioners. The feedback received will then be incorporated into a guidance document.
2. *Donor experimentation with evaluations* – The resulting draft guidance could then be used as the basis for a concerted effort by donors to implement evaluations of as many conflict prevention and peacebuilding programmes as possible over the next two years, with careful documentation of the processes used, the Terms of Reference (TORs), the lessons learned about the evaluation process, and programme content issues. This effort should include the experimentation with joint and cumulative evaluations noted above, as well as application of the guidance to single-programme evaluation efforts.

Box 4.2. Future DAC actions and next steps in developing guidance (cont.)

3. *An evaluation of evaluations* – The accumulated evaluations from the experimentation in Point 2 could provide the basis for a comparative evaluation of conflict prevention and peacebuilding evaluations, in order to learn what kinds of evaluation have proved useful and which evaluation processes and methods produced those lessons.
4. *Annual review of conflict prevention and peacebuilding evaluations* – In order to facilitate learning about evaluations, OECD/DAC could convene an annual session to examine a set of evaluations performed during the previous year, perform cross-case analysis, and derive ongoing lessons to inform subsequent evaluations.
5. *Policy review* – Over time, the review of a range of interventions will provide evidence that should inform a review of the policies of individual donors, as well as OECD/DAC policies and guidelines. In particular, the connections between economic factors and peace and the effects of efforts towards coherence should be examined.

A final note: Keep it simple

People involved in conflict prevention and peacebuilding activities commonly speak about how complicated conflict is, and therefore how complicated peacemaking is. The very terms now in use – such as “complex emergency” and “fragile state” – indicate the general agreement that these situations are extremely complex and difficult. But some of the practitioners with whom the CDA team spoke noted that some in the conflict prevention and peacebuilding field are probably over-complicating issues and that doing so provides an excuse for ineffectiveness and lack of accountability. They urged that conflict prevention and peacebuilding evaluations avoid long discussions of complexity in the context, as these impede analysis of the effectiveness of conflict prevention and peacebuilding efforts. Rather than “proving” their sophistication and knowledge by discussing all contextual factors that have potential or hypothetical relevance or not, *evaluations should focus on how conflict prevention and peacebuilding interventions interact with the key factors and actors that drive the conflict*. Simplicity would then be achieved without denying the complexity of the conflict’s causes and dynamics.

Annex 1

Interviewees

Category/Name	Organisation	Country/Nationality
Evaluation specialists		
Michael Lund	Private consultant + MSI	United States
Cheyenne Church	Private consultant + Tufts University	Canada
Tony Vaux	Private consultant/Channel Research	United Kingdom
Arne Strand	Private consultant	Norway
Jonathan Goodhand	University of London	United Kingdom
DAC Steering Group		
Jennifer Stuttle	DFID	United Kingdom
Bjorn Holmberg	SIDA	Sweden
Agnete Eriksen	NORAD	Norway
Other DAC		
Jill Tirnauer	USAID (formerly with CMM)	United States
Ruairi O'Connell	DFID (Balkans)	United Kingdom
Patrick Merrienne	DFID (Central Africa)	United Kingdom
Steve Ainsworth	DFID (Sri Lanka)	United Kingdom
Rob Wilkinson	DFID/CHASE	United Kingdom
Private donors		
Melanie Greenberg	Cypress Fund (formerly with Hewlett Foundation)	United States
Multilaterals		
Ron Parker + team	World Bank (IEG)	Mixed group
Andrew Russell	UNDP Cyprus	Canada
Jaco Cilliers	UNDP Cyprus	South Africa
Gay Rosenblum-Kumar	UN/DESA	United States
Implementers/Practitioners		
Dan Smith	International Alert	United Kingdom
Tale Steen-Johnson	Norwegian Church Aid	Norway
Mohammed Abu-Nimer	American University	Palestine
Howard Wolpe	Woodrow Wilson Center	United States
Pamela Aall	US Institute of Peace	United States
Anton Baare	DDR specialist/consultant	Denmark
Emmanuel Bombande	WANEP	Ghana
Susan Hackley	Harvard Program on Negotiation	United States
Rebecca Bern	Mercy Corps	United States
Frédéric Kama-Kama Tutu	Peace Tree Network	DR Congo

Total interviews: 28

Annex 2

General Bibliography

This first bibliography below includes literature regarding conflict analysis, peace and conflict impact assessment (PCIA), conflict sensitivity, general evaluation methods and practice, evaluation of conflict prevention and peacebuilding, and literature relevant to issues of conflict prevention and peacebuilding boundaries. Policy documents are covered separately in Annex 3. A number of evaluations and evaluation methodologies provided by interviewees as representative of best efforts were also examined, along with CDA's own experience and the evaluations of some NGO efforts (*e.g.* Search for Common Ground, the Burundi Leadership Training Programme, and International Alert) that are public. The bibliography is not exhaustive.

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Annex 4

Who should use the DAC Conflict Prevention and Peacebuilding Evaluation Guidance and for which Types of Intervention?

In some domains of work it is relatively easy to determine which programmes should be subjected to evaluation guidance. For instance, the DAC has developed criteria and guidance for development programmes and for humanitarian assistance. There is little apparent confusion over which programmes “fit” in these categories and should therefore use the relevant evaluation guidance. In the peacebuilding and conflict prevention world, however, there is much controversy over what is or is not included within the field – and therefore over which interventions should be accountable to DAC guidance. Some donor representatives wish to know which programming types and policy approaches should be the “target” of forthcoming guidance, while others want the discretion to use the guidance in a tailor-made fashion, based on specific situations and needs.

This section is intended to meet both sets of expectations. First, it lists questions designed to help potential users in determining whether the guidance is applicable to a programme or policy that they wish to examine. This provides a framework for decision making regarding the pertinence of the guidance to specific evaluation objects (projects, programmes, country strategies, policies, etc.) Second, it proposes a provisional list of programmes to help potential users categorise areas within the conflict prevention and peacebuilding field. It presents a chart of common types of programming, while at the same time identifying the challenges of drawing clear boundaries within the contested field.

Potential users and applications of the guidance

This section explores the following questions:

- Who should use this guidance?
- To what programmes should the guidance *always* be applied?
- What other programmes might use the guidance on a *discretionary* basis?

Who might use future guidance: Potential audiences

A number of groups might use this guidance, or draw on it for evaluation or review of programmes or policies that, in one way or another, touch upon issues of conflict and peace. The main audiences are donors:

- Desk officers in donor headquarters who have the task of organising the evaluation of conflict prevention and peacebuilding programmes or policies.
- Donor desk officers managing development and/or humanitarian aid programmes that have implications for peace and conflict.
- Evaluation departments in donor organisations advising other departments regarding the evaluation of peacebuilding and conflict prevention programming.

- Individual evaluators or evaluation teams under contract to perform specific evaluations of programmes/policies.
- Field staffs of donors.

The guidance may also prove valuable to others, such as:

- Peacebuilding practitioners and practitioner organisations, in the field or headquarters.
- Networks of peacebuilding or evaluation practitioners.
- Academic researchers and conflict theorists.
- Developing countries' evaluators working in conflict-affected or conflict-prone regions.

Universal accountability for conflict sensitivity

All projects, programmes and policies at all levels and all settings should be conflict-sensitive. This is already enshrined in OECD/DAC policies, and the policies of most individual donors.²² *However, conflict sensitivity focuses on “doing no harm” and does not always address proactive measures that promote peacebuilding or conflict prevention.* We should be clear about the difference.

Conflict sensitivity requires those who are designing and implementing all interventions (humanitarian, development or peacebuilding) in a potential or actual conflict context to account for the inadvertent impacts of those interventions on conflict dynamics. At a minimum, they must avoid the negative and unintended consequences resulting from the way such efforts are carried out: distribution policies, staffing, behaviour of international staff, decision making, etc. Additionally, they should recognise opportunities for reducing intergroup divisions and reinforcing intergroup connectors that exist in the conflict area. Application of conflict sensitivity frameworks (Do No Harm or other similar instruments) prompts organisations to analyse their positive and negative effects on the conflict, and to take measures to minimise or correct those effects. Conflict sensitivity does not require a full conflict analysis or explicit relevance to key driving factors, triggers or actors of conflict. Conflict sensitivity is not, therefore, the same as peacebuilding.

Of course, such efforts can have positive impacts on peace – although usually not deliberately, even when aimed primarily at feeding and sheltering people or promoting sustainable development. As explained below, conflict prevention and peacebuilding criteria can be applied to those programming features that are making a positive contribution to either reinforcing intergroup connectors, or more directly addressing key driving factors and actors in the conflict.

The conflict prevention and peacebuilding evaluation criteria, presented elsewhere in the guidance, go beyond conflict sensitivity and apply broader standards of effectiveness. A conflict prevention and peacebuilding evaluation not only asks whether the effort has avoided inadvertent negative impacts or reinforced existing intergroup connectors – it also assesses whether the effort has made a contribution to peace through relevance to key driving factors and important constituencies. Conflict prevention and peacebuilding programmes must also be held accountable to conflict sensitivity standards, but the conflict prevention and peacebuilding criteria go beyond those.

22. Some note that the application/enforcement of the principle is not uniform – many people and programmes in the field still violate the standards, even when they are aware of them.

Which intervention types call for this guidance?

DAC evaluation guidance can be applied to a range of intervention types, outlined below. Guidance is mainly conceived as applying to the first two categories (explicit peacebuilding and conflict prevention). Such efforts should *always* be accountable to these guidelines, and the criteria included in them.

Guidance may also be used to assess development and humanitarian work that is either contributing to peace or has the potential to do so. This application is discretionary, and depends on the particular circumstances, donor policies, political sensitivity of interventions, stage of conflict, and overall strategies of influence adopted by the international community.

Explicit peacebuilding efforts

These are interventions in a context where there is ongoing or recently halted violence. They have incorporated specific goals or objectives that deliberately seek to exert a positive effect on the conflict.

Primary evaluation inquiry: Is this effort making a relevant contribution to durable peace, by deliberately and effectively addressing key driving factors of conflict among crucial conflict actors/constituencies?

Explicit conflict prevention efforts

These are interventions that have adopted specific conflict-related goals and objectives in a context in which there are indications, through early warning systems or other mechanisms of alert, that violence is likely in the short or long term. Operational prevention undertakes urgent interventions to avert or de-escalate tensions, while structural prevention seeks to address socio-political factors that, if not addressed, can be expected to lead to violence in the future.

Primary evaluation inquiry: Is this effort making a relevant contribution to preventing violence, either by intervening swiftly to avert escalating violence or by addressing long-term structural factors of conflict?

Development programmes in conflict-prone contexts

These are interventions in a conflict context (long-term structural issues but not yet overt violence; ongoing violent conflict; or post-violence) that are primarily aimed at development objectives, such as health, education, infrastructure, business development, etc., and have the potential for making a positive contribution to peace.

Primary evaluation inquiry: Is this effort maximising the potential for contributing to durable peace, by incorporating in its design elements that account for or address the key social tensions that have been identified as driving factors of past, current or potential conflict?

Application of conflict prevention and peacebuilding criteria to these efforts sets a higher performance standard in terms of contribution to peace, one that extends beyond the critically important “Do No Harm” principle that underlies conflict sensitivity. In some cases the question will be whether existing development efforts (projects, programmes, policies) can be better oriented, through redesign, to make a stronger contribution to peace and/or conflict prevention. In other cases the original design may have included conflict prevention and peacebuilding objectives, in which case the evaluation must determine whether the intervention, as conceived and implemented, is having the intended impacts.

Conflict prevention and peacebuilding evaluation criteria should be applied to development interventions when:

- The effort has adopted explicit peacebuilding or conflict prevention goals and objectives (in addition to its development aims).
- The effort is seen to be making a contribution to peace, even if inadvertently.
- Programme implementers and/or donors wish to explore how to increase the positive impact of the effort on the conflict.

Humanitarian assistance programmes in a conflict context

These are interventions in a conflict context (long-term structural issues but not yet overt violence; ongoing violent conflict; or post-violence) that are primarily aimed at humanitarian objectives (food aid, emergency health, shelter, survival, protection, etc.) and have the potential for making a positive contribution to peace.

Primary evaluation inquiry: Is this effort maximising the potential for contributing to durable peace, by incorporating in its design elements that account for or address the key driving factors of conflict?

Application of conflict prevention and peacebuilding criteria to these efforts sets a higher performance standard in terms of contribution to peace, one that extends beyond the critically important Do No Harm principle that underlies conflict sensitivity. In some cases the question will be whether current humanitarian assistance efforts (projects, programmes, policies) can be better oriented, through redesign, to make a stronger contribution to peace and/or conflict prevention. In other cases the original design may have included conflict prevention and peacebuilding objectives, in which case the evaluation must determine whether the intervention, as conceived and implemented, is having the intended impacts.

Conflict prevention and peacebuilding evaluation criteria should be applied to humanitarian interventions when:

- The effort has adopted explicit peacebuilding or conflict prevention goals and objectives (in addition to its humanitarian assistance aims).
- The effort is seen to be making a contribution to peace, even if inadvertently.
- Programme implementers and/or donors wish to explore how to increase the positive impact of the effort on the conflict.

The categories of conflict prevention and peacebuilding programming

The Utstein report presented a “palette” of peacebuilding programmes in four categories: security, socio-economic foundations, political framework, and reconciliation and justice. Those categories were developed to reflect the programmes surveyed in the Utstein process, which were selected from programmes supported by the four donor countries involved. The palette was not intended to be comprehensive.

Table 4.1. uses essentially the same four categories as the Utstein palette but adds other programming approaches to each of the categories, in an effort to include a wider range of intervention types and to

reflect the findings of recent policy research. The third category (“Political Framework” in the Utstein report) has been renamed “Political Structures and Policies”. The fourth category (“Reconciliation and Justice” in the Utstein report) has been renamed “Justice, Truth & Reconciliation Culture”.

A word of warning: Attempts to develop a comprehensive catalogue of conflict prevention and peacebuilding programming types is dangerous, for two reasons. First, potential users may be led to view the inventory as the list – i.e. to believe that anything that falls outside is not conflict prevention and peacebuilding. Second, they may assume that everything on the list is automatically conflict prevention and peacebuilding work, despite considerable evidence that many of the programme approaches enumerated fail to contribute to peace in many circumstances. Therefore, the accompanying list is illustrative. It should be used with caution: not all kinds of peacebuilding and conflict prevention work can be found there, and not all types on the list will automatically contribute to peace.

The types of activities listed below can, under certain circumstances, contribute to Peace Writ Large, but there is no guarantee that any of them will do so. Some may even do harm. Nor is this a comprehensive list – other types of activities may also be conflict prevention and peacebuilding.

Table 4.1. **Range of conflict prevention and peacebuilding approaches**

Socio-economic foundations Balanced physical reconstruction Sound and equitable economic management Equitable distribution of benefits from poverty reduction programmes Promotion of gender equality Equitable access to health care, education, social services and safety nets Repatriation/reintegration of refugees and IDPs Employment and social inclusion projects Sustainable use of (and equitable access to) natural resources Practical projects aimed at promoting contacts and understanding	A Culture of justice, truth and reconciliation Dialogue among conflicting groups (elites) Dialogue for change of attitudes/perceptions Grassroots dialogue/negotiation Relationship-building among conflicting groups Enhancing dispute resolution systems Prejudice reduction/diversity training Trauma healing Transitional justice processes/war crimes trials Reparations Future visioning Capacity-building/conflict skills training Peace education/conflict resolution education
Political structures and policies Democratisation/electoral processes Civil society development Freedoms of press, expression, etc. Media development/conflict sensitisation Improved access/power sharing Participatory processes, transparency, government accountability Rule of law/access to justice Human rights monitoring, protection, development Governance and anti-corruption programmes	Security De-mining campaigns Small arms and light weapons reduction Demobilisation, disarmament and rehabilitation(DDR) of (ex-)combatants, soldiers Security sector reform (police, military, intelligence...) Community policing Peacekeeping Nonviolent interposition/observers Nonviolent accompaniment

Source: Adapted from the “Utstein palette” (Smith, 2004a, pp. 27-28).

Annex 5

Reflecting on Peace Practice (RPP) Criteria of Effectiveness

Challenges for assessing effectiveness

Assessing an intervention's contribution to Peace Writ Large is difficult. Most peacebuilding interventions are discrete efforts aimed at affecting one (often small) piece of the puzzle, and no one effort can do everything. Attribution of social impacts to particular peace activities is even more difficult. As one practitioner noted: "Peace requires that many people work at many levels in different ways, and, with all this work, you cannot tell who is responsible for what." Moreover, when the goal of "just and sustainable peace" is so grand, and progress toward it immeasurable in its multitude of small steps, it is difficult to know whether or when a particular outcome is significant for peace.

Yet an effort is not necessarily ineffective just because it does not fully accomplish the lofty goals of ending violent conflict or building sustainable just structures. Are there criteria for determining which programmes have a more (or less) significant impact? Against what benchmarks can agencies identify whether their programmes have contributed to progress? How can agencies judge, as they are planning their programmes, which of the wide range of possible approaches will have the most significant impacts on the conflict?

Programme effectiveness vs. peace effectiveness

RPP's review of experience identified two levels of effectiveness:

- *Programme level* – At this level, agencies assess whether a specific activity (e.g. peace education, dialogue workshop, income generation project) is achieving its intended goals.
- *Peace Writ Large level* – The effectiveness question at this level asks whether, in meeting specific programme goals, an intervention is making a contribution to broader socio-political change. This requires assessing changes in the overall environment that may or may not have resulted from the project, programme, or policy. RPP found that this question – whether results represent a significant contribution to peace – was rarely asked. Rather, the connection between an activity and its impact on Peace Writ Large was assumed.

Nonetheless, practitioners involved in the RPP process affirmed that they *do* want to understand the connection between their peace efforts and ultimate impacts, and that they are dissatisfied with the way interventions are currently assessed.

Six Criteria of Effectiveness

From analysis of the RPP case studies and practitioners' reflection on their own experiences, the RPP process produced six Criteria of Effectiveness by which to assess, across a broad range of contexts and programming approaches, whether a peace effort is having a meaningful impact at the level of Peace Writ

Large. These Criteria can be used in programme planning to ensure that specific programme goals are linked to the large and long-term goal of Peace Writ Large. They can be used to guide the development of impact indicators in specific contexts. Moreover, they can be used during programme implementation to reflect on effectiveness and guide mid-course changes, and as a basis for evaluation after the programme has been completed.

An intervention is more effective to the extent that:

- The effort addresses the driving factors, people and dynamics that are key to the conflict.
- The effort results in the creation or reform of political institutions or mechanisms that deal meaningfully with grievances or injustices when these are key to the conflict. To reform or build institutions that are unrelated to the actual drivers of a specific conflict would be ineffective.
- The effort contributes to a momentum for peace by causing participants and communities to develop independent initiatives that reduce dividers, increase or support connectors, or address causes of conflict. This Criterion underlines the importance of “ownership” and sustainability of actions and efforts to bring about peace, as well as creating momentum for peace, involving more people. Yet not all participant or community initiatives are effective peace initiatives; the more the initiatives reduce the things that are dividers or sources of tension, reinforce things that connect people in spite of the conflict, or address the forces driving the conflict, the more effective they are.
- The effort prompts people increasingly to resist violence and provocations to violence. One way of addressing and including key people who promote and continue conflict (*e.g.* warlords, spoilers) is to help more people develop the ability to resist the manipulation and provocations of negative key people.
- The effort results in an increase in people’s security and in their sense of security. This Criterion reflects positive changes both at the socio-political level (in people’s public lives) and at the individual level as people gain a sense of security.
- The effort results in meaningful improvement in relations among groups in conflict. This Criterion reflects the importance of the relationship between conflicting groups, in terms of transforming polarised (and polarising) attitudes, behaviours and interactions to tolerant and co-operative ones, as a necessary precondition for addressing the underlying problems and grievances driving the conflict.

The Criteria are cumulative

The experience gathered through RPP suggests that the Effectiveness Criteria are cumulative. Peace efforts that meet more of the Criteria are more effective than those that meet only one of them.

Annex 6

Theories of Change

A useful first step in enhancing strategies in conflict prevention and peacebuilding programming and evaluation is to become more explicit about underlying assumptions regarding how change comes about – that is, theories of how to achieve peace. Conflict prevention and peacebuilding activities are carried out based on specific ideas and goals concerning what they hope to achieve. Such decisions are based on a number of factors – including assumptions about how to bring about peace and theories about how to bring about change. Peace practitioners select methods, approaches and tactics that are rooted in a range of “theories” of how peace can be achieved in a specific context. It is important to disclose these “theories of change”, both to test the theories against the realities of the conflict and to provide the basis for evaluating progress towards related objectives.

Such theories can take the simple format: “We believe that by doing X (action) successfully, we will produce Y (movement towards peace).” However, in many cases such theories are subconscious and unstated. They are embedded in the skills and approaches that conflict prevention and peacebuilding practitioners and policy makers have learned, the capacities of their organisations, personal attachments to favourite methodologies, and the individual perspectives various decision makers bring to the peacebuilding process. Ideas about what will contribute to peace may also be dictated by donor objectives or international political dynamics and policies.

Theories of peacebuilding include those presented at the end of this annex, though a systematic inquiry into ongoing and past conflict prevention and peacebuilding work would likely reveal other theories underlying peacebuilding programmes.²³ Note that these theories are not mutually exclusive—a single programme can be based on two or more of them.

Some theories focus on *who* needs to change: which individuals and groups in society or which relationships need to change. Other theories concentrate on *what* needs to change: an institution, a policy, a social norm. Still other theories are tied directly to a particular methodology or approach: *how* the change can or should happen.

Evaluating conflict prevention and peacebuilding theories of change

The impacts, effectiveness, relevance, efficiency and sustainability of a conflict prevention and peacebuilding activity rest to a large extent on the accuracy of its underlying theory of change. A false or incomplete theory may be a key explanatory factor for the failure of a programme, project or policy. In contrast, good theories (based on an up-to-date, thorough conflict analysis) contribute to effective conflict prevention and peacebuilding action and successful interventions. Analysis of the theory of change is therefore a key aspect of any evaluation. The pertinent theory should be reviewed in the evaluation report and be covered in the evaluation’s findings, conclusions and lessons learned. Such analysis will help contribute to a more refined understanding of how to bring about change for peace.

23. An initial list of these theories was derived from reviewing the Reflecting on Peace Practice cases studies; see http://www.cdainc.com/cdawww/project_profile.php?pid=RPP&pname=Reflecting%20on%20Peace%20Practice for a full list of the case studies.

When conducting an evaluation, the evaluator or evaluation team should ascertain the theories of change of the peacebuilding intervention in question. While they are often variations on the generic theories presented in the table at the end of this annex, for the purpose of evaluation the theories should be reframed using the intervention's particular terms and in relation to the specific context.

At times the theories in operation are obvious, even if unstated, in programme proposals and other documents. More often, the theories need to be uncovered through interviews with implementing staff and other stakeholders – or can be confirmed by those discussions. The evaluation process may also reveal that different staff members are proceeding on different assumptions (theories) about how their efforts will promote change towards peace. Thus, the evaluation process itself can be useful for helping to clarify this important dimension of intervention strategy.

The two real-life examples that follow illustrate these points.

Example 1: Evaluating grassroots conflict prevention in Liberia

In the wake of the 14-year civil war in Liberia, a large international NGO received donor funding to develop Community Peace Councils (CPCs), a community-based mechanism for resolving a range of disputes, with an explicitly inter-ethnic approach. The CPCs were designed to promote greater democratic participation through leadership development. In a parallel component, the programme organised a process of dialogue and negotiation (labelled “Forums”) at the village level among key leaders from the often mutually hostile ethnic groups – searching for ways for the groups to live together again after they had done so much damage to each other during the war.

The evaluation team first identified underlying theories of change and programme assumptions (derived mainly from discussions with local and international staff members) for the two components:

Theories of change for the Community Peace Councils:

Theory #1: By establishing a new community-level mechanism for handling a range of dispute types, we will contribute to keeping the peace and avoiding incidents that have the potential for escalating into serious violence.

Theory #2: By creating inclusive structures for community problem solving, we can improve communication, respect, and productive interactions among subgroups in the community, and improve the access of disenfranchised groups to decision making.

Theory #3: By creating a new leadership group infused with democratic concepts and provided with critical skills, we can foster more effective and responsive leadership.

Theories of change for the Forums:

Theory #1: If we bring together influential representatives and other community members of both (all) ethnic groups that are experiencing tension to engage in dialogue and negotiate formal agreements regarding outstanding issues, we can improve inter-ethnic relations and develop the basis for long-term coexistence.

Theory #2: If we can negotiate the basis for coexistence among influential people at the national level and key local leaders of contending ethnic groups, it will become more possible to settle individual disputes over such issues as land claims.

The evaluation team then discussed whether and how these theories of change were appropriate for the situation in Liberia, and how they were playing out in the programme. To begin, the team conducted an updated conflict analysis based on interviews and focus groups with a wide range of people in the communities themselves.

The team then examined whether the programme was having the effects envisioned in the theory of change. In the case of the Community Peace Councils, for example, the team examined the kinds of conflicts the CPCs handled, and whether those conflicts had the potential for escalating and inciting widespread violence. If they did, then the CPCs would directly contribute to stopping a key factor in violent conflict. If, however, those conflicts were unconnected to the driving factors of the conflict or the local-level conflict handling mechanisms were not able to address the types of conflict most likely to escalate, then the CPCs would make little or no contribution to Peace Writ Large.

The evaluation team found that the CPCs were, for the most part, not handling the most serious and volatile disputes, which concerned land issues. The team then explored whether this was due to a failure in programme implementation or, alternatively, to a theory of change that was incomplete or inaccurate. The main conclusion was that while the CPCs were set up and trained well, as communities were repopulated and traditional leadership patterns were re-established the CPCs were mostly excluded from handling land issues. At the same time, the hope (and theory) regarding alternative leadership models proved unfounded, as traditional leaders gained control over the CPCs or used them to address issues they preferred to have someone else deal with. The evaluation recommended that the agency work to expand the mandate and capability of the CPCs for handling land disputes, by connecting them to land commissions and other emerging government structures. It should also be said that the CPCs did represent a useful developmental advance, even if they were unable to fulfil, as completely as hoped, a contribution to Peace Writ Large.

In contrast to the CPCs, which were only partly successful, the Forum effort was making a significant contribution to addressing serious social fractures between hostile ethnic groups inhabiting the same areas. In other words, the theories of change underlying the programme were proving true. Although the evaluation occurred as the programme was just gaining full momentum, all indications were that it would continue to promote inter-ethnic reconciliation.

Example 2: The impact of international peacebuilding policies and programming in Kosovo

CDA performed an extensive study regarding the reasons for the recurrence of inter-ethnic violence in Kosovo in the spring of 2004, and the relationship of that violence to policies and programmes undertaken by the international community. Among other things, the study identified the theories of change underlying the various approaches to improving ethnic relations. As is often the case, these underlying theories were strongly influenced by the policies and (unspoken) assumptions of the international community. The multiple aid and development programmes were directly linked to implementation of internationally established Standards for Kosovo and widely held beliefs regarding refugee returns, inter-ethnic relations, and a future multi-ethnic state as the basis for peacebuilding.

The Kosovo example concerns many agencies and multiple programmes. The study identified major programming approaches and associated theories of change – some of which are listed here – and then examined the effectiveness of each of these programming approaches and their relationship (if any) to preventing violence.

A. Inter-ethnic and inter-religion dialogue

In Kosovo, the bulk of what agencies and community members identified as peacebuilding was labelled “dialogue”. “Dialogue” encompassed a wide range of activities: from social contact to structured conversations about identity and promotion of mutual understanding, to problem solving related to concrete issues and to negotiation and mediation of agreements on land use in the Municipal Working Groups on Return. The most frequent theories of change for dialogue efforts in Kosovo were:

Theory #1: By involving Kosovar Serbs and Albanians in mutual discussions, we can develop the conditions for the safe, successful and peaceful return of IDPs to their homes. This in turn will promote reintegration and stabilisation of the environment, and will reverse one of the negative consequences of the conflict.

Theory #2: If we engage community members in participatory approaches to decision making and implementation of development activities, we can strengthen community relationships.

Theory #3: If we promote co-operation across ethnic lines regarding non-political issues of common interest (HIV/AIDS, drug use, business and entrepreneurship, women’s rights, infrastructure, etc.), we can build stronger inter-ethnic ties and understanding.

B. Training and peace education

Training in conflict resolution, human rights, nonviolent communication and related topics was carried out in many communities and, with dialogue, was one of the most popular approaches to peacebuilding programming. Youth camps, peace camps, archaeological camps, art camps and many others were widespread, as were multi-ethnic programmes of technical training in computers, project management, marketing, and other technical or professional topics. To a lesser extent, school-based peace education programmes were developed, including human rights education and tolerance education for children.

Theory #1: If we provide people with better skills for conflict resolution, this will increase the ability of communities to settle disputes nonviolently and reduce the likelihood of inter-ethnic violence.

Theory #2: If people talk and play together they will build relationships and break down stereotypes.

C. Multi-ethnic projects and institutions

Along with dialogue and training, joint (inter-ethnic) projects and institutions comprised a significant proportion of peacebuilding programming in the communities included in the Kosovo study. Some of the projects were the outcome of or follow-up to dialogue, aiming to take the communication and relationship-building beyond mere talk.

Theory #1: If we develop activities that provide economic benefits to both ethnic communities (economic interdependence), people will have incentives to resist efforts to incite violence against each other.

Theory #2: If we provide opportunities for people to work together on practical issues across ethnic lines, it will help break down mistrust and negative stereotypes, as well as develop habits of co-operation.

Theory #3: If people have jobs and economic stability, they will be less hostile to the other ethnic group.

D. Democratic governance and capacity-building

Many international donors, agencies and NGOs have implemented peacebuilding activities designed to strengthen municipal government institutions to support integration of minorities, better communication and dialogue, and sustainable returns.

Theory #1: If we can improve administration and service delivery and establish non-discriminatory policies, this will reduce inter-ethnic tensions and demonstrate the viability of a multi-ethnic Kosovo.

E. Media

Two approaches dominated the media programming. The first aimed to build independent, objective media. The second aimed to build multi-ethnic media, with multi-ethnic staff and multi-ethnic programming.

Theory #1: If local media provide objective, non-inflammatory information and a venue for open debate, that will contribute to improved inter-ethnic relationships.

Theory #2: If we build multi-ethnic media (staff and programming), that will promote mutual respect and the values of multiculturalism.

Many programmes and policies integrated several approaches and theories of change. For example, a programme to facilitate returns of Kosovo Serb minorities included several activities and approaches reflecting a combination of different theories:

- Dialogue between the host community and returnees was facilitated on the assumption that dialogue would allay fears and re-establish relationships that would allow returnees to return to their homes in peace (Theory A #1).
- Multi-ethnic committees to decide community priorities for development aid (Theory A #2).
- Training in conflict resolution and technical subjects (Theory B #2).
- Provision of equipment and seeds to a multi-ethnic agricultural co-operative (Theories C #1 and #2).

Once the theories had been identified, they could be assessed in relation to the driving factors of conflict and the factors contributing to the absence of violence in some places in March 2004. The Kosovo study identified patterns of inter-ethnic violence and factors that contributed to the prevention of inter-ethnic violence, through extensive interviews in communities (including some that experienced violence in March 2004 and some that did not). The team then examined the programming approaches and their relationship (if any) to the factors that helped communities avoid violence.

The study found that the failure of peacebuilding programming to achieve desired impacts was due in part to faulty theories of change, and in part to problems in programme design and implementation.

Design problems included failures in the participant selection processes, fragmentation of programming, insufficient follow-up and limited resources for “soft” aspects of programming. In terms of implementation strategy, returnees were not central actors with respect to violence, although they were important victims of the conflict. The channelling of aid to returnees and communities with returns, it turned out, prompted resentment, increasing inter-ethnic divisions rather than improving relations between groups.

In part, the theory of change on which the programming was based was faulty. With respect to inter-ethnic dialogue between host communities and returnees, the study found that while dialogue activities opened space for inter-ethnic interaction that might otherwise not have happened, and had some powerful personal effects and led to some co-operative activities across ethnic lines, they neither strengthened community relationships nor led to collective opposition to violence.

The assumption that the changes in attitude resulting from dialogue would lead to changes in political attitudes and actions, or trickle down to influence others in the community or trickle up to influence key decision makers, proved to be wrong. In both Kosovo Albanian and Kosovo Serb communities, implicit intra-community pressures, or “rules of the game”, restricted the boundaries of permissible interaction to generally non-visible business interactions, and made maintenance and expansion of inter-ethnic linkages difficult.

Table 6.1. **Common theories of change**

Theory of change	Methods (examples only)
<i>Individual change:</i> If we transform the consciousness, attitudes, behaviours and skills of many individuals, we will create a critical mass of people who will advocate peace effectively.	Individual change through training, personal transformation or consciousness-raising workshops or processes; dialogues and encounter groups; trauma healing.
<i>Healthy relationships and connections:</i> Strong relationships are a necessary ingredient for peacebuilding. If we can break down isolation, polarisation, division, prejudice and stereotypes between/among groups, we will enable progress on key issues.	Processes of intergroup dialogue; networking; relationship-building processes; joint efforts and practical programmes on substantive problems.
<i>Withdrawal of the resources for war:</i> Wars require vast amounts of material (weapons, supplies, transport, etc.) and human capital. If we can interrupt the supply of people and goods to the war-making system, it will collapse and peace will become possible.	Campaigns aimed at cutting off funds/national budgets for war; conscientious objection and/or resistance to military service; international arms control; arms (and other) embargoes and boycotts.
<i>Reduction of violence:</i> If we reduce the levels of violence perpetrated by combatants and/or their representatives, we will increase the chances of bringing security and peace.	Cease-fires; creation of zones of peace; withdrawal/retreat from direct engagement; introduction of peacekeeping forces/interposition; observation missions; accompaniment efforts; promotion of nonviolent methods for achieving political/social/economic ends; reform of security sector institutions (military, police, justice system/courts, prisons).
<i>Social justice:</i> If we address the underlying issues of injustice, oppression/exploitation, threats to identity and security, and peoples' sense of injury/victimisation, it will reduce the drivers of conflict and open up space for peace.	Long-term campaigns for social and structural change; truth and reconciliation processes; changes in social institutions, laws, regulations, and economic systems.
<i>Good governance:</i> Peace is secured by establishing stable/reliable social institutions that guarantee democracy, equity, justice, and fair allocation of resources.	New constitutional and governance arrangements/entities; power-sharing structures; development of human rights, rule of law, anti-corruption; establishment of democratic/equitable economic structures; economic development; democratisation; elections and election monitoring; increased participation and access to decision making.

Theory of change	Methods (examples only)
<i>Political elites:</i> If we change the political calculus and perception of interests of key political (and other) leaders, they will take the necessary steps to bring peace.	Raise the costs and reduce the benefits for political elites of continuing war and increase the incentives for peace; engage active and influential constituencies in favour of peace; withdraw international support/funding for warring parties.
<i>Grassroots mobilisation:</i> “When the people lead, the leaders will follow.” If we mobilise enough opposition to war, political leaders will be forced to bring peace.	Mobilise grassroots groups to either oppose war or to advocate positive action; use of the media; nonviolent direct action campaigns; education/mobilisation effort; organising advocacy groups; dramatic/public events to raise consciousness.
<i>Peace agreements/accords:</i> Some form of political settlement is a prerequisite to peace – we must support a negotiation process among key parties to the conflict and violence.	Official negotiations among representatives of key parties; “track 1½” and “track 2” dialogues among influential persons; civil society dialogues in support of negotiations.
<i>Economic action:</i> People make personal decisions, and decision makers make policy decisions based on a system of rewards/incentives and punishment/sanctions that are essentially economic in nature. If we can change the economies associated with war-making, we can bring peace.	Use of government or financial institutions to change supply and demand dynamics; control incentive and reward systems; boycotts and embargoes.
<i>Public attitudes:</i> War and violence are partly motivated by prejudice, misperceptions, and intolerance of difference. We can promote peace by using the media (television and radio) to change public attitudes and build greater tolerance in society.	TV and radio programmes that promote tolerance; modelling tolerant behaviour; symbolic acts of solidarity/unity; dialogue among groups in conflict, with subsequent publicity.
<i>Transitional justice:</i> Societies that have experienced deep trauma and social dislocation need a process for handling grievances, identifying what happened, and holding perpetrators accountable. Addressing these issues will enable people to move on to reconstruct a peaceful and prosperous society.	Truth and reconciliation commissions; criminal prosecutions and war crimes tribunals; reparations; community reconciliation processes; traditional rites and ceremonies; institutional reforms.
<i>Community reintegration:</i> If we enable displaced people (IDPs/refugees) to return to their homes and live in relative harmony with their neighbours, we will contribute to security and economic recovery.	Negotiation and problem solving to enable returns; intergroup dialogue; ex-combatant-community engagement; processes for handling land claims; trauma healing.
<i>Culture of peace:</i> If we transform cultural and societal norms, values and behaviours to reject violence, support dialogue and negotiation, and address the fundamental causes of the conflict, we can develop the long-term conditions for peace.	Peace education; poverty eradication; reduction of social inequalities; promotion of human rights; ensuring gender equality; fostering democratic participation; advancing tolerance; enhancing the free flow of information/knowledge; reducing the production of and traffic in arms.

Annex 7

Application of General Evaluation Guidance to Specific Conflict Prevention and Peacebuilding Domains of Work

The Terms of Reference (see Annex 8) for preparing this research instruct CDA to prepare an annex offering direction or advice on evaluating specific domains of conflict prevention and peacebuilding programming. It was assumed that, in addition to the generic issues raised in the core report, each area of conflict prevention and peacebuilding work – for example dialogue, security system reform (SSR), conflict prevention and peacebuilding training – would present evaluators with specific challenges.

To prepare this annex, CDA and the DAC Networks' Steering Group agreed to conduct two special workshops, one dealing with dialogue and one with SSR, where specialists would help identify the special considerations for their fields. The resulting draft specialised application (sometimes called a “drill-down”) for dialogue is included below. The SSR evaluation material has been incorporated into a comprehensive DAC manual on SSR programming, available separately.

In addition, CDA agreed to draft a sample of the advice needed on a subject it examined closely with peace practitioners through the Reflecting on Peace Practice project (RPP) – namely conflict prevention and peacebuilding training programmes. This draft is intended to: a) test the extent to which the generic evaluation principles and issues raised in this report are sufficient to cover evaluations of specific areas; b) explore whether there are special issues that arise in each potential conflict prevention and peacebuilding field; and c) provide guidance to evaluators on how to ask the right questions and assess the right things in relation to conflict prevention and peacebuilding training. We have based this Annex, as noted, on RPP findings.

A. Evaluating training programmes: Special issues, special considerations

Characteristics to note:

- Experience shows that conflict prevention and peacebuilding training is very often a “default” programme. If things are going badly and one does not know what to do about it, one can always do some “useful” (or what one assumes to be useful) training.
- Training is often undertaken because it is an identifiable event, for which one can count the number of people trained, the length of training and the curriculum; one can even provide an assessment of the training experience through trainees' evaluations.
- Training by itself is never a conflict prevention and peacebuilding “stand-alone” strategy; it is often only a weak tactic. Unless training is linked to a specific strategic plan for addressing the key issues of the conflict or affecting key people, it will have no discernable effect on peace.

Basic Framework: *As with all conflict prevention and peacebuilding programmes, evaluators would need to:*

- Start with a valid, up-to-date analysis of the conflict.

- Examine the theory of change on which a conflict prevention and peacebuilding training programme is based.
- Determine the relevance of this theory of change, and the particular design of the training programme, to the key driving factors and actors of the conflict.

Theories of change for training:

There are two theories of change that often underlie conflict prevention and peacebuilding training programmes.

Theory #1: If we provide people with new understanding and /or skills they will become more effective in making peace. Refinements of this theory may include:

- Specification of which people.
- Specification of which understanding.
- Specification of which skills.
- Specification of how these people with this understanding/these skills will be able to use them to address in some reasonable way the key driving factors or to affect key people in the conflict.

Theory #2: Local conflict prevention and peacebuilding organisations will be more effective at peacebuilding if we build their institutional capacity through training. Refinements to this theory may include:

- Specification of which organisations.
- Specification of the important activities/functions that they need to perform more effectively.
- Specification of the institutional capacities they need for preceding refinement.
- Specification of the skills needed that can be provided through training.

Questions for evaluation of conflict prevention and peacebuilding training:

- What is the broader strategy for change into which this training or capacity-building is supposed to fit? What is the theory of change implicit in this strategy?
- How does this theory of change relate to the realities of this particular conflict at this particular time (relevance to conflict analysis)?
- Are the people being trained the “right” people? That is, are they in a position, and in the best position of all people, to use the knowledge or skills of the training to affect a key driving factor, or to strongly influence key people, in this conflict at this time?
- Are the local organisations being trained the “right” organisations? Are they in a position and in the best position of all organisations to use the capacities/skills of the training to affect key driving factors, or to strongly influence key people, in this conflict at this time?

- Is the training designed to give these people or these organisations the right skills or knowledge or capacities that they need to affect key driving factors or strongly influence key people in relation to this conflict at this time (content of training, duration of training, methodology of training)?
- Is there a planned follow-up to the training to ensure that these people can use this knowledge or these skills in the way planned? (Will they be monitored and mentored? Are there systems in place for mutual support of the trainees? Will they be in danger if they use this training? Will they have time to use it? Do they need to be paid to use it? Are there mechanisms for them to get “refresher” training? etc.).
- How long will it take for this training to have any discernable impact on Peace Writ Large in this context? Is this the best use of conflict prevention and peacebuilding resources, given other options for programming that exist?
- What evidence can the evaluator cite to back up the findings in each of the above areas?

B. Evaluating dialogue programming: Definitions, special challenges, considerations

Definition of dialogue

Evaluating dialogue is made difficult by the broad and loose use of the term and the resultant ambiguity of the boundaries of dialogue. “Dialogue” means many things to many people. It is not an end in itself, but a tool or method that can be applied in many contexts for many purposes, including for goals unrelated to conflict prevention and peacebuilding. The multitude of activities categorised as “dialogue” and the large variation in focus, outcomes and quality have generated dialogue fatigue and cynicism.

While there is no consensus on a precise definition of dialogue, there is broad agreement on elements that comprise “dialogue” in the context of conflict prevention and peacebuilding:

- It is a deliberate process. It does not include any or all conversations or social interactions among groups.
- It encourages (and provides opportunities for) disagreeing protagonists to talk with each other, in face-to-face interaction or indirectly. The protagonists include parties to a conflict or potential conflict, or factions within a party.
- It is an organised form of communication when constructive discourse is difficult or blocked.
- Its purpose is to have a positive influence on the conflict.
- There are a number of key variable dimensions of dialogue:
 - A range of goals, from simply improving communication and relationships to recommending political solutions in negotiations.
 - A range of issues addressed.
 - Varying degrees to which the process is carefully designed or evolves based on the needs and interests of the group.

- A range of participants, from grassroots community members to mid-level influentials to high-level political operatives with connections to decision makers.
- A range of third party functions and roles.

It is important to distinguish “dialogue” from “negotiation.” Negotiation is a formal process with formal obligations to honour agreements reached. A dialogue is more open-ended regarding the result and the relationship of the participants to decision makers. Successful negotiations almost always include an element of meaningful dialogue, but dialogue does not always lead to negotiation or agreement.

Special challenges regarding dialogue

The link to methodology. Dialogue is an instrument for change, not the change itself. Consequently, evaluation of dialogue cannot be limited to the process itself, or to the participants in it, but must assess what the dialogue leads to. In order to capture the impacts of dialogues, evaluations need to occur over the long term, at times long after the programme has ended.

Timing of evaluations. A “snapshot” at the end of (or at an event during) a programme may not capture the outcomes or impacts of the dialogue; it is difficult to know *when* those will occur. Some dialogues that at first appear to have been successful ultimately lead to nothing. It may take years before participants are able to leverage the relationships and insights gained in dialogue sessions to influence a peace process. A successful dialogue process (*e.g.* one that resulted in a consensus document on a solution) could have a disastrous impact on the conflict by mobilising opposition to peace.

Tracing and measuring impacts. Several aspects of dialogue processes make it difficult or unwise to attempt to measure impacts. First, an evaluation would need to try to measure what is not quantifiable, such as personal relationships that become operative in different contexts. Second, there can be negative impacts of attribution. Dialogue processes are often off-the-record and confidential. This makes it difficult for an evaluator to trace near- and long-term impacts, in part because participants themselves may not want to go on record as having participated or having gained anything from the dialogue.

Moreover, in a successful dialogue, participants will come to embrace the process and its outcomes as their own, and may not be willing or able to acknowledge the instrumental role of the dialogue. In these circumstances, a high-profile evaluation may undermine the impact of the dialogue on the conflict; public exposure may draw negative political attention to the process and its outcomes, or may undermine the impact by taking credit for ideas generated by the dialogue. Third, even under the best of circumstances, attribution can be difficult. Participants in these dialogues often also participate in other processes, making it difficult, even for participants themselves, to attribute specific changes to the dialogue process itself.

Changing indicators over time. The indicators of progress or impact should, in a successful dialogue process, change over time, depending on the context in which the dialogue is taking place and the evolution of the dialogue process itself. By the tenth meeting or interaction the process should have progressed, and the indicators of change will need to change as well.

Methods and evaluation criteria. Dialogue for conflict prevention and peacebuilding work has more in common with international diplomacy, social psychology and politics than with humanitarian and development activity. Evaluation criteria and methods used in relief and development practice may only be partially relevant.

Considerations in evaluating dialogue

Conflict analysis

As with all evaluation of conflict prevention and peacebuilding activity, an evaluator needs to start with an up-to-date analysis of the conflict. With dialogue programmes, an evaluator looks at the following:

- Is the dialogue addressing driving factors or issues of conflict? As dialogue can be used in multiple contexts to address any kind of dispute, community conflict, policy development, etc., it is important for conflict prevention and peacebuilding purposes to establish that the dialogue is addressing issues important for the broader conflict.
- How does the dialogue interact with the politics of the situation? What are the politics of the intervention? To assess this, the evaluator would need to do a political analysis (in addition to the conflict analysis), and in particular a power analysis.

Assessing the theory of change

The test for effectiveness of dialogue lies in its impact on the socio-political sphere beyond the participants in the dialogue process. As the time frame for these impacts to happen may be very long, an evaluator's "snapshots" of the process need to take into account the broader context and look for evidence of robust strategic thinking, including:

- How does the dialogue plan to affect the key driving factors of conflict? Is the dialogue relevant to the conflict?
- Is dialogue the appropriate option? Criteria for assessing whether dialogue is appropriate include:
 - Is there a demand by key people?
 - Will it assist in getting parties to the peace table (pre-negotiation), overcoming deadlock or difficulties (negotiation stage), reviving negotiations (when they collapse) or implementing or increasing ownership of agreements (implementation stage)?
 - Is there no other intervention possible, even while it is important to keep key groups in contact in anticipation of later developments that allow deeper engagement?
 - Is it necessary to make a larger political process more inclusive (due to power differentials, key groups excluded, etc.)?
 - Are there parties that need to be brought into the process but that are otherwise considered anathema (because they are corrupt, violent, abusers of human rights, considered to be "terrorists", motivated by greed, traffickers in arms, recruiters of child soldiers...)?
- Dialogue is not appropriate when:
 - It duplicates other efforts under way, or communication is already effective and productive.
 - It poses danger for participants.
 - It reinforces power differentials.

— Conflict analysis suggests that other kinds of efforts would be more useful.

- Who is part of the dialogue? Does the dialogue include or address key people to the conflict? “Key” people are not necessarily decision makers, but people or groups that are determined, through the conflict analysis, to have a significant influence on whether and how the conflict continues or not. Who is left out of the dialogue? How has the dialogue planned to deal with “spoilers” and opponents of the peace process?
- Have possible threats to the dialogue and to the impacts of the dialogue been considered?

Assessing programme quality

One of the reasons for cynicism about dialogue has been its variable quality and the lack of evidence of follow-on action from them. While there is as yet no formal consensus in the field of standards of practice, there are some implicit standards that cut across the range of dialogue practices. An evaluator might look at these in assessing quality:

- Is communication open?
- Is there respect for differing points of view?

Applying the DAC Evaluation Criteria

In applying the DAC Evaluation Criteria and the criterion on Linkages, special questions and considerations relevant to dialogue should be taken into account.

Relevance/appropriateness. Is this dialogue with these participants to address these issues using this process relevant, or the right ones, in these circumstances?

Effectiveness. Has the dialogue achieved its stated goals? Are the goals relevant to the driving factors of conflict? How?

Efficiency. Are outputs and outcomes delivered in an efficient manner? What were alternative methods to achieving the goals of the dialogue? How does this dialogue compare in cost and time to other avenues for achieving the same goal? Is the effort achieving progress in reasonable time?

Impact. What are the results or effects of the dialogue – going beyond the immediate programme activities, sphere and participants – that constitute broader change in the conflict?

Dialogue can be evaluated at three levels, each of which needs its own indicators:

- Evaluation of the effects on individual participants (changes in attitudes, perceptions and behaviours). These individual/personal effects are not sufficient to constitute “impact” on the broader conflict.
- Evaluation of the overall project, of which the dialogue is a part, looking at follow-on actions, transfer effects, etc.
- Evaluation of the project impacts on the conflict.

Measuring these impacts at any level is difficult, and potentially costly and time-consuming. In light also of the non-quantifiable quality of many of the impacts and the difficulty of attribution, the focus should be on generating *independently verifiable evidence* of outcomes and impacts, rather than measurement of them. In this context, evaluations should draw more on methods and tools from political science, policy analysis and social psychology in developing methodology.

Sustainability. Will hard-won improvements in intergroup relations hold in the face of challenges? Are effective mechanisms in place to implement products of the dialogue? Have those who benefit from ongoing conflict or resist peace (“spoilers”) been addressed adequately?

Linkages. Are individual and grassroots programmes linked to higher levels (“key people”)? Are dialogues focused on “key people” linked to efforts to engage larger constituencies? Are dialogues focused on promoting changes in people’s behaviour, skills and attitudes linked with change efforts at the socio-political level? Are dialogues linked to parallel efforts in other domains (*e.g.* in different sectors)? Are different efforts contradictory or undermining each other?

Developing indicators

Specific indicators are difficult to establish in the absence of specification of the goals or objectives of the dialogue and the specific context in which the dialogue is taking place. However, it is possible to identify common types of impacts of dialogue at each level. Programme designers and evaluators would then need to identify which are most relevant and appropriate in the particular context, and develop context-specific indicators to verify the results. At each level, the evaluator should still ask whether the changes and the indicators associated with them are *relevant* to the conflict’s driving factors, and how.

Participant level (changes in participants in the dialogue)

- Changed perceptions about the conflict (more accurate, more balanced, more empathetic, inclusive, fewer stereotypes).
- More positive attitudes towards the opposing side.
- Insights into the conflict, new ideas, new analyses.
- More co-operative orientation towards and skills for dealing with the conflict, less blaming.
- Positive relationships with the opposing side, including trust.
- Better communication and understanding.
- Increased consciousness and skills regarding the effects of language on others.
- Greater hope, confidence and energy for the work towards peace.
- Greater clarity about one’s own interests and priorities.

Project /programme level (what is done by participants as a result of the dialogue)

- Individual participants become effective conflict resolvers in official roles.
- Participants reduce vitriol or public rhetoric, use of inflammatory language.

- Dialogue participants take specific actions in their professional or political capacities that show increased responsiveness to the concerns of the opposing side.
- Public recognition of the legitimate interests of the opposing side.
- The dialogue process or the relationships built survive destabilising or hostile acts.
- There is continuity of connection and contact.
- The group produces something concrete/specific on issues related to the conflict.

Social-political level

- Adoption of ideas into official structures or political negotiations (transfer effect).
- Changed vision of the problem and/or solutions; more common vision among elites or in public across conflict lines, possibly reflected in changed language for speaking about conflict.
- Breaking of taboos – putting the previously unthinkable on the table.
- Changes in public opinion, as indicated by reduced levels of fear of the opposing side, reduced tension, reduced use of inflammatory language and content in the media.
- Rising demands by peace constituencies: mobilisation of large numbers of people voicing demands for peace or support for negotiations that political leaders cannot ignore (large-scale demonstrations, lobbying campaigns, large peace meetings/conferences, establishment of peace structures and mechanisms).

Organisation of the evaluation

The evaluation of a dialogue effort will itself be an intervention with its own impacts. Special considerations for dialogue about the organisation of the evaluation include:

- *Timing of the evaluation.* Is this the right time? Would an evaluation at this moment be disruptive to the dialogue? What effect would an evaluation have on morale? Would an evaluation provoke political reaction that could undermine the dialogue, by calling attention to the dialogue, or by inadvertently feeding political forces in opposition to a peace process? Would an evaluation put participants in dialogue at personal or political risk?
- *Composition of the evaluation team.* In order to minimise potential harm from the evaluation and ensure an accurate assessment of the dialogue, evaluators should be acceptable by both (or all) sides, who ideally should be consulted on the identity of the team. In addition, the evaluators need to understand the conflict well, as seen and experienced by internal actors who are able to interpret the political and social meanings of behaviours and outcomes.

Annex 8

Consultant Terms of Reference Developing Guidance for Evaluating Conflict Prevention and Peacebuilding Activities: an Approach Paper

Introduction

The DAC Network on Conflict, Peace and Development Co-operation (CPDC) and the DAC Network on Development Evaluation are collaborating on the development of guidance for evaluating conflict prevention and peacebuilding activities, an area where only minimal guidance already exists. The two networks have agreed to commission a consultant to develop an approach paper that provides in-depth exploration of the options for practical guidance for conflict prevention and peacebuilding at programming and policy levels.

The approach paper will require tasks such as a literature review of key DAC and donor agency policies and guidance on evaluation and on conflict prevention and peacebuilding, and in-depth interviews with a select number of key informants. The approach paper will explore and define possible ways forward, highlight the main methodological issues and recommend next steps for developing guidance on evaluating conflict prevention and peacebuilding activities.

This will build on work previously carried out by the DAC Evaluation Network, by the CPDC and by the Utstein Group.²⁴ The consultant(s) should review and utilise relevant DAC, donor and other publications, including the DAC guidance documents on conflict prevention and security system reform as well as the recently developed issues briefs on conflict prevention and peacebuilding (www.oecd.org/dac/conflict) and the guidance documents available on the DAC Network on Development Evaluation website (www.oecd.org/dac/evaluationnetwork), along with a draft report that seeks to review substantive and methodological lessons from past evaluations of conflict prevention and peacebuilding activities.

Questions and challenges: Towards developing guidance for evaluating conflict prevention and peacebuilding activities

In developing the approach paper, the style and approach of the Network on Development Evaluation publication “Guidance for Evaluating Humanitarian Assistance in Complex Emergencies” (www.oecd.org/dataoecd/9/50/2667294.pdf) should be considered as a possible loose framework/model for developing conflict prevention and peacebuilding guidance in this field. The consultant(s) will, therefore, first undertake a detailed analytic review of the humanitarian guidance, as well as other guidance developed by DAC member agencies, and determine if any areas of this text or others could be transferable to future conflict prevention and peacebuilding guidance. New areas and issues will also need to be added. The humanitarian Guidance should be used only as a basic model on which to build, rather than as a fixed formula or constraining framework.

24. The Utstein study was a review of the peacebuilding experience of Germany, Netherlands, Norway and the United Kingdom.

The following sections provide a working outline of possible questions to be addressed in the approach paper. In addition to the outline and issues raised below, it will be important to look at related cross-cutting questions such as: i) the need for assessing gender sensitivity of conflict prevention and peacebuilding programmes; ii) the need to assess whether a rights perspective has been mainstreamed/included in the programmes; iii) a reference to violence in evaluations, and how the programme evaluated contributed to reduce violence/violent conflict; and iv) some consideration of whether/how HIV and AIDS prevention is covered in conflict prevention and peacebuilding evaluations, as this is becoming an increasing problem in conflict-affected countries and regions – especially in Africa. This outline should be seen as a working guide and not as a straitjacket. The consultant(s) is (are) encouraged to adopt the scope and flexibility necessary for creative thinking in developing thematic areas and ideas in the approach paper and for proposing content for future guidance.

1) An overview of conflict prevention and peacebuilding activities and current evaluation practices: The value added of DAC guidance

An introduction could provide a broad but concise overview of the conflict prevention and peacebuilding environment, using available policy documents. The introduction should cover the question of why guidance is needed in this area and outline the key audiences for guidance and their evaluation needs.

Questions to be addressed may include: What, in brief, is the operational meaning of conflict prevention and peacebuilding activities? What are the characteristics of modern-day conflict environments? What kind of conflict prevention and peacebuilding activities are most commonly undertaken and by which agencies? What do we mean by evaluation of these activities? What is the need for and purpose of undertaking evaluations of conflict prevention and peacebuilding activities? What is the present situation with regard to the frequency, rigour and robustness of conflict prevention and peacebuilding evaluations? What is the purpose and value added of the new guidance? What would be a suitable methodology and approach for developing guidance?

2) Analysing and developing guidance for conflict prevention and peacebuilding activities: Differences from traditional evaluations

The approach paper should look at how guidance might outline the main generic differences involved in evaluating, on the one hand, conflict prevention and peacebuilding activities and, on the other, both “conventional” development programmes and humanitarian aid interventions. Differences to be explored in this scene-setting overview could include, but should not be limited to, the following:

- The particular difficulties involved in defining conflict prevention and peacebuilding – for example, it can be difficult to determine when conflict ends or peace begins. The consultant(s) is (are) required not to devise methodologies to answer such questions but rather to acknowledge that in any given context debates may exist about whether the environment is one of “peace” or “conflict”. It will be helpful to look at how agencies shape their programmes differently according to the context in a conflict-affected or prone country.
- The particular importance of the political nature of conflict prevention and peacebuilding and of its ideological context or country-specific situations as they relate to the donor community, government agencies, NGOs, national and regional actors, etc.
- The goals and challenges of not working “around” but “in” and “on” conflict situations should be considered. The latter is the main approach of conflict prevention and peacebuilding activities; the study should therefore address approaches taken by different donors in terms of being proactive and working “on” conflict.

- The “high stakes” nature of conflict prevention and peacebuilding activities, *e.g.* misconstrued projects/programmes, can lead to an increased risk of conflict. The consequent value of a “Do No Harm” approach and conflict sensitivity by working “in” and not “around” conflict situations.
- The importance of policy coherence – whole-of-government approaches to issues involving diplomacy, defence, trade policy, etc. at the donor and partner-country levels – due to the interconnected nature of causal factors.
- The cross-border, regional, sub-regional and international context of many conflicts.
- The question of applying the principles of the Paris Declaration in a fragile state or in a context where key stakeholders may be protagonists in the conflict. How do principles of ownership and alignment apply in this context, and what are the challenges?
- The problem of vested interests (military, political, other) that may lose out from the success of a project/programme, and the possible need for rigorous stakeholder analysis.
- The particular importance of looking at the effect of an individual project/programme on the wider Peace Writ Large within any given context, *e.g.* the difficulties of demonstrating the links between micro projects and macro Peace Writ Large.
- The particular importance of UN and NGO actors in conflict environments.
- The data deficit and particular difficulties in establishing good baseline information. With the possible absence of “hard data” in conflict situations, what other methods can be used to qualify/quantify sources other than data?
- Lessons learned should also be reflected in the analysis; DAC Guidance and issues briefs could be helpful in that endeavour (see www.oecd.org/dac/conflict).
- Participatory approaches to evaluation of conflict prevention and peacebuilding activities and the perceptions of stakeholders, in particular the poor, are also critical in these contexts.

3) Options for guidance on programme design and management

Based on the above overview of the context, the approach paper should consider recommending steps for conflict prevention and peacebuilding practitioners to build into project/programme design and management to facilitate their evaluation. Issues to be covered would include, but should not be limited to, the importance of:

- Articulating and clarifying objectives at the planning stage.
- Working according to the principles of results-based management.
- Developing robust baselines and monitoring systems.
- Carefully considering the different needs of the intended end-users/audiences.

4) *Recommendations for practical guidance on evaluation*

This section of the approach paper should consider some of the core questions related to providing guidance for undertaking evaluations of conflict prevention and peacebuilding activities. It should underline the key point that evaluations in this field must be designed in a conflict-sensitive manner, with a special emphasis on the obstacles and possible incentives to achieving this. In addition to areas covered in the humanitarian guidance, issues could include:

- What kinds of evaluation and research methods are generally more suitable in conflict environments – e.g. qualitative versus quantitative or mixed-method approaches? How can the design of an evaluation methodology be informed by the political economy and/or by conflict analysis tools? What are the advantages or disadvantages of using theory-based evaluation in conflict prevention and peacebuilding activities?
- What is the particular value of policy evaluations in conflict environments? What are the difficulties of demonstrating the links between micro projects and macro Peace Writ Large? How could we look at evaluating all conflict prevention and peacebuilding activities within one conflict or national context?
- What is the role of conflict analysis when evaluating the relevance of conflict prevention and peacebuilding activities? How is it possible to make use of other conflict analysis tools and Post-conflict Impact Assessments (PCIAs)?
- The importance of triangulation in a context where stakeholders may have firm ideological standpoints and/or their perceptions may be affected by trauma or perceived danger.
- The importance of protecting the security and safety of the evaluation team, while addressing the need for evaluations to take account of work done in potentially more insecure rural areas.
- The ethical responsibility to protect the security and anonymity of evaluation informants.
- How can evaluators make the links between the micro and macro levels, and to what extent can any existing national policy framework such as Poverty Reduction Strategies (PRS) be used to frame the approach?
- Are joint evaluations more suitable in a context where multiple programmes are affecting the same Peace Writ Large?
- How can steps be taken towards addressing the “strategic deficit” in conflict prevention and peacebuilding evaluations, as identified by the Utstein report? How can evaluations assess the relevance of donor projects/programmes to country-specific and broader policies?
- How should the timing of evaluation be planned in a conflict prevention or peacebuilding environment?
- How can a lack of baseline information be addressed by the evaluators?
- How applicable are the five standard DAC Criteria to a conflict environment? Do they need modifying or adapting to the conflict context, and are any additional criteria needed?

5) Annex: Categorising conflict prevention and peacebuilding activities for evaluation guidance

The approach paper for developing guidance on undertaking evaluations in conflict-prone and/or conflict-affected settings should be supplemented by a short discussion piece (5-10 pages) that categorises the field of conflict prevention and peacebuilding for evaluation purposes and serves as an annex to the main approach paper.

Conflict prevention and peacebuilding work encompasses a number of distinct policy areas (for example, from security and development to governance, state building, peacekeeping operations and support for truth and reconciliation), together with a wide variety of activities. Given such a broad domain, it is anticipated that – while guidance could provide generic advice across the conflict contexts – more specific advice/direction will also be required within each conflict prevention and peacebuilding category. The purpose of this annex is to discuss a breakdown of the conflict prevention and peacebuilding domain and to differentiate each category from the point of view of how evaluations could be undertaken. The annex should also provide preliminary proposals on specific key issues/questions that would be pertinent for an evaluation team for each category within the domain of activities.

There have been a number of categorisations of conflict prevention and peacebuilding, including the “palette” concept contained in the Utstein study. However, none has attempted to categorise conflict prevention and peacebuilding for evaluation purposes. Issues that may be pertinent to defining the categories relate to the type of actors involved, the level of local ownership, political/conflict environmental factors and the scope of the activities being undertaken (whether focused on regional, national or local actors/institutions). Developing a clear picture of conflict prevention and peacebuilding activities as practiced by most agencies will be informed by the literature review and the interview process.

Overview of activities

1. Develop an *inception report* that would provide: a presentation and justification of the methodology chosen to approach the task; the feasibility of the Terms of Reference – the questions, scope, time, budget and foreseen methodology; and deviations from TORs, with justifications for these.
2. To underpin the work, undertake a *focused literature review* of key DAC and donor agency policies/guidance on evaluation on conflict prevention and peacebuilding, with particular attention to the useful information to be drawn from the DAC Guidance on Humanitarian Assistance.
3. Conduct *in-depth interviews* with a select number of key informants (15-20) by telephone, including members of the Networks on Evaluation and Conflict, Peace and Development Co-operation. The list of interviewees will be agreed with the DAC Secretariat.
4. *Review and map the breadth of activities* conducted in the field of conflict prevention and peacebuilding to be included in the annex, with a view to categorising the various areas for the purpose of future evaluation.
5. Conduct *analytical work and conceptual thinking* to develop and write an approach paper covering preliminary recommendations for guidance for evaluation of conflict prevention and peacebuilding activities and policies.
6. *Present and discuss the findings of the draft approach paper* at a workshop in Oslo planned for the 3rd quarter of 2006. The consultant(s) should also prepare break-out group discussion topics based on questions raised in the approach paper and provide inputs to the agenda.

7. *Finalise and submit a final approach paper* that is of publishable quality following discussion and feedback at the workshop.

Budget, inputs and competencies

The consultant(s) should develop a detailed budget proposal and suggest the number of necessary person days in order to complete the tasks, also indicating any other individuals who may support this work (with relevant CVs) if working in a team. At least eight to ten weeks of full-time work is envisaged, followed by intermittent work through end-2006. The detailed budget proposal – and information on the full team, if relevant – should be included in an annex to the inception report.

The consultant(s) will need solid experience of donor practices in development co-operation and a background in: 1) conflict prevention/peacebuilding/security programming; 2) conflict assessment/conflict analysis; 3) evaluation methodology and implementation; and 4) communications and writing skills.

Timing and outputs

The consultancy is expected to begin in May 2006.

The consultant(s) will first be asked to provide an *inception report* (8-10 pages) for the approach paper within three to four weeks of the signature of the contract. The inception report will then be reviewed and considered for approval by the Steering Group. Once agreement has been reached on the inception report, the consultant(s) will be asked to begin work on the approach paper.

A *first draft of the approach paper* (approximately 30 pages + 5-10 page annex) should be provided for preliminary review and feedback by the DAC Secretariat within six to eight weeks of approval of the inception report. As noted, under “Activities” the consultant(s) will be asked to undertake a literature review to explore the options for guidance in this area, as well as interviews with a select number of key informants and the other activities described above for the development of the approach paper.

The *full-draft approach paper* (approximately 30 pages + 5-10-page annex) is due for submission within two to four weeks after approval of the draft approach paper. The draft approach paper, which should provide information on the scope, audiences and preliminary findings for guidance in this field, will be presented and reviewed at a workshop envisaged for the 3rd quarter of 2006. Therefore, a draft list of topics for break-out group discussions at the workshop, based on questions raised in the approach paper, should also be provided with the full-draft approach paper. This work may involve wider input to the workshop agenda.

A *final revised version of the approach paper* – that is, reworked in view of the outcomes of the workshop and of publishable quality – should be submitted within two to three weeks following completion of the workshop.

Part 2

Enhancing the Delivery of Justice and Security

Abstract: This section provides an in-depth analysis of the challenges faced in security and justice service delivery. It explains why security and justice are crucial to development efforts, outlines the objectives of justice and security delivery in fragile states, and provides guidance on how to overcome the challenges of providing security and justice delivery in fragile environments.

Acknowledgements: This paper is the result of a collaborative effort by members of the DAC Network on Conflict, Peace and Development Co-operation (CPDC) and the Policy Co-ordination Division of the Development Co-operation Directorate. It is based on a commissioned study written by Eric Scheye and Andrew McLean. Any comments or queries should be addressed to dac.contact@oecd.org.

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FOREWORD

Recent debate surrounding the “security and development nexus” has highlighted the indispensable role that security and justice play in creating a conducive environment for sustainable economic, social and political development. The positive role of security system reform in stabilising conflict-prone or conflict-affected countries has been established in the 2004 guidance on *Security System Reform and Governance*. Subsequent work by the DAC has focused on how to enhance short-term security and justice service delivery, while supporting the long-term goal of developing a viable and sustainable security and justice system.

Many donors approach security and justice delivery in fragile states through the lens of democratic governance and state building. This is an important and necessary perspective and the state is, unquestionably, a principal actor and has an irreducible role in the delivery of justice and security services. This approach, however, needs to be balanced with the reality in fragile states; the state may not be deemed legitimate by significant proportions of the populace, and historically may have never exercised full sovereign authority over its territory. Furthermore, recent studies have indicated that a significant majority of people in fragile states access security and justice services through non-state means. Working with non-state providers can expose donor countries and development agencies to a degree of risk to which they are unaccustomed. It may require a paradigm shift, challenging donors and fragile state governments to work in unfamiliar ways and with unfamiliar partners. Overcoming this challenge of enhancing service delivery in the short term, while developing the state’s capacity to provide and regulate services in the long term, is crucial and the issue at the heart of this study.

This study was undertaken under the auspices of the SSR Task Team of the DAC Network on Conflict, Peace and Development Co-operation (CPDC) and was the product of a consultative process that brought together policy makers and field practitioners from both donor countries and states affected by conflict. The findings of this work were informed by a workshop hosted by the United Kingdom’s Department for International Development (DFID) in March 2006. This workshop investigated security and justice service delivery in a number of fragile and conflict-affected states including: the Democratic Republic of Congo, Nepal, Sierra Leone and the Solomon Islands. This study represents one of the pillars of the workstream on “Service Delivery in Fragile States” being undertaken by the DAC Fragile States Group. The other areas covered by that work include education, health and water. The multi-layered approach, a central policy recommendation from this work, was also included in the *OECD DAC Handbook on Security System Reform: Supporting Security and Justice*, a practical guide for practitioners working to support security and justice system reforms.

This study provides in-depth analysis of the challenges faced in security and justice service delivery, together with groundbreaking recommendations for development agencies working in fragile and conflict-affected countries. Its central recommendation is that development agencies take a multi-layered approach to their support of security and justice reform programmes. The primary objective of this innovative approach is to help development agencies overcome the challenge of targeting donor assistance to state and non-state actors simultaneously and to ensure short-term service delivery with long-term institutional reforms.

Richard Carey
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Acronyms

ANC	Afghanistan National Army
CPDC	DAC Network on Conflict, Peace and Development Co-operation
CPLC	Citizen Police Liaison Committee
DFID	Department for International Development, UK
GDP	Gross domestic product
RAMSI	Regional Assistance Mission to Solomon Islands
SFD	Social Fund for Development
SSR	Security system reform

Executive Summary

Justice and security are key concerns of poor people in fragile states. Strengthening the delivery of justice and security is an important development challenge, for without justice and security other public goods and services cannot be provided or accessed. As the OECD states, “A measure of physical security is necessary to make relief, much less development, possible. Without reform of [security] policies and institutions that address incentives and expectations, [other development] capacity building [endeavours] will be largely futile.”¹

Justice and security are different from other public goods and services. In fragile states, the actors providing security and justice – state and non-state – are often actually sources of insecurity and injustice. Health care and education providers may not always offer a good service, but they rarely do direct harm. However, the means by which justice and security are delivered or withheld by providers is often a matter of life and death. The dual OECD emphasis on “providing effective services to all members of society while addressing the weak governance and limited accountability that lead to fragility” is, therefore, especially important in the delivery of justice and security.² It is also imperative to focus on the fragmentation of social cohesion and target assistance to help rebuild its fabric in order to deliver sustainable justice and security services.

Supporting the state to deliver security and justice may be the “first best” solution.³ However, an approach to security and justice delivery that focuses solely on strengthening governance and state capacities is unlikely to be an effective strategy in fragile states – countries where the state has exceedingly limited capacity, may not be deemed legitimate by significant proportions of the populace and historically may have never exercised full sovereign authority over its territory.⁴ Furthermore, the nature of the post-colonial state may not correspond to Western assumptions of how a state is structured and functions, and the degree to which it interacts with civil society. In many fragile environments, as the state itself may be partially incomplete and unformed, the development of effective, co-ordinated, state-provided justice and security may be a remote prospect, a prognosis that severe capacity and sustainability limitations only reinforce.

Nevertheless, the state has an irreducible role in the delivery and accountability of justice and security. At the very least, this role includes setting minimum standards, formulating policy and legal frameworks, developing varying types of accountability mechanisms, upholding the principles of human rights, and establishing networks and partnerships among service providers. The precise role the state does, can and should adopt, however, will vary from context to context. Furthermore, local context should determine what development activities occur when, how and in what order, as the provision of justice and security is based upon historical legacies, cultural value systems, political calculations and intricate balances of power. What is central in fragile states, however, is vigilance to the twinned issues of:

1. OECD (2005a), p. 4.

2. OECD Fragile States Workstream Terms of Reference.

3. OECD Fragile States Workstream Terms of Reference p. 15.

4. Andersen (2006).

- “who” actually provides justice and security, where, when and how; and
- “for whom” justice and security are being provided.

The reality in fragile states is that justice and security are delivered by a large number of actors, some of whom are state agencies and services, but the vast majority are likely to be non-state organisations and systems.⁵ Research in many fragile states suggests that non-state systems are the main providers of justice and security for up to 80-90% of the population.⁶ Non-state systems may often be more effective, accessible, fairer, quicker, cheaper and in tune with people’s values. It is also important to recognise that some non-state providers may be purveyors of insecurity and injustice. There may be other challenges associated with them in terms of corruption, manipulation by local elites and discrimination against disadvantaged groups. However, it is mistaken to presume that the challenges faced by non-state justice and security systems are any more severe than comparable ones in the state system without a thorough study of local contexts. More likely than not, the challenges of one are mirrored in the other. It is also erroneous to believe that development of the non-state system is more onerous and difficult than that of state justice and security service providers, without examining local political circumstances and capacities.

Admittedly, working with non-state providers may expose donor countries and development agencies to a degree of risk to which they are unaccustomed. It may also be true that working in the non-state sector may be highly charged politically for the donor and the fragile state. Additionally, fragile state governments may resist donor engagement with non-state actors. Assistance to non-state providers may require a paradigm shift, challenging donors and fragile state governments to work in unfamiliar ways and with unfamiliar partners. Nevertheless, this conceptual shift is vital to help meet local needs for justice and security. In the short- and medium-term, assistance to non-state providers should be a core element of donor strategies to support the delivery of justice and security in fragile states, as there may be few other viable options.

What fragile state justice and security delivery requires, therefore, is a multi-layered approach. It is a methodology that is highly context specific, targeting donor assistance to those providers – state and non-state actors simultaneously – at the multiple points at which actual day-to-day service delivery occurs. A multi-layered strategy recognises that unorthodox solutions and partnerships may be necessary to respond to the severe challenges of fragile states. The primary objective is to develop and strengthen the relationship between service providers (state and non-state) and the users of those services in the marketplaces where they work, in the neighbourhoods where they live and on the roads they travel. The intention is to reinforce the already existing range of choice that users have in fragile states, while developing providers’ service delivery to make it more effective, fair, accessible, accountable and rights respecting. At the same time, a multi-layered approach seeks to strengthen governance, organisational structures and systems at the local, provincial and national levels. The objective is to develop the capacities of the state at its various levels to engage in productive partnerships with non-state providers **and** to formulate the necessary policies, frameworks and minimum standards by which the contours of an enabling environment for service delivery can be established.

5. “Non-state system” refers to all systems of justice and security operating alongside formal state institutions “that exercise some form of ... authority in providing safety, security and access to justice,” see DFID (2004), p. 1. Non-state systems, therefore, would include traditional courts, mediation processes, civic and trade organisations, neighbourhood groups, ethnic/clan police etc. See also Schärff (2003), pp. 1-3.

6. Chirayath et al. (2005).

Supporting the multi-layered approach to justice and security delivery

The multi-layered approach to justice and security **proportions** international assistance between and among:

- the state, at its various levels, as a minority provider of justice and security service delivery;
- the state, in its role of regulator, to establish the parameters for justice and security service delivery and ensure accountability of providers;
- non-state justice and security service providers, given their position as the primary purveyors of day-to-day service delivery; and
- the users and recipients of justice and security services to increase their voice and hold providers accountable.

The most fundamental lesson in justice and service delivery in fragile states is that context trumps everything. However, the DAC typology of fragile states with particular needs (deteriorating environments, collapsed states and countries recovering from conflict or crisis) is helpful in drawing out broad recommendations of the types of issues to address and the nature of support that can be effective. Some of these recommendations apply to all categories of fragile states. Complementing the OECD's principles for engagement in fragile states, this paper recommends that donors can support service delivery in these environments by:

Deteriorating fragile states

Staying engaged and focusing on long-term development building blocks. Focusing on the non-coercive elements of the security system such as state-delivered justice. Developing building blocks for long-term judicial reform, such as new legislation on codes of criminal and civil procedure, family and juvenile law; developing a judicial training institute; publishing laws and digests of court decisions; modernising court administration; and fostering integrative financial budgeting.

Supporting non-state justice and security systems. In worsening conflict and human rights situations, non-state security and justice providers provide a "safety net" at the community level and can ensure that basic local needs are addressed, when state actors are unable to do so.

Supporting broad-based human rights activities through assistance to community organisations, non-governmental organisations, bar associations and independent lawyers' groups that protect human rights, monitor allegations of abuses and defend victims.

Assisting women's groups because in conflict, they exhibit particular resilience, become increasingly active and can be one of the primary vehicles for the multiple provision of justice.

Collapsed fragile states

Undertaking comprehensive assessments of who is actually delivering justice and security on the ground and to whom. This should assess state and, especially, non-state providers and the impact of international interventions on those service providers.

Being realistic and modest about what is feasible and sustainable, remembering that international intervention does not begin with a blank slate and that the vast majority of existing service providers will be non-state actors.

Addressing priority security issues while developing a longer-term strategic plan. Recognising that collapsed states are unlikely to possess the capacity to participate fully in the design of these plans, international actors may be compelled to take the lead. Nevertheless, local stakeholders should be involved in the process to help develop ownership and increase capacity.

Starting small and scaling up, by targeting salient issues or specific regions, as determined by the political and security situation, with the intention of creating “islands of dependability” that can provide bundled services to a limited area.

Recovering fragile states

Focusing on the financial sustainability of service delivery programmes with detailed estimates of the costs the recovering state will have to assume, correlated to its projected state revenues over a period of five years.

Concentrating on managerial sustainability, recognizing that “train and equip” projects with their emphasis on outputs have repeatedly been proved to be ineffective and cost inefficient, unless embedded in enduring management development programmes.

Integrating security and justice issues into national development frameworks to ensure they are established as a priority in national government and donor planning and budgeting.

Supporting non-state justice and security providers that have endured throughout violent conflict and are already often delivering more than 80% of all services, and endeavouring to link them into networks and partnerships with one another, as well as with state providers of justice and security.

I. Why Justice and Security Matter

Justice and security are key concerns of poor people in fragile states.⁷ Many local communities in the World Bank's *Voices of the Poor* research identified insecurity as their major barrier to development.⁸ This view was amplified by the development ministers of the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development in 2005 who said,

Security matters to the poor and other vulnerable groups, especially women and children, because bad policing, weak justice and penal systems, and corrupt militaries mean that they suffer disproportionately from crime, insecurity and fear. They are consequently less likely to be able to access government services, invest in improving their own futures and escape from poverty.⁹

Justice and security have not traditionally been viewed as development services. For example, the *World Development Report 2004* focuses on education, health, water, sanitation and electricity as “those services that have the most direct link with human development.”¹⁰ However, without security and justice the poor will be unable to receive these vital services. As the OECD states, “a measure of physical security is necessary to make relief, much less development, possible. Without reform of [security] policies and institutions that address incentives and expectations, [other development] capacity building [endeavours] will be largely futile.”¹¹ Enhancing the delivery of security and justice, therefore, is a key challenge for development. This may be particularly true in fragile states where insecurity and disorder are often most acute.

The costs associated with disorder, insecurity and injustice pose an enormous drain on development in fragile states. The World Bank estimates that the direct cost of crime in Jamaica is at least 3.7% of the country's gross domestic product (GDP).¹² If indirect expenditures were to be accounted for, the costs would rise exponentially. Estimates suggest that in El Salvador and Colombia, in the late 1990s, the costs of insecurity may have reached as high as 25% of GDP, once the full range of indirect costs associated with insecurity was included.¹³

Divided into four parts, this paper examines how donors can best support the delivery of justice and security in fragile states. Part II looks at the objectives of justice and security services and identifies the

7. The OECD characterises fragile states as countries lacking political commitment and/or weak capacity to develop and implement pro-poor policies as well as suffering from violent conflict and/or weak governance. This comprises mainly those countries ranked in the fourth and fifth quintile of the World Bank's Country Policy and Institutional Assessment.

8. Narayan, et al. (2000).

9. OECD (2005b), p. 11.

10. World Bank (2003b), p. 1.

11. OECD (2005a), p. 4.

12. World Bank (2003a).

13. Buvinic et al. (1999).

particular challenges of delivering them in fragile states. Part III discusses the political economy of the justice and security sector, examining who actually delivers services in fragile states, and how they may be effectively, efficiently and accountably provided. Part IV presents practical experiences of delivering justice and security in different fragile state contexts and draws out lessons for policy makers and practitioners.

This paper defines the scope of services within “justice and security” as addressing:

- safety, security and protection of persons and property from violence, crime and disorder;
- equal access of justice and security for all;
- fair and equitable resolution of disputes according to publicly known principles of due process; and
- human rights-respecting treatment of alleged offenders from detention through arrest, prosecution and imprisonment or the imposition of other sanctions.

This paper seeks to address the full range of actors that play a role in policing, justice, prosecutions and corrections in fragile states. In addition to official state justice and security institutions (e.g. the police, courts, prosecutors), this involves looking at the military and intelligence services where they are involved in the provision of internal security. It also necessitates examining the roles, functions and activities of the myriad private, community and international actors that deliver justice and security in fragile states.

The rights to justice and security are enshrined in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights. Justice and security are “public goods” because every state has the obligation to uphold and preserve them. They are public goods for four other reasons as well. First, no single individual can exercise or protect his/her rights in isolation, without the concurrence and co-operation of others. Second, the consumption of the good by one individual does not necessarily reduce the amount of the good available for consumption by others.¹⁴ Third, “it is difficult to exclude individuals that the group might wish to disqualify (tax evaders).”¹⁵ Finally, as universal human rights, justice and security must be equitably and fairly distributed, with equal access for all, which implies a further responsibility on the state.¹⁶ The importance that the Weberian model of the state attaches to the state monopoly of violence and coercion only reinforces this perspective.

The reality of justice and security service delivery in fragile states, however, is quite different for two reasons:

- the nature of the fragile state; and
- the existence of non-state providers.

The fragile state does not necessarily resemble Western notions of what constitutes a state in terms of its control over its sovereign territory, legitimacy, structure, cultural value systems and capacity to exercise its will. At best, the fragile state is weakly institutionalised with its writ rarely extending beyond the main urban centres, if that far. Second, in fragile states the public goods of justice and security are delivered by a number of actors, some of which are state agencies, while the vast majority are often non-

14. Samuelson (1954).

15. Meagher (2005), p. 21.

16. World Bank (2003b), pp. 32-35.

state organisations. Similarly, the public responsibility to ensure the equitable and effective delivery of justice and security does not imply that their provision must necessarily be performed by public state services or that state provision is necessarily more accessible, legitimate, fair, effective or cost efficient. The issue of public goods, and who delivers the service and is held accountable for that delivery, are distinct and separate categories of equal importance.

II. Objectives of Justice and Security Service Delivery in Fragile States

The OECD characterises fragile states as “states which lack either the capacity and/or the willingness to deliver on their core functions.”¹⁷ Given its poverty reduction focus, DFID specifies the most important state functions as being “territorial control, safety and security, capacity to manage public resources, delivery of basic services and the ability to protect and support the ways in which the poorest people sustain themselves.”¹⁸

With its slightly different perspective on fragility, concentrating on issues of governance and democratisation, USAID emphasises the relationship between effectiveness and legitimacy, with the former referring:

To the capability of the government to work with society to assure the provision of order and public goods and services. Legitimacy refers to the perception by important segments of society that the government is exercising state powers in ways that are reasonably fair and in the interests of the nation as a whole. Where both effectiveness and legitimacy are weak, conflict or state failure is likely to result.¹⁹

Whichever lens is used, service delivery lies at the heart of state fragility, with the provision of the public goods of safety, security, law and order being not only the most elemental exercise of state power, but the foundation upon which all other human rights are grounded.

The OECD recognises this and defines best practice in service delivery as “providing effective services to all members of society while addressing the weak governance and limited accountability that lead to fragility”.²⁰ This is as true for justice and security delivery as it is for the delivery of other public goods and services. The importance of the dual emphasis on operational effectiveness and good governance/accountability was a key conclusion from a survey of security system reform (SSR) programmes in developing countries.²¹ The need to work on both objectives simultaneously is a central theme of the *OECD DAC Handbook on Security System Reform*.

However, fragile state contexts pose particular challenges to achieving and maintaining this balanced approach to security and justice delivery. Because of legitimacy, capacity and political willingness issues, there are three axes that describe the different dimensions of security and justice in fragile states, each of which describes a balance to be achieved and a tension addressed between equally valid goals:

- short-term achievements – long-term development;

17. OECD CPDC Sub-Group on Security and Justice Service Delivery in Fragile States Terms of Reference.

18. DFID (2005), p. 7.

19. USAID (2005a), p. 3.

20. OECD Fragile States Workstream Terms of Reference.

21. OECD Fragile States Workstream Terms of Reference, p. 58.

- state building and centralisation of governance – responsiveness to local needs;
- rights accountability – performance accountability.

There may be instances when the opposite ends of the spectrum may appear to be irreconcilable, though this may be mainly attributable to political considerations and calculations (donor and partner country) rather than inherent contradictions in service delivery. The urgency of needs and the high degree of disorder in fragile states further complicate the situation. Development aid, however, should attempt to minimise the trade-offs between the objectives, by providing assistance at varying levels and through differing partnerships, while recognising that justice and security service delivery in fragile states is played out upon an inherently political terrain, a factor that cannot be underestimated.

The manner in which justice and security is provided in fragile states is based upon historical legacies, cultural value systems, political calculations and intricate balances of power. Development assistance can support, disrupt, change and recast these pre-existing rationales, creating winners and losers, advocates and resisters, enthusiasts and spoilers. There may be multiple and competing “local owners” whose legitimate interests may not be capable of reconciliation.²² In fragile states, the concept of “local ownership” is inherently contested and difficult for a number of reasons. First, even with the best of intentions, the government may be unable to effect control over the disparate branches of governance. This is not merely a question of organisational behaviour with its natural differentiation between “official” and “unofficial” values, behaviours and structures. In fragile states, this also refers to the often uncertain legitimacy of political authorities and their highly circumscribed capacities. Second, the division of state power between and among levels of government – national, provincial and local – may, in many fragile states, be an inherent source of dispute and conflict, with poorly delineated roles, competencies, functions and responsibilities, not to mention the differing ability of each level to acquire resources (financial, human, capital, infrastructure, etc.). Third, given that the majority of service providers are often non-state actors, the government may be only a “minority owner” of the issue, one whose actions may be severely resisted by other stakeholders for numerous reasons, including questions of legitimacy, effectiveness, accessibility, accountability and the exercise of political power. Fourth, the nature of the state in fragile environments may bear little similarity to Western understandings of what constitutes a state, thereby complicating notions of governance and what “local ownership” entails.

These factors do not undermine the importance of local ownership of programmes to strengthen justice and security delivery. Rather, they imply the existence of multiple, sometimes competing, owners, only one of which is the national government. The recognition of multiple local owners and the severe capacity constraints means that donors need to be realistic and politically sensitive in understanding the varying levels and types of local ownership (state and non-state) that are necessary for programme development and implementation. It is essential to prepare the political terrain and increase the ownership of multiple stakeholders throughout the design and implementation phases.²³

22. Scheye and Peake (2005a). It should be noted that in judicial reform, “local ownership” is inherently conflict-ridden, as it is divided between and among the prerogatives of judges, the Ministry of Justice and prosecutors, all of whom may belong to different institutions and independent branches of government.

23. A recent paper suggests that local ownership in fragile states differs from that in other types of situations because of fragile states’ massive lack of capacity. “If governments want to undertake SSR, they need the capacity to design, manage and implement the reforms adequately. Capacity here... refers to people with the requisite knowledge, expertise and skills and to material resources, including funds and equipment. Governments in low income countries, fragile states and war-torn societies generally lack the necessary capacity.” Nathan (2006), p. 11.

Enhancing security and justice delivery in fragile states is, therefore, an inherently political and sensitive issue, with local political and community leadership, at various levels, a key variable. Local context should determine what development activities occur when, how and in what order. In the assessment, design, implementation, monitoring and evaluation of justice and security development programmes, priority must be given to the needs and strictures of local context. As the OECD has stated, "...analysis and action must be calibrated to particular country circumstances[...] Sound political analysis is needed to adapt international responses to country context, above and beyond quantitative indicators of conflict, governance or institutional strength."²⁴

What fragile state justice and security delivery requires is a multi-layered approach, that recognises the complexity of the local ownership issue and works with multiple stakeholders. The multi-layered methodology is highly context specific, targeting donor assistance to service providers – state and non-state actors simultaneously – at the multiple points at which actual day-to-day delivery occurs. A multi-layered approach²⁵ recognises that unorthodox solutions and partnerships may be necessary to respond to the severe challenges of fragile states. Complementing the OECD's principles for engaging with fragile states, a multi-layered approach is a flexible strategy grounded in realism and modesty. It enables the role of the state at various levels of governance to be developed over time as fragility decreases and countries move from disorder to order to safety and security. This approach has two primary objectives:

To develop and strengthen the relationship between service providers and the users of those services in the marketplaces where they work, in the neighbourhoods where they live and on the roads they travel. It reinforces the already existing range of choice that users have in fragile states, while developing providers' service delivery to make it more effective, fair, accessible, accountable and rights respecting.

To strengthen governance, organisational structures and systems at the local, provincial and national levels in order to develop and extend the legitimacy and capacity of the state to formulate the necessary policies, regulatory frameworks, partnerships, licensing and minimum standards, thereby establishing the contours of an enabling environment for service delivery.

Box 1. Supporting the multi-layered approach to justice and security delivery

The multi-layered approach to justice and security **proportions** international assistance between and among:

- the state, at its various levels, as a minority provider of justice and security service delivery;
- the state, in its role of regulator, to establish the parameters for justice and security service delivery and ensure accountability of providers;
- non-state justice and security service providers, given their position as the primary purveyors of day-to-day service delivery; and
- the users and recipients of justice and security services to increase their voice and hold providers accountable.

24. OECD (2005a), p. 1.

25. Multi-stakeholder approaches are now accepted as good development practice in many programme areas. The term "multi-layered" approach is used to extend this to the delivery of justice and security and convey the different levels at which services need to be provided by different actors.

Short-term achievements/long-term development

In fragile states there is often an urgent need to establish a basic sense of order. Only after order has been achieved can the wider issues of safety and security be addressed. This continuum from disorder to order to safety and security is the essential starting point for justice and security delivery in fragile states. This has been true in such disparate fragile state cases as Timor-Leste, Solomon Islands, Sierra Leone, Kosovo, and Bosnia and Herzegovina in the initial stages of international intervention. As a result, this short-term imperative often drives donor assistance, particularly in contexts where international actors are mandated or take the responsibility to establish order.

There are often good reasons for a strong emphasis on short-term initiatives to strengthen the capacity of security and justice providers rather than on longer-term efforts to enhance their accountability. However, this focus on expediency may be politically generated by donor concerns and needs rather than by imperatives on the ground. Although development agencies may not be able to resist such political demands, experience suggests that short-term solutions are often self-defeating and invariably create enduring problems. The challenge is to find creative solutions to respond to pressing physical security needs while avoiding what one commentator has termed “the slide towards expediency”²⁶ and being besieged by what another calls “the tyranny of the immediate”.²⁷

The sustainability of short-term responses is a vital, but an often overlooked, consideration. Sustainability has four important aspects:

- human capital;
- financial;
- cultural appropriateness; and
- institutional structures and systems.

Development programmes in the justice and security sector may often be designed without realistically considering the local capacity of each of these four factors. For example, a sustainable justice and security programme in Timor-Leste would have had to take into account the fact that there were only nine lawyers in the territory after the independence referendum.²⁸ In Malawi, at the turn of the century, only nine of the country’s magistrates had professional training.²⁹ Similarly, in 2000 in Haiti, approximately 8% of the judges and 5% of their assistants were licensed attorneys and only one-third had any formal legal training.³⁰ And in the recovering fragile state of Mozambique, as of 2000, only eight lawyers resided and worked outside either the national capital, Maputo, or the major provincial capital, Beira.³¹ Given these statistics it is highly dubious whether state-centric judicial development programmes can be feasible or sustainable in the short- to medium-term. It is partially in light of these massive human capital deficits

26. Sedra (2006).

27. Rathmell et al. (2005), p. 110.

28. Personal interview with development personnel working in Timor-Leste (2006).

29. Schärf (2003).

30. Inter-American Development Bank.

31. Schärf (2006).

that a recent DFID-sponsored study concluded that “holistic, sector-wide approaches to [justice and security programmes in] conflict and post-conflict contexts have not yet proved possible”.³²

Financial sustainability is equally important and often dooms justice and security programmes over the long haul if not addressed at the outset of a programme. Although the military reform currently underway in Afghanistan has proved itself to be operationally successful, it is debatable whether the public revenues of the Afghan government can sustain it.³³ The judicial reforms that Guatemala has been undertaking for the past half dozen years with extensive donor involvement have suffered severe budgetary cutbacks that call into question the appropriateness of its original design.³⁴ In Bosnia and Herzegovina and Kosovo, UN peace operations ramped up the numbers of state-employed police officers, only to be compelled to “re-engineer” the institutions a few years later once the costs of expanded payrolls and associated expenditures became apparent.³⁵ Security imperatives in a post-conflict situation may justify an initially disproportionate allocation of resources to the justice and security sector but, unless carefully designed, subsequent cutbacks can themselves be a source of insecurity.

Sustainability also refers to development that is culturally appropriate for the country in which it takes place. For justice and security development to be successful and sustainable, programmes need to address not “merely access to the institutions, but also... access to fair laws, procedures, affordable, implementable and appropriate remedies in terms of values” that are held by the recipients of those programmes.³⁶ Accessible justice and security implies that what constitutes a crime, how the community thinks that crime should be handled (in terms of reparations, restorative justice and corporal punishment), and the language of proceedings coincide with the beliefs and customs of the communities where that justice is to be applied.³⁷ In Timor-Leste, for example, it is apparent that many of the development programmes initiated by the United Nations’ intervention have been and are being circumvented as the Timorese are “revert[ing] to their ‘traditional’ means of solving conflict ..., which [are] based on local structures” and a belief in a different form and type of justice.³⁸ If a discrepancy emerges between generally

32. Stone et al. (2005), p. 20. The OECD DAC SSR Handbook also critiques the “comprehensive” approach and advocates taking a practical, problem-solving approach that focuses on the most important linkages between parts of the justice system. In this sense, particularly in fragile states with their capacity deficits, SSR is best conceived as the “art of the possible.” See Nathan, p. 12.

33. Sedra (2006).

34. Hessbruegge and García (2007), pp. 29-30.

35. See, for example, International Crisis Group (2005), “Bosnia’s Stalled Police Reform: No Progress, No EU”, 6 September, that argues that the various police agencies in Bosnia and Herzegovina consume “close to 10 per cent of the government budgets at Federation, RS, cantonal and state level, double the percentage of public expenditures dedicated to policing in the EU.” (p. 2). In Kosovo, it is expected that the Kosovo Police Service will have to be reduced by up to 15% because of budget constraints (author interview with former UNDP Security Programme Advisor, 2006). As of 2005, costs for the Kosovo Police Service constituted approximately 9% of the provisional government’s budget, despite police salaries being unacceptably low. See also O’Neil.

36. Schärf et al. (2002), p. 4.

37. Qhubu (2005), pp. 10-11 where, in Lesotho, “neighbours feel intimidated and confused when even minor offences are taken to the police. This makes them feel as if the offended party is declaring permanent feud with the offender. Therefore they are instruments of alienation. The offenders themselves believe that the sentences that are passed by the court are unreasonable and unjust. Even the Local and Central Courts – which are supposed to be Basotho customary courts, are regarded as oppressive and too impersonal... Many ...feel that their need for justice is hardly addressed by the conventional justice system. Restorative Justice is the preferred approach ... [which] would revive the spirit of humanity which the western model is blamed for destroying.” See also Schärf and Nina (2001).

38. Hohe and Nixon (2003), p. 2. The issue of cultural sustainability and adherence to local values and beliefs raises the fundamental question of for whom justice and development programmes are designed and implemented.

held societal values and those embedded within a justice and security development initiative, the reform programme may be deemed unsustainable and inappropriate.

Finally, sustainability pertains to the appropriateness of the institutional arrangements, systems, procedures and policies within and with which the individuals who deliver the public goods of justice and security work at the various levels of governance – national, provincial and local. It is not sufficient to train and equip judges, prosecutors, prison wardens and police officers. It is also necessary to house the actual service providers in effective and efficient institutions, whose operations are well planned, managed and evaluated. Justice, for example, cannot be provided without a reasonably managed court administration. In fragile states this issue of institutional and managerial sustainability may often be overlooked because of the urgency to establish a semblance of order. For example, the UN peace operation in Timor-Leste over the course of five years “provided uniforms for 3,000 officers, gave [the] basic training and equipped [them] to minimum standards. However, [the peace operations] were unable ... to develop an appropriate Ministry of the Interior in addition to [not] establishing the internal systems and procedures that provide for the accountable and transparent management and administration of the police service.”³⁹ The result was a police service without “a publicly articulated internal security policy, an up to date police service development plan, and lack[ing] any sense of institutional identity... Indeed, the general lack of an internal security policy is partially responsible for the proliferation of questionable paramilitary police units” that, rather than providing security, are responsible for creating conditions of heightened insecurity and instability.⁴⁰

State building and centralisation/local needs

Many donors currently approach security and justice delivery in fragile states through the lens of democratic governance and state building. This is an important and necessary perspective and the state is, unquestionably, a principal actor and has an irreducible role in the delivery of justice and security services. The precise nature of that role and the appropriate level of state involvement (national, provincial, municipal, local), however, are open questions given the structure and character of the state under conditions of fragility.

In fragile environments, it is important to maintain an open perspective as to the precise role of the state in justice and security service delivery. A recent OECD survey of recipients of SSR programming has criticised SSR development programming for a lack of evidence-based research in understanding the local context and an over-reliance on “a normative western template of how security systems should operate” that envisages “‘ideal-type’ situations that no country, including OECD countries, has fully succeeded in implementing.”⁴¹ Implicitly referring to the disorder of the safety and justice continuum, the OECD survey also noted that donor-sponsored SSR programmes are often conducted contrary to the needs and priorities of the local populations who desire concrete improvements of security in the “physical sense”.⁴² Consequently, to meet the acute need to restore order and deliver justice and security as demanded by the local populations, donor assistance might be more effective if it were to support the multiple methods (state and non-state) by which service is delivered **and** at the point at which service delivery occurs – where people work, live and travel.

39. Rees (2006), p. 18.

40. Rees (2006), p. 19.

41. OECD (2005f), p. 62.

42. OECD (2005f), p. 65.

It is in this sense that justice and security delivery in fragile states should be informed by an understanding of local context, needs, and for whom justice and security is to be provided.⁴³ The objective should be to identify, on the basis of local realities, the desirable but realistic roles for the state and other actors to play, rather than to assume that central government does, can or should be the main provider. There is therefore an important, but difficult, balance to strike between centralisation and local needs in justice and security delivery. As one commentator reflects, centralisation “offers the benefits of tighter control and better funding, and local control offers greater accountability and specific responses to local needs.”⁴⁴

Box 2. Public-private partnership to deliver citizen security in Karachi, Pakistan

Beginning in 1989, the Citizen Police Liaison Committee (CPLC) has become an important component of policing in Karachi, the largest city in Pakistan. Rooted in the business community, and dependent largely on private donations and the volunteer labour of business people, it has taken on core policing intelligence functions. The CPLC works very closely with the police and focuses on improving police performance through supportive engagement with their work. It has established a number of crime databases that are used operationally by the police, and manages them on a day-to-day basis. The organisation conducts crime analysis, plays an important role in the investigation of kidnappings, and provides a range of police-related services to rich and poor alike. With offices in police stations and its headquarters in the office of the Governor of Sindh Province, the CPLC has become deeply integrated into the apparatus of government.

The CPLC is an example of the type of “hybrid” arrangement for the provision of public services that, we are beginning to realize, may be widespread where there is a breakdown of conventional governance arrangements. This we term “co-production”: the provision of public services through an institutionalised long-term relationship between state agencies and organised groups of citizens, where both make substantial resource contributions.

This approach offers lessons for donors operating in fragile states:

- The challenges of justice and security delivery in fragile states often require unorthodox solutions.
- Context is the most important factor in designing service delivery arrangements. The right approach has to be decided upon by the environment, the range of available actors, their legitimacy in the local context, and their relationships.
- The private sector (business and non-governmental organisation) can provide finance, technology and technical skills that are often in short supply in police services. Their involvement can also increase public trust.
- The CPLC decided to adopt a co-operative attitude to working with the police, rather than confronting them publicly (e.g. on human rights). This approach seems sensible, given the institutional and political resistance of police to working with outside actors, and has produced results. It shows that a focus just on “amplifying client voice” in service delivery may not work in many fragile states.
- There is an important role for leadership, in the police, government and in the business community, in developing this approach and making it work.

This example is drawn from Musad, M. (2002), *Co-producing Citizen Security: The Citizen-Police Liaison Committee in Karachi*, Institute of Development Studies Working Paper 172, IDS, Sussex.

43. Scheye and Peake (2005b).

44. Baker (2004a), p. 7.

Upon close examination, it is also evident that the fragile state does not necessarily resemble the Western state in the ways in which it is institutionalised or structured. Nor does it necessarily correspond to Western concepts of how a state functions, and the degree to which it interacts with civil society. Furthermore, the fragile state, particularly the post-colonial African state, has hardly at any point in time had a monopoly of legitimate force.⁴⁵

Many “of the states, which today are considered failed, have artificial and imposed borders, heterogeneous and divided populations and privatized and personalized structures, where traditional notions of kinship, religion and community matters more than modern ideas of citizenship and nationality.”⁴⁶ Furthermore, in fragile state contexts, control over the state may be deeply contested in a winner-takes-all political struggle. Effective fragile state authority may not extend past the tarmac of the national capital. A state-centric approach, therefore, that primarily focuses on strengthening governance and state capacities, may be an inappropriate strategy for fragile states that have exceedingly limited capacity, may not be deemed legitimate by significant proportions of the populace and historically have never exercised full sovereign authority over their territory.⁴⁷

When seen from this perspective, it is a misnomer to advocate a “decentralisation” programme for a fragile state that has never “centralised” state service delivery of justice and security in the first place. Instead, the focus of assistance to strengthen state building and governance should be on creating the capacity to facilitate a multi-layered approach. It is important to assist the state in building its capacities to centralise particular functions and activities as they pertain to policy formulation, regulatory frameworks, licensing and the establishment of minimum standards. It may also be appropriate to support the state’s ability to engage in partnerships and networks with various non-state actors, though the fragile state’s participation need not necessarily be as a service provider. In fact, on pragmatic, practical and political grounds, it may be inappropriate for donors to support an extensive build-up of fragile state-provided justice and security, given that the development of effective, co-ordinated state service delivery may be a remote prospect. Nevertheless, even if the national state is not a majority provider of justice and security service, its role in establishing the parameters of service delivery and in ensuring the accountability of that service provision remains central.

Enhancing the fragile state’s policy, regulatory, licensing and partnership capabilities may be one way to balance state building with servicing local needs. A multi-layered approach acknowledges that the political leadership of the fragile state may insist upon a centralisation strategy, in that their primary objective may be political – the extension of state power and authority. Furthermore, for similar political reasons, the state leadership may resist donor efforts to work with and support non-state providers. By engaging with the political leadership on issues of minimum standards, networking and accountability, donors may be able to address the state’s political imperatives as well as meet acute service delivery issues. This may be especially crucial at the provincial and local levels of governance. As state capacity is gradually developed and fragility decreases, the role of the state as a direct provider may be gradually increased.

This potential conflict between the political leadership of a fragile state wanting to centralise and expand state power, and the imperatives of local needs, further highlights the importance of not conflating local ownership with government ownership. As pointed out earlier, multiple and competing local owners

45. Ebo (2006), p. 10.

46. Andersen (2006), p. 7. In Africa, for example, it has been argued that, in many countries, there is “no genuine disconnection between a structurally differentiated state and a civil society composed of properly organised and politically distinct interest groups.” See Chabal and Daloz (1999), p. 18.

47. Andersen (2006), p. 7

may exist. Without presuming which “owner” is paramount, a multi-layered approach seeks to bring the various stakeholders together – from parliamentarians, to the provincial and local levels of governance, to the varying levels of service providers, to civil society organisations, to neighbourhood groups and individuals – so that their differing needs can be addressed, even as it is acknowledged that they may not always necessarily be reconcilable.

One of the central questions in a fragile state that will be affected by the tensions within local ownership is the choice of legal system(s) and the relative proportions and scope of their applicability within the fragile state. There are four main types of legal systems: i) civil law, ii) common law, iii) religious law, and iv) traditional/customary law.⁴⁸ In many fragile state countries, three of the four may operate simultaneously, with common law or civil law being complemented by religious and traditional systems. In a multi-layered approach, the operative issue is how to relate the co-existing legal systems – for example, addressing their respective jurisdictions and rights of appeal of cases in one system to another – rather than attempting to amalgamate or integrate them. The reason is that in the short to medium term, it is unlikely for fragile states to possess the requisite resources or capabilities to rely on only one form of jurisprudence. A common law system, for instance, requires that parties to a legal claim be represented by legal professionals; that the state provide legal aid to those who cannot afford representation in criminal cases; and that the process be accessible in terms of “cost, distance, language, procedure, values and outcomes”.⁴⁹ In a fragile state, these assumptions simply cannot be upheld. Similar issues pertain to a civil law system, with its conception of sufficient numbers of well-trained judges capable of being actively involved in evidence collection, investigation and examination. As a result, the most pragmatic and practical option is a multi-layered approach that seeks to weave a framework of accessible justice by recognising the validity and operation of differing forms of jurisprudence.

Accountability

Strengthening accountability is a fundamental objective for achieving effective service delivery. Accountability in security and justice sector reform is often conceived as primarily focusing on human rights, holding providers accountable for abuses and strengthening rights protection. From this perspective, donor assistance often concentrates on external oversight bodies, such as parliamentary committees, complaints commissions and ombudsman offices. It also leads to institutional reform of internal mechanisms within the police, judiciary and prisons, such as disciplinary procedures and professional standards systems. Ensuring that security and justice providers not only respect, but are the principal defenders of, human rights is a key part of strengthening service delivery.

Accountability, however, is about much more than human rights, narrowly defined as protection from abuse. It is also about real, accessible justice and the actual provision of safety and security. Unfortunately, “SSR initiatives [have too] often operate[d] and end[ed] up at a rather superficial level, having negligible direct effect on the actual security situation of the ... [majority] of the population.”⁵⁰ A vigorous human rights programme, therefore, must recognise that accountable justice and security services have to be responsive to the needs of local communities, in a language and a cultural manner that

48. Although “traditional/customary law” is a unique category of jurisprudence, there is no presumption that only one type of traditional/customary law exists. On the contrary, in any one fragile state, it would be expected that there may be numerous different customary law traditions, only some of which are related. Furthermore, the label “traditional/customary law” does not presume that such systems are rigid. Rather, it is believed that they are living, changing, growing legal traditions, continuously adopting to their environments.

49. Schärf (2006), p. 12.

50. Ebo (2006), p. 18.

they understand. An ineffective police service, for instance, is fundamentally unaccountable if disorder is allowed to persist. Even the best court system is inaccessible to local villagers if they cannot understand the language used in the court system, whether due to linguistic, technical and cultural reasons. Accountability, therefore, is not only about human rights abuses, but also an issue of the performance of a service, and the daily delivery of the public goods of safety, justice and security.

To increase accountability, the World Bank advocates the need to strengthen three relationships in the service delivery chain:⁵¹

- between poor people and providers (increasing clients' choice and participation);
- between poor people and policy makers (raising citizens' voice through elections and information);
- between providers and policy makers (rewarding effective delivery and penalising ineffective delivery).

For justice and security delivery in fragile states, investing in the “long route” to accountability by helping citizens hold policy makers to account is impractical and unlikely to lead to improvements in services (in the short- or medium-term) or to effectively address local needs. Accountability relationships between citizens and policy makers are weak in fragile states and will take time to strengthen. In the medium term, initiatives to strengthen the accountability relationships between policy makers and providers are important. These initiatives may bear fruit, if they are targeted to develop government capacity (at its varying levels); regulate service providers (state and non-state); formulate minimal standards of conduct, behaviour and performance; and establish licensing boards, auditing commissions, ombudsman offices and parliamentary oversight committees. Building effective executive ministries capable of exercising managerial control, strategic vision and oversight is an imperative. Some of these mechanisms will be applicable to the provision of security by private for-profit companies such as vetting and training requirements for company personnel, registration of firearms owned by the firm, and the exchange of information between company employees and police agencies. Furthermore, state capacity needs to be strengthened to enable the state's police services to form partnerships and other collaborative relationships with neighbourhood security groups, trade associations, town crime prevention councils, etc. that provide day-to-day security in defined areas. Additional initiatives could focus on enhancing the relationships between state justice actors and their non-state counterparts, delineating the competencies of the various players, recording disputes and their adjudication, and establishing minimum standards of procedure so that the whole forms an overlapping network of accountability and service provision.

The area where initiatives are most likely to lead to short-term improvements in effective service delivery, however, is the “short route” to accountability. This accountability method calls for promoting the participation of the recipients of services in decision making at local levels, and increasing trust between local communities and their justice and security providers (irrespective of whether they are state or non-state actors). Consequently, channels are needed to enable local communities to exercise their rights to articulate demands for and participate in the provision of better service delivery performance.⁵²

51. World Bank (2003b), pp. 1-30.

52. When relating to state providers of justice and security, this type of accountability may involve varying forms of decentralisation of state delivery of service, but it needs to be remembered that sustainable capacity is markedly less likely at local levels, which is where local authorities would “require more autonomy, including budgetary control, if they were to meet local needs and be held accountable for service delivery.” See Saferworld, *et al.* (2003), p. 9.

The key to this form of accountability is the responsiveness of the policy maker and service provider to local needs, with action to be taken to strengthen one or more of the following three areas:⁵³

- answerability (provide information and/or a decision);
- enforcement (strengthen achievement of service norms);
- organisational change (change the way the service is delivered).

Responsiveness to local needs lies at the heart of strengthening the delivery of justice and security. The emphasis on “providing effective services to all members of society” should also be underscored. Often in fragile states, the provision of security and justice (by state and non-state providers) is skewed towards the powerful, wealthy, the urbanised and men. This undermines the legitimacy of service providers, because they may not be deemed representative of the broad base of society (for example an ethnically biased police force) or because the services they deliver disadvantage certain groups. Ensuring an equitable approach to service delivery based on local needs is therefore a vital objective.

53. Casely (2003), pp. 24-25.

III. Political Economy of the Justice and Security Sector

Justice and security are, by their nature and the impact of their delivery, different from other public goods for three reasons:

- without a minimal level of order, justice and security, no other public goods can be adequately delivered;
- one of the primary roles of the state is to ensure a reasonable level of justice and security service delivery and, therefore, justice and security delivery defines the basic function of the state; and
- the state may be a principal agent creating insecurity and injustice through its delivery of these public goods.
- Consequently, the methods by which justice and security are and can be delivered may fundamentally differ from those of other public goods, such as sewage, health and water.

Security and justice providers as sources of insecurity and injustice

A fundamental difference between the delivery of justice and security and the delivery of other public goods is that very often, in fragile states, the actors providing security and justice – state and non-state – are actually sources of insecurity and injustice. Health care and education providers may not always offer a good service, but they rarely do direct harm. However, the means by which justice and security are delivered or withheld by providers is often a matter of life and death.

Police, militaries and militia in fragile states often prey on local populations and may be major violators of human rights. “The relationship between the security sector and the population in ... [fragile] contexts tends to be exploitative and predatory, in which individuals and groups are more victims than beneficiaries of underpaid and ill-governed security services.”⁵⁴ The same can hold true with non-state actors, the May 2006 outbreak of violence in Somalia being a case in point. In some instances, such as in the Democratic Republic of Congo, the state justice and security sector may have been designed to function primarily as a means of exploitation.⁵⁵ Courts and prosecutorial services may also offer impunity to the rich and powerful or be used as vehicles of oppression. Inequitable access to justice for minorities and vulnerable groups, including women and juveniles, exacerbates exclusion, insecurity and injustice, irrespective of whether the service provider in question is the state or a non-state actor.

A challenge for development assistance is to try and identify the reasons for the perpetration of insecurity and injustice. One common cause is the state’s lack of commitment to provide security and justice for all. For example, in many fragile states there is a marked tendency for the sector to perceive itself and be perceived as a means to preserve the ruling regime’s prerogatives. As the Kenya police now

54. Ebo (2006), p. 2.

55. See also Hills, in which she argues that “it is not in the interests of (many) African regimes to build strong, efficient or ‘profession’ forces” (p. 186).

acknowledges, “the Kenya Police Force has in the past practised regime policing that appeared to focus substantial energy on sustaining the power of the political elite.”⁵⁶ The result is that significant segments of the population distrust the sector’s institutions and view them as illegitimate.

In virtually all fragile states, even if the will to provide security and justice exists, state providers face overwhelming and (at least in the short to medium term) insurmountable capacity problems. A lack of personnel, communication networks and transport may mean that it is impossible for many police services to deploy personnel to local security incidents, let alone have the skills and training to deal effectively with them once at the scene. The inability of the state to pay the sector’s personnel a living wage may facilitate a culture of corruption, which, in turn, produces insecurity and injustice. Desperately overcrowded prisons, weak or non-existent managerial systems, the lack of measurement indicators with which to evaluate performance, untrained court administrators, the absence of trained personnel throughout large swathes of the country and the inability to enforce judicial decisions may all contribute to an insecure and unjust fragile state environment.

In many contexts, capacity deficits and lack of political will may reinforce one another. For instance, political pressure may result in the military drawing budgetary resources away from policing, so that the national police are deprived of the necessary capacities to maintain law and order, as happened in Peru during its recent attempts to reform the police.⁵⁷ A lack of police resources can result, as in Guatemala, Honduras and Belize, in the military being asked to engage in domestic security, in support of state police services. In other situations, parliamentary committees may not possess the requisite oversight authority or staff capacity to exercise their democratic prerogatives. Additionally, state prosecutors, as in Yemen, may not possess the requisite legal power and/or capability to investigate incidents of alleged malfeasance committed by security services.

Social cohesion, insecurity and injustice

In almost every instance, fragile states are countries undergoing multiple transitions at the same time. The type of the transition may vary (political, modernisation, globalisation, urbanisation, AIDS, drought, etc.), but in virtually all circumstances, traditional forms of internal social cohesion are being fragmented and eroded; new arrangements may not yet have taken root.⁵⁸ Insecurity and injustice may be acute in fragile states because of the splintering and dissolution of social cohesion that these transitions engender.⁵⁹ Recent studies in the West suggest that a deterioration of the social fabric is directly associated with insecurity and injustice because of the deterioration of social capital and social efficacy.⁶⁰ When this occurs, as it does in most fragile states, individuals and groups become increasingly less able to engage in productive collective action to protect and promote their public goods and interests and, as a result, their neighbourhoods typically descend into disorder, crime and violence.⁶¹

56. “The Kenya Police Strategic Plan 2004-2008”, advertisement in *Sunday Nation* newspaper, Kenya, 7 March 2005.

57. Gino da Costa (forthcoming).

58. Zartman (1995), p. 6, who argues that in fragile states there is an “extended breakdown of social coherence: society, as the generator of institutions of cohesion and maintenance, can no longer” bind segments of the population together.

59. Shaw (2000), pp. 10-11.

60. Sampson, Raudenbush and Earls (1997), Sampson and Raudenbush (2001), Sampson, Morenoff and Gannon-Rowley (2002), and Sampson (2003).

61. Sampson, Raudenbush and Earls (1997), Sampson and Raudenbush (2001), Sampson, Morenoff and Gannon-Rowley (2002), and Sampson (2003).

In some cases, where the method by which the state delivers its services contributes to rising rates of insecurity and injustice, reforming and strengthening service delivery may ameliorate the difficulties caused by a weakening in social cohesion. However, “comparative experience suggests that while the state is good at breaking down forms of local social control and cohesion it is notoriously bad at reconstructing” societal ties.⁶² Developmental assistance, therefore, may also have to look to non-state actors to redress the root causes of conflict and rebuild a fragile state’s social fabric. By providing assistance to multiple layers of state and non-state justice and security providers, donors may support the reconstruction of the bonds that tie. It is also important to note that complementary support may often have to be given to providers of other services (for example, education, health and livelihoods), as the issue of social cohesion extends far beyond the justice and security sector. This does not entail an expansion of SSR into other areas of development, such as youth employment, but highlights the benefit of “bundling” development assistance across different service areas to address underlying causes of insecurity.

Challenges and opportunities of working with different actors to deliver security and justice in fragile states

The question of who delivers justice and security services, and how, is deeply and inherently political, wholly dependent upon local contexts, institutional capacities, popular demands and leadership. It cannot be answered generically. Instead, it requires in-depth analysis of the fragile state, its capabilities, political terrain, regulatory and legal environment, and cultural legacies. The most appropriate developmental approach to the delivery of justice and security services under conditions of fragility may be one that recognises the presence of multiple providers whose services are layered to meet differing contingencies. This may not be the optimal solution, but does reflect actual realities. The emphasis given to strengthening the role of the state vis-à-vis non-state providers depends on the political context, the willingness of the government, the capacity of different institutions and the needs of local people. It is not a question of donors’ supporting the existence of parallel non-state structures and thereby weakening state authorities, as there may often not be a state structure of effective provision. Rather, a multi-layered approach is an explicit recognition of “local ownership” as expressed through the day-to-day choices made by individuals, neighbourhoods and communities in their desire to live in safety, security and justice.

Experiences of supporting the delivery of security and justice by different actors in fragile states suggest a number of lessons for development agencies. This section examines the challenges and opportunities of working with state, non-state and international actors. It highlights each actor’s strengths and weaknesses and assesses them against the three dimensions of security and justice in fragile states set out in Part I.

a) State actors

Because justice and security are public goods, the state has an irreducible role in their delivery and accountability. This irreducible role is the core issue in the balance between state building, centralisation and local needs, and is pivotal in security and justice programming. The precise role the state does, can and should adopt varies from context to context. It may also differ within the sovereign territory of the state, with distinctions made, for instance, between urban and rural areas or between indigenous and other regions. What is applicable in one environment may be counterproductive in another for historical, political, economic, cultural and eminently practical reasons. The realistic and appropriate role of the state may also often vary over time. For example, there may be pragmatic immediate limits to a state’s authority because it does not have control over parts of its terrain, but a strategy could be developed that seeks to

62. Shaw (2000), p. 12.

increase this over time, as is currently being attempted in the Democratic Republic of Congo. At a very minimum, the irreducible role of the state in justice and security service delivery is fourfold:

- to monitor and regulate the delivery of justice and security;
- to ensure that public goods are equally accessible to all;
- to protect and preserve human rights, and;
- “to establish the contours of an enabling environment for” the provision of justice and security, even if it is to be delivered by non-state actors.⁶³

To fulfil its obligations, the state may legislate minimum standards and rights respecting codes of conduct. It may also outsource their establishment to professional associations, as is often the situation, for example, with the creation of bar associations. The state may establish broad policy guidelines or strategic justice and security frameworks. It may determine, for instance, that serious crimes such as murder and rape must be referred to state courts, while all other alleged offences can be adjudicated in non-state systems. Or it may decree that crimes that would, upon conviction, warrant long periods of incarceration must be handled by state courts, with others being delegated to non-state purveyors of justice and security.

States may provide justice and security services directly or work in varying types of partnerships or co-operative arrangements with non-state actors. There is an important role for the state in regulating, licensing and monitoring non-state justice and security actors. It may establish networks among various actors, furthering the exchange of information. There is no one right method, nor one that is necessarily inappropriate. Invariably, the delivery of justice and security will mix and match approaches, with a variety of state and non-state service providers delivering the public goods of justice and security. To adapt the *World Development Report*, “no matter how daunting the problems of delivery may be, the public sector cannot walk away from [justice and security]. The challenge is to see how the government – in collaboration with the private sector, communities and outside partners – can meet this fundamental responsibility.”⁶⁴

In fragile states, the challenge is especially acute, given local needs and states’ severe capacity deficiencies. It must be acknowledged that even the most narrowly circumscribed role of the state – monitoring and regulating non-state service delivery – may severely test state capacities and in many fragile states the state-provider relationship is “either problematic or inoperative”.⁶⁵ Holding service providers accountable for the protection of human rights and performance delivery must, however, remain part of the state’s responsibility. It is a central element of a multi-layered approach. In addition to maintaining budgetary and prosecutorial oversight, the state may most effectively concentrate on policy, legal and regulatory frameworks, laying the building blocks for later development and state building endeavours. Because of capacity deficits, establishing networks, partnerships and collaborative relationships between the state and non-state providers is also crucial. Developing the appropriate accountability and working relationships for recording, exchanging, collecting and analysing information among the multiple justice and security providers – and between providers and recipients – is vital in fragile states. With the state as the central player, this may also be one of the primary areas of donor assistance. It may also be the most effective way of building state capacity and legitimacy.

63. OECD, (2005a), p. 4-5

64. World Bank (2003), p. 3.

65. Meagher (2005), p. 17.

The capacity shortfalls in many fragile states are enormous and cannot be underestimated. Given current human resource staffing levels and capacity, fragile states are simply unable to provide adequate justice and security to the vast majority of their populations and it is unrealistic to expect them to be able to do so in the short to medium term. As already suggested above, the likelihood of being able to implement a Western model of judicial reform in Timor-Leste, Malawi, Haiti or Mozambique is severely curtailed because of dire human resource constraints. As the following table illustrates, using data from fragile and non-fragile states, these countries are not alone in their massive capacity deficits.⁶⁶

Table 1. **Numbers of lawyers/population in fragile states**

Country	Number of private lawyers	Size of population in 2002 (millions)
Namibia	140	1.2
Kenya	Over 3 000	31.3
Zimbabwe	700 or more	13.0
Tanzania	120	35.2
Malawi	300	10.7

Estimates of the ratios of police to inhabitants of selected African countries, again using fragile and non-fragile state figures, only reaffirm the massive capacity shortfall:

- Uganda: 1:1 800
- Nigeria: 1:1 166
- Sierra Leone: 1:750⁶⁷

The shortfall in personnel is matched by comparable fragile state deficits in infrastructure, financial resources and human capital. This lack of capacity is important in a related way as well. A fragile state may voice political commitment to development, but it may be an open question whether (and to what degree) the political leadership is able to exercise real control over the state's disparate components. Recognising that the state is not monolithic, it is often the case that,

Governments that do pursue reforms run into problems arising from conflicts among ministries and agencies with different objectives and bases of power, the fear among officials in different units of government of losing personnel or budgetary resources, and from widespread inertia because no organization within government has overall coordinating responsibility for implementation of reforms or because they lack a sufficient number of "champions" within government to sustain the momentum.⁶⁸

66. Kampala Penal Reform International Conference, "Access to Justice", October 1999.

67. The United Nations model ratio is 1:500. The United Kingdom ratio is 1:418. It should be noted, however, that the ratio is only indicative and cannot be an absolute guide to estimate the required number of police personnel. A number of factors need to be taken into account to determine the appropriate staffing levels of a police service, including, among other, demographic data, transportation systems, geographic terrain, economic information, education levels and crime statistics.

68. Rondinelli (2006), p. 17.

Short-term achievements – long-term development

In the long term, supporting the delivery of state justice and security may be the “first best” solution.⁶⁹ However, even with the political commitment of the government, most fragile states have exceedingly limited resources and means to provide safety and justice to the majority of their citizens in the short and medium term. Economic and institutional sustainability issues only compound the daunting challenge. To attempt to rapidly create new justice and security services or grow existing ones is unlikely to meet local needs immediately, can result in the proliferation of corruption and human rights abuses, and may be counterproductive. A rapid expansion of services, for instance, was attempted with the initial policing efforts in El Salvador after the end of the civil war and subsequently necessitated a thorough overhaul, setting back police development by a number of years at the moment when crime and violence were growing exponentially. Similar results have recently occurred in Iraq with respect to the accelerated build-up of the Iraqi police and other security services, as significant percentages of newly commissioned police officers and those assigned to protect vital installations have been found to be illiterate, convicted criminals, and deeply implicated in corruption and violence.⁷⁰

To strengthen recruitment and selection procedures takes time. Thorough professional training, particularly of police middle management, requires years, not weeks or months. Three- to six-week crash training programmes may prove inefficient and ineffective, particularly if illiteracy is an issue and court codes of procedure (criminal and civil), as well as administrative processes, are faulty or non-existent. Legal education is an even longer process. The practical question is not how many police personnel or judges pass through training programmes, but what has been absorbed, by whom, and what behaviours have been changed in the day-to-day delivery of justice and security. Initiatives to progressively develop the basic foundations of state capacity have to be balanced with support to other providers, to help meet immediate local needs and facilitate moving along the disorder to safety, security and justice continuum. It is precisely to address the varying needs that a multi-layered approach to justice and security service delivery is required.

Although the fragile state’s capacity is exceedingly limited, developmental assistance to multiple service providers serves a second purpose. It can foster the long-term legitimacy of the state by building its capacity to formulate policy; set minimum standards; and monitor, regulate, license and participate in partnerships and networks of non-state providers. Establishing regulations for the numerous justice and security providers is crucial and is a key element of any accountability mechanism. In Honduras in 2002, for example, the police had no functional ability to regulate the activities of private security companies with regard to their personnel, training programmes or weaponry utilised. In the short term, therefore, it may be productive to strengthen these strategic capabilities of the state. Of special interest may be managerial systems and capabilities, focusing on those that can measure and evaluate the performance of justice and security providers.

State building and centralisation of governance – responsiveness to local needs

Unquestionably, developing state functions and service delivery are the most convenient ways of establishing control over service provision in order to address, for instance, inequalities of access to justice and security. Building the capacities of ministries and parliaments may be productive under most circumstances, except when the government exhibits little commitment to reform and/or is engaged in severe human rights violations.

69. OECD Fragile States Group Workstream Terms of Reference, p. 15.

70. *New York Times*, 19-24 May, 2006, articles on security in Iraq.

Enhanced state building and centralisation, however, is often achieved at the cost of meeting local needs, whether they pertain to crime reduction strategies, alternative sentencing methods or restorative justice. An excellent example of the trade-offs incurred is the unwritten history of bail reform in South Africa.⁷¹ To resolve a burdensome pre-trial detention issue, a new bail regime was established. Although the number of incarcerated declined, local needs went unaddressed and the result was that many of the alleged perpetrators were murdered upon release from jail by the new bail system. Local communities, believing the released detainees to be guilty, did not want them living in their neighbourhoods.

Rights accountability – performance accountability

There is no necessary trade-off between these two forms of accountability. In fragile states, however, there may be a question of efficacy in determining which approach produces the desired outcomes (the preservation and protection of human rights). Although perceived as necessary in the short term, particularly when there is a lack of state commitment to reform, the establishment of independent ombudsman offices and human rights commissions may prove to be financially unsustainable. The development of internal institutional mechanisms such as codes of conduct, professional standards, promotion systems and managerial accountability within the police, prisons and the judiciary may prove to be significantly more effective and cost effective in changing behaviours in the long term, though the human resources and capital within the institutions may be in decidedly short supply.

Because of structural and capacity deficits, as well as the politicisation typical of the fragile state's justice and security sector, mechanisms to monitor abuses and enforce sanctions, if existent, are often weak. Performance accountability is also often highly circumscribed, with clients distrustful of state providers. Consequently, the most productive method of enhancing accountability may be to encourage a multi-layered approach by maximising client/customer choice, participation and knowledge of their legal and human rights. The objective is to increase the frequency and strength of the relationship between the local service provider and the client, not only to make the performance more accountable, but to better preserve and protect human rights.

b) Non-state actors

“Non-state justice” refers to all systems of justice and security operating alongside formal state institutions “that exercise some form of ... authority in providing safety, security and access to justice.”⁷² This includes “a range of traditional, customary, religious and informal mechanisms that deal with disputes and/or security matters.”⁷³ Non-state justice may include systems that employ varying mechanisms to mediate, arbitrate and resolve conflicts through restorative and/or reparative justice procedures, including (but not limited to) traditional courts, village elder councils, market associations

71. Personal interview with police advisor who, during the time of the reform, worked in South Africa (2006).

72. For an explanation of some of the terms used, such as “informal justice” and “legal pluralism”, see Schärf (2003) pp. 1-3. It is inappropriate to label non-state systems as customary or traditional justice because the systems employed change over time, adapting to historical circumstances. It is also inappropriate to label them as informal in that there may be well-established rules of procedure, even if they may not be codified. Finally, it is important to recognise that the issue is not one of public versus private justice and security. In many fragile states, public state justice and security is anything but free, given rampant corruption. Transparency International (2002) research indicates, for instance, that 95% of citizen interactions with the Kenyan police involved bribery and that the average Kenyan paid police bribes 4.5 times a month, totalling approximately USD 16. This suggests that Kenyan state policing may not be public in any sense other than in a narrowly defined *de jure* sense. Instead, it is privatised security conducted according to a fees-for-service model in the guise of state policing.

73. DFID (2004), p. 1.

and religious hearings.⁷⁴ Non-state security encompasses varying agencies and services that provide safety and security to individuals and groups in the places where they live and work that are not entirely incorporated within institutions of the state.⁷⁵ Such organizations and groups may include:⁷⁶

- informal loosely organised groups;
- civic and trade associations;⁷⁷
- neighbourhood groups and crime prevention organisations;⁷⁸
- religious police;⁷⁹
- ethnic/clan police;⁸⁰

political party security; and

private for-profit security companies.

It should be also pointed out that in many fragile countries is it impossible to make clean and sharp distinctions between state and non-state justice and security systems. In many parts of Somalia, it is legal that if a murder case can be resolved through “customary clan methods”, the case will be removed from the formal court docket and the alleged perpetrator set free, even if he/she had been in custody.⁸¹ In Yemen, many traditional and religious procedures and processes are written into state law. Similar situations exist in Peru, Bolivia, Ecuador, Paraguay, Indonesia, Timor-Leste, Nepal, Sierra Leone, Rwanda, South Africa, Botswana, Malawi and Mozambique. Even when the state is not directly involved in the provision of justice and security, non-state systems may still be strongly influenced by or associated with elements of the state system, or semi-legitimated by the state through licensing, regulation, partnerships, collaborative relationships and/or the exchange of information. As a result, instead of a clean demarcation between state and non-state justice and security, a continuum of methods of resolving disputes and delivery safety exists.

74. The types of traditional, customary, village, mediation and conflict resolution non-state justice systems are innumerable. Alternative dispute resolution, justices of the peace, paralegals, lay judges and all related mechanisms also fall into this category. For examples of the latter types of systems in Peru and Colombia, see Faundez (2003).

75. Johnston and Shearing (2003).

76. This list is adapted from those proposed by Baker.

77. See Bassett and the hunters associations of Côte d'Ivoire during the 1990s. For taxi associations in Sierra Leone and Uganda see Baker (2005a) and (2005b). For community group security in Somalia, see Le Sage, *Stateless Justice in Somalia: Formal and Informal Rule of Law Initiatives* (USIP, forthcoming.)

78. Chirayath et al. (2005) for a discussion of the Tanzanian *Sungusungu* traditionally organized village defense groups; see also Baker (2005a) for a discussion of the Local Council 1's, the lowest level of administrative governance, and crime prevention panels.

79. Religious police existed in Afghanistan under the Taliban and currently exist in Saudi Arabia.

80. Yemen is a case study of a country in which local tribes exercise significant policing authority.

81. Academy for Peace and Development (2002).

As highlighted above, resource scarcity may explain the existence of non-state justice and security service providers, but it does not elucidate the tenacity and vibrancy of those systems. There are many reasons for the vitality and strength of non-state service delivery, including:⁸²

- greater effectiveness;
- the public's greater physical access to non-state dispute resolution methods;
- the public's ability to understand the language – linguistically, culturally, intellectually;
- the public's greater trust in the transparency, legitimacy, efficacy and timeliness of decisions;
- lower transactional costs;⁸³
- the public's belief in restitution and restorative justice rather than punishment and incarceration;
- a higher degree of participation afforded in that the parties to a dispute may be able to choose their arbitrators and mediators;
- greater accountability;
- a more holistic approach with a greater ability to resolve the complexity of issues surrounding an incident by examining the antecedents and addressing the root cause(s).

Consequently, “in many developing countries, customary systems operating outside of the state regime are often the dominant form of regulation and dispute resolution, covering up to 90% of the population in parts of Africa. In Sierra Leone, for example, approximately 85% of the population falls under the jurisdiction of customary law.”⁸⁴ Similarly, the Ministry of Justice in Afghanistan estimates that “90% of Afghans rely on customary law due to a lack of ‘trust and confidence’ in the nation’s formal justice institutions as well as the justice institutions’ ‘physical absence and low capacity’”.⁸⁵ Comparable estimates exist for Mozambique, Malawi, Lesotho, Somalia, Sudan, Yemen, Solomon Islands, Timor-Leste and Nepal. In Nigeria, for example, approximately “16 [different] types of informal policing structures [have been] established [by local] communities to deal with crime... in order to protect their neighbourhoods from criminal attacks; to provide speedy safety and security services which the formal police were unable to offer; and because they were closer to the people than the formal police.”⁸⁶

The prevalence and dominance of non-state justice and security systems does not imply that the fragile state is uninvolved. As indicated earlier, a continuum exists along which state and non-state service providers are arrayed. As one scholar of African policing has written (an assertion which applies equally to justice systems in fragile states), “as people move about their daily business, or as the time of day

82. Penal Reform International (2000).

83. World Bank (2004b), p. IV. “Time, distance and cost were especially serious obstacles in rural areas where, in one place, it took villagers three days and the equivalent of half the minimum monthly wage to travel to the district capital for police interviews.”

84. Chirayath et al. (2005), p. 3.

85. Senier (2006), p. 2.

86. Alemika and Chukwuma (2004), p. 6.

changes, so they may move from the sphere of one policing agency to which they would naturally look for protection, to another, or be faced at times with a choice of agency to be made in terms of personal experience, preference for mentality (surveillance or punishment), cost or communal status.”⁸⁷

In fact, for many citizens of fragile states their experience of justice and security service delivery is based “on ‘what is available’, ‘what works best’ and ‘what can I afford’, more than issues of legal authority, mandate, and accountability.”⁸⁸ From the perspective of the individual or group, it is an issue of “local ownership”, legitimacy, effectiveness, choice and diversity. From the perspective of development, it is an issue of governance and local ownership in the multiple layering of service providers, a continuum of state and non-state, which only at the extremes of the range can be readily delineated.

It is important to recognise, however, that there are potential challenges associated with non-state security and justice systems. For example, non-state systems may be:⁸⁹

- sources of insecurity and injustice;
- subject to corruption, abuse of power and manipulation by local elites;
- in non-compliance with international human rights standards, such as discrimination (especially against women) or inhuman and degrading punishments;
- unaccountable;
- unable to maintain adequate records.

It is a fundamental mistake, however, to presume that these challenges are any more severe in the non-state systems than in the state one, without a thorough study of local contexts. More likely than not, the challenges of one are mirrored in the other. It is also erroneous to believe that development of the non-state system is more onerous and difficult than that of state justice and security service providers, without examining local political circumstances and capacities. A multi-layered approach, in fact, makes no generalised presumption that accountability and protection of human rights is best achieved through state systems.

In some instances, the activity of non-state systems may be significantly more human rights respecting. For example, vigilantism and lynching appear to be more common in communities where, in the absence of effective state justice and security, non-state systems have fallen into disrepair.⁹⁰ A study of rural Colombia suggests that mob justice is up to five times more likely in such environments.⁹¹ This may also be especially true in countries where the criminal code does not correspond to the beliefs of the local population. “For example, the criminalization of customary responses to witchcraft in South Africa, and the fact that state courts refuse to recognize the existence of witchcraft, has arguably led to a form of vigilante justice based on the belief that the state sides with witches.”⁹² It may be the case that non-state

87. Baker (2004a), p. 36.

88. Baker (2004b), p. 170.

89. See DFID (2004), p. 3.

90. Buscaglia (1996) and Buscaglia (1997).

91. Buscaglia (1996) and Buscaglia (1997).

92. Chirayath et al. (2005), p. 6. See also Hund (2000).

systems, as they are closest to their clients, may be more amenable to the preservation of human rights and the delivery of an accountable service, for they more accurately reflect local beliefs and needs and are believed to be more legitimate.

Short-term achievements – long-term development

Supporting non-state justice and security systems may be a means of realising short-term gains in security and justice provision, as they exist in virtually all fragile states. These systems are often more resilient than state systems, enduring throughout conflicts and deteriorating environments. Despite recent events that highlight some of the inherent difficulties of working with non-state actors, Somalia is a case in point, for even after state collapse,

The ensuing years of warfare eroded [but]... did not destroy, the traditional, clan-based structures that had been used to manage problems and maintain law and order. There appears to have been a turnaround in recent years, with traditional (clan-based) and religious (Sharia) structures providing protection and social insurance, and increasingly being relied on to resolve disputes and create stability. In South-central Somalia, for instance, given the failure of the [transitional government] to perform such normal government functions as provision of security and justice, Sharia courts, which transcend clan divisions, have been revived. These courts, funded by businessmen and controlled by clan elders, are providing increased law and order...⁹³

In this sense, non-state systems may be the most productive vehicles for the reconstruction of social capital and social efficacy in the hope of rebuilding social cohesion. Furthermore, non-state justice and security provision may be bundled together with other social services to provide more comprehensive development outside the confines of the justice and security sector.

While non-state systems may be the most effective means of delivering justice and security in fragile states, it cannot be overlooked that, at the same time, there may be significant discrepancies between the methods and activities of non-state justice and security providers and international human rights covenants. However, rather than shun non-state systems, the multi-layered answer is to engage with the non-state system through the use of local actors to ameliorate conditions, procedures and results. The same applies to non-state actors that, although initially provide security, may over time devolve into organisations that may perpetuate insecurity. The *Sungusungu* traditionally organized village groups, for example, effectively provided security against crime and violence in areas of Tanzania, but also engaged in beating of petty criminals and have been implicated in conducting witchcraft trials in which women were singled out and, in some instances, killed.⁹⁴

In line with the findings of the 2005 OECD survey of recipient countries, the issue is not whether to engage with non-state justice and security providers, but how, given there are few other viable methods of delivering service in fragile states. The *Sungusungu* are considered legitimate organisations by local people. They represent the values of the communities for whom they provide effective justice and security service. The Tanzanian state has attempted to improve the situation, but seems to have met with little success in increasing *Sungusungu* rights-respecting accountability and behaviour.⁹⁵ It may be, then, that only a multi-layered approach that works to increase the capacity of other local community groups to raise legal and rights awareness might have a chance to increase accountability and improve the situation.

93. World Bank (2005b), p. 17.

94. Chirayath et al. (2005), p. 18.

95. Chirayath et al. (2005), p. 18.

State building and centralisation of governance – responsiveness to local needs

Supporting non-state systems may be perceived to be the antithesis of state building and centralising governance, but because they operate at the local level they can readily respond to local needs. It is likely that non-state systems are also more adaptable to the changing needs of the local populace and, thus, more capable of modification during periods of transition.

Assistance to non-state systems, however, ought to be balanced by the establishment of mechanisms to link them to state systems. The registering and recording of decisions reached in the non-state systems may be an appropriate first step, eventually leading to a strengthening of the connections between and among systems. Developing methods of exchanging information and co-ordinating operations may be a second step, which, over time, may create enduring networks and partnerships of state and non-state justice and security providers. Policy formulation that lays out the broader competencies of varying levels of justice and security would also be appropriate, although it may be necessary to acknowledge that written policy and actual practice may be two very different phenomena and that codification of non-state justice systems does not allow them to change and meet local needs. Establishing a right of appeal to formal courts may be another important measure in many contexts, accepting that “forum shopping” is an everyday occurrence. Finally, strategic frameworks could be developed, so long as non-state systems are allowed to retain their flexibility.⁹⁶ In all these ways, state building may be progressively achieved and sustained.

Similarly, there may be a need to insulate the non-state systems from being co-opted by political parties and leaders. Frequently, non-state systems are used in the democratic process as a means of garnering votes or extending the reach of political parties. Conversely, traditional leaders can be used by the fragile states, such as Mozambique, as the reason not to extend local forms of democratisation.⁹⁷

Rights accountability – performance accountability

The accountability of non-state systems varies. Some may be more accountable than others. Some non-state systems may protect the prerogatives of the local power elite to the detriment of vulnerable and excluded groups, including women. Private security firms, for instance, may be more accountable to the clients who pay for the service, but less accountable to those who may fall under the private companies’ exercise of power. What may be required is that the state establishes minimum standards of procedure to which non-state systems must adhere. Similarly, efforts may need to be undertaken to raise awareness of legal and human rights, and methods established for appealing decisions rendered in the non-state system.

c) International actors

International actors – government development agencies, international organisations, peace support operations, non-governmental organisations and private-sector companies – are playing increasingly significant roles in security and justice delivery in fragile states. The roles vary depending on the actor and the context. The lack of capacity in fragile states and the need to regain a semblance of order, as quickly as possible, mean that international actors have an active role to play. In many fragile states emerging from conflict, there is often a regional or UN-mandated peace support operation and international actors may be directly responsible for the delivery of many security and justice services. In contested fragile states, international actors can sometimes have the benefit of being viewed as relatively neutral actors.

96. For lessons learned in donor assistance to non-state justice systems, see Penal Reform International (2000).

97. Kyed and Burr (2006).

Box 3. The role of international actors in security system reform in Solomon Islands

In 2003 the Australian government led a multilateral Regional Assistance Mission to Solomon Islands (RAMSI). The assistance mission was in response to a request from the newly elected Solomon Islands government for support in restoring the rule of law. Under the auspices of the Pacific Islands Forum (the regional multilateral organ), more than 2000 police and soldiers from many member countries landed in Solomon Islands with the mandate to “reinforce and uphold the legitimate institutions and authorities in Solomon Islands, and insure respect for the Constitution and the implementation of laws.” RAMSI’s first goal was to reinstate law and order.

Prior to RAMSI, the Royal Solomon Islands Police had effectively disintegrated as an agency for enforcing the rule of law across Solomon Islands. The early phases of RAMSI therefore depended on the regional Participating Police Force, supported by military personnel, playing an active role in restoring law and order throughout the country, providing a boost in law enforcement capabilities and re-establishing the trust of the people in the police force. The Solomon Islands government endorsed the priority given to law and order under RAMSI. Furthermore, the government agreed that the substantial increase in law enforcement capabilities (delivered through the Participating Police Force) meant that increased donor support to the criminal justice and corrections systems was also required. In addition, corruption and politicisation of the Royal Solomon Islands Police had been strongly associated with state decline in Solomon Islands; therefore reform of the police force was a key entry point for Australia’s increased engagement in Solomon Islands.

Another key aspect in restoring security – and an important entry point - was the introduction of a systematic disarmament program, which included a comprehensive weapons amnesty (in late August 2003) coupled with the demobilisation of “Special Constables” and their reintegration into society. Over 3,700 firearms have been removed from circulation in Solomon Islands.

With basic law and order largely restored in Solomon Islands, RAMSI has moved into the longer-term state-building phase. On the policing side, the emphasis on long-term reform is reflected in a transition from an active law enforcement role (with a strong operational focus) towards capacity development and sustainability. However in recognition that the security situation in the Solomon Islands will remain fragile for some time, the Australian government stands ready to deploy additional military and police capability to assist if law and order breaks down again. This preparedness to respond quickly was demonstrated during the post-election riots in Honiara in April 2006.

Given the integrated nature of the law and justice sector, support to policing is complemented by a comprehensive program of judicial and corrections strengthening. Attention is now focused on dealing with longer-term priorities and the re-establishment of an effective, accessible and sustainable law and justice system which regains and maintains the confidence of the Solomon Islands.

This approach offers lessons for donors operating in fragile states:

- restoring law and order is often the most pressing priority in fragile states;
- the transition from short-term crisis management to longer-term development is challenging and requires significant local capacity development;
- there are potential linkages between small arms control and police reform in fragile states;
- having a clear lead donor provides considerable clarity and increases the possibilities for co-ordination and coherence.

The comprehensive make-up of RAMSI’s support to the security and justice sector in Solomon Islands addresses police, justice, prisons, economic governance and machinery of government in parallel.

However, that may not always be the case and international actors are viewed as partisan figures that have sometimes been a party to the conflict themselves, as in Afghanistan, Iraq and Somalia.

When international actors are responsible for justice and security delivery, it is crucial to distinguish between the establishment of law and order, and developmental activity.⁹⁸ There is frequently a tension between the role international actors play in short-term crisis management and the longer-term development needs for building the capacity of local actors to provide sustainable justice and security. A fundamental problem that international actors face is that they are subject to political, reporting and accounting pressures in their home countries that have no relation to the fragile state environment in which they are operating. This, combined with the imperative of arresting insecurity, means that international actors often get frustrated by the pace of local reform initiatives and end up designing and implementing programmes themselves. The benefits of this approach, though, are invariably fleeting. Experience shows that investing time in involving local actors and building ownership pays dividends in the end. However, in some fragile state circumstances with their massive resource deficits, particularly in collapsed conditions, donors may have to initiate and manage the development process at the outset, building support and local ownership from the ground up.⁹⁹ Ensuring that this happens is vital. As a recent report puts it, “domination and paternalism by external actors generate resentment, resistance and inertia among local actors; local actors have little commitment to externally imposed products... The bottom line is that reforms that are not shaped and driven by local actors are unlikely to be implemented properly and sustained.”¹⁰⁰

Achieving local ownership is a process that often starts with ensuring effective consultation, participation and dialogue. Ownership may follow when stakeholders see evidence that they are being heard, and their views are reflected in consensus and outcomes. “A process-oriented approach that respects and empowers local actors is more likely to yield good results than a product-oriented approach that undermines local actors.”¹⁰¹ For example, in the Solomon Islands under RAMSI, the active involvement of the Solomon Islands Prison Service in the recruitment of international advisors (who have been tasked with assisting in capacity building of the Solomon Islands Prison System) has helped increase local ownership and empowerment. This has been the case particularly for infrastructure development and procedural reforms. The same can be said for the recruitment process in the justice sector. Key stakeholders, including the Chief Justice, Attorney-General and the Permanent Secretary of the Ministry of Justice and Legal Affairs, are involved in recruitment panels for advisors, prosecutors, defenders and magistrates. Solomon Islands government involvement in recruitment has also helped as a capacity-building exercise in itself, which has enabled officials to experience and apply good human resource management practices in the workplace.

International interventions in fragile states have significant potential to support peace building and conflict resolution. However, if poorly targeted, they can also exacerbate fragility. A conflict-sensitive

98. Dwan (2003).

99. OECD DAC (2005e), *The Challenge of Capacity Development: Working Towards Good Practice* argues that ownership is never likely to be a simple yes/no issue. Ownership is a matter of processes and trends, not the presence or absence of a particular quality. Also, ownership is not monolithic, something that is exercised by a whole nation or its government. Systemic constraints are likely to be important, and the highest level of leadership endorsement should be sought in all cases. But the potential for real policy ownership may vary across sectors or individual organisations (departments, agencies). The conditions may be right for donors to support locally owned processes of improvement in certain organisational spheres even when the conditions in the wider system and the overarching structural/institutional environment are unhelpful.

100. Nathan (2006), p. 3.

101. Nathan (2006), p. 3.

approach to the delivery of justice and security is, therefore, vital in all fragile states. This requires a comprehensive assessment of the root causes of conflict and fragility, such as a lack of participation of disadvantaged social groups, human rights abuses and land tenure disputes, and then a targeted programme to address these issues.

Short-term achievements – long-term development

International actors may often be able to achieve quick and effective results in the aftermath of conflicts. Ensuring, however, that international actors play a mentoring role to local stakeholders and institutions and transfer their skills is fundamental to moving fragile states along the development continuum. Equally important is the effort to support the development of the enabling institutional framework, structures and systems, in which the skills transfer is to take place.¹⁰² In Kosovo, for instance, after five years of international intervention, there was still no functioning Ministry of Interior within the government. Furthermore, it was only after UNDP initiated a police management programme that,

The procedures, processes and systems [came into being,] which are the backbone of [a police agency's] institutional administrative capacity in personnel, logistics, finance/budget, strategic management and procurement functions ... [The UNDP programme] has also had some success in binding the KPS to the Ministry of Finance and the broader Government as well as in designing and implementing a transition strategy for a future Ministry of Interior.¹⁰³

Progress in security and justice delivery in fragile states is often undermined by a lack of co-ordination among international actors. A recent report on SSR in the Democratic Republic of Congo highlights that “co-ordination remains problematic at best between donors who have diverging philosophies on the nature of these [specialised police] forces... The difference of approach was apparent during the management of street protests that followed postponement of the elections in July 2005, when most police performed well but Angolan-trained units adopted a heavy-handed approach to crowd control.”¹⁰⁴ Developing practical mechanisms for donor co-ordination is important to support service delivery and a key element in a multi-layered approach.

State building and centralisation of governance – responsiveness to local needs

International actors, particularly governments and international organisations, tend to work primarily with the national governments of fragile states on security and justice delivery,¹⁰⁵ even though 80% or more of justice and security delivery is often conducted in the non-state arena. Although strengthening governance is a key component of a multi-layered strategy, such international assistance may have little effect on the delivery of services and meeting the real security and justice needs of local people. Such support may also misconstrue the nature of the fragile state in the false belief that the state once had monopoly control over coercive force and violence. In most fragile states, the issue is not a

102. OECD DAC (2005e). Human capital development is a necessary but not sufficient element for development. Also required is the organizational and institutional capacity.

103. Rees (2006), p. 20; author interviews with UNMIK and UNDP staff (2003 and 2005).

104. ICG (2006a), p. 7.

105. When international actors do engage with national governments they often primarily engage with government ministries at the expense of service providers. A recent UN study of peacekeeping missions identifies that “the focus of ROL [rule of law] relationships with the executive (usually the Ministry of Justice) often overshadows the importance of the judiciary as a key and independent partner. For reasons of political import or expediency, the UN can unintentionally reinforce executive control and interference in the judicial realm by relying too heavily on relationships with executive actors.” This illustrates the importance of engaging with multiple service providers.

“re-creation of a state” as understood in Western parlance; nor is it a question of supporting parallel non-state structures that undermine state authority and capacity, given that there is little state capacity in the first place. Rather the challenge is to facilitate the “birth” of the “enabling contours of a sustainable state”, where the state may never have exercised sovereign control over the entire country, possessed a monopoly of force, or delivered accessible justice and security to a majority of its citizens. In fact, in addition to giving birth to “the enabling contours of the state”, the main governance challenge may be how to invigorate local and provincial levels of government as a means of strengthening the accountability of service providers to meet local needs. In fragile states, this is not an issue of decentralisation, but of establishing governance systems at the local and provincial levels that may have never existed (or functioned), at a time when the political leadership of the fragile state may be seeking to centralise state power and authority.¹⁰⁶

Rights accountability – performance accountability

The performance accountability of international actors is weak. Development actors are in theory accountable to their own governments, funders or electorates but there is little oversight or accountability of their work. In the countries where they operate, there are often few means by which local institutions or people can hold them accountable for their performance, thereby creating a fundamental challenge, which lies outside the scope of this report. Similarly, the rights accountability mechanisms are not strong, but recent cases of peacekeepers investigated for allegations of abuses indicate that they do exist.

A key issue is how donor assistance can help foster greater accountability of justice and security providers (state and non-state) by “better matching of local preferences to service delivery”.¹⁰⁷ As discussed above, in fragile states,

Despite the long-term presence of some kind of state apparatus, either in the form of colonial rule or an independent, though authoritarian, regime, local communities have often functioned according to their own, fundamentally stateless, structures, regardless of the paramountcy of the machine controlled by the capital city. Considerably older than the national identity, such social structures have proved profoundly resilient and easily resist quick interventions to build new ‘democratic’ institutions to replace the ones that have previously collapsed.... To avoid this scenario, and bridge the local-national gap, communities have to be integrated in the process of institution-building, where they live as well as at higher levels, in order to foster a sense of identification with the greater whole and a feeling of ownership of the alternative structure.¹⁰⁸

To achieve the accountability objective, one method of linking local non-state systems to state building processes may be through community-driven social funds, development initiatives that build local and provincial governance structures in conjunction with existing community, village and neighbourhood institutions. In Afghanistan this may mean working with local shuras; in Mozambique, a combination of village elders, elected councils and local administrative structures; in Indonesia, an extension of the Kecamatan Development Programme modified to the justice and security sector. In each and every fragile state, the non-state systems will be different and, therefore, so will the methods of

106. One of the principal lessons learned in decentralisation programmes is the imperative that local levels of governance have the financial wherewithal to function appropriately, which means the ability to generate their own revenues and/or to have the mechanisms in place by which such revenues can be transferred to them from national/federal coffers. In Africa, a recent study has indicated that in 19 out of 30 countries examined, “local governments control less than 5% of public expenditures.” See Social Development Notes, p. 2.

107. Social Development Notes (2004), p. 2.

108. Chopra and Hohe (2006), p. 7.

establishing the appropriate governance structures at the local and provincial levels. Key elements common to all contexts though are support to vibrant community organisations and locally driven, demand-based planning.¹⁰⁹

Strategic choices

There are a number of strategic choices in the development of a multi-layered approach to justice and security delivery in fragile states. A flexible approach is needed, but it is important to think and plan programmatically. Donors supporting the delivery of security and justice by multiple actors need to be aware of the basic strategic choices, and work with local partners to identify the approach most suited to the context. These choices need not (and often cannot and should not) be made at the start, but it is important to be aware of their existence. They include:

- benign neglect or toleration (by the state and donors) of non-state systems until the state can take over service provision;
- eventual incorporation of multiple service providers into a single system;
- evolution of a structured system of multiple and overlapping systems and jurisdictions.

Given the significant capacity constraints of the state, the first option fails to acknowledge the reality of justice and security provision in most fragile states and is, at best, a very long-term prospect. The second approach recognises the existence of alternative non-state providers, but in practice is often limited to recognising the right of traditional communities to use their own norms and dispute resolution mechanisms, without examining how the formal and informal systems will work with or alongside one another. Implementation, therefore, often remains problematic. The most realistic and desirable goal in the circumstances, therefore, may often be a combination of the second and third options. The goal should be to position the state at the hub of a network of justice and security providers. The result may not be a single, unitary system, for there will be multiple and overlapping systems and jurisdictions. Nevertheless, the state would provide the linkages, partnerships and regulatory frameworks needed to ensure effective, equitable and accountable service provision. A realistic and considered assessment of the desirable and likely end point of assistance can help donors structure support towards that goal. A multi-layered approach is a more nuanced and realistic objective than simply “state building”, and may often be more effective at meeting local needs.

Selecting aid instruments to support a multi-layered approach

One of the challenges for donors in supporting a multi-layered approach to justice and security delivery in fragile states is how to channel resources and structure programming. The lack of state capacity and the need to support multiple providers mean that relying on traditional methods of channelling large-scale support primarily to the partner government may not be effective. The level of political support for a progressive approach in fragile state governments is another factor. As a working paper produced for DFID put it, “In countries where there is little political will to invest and account for pro-poor expenditure, programme aid instruments such as budget support will remain inappropriate.”¹¹⁰ This is particularly true in deteriorating or collapsed fragile states. In fragile states recovering from conflict with new regimes that

109. Social Development Notes (2004), p. 3.

110. Leader and Colenso (2005), p. 7.

are committed to enhancing service delivery, however, budget support either directly to the government or through a trust fund can bring benefits. But even in these circumstances, the need to support multiple layers of service provision means that budget support should not be the sole approach.

Social funds provide a valuable means of disbursing resources to multiple service providers and client groups. These funds generally involve the provision of block grants to communities to be spent on micro-projects selected by the community, but they can also be scaled up to a provincial, regional or national level. They enable a decentralised approach to service delivery that is often important in fragile states, increase local participation and respond to local needs. “They can be effective mechanisms for delivering small-scale [service delivery] infrastructure and because they are demand-driven can promote both allocative efficiency and sustainability.”¹¹¹

Social funds, such as the Kecamatan Development Programme in Indonesia, are used widely by the World Bank and have grown in popularity in many countries for the development of local infrastructure, education, health and water services. For example, the Yemen Social Fund for Development (SFD) is a public agency that has had a significant impact in a difficult environment. “The autonomous setup and a flexible, demand-driven approach to service delivery has allowed the SFD to successfully scale up its operations...evidence points to SFD’s success in reaching poor and disadvantaged groups.”¹¹² Its financing rose from USD 80 million for the first phase starting in 1997 to USD 340 for the third phase starting in 2004.

The potential of social funds to support a multi-layered approach to justice and security delivery has not yet been broached, though this may be beginning to change. In Uganda, for instance, the Northern Uganda Social Action Fund has established a pillar on conflict management and has targeted support to a range of community reconciliation and dispute resolution initiatives. SSR programmes in other countries currently in the planning phase are looking to extend the use of social funds for justice.

The relationship of social funds for justice with government structures is a key design issue. It will depend largely on the commitment of the government to pursue a multi-layered approach to service delivery, recognising the necessity of devolving authority to local communities and non-state actors. Various configurations and levels of government involvement are possible according to the local context. When sensitively designed, social funds for justice do not undermine the state by creating parallel structures, especially when effective state systems and service delivery structures have never existed. Rather they may provide a flexible means of strengthening a wide range of local actors in their provision of effective, legitimate and accountable service delivery, while simultaneously increasing state capacities by developing its position at the hub of this network of provision. As grants are often seen as coming from the government, they may also provide a means of enhancing the legitimacy of the state. There are clearly risks with any choice of aid instrument in fragile states, but social funds for justice can enable “a ‘venture capital’ approach...that acknowledges high risk, but high returns.”¹¹³

111. Leader and Colenso (2005), p. 31.

112. World Bank (2004a), p. 2.

113. Leader and Colenso (2005), p. 54.

IV. Practical Experiences of Justice and Security Delivery in Fragile States

This part of the report reviews experiences of donors working to support justice and security delivery in three different types of fragile states identified by the OECD: countries where security and governance are deteriorating, countries (or parts of countries) where the state has collapsed, and countries recovering from conflict. Recommendations are offered, based upon case studies, on ways in which a multi-layered approach could target donor support to strengthen service delivery in these different contexts. Some of these recommendations apply to all categories of fragile states. Taken together, the recommendations suggest ways to develop an enabling environment for service delivery in fragile states by targeting support to a range of service providers (state and non-state) and strengthening their accountability.

Table 2. OECD DAC typology of fragile state contexts

Declining/Deteriorating	Collapsed	Recovering
Capacity and/or willingness to perform functions in decline (indicators falling). May have weak rule of law and authoritarian regimes. In some cases, donors may be unwilling to work with government because of human rights issues	State no longer able to function in most of its territory, and little or no government for international actors to engage with. Chronic conflict likely.	Includes post conflict and early recovery – willingness may be low or high but capacity extremely weak. Risk of return to conflict in post-conflict transition high and focus will be on initial peace building. In early recovery, more evidence of willingness.

A) Deteriorating fragile states

Because of the downward spiral in which deteriorating countries find themselves, these fragile states pose a complex set of challenges for development donors in their support to justice and security provision. Deteriorating states exhibit low capacity and/or political willingness, which is often associated with an erosion of the state's perceived legitimacy.¹¹⁴ "Channels of political expression, mechanisms of accountability, administrative capabilities" are all under-developed.¹¹⁵ Managerial control of justice and security is often weak or non-existent, while social cohesion is fragmenting and possesses little resiliency to the ongoing strife. The impact of deterioration in security and governance on excluded and vulnerable groups is particularly acute, with their access to justice and security decreasing proportionally more than it does for other groups.¹¹⁶

The populace's reaction to a deteriorating environment in which justice and security service delivery markedly decreases includes a range of responses, such as:

- increased use of non-state systems;
- banding together to apply group pressure;

114. Meagher (2005), p. 11.

115. Meagher (2005), p. 11.

116. UNDP (2005b), p. 11.

- seeking assistance from influential third parties;
- abandonment of justice and security systems (state and non-state) for the seeking of redress.

These responses are compounded by the fact that in many deteriorating environments, state justice and security providers modify and lower the norms of legal procedures.¹¹⁷ The challenge for development donors is how to support service delivery given this constellation of factors. The appropriate response is determined largely by the political commitment of the state to address the declining situation and to provide increased justice and security for local people.

B) Deteriorating states without political commitment

A classic case of a deteriorating fragile state where political will was in short supply is Nepal, prior to the most recent democratisation efforts during early spring 2006. The country had been suffering a civil war and the state exercised control over only limited areas of the country, mainly urban centres.¹¹⁸ The police had “insufficient resources and coordination to properly conduct investigations, together with a weak monitoring of the investigation process”, all of which resulted in “low prosecution rates... creating a favourable environment for the widespread use of torture.”¹¹⁹ The attorney general’s offices had “a substantial backlog of cases and a high rate of failure”... and faced “constraints in jurisdiction and weak capacities to monitor/direct police investigation.”¹²⁰ Allegations of human rights abuses by state security services had been spiralling upward with beatings and deaths recorded. These factors, coupled with a state of emergency declared by the King, resulted in a withdrawal or diminution of activity by many international development donors.¹²¹

Recommendation 1: Stay engaged by focusing on long-term development building blocks and support to broad-based human rights activities

Donor risks are high in a deteriorating environment in which the fragile state exhibits little commitment to undertake justice and security sector development. Nevertheless, experience suggests that it is important to remain engaged with security and justice institutions, where possible. A multi-layered approach recommends a focus on:

- non-coercive elements of the security system, such as state-delivered justice;

117. UNDP (2005).

118. Case study presented by Nepalese participants at OECD Fragile State Workshop, London, 24 March 2006.

119. UNDP (2005a), p. 6.

120. UNDP (2005a), p. 6.

121. UNDP (2005b), p. 30: “Human Rights Watch situates Nepal as the world leader in ‘disappearances’, with at least 1 200 people allegedly missing after being detained in the past four years. According to the National Human Rights Commission of Nepal (NHRC), government security forces have been responsible for approximately 2000 extrajudicial killings since 2001. The total number of disappearances reported by the NHRC between the years 2000 and 2004 is 808.” See also case study presented by Nepalese participants at OECD Fragile State Workshop, London, 24 March 2006.

- activities of community organisations, non-governmental organisations, bar associations and independent lawyers groups engaged in the protection of human rights, the monitoring of allegations of abuses and the defence of victims.¹²²

In deteriorating environments a significant range of activities can be conducted to promote the provision of state-delivered justice. USAID's experience in El Salvador, during the civil war, is emblematic of how to develop the building blocks for enduring judicial reform. During the 1980s, USAID supported efforts to "introduce non-political research and public consultation to the formulation of legal policy and draft legislation on key themes such as criminal procedure and family law."¹²³ The results also included a new law establishing the judiciary, the creation of a public defenders service and the establishment of a judicial training institute.¹²⁴ Equally importantly, USAID assisted the El Salvadorian Supreme Court in resuming the "publication of laws and [a] digest of its opinions for the information of judges and the public."¹²⁵

Additional judicial building block projects that can be initiated during periods of deterioration include the modernisation of court administration: the manner in which it is structured and organised, its procedures and its training programmes. To accompany new codes of procedures (civil and criminal), bench books and digests can be published and disseminated and integrative financial budgeting introduced. Prison reform can also be initiated during periods of deterioration in much the same way, with an emphasis, for instance, on juvenile law, as accorded in El Salvador. Other initiatives could include modernising prison law, strengthening the education of prison personnel and improving in-prison health facilities. All of these programmes are long-term projects that need not necessarily await a cessation of conflict, but each is a fundamental cornerstone upon which enduring and sustainable state justice can later be provided.

To supplement and complement the building block approach, a multi-layered strategy would also recommend extensive engagement with human rights activities. The donor community can support the work of community organisations, non-governmental organisations, bar associations and independent lawyers groups, engaged in protecting human rights, monitoring allegations of abuses and defending victims.¹²⁶ The level and nature of human rights abuses are good indicators of a worsening security and justice situation. It is important to be able to record abuses because the instruments used to analyse human rights allegations may be converted, in time, to performance assessment tools once the political situation stabilises, thus, initiating the possibility of multiple forms of accountability oversight.

Donors can also support the creation of legal libraries, the establishment of legal clinics for lawyers to gain experience and the training of paralegals, justices of the peace and lay judges to work in local communities. Experience shows the benefits of supporting inclusive justice networks, bringing together various non-state actors (as USAID did in Central America) to strengthen legal awareness and advocacy, while initiating the process of formulating strategic frameworks and policy orientations that will be needed once the political situation solidifies and development can take place.

122. Presentations and comments at the OECD Fragile State Workshop, London, 24 March 2006.

123. USAID (2002), p. 66.

124. USAID (2002), p. 66.

125. USAID (2002), p. 67.

126. Presentations and comments at the OECD Fragile State Workshop, London, 24 March 2006.

Recommendation 2: Support non-state structures

In situations where direct support to the state is politically sensitive, a multi-layered approach advocates that donors, in addition to seeking ways to strengthen the state's provision of justice and security, should also look creatively at the range of non-state justice and security systems that service local needs in direct and immediate ways. Approximately 90% of all Nepalese disputes appear to be addressed through non-state actors and mechanisms, even though these procedures are not legally recognised.¹²⁷ The state systems have little presence outside urban centres, are considered illegitimate, and/or are perceived (in comparison to non-state systems) to be less effective, too expensive, unaccountable and non-responsive to local needs.¹²⁸ As a UNDP-sponsored study concluded,

Judicial remedy of disputes are not easy, quick and inexpensive because it is a slow and lengthy process with lots of bureaucratic hassles and in some of the cases it continued for decades. The scenario for rural people in this regard is further aggravated by the difficult accessibility to most of the district headquarters where the district courts are situated. As such, in most of the cases for the rural population of the country, the possibility of easy judicial remedy becomes more remote.¹²⁹

In worsening conflict and human rights situations, non-state security and justice providers are the safety net at the community level and, perhaps, the only service delivery that addresses basic local needs. It is imperative, therefore, that the donor community support their activities.

Recommendation 3: Support women's groups and women's access to justice

Non-state justice and security systems often adapt and endure in deteriorating environments. As in the case of Nepal, some "informal providers of justice [have been] displaced by the conflict or [can] no longer function."¹³⁰ Interestingly, a high percentage of these displaced providers are most likely males and "in their absence women groups become increasingly active, taking up some of the functions of more traditional providers."¹³¹ Research shows that "women's groups and [non-governmental organisations] seem to have a particular resilience"¹³² and flexibility to cope with changing and deteriorating situations. In Guatemala and Somalia, women have been at the forefront of peace movements. It is also well known that, in the provision of micro-credits, women and women's organisations are the most effective way not only of stimulating economic activity and growth, but of promoting social cohesion. The evidence, therefore, seems to support the case for donor assistance to these organisations as one of the primary vehicles in a multi-layered provision of justice.¹³³ Paradoxically then, deteriorating environments may

127. Case study presented by Nepalese participants at OECD Fragile State Workshop, London, 24 March 2006.

128. Pun and Bhandari, and UNDP (2005b). It should also be noted that the Maoist insurgents have established a justice system in areas of the country under their control. The fear instilled by the Maoists in the population should not be minimised, further constraining access to justice.

129. Pun and Malla (2003), p. 9.

130. UNDP (2005b), p. 38

131. UNDP (2005b), p. 73.

132. UNDP (2005b), p. 73.

133. For a case study in which women and a local non-governmental organisation were the main actors in a resolution of a dispute over water use, see Upreti (2000), pp. 11-20.

provide a unique opportunity for donors to strengthen women's rights by supporting their participation in non-state justice systems.¹³⁴

A broad range of programmes can be supported that raise legal awareness and promote legal rights. Local non-governmental organisations and other community groups have been utilised for the provision of paralegals, lay judges and/or justices who assist women to be the providers as well as recipients of enhanced justice. Donors have also supported local mediation and arbitration projects that have similar objectives. Efforts can encourage the recording and registering of disputes addressed in the non-state justice system, as women appear more conscientious than men in keeping records, a crucial first step in an eventual linkage between non-state and state systems.¹³⁵ With women as the core group, programmes can be bundled, addressing health, education and justice issues simultaneously.

Recommendation 4: Use political pressure and conditionality carefully while preparing for the future

In deteriorating contexts when the state is misusing the security sector, "high level [international] diplomacy and pressure... may be required."¹³⁶ Political engagement is vital to complement the multi-layered approach. It may be the case, however, that some forms of political conditionality are counter-productive because the fragile state government may have little incentive to co-operate and strengthen justice delivery. For example, in Nepal, donor assistance to bolster judicial independence had to be offered unconditionally because any preconditions would have hastened governmental withdrawal from development programmes, which would have only worsened the situation.¹³⁷

It is also important that donors adopt a long-term perspective in deteriorating contexts and maintain assistance and engagement, because human capital development benefits do accrue over time. Throughout Latin America and Africa, a number of emerging leaders are individuals who have participated in donor-assisted development programmes over the past 10 years. For instance, the Deputy Minister of Interior of Guatemala, in 2004, was a former non-governmental organisation leader whose organisation donors had supported. With the improving political situation, in her position as Deputy Minister, she has been able to apply the knowledge and experience she had gained.

Deteriorating states with political commitment

There are contexts in which the state may be strong, but the justice and security sector is fragile and deteriorating, unable to deliver adequate service. Jamaica, for example is a democratic, middle-income country with established governance structures, but its security situation has worsened significantly in recent years. Murder has risen from 232 cases in 1973 to 1 139 in 2001 and up to a record 1 669 murders in 2005.¹³⁸ "Violence occurs predominantly in 'garrison communities' where the state often exerts limited control. These communities are dominated by gangs led by 'Dons' that demand local support and are often aligned to rival political parties. The Government faces significant challenges to its law enforcement capacity in these communities, partly because the gangs are heavily armed but also because the Dons

134. UNDP (2005b), pp. 74-77.

135. UNDP (2005b), pp. 79.

136. Greene (2003).

137. Case study presented by Nepalese participants at OECD Fragile State Workshop, London, 24 March 2006.

138. UNDP Draft Programme Document (June 2006-May 2009).

enjoy widespread public support (they are considered benefactors and often provide basic social services). This support is strengthened by public mistrust in the police force, which is linked to its failure to provide security and a perceived lack of accountability.”¹³⁹

Recommendation 5: Support the development of a National Security Strategy

Supporting the development of a National Security Strategy is a good means of testing the government's commitment to address security and justice issues. It can also provide a valuable framework to address security and justice issues, ensure the involvement of a wide range of government and non-state stakeholders, and co-ordinate the support of different donors. In Jamaica, the British, Canadian and United States governments provided joint technical assistance to the development of the National Security Strategy. The strategy includes a comprehensive range of reform programmes including changes in the division of responsibilities between the Jamaican Police and Defence Forces, a review of the criminal justice and law-making systems, major reform of intelligence systems, a dismantling of organised crime organisations, and local crime prevention and community development projects in target neighbourhoods.¹⁴⁰

Recommendation 6: Support government security and development initiatives

In deteriorating environments where the government has the political will to address security and justice issues, it is important to target support to strengthen legitimacy in the eyes of local people. A key priority for international assistance in these contexts should be to build the capacity of security and justice providers to meet local needs. For example, USAID is supporting a community-based policing programme in Jamaica to help increase trust between the police and local communities, and strengthen accountability for service delivery. Programmes should target the root causes of crime and insecurity in deteriorating environments. This often requires linking initiatives to regain security with projects that increase access to social welfare and alternative livelihoods, and that strengthen the voice of communities in service delivery and planning processes. For example, DFID is supporting the Community Security Initiative led by the Ministry of National Security in Jamaica as a “Framework for action on revitalising security, social inclusion and the social contract.”¹⁴¹ This approach bundles the provision of different services together in target communities to try and undermine popular support for organised crime and demonstrate a “peace dividend” to local communities. In such circumstances, donors should align themselves with government initiatives and provide support directly to the ministries concerned.

Recommendation 7: Take an area-based approach

In many deteriorating environments, the fragmentation created by neighbourhood-related violence disrupts the natural radius of local economies and makes it difficult for government to provide services to citizens. For example, through “political and gang related activities the definition of ‘community’ in Jamaica has shrunk in some cases down to the level of city blocks. This makes it difficult for people to seek out services or employment as doing so may require them to cross dangerous and invisible borders in urban areas.”¹⁴² This fragmentation highlights the need for an area-based approach that links support for peace building, security and livelihoods approaches across selected communities.

139. UNDP Draft Programme Document (June 2006-May 2009).

140. Ministry of National Security (2006).

141. Ministry of National Security (2004), p. 1.

142. UNDP Draft Programme Document (June 2006-May 2009), p. 2.

Recommendation 8: Support balanced representation

In many deteriorating contexts, unrepresentative and unbalanced justice and security agencies may be a root cause of insecurity. If the government demonstrates the political commitment to address this issue, then donors should provide assistance “to balance recruitment among different factions and even provide preferential treatment to members of groups who had been discriminated against or precluded from government positions in the past.”¹⁴³ Public service reform invariably calls for a de-politicisation of the civil service, including the justice and security agencies; however, in a deteriorating context positive discrimination may be more appropriate. Such programmes are typical activities of post-conflict development and often written into peace accords, as in El Salvador, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Kosovo and Macedonia, but if the government demonstrates commitment they will pay dividends in deteriorating environments as well.

Such efforts may need to be highly localised, as was the case in southern Serbia with the establishment of an area-based, ethnically integrated security service. Development assistance included support for recruitment and selection, equipment, training and, most importantly, mentoring. A comparable attempt was made in 2001: the UN provided assistance to the state police service in Kisingani, Democratic Republic of Congo, a region that, at the time, was not entirely under the control of the state. Admittedly, neither of these programmes could be sustainable, even in the medium term, but that is not the primary issue in a deteriorating context. Instead, the need may be for immediate physical security and the challenge at hand may be to conduct initiatives that prove productive as initial steps in a conflict resolution and confidence-building programme. Over time, these initiatives might be incorporated into larger state-centric justice and security programming, as in southern Serbia, once the short-term, local needs have been accommodated.

C) Collapsed states

Countries or parts of countries where the state has collapsed pose significant challenges to donors trying to support justice and security delivery. In this category of fragile states, government institutions are often absent or new administrations are weak, transitional and in their early stages of development. Social cohesion, normally, will have been severely affected by conflict. This does not mean, however, that there is a lack of local structures, organisations and service deliverers. “The collapse of state authority does not necessarily mean the end of order. Alternative – non-state – systems of order tend to evolve in the process of state decay.”¹⁴⁴

The experiences of East Timor, immediately after the independence referendum and subsequent violence, and Somalia, illustrate this phenomenon well:

Notwithstanding the prevalence of violent crime, particularly in urban areas, and regular armed clashes between the factions, Somalia does not exist in a state of anarchy or chaos. Although lacking an effective central government, the country has had no lack of *governance* over the past decade. The latter has been established both top-down by powerful political interests seeking to entrench control

143. Rondinelli (2006), p. 21. In a similar vein, even if the state were to agree to engage in civil service reform (as various World Bank studies have suggested downsizing), “right-sizing” or consolidating public administration, although necessary, may be politically undesirable and, in fact, could be destabilising. In Yemen, for instance, civil service employment, particularly in the security services, is a stabilisation mechanism, one that reduces potential conflicts. See also World Bank (1998) and World Bank (2003c).

144. Anderson (2006), p. 10.

over particular towns and regions, and bottom-up by Somali religious leaders, businessmen and communities, attempting to establish basic security conditions for the normalisation of social life and the expansion of trade.¹⁴⁵

A report on the situation in East Timor in 1999 after the brutal rampage following the vote for independence from Indonesia posits that,

There is a general perception that these societies are characterised by ‘vacuums of power’. Yet quite the opposite is the case – societies refer even more strongly to their ‘traditional’ authority structure, as this is what is left after the destruction of the state apparatus and the withdrawal of a government.¹⁴⁶

The range and coverage of justice and security systems in collapsed states is often surprisingly high. “According to a survey on the availability of justice systems in Somalia by the World Bank and the UNDP, community based justice systems carried out by clan/community elders were reported to be available by 94% of urban and 97.8% of rural and nomadic households, followed by council of elders (85% for urban and 86.4% for rural and nomadic) and Islamic *Sharia* (47.8% of urban and 37.4% of rural and nomadic). [Only] 35% of urban households and 25.6% of non-urban households reported availability of the [state] judiciary system.”¹⁴⁷

In Somalia, many of these different sources of law are contradictory or overlapping. Customary law discriminates against women; determination of primacy and jurisdiction between and among the different providers are contentious issues; and the choice of applicable law is biased in favour of the stronger party.¹⁴⁸ The systems in place have many faults, but they also all have their own strengths. Most importantly, they have functioned and provided a basic service for Somalis over the past decade in the absence of a state.

Recommendation 1: Undertake a comprehensive assessment of who provides justice and security (state and non-state), where, when, how and for whom

It is all too rare for a development programme to undertake a comprehensive assessment of who (state and non-state) provides justice and security in real terms. If a multi-layered approach is to be adopted, it is essential that the entire spectrum of purveyors of justice and security be examined and analysed. It is equally important to understand the where, when, how and for whom justice and security is provided.

Time and again, little or no attempt is made to examine what the needs of local people are, who is actually providing security and justice in these contexts, and what the impact will be of international interventions on fragility. A case in point is East Timor where “no detailed and systematic study of local law was commissioned by UNTAET [UN Transitional Administration East Timor] throughout the course of its mandate.”¹⁴⁹ A more recent example is the UN 27 March 2006 Haitian National Police Reform Plan, in

145. Le Sage (2005), p. 13.

146. Hohe and Nixon (2003), p. 7.

147. Reported in Danish Immigration Service (2004), p. 27.

148. Danish Immigration Service (2004), p. 27 and Le Sage (2005), p. 7.

149. Le Sage (2005), p. 40.

which there is no mention of who may be the real security delivery actors on the ground, let alone an analysis of the non-state arena.¹⁵⁰

Recommendation 2: Be realistic and modest and support a range of service providers (state and non-state)

International actors need to be realistic and modest about what is feasible and sustainable in collapsed states. Even in collapsed states, international intervention does not begin with a blank slate and ignoring the service delivery providers to whom the local population is loyal will lead to failure. As one Timor-Leste commentator has written about the less than optimal results on the island, “what is important to consider when making these decisions is that institutions and systems that have little or no relevance to a people’s way of life are unlikely to be adopted in the short term.”¹⁵¹ This is true, even if the local non-state systems do not meet international human rights standards. As a consequence, a multi-layered approach to service delivery is vital to help meet the immediate local needs of collapsed states.

Attempts to impose a unitary justice system at the expense of all other justice providers, for example, are doomed or, worse, can unleash renewed conflict and violence. For example, in Somalia one commentator argues that, “efforts to force one [justice] system across all areas would undermine those systems that function locally, and ‘rule of law’ assistance could in those circumstances create more conflict by undermining the structures that currently underpin local peace and security arrangements.”¹⁵² This is partially what happened when the UN peacekeeping missions (UNOSOM I and II) attempted the “top-down re-implementation of the 1962 criminal and penal laws [which] undermined local rule of law initiatives.”¹⁵³

Even with the best of political commitments, it takes decades to rebuild the most basic physical, human and infrastructure capacities for state-provided security and justice delivery in collapsed states. The situation in southern Sudan is stark, but illustrative. “There are presently approximately 5 000 police in Southern Sudan’s five regions, while at least 38 000 are required according to the Chief of Police... There are presently 500 prison wardens... [and] an estimated 4 800 are required.”¹⁵⁴ What applies to the police and prison is similarly applicable to legal education, the judiciary, court administration and prosecutorial services. As the Head of the UNDP’s Sudan Rule of Law Programme says, “only 22 of the 750 trained judges envisaged under the CPA [Comprehensive Peace Agreement] are in place, highlight[ing] the need for establishing a paralegal training centre to fill the gap in the number of qualified professionals during the Interim Period.”¹⁵⁵

These huge numerical deficits begin to highlight the challenge given the dearth of training; the lack of infrastructure; the absence of institutional structures, systems and procedures; and the overwhelming capital costs required to enable the state sector to perform its assigned duties. “The judiciary has virtually no means of transportation, communication or other essential resources necessary to administer justice, such as libraries, law books or even the text of the few laws promulgated by the SPLM [Sudan People’s

150. UN DPKO (2006).

151. Hohe and Nixon (2003), p. 3.

152. Le Sage (2005), p. 8.

153. Le Sage (2005), p. 23.

154. UNDP (2004) Sudan Final Project Document.

155. Sherif (2005), p. 29.

Liberation Movement].”¹⁵⁶ The Multi-Donor Trust Fund is planning to support the building of 130 police stations across the south.¹⁵⁷ However, even once these are established, it is unclear how much justice and security 130 police stations or 750 judges can provide in a territory as large as south Sudan. Modesty, realism and sustainability all suggest that a multi-layered approach is needed. The capacity of the government in the south should be developed, not as the sole service provider, but as the regulator of a network of state and non-state providers, while non-state systems are given assistance at the same time.

Recommendation 3: Develop an overall strategy for justice and security development

The development and implementation of strategic plans face severe difficulties in collapsed states. It is highly unlikely that collapsed states possess the requisite capacity to participate fully in the design of those plans, let alone their implementation. Ongoing political disputes may impede agreement on the substance of a plan, if not scuttle it altogether. These challenges, although acute, do not negate the necessity of laying out a development framework for the justice and security sector. The absence of an overall strategic framework to guide the SSR process in Afghanistan from an early stage when the country was emerging from state collapse has been identified as a reason why the process has been characterised as reactive.¹⁵⁸

Given these problems, international actors will in most cases have to take the lead initially. “Planners have to determine which options are realistically achievable, with an emphasis on what is attainable given the strength of local paradigms, budgetary and time issues and political will.”¹⁵⁹ Importantly, planners will have to accept the overarching reality of fragile states: first, the government will be unable to meet service delivery needs for the foreseen future and, second, alternative methods of justice and security provision will have to be utilised. Strategic frameworks, therefore, should anticipate the establishment of partnerships and networks between state and non-state actors and plan accordingly. Planners should balance their concentration on the state’s role in delivering a direct service with its function in establishing regulatory schemes and the overall contours of service delivery by state **and** non-state providers. To understand the non-state sphere, local stakeholders must be involved because international actors will not be able to comprehend the complexity of the actors or systems. The involvement of local actors in planning processes is vital to helping develop ownership and capacity.

Recommendation 4: Focus on addressing priority security issues that will breed confidence

It is often critical in collapsed states to identify priority issues at an early stage: addressing them will have high visibility and help create an enabling environment for wider service delivery efforts. In the Democratic Republic of Congo, for example, donors have focused on building the operational capacity of the police to provide security during forthcoming elections.¹⁶⁰ This was a priority issue because if the elections were affected by riots and violence then the political transition would be seriously undermined. It also provides an opportunity for the police to demonstrate their worth to a doubtful population. Addressing this immediate security imperative provides breathing room for the longer process of developing a strategic plan (see below) to simultaneously take place.

156. Sherif (2005), p. 29.

157. Interview with DFID Senior Governance Adviser, 2 May 2006.

158. Sedra (2006), p. 107.

159. Hohe and Nixon (2003), p. 2.

160. Case study presented at OECD CPDC Fragile State workshop, March 2006, London.

Box 4. Pragmatic and realistic approaches to supporting policing and justice sector services in Eastern Democratic Republic of Congo

Donors wishing to support policing and justice sector service delivery in Eastern Democratic Republic of Congo face an almost unparalleled set of challenges relating to state fragility including widespread insecurity caused by foreign and national armed groups, ethnic and political tensions, and a corrupt and inefficient security sector.

In addressing this context, donors have designed interventions that balance a realistic perspective about what can be achieved in the short term with providing a strategic platform for institutional reform at a later stage. In the policing sector, donors are building police capacity to provide security for holding the next elections through planning, communications, training and equipment support. In the justice sector, donors are engaged in a Restoring Justice in the East of Congo project, through supporting aspects of the criminal justice system to demonstrate it can function while at the same time supporting a long-term planning process for reform with the Ministry of Justice.

These approaches offer lessons for donors operating in fragile states:

- Operational capacity development can be structured around specific but strategic tasks (e.g. policing for election security) which can bolster support from a doubtful public and provide confidence for planning for later reform. This results-based approach may be preferable to setting unrealistic and over-ambitious reform objectives that, if unsuccessful, can undermine both local reformers and the case for future help from outside.
- The importance of institutional sustainability must be balanced with strategies that respond to the imperatives of service provision. Sponsoring operational police and justice service performance (e.g. to deliver a credible outcome of trials) can build confidence in the workings of the system and is a short-term priority for donors.
- Where transitional or interim governments have yet to be legitimised through elections, donors cannot count on political ownership or commitment. In such cases, donors can still work with state sector institutions and act as sponsors to support short-term service delivery outcomes.
- Short-term confidence-building measures buy time to allow a more in-depth understanding of constraints and opportunities for longer-term reform programmes and institutional support.
- Understanding historical developments (e.g. policies to encourage soldiers to live off local populations so as to discourage coups, or the extractive purpose of the security and justice sectors) illuminates the complexity and challenges in setting service provision reform objectives. For OECD governments, this requires whole-of-government (diplomatic, defence and development) assessment and analysis.

Recommendation 5: Develop “islands of dependability”

Even in collapsed states where there is ongoing armed conflict and no political commitment to ensure an effective and accountable justice and security sector, progress on service delivery is possible. A recent evaluation of a UNDP/International Rescue Committee rule of law project in Darfur, west Sudan, highlights the advances in justice and security delivery made possible by the establishment of Justice and Confidence Centres in camps for internally displaced persons and nearby towns. Each one is staffed by 20-30 paralegals (women and men), drawn from the local community and provided with basic human rights training. They go out into their communities “helping people to resolve differences according to human rights principles, helping people to identify grievances and bring them to the appropriate place, including

providing mediation.”¹⁶¹ The paralegals have had a significant ripple effect in their communities, empowering the internally displaced persons, raising awareness of human rights and increasing the responsiveness of law-enforcement agencies. This has helped to begin to develop a valuable accountability mechanism for service provision in a context where none existed. This approach follows what one analyst calls “a strategy of ‘islands of dependability’” that can provide a reliable service to a certain geographic location in the worst environments.¹⁶² Bundling services together in these centres provides a base level of delivery that can be scaled up to neighbouring areas.

Recommendation 6: Start small and scale up

Starting small and then scaling up is an important lesson identified for service delivery in fragile states. Developing partnerships with non-governmental organisations can be a useful means by which donors can help test approaches through pilot projects (which can then be rolled out if successful). For example, in Eastern Democratic Republic of Congo, DFID is funding two international non-governmental organisations that are working with communities, supporting the establishment of a mobile court and training magistrates to provide transitional justice.¹⁶³ Providing services through this mechanism can be less high profile and risky for donors when working on sensitive issues, and enable innovative approaches to be tested before committing large sums of money.

Recommendation 7: Provide incentives to attract experienced national and international staff

A fundamental issue is the challenge of finding experienced and able personnel (both national and international) to work on security and justice delivery programmes in fragile states. The quality and availability of staff is often a decisive factor in the success of service delivery programmes, more important than the amount of financial resources. Incentives (financial or career development) should be provided to try and attract good staff. Personnel shortages are widespread in different fragile states. In Uganda, the government has great difficulty in getting government officials, magistrates and law enforcement officers to work in the conflict-affected north.¹⁶⁴ In Iraq, when the security situation was at its worst before the creation of the new government, “...manning [sic] for the CPA [Coalition Provisional Authority] was a particular problem. It hovered just above 50 per cent of authorized levels at best, and the US Government had no way of directing the civilian personnel with the right skills to deploy to Iraq. As a result, the entire effort was undertaken almost entirely with people who were in country for too short of time, working outside of their areas of expertise and often at levels of responsibility far above what they were accustomed to.”¹⁶⁵

d) Recovering states

The recovering category is, perhaps, the one in which the development community has the most experience. A recovering state is one in which the political situation has sufficiently stabilised so that “a government is in place and basic state functions are being re-established.”¹⁶⁶ The government may be

161. Maguire (2006), p. 17.

162. Meagher (2005), p. 25.

163. Case study presented at OECD CPDC Fragile State workshop, March 2006, London.

164. Interview with UNDP Programme Manager, April 2006.

165. Rathmell et al. (2005), p. 85.

166. Meagher (2005), p. 13.

transitional, having assumed power after a peace accord and prior to national elections, but it has a degree of legitimacy and the political leadership exhibits the will to lead the country out of crisis. In other cases, elections have taken place, but it should not be presumed that the elections have conferred full legitimacy on the government. There may continue to be elements within the country for whom the government may be less than legitimate, as was the case in Bosnia and Herzegovina despite numerous local, cantonal, entity and national elections. With regard to the recovering state's capacity, "the performance of government is extremely weak in terms of policy development and implementation," but these states generally demonstrate a limited but growing ability to deliver on their commitments.¹⁶⁷ Social cohesion remains debilitated and distrust may be rampant, but the country is on an upward, albeit slow, trajectory towards development.

It is generally recognised that there is a "window of opportunity" after the signing of a peace agreement. International actors need to act quickly to provide support to the delivery of security and justice. Nearly half of all post-conflict states slip back into conflict within five years of the signing of a peace agreement and a failure to provide security and justice is often a key factor in the resumption of violence.¹⁶⁸ Preventing the slide back to violence requires rapid and sustained donor support.

The list of countries that qualify as recovering fragile states is long, ranging from Guatemala and El Salvador to Peru, from Bosnia and Herzegovina to Albania, from Solomon Islands to Timor-Leste, and, in Africa, from Mozambique to Sierra Leone and Angola. The range of service delivery development activities suitable for donor support is equally long and there are many successful examples, including, among others:

- strategic national security dialogues and policy frameworks (Uganda);
- national security councils (Sierra Leone);
- non-governmental organisation security policy networking (Central America);
- community-based policing (Albania, Kenya, Nicaragua);
- judicial reform, court administration, alternative dispute resolution mechanisms, houses of justice (Latin America).

However, there are also a number of lessons identified about strategies to avoid in fragile states that are recovering from conflict. Important recommendations for donors include:

Recommendation 1: Focus on financial sustainability

Ensuring that initiatives to strengthen justice and security delivery are sustainable is a key challenge for donors. Given the degree of insecurity that exists within Afghanistan, significant levels of reform aid have been directed to the development of the Afghan military. "In the first nine months of 2005, more than 1,200 people were killed in factional and insurgent violence."¹⁶⁹ Nevertheless, the establishment of the Afghanistan National Army (ANA) "is widely viewed as a 'success story'... display[ing] a high degree of discipline, professionalism and combat effectiveness."¹⁷⁰

167. Meagher (2005), p. 13.

168. Human Security Centre at the University of British Columbia (2005).

169. Sedra (2004) p. 102.

170. Sedra (2004), p. 97.

The underlying challenge, however, is that the ANA is unaffordable as currently constituted. Setting aside monies required to fund the Afghan police services,

the recurrent costs for the ANA in fiscal year 2004/2005 were USD 171 million. This was equivalent to roughly 25 per cent of the Afghan government's entire operating budget of USD 721 million and 57 per cent of the country's domestic revenues of roughly USD 300 million for 2004/2005. If the ANA reached its force ceiling of 70 000 troops, expenditures for salaries alone would total USD 107 million. Adding costs associated to equipment and logistics, the recurrent budget of the ANA could reach upwards of USD 290 million, a prohibitively high figure. Even if state revenues were to increase substantially over the coming decade, the government would be hard-pressed to underwrite a force of this size, and international largesse will not fill the resultant funding gap.¹⁷¹

According to the World Bank, international assistance to the ANA and Afghan police services was not matched by comparable development of public administration reforms, salary levels were not co-ordinated with those of other civil servants and decisions on financial matters took place apparently haphazardly, without consultation and with little consideration of medium-term fiscal affordability.¹⁷² Strategic national security and policy framework planning was limited and Afghan reform concentrated too heavily on "train and equip initiatives", all of which only further compounds the sector's financial unsustainability.¹⁷³

As part of all strategic and policy framework planning (and even in the absence of such planning), justice and security service delivery assistance should forecast the costs to the fragile state of sustaining development programmes over a three- to five-year period, correlating those costs to expected state revenues. High levels of expenditure on security are understandable in the immediate post-conflict period, but they are most likely not sustainable over time. Unless a multi-layered approach is utilised, donors may be only postponing inevitable problems and new forms of insecurity when downsizing occurs.¹⁷⁴

Recommendation 2: Focus on managerial sustainability by strengthening management capacity

Donors frequently engage in wide-scale training programmes for justice and security providers in recovering contexts, but these are most often ineffective unless embedded in efforts to strengthen management capacity. The Guatemalan Peace Accords were signed in 1996, launching the country's recovery from civil war. One of the primary challenges to Guatemala's sustainable service delivery has been the paucity of managerial development. Police personnel are rotated annually, if not more frequently.¹⁷⁵ There is no legislation defining a police officer's career development or promotion possibilities and similarly no clear demarcation of the role of educators and trainers in the police academy. Some 70-80% of all detentions appear to be for misdemeanour crimes, suggesting a fundamental mismanagement of resources, planning and tactics, indicating that whatever police performance measurements may be employed are inadequate and/or inappropriate.

More telling, three sets of statistics stand out. First, "it is alleged that more than a thousand officers – perhaps up to five thousand, though that number seems to an outside observer as somewhat high –

171. Sedra (2004), p. 104.

172. World Bank (2005a), pp. 23-24.

173. Sedra (2004), p. 107.

174. It is forecast that the Guatemala's attempt to replace Mayan law with state law will fail, partially because it is unsustainable. Hessbruegge and García (2007).

175. USAID (2005b). p. 7.

have been provided with varying types of investigative training, whereas less than 14 of them currently serve as police investigators” or in comparable positions.¹⁷⁶ Second, “while up to 145 police officers were given ‘train the trainers’ courses in community policing, none of these officers are now assigned to the Police Academy.”¹⁷⁷ Lastly, it has been “claimed that the Guatemalan police [are] given only 45 minutes of ‘use of force and firearms’ training and virtually all of it [is] conceptual rather than practical.”¹⁷⁸ In addition, “US Embassy personnel openly acknowledged that middle management capacity is ‘zero’ while senior management capabilities are ‘almost zero.’ It was also asserted, ‘the police couldn’t care less’ about managerial issues despite almost three years of dedicated internationally-provided managerial training.”¹⁷⁹

In short, police reform in Guatemala has been less than successful and one of the primary reasons appears to be the lack of consistent, sustained attention to develop the requisite managerial capacities of the police. As the Guatemalan example suggests, stand-alone professional training initiatives are unproductive, ineffective and unsustainable if not accompanied by enduring and effective managerial development in terms of policy, establishment of accompanying regulation, and, equally important, a systematic, human capital improvement programme in which the skills required to utilise the new managerial processes are acquired.

In the absence of sufficient state police management and technical capacity, one approach is to involve the private sector. The CPLC in Karachi, Pakistan is a hybrid organisation involving local business leaders. It plays an important role in information collection, collation and analysis so that policing operations can be made more effective. The CPLC has had a significant impact on improving policing procedures, enhancing monitoring of police performance, setting standards, developing accountability mechanisms and providing access to justice for the poor. One analyst describes the CPLC as a “co-production organisation” that provides public services,

Through an institutionalised, long term relationship between state agencies and organised groups of citizens, where both make substantial resource contributions... The sharing of core state authority with non-state actors evolved as a response to a crisis of governance. The solution may not be ideal from every perspective, but it may be the best available in situations of crisis where government agencies are unable fully to perform core roles.¹⁸⁰

Recommendation 3: Work with non-state justice systems

One of the reasons for providing assistance to non-state systems in recovering fragile states is the simple fact that over 80% of all disputes may be resolved by such providers and that local populations will continue to adhere to them, such as the Mayan in Guatemala.¹⁸¹ In Burundi, “While this country did not suffer state collapse, the formal justice system is malfunctioning to the extent that the informal system has become the *de facto* court of first instance for the vast majority of the population.”¹⁸²

176. USAID (2005b), p. 9.

177. USAID (2005b). p. 9.

178. USAID (2005b). p. 9.

179. USAID (2005b). p. 6.

180. Masud (2002), p. 28.

181. Hessbruegge and García (2007).

182. Centre for Humanitarian Dialogue (2005), p. 4.

One key area for development assistance to non-state justice systems in recovering states can be supporting the resolution of land tenure disputes. Clashes over land rights, along with wrangling over other scarce resources, are often one of the major causes of conflict. In Timor-Leste an innovative programme, linking together the state with non-state conflict resolution mechanisms, is being adopted to address land tenure issues.¹⁸³ The first step is to map who owns what parcels of land and under what arrangements, given the likelihood that different types of ownership covenants exist not only for the land itself, but what lies on and beneath it. The agency that conducts the mapping exercise should be a state organisation, seen to provide objective data to all parties neutrally. However, this state organisation will, most likely, not possess either the national capacity to resolve disputes or the legitimacy to do so. “The preference throughout Timor-Leste [is] for local dispute resolution mechanisms where possible... [because they are] perceived as cheaper, quicker, fairer, more accessible, easier to understand, less corrupt, and more supportive of reconciliation between disputants than the court system.”¹⁸⁴ Fragile states may need to pass legislation authorising the establishment of such a land tenure dispute resolution mechanism, a law that could be the model for linking state actors with non-state justice and security providers.

There are, however, weaknesses in the Timor-Leste approach for recovering fragile states. “Local [Timorese] systems are weak in the area of women’s rights” and “Timorese disputants value access to a range of forums for matters that resist resolution at the local level.”¹⁸⁵ Mechanisms may need to be established by which disputes at one level can be applied to higher levels, which may include an application to state systems. Rights of vulnerable and excluded groups need to be protected through varying kinds of legal awareness, advocacy and education programming.

Many of these admitted weaknesses can be addressed by examining how the state and non-state systems interact with one another. It is known, for example, that in Mozambique one of the actual functions of the police is to mediate and arbitrate disputes, including criminal ones, often in conjunction with traditional local leaders.¹⁸⁶ If this is one of their acknowledged and accepted functions, it may be appropriate to establish minimal standards and procedures by which they carry out their activities rather than to allow them to engage in such activities without guidance.

Recommendation 4: Support transitional justice as part of overall capacity building of national justice systems

Support to transitional justice mechanisms is important in countries recovering from conflict. This is another area where non-state systems can play a role, as shown in Rwanda, where the Gacaca courts set up to deal with genocide cases have demonstrated how “the indigenous system has been successfully adapted to dealing with one of the serious obstacles to achieving healing in a post-conflict society.”¹⁸⁷

However, in some countries emerging from conflict, substantial donor funds have gone to supporting international or hybrid tribunals with “significant resources devoted to the prosecution of a small number of individuals with only modest leftover contributions to local judicial capacity.”¹⁸⁸ It is important that

183. USAID (2004a).

184. USAID (2004b), pp. 56 - 57.

185. USAID (2004b), p. 57.

186. Kyed (forthcoming).

187. Centre for Humanitarian Dialogue (2005), p. 2.

188. Carlson (2006), p. 13.

support to transitional justice bodies is placed in the context of overall judicial development and capacity building, particularly with regard to the delivery of justice by state providers. The UN Mission in Burundi has developed an innovative programme “which links and sequences funding for a hybrid tribunal to an initial period of local judicial capacity building.”¹⁸⁹ This provides an interesting potential model for donor support to justice delivery in recovering fragile states.

Recommendation 5: Integrate security and justice issues into national development frameworks

National development frameworks (for example, Poverty Reduction Strategy Papers or Transitional Results Matrices) provide an important opportunity to stimulate a more inclusive public debate on security issues in post-conflict societies and shift public policy towards a greater focus on service delivery. Including security and justice issues in these frameworks can help ensure that they are established as a development priority in national government and donor planning and budgeting.

In Uganda’s Poverty Eradication Action Programme and Sierra Leone’s Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper there is a specific pillar on security issues. However, security and justice delivery can also be addressed within the framework of governance. There is often a pillar on governance in national development frameworks, while there may be sensitivity to the inclusion of a pillar on security issues.

Experience in post-conflict countries shows that national development frameworks provide a means to address comprehensively a wide range of issues that are important for strengthening justice and security delivery including: the disarmament, demobilisation and reintegration of ex-combatants; security sector reform; small-arms control; and the provision of alternative livelihoods. It is therefore vital to involve all relevant government actors in security and development planning, including ministries of finance, defence and interior, as well as wider stakeholders including parliamentarians, non-state justice and security providers, and civil-society organisations.

Recommendation 6: Develop effective donor co-ordination mechanisms

A large number of international actors are often involved in providing support to justice and security delivery in countries emerging from conflict. This presents significant challenges of co-ordination. As one report puts it, “from the perspective of multilateral peacebuilding efforts, ‘herding cats’ is therefore an apt metaphor for the work involved in post-conflict security management.”¹⁹⁰ A key challenge is to develop an effective division of labour, while establishing common standards in areas such as training and ensuring that the important linkages between different justice and security delivery initiatives are made. As the SSR Handbook states,

It is important to ensure that dividing roles and responsibilities does not lead to a ‘stove-piped’ approach to SSR, as has been seen in Afghanistan. The Bonn agreement established five pillars for SSR-related issues, each with a lead donor. But this approach failed to take into account linkages between sectors and undermined an integrated approach. It has also failed to recognise the importance of local ownership in ensuring sustainability.¹⁹¹

189. Carlson (2006), p. 14.

190. Bryden et al. (2005), p. 3.

191. OECD DAC Handbook on Security System Reform (2007), p. 245

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Part 3

Whole-of-Government Approaches to Fragile States

Abstract: As recognised in the DAC Principles for Good International Engagement in Fragile States and Situations, interconnected challenges of governance, economic performance, insecurity and poverty are acute in fragile states, requiring close collaboration among defense, diplomacy, development and beyond. Good international engagement in fragile states requires a complex and coherent range of approaches and instruments if lasting peace is to be secured.

The study provides a synthesis of current whole-of-government approaches in seven donors' administrations, identifying several challenges to a whole-of-government approach, including differences in mandates, approaches, resources and considerable transaction costs. Recommendations include the need for political commitment, the need to engage a wide range of actors, joint analysis, country-specific joint planning, and creating the right incentives structure and knowledge management systems for actors involved to adopt a comprehensive approach.

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Executive Summary

Background

In 2005, the OECD Development Assistance Committee's (DAC) Fragile States Group (FSG) developed a draft set of Principles for Good International Engagement in Fragile States. These Principles highlight the fact that successful development in a fragile environment depends, at least in part, on well-sequenced and coherent progress across the political, security, economic and administrative domains. Working effectively across these domains requires donor countries to adopt a 'whole-of-government' approach (WGA), involving departments responsible for security, and political and economic affairs, as well as those responsible for development aid and humanitarian assistance. An OECD DAC workstream on policy coherence and WGAs in fragile states was initiated¹ to produce an agreed DAC framework or guidance on good practice for WGAs in fragile states that would inform international donor country practice.²

The scope of this study is limited to an assessment of existing WGAs, drawing upon the recent experiences of a number of OECD countries in fragile states.³

Rationale for Whole-of-Government Approaches to Fragile States

Resonating with global concerns such as international security and crime, fragile and failing states have increasingly become a preoccupation of the international community. Fragile states face problems in a wide range of domains (*e.g.*, provision of physical security, legitimate political institutions, sound economic management and the delivery of social services), indicating the need for a mix of actors, instruments, incentives and interventions.

As stated in the OECD DAC Principles for Good International Engagement in Fragile States, **the political, security, economic and social spheres are interdependent: failure in one risks failure in all others.**⁴ The case studies show that governments involved in fragile states recognise the need for, and the benefits of, WGAs to fragile states. Further, greater coherence between security and development policies is a key to establishing an effective WGA to fragile states, acknowledging the interdependence between the two fields. As a result, security actors and objectives related to the security domain are increasingly included in the development debate, as are economic actors, justice departments and others.

A clear benefit of a WGA is that it can contribute to the overall objective of long-term development and stability in fragile states at a lower overall fiscal cost. In addition, the risk of these objectives either being compromised, or simply not being met, is reduced. Finally, coherent policies and activities may have greater legitimacy in the eyes of the recipient country and will therefore be more likely to receive a positive response.

Challenges to Whole-of-Government Approaches to Fragile States

There are several challenges to the development and successful implementation of WGAs to fragile states. First, the case studies show that **political interests and priorities are important for successful WGAs**. Joined-up working becomes more important and receives more attention if a country is high on the priority list of national interest. However, not all fragile states receive political priority. Experience demonstrates that political attention focuses on (post-)conflict states. Not paying attention to non (post-)conflict states can lead to the risk of creating donor orphans.⁵ Moreover, achieving real progress in fragile states requires a long-term commitment. This is a challenge as political priorities often shift.

At the national level, **the constitutional and political context of a donor government poses a challenge to WGAs**. These factors have consequences for the (type of) political leadership, the position of departments and agencies within the government system, and the potential and options for joined-up working. In a political system that is characterised by coalition or minority governments with a typically give-and-take custom, joined-up working is not as easy to achieve as compared to systems where one political party can provide the prime minister and all cabinet ministers.

The case studies show that actors may approach work on fragile states from very different (though relevant) perspectives, ranging from counter-terrorism to governance, conflict prevention and peacebuilding, trade promotion or development co-operation. **The rationales for engaging in fragile states may differ and, at times, come into conflict**. It is important, therefore, to try to strike a balance among these different rationales and perspectives, in particular between development and security objectives. Furthermore, the roles of the actors involved need to be clarified (including who should take the leadership role). Here, the challenge of bridging differences in organisational culture among the actors involved needs to be taken into account. For example, departments for development co-operation will traditionally be more process-oriented, whereas defence or foreign affairs will tend to be more output-oriented.

The case studies suggest that there are **strong disincentives to working in close partnership with other government departments**, challenging the commitment of actors to become involved in a WGA. First, working horizontally in a multi-actor context requires more consultation and is therefore time-consuming. Second, it may require compromise and a willingness to dilute one's own policy agenda. Third, it can weaken individual (departmental) visibility.

Finally, **joint work can have huge resource implications in both financial and human terms**. The case studies show that in many cases the selected governments have not matched their ambitions for an integrated approach with sufficient resources. Specifically at the field level, a WGA requires sufficient staff capacity, both in terms of numbers and qualifications, to manage relations with other partners and implement policies in an integrated manner.

Main Findings and Recommendations

All case studies confirm the appropriateness of the Principles for Good International Engagement in Fragile States and highlight the need for them to be mainstreamed in OECD member governments. As there are nonetheless considerable gaps between what has been agreed in principle and the practice of ministries and agencies, mainstreaming of the Principles should be accompanied by efforts to develop the policy instruments and mechanisms required to operationalise these into assistance programmes.

The Need for an Overall Framework

The case study reports show that progress has been made: several of the countries have started to tackle the issue of more co-ordinated and integrated approaches. However, the case studies also find that none of the governments studied has developed an overall policy aimed at establishing a whole-of-government approach on fragile states. This can partly be explained by the absence of a clear definition of fragile states. As a result, **there seems to be a tendency to focus more on conflict and post-conflict countries**. Furthermore, it was found that involvement in fragile states is generally based on broader regional or post-conflict policy documents that often originate from development co-operation. The reports also show a lack of dialogue on what a joined-up approach means for the key actors involved. In the absence of such a dialogue, the risk of continuation of existing approaches remains.

The effectiveness of joined-up approaches may be improved by the creation of an overall framework for managing whole-of-government engagement in fragile states. Such a framework would consist of three elements: 1) a clear understanding of what fragile states are, which is shared by all relevant government actors; 2) a joint policy statement explaining the rationale for collaborative working in fragile states, together with the aims and how these will be achieved; and 3) a commitment to establish an effective dialogue between the key actors involved in a WGA, and to work on bridging differences in organisational culture. The suggested framework would enable early involvement of relevant actors (including those at the field level) and define their roles and objectives in a WGA. While important as an instrument for promoting and managing joined-up working, the creation of an overall framework should not result in a bureaucratic straitjacket that would create an additional layer of decision making. Rather, the framework should acknowledge the need for joint, country-specific approaches on fragile states.

The success of such a framework requires political commitment at the highest levels. Ideally, the process is driven at the level of a prime minister, and engages the relevant ministers for a whole-of-government-approach.

Who to Involve?

The study finds that, **when dealing with fragile states, it is important to engage with a wide range of actors**. The case studies show that, along the lines of the political-security-development nexus, currently foreign affairs, defence and development co-operation are the key actors in WGAs to fragile states. In order to create a WGA, evidence calls for increased involvement of other departments, in particular ministries of economic affairs and trade.

Other actors may also have a role to play, depending on the circumstances. Here, one can think of the police, ministries of finance and treasury, justice and migration. However, in light of the difficulty of co-ordinating the activities of a broad range of actors, these other departments should only be involved when they have a comparative advantage.

Joint Analysis

In order to improve the effectiveness of the activities of the different actors involved, they need to be linked to a set of broader, joint objectives. These objectives ought to be defined on the basis of joint analyses or assessments. The case studies make clear that in most countries investigated, this has not been the case.

At the national level, it is recommended that governments aim to conduct joint analyses of fragile states, and to share findings with the key ministries and agencies involved in order to set priorities

for action. The case study reports indicate that already a good deal of informal learning is going on, but that this could usefully become more institutionalised. Sharing experience among members of the Fragile States Group could be helpful in this regard. However, the case studies also show that the success of joint analyses and shared findings is, at least in part, dependent on a government structure that compels ministries to work together, as WGAs to fragile states do not emerge automatically or organically at the operational level.

Country-Specific Joint Operational Strategies

The case studies confirm that there is no “one-size-fits-all” strategy for addressing state fragility and show a need for developing practical, country-specific approaches for engagement in fragile states. Even though all governments investigated acknowledge the need for (joint) country strategies, there seem to be no clear guidelines on the development of such strategies. An overall framework could provide much-needed guidance.

Collaborative working is undermined by approaches that become fragmented and are guided by different – and potentially conflicting – departmental objectives. The case studies suggest that joint assessments early in the process allow for joint strategies, planning, monitoring and evaluation. Here, existing multilateral joint assessment mechanisms should be taken into account, in order to avoid duplication.

Co-ordination: The Need for Political Leadership and a Lead Co-ordinating Role

The study finds that **clear political guidance and leadership is the starting point for an effective WGA**, providing the actors with an understanding of the importance of their involvement. The study points to the need for clarity on who plays what role in creating an integrated approach, and the need for a lead co-ordinating role. Otherwise, the risk of fragmentation remains. How to establish co-ordination is crucial and sensitive; it should not be underestimated. Here, one should differentiate between leadership and co-ordination. The first implies that other ministries and departments have to follow directions; the latter indicates equal relationships which are essential for joined-up working.

A government's engagement in a fragile state covers different phases that require different types of involvement from different actors. This **engagement is not static: the roles and involvement of actors change according to circumstances**. In a simplified model this could imply that, for instance, defence and police may play a more central role in a stabilisation phase, whereas in a capacity-building phase, development co-operation may play a more central role. External interventions will be heavily politicised; hence, there will often be a case for diplomatic actors to play a key role. As the phases of engagement operate in parallel rather than in succession, attention should be paid to continuity and overall coherence, underlining the need for whole-of-government co-ordinating leadership.

Some of the case studies suggest that, **given their position, role and mandate, foreign affairs may be best positioned at headquarters level to take up this lead co-ordinating role** (in particular integrated departments and ministries of foreign affairs and development co-operation). These cases showed that at the field level, ambassadors or special co-ordinators originating from foreign affairs seem to be best positioned for such a lead co-ordinating role, supported in this task by representatives from development co-operation and defence. Other cases indicate that the lead co-ordinating role can also be taken on by other actors, depending on the modalities. Key is that a capable lead co-ordinating actor be identified. It is suggested that, in order to guarantee continued whole-of-government co-ordinating leadership, foreign affairs could act as a constant (co-)coordinating actor during all the phases.

Creating the Right Incentive Structures

The study finds that **joined-up working has considerable resource implications, both in financial and human terms**. In view of potentially high transaction costs, governments should acknowledge that there are disincentives for collaborative working (e.g., time-consuming, requiring compromise and a willingness to dilute one's own policy agenda, possibly less visibility). Similarly, existing and new incentives for joined-up working should be identified. An important incentive is providing the means and resources for joined-up working on fragile states, allowing ministries and departments other than development co-operation to devote part of their budget to fragile state activities.

A joint policy statement by the key ministers, providing the rationale for whole-of-government engagement in fragile states as well as the main objective, can also serve as an incentive for joined-up working, as it commits the key actors involved to enter into a dialogue. Furthermore, donor governments could use such a policy statement as a means of accountability for higher-level officials to put joined-up working into operation in their respective organisations. Governments should also be encouraged to identify institutional incentives in terms of trade-offs: working with other actors provides the opportunity to influence policy agendas and offers a means to access skills and resources which a department may lack.

Mechanisms and Instruments for Promoting Policy Coherence and Joined-Up Working

In addition to the need for an overall framework, joint country strategies and attention to process, it is imperative to have the right instruments to support political decisions on WGAs. The case study reports indicate that even where such instruments are available, their usage can be improved. In other cases, new instruments will need to be developed.

The case studies show that **institutional, budgetary and functional walls between departments can impede co-operation and co-ordination**. Instead, joint budget lines would foster integrated planning. Establishing such budget lines proves to be difficult however, or even impossible, given existing mandates and budget reporting requirements. Pooled funding is considered an important alternative instrument to foster integrated planning, allowing flexibility in support of activities which may be classified as official development assistance (ODA) and non-ODA. However, it is critical to avoid creating parallel structures, and instead to encourage the participation of geographic desks across relevant government departments (foreign, development and security) in the planning and implementation of initiatives funded by these pools.

Information Management Systems

In order to promote joined-up working **it is recommended that where possible the information management systems of different actors be integrated**. The case studies show that intra- and interdepartmental communication systems can be revamped to improve the technical features of access to information. Practical issues, such as insufficient levels of staff security clearance, can be a significant impediment to accessing information and creating a shared understanding of sensitive issues and problems, both at headquarters and field levels. In order to make joined-up working more effective, participants need adequate information access if they are to enter into dialogue with colleagues from other ministries.

I. Introduction

Background

The topic of fragile states is increasingly gaining ground on the international agenda, including within the OECD Development Assistance Committee (DAC). The DAC characterises fragile states as those countries where there is a lack of political commitment and/or weak capacity to develop and implement pro-poor policies. In addition these countries tend to be characterised by poor governance and by being prone to violent conflict.⁶

In order to deal with the specific issues and needs of fragile states, the DAC 2003 High-Level Meeting established the Fragile States Group (FSG) (see Box 1). The work of the FSG was brought together at a Senior-Level Forum on Fragile States that was held in London in January 2005. One of the outcomes of this Forum was that a draft set of Principles for Good International Engagement in Fragile States be developed. The Principles (see DCD/DAC(2006)53) reflect lessons on development effectiveness derived from experience in fragile states, covering issues including: priority interventions, alignment, aid instruments and aid allocations, donor coherence and co-ordination.⁷

Box 1. What is the Fragile States Group?

The purpose of the OECD DAC Fragile States Group (FSG) is to facilitate co-ordination among bilateral and multilateral international actors in order to improve development effectiveness in fragile states. It brings together knowledge from experience, research and lessons learned on the design and implementation of development approaches in fragile states.

The Fragile States Group was established at the 2003 DAC High Level Meeting. That meeting asked the Network on Governance (GOVNET) and the Network on Conflict, Peace and Development Co-operation (CPDC), with input from other Networks and Working parties, to jointly work on issues relating to fragile states. It also agreed that this work should be carried out in conjunction with the World Bank Group, UNDP and the European Commission.

The Principles highlight that successful development in a fragile environment depends, at least in part, on well-sequenced and coherent progress across the political, security, economic and administrative domains. Working effectively across these domains requires donor countries to adopt a “whole-of-government” approach (WGA), involving departments responsible for security, political and economic affairs, as well as those responsible for development aid and humanitarian assistance.

The OECD DAC members had previously recognised the importance of integrated approaches for conflict-affected fragile states, in particular in their commitment to, “strive to increase coherence among our policies – trade and investment, foreign affairs and defence, and development co-operation – that impact on conflict prevention”.⁸ In 2004, DAC guidance to support donors in

their work on security system reform and governance, where collaboration across ministries and departments is fundamental, was adopted.⁹

To deepen understanding of the issue of whole of government and improve knowledge of existing good practice in the area, an OECD DAC workstream was initiated on policy coherence and WGAs in fragile states.¹⁰ The workstream would assess experience and practice, and produce an agreed DAC framework on good practice for WGAs in fragile states, which should inform international donor country practice.¹¹ The present study is an output of the workstream.

Objectives and Scope of the Study

The objective of the study is to assess existing whole-of-government practice with a view to develop practical guidance in the future application of effective whole-of-government arrangements in fragile states.¹²

For the purpose of the study, a whole-of-government approach is defined as “one where a government actively uses formal and/or informal networks across the different agencies within that government to co-ordinate the design and implementation of the range of interventions that the government’s agencies will be making in order to increase the effectiveness of those interventions in achieving the desired objectives”.¹³

To achieve this broad objective, the scope of the study has been limited to an assessment of existing WGAs developed within a select group of OECD governments: Australia, Belgium, Canada, France, the Netherlands, Sweden and the United Kingdom. In order to provide an in-depth analysis of specific whole-of-government initiatives implemented within partner countries, the study has focused on a small group of recent field-level examples: Democratic Republic of Congo (linked with Belgium and France), Haiti (linked with Canada), Solomon Islands (linked with Australia), Sudan (linked with Sweden and the Netherlands) and Yemen (linked with the UK).¹⁴ The case studies have been selected with a view to linking headquarters-level WGAs with specific in-country experience.

It is important to note that the study does not evaluate existing WGAs. Rather, the study focuses specifically on trade-offs, processes, mechanisms and instruments that contribute to effective WGAs in fragile states. However, it should be noted here that the assessment of the cases for this study suggests that in terms of joined-up working a lot of progress has been made over the last years. There also seems to be an increasing interest in cross-governmental co-operation, in particular in the work on the security and development nexus.

The scope of the study is not limited to the selected governments’ fragile state policies, but includes broad policy documents on policy coherence and WGAs. In line with the areas identified in the Principles for Good International Engagement in Fragile States, the study focuses on the engagement of the selected governments on the political-security-development nexus. The study also considered WGAs in terms of economic issues (*e.g.*, arrears, trade, extractive industries), immigration and humanitarian assistance. The country reports indicate an interest in moving beyond the political-security-development nexus, and encourage involvement of ministries of economic affairs and trade.

Limitations of the Study

The study has a number of limitations. First, the study focuses predominantly on process. This does not imply that content is not of importance; rather, the aim of this report is to map the process of bringing WGAs to fragile states in order to maximise synergies of cross-governmental co-operation.

Second, the study focuses predominantly on best practices of WGAs to fragile states. As the study does not entail an in-depth evaluation of WGA practices, it is not possible to provide a balanced assessment of joined-up working in terms of both positive and negative consequences. Wherever possible, the report does provide insight in the difficulties that stem from joined-up working.

Third, the study looks at cases that almost all deal with post-conflict situations. The concept of fragile states however, is not limited to post-conflict countries. In this study, Yemen is the only non (post-) conflict country. From the perspective of prevention (i.e., deterioration of fragile states to conflict states) it is important to broaden the scope. It is advisable that future studies on fragile states take note of this fact, as well as of the implications this may have on WGAs.

Fourth, the study does not examine the perspectives of partner countries and major international actors on the selected governments' WGAs. The case studies provided little or no input on this subject due to lack of opportunity to contact these actors.

Structure of the Report

The report is structured along the following lines:

Section 2 provides a synthesis of the assessments of existing WGAs as presented in the different case studies. The assessment is structured along the following categories: conceptual/policy level, tools and instruments, and process (co-ordination and management).

Section 3 presents recommendations on WGAs in fragile states and key orientations for donor governments, as well as the FSG and the DAC, in terms of future applications of WGAs.

II. Assessment

Introduction: Rationale for Whole-of-Government Approaches to Fragile States

Before the 11 September 2001 attacks, fragile states were mainly seen as countries facing serious developmental challenges, often lacking a functional government. As such, most fragile states had little broader strategic significance for OECD countries. Consequently, their problems were perceived primarily through a development and humanitarian lens. This perception changed following 9/11, however, and fragile and failing states have increasingly become a preoccupation of the international community.

For the purpose of this study, the defining features of state fragility are to be found in a state's inability or unwillingness to provide physical security, legitimate political institutions, sound economic management and social services for the benefit of its population. While there are differences in the way these states are described ("weak", "failing", "failed", "collapsed", "fragile", "at risk", or "precarious"), it has become clear that such states are linked to a range of threats such as trans-national crime; trafficking in weapons, drugs and human beings; the spread of disease; intra-state and regional violent conflict; genocide; and terrorism. As this wide range of threats is not limited to the territories of these states, precarious statehood is considered to have ramifications for regional and global security.¹⁵ The fact that fragile states can face problems in a wide range of domains indicates the need for a mix of instruments, incentives and interventions, as well as actors, to be involved.

However, notwithstanding the prominence on the international foreign policy, security and development agendas, attempts to deal with precarious states have proven complex and problematic. Most recently, interventions in Afghanistan and Iraq have revealed the limitations of traditional diplomatic and military interventions. Experiences in Bosnia and Herzegovina, and Kosovo have taught security actors that predominantly military responses are insufficient for multidimensional state-building and post-conflict peace-building processes. Development actors have come to realise that successful long-term development in impoverished nations is impossible when incapacitated states cannot deliver the collective goods of basic security and effective governance. Both development and military actors are also aware of the fact that short-term, *ad hoc* responses in which national and international policies lack coherence and co-ordination will not be successful. As a result, the focus has now shifted to improving state-building capacities through better joined-up working.

This new quest for policy coherence across domains can also be found in the OECD's draft Principles for Good International Engagement in Fragile States, where it is stated that it is important for the international community to work in a coherent way across diplomatic, security, development and financial domains when engaging in fragile states.¹⁶

The challenge for governments involved in fragile states is to establish clarity on and coherence in objectives. These objectives are likely to differ among the departments involved. For instance, the promotion of sustainable development is not the primary mandate of all government departments. Therefore, ministries may promote national interests rather than the interests of a partner country, which, from the perspective of development co-operation, is problematic. When dealing with the problems of precarious statehood – and in particular the wide range of potential threats emanating from them – the issue therefore is how governments determine their priorities for engagement in fragile states. From the perspective of the OECD DAC, the question more specifically is where development outcomes should rank *vis-à-vis* trade, counter-terrorism, national defence and other political objectives of donor countries.

One cannot conclude that the interconnectedness of the key areas for successful engagement in fragile states will result in a well-sequenced and coherent progress across the political, security, administrative, economic, and humanitarian and emergency domain.

The case studies show that the selected governments recognise the need for, and the benefits of, WGAs. They are increasingly developing new mechanisms and instruments to promote joined-up working among different government actors. Specifically, greater coherence between security and development policies is recognised as key to establishing an effective WGA on fragile states. Yet, it is also clear that there is no single blueprint for such a WGA; there are many differences in WGAs across OECD governments, as well as in the effectiveness of these.

In terms of benefits, it is apparent that in order to be more effective, policy coherence and WGAs should go beyond providing a collection of independent policies guided by departmental mandates. If not, the risk of policy incoherence is magnified. The advantages of coherence are clear: more coherent policies and activities can contribute to the overall objective of long-term development and stability in fragile states at a lower overall fiscal cost. In addition, the risk of these objectives either being compromised, or simply not being met, is reduced. Finally, from the perspective of harmonisation and alignment, coherent policies and activities may have greater legitimacy in the eyes of the recipient country and will therefore be more likely to receive a positive response. Achieving policy coherence within governments of international actors, as well as between the international actors and partner governments, may be one critical determinant of successful outcomes in fragile states.

Progress has been made already in the field of security system reform (SSR), which was one of the first areas where the need for a whole-of-government approach was recognised. The work on SSR brings together the development community with their military, intelligence, police, prisons, civil society, judicial and customs services colleagues. However, although SSR indicates the need for a WGA, policy instruments that can promote policy coherence among these actors were largely absent. This has led the OECD DAC to provide *DAC Guidelines on Security System Reform and Governance*, which were agreed upon by development ministers and agency heads in 2004. Currently, the SSR work of the DAC is taken one step further. Although not the direct focus of this study, it should be noted that the DAC is developing a policy instrument (Implementation Framework for Security System Reform (IF-SSR)) that can provide a unifying framework for development, security and diplomatic interests working jointly on security system reform. For this study on WGAs, it will be relevant to link the two activities to ensure that they incorporate knowledge on the political and technical aspects of their work, and build the necessary linkages across government.

Challenges to Whole-of-Government Approaches to Fragile States

The case studies for this report identify several challenges to the development and successful implementation of WGAs to fragile states. First, the case studies underline the importance of

political interests and priorities for successful WGAs. Joined-up working becomes more important and receives more attention if a country is high on the priority list of national interest, regardless of formal structures, mandates or parochial departmental factors. The challenge is how to create political interest. A second challenge is the constitutional and political context of a donor country, which has consequences for the type of political leadership, the position of departments or agencies for development co-operation, and the potential and options for joined-up working. Third, the case studies show that a key challenge for whole-of-government engagement in fragile states is to balance different rationales and perspectives of actors involved, as well as to clarify the roles of the actors and to establish who should take a leadership role. Fourthly, evidence also points to the challenge of bridging differences in organisational culture among the actors. A fifth challenge identified by the case studies is the lack of incentives for departments to work collaboratively with other government counterparts. In many cases, there are strong disincentives to work in close partnership with other government departments. Finally, the case studies show that joined-up working can have huge resource implications in both financial and human terms. Evidence points out that in many cases donor governments have not matched their ambitions for an integrated approach with sufficient resources.

This section of the report will take into account the above mentioned challenges and assess the different selected governments' responses to these challenges in assessing the different WGAs developed. The assessment will first focus on the conceptual/policy level of WGAs to fragile states, and will then look into the different tools and instruments developed for these approaches, as well as co-ordination and management mechanisms which have been developed and implemented.

Conceptual/Policy Level

Constitutional and Political Context

When assessing donor governments' WGAs to fragile states, it is important to take the constitutional and political context, as well as the agenda of national interests, into account. These factors have consequences for the type of political leadership and the potential and options for joined-up working, which can range from mere information sharing at the one extreme to a fully integrated approach on the basis of one common policy at the other.

The countries investigated represent a variety of political systems and legislative processes. These differences present opportunities and constraints on cross-governmental working. For instance, in some countries responsibilities for policy making can be delegated to other bodies (e.g., a regional or local body like a state or province, as is the case in Belgium). In these cases, there can be different decision-making levels involved in a WGA, thereby complicating the process.

In a political system that is characterised by coalition governments (as is the case for instance in the Netherlands and Belgium) there is typically a give-and-take custom. Coalition partners all have their own party's agenda to take into account, next to the overall government agenda. This often results in a need to compromise and balance different agendas. A similar problem applies to minority governments that have to look for parliamentary support on a case-by-case basis. Joined-up working in such a context is difficult to achieve and more time consuming than in countries where one political party provides the prime minister and all cabinet ministers, as is the case for instance in the United Kingdom.

Furthermore, WGAs are limited by constitutional mandates and subsidiary legislation, indicating key priorities for different actors, as well as by positions within the overall government system. Mandates can limit what actors can contribute to a WGA and what role they can play in such an approach. The issue of fragile states for instance, traditionally stems from the development co-operation agenda.

The position and role of development co-operation actors within the different donor governments, however, varies.

There are a number of options: development co-operation can be fully integrated into the ministry of foreign affairs (*e.g.*, the Netherlands); it can have partial autonomy, reporting to the minister of foreign affairs (*e.g.*, Australia); there can be a separate development ministry (*e.g.*, the United Kingdom); and there can be a split responsibility for official development assistance among several ministries and agencies (*e.g.*, France). Independent from the status, there may be a minister for development co-operation. In other cases, the minister of foreign affairs is responsible for development co-operation.

Sweden, Canada and Australia have government agencies responsible for development co-operation,¹⁷ which operate on a fairly autonomous level, implementing the donor government's development aid and administering the bulk of the official aid resources. They do not however, have the legal status to formulate official donor government policy. In Canada, the Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade (DFAIT) is the legal authority for formulating and co-ordinating Canada's international policy, including development co-operation. In Australia, this is co-ordinated within the portfolio of the Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade (DFAT) with AusAID taking a lead role. In Sweden there is one main department within the Ministry of Foreign Affairs responsible for development policy, but several are involved in the preparation due to the Joint Preparation Process law. This lack of legal status can have practical implications on the way in which these government agencies can influence the development and implementation of WGAs. Yet, the Swedish case study reports that the Swedish Agency for Development Co-operation (Sida), even though it is not part of the departmental structure, does participate in the interdepartmental working group on Sudan.

In the Netherlands, Belgium and France, development co-operation is integrated as a directorate general within the ministry of foreign affairs. All three countries have a minister for development co-operation, and in the cases of the Netherlands and Belgium, these ministers also have a Cabinet status. In the case of France, the Minister for Development Co-operation operates under the authority of the Minister of Foreign Affairs. The United Kingdom has a separate Department for International Development (DFID), which operates autonomously from the Foreign and Commonwealth Office (FCO).

Having a minister responsible for development co-operation can be of importance for WGAs. It is clear that the higher the status of the actors involved (*i.e.*, a minister) the more impact the ministry or department can have in raising certain issues or views. An example would be the role of the Netherlands Minister for Development Co-operation in putting co-ordination with the Ministry of Defence on the agenda and in practice together with the Minister of Defence. This suggests that it can be helpful for cross-governmental co-operation, and that buy-in can be created at the highest (ministerial) level.

Finally, WGAs are influenced by political interests and priorities of donor governments. Joined-up working becomes more important, and therefore receives more attention, if a country is high on the priority list of national interest, regardless of formal structures, mandates or parochial political factors. The Belgian case study for instance, focuses attention on the fact that the Great Lakes Region, and the Democratic Republic of Congo in particular, historically plays an important role in Belgian foreign policy. The fact that the Democratic Republic of Congo is not just a technical, but also a political, area of attention has resulted in a long history of interdepartmental co-ordination.

However, it is important to keep in mind that not all fragile states receive political priority. Experience demonstrates that political attention focuses on conflict and post-conflict states. This in part can lead to the risk that non (post-)conflict states become donor orphans.¹⁸ Moreover, achieving real

progress in fragile states requires a long-term commitment. This is a challenge as political priorities often shift. Donor governments need to be willing to enter into a long-term relationship with a fragile state in order for their responses to be effective.

The case of Yemen and the attention of the UK seem to be an exception to the rule in that Yemen is neither a post-conflict country, nor one of the top priorities of the UK. However, the UK approach can still be characterised as a WGA.

Notwithstanding the case of Yemen, there seems to be greater interest in conflict and post-conflict countries. Not having investigated this, the study calls for work on deteriorating situations to be linked with the work on conflict prevention, which is already on the agenda of many international actors.

Overall Policies for Whole-of-Government Approaches to Fragile States

All governments studied identify fragile states as an important international challenge, acknowledging the fact that fragile states are potential threats to both national and international security, as well as to development processes. They also recognise that a holistic and integrated approach is needed to effectively address the challenges of fragile states. Yet, of the governments studied, none has developed a policy paper aimed at establishing a whole-of-government approach for dealing with these challenges. The studies for this report suggest a number of reasons for this absence.

One reason can be found in the fact that *the concept of fragile states originally stems from development co-operation*. As a result, discussions and initiatives on fragile states were predominantly initiated from this perspective. This limitation changed after 9/11, when the problem of fragile states suddenly appeared high on the international diplomacy and security agenda. However, at the conceptual level the fragile states issue is still largely couched in development co-operation terminology, creating hurdles for other actors to become actively involved and assume ownership of the issues at stake.

A second reason is the *lack of international agreement on a definition* of a fragile state. The concept is applied to a wide variety of countries and actors. For instance, the choice for Sudan as one of the case studies for this workstream was questioned by a number of respondents as they felt that the Sudanese government could not be qualified as weak.

The *political sensitivity* of the concept of fragile states can be seen as a possible third reason. Labelling states as fragile can cause problems in terms of establishing or maintaining fruitful and equal partnerships. It should be noted that this has not prevented the UK from publishing a proxy list of fragile states, taken from the World Bank CPIA ratings.¹⁹ However, it appears to be problematic for the UK to use the label in practice.

A fourth and final reason relates to the perception that *the problems of respective fragile states cannot be captured in one, overall strategy*. The context of fragile states is considered to be complex, of a highly fluid and political nature, and entirely different for each country. Donor countries must therefore develop a specific policy and strategy towards each individual fragile state. Universal documents on fragile states, consequently, are considered to be too general to be of practical use. However, not all respondents shared this criticism, as this does not rule out an ideal description of how to organise engagement in fragile states, who to involve at what time, et cetera. Instead of a “one-size-fits-all” approach, an overall approach could be built with sufficient flexibility for adapting to specific contexts. Some respondents even felt that an overall policy document would be particularly useful at the headquarters level, where specific country experience is not always available.

The fact that these discussions are not settled within the donor countries investigated for this study does not mean that nothing has been established in terms of joined-up working in this context. The

case study reports confirm that donors acknowledge the need for an integrated approach towards fragile states, hence support the OECD DAC Principles. Progress has been made, in that several of the countries investigated have started to work on the issue of more co-ordinated and integrated approaches, albeit not specifically aimed at fragile states. In the case of Sweden for instance, the *Policy on Global Development* is aimed at promoting coherence in development co-operation through engaging a wide range of actors: Parliament, the Ministry for Foreign Affairs, the Ministry of Defence, the Ministry of Justice, Sida and the Swedish Rescue Services Agency. Similarly, Australia has launched a White Paper on its Aid Programme (April 2006), which established a whole-of-government approach to international development and the provision of Australian development aid. A cross-government Office of Development Effectiveness was established to monitor the performance of the aid programme.

In the absence of a clear definition of fragile states, many of the governments investigated have designed approaches dealing with pre-conflict, conflict and post-conflict countries (i.e., countries that could easily be labelled as fragile). The Netherlands, for instance, has developed a WGA on reconstruction after violent conflict, involving the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (including Development Co-operation), the Ministry of Defence and the Ministry of Economic Affairs.

The United Kingdom and Australia have developed policy statements dealing specifically with the issue of fragile states and acknowledging the need for more joined-up working on this issue.²⁰ Other countries (e.g., Canada, the Netherlands and Sweden) have developed policy statements on the need for cross-governmental working, but their focus is not specifically on fragile state environments. However, none of these countries has a specific policy document that can be used as a framework, mandating or setting guidelines for whole-of-government working.

Notwithstanding the above-mentioned initiatives, involvement in fragile states is generally based on broader regional or post-conflict policy documents that often originate from development co-operation. In the absence of a dialogue on what a joined-up approach means for the various actors, and how this relates to their role in supporting national interests, the risk of maintaining of existing approaches remains. The reports indicate that each of the actors has different objectives; uses different language, methods and instruments; and has specific departmental policy imperatives and approaches that remain guidance principles. These differences potentially undermine joined-up working. The absence of an overall concept and guidance policy is felt here.

Who Should Be Involved in Whole-of-Government Approaches on Fragile States, and When?

When dealing with fragile states it is important to engage with a wide range of actors. Even though the fragile states issue is still predominantly perceived from a development co-operation perspective, the case studies confirm that the effect of non-aid policies on development outcomes is now widely accepted. As a result, security actors and objectives related to the security domain are increasingly included in the development debate, as are economic actors, justice departments and others.

Most of the case studies show that currently, development co-operation, foreign affairs and defence are the key actors in WGAs to fragile states. In order to create a WGA, increased involvement of other departments should be encouraged.

Other actors that may have a role to play, depending on the circumstances, are the police, ministries of justice, ministries of finance or treasuries and ministries of economic affairs. In Belgium for instance, the Administration of the Treasury is involved in financial aid to countries with emerging economies. Similarly, in the Netherlands, the Ministry of Economic Affairs is co-operating with the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Development Co-operation to promote economic development programmes, as well as the position of Dutch businesses in emerging markets. In Canada, state-

building activities have resulted in the development of partnerships between internationally oriented departments and agencies of the government and typically domestic ones (for instance in the Health Policy Framework for Haiti, in which the Canadian International Development Agency co-operates with the Canadian Public Health Agency). In Australia, the Federal Police and the Federal Treasury and Department of Finance and Administration play key roles in the regional engagement in the Solomon Islands.

However, in light of the difficulty of co-ordinating the activities of a broad range of actors, these other departments should only be involved next to the key actors if and when they have a comparative advantage. In the case of the UK involvement in Yemen, it was preferred to work with a group of core actors, to be expanded on a case-by-case basis. The MFA, Development Co-operation, the MoD were preferred as core group by the UK. The Netherlands, Australia and Canada also mention the ministry of economic affairs or finance/the Treasury as key actors for working in difficult environments such as fragile states.

In several countries, work focused on the nexus of security and development, for example, supporting the development of an effective and accountable security system as part of SSR.²¹ In these cases the departments of justice, interior and finance could be brought in to work alongside the departments of foreign affairs, development co-operation and defence.

Overall, the challenge to most of these partnerships is that they have comparatively little history. For the practitioners involved, most activities therefore have a pioneering character in which actors are still adapting to each others idiosyncrasies, arising from differing organisational cultures, professional skills-sets, mandates and legal statutes. These are then compounded by a lack of consensus or clarity over roles and responsibilities of each partner and lines of accountability.

Furthermore, the case studies suggest that there are strong disincentives to working in close partnership with other government departments, challenging the willingness of actors to become involved in a WGA. Working horizontally in a multi-actor context requires more consultation and is therefore time-consuming, it may require compromise and a willingness to dilute one's policy agenda, and it can lead to less visibility.

The Need for Political Leadership and a Lead Co-ordinating Role

Effective political leadership is key for the implementation of all-encompassing approaches such as whole-of-government approaches to fragile states. Who should promote such an agenda across government and facilitate coherence for such a goal? There are similarities to promoting coherence for development. But, whereas in the case of development it is clear which agenda should be promoted, a WGA on fragile states first has to identify a clear focus and a coherent agenda for the various actors involved. This implies building coalitions among policy communities and negotiating various policy options. In the case of fragile states, the lack of a clear objective means that the process is more complicated, as different actors will have different perspectives on (and stakes in) dealing with fragile states. The case studies confirm this. Perspectives range from counter-terrorism to governance, conflict prevention and peacebuilding, or trade promotion. The rationales for engaging in fragile states may differ and, at times, come into conflict. A key challenge for whole-of-government engagement in fragile states, therefore, is to balance these different rationales and perspectives.²²

The starting point for an effective whole-of-government approach is clear political guidance and leadership. To provide the institutional impetus for the different phases of a WGA requires commitment and leadership from the political top: the different actors need to understand the importance of their involvement. Therefore, it is vital to have a clear understanding of the objectives

of a donor government's involvement in a fragile state. For example, in the case of Australia, it was the Cabinet under the leadership of the prime minister that made whole-of-government working a priority for the Australian public service. This resulted in a report entitled *Connecting Government: Whole of Government Responses to Australia's Priority Challenges*. The importance of such political leadership is not confined to general policies on joined-up working, but also relates to specific policy priorities and selection of target countries. This is confirmed by the case of the UK, where sustained joined-up working on Yemen is related to Cabinet attention, as well as by other cases such as Canada's involvement in Haiti. The report on the Netherlands states that the Minister for Development Co-operation and the Minister of Defence have led the way in creating greater collaboration between the two policy fields, by publicly acknowledging the interaction and interdependence between both fields, by stepping out of their comfort zones and by advocating greater cohesion.

The reports also underline the fact that an integrated approach should not simply be perceived as an outcome, but rather as a process; how to get there is just as important as getting there. One of the issues that an overall concept or guidance policy should address is who plays what role in this process. On the one hand, a joined-up approach may imply that any of the actors could take that lead. From the perspective of co-ordination, on the other hand, it is better to have an established lead co-ordinating agency. In this regard it is important to differentiate between leadership and co-ordination. The first implies that other ministries and departments have to follow directions, while the latter indicates equal relationships.

A government's involvement in a fragile state covers different stages that require different types of involvement from different actors. The Australian-led Regional Assistance Mission to the Solomon Islands (RAMSI) for instance, is conducted in three phases: intervention, stabilisation and capacity building. The roles of actors are expected to change as each of these phases takes centre stage: each of the key actors will take a central co-ordinating role at some point. For example, in the stabilisation phase, the Police plays a central role, whereas in the capacity-building phase, Development Co-operation will have a central role. At the same time, external interventions in a fragile states context will be heavily politicised. Hence, there will often be a case for diplomatic actors to play a central role.

These phases may operate in parallel rather than in succession. In view of the fact that the key actors' involvement in WGAs to fragile states changes over time, and for reasons of continuity, the case of RAMSI suggests the need for continuous overall co-ordinating leadership. The Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade was given the lead, both in Canberra and through a special co-ordinator in the field.

Objectives

In order for the activities of the different actors to be successful, they need to be linked to a broader strategy.²³ The same can be argued for the objectives of interventions: if these are not adequately linked, the whole (i.e., the strategic impact of all interventions) is less than the sum of the various interventions. Considering the lack of overall strategies on involvement in fragile states and an often unclear leadership role for any of the departments involved, it will be difficult to set clear, interlinked objectives for engagement.

Objectives should be identified at two levels. First, there needs to be clarity on why a country should engage in a fragile state, i.e., what is the overall objective? Second, there needs to be clarity on why and how specific actors need to be involved.

The first requires a broad assessment of the national interests of the country of the international actor involved. This assessment should not take place from a specific perspective, but should encompass development co-operation, diplomatic, economic and security interests.

The second requires joint planning and possible joint implementation mechanisms as part of an overall strategic process. If joined-up working is to succeed, it first requires joint setting of objectives and priorities. Although difficult to achieve, the same holds true for the process of monitoring and evaluating. It is vital that key departmental actors in a joined-up approach are part of the development of a strategy from the beginning.

The studies make clear that, in most cases, objectives were not defined on the basis of joint analyses or assessments. In the case of the UK's involvement in Yemen, however, joint assessment instruments have been applied (see Strategic Conflict Assessments and Drivers of Change analyses under *Tools and Instruments* below). Although the instruments had been developed by the Department for International Development, the Foreign and Commonwealth Office and the Ministry of Defence were invited to contribute to the process, resulting in a shared analysis of the issue of state fragility in Yemen.

Several other donor governments have tried to deal with this issue by designing instruments or approaches, like the Netherlands' Stability Assessment Frameworks. Other attempts at bringing about joint processes vary from stimulating voluntary co-operation (e.g., the Competition of Ideas used in Canada, that aimed to allocate resources for the international assistance envelope with greater interdepartmental transparency and participation), to requirement by law (e.g., the Swedish Joint Preparation Process). Yet the cases show that they were not fully used, nor did they lead to the creation of common objectives on the involvement in fragile states.

The case studies show that it remains a challenge to make sure that interdepartmental contacts exceed the level of fragmented information sharing. Exchange of information does not yet entail dialogue on problems, approaches and objectives, nor does this necessarily lead toward joined-up working. In particular, joint assessments are an important first step to exceed the level of merely exchanging views, and to move to the level of promoting dialogue on strategy and objectives. (The UK engagement in Yemen is a case in point.)

The emphasis on these joint assessments and a more integrated perspective is also important for guaranteeing that objectives balance the availability of resources and capacity of a donor country with the needs of a fragile state. It is therefore essential that, from the beginning, objectives are linked to planning, implementation, co-ordination, monitoring and evaluation. If such objectives can be clearly defined, this will also be helpful in terms of donor co-ordination and harmonisation.

Tools and Instruments

Whole-of-government approaches can be facilitated in various ways: the development of formal and more practical instruments can be one such way. For this study, an attempt was made to map the various instruments developed by the countries investigated, as well as to assess their role in the process of interdepartmental co-operation. The instruments found on the basis of the mapping are categorised in terms of funding, country strategies, secondment and deployment of staff, and analytical tools. In order to avoid overlap, some instruments that are more of a co-ordinating nature will be dealt with under the section *Co-ordination*.

Given the fact that the fragile states issue is traditionally perceived from a development co-operation perspective, the risk is that fragile states are treated as traditional development co-operation countries. However, it should be avoided that other one-sided approaches are adopted that will address only part of the problems that fragile states confront. The case studies show a need for development actors to adapt their instruments and implementation arrangements more flexibly, to allow for working in complex and difficult political settings. In line with the OECD DAC Principles for Good International Engagement in Fragile States²⁴ and various other studies, the reports at

hand show that a mere refinement of existing tools may not suffice; fragile states require specific approaches and policy instruments.

Funding Mechanisms

One of the Principles for Good International Engagement in Fragile States deals with the need to mix and sequence financial instruments to fit the context (Principle 9).²⁵ Donor countries are increasingly aware of the need to adjust existing funding mechanisms to the specific needs of fragile states. Research shows that there is a severe resource mobilisation gap for interventions on the nexus of peace, security and development, as they cut across organisational and budgetary boundaries and often fall between stools.²⁶ Furthermore, fragile states require flexible and timely funding to meet urgent basic needs, as well as to create peace dividends. Simultaneously, fragile states require recurrent funding to meet structural needs and to provide long-term rehabilitation support (e.g., rebuilding basic service delivery channels). Given the importance of resources for implementing policies, funding mechanisms are considered by most respondents in the case studies as a key factor for enabling effective integrated engagement in fragile states.

The creation of joint budget lines or pooled funding is an important instrument to foster integrated planning. Pooled funding allows flexibility in support of activities which may be classified as official development assistance and non-official development assistance. The challenge, however, is to ensure the integration of both categories of funds according to a coherent, whole-of-government strategy.

Donor governments have made attempts to create integrated financial instruments that are flexible and allow for the swift provision of funding. Although not labelled as fragile-state oriented funding instruments, their focus seems to be on enabling rapid disbursement of non-humanitarian assistance. Belgium, for instance, has recently opened up a budget line for “Transitional Actions, Reconstruction and Society Building”, aiming specifically to bridge the gap between humanitarian and development assistance.

Other examples go one step further and seem to pick up on the aspect of facilitating joined-up working. Important examples of innovative practice in support of interdepartmental co-operation are the Netherlands’ Stability Fund, the UK’s Global and Africa Conflict Prevention Pools, and the Canadian Global Peace and Security Fund (see Box 2 for a short description of these funds in terms of objectives and actors).

Yet, although these instruments are certainly laudable in terms of flexible and integrated funding, there are also limitations. Overall, the schemes funded by these instruments are relatively small and the “project-by-project” approach of the instruments is not ideally adapted to the chronic and structural problems of fragile states.²⁷ The instruments’ management structures therefore pose limitations in terms of establishing a WGA. This is particularly true in the case of the Netherlands’ Stability Fund, which is managed and largely financed by one single actor (the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, including Development Co-operation). Even though the Stability Fund involves actors from the security, the economic and other communities for consultation, they do not contribute financially. This arrangement limits the possibility for real joined-up decision making and planning; actors remain executors and subcontractors. In order to create more ownership and involvement it would therefore be recommended to consider funding arrangements and instruments aimed at involving other actors as equal funding partners. The same would apply to the case of Canada, where the Global Peace and Security Fund (administered by the Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade) is aimed at funding initiatives co-ordinated by the interdepartmental Stabilisation and Reconstruction Task Force. Similar to the case of the Netherlands, this limits the involvement and shared responsibility of other actors.

In the case of the UK's Conflict Prevention Pools, such problems are less pressing as all participating departments contribute financially. Initially, each department put in funds from their own budget, with the Treasury providing additional resources. Today, the Pools bid for money alongside their parent departments in each governmental spending round. Consequently, all participants have a role in chairing and overseeing the Pools. The pooled approach facilitates a process of developing a shared analysis of problems and integrated policies on conflict prevention. Other case studies tie in with this finding by suggesting that joint funding mechanisms should be managed by interdepartmental units.

Box 2. Financial instruments

The Netherlands Stability Fund (established in 2004) combines official development assistance and non-official development assistance funds in order to provide rapid and flexible support for activities at the juncture of peace, security and development, as well as operational conflict prevention and peacebuilding (*i.e.*, short term). The Fund falls under the responsibility of the Ministers of Foreign Affairs (MFA) and for Development Co-operation, both in political and financial terms. Defence is involved in the Fund's steering committee, but does not contribute financially. The overall management of the Fund is in the hands of the MFA.

The UK's Global Conflict Prevention Pool (GCPP) and the Africa Conflict Prevention Pool (ACPP) are tri-departmental mechanisms (DFID, FCO and Defence), supervised by the Defence and Overseas Policy Cabinet Committee. The Conflict Prevention Pools aim to develop integrated departmental policies on conflict prevention in areas of either thematic or regional interest. The emphasis on joint working is reflected in the fact that the three departments share a Public Sector Agreement target to deliver improved effectiveness of UK and international support in conflict prevention by 2008. The ACPP is chaired by DFID, while the FCO chairs the GCPP. Joint steering committees are made up of officials from each department. Funding for the ACPP and GCPP is additional to DFID, FCO and MoD allocations.

Canada's Global Peace and Security Fund (GPSF) is administered by Foreign Affairs and was created to support Canada's response to international crises. The Fund will largely be used to fund initiatives co-ordinated by the Stabilisation and Reconstruction Task Force (START – see below).

However, pooled funding instruments are not necessarily perceived as resources for new and integrated activities. Rather, there is a danger that they can generate competition among departments for scarce resources and as such, discourage joined-up approaches. In the early stages of set up, pooled funding instruments can easily be perceived (and used) as pots of additional money. They can be tapped into for re-packaging or dealing with “regular” projects that would have received funding from either of the ministries, but would now be funded through these new financial instruments. This practice can for instance be found in the case of the UK's Conflict Prevention Pools,²⁸ as well as in the Dutch Stability Fund. Consolidated guidance policies that outline clear processes for the disbursement of resources from the funds, and joined-up country strategies (against which to assess project proposals) are clearly required and may help prevent such practices. They are nevertheless likely to continue if departments are heavily budget-constrained and have few other resources outside the pooled funding arrangements to pursue their own objectives.

In examining the Conflict Prevention Pools, the study found that, because there is only a small pot of funding available for Yemen, departments are primarily reliant on their own resources. This can in certain ways make it more difficult to match UK assistance with needs on the ground. This issue has not been problematic for the Department for International Development which benefits from a substantial aid budget. However, the Foreign and Commonwealth Office and Defence are more constrained in meeting their policy objectives in Yemen due to internal budget constraints and their inability to secure as much funding from the Global Conflict Prevention Pool as they require. The management of the Pool is also challenging in that while the overall objectives are shared by all departments, potential projects are screened by the Department for International Development to

assess how they meet key development criteria such as ownership, participation and sustainability. A number of Foreign and Commonwealth Office and Defence project ideas that were discussed between departments at the draft stage have not been put forward to the Pool for consideration. In fact, the report mentions that overall relatively few of their projects in Yemen have been funded through this joint mechanism.

Country Strategies

There is no “one-size-fits-all” strategy for addressing state fragility. This is confirmed in the studies, which show a need for developing practical, country-specific approaches for engagement in fragile states. In the absence of an overall policy towards fragile states, country strategies could prove to be of great importance by providing operational guidance (objectives and priorities) for both the headquarters and the field level. They also help making trade-offs between *ad hoc* and structural approaches.

The process of developing a joint country strategy can furthermore contribute to a whole-of-government approach by encouraging consultation and shared analysis of political, security and development issues. It can also become a management tool and enable actors to link departmental priorities to overall foreign policy objectives, thereby providing a basis for ensuring that actors speak with a common voice when dealing with different host government interlocutors.

Even though all donors studied acknowledge the need for joint country strategies, there seem to be no clear guidelines on the development of such strategies. The UK, for instance, has developed joint strategies for a number of countries with the impetus to draft such a strategy often coming from Cabinet Office. In some cases a joint strategy emerges from discussions between departments, for instance, when either the Foreign and Commonwealth Office or the Department for International Development produces a draft strategy based on its own analysis and invites comments from other departments. While there are no agreed criteria for establishing strategies, they tend to be drawn up because of high political interest, awareness of a potential threat to the UK or its objectives, or a significant UK involvement in a given country. Country strategies therefore tend to vary greatly in terms of timing, content, objectives, monitoring and management.

In the case of France, one of the specific aims of country policy frameworks is policy coherence. Here, the embassies have the lead in developing country frameworks, aiming to establish coherence among the different French actors, harmonisation with other donors and alignment with the host government. The frameworks are limited however, in terms of creating a WGA, as they do not include defence or security aspects. Furthermore, the frameworks have a five-year time span, which in practice will prove difficult to apply to the fluid situations in fragile states.

In the case of Sweden, discussions in the framework of the Policy on Global Development led to a *Co-operation Strategy* incorporating relevant forms of Swedish assistance provided to a country. There is an interdepartmental dialogue and joint planning. The case study report shows however, that this process, which is led by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (regional desks), in practice does not lead to a fully joined-up approach due to the fact that there is no joint assessment process. Different actors provide what they find important from their perspective and it is all incorporated into the strategy.

At the Belgium Directorate-General for Development Co-operation, an interdepartmental exercise is being undertaken to develop a policy framework involving the OECD Principles for Good International Engagement in Fragile States. This includes a conflict-sensitive approach as a basis for the reinforcement of the bilateral co-operation with Burundi and the elaboration of new three-annual indicative co-operation programmes. A multidisciplinary mission will be sent to the field to conduct part of the assessment, with an important role for the Embassy. The methodology developed in this

exercise could be used in other cases of post-conflict, post-transition engagement. Overall, the case studies show the need for country-specific strategies to be based on joint analysis and assessments early in the process, thereby providing an important building block for the development of a shared understanding of the issue at hand and laying the foundation for common strategies.

When developing country strategies, developments and activities in the multilateral domain can also play an important role. As can be seen in the case of Haiti, Canada's country strategy has taken these factors into account through participation in the Interim Co-operation Framework. In the case of Belgium, the EU country strategy papers are increasingly the first reference for donor-harmonisation for the Directorate General for Development Co-operation.

Secondment and Deployment of Staff

One instrument that is used in all cases investigated as part of a broader strategy for the promotion of joined-up approaches both at headquarters and field level, is secondment of staff to other departments. However, the cases also show that secondments hardly ever exceed the working level, thereby missing opportunities for creating joined-up approaches at the strategic level. The cases of the Netherlands and Canada can be mentioned here as an exception to this rule. In the Netherlands, a Development Co-operation Advisor was seconded to Defence, while a Military Advisor was in turn seconded to Foreign Affairs. Although these secondments only involved two people, their roles and positions within their departments are such that they have direct access to the level of the political leadership. This indicates that the secondments are taken seriously as instruments to contribute to the exchange of experience, as well as to bridging the cultural gap between the institutions involved. In the case of Canada, the Department of National Defence provides a liaison officer/military advisor to the Canadian International Development Agency.

At the working level, secondments of staff are more common. In the Netherlands for instance, staff from the Ministry of Economic Affairs is seconded to Foreign Affairs and vice versa. Along the same lines, secondments between Defence and Foreign Affairs take place (e.g., for the interdepartmental SSR Team). In Canada, staff from various departments, notably Defence and the Canadian International Development Agency, is seconded to Foreign Affairs to be part of the Stabilisation and Reconstruction Task Force (START). In France, Foreign Affairs' "Direction de la Coopération Militaire et de Défense" is made up largely of Defence personnel. In Australia, the Australian Defence Force and the Australian Federal Police have permanent liaison officers lodged with the other in the field and have institutionalised their links at headquarters.

Secondments and, in a broader sense, mobility of staff and common training across different government departments and agencies can be catalysts for shifting paradigms and promoting joined-up working. Staff mobility will allow officers to become more familiar with other departments, and specifically, their expertise and potential contributions in addressing the problems of fragile states. The prospect of greater mobility can also work as an incentive for enhanced partnership across departments and agencies at middle-management and desk-officer level. However, this is not a given.

The case studies also show that secondment of staff from departments other than foreign affairs to embassies and representations at field level (such as a defence or military attaché or an economic advisor) are likely to enhance the involvement of these other departments in WGAs to fragile states. Furthermore, it was noted that at the embassy level, the role of such secondments is welcomed from the perspective of added expertise. However, the case studies show that the decision-making process on the secondment of defence attachés is rather pragmatic and *ad hoc*. Both the Netherlands and Sweden for instance, do not have a full-time defence attaché based in Khartoum. Rather, in the case of the Netherlands, the Cairo-based defence attaché is accredited to Sudan, while in the case of Sweden, the defence attaché based in Addis Ababa is accredited to Sudan. From the perspective of

joined-up engagements in fragile states, there is a need for a more structural involvement of defence attachés. The reports also indicate that, whereas the position of a defence attaché is not new, their required role in fragile and post-conflict states may be totally different from their old mandate. This relates in particular to their role in issues such as the reform of security systems.

In the case of the UK, the Embassy is encouraged to develop a “mini-strategy” aimed at ensuring a more coherent cross-governmental engagement. Here, the new defence attaché is considered as an important actor in facilitating the process of reaching agreement among partner ministries on project proposals before formal submission to the Global Conflict Prevention Pool steering committee.

Australia has embarked upon the secondment of central agency staff to positions in the Solomon Islands Government. Such secondments are of a different nature and pose new challenges, as officials have to reconcile the dual nature of their positions. Sworn in as public servants of the Solomon Islands Government, they may detect potential conflicts of interest when faced with requests for information or other forms of service from their home departments.

Such elaborate secondment and deployment activities also call for effective personnel management. In the case of Australia, this was taken seriously, particularly for those departments making sustained deployments for the first time. For those who are not familiar with the realities of overseas postings, an operational support unit within AusAID was created to supply training and education.

The deployment of a large number of Australian public servants from different agencies also proved challenging from another perspective. It has, for instance, led to disparities in pay and conditions, which have also caused some tensions in the field. Part of the problem for central agencies not familiar with secondments and deployments overseas is that there has been little or no career structure based around international deployments, because until recently they have been a minor part of their business.

The reports furthermore indicate that there are differences in criteria for deployment between defence and civilian staff. These relate to issues of staff security (preconditions and safety procedures). It was found that even though such differences serve a purpose, they can also hamper flexibility of deployment between departments, when it would be useful to aim for joined-up approaches in terms of deployment. Such differences in deployment criteria may also create problems in terms of deploying staff to international organisations.

The reports describe a change in the role of security-related actors (i.e., military and police). It is now increasingly common to deploy a limited number of individual staff as advisors or observers, as opposed to deploying entire contingents or battalions. The deployment of individuals requires other deployment criteria, both in terms of preconditions of deployment and in terms of management. Some of the donor countries investigated have set up expert pools, consisting of available experts who can be deployed on individual missions. Sweden, for instance, has set up a pool for the deployment of police officers to international police missions. Another example is the integrated Security System Reform (SSR) Pool set up by the Netherlands in 2005, consisting of military (former defence) personnel and civilian (juridical) experts, to support the implementation of SSR activities. Defence is responsible for the composition and deployment of the pool, while a Foreign Affairs-based interdepartmental SSR team (consisting of staff from Defence and Foreign Affairs), is responsible for the overall co-ordination. The interdepartmental nature of this SSR team provides plenty of opportunities to exchange views and develop joint strategies towards SSR.

The creation of such pools not only increases the possibilities of donor governments to swiftly engage in international missions, but can furthermore serve to support a donor country's own activities on the nexus of peace, security and development.

Analytical Tools

The studies show that many of the selected governments have developed analytical tools to provide an evidence base for long-term coherent policy and strategy development. Examples are the UK's interdepartmental Drivers of Change analyses and Strategic Conflict Assessments, and the Netherlands' Stability Assessment Frameworks (see Box 3).

Apart from enabling joint assessments, these analyses also provide opportunities to establish closer collaboration among the various departmental actors. In order for these analytical tools to be effective in terms of establishing co-operation, they should be used as a standard procedure in the design of country strategy papers. They should be guided from an integrated perspective, as well as linked to other initiatives, as in the case of the current Belgium interdepartmental reflection exercise on the future role of Belgium in a post-conflict/transition context which includes several departments (Federal Public Service, Foreign Affairs, Finance, and Defence).

Box 3. Analytical tools

The UK *Drivers of Change* analysis offers a way of understanding the political economy of poverty reduction in developing countries. It directs attention to the underlying and long-term factors that affect the enabling environment for reform in different countries, including actors, institutions and structural issues. *Drivers of Change* offers the prospect of better informed development assistance and more effective delivery of the Government's International Strategic Priorities. While the tool was originally developed by DFID, its value is enhanced if the analytical process is shared with other departments. To date, *Drivers of Change* analysis has been applied in over 20 countries. Mechanisms are being developed to formalise collaboration between DFID and FCO and, where appropriate, to draw other interested departments into the process.

The UK *Strategic Conflict Assessments* have been used in a number of countries, including Yemen, Sri Lanka and Nigeria. The aim is to improve the effectiveness of development policy and programmes in contributing to conflict prevention. The methodology is flexible, but generally focuses on analysis of conflict structures, actors and dynamics. FCO has contributed to these assessments in a number of countries.

The Netherlands *Stability Assessment Frameworks* offer a general analytical tool for stability and strategic, joined-up planning for a particular country. It provides an analysis of trends on a number of stability indicators and helps to identify options improving these trends by taking into consideration a large number of sectors (development co-operation, politics, military, economics). The *Framework* has thus far been used in Mozambique, Rwanda, Kenya, Afghanistan and Bolivia.

This reconfirms the need for an overall guidance strategy that calls on departments to establish objectives and approaches on the basis of a joint assessment of the country. As stated before, the case studies show that such conditions are lacking, thereby undermining the effectiveness of the analytical tools.

Process: Co-ordination and Management

The case studies show that WGAs to fragile states do not emerge automatically or organically at the operational level. The countries investigated have each established a broad range of policies, instruments, tools and strategies that can promote joined-up working. This section explores how donor governments co-ordinate and manage these arrangements. In general, co-ordination can take place at different levels: the intra-departmental level, the interdepartmental level, co-ordination among donors (i.e., harmonisation) and co-ordination with the partner government (i.e., alignment).²⁹ This section will focus on intra- and interdepartmental co-ordination and management.

However, before moving to co-ordination and management mechanisms, it is important to identify a few important factors that will determine the effectiveness of co-ordination. Differences in organisational culture, for example, have a major impact on effectiveness. Arrangements for co-ordination,

implementation and management can help minimise these differences, as can continued exposure to other actors through collaboration, but their success still also depends on political interest.

The role of political interest and, often closely related, the availability of resources, are a central feature in the various studies. The case studies indicate that the level of political importance attributed to a country (here, a fragile state) determines to a large degree the level of joined-up working, the use of the whole spectrum of instruments available for promoting such joined-up working and the available resources. Yet, the case of the UK approach with regard to Yemen shows that even if a country is less high on the list of priorities, much can be done with the right approach and mechanisms, and with complementary interests.

Co-ordination and Management Mechanisms

The case studies show that donors have developed a plethora of mechanisms aimed at better co-ordination, often supported by specific initiatives, instruments and tools. Annex B provides a short overview of the most important co-ordination mechanisms by case study.

The various cases investigated show that donor countries use different approaches in different places to promote cross-departmental working. Co-ordination may be achieved through informal mechanisms when formal structures are not appropriate to the circumstances, and hence not being used to their full potential. For instance, in the case of Yemen, the UK has not relied as heavily upon the Conflict Prevention Pools, the PCRU [spell out] or the Cabinet Office to deliver integrated assistance programmes as it has in other countries. Co-location of the Department for International Development, and the Foreign and Commonwealth Office at the field level in Yemen may have done more to enhance joined-up working between the departments by facilitating co-operation on a *Drivers of Change* analysis which contributed to a shared understanding of the problems facing Yemen. In addition, the UK Cabinet Office's "light touch" approach to managing the whole-of-government approach in Yemen allowed the Department for International Development, the Foreign and Commonwealth Office, and Defence room for manoeuvre to respond to changing conditions in the field and to determine assistance policy accordingly.

An interesting concept emerging from the case studies is the added value of task forces. The case of the Netherlands shows that such task forces can play a key role in policy formulation and implementation, and thus in co-ordinating the input from the different ministries. It should be noted, however, that in the case of the Netherlands various steering committees – also covering the key areas of a joined-up approach – play an equally important supporting role in this co-ordination. An important element of the Dutch task force in Sudan is that it is operationally placed outside the normal ministerial channels and has direct access to the ministerial level. This facilitates flexibility and rapid responses, both essential elements of involvement in fragile states. It may also promote much-needed "out-of-the-box" thinking, which is also key for responding to the issue of fragile states. A challenge linked to the temporary character of the Dutch task force is the potential loss of institutional memory when the task force is dissolved.

The Canadians take an interesting approach to the annual country strategy. By providing the embassy with a key role in the strategic planning process and by making the ambassador accountable, the field level may be more directly involved in designing and implementing a joined-up approach. This idea would have to be investigated further, as it may not only imply a stronger role for the field level, but also the need for a stronger and more joined-up representation in embassies.

In Australia, co-ordination across a number of departments is achieved by interdepartmental committees, which have been in use within the Australian Public Service in one form or another for decades, and are formed, regularised or disbanded according to requirements. They exist at every

level of government, from the purely functional junior ranks of the public service to the Cabinet itself, where ministers represent their respective departments and co-ordinate policy under the direction of the prime minister. These committees may be *ad hoc* or institutionalized. A key committee for the purposes of developing government policy on international engagements is the Strategic Policy Co-ordination Group, made up of deputy secretaries from the relevant departments. Lower down the scale, interdepartmental working groups address policy and operational details.

Special reference should also be made to the way the Regional Assistance Mission to the Solomon Islands is co-ordinated. The mission's administrative structure is an expression of Australia's whole-of-government principles. It uses a special co-ordinator model which provides a single authority under which the various strands of the mission can be drawn together and coherently managed through the nexus of the close-knit Principals Group. The group is made up of the lead representative in the field from each of the police, military and civilian components (Foreign Affairs, the Participating Police Force, AusAID and the Consultant Trust Fund). With operational policy emanating from the Office of the Special Coordinator, there is reduced scope for separate fiefdoms to develop. The Special Coordinator model thus seems to have distinct advantages over a shared leadership model for efficiency and clear communications.

Interestingly, the Australian co-ordination model puts great emphasis on the field level. When differences of opinion cannot be resolved in the Office of the Special Coordinator they are referred to a more senior committee at first assistant secretary level or above. Besides the Principals Group, a series of regular and *ad hoc* working groups have been set up to deal with the different elements of the mission. Regular planning and co-ordination between headquarters and the field is based around a standing weekly inter-departmental conferences with membership at first assistant secretary level and Principals level, attended also by the deputy special co-ordinator and the heads of each governance pillar. Every six months the National Security Committee of Cabinet (NSC) meets to review the Mission and the Strategic Policy Co-ordination Group meets more frequently as needed. Half-yearly a "super-planning day" is held in Honiara and attended in person by senior representatives from each agency from the field and from Canberra. Regular submissions to Cabinet also facilitate co-ordination among departments.

Yet other ideas to be picked up on co-ordination are the UK's *Closer Working Action Plan* for Department for International Development and the Foreign and Commonwealth Office, and the planned *Comprehensive Spending Review*, as well as the Swedish Ministry of Foreign Affairs' extended information sharing, in order to use Sida and Foreign Affairs funds in a more complementary manner. The idea of a working plan could be broadened to include other ministries, departments and agencies. The spending review and the attempt to make budgets more complementary are potentially strong instruments for promoting joined-up working, as they can be linked to formal reporting to Parliament. It would also make sense to link these reviews and assessments to funding instruments such as the UK's Conflict Prevention Pools and the Netherlands' Stability Fund.

Finally, mechanisms such as the Swedish Joint Preparation Process and the Global Policy for Development could inspire other countries to establish formal procedures or even obligations at the governmental level to co-ordinate for a specific purpose. In the case of Sweden, co-ordination ensures that, at the working level, departments are in agreement on *all* issues – domestic and international.

There are also a number of important lessons to be drawn from the cases. A first lesson relates to the need to work in a joined-up manner from the beginning. Sweden for instance has introduced the *Management Response*, which is a mechanism employed by Foreign Affairs' Department for Policy Development, aiming to operationalise findings from studies that are commissioned. As part of the need for a more joined-up approach, the scope of actors involved in the discussions on operationalising such findings has been broadened to an inter-ministerial level, with relevant

ministries represented according to the theme concerned. The case study indicates that excluding relevant partners from the beginning of the process can hinder co-operation and co-ordination. A second lesson concerns the need for formal structures. Although not always inadequate, informal mechanisms do have limitations. A third lesson has to do with a very basic, yet important aspect: one cannot co-ordinate what is not accepted and operationalised. The cases of France and Sweden show most clearly that it is difficult to co-ordinate different inputs, such as from development co-operation and security departments, in the absence of a policy that allows for such co-operation and co-ordination.³⁰ This relates back to Principle 5 of the OECD DAC Principles for Good International Engagement in Fragile States: recognise the political-security-development nexus. The lesson is to have clarity on approaches to development and security.

Harmonisation

It is also important to assess how WGAs relate to co-ordination with other international actors, through harmonisation. The Regional Assistance Mission to the Solomon Islands is harmonised as it is a regional mission with representation from 12 Pacific Island countries and New Zealand. The Mission is led by the Special Coordinator, a career diplomat from the Australian Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade. The Deputy Special Coordinator is a New Zealand Government official, and the Assistant Special Coordinator is from Fiji. The United Nations is not involved beyond giving the mission its blessing.

In the other cases, harmonisation also plays an important role. In the case of Yemen, the Department for International Development is seeking to engage more strategically by influencing the policies and approaches of its assistance partners. In this context, the Department takes an active lead in Yemen in driving the harmonisation and alignment agendas both through its support of an Aid Effectiveness Unit in the Ministry of Planning and International Co-operation and its interaction with other donor countries and agencies. One result is that the September 2004 *Drivers of Change* study was supported by the Dutch Embassy.

In Haiti, Canada also puts a premium on harmonisation by working through the Interim Co-operation Framework. The Framework co-ordinates a vast array of donor activity including the interventions of multilateral organisations and bilateral aid agencies.

In the case of the Democratic Republic of Congo, Belgium co-ordinates with other international actors and donor governments through a multitude of political and diplomatic forums, including the International Committee to Accompany the Transition (known by its French acronym, CIAT), the Great Lakes Contact Group, the Great Lakes Regional Conference and the Multi-Country Demobilization and Reintegration Program (MDRP). In addition, co-ordination takes place at the EU level. For France, the Document Cadre Partenariats (DCP) are the main instrument for assuring co-ordination with international actors.

In Sudan, some novelties can be identified. In addition to EU dialogue and participation in the Assessment and Evaluation Commission and the Multi-Donor Trust Fund, the Netherlands, Denmark, Norway, Sweden and the United Kingdom have embarked upon an innovation in donor co-ordination with the establishment of a Joint Donor Team for the South, to be based in Juba. The five parties to the Team will jointly co-ordinate and execute the development co-operation activities of their respective countries in the South of which they consider the Multi-Donor Trust Fund to be the core.

An important note should be made about the fact that not all international actors support and work through mechanisms and procedures promoting harmonisation. In the case of the Solomon Islands and Sudan, special mention was made of this aspect. In the case of Sudan it implied that the

most influential international actors in terms of assistance remain outside the main co-ordination mechanisms.

Alignment

Almost all cases show great interest of international actors and donor governments in co-ordinating with partner governments. In the case of the Regional Assistance Mission to the Solomon Islands, formal systems for co-ordinating with Solomon Islands Government are less well developed. Co-ordination of policy between the Mission and the Solomon Islands Government is largely informal and high-level. A problem in terms of co-ordination is the government's limited capacity to service membership of the numerous inter-departmental conferences. The Mission is currently working on its first coherent medium-term strategy, an inherently whole-of-government objective which should help to provide both strategic information and the opportunity for input to Solomon Islands Government officials and ministers.

In Haiti, the Interim Co-operation Framework and its system of committees also help to enhance the leadership and ownership of the Interim Haitian Government of its development agenda. In particular the formulation of a Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper is seen as an opportunity for Canada to revise and update its engagement within a long-term strategic vision led by the Haitian Government.

In the Democratic Republic of Congo and Sudan, alignment takes place through the same mechanisms that were mentioned for harmonisation. In Sudan, the Multi-Donor Trust Fund is mentioned as an important instrument, as for every donor-dollar in the Fund the Sudanese authorities will add two from their own budget.

Differences in Organisational Culture

Each of the case studies points out that in terms of management, differences in organisation cultures can play a role. Development co-operation for instance, traditionally engages in countries based on an understanding that change is a slow process and that obstacles are structural in nature. This implies a long-term engagement with various kinds of local actors (also non-governmental), and the risk of various setbacks. Ministries of Foreign Affairs, on the other hand, are much more focused on the shorter term, e.g., managing crises. This may lead to less attention for the longer-term aspects, and even to approaches that are not in favour of longer-term commitments. Ministries of Defence are generally also more focused on short-term outputs, e.g., related to the duration of a military mission.

In order to develop an effective joined-up approach, it is of vital importance that the actors involved acknowledge and recognise such cultural differences, and take them into account in developing co-operation strategies. Instruments such as secondment of staff and shared training of staff on thematic issues are being used by the donor governments to bridge the cultural gaps between departments. Joint assessments are another important way to raise awareness of differences in organisational culture.

Staff Capacity and Human Resources

Joined-up working has considerable resource implications, both in financial and human terms. This poses yet another challenge to the successful development of WGAs. The case studies show that lack of qualified staff is one of the main problems encountered in the implementation phase. Capacity problems are not limited to the field level – as mentioned in almost all the cases – but can also be found at the headquarters level. Sweden and the UK are examples: capacity problems are

amplified in cases where organisations are faced with high rates of staff turnover. In cases where a staff position lasts for only 12-24 months it will be difficult to build relationships with counterparts, an important factor for the long-term commitment needed in fragile states. This not only applies to actors with an organisational culture focused on the shorter term, but also to those with a longer-term orientation.

In the case of Canada's involvement in Haiti, it was noted that given the long-term involvement and the relatively small turnover of staff – especially at CIDA – institutional memory was strong. However, it was also noted that this is rather an exception to the rule. In order to deal with this problem, and to capture best practices, emergency officials are now developing standard operating procedures that should help to inform new staff.

The reports also seem to suggest that problems of capacity are bigger in those cases where engagement is high on the political agenda and where formal co-ordination and reporting mechanisms are in place. Notwithstanding the advantage in terms of more political attention, such mechanisms also draw heavily on embassy resources and staff. As the case of the Netherlands made clear, it may be necessary to better balance political ambitions and implementation capacity. Specifically at the field level, a WGA requires sufficient staff capacity to manage relations with other partners and implement policies in an integrated manner.

Efficient WGAs to fragile states do not only require a sufficient number of staff, they also require a certain level of qualified staff. Specifically in fragile states, international actors need to be able to respond to developments in a swift and flexible manner. This requires a level of staff able to take strategic decisions and operate without having to refer back to the headquarters level for every little detail. In the case of Australia for instance, senior officials were appointed specifically to the mission in the Solomon Islands as a way of ensuring flexibility.

In the case of Australia, special attention is paid to the quality and seniority of the staff as this is crucial for the effective functioning of its Special Co-ordinator model. In the Regional Assistance Mission to the Solomon Islands, the Special Co-ordinator role is tasked to a career diplomat from Foreign Affairs. In general, much importance is attached to the personal attributes of the Mission's Principals, particularly to the relationship between the Special Co-ordinator and the commanders of the military and police contingents. The success of this structure depends on their personal qualities. However, for such models to work effectively, it will be necessary to appoint equally senior and equally competent personnel in all key positions.

Availability of Financial Resources

Another problem at the implementation level relates to resources in terms of having flexible funds available for implementing policies. This aspect is further touched upon in the section on instruments, but needs to be highlighted here as well. Even when resources are available at the field level, their disbursement can be complicated due to reporting and accounting regulations, or the need for formal approval at the headquarters level. In order to be able to disburse quickly, attempts should be made to delegate funds to the field level as much as possible. Alternatively, simplification of procedures should be considered to enable swift disbursement.

The reports show that funding disparities among departments can be problematic. By channelling funding through development agencies or ministries, there is a risk that development priorities and reporting requirements limit flexibility, in particular if those requirements do not suit the purpose of programmes run by other agencies. Also procedures can be quite different from other ministries and agencies, thus leading to questions and sometimes differences of opinion. This was reported for the cases of Australia and the UK. Part of this has to do with formal aspects and requirements, such

as development assistance eligibility, and part has to do with organisational culture. In addition it was mentioned that there is a lack of common understanding across agencies on basic economic management, in particular as regards working in difficult environments like fragile states. This seems to suggest that, whereas it may be good to have funding coming from a single source, attention still needs to be paid to who manages that source, and to the implications for the main procedures.

The case studies show that the selected governments have not always matched their ambitions for an integrated approach with sufficient resources. Pooled funds can be a solution to this challenge, but it was also mentioned that limited availability of non-development resources can be a constraint for some programmes to emerge or being executed.

Communication Systems: The Intra- and Interdepartmental Level

In addition to various formal mechanisms, the reports for this study indicate that in most cases communication among departments and between headquarters and field level is achieved primarily in an informal manner. In the case of the UK for instance, although formal meetings were arranged between the various members of each department's Yemen team, in general, communication took place by e-mail and phone. Similar findings emerge from the reports on Belgium, Sweden and Australia.

The reports point out the lack of joined-up communication strategies and procedures. In the case of Canada, Canadian International Development Agency officers are not able to link up easily with relevant communication systems used by Foreign Affairs officers (as they tend to use secured communication lines) and messages can take days to reach them. In order to achieve efficient communication, governments need to make sure that systems are accessible and information is available to all relevant actors.

Collaboration between development and security actors can also be affected by issues of security clearance. The fact that a joined-up approach implies sharing all kinds of information (including information with a higher level of confidentiality) implies the need for effective planning to ensure that staff in relevant posts, including those working for development agencies or ministries, have appropriate levels of security clearance.

In order to improve the *ad hoc* character of communication, and to exceed the level of mere information sharing and the role of personalities in establishing and maintaining contact, departments should seek to integrate their information-management systems and reporting structures. Apart from technical and security aspects, it would be of particular interest to assess whether it is possible to establish a more centralised formal communication and reporting system. Such a centralised system would promote coherent joined-up approaches. The papers indicate that currently reporting structures often are quite different, thus leading to perceptions of complicated partnerships, misunderstanding or even mistrust in terms of willingness to co-operate or co-ordinate.

The question remains where the centre for such communications co-ordination should lie and which system to adopt. Establishment of a more formal process involving regular reporting to political actors like Parliament might also create incentives for policy coherence that are sufficiently strong to override departmental incentive structures and cultural differences that impede a joined-up approach.

Communication Systems and Reporting Structures: Field vs. Headquarters Level

The case studies show that for increasing effectiveness, donor countries need to ensure regular communication between headquarters and the field level. Information must flow vertically as well

as horizontally: headquarters must make a greater effort to contact the field. Currently, most of the cases investigated indicate that contacts are insufficient to ensure field input on all strategic documents. In the same context, information is hardly shared with field staff on a regular basis. If information is shared, it is often to obtain field-level input for specific initiatives or issues at headquarters level. The case study of Canada highlights the need for greater information exchange and joint planning not only between departments, but also between headquarters and the field, in order to reconcile short-term stabilisation efforts with longer-term development objectives in Haiti. Emergency relief and stabilisation on the one hand, and sustainable development on the other, often involve different sets of actors. Unless they plan together, they could miss opportunities for synergy and greater overall impact, or possibly even potentially work at cross-purposes.

In the case of Belgium, these issues were dealt with quite pragmatically. The Joint Team on DDR (demobilisation, disarmament and reintegration) and SSR (consisting of development co-operation and defence staff) is present at weekly interdepartmental co-ordination meetings on the Great Lakes, and reports back to (and consult with) the embassy in the Democratic Republic of Congo on a regular basis. In the case of Sweden, however, the embassy is only to a small extent involved in the work of the Sudan Working Group in Stockholm. Nor is the Working Group reporting back on a regular basis. In addition, the staff in the Swedish Embassy Office – Sida and Foreign Affairs – report back separately to their institutional headquarters. This practice of separate reporting to headquarters can be found in the case of the Netherlands as well. No best practices are found for this inadequacy apart from *ad hoc* and personal initiatives. However for a joined-up approach one solution would be to consider a different communication system in which reports are shared with relevant departments and agencies on a formal basis. In the case of Australia, the communications matrix with the Office of the Special Co-ordinator (OSC) at the centre at the field level, and with lines of communication operating in three directions (among personnel from the different agencies in Honiara, among personnel from each agency in the field and their counterparts or superiors in Canberra, and among personnel from the different agencies in Canberra), has proved to be an effective way to transmit coherent, synthesised information about progress on the ground while allowing each department to retain a degree of hierarchical contact and control.

III. Recommendations

The Need for an Overall Framework

All case studies confirm the appropriateness of Principles 5 and 6³¹ of the Principles for Good International Engagement in Fragile States. They also highlight the need for all these Principles to be mainstreamed in OECD member governments, along with other DAC guidelines. There are nonetheless considerable gaps between what has been agreed in principle and ministerial and agency practice. While mainstreaming of the Principles within donor governments should therefore be a high priority for DAC members, this should be accompanied by efforts to develop the policy instruments and mechanisms required to operationalise these into assistance programmes.³²

The effectiveness of joined-up approaches may be improved by the creation of an overall framework for managing whole-of-government engagement in fragile states. Such a framework would consist of three elements: 1) a clear understanding of what fragile states are, which is shared by all relevant government actors; 2) a joint policy statement explaining the rationale for collaborative working in fragile states, together with the aims and how these will be achieved; and 3) a commitment to establish an effective dialogue between the key actors involved in a WGA, and to work on bridging differences in organisational culture. The case studies show that current approaches are often initiated by development actors and that discussions on the political-security-development nexus are also mainly couched in development terminology. Creating a joined-up approach requires taking on board the views, approaches and needs of other government actors as well. The aim of the suggested framework is to enable early involvement of all relevant actors, including those at the field level, and to provide clarity about their roles and objectives in a whole-of-government approach. While important as an instrument for promoting and managing joined-up working, the creation of an overall framework should not result in a bureaucratic straitjacket, creating an additional layer of decision making. An overall framework resulting in standardised approaches towards fragile states is to be avoided. The starting point should be that there are no blueprints for addressing their problems.

Achieving such a framework requires political commitment at the highest levels. Ideally, the process is driven at the level of a prime minister, and involves engaging the relevant ministers for a whole-of-government approach.

Who to Involve?

When dealing with fragile states it is important to engage with a range of actors. Which actors to engage, and to what extent, may vary from case to case. However, notwithstanding the fact that the fragile states issue is still predominantly perceived from a development co-operation perspective, the case studies confirm that the effect of non-aid policies on development outcomes is now widely accepted. As a result, security actors and objectives related to the security domain are increasingly included in the development debate, as are economic actors, justice departments and others.

Most of the case studies show that currently, departments of development co-operation, foreign affairs and defence are the key actors in WGAs to fragile states. In order to create a WGA, evidence suggests that increased involvement of other departments, in particular ministries of economic affairs and trade, should be encouraged.

Other actors may also have a role to play, depending on the circumstances. Here, one can think of the police, ministries of justice and migration. However, acknowledging the difficulty of co-ordinating the activities of a broad range of actors, these other departments should only be involved next to the key actors if and when they have a comparative advantage.

Joint Analysis

Donors must not underestimate the difficulty of developing and carrying out joint analysis, let alone sharing and internalising findings so that they can be acted upon in a joined-up manner through country strategies. But despite the challenge, it is recommended that donors aim to develop joint analyses of fragile states, and to share findings as important steps in the process towards setting priorities for action. The case study reports indicate that there is already a good deal of informal learning that goes on, but this could usefully become more institutionalised. Sharing experience among members of the Fragile States Group could be helpful in this regard. However, the case studies also show that the success of joint analyses and shared findings is, at least in part, dependent on a government structure that compels ministries to work together.

Country-Specific Joint Operational Strategies

There is no “one-size-fits-all” strategy for addressing state fragility. One of the challenges, therefore, is to become collaborative and country-specific while avoiding approaches that become fragmented and guided by different and potentially conflicting departmental objectives. The suggested overall framework plays a critical role in this regard, and should promote the development of practical, country-specific approaches. The case studies suggest that donors would benefit from the development of country-specific approaches on the basis of joint assessments early in the process that allow for joint strategies, planning, monitoring and evaluation.

Box 4. How can country strategies contribute to policy coherence?

The major components of joined-up working are: analysis, policy, strategy, programming and monitoring. The strategy development process is key to linking these different components together by:

- encouraging consultation and shared analysis of political, security and development issues, as a basis for agreeing policy;
- linking departmental priorities in the country in question to a donor country’s foreign policy objectives;
- providing a tool for managing joined-up working through the development of action plans with benchmarks;
- providing a basis for ensuring that departments speak with a common voice when dealing with different host government interlocutors; and
- officially committing departments to work more closely with each other in a particular area.

Co-ordination: The Need for Political Leadership and a Lead Co-ordinating Role

The case studies indicate that WGAs require commitment and leadership from the political top. The starting point for an effective whole-of-government approach, therefore, is clear political guidance and leadership which should provide the different actors involved with an understanding of the importance of their involvement.

The case study reports also underline the fact that an integrated approach should not simply be perceived as an outcome, but rather as a process: how to get there is just as important as getting there. In this regard, it is important to have clarity on who plays what role in this process, and in particular to recognise the need for lead co-ordination. Without clarity on how co-ordination is established, the risk of fragmentation remains. How to establish co-ordination is crucial and sensitive, and should not be underestimated. On the one hand, a joined-up approach may imply that any of the actors involved could take that lead. From the perspective of co-ordination, on the other hand, it is to be preferred to have an established lead co-ordinating agency. In this regard it is important to differentiate between leadership and co-ordination. The first implies that other ministries and departments have to follow directions, the latter indicates equal relationships.

In examining co-ordination, it is important to note that a government's engagement in a fragile state covers different phases that require different types of involvement from different actors. This engagement is not static: the roles and involvement of actors may change according to circumstances. In a simplified model this could imply that, for instance, defence and the police may play a more central role in a stabilisation phase, whereas in a capacity-building phase, development co-operation may play a more central role. At the same time, external interventions in a fragile states context will be heavily politicised. Hence, there will often be a case for diplomatic actors to play a key role. It is important to recognise the fact that these phases may operate in parallel rather than in succession. In view of this fact, as well as the fact that the key actors' involvement in WGAs to fragile states changes over time, attention should be paid to continuity and overall coherence. The case studies underline the need for continuous whole-of-government co-ordinating leadership to ensure consistency.

Some of the case studies suggest that given their position, role and mandate, foreign affairs may be best positioned at headquarters level to take up this lead co-ordinating role (in particular, integrated departments and ministries of foreign affairs and development co-operation). These cases showed that at the field level, ambassadors or special co-ordinators originating from foreign affairs seem to be best positioned for such a lead co-ordinating role, supported in this task by representatives from development co-operation and defence. Other cases indicate that the lead co-ordinating role can also be taken on by other actors, depending on the modalities. The key is that a capable lead co-ordinating actor be identified. It is suggested that, in order to guarantee continued whole-of-government co-ordinating leadership, foreign affairs could act as a constant co-ordinating partner during all the phases.

What should be avoided at all cost is formal overall leadership resulting in "contractor-subcontractor" relationships, whereby some departmental interests are systematically ignored or co-opted to serve one narrow policy objective. This would frustrate real joined-up working. All departments have the lead in their sectors of expertise and policy mandates. Attempts need to be made to increase ownership of the joint working, not least by involving core actors from the start, and to let all parties share in successes and in taking risks.

Creating the Right Incentive Structures

In view of the potentially high transaction costs involved, governments should acknowledge that there are disincentives for collaborative working and identify those (e.g., time-consuming, requiring compromise and a willingness to dilute one's own policy agenda, possibly leading to less individual (departmental) visibility). Similarly, attention should be paid to identifying existing incentives for joined-up working, as well as create new ones where necessary. An important incentive is providing the means and resources for joined-up working. However, in some countries such an approach can be problematic. It is clear that if fragile states are a priority as part of joined-up working, ministries and departments other than development co-operation should also devote part of their budget to fragile

state activities. In this regard, high official development assistance targets can limit governments in identifying financial room or extra money for other sectors to devote to fragile states. Finally, it is important to have better insight in the financial costs involved in mainstreaming policies.

A joint policy statement by the key ministers, providing the rationale for whole-of-government engagement in fragile states as well as the main objective, can also serve as an incentive, as it commits the key actors involved to enter into a dialogue. Furthermore, donor governments could use such a policy statement as a means of accountability for higher-level officials to put joined-up working into operation in their respective organisations. An incentive for the working level could be for performance reviews, not just to focus on project outputs, but also to include credit for effective co-ordination with other government departments leading to improved outcomes. Governments should also be encouraged to identify institutional incentives in terms of trade-offs. A key incentive for working with other actors is that it provides the opportunity to influence their policy agendas and ways of working, and it also offers a means to access skills and resources which a department may lack. Overall, a benefit of a whole-of-government approach is access to a broader pool of expertise in the public sector to help strengthen partner government institutions.

Mechanisms and Instruments for Promoting Policy Coherence and Joined-Up Working

In addition to the need for an overall framework, joint country strategies and attention to process, it is imperative to have the right instruments available to support political decisions on WGAs. The case reports indicate that where such instruments are available, their usage can be improved. In other cases new instruments will need to be developed.

The case studies show that institutional, budgetary and functional walls between departments can impede co-operation and co-ordination. The creation of joint budget lines can foster integrated planning. Establishing joint budget lines, however, proves to be difficult, or even impossible, given existing mandates and budget reporting requirements. Pooled funding is considered an important alternative instrument to foster integrated planning. The case studies show that different approaches are possible. One is the Dutch model, the Stability Fund, in which money comes from foreign affairs (including development co-operation), and in which defence, as one of the key actors, is consulted for planning. The other is the UK model for pooled funding, where the different ministries adding to the fund decide on its spending. Both models of pooled funding allow for flexibility in support of activities which may be classified as official development assistance and non-official development assistance. However, there is a danger that pooled funding can result in the proliferation of small projects unconnected to a wider strategy, and can generate competition among departments for scarce resources and so discourage joined-up approaches. There is also a risk that pooled funds can lead to the creation of new and additional structures (e.g., new units, geographic desks), which can make achieving coherence more difficult by the addition of more actors. Avoiding the creation of parallel structures and encouraging the involvement of existing geographic desks across relevant government departments (foreign, development and security) in the planning and implementation of initiatives funded by these pools can result in improved coherence with lower management and transactions costs.

Reporting structures, both vertical and horizontal, are an important instrument to promote effectiveness in terms of implementation. Joined-up reporting can strengthen co-operation between headquarters and the field level (vertical). And at the field level, joined-up reporting can enhance dialogue (horizontal) among different departmental interests. Joined-up reporting can also play a role in terms of developing an influencing agenda as it ensures that the key actors speak with a common voice when they deal with their host-government interlocutors.

Information Management Systems

In order to promote joined-up working, it is also recommended that where possible the information-management systems of different actors be integrated. The case studies show that intra- and interdepartmental communication systems can be improved in terms of technical features of access to information. Practical issues, such as a lack of the right level of security clearance for key personnel, can be an impediment to accessing information and creating a shared understanding of sensitive issues and problems, both at headquarters and field levels. In order to make joined-up working more effective, differences in information access have to be addressed as they can limit the ability of actors to enter into dialogue with colleagues from other ministries.

NOTES

1. See OECD (2005), "Policy Coherence and Whole of Government Approaches in Fragile States", draft concept note prepared by France and Australia, Fragile States Group, OECD, Paris.
2. FSG Work stream on whole of government approaches, Terms of Reference Phase 1 (6.2 and 6.3, December 2005)
3. Countries assessed are Australia, Belgium, Canada, France, the Netherlands, Sweden and the UK. The field level cases included Democratic Republic of Congo (Belgium and France), Haiti (Canada), Solomon Islands (Australia), Sudan (the Netherlands and Sweden), and Yemen (UK).
4. Principle No. 5 in OECD (2005), "Principles for Good International Engagement in Fragile States", draft, Fragile States Group, OECD, Paris, DCD(2005)8/REV2, www.oecd.org/dataoecd/59/55/34700989.pdf.
5. OECD (2006), *Monitoring Resource Flows to Fragile States: 2005 Report*, Fragile States Group, OECD, Paris, www.oecd.org/dataoecd/61/9/37035045.pdf.
6. (2005), "Piloting the Principles for Good International Engagement in Fragile States", concept note, Fragile States Group, OECD, Paris.
7. *Ibid.*
8. OECD (2001), *The DAC Guidelines on Helping Prevent Violent Conflict*, OECD, Paris, www.oecd.org/dataoecd/15/54/1886146.pdf, see policy statement, p. 13.
9. OECD (2005), *Security System Reform and Governance*, DAC Reference Document, OECD, Paris, www.oecd.org/dataoecd/8/39/31785288.pdf.
10. See OECD (2005), "Policy Coherence and Whole of Government Approaches in Fragile States", draft concept note prepared by France and Australia, Fragile States Group, OECD, Paris.
11. FSG Work stream on whole of government approaches, Terms of Reference Phase 1 (6.2 and 6.3, December 2005).
12. *Ibid.*
13. *Ibid.*
14. The authors of the case studies are Nicole Ball (Sweden), Mariska van Beijnum and Luc van de Goor (the Netherlands), Ivan Cook (Australia), Dylan Hendrickson (United Kingdom), Yannick Hingorani (Canada), Hans Hoebeke (Belgium and France).
15. As a result, attention is paid to this issue in several important security documents that have appeared in recent years: the U.S. National Security Strategy (September 2002), the European Security Strategy (December 2003), and the Report of the UN Secretary-General's High-level Panel on Threats, Challenges and Change (December 2004).
16. OECD (2005), "Principles for Good International Engagement in Fragile States", draft, Fragile States Group, OECD, Paris, www.oecd.org/dataoecd/59/55/34700989.pdf.
17. These are respectively: the Swedish International Development Cooperation Agency (Sida), the Canadian International Development Agency (CIDA) and the Australian Agency for International Development (AusAID).
18. OECD (2006), *Monitoring Resource Flows to Fragile States: 2005 Report*, OECD, Paris, Development Assistance Committee, www.oecd.org/dataoecd/61/9/37035045.pdf.
19. DFID (2005), "Why We Need to Work More Effectively in Fragile States", Annex I, DFID, London, www.dfid.gov.uk/pubs/files/fragilestates-paper.pdf, p. 27.
20. Respectively: DFID's policy note ("Why We Need to Work more Effectively in Fragile States", Annex I, DFID, London, January 2005, www.dfid.gov.uk/pubs/files/fragilestates-paper.pdf) and AusAID's statement to parliament ("Investing in Growth, Stability and Prosperity", Canberra, Australia, 2002, www.ausaid.gov.au/publications/pdf/eleventh.pdf).
21. OECD (2005), *Security System Reform and Governance*, DAC Reference Document, OECD, Paris, www.oecd.org/dataoecd/8/39/31785288.pdf, Chapter 2.
22. OECD (2005), *Security System Reform and Governance*, DAC Reference Document, OECD, Paris, www.oecd.org/dataoecd/8/39/31785288.pdf, Chapter 2.
23. As recently argued in Dan Smith's "Towards a Strategic Framework for Peacebuilding: Getting Their Act Together" (Overview Report of the Joint Utstein Study of Peacebuilding – Evaluation Report 1/2004, International Peace Research Institute, Oslo, www.dep.no/filarkiv/210673/rapp104.pdf).

24. OECD (2005), "Principles for Good International Engagement in Fragile States", draft, Fragile States Group, OECD, Paris, www.oecd.org/dataoecd/59/55/34700989.pdf.
25. *Ibid.*
26. Picciotto, R., C. Alao, E. Ikpe, M. Kimani and R. Slade (2005), "Striking a New Balance Donor Policy Coherence and Development Cooperation in Difficult Environments", background paper commissioned by the Learning and Advisory Process on Difficult Partnerships of the Development Assistance Committee of the OECD, Paris, p. 37.
27. *Ibid.*
28. Lockhart, C. (2005), "From aid effectiveness to development effectiveness: strategy and policy coherence in fragile states", background paper prepared for the Senior Level Forum on Development Effectiveness in Fragile States, Overseas Development Institute.
29. Picciotto, R. (2004), "Policy coherence and development evaluation", background paper prepared for OECD Workshop, Paris.
30. Sweden started working on a Policy for Security and Development in late spring of 2006.
31. Principle 5: Recognise the political-security-development nexus. Principle 6: Promote coherence between donor government agencies, see OECD (2005), "Principles for Good International Engagement in Fragile States", draft, Fragile States Group, OECD, Paris, DCD(2005)8/REV2, www.oecd.org/dataoecd/59/55/34700989.pdf.
32. The need to take a whole-of-government approach in the area of security system reform was first highlighted in the DAC Reference Book on Security System Reform and Governance (2005). The guidelines focused on how such an approach could be encouraged through establishing an overarching policy framework, inter-ministerial committees or pooled funding.

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ANNEX

OVERVIEW CO-ORDINATION MECHANISMS CASE STUDY COUNTRIES

The case studies show that over the last years, donors have developed a plethora of mechanisms aimed at better co-ordination, often supported by specific initiatives, instruments and tools. A short overview of each case study is provided here.

Australia

Australian security policy is co-ordinated at the highest level by the National Security Committee of Cabinet which comprises key ministers and department and service heads, and therefore covers both the making and implementation of policy. Committee members are well-placed to provide the necessary whole-of-government impetus to their individual departments with regard to combined operations, so that failures of communication at lower levels tend to be faults of leadership rather than structure.

At lower levels, foreign and development policy is generated by the Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade (DFAT) and its institutional younger sibling, the Australian Agency for International Development (AusAID), while security policy and operations may be undertaken by the Department of Defence, the Australian Defence Forces and the Australian Federal Police (AFP). Where a particular operation requires the involvement of these (and other) actors, the Department of Prime Minister and Cabinet has oversight of proceedings. In general these departments attempt to co-ordinate their efforts by common membership of interdepartmental committees (IDCs), some of which stand permanently while others are formed and disbanded according to circumstance.

Personal relationships across departments have proven just as important as more formal mechanisms for the effective co-ordination of policy at both headquarters and field level. Some relationships arise naturally from the current circumstance, but others were formed previously and provide productive but less obvious paths of communication among different departments. The relatively small size and geographic concentration of the Australian Public Service contributes to this effect. Permanent liaison officers placed in Defence, the AFP and AusAID help to facilitate common understanding.

In the case of the Regional Assistance Mission to Solomon Islands (RAMSI), co-ordination is achieved by means of two central mechanisms: the RAMSI IDC, which meets weekly by video link and includes senior officials from both the field and headquarters; and by the good offices of the RAMSI Special Coordinator, a DFAT official who brings together the leaders of each element of RAMSI and has overall charge of the field mission. The Office of the Special Coordinator is the nexus through which reporting and decision making flows between the field and headquarters. Separate lines of communication also operate between the field and headquarters within each department, though they tend to deal with departmental rather than mission-wide issues. At lower levels in the field, interdepartmental committees and working groups address specific issues.

The Australian High Commission in Honiara is neither formally nor directly involved in co-ordinating RAMSI activities, although there is constant communication between their respective leaders, both of whom are career diplomats. Because RAMSI is a regional mission (though overwhelmingly staffed and funded by Australia) it cannot be run bilaterally, and the High Commission's activities are limited to the usual business of diplomacy, including management of the bilateral aid program. Although this program is formally distinct from RAMSI, their respective components are practically seamless. AusAID's country strategies, mandated to include whole-of-government inputs, therefore provide another forum for interdepartmental co-ordination in the case of RAMSI.

Belgium

The political and institutional complexity in the case of Belgium indicate that issues of co-ordination and the potential for a WGA can vary according to country due to national political and institutional factors. In this context, the key co-ordinating role for foreign policy lies with the Federal Public Service Foreign Affairs, International Trade and Development Co-operation (FPS FA). Within the FPS FA, several Directorates General have a central function to achieve policy coherence through a range of mechanisms and forums. The Directorate General for Development Co-operation is integrated into the FPS FA, and is responsible to seek coherence among the different Belgian actors in development policies.

With regard to the case of the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), the case study focuses attention on the fact that the Great Lakes Region, and the DRC in particular, historically play an important role in Belgian foreign policy. The fact that the DRC is not just a technical, but also a political area of attention has resulted in a long history of interdepartmental co-ordination. The paper mentions that, notwithstanding the political importance of the DRC, co-ordination has mainly been *ad hoc*. At the headquarters level, co-ordination on the DRC takes place through a weekly meeting, which involves representatives from all relevant ministries, as well as the policy cells of the Prime Minister and the Ministers of Foreign Affairs, Development Co-operation and Defence. The meeting is informal, but a written report is widely distributed. As in the case of the Swedish Sudan Working Group, this Belgian group is not a decision-making organ: it is mainly a vehicle for exchanging views, information and policy on a regular basis.

At the field level, Belgium has a considerable diplomatic representation with a political, economic/commercial, development, military and consular section. The Ambassador plays a central role in terms of co-ordination. He presides over daily meetings between the sections, and relates to the weekly interdepartmental co-ordination meetings in Brussels.

The fact that most co-ordination takes place on an *ad hoc* basis is now recognised as an area for improvement. A first step to enhance co-ordination is the Joint Team (Ministry of Defence and Development Co-operation), which was established for dealing with issues related to SSR and DDR. The different sections of the Embassy are closely involved in its work (field missions), their reports are widely circulated and they participate in the weekly co-ordination meeting.

Canada

At a more general level, the Prime Minister of Canada is ultimately responsible for the coherence of Canada's public policy overall, supported by his Cabinet and its system of committees. For international policy, the Foreign Affairs and National Security Committee is responsible for ensuring a co-ordinated and integrated approach to Canada's engagement abroad. The Privy Council Office (PCO) provides a critical link between the Prime Minister and his Cabinet on the one hand, and the civil service on the other. The PCO is responsible for ensuring that the Prime Minister's priorities are reflected in the work of the civil service. For the latter, the PCO serves as a focal point for co-ordinating priorities across government.

Policy co-ordination among departments and agencies is done mainly through interdepartmental committees, working groups and task forces. The Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade (DFAIT) is mandated to co-ordinate all relevant departments and agencies. The Stabilisation and Reconstruction Task Force (START) has recently been established at DFAIT to enhance the government's ability to produce timely and co-ordinated responses to international crises. Although START is meant to be an interdepartmental mechanism, its management comprises only of DFAIT officials. A number of Department of National Defence (DND) and Canadian International Development Agency (CIDA) officers are seconded to START, but they are placed mostly at a working level.

As of April 2006, the way in which START was to interface and work with other departments and agencies remained unclear. An interdepartmental Advisory Board made up of DFAIT, CIDA, DND, Public Safety and Emergency Preparedness Canada (PSEPC), Royal Canadian Mounted Police (RCMP) and PCO's Foreign Affairs and Defence Policy Secretariat has been established to provide guidance to START. However, the terms of reference for this director general-level co-ordinating body have yet to be finalised. Furthermore, at the operational level, it remains to be seen how START will be able to co-ordinate the Global Peace and Security Fund with CIDA bilateral programmes, and promote coherence between short-term stabilisation and longer-term institution building. The latter is normally the purview of development co-operation. How START will work with CIDA bilateral desks to ensure complementary design and delivery of longer-term programmes, as well as how exit strategies will be developed, remains to be seen.

The Canada Corps and Canadian Police Arrangement (CPA) are two mechanisms that also enhance interdepartmental engagement in fragile states. The former enabled Canada to deploy a large number of short-term election observers to the International Monitoring Mission of Haitian Elections, headed by Canada's chief electoral officer. Canada's election support was a good example of how various departments pooled their resources to provide multifaceted support to a strategic initiative. Similarly, the CPA enabled Canada to deploy up to 100 Canadian police officers to the United Nations Stabilization Mission in Haiti during the past two years, involving collaboration between DFAIT, CIDA and the RCMP.

Canada's overall engagement in Haiti was planned by an Interdepartmental Steering Group, consisting mainly of DFAIT, DND, CIDA, PSEPC and PCO. When resource issues were addressed, the Department of Finance and Treasury Board Secretariat participated in the meetings. At the operational level, an Interdepartmental Working Group was also convened by departments and agencies to plan and oversee the implementation of Canada's approach in Haiti. Domestic departments with important technical expertise participated in this Working Group, such as Correctional Services Canada, Elections Canada and the Department of Justice. The Prime Minister also appointed a Special Advisor, but this advisor has no specific co-ordinating role. At field level Canada co-ordinates its support mainly through the Interim Co-operation Framework and its system of sectoral tables. The Ambassador and Head of Aid play a key role in aligning Canadian activity with priorities set by Haitian authorities and supported by the international community.

The formulation of a Country Strategy is a new process launched by all Canadian embassies this year. The Country Strategy is to be produced on an annual basis and outlines how the Mission, with headquarters support, will implement Canada's strategic objectives on the ground. Particularly, it seeks to define how the Mission will advance these objectives with a WGA. This Strategy is also linked to the Ambassador's *Performance Management Agreement*, which defines the specific mandate of the ambassador which he/she is professionally accountable for implementing. The performance management agreement is a relatively new tool and is currently still being developed. However, it is considered an important incentive for working in a joined-up manner.

France

In the case of France, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs – with the Directorate General for International Co-operation and Development (DGCID) and the *Direction de la Coopération Militaire et de Défense* (DCMD) – is a main player in terms of international assistance. A broad range of other actors are also involved: the Ministry of Defence, the Ministry of Economic Affairs, Finances and Industry and the French Agency for Development (AFD). Specifically with regard to co-ordination of policies on Africa, the *Cellule Africaine* of the Elysée and the Directorate Africa and the Indian Ocean (DAOI) are also important actors. In addition, for the co-ordination of development co-operation, two platforms

have been created recently: the CICID (Interministerial Committee for International Co-operation) and the COSP (Conference on Strategic Orientation and Planning).

In terms of actual co-ordination in the case of the Democratic Republic of Congo, these ministries and bodies are supported by a range of instruments, of which the *Documents Cadres de Partenariat* (DCP – partnership framework documents) are the latest and most important addition. The main actors for co-ordination are the DAOI and the Embassy in Kinshasa, with strategic input from the *Cellule Africaine*. In terms of the development co-operation, the AFD plays the main role. However, it is clear that there is only limited co-ordination, at the level of the administration, between issues of security and development. The assessment concludes that the DCMD seems to operate in a different sphere, and is culturally and content-wise very disconnected from the DGCID of that same ministry.

Hence, whereas the DCP plays an important role in terms of co-ordination of development co-operation, the limited scope (excluding all issues related to security) makes it in its current form less useful as an instrument for co-ordination of joined-up approaches in fragile states. The Ambassador, though, can and does play a key role in the co-ordination of all policies – development and security-related – and is able to bridge this gap to a certain degree through his defined role (but in the case of the Democratic Republic of Congo to a large degree because of his personality). There are however no formal structures to bridge this gap, i.e., to promote co-ordination for joined-up approaches.

The Netherlands

In the case of the Netherlands, co-ordination at the more general level takes place in the Council of Ministers, the Co-ordination Commission for International Affairs and the Cabinet Committee on European and International Affairs. In terms of the implementation of Dutch integrated policies, more specialised co-ordination mechanisms come into play. Key are the Steering Committee for Security Co-operation and Reconstruction, the Stability Fund (SF) Steering Committee, the Steering Committee Military Operations, the Steering Committees on Police and Rule of Law, and the inter-ministerial consultation committee on Civil Military Co-operation. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA) plays a key role in most of these steering committees, often with the Ministry of Defence as co-chair. These steering committees also cover the key actors (foreign affairs, development co-operation and defence) and instruments (SF) of the Dutch WGA on fragile states (i.e., post-conflict reconstruction).

For Sudan, the Netherlands has established a temporary task force with members from the MFA's Africa Department, the Human Rights and Peacebuilding Department, the Security Policy Department and the Humanitarian Aid Division. Meetings of the Task Force Sudan (TFS) take place on a weekly basis and are attended by representatives from Defence. Other actors can join on an 'as-needed' basis. Part of the TFS staff is temporarily seconded. The TFS is special in the sense that it is positioned outside the MFA's bureaucratic structures. This provides the TFS with direct access to the Directors-General for International Co-operation and for Political Affairs, and ensures efficient provision of information to the Ministers of Foreign Affairs and for Development Co-operation (who are integrated in the MFA). In practical terms, the TFS is responsible for policy formulation and implementation, and functions as the key co-ordinating mechanism to integrate policies. In doing so, the TFS has a special envoy who is, among other things, involved in the Darfur negotiations in Abuja. The TFS also works closely with the Embassy in Khartoum. Interestingly, it was noted that the TFS as co-ordinating mechanism is better staffed than the Embassy. It was also noted that a full time Defence Attaché in Khartoum (as opposed to the current situation, where the Cairo based Defence Attaché is accredited for Sudan) would enhance joined-up working at the Embassy level. Although a co-author of the joined-up Reconstruction Memorandum, the Ministry of Economic Affairs is less visible in the TFS, and not present at the field level.

Special mention needs to be made here of the Joint Donor Team and Office in Juba, which will jointly co-ordinate and execute the development co-operation activities of five donor countries (Denmark, Netherlands, Norway, Sweden and the UK).

Sweden

In the case of Sweden, the co-ordination of foreign and development policy starts with the *Joint Preparation Process*, which is required by law and which produces government decisions that are acceptable to all relevant ministries. A second important mechanism for co-ordination is the *Policy on Global Development* (PGD). This policy is aimed at fighting poverty through promoting coherence in the whole government. When it comes to the nexus of security and development and engaging in fragile states, the range of actors is usually: Parliament, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA), Defence, the Ministry of Justice, Sida and the Swedish Rescue Services Agency. The range of actors indicates that most relevant policy areas for a fragile state are included. Discussions in the framework of the PGD lead to a *Co-operation Strategy*, incorporating relevant forms of Swedish assistance provided to a country. There is an interdepartmental dialogue and joint planning. The case study report shows however, that this process, which is led by the MFA (regional desks), in practice does not lead to a fully joined-up approach, due to the fact that there is no joint assessment process. Different actors provide what they find important from their perspective and it is all incorporated into the strategy.

Further co-ordination takes place through *regular consultations* between the MFA and Sida. These take place once or twice a year, or whenever this is called for, and can address questions and reviews of policy implementation. In order to promote coherence and to contribute to a joined-up approach, Sweden has developed a number of new initiatives as well.

A first new development for Sweden is the MFA's extended consultations with Sida on ways to use funds in a complementary manner. A second new development is the *Management Response*. This latter mechanism is employed by the MFA's department for Policy Development, and aims at operationalising findings from studies that are commissioned. As part of the need for a more joined-up approach, the scope of actors, i.e., different ministries, involved in the discussions on operationalising such findings has been broadened according to the theme concerned.

Regarding Sudan, co-ordination is – in addition to the mechanisms mentioned above – organised through the *Sudan Guidelines* (for the moment a revised version as from October 2005), and the *Sudan Working Group*. The paper on Sweden concludes that these Guidelines are developed through consultations, but are not based on a joint assessment process. However, each of the ministries involved provides its input, from its perspective, for a Sudan policy to the MFA. The Sudan Working Group, which is not a decision-making group, is supposed to promote coherent implementation of the Guidelines. The Sudan Working Group is informal and provides key civil servants with a forum for discussion and facilitates agreements on next steps. Given the fact that the Sudan Working Group only meets on an as-needed basis – also due to capacity problems – the co-ordinating role is limited. A factor further constraining the co-ordinating role of the Sudan Working Group is the fact that Sida does not participate in the working group on a regular basis. Sida is, however, consulted whenever necessary.

At the field level, the potential for co-ordination is both high and low. As in the case of the UK, the co-location of the Sida and MFA representatives in Khartoum has led to an ad-hoc integrated approach at the field level. A limiting factor is the fact that Sweden has a very small representation in Sudan consisting of only two people (one representative from the MFA and one from Sida). However, a Special Envoy for the Horn of Africa has been working since spring 2006. Sweden has also had a Special Envoy connected to the Darfur peace negotiations in the first half of 2006. The Swedish

Ambassador and Defence Attaché work out of the Swedish Embassy in Addis Ababa. All this could possibly lead to a fragmented approach. Sweden is a partner in the Joint Donor Team (JDT) in Juba; another Sida official will be assigned to the JDT.

United Kingdom

The three key actors involved in the UK's joined-up approach to Yemen are the Foreign and Commonwealth Office (FCO), the Department for International Development (DFID), and the Ministry of Defence (MoD). All three departments participate in the Africa and Global Conflict Prevention Pools, which aim to develop integrated policies on conflict prevention in areas of either thematic or regional interest. The Post Conflict Reconstruction Unit (PCRU) was established to improve the UK's capacity to deal with post-conflict stabilisation, including integrating civilian and military policy, planning and operations. By providing operational support and facilitating communication between DFID, the FCO and the MoD, the PCRU can help to align departmental planning processes. The Cabinet Office provides the central support to the government to take forward its strategic foreign and policy objectives. The Cabinet Office supports the Prime Minister's Office and the Cabinet, and drives cross-Whitehall co-ordination. The Cabinet Office is supported by the Joint Intelligence Committee (JIC), which co-ordinates interdepartmental intelligence assessments.

Improvements in cross-departmental collaboration since the 1990s have been made possible by a number of factors. Two worth noting are ministerial leadership stressing the need for greater cross-departmental collaboration and the development of shared concepts and terminology. Important additional initiatives have been the *DFID/FCO Closer Working Action Plan* (2003) aimed at improving collaboration between these two departments, and the planned 2007 *Comprehensive Spending Review*. The latter initiative will aim for greater government-wide efficiency through further integration across departments.

The UK's WGA to Yemen has been underpinned by a range of formal and informal processes and mechanisms. Development of a shared analysis of the problems was a key starting point for building a case for a more integrated UK engagement with Yemen (i.e., a *Drivers of Change* analysis). On this basis, the Prime Minister's Office took the decision to review UK policy towards Yemen, and assigned the Cabinet Office with the task to initiate a dialogue among the relevant departments. The FCO, finally, was given responsibility for developing the overall approach under the guidance of the Cabinet Office.

However, in contrast to various formal mechanisms for other countries (e.g., for Sudan there is a formal Sudan Unit), the co-ordination of activities for Yemen was done mainly through informal mechanisms. Management of the UK engagement in Yemen has relied on a "light-touch" approach driven essentially by individual departments rather than by a formal cross-departmental or Cabinet-level committee. PCRU has not been involved in either the planning or co-ordination of departmental activities. This approach reflects the fact that Yemen ranks below other current UK priorities such as Afghanistan and Iraq where more formal management structures have been established.

This light-touch approach can be seen as a pragmatic response to resource constraints which exist across government. To the extent that joined-up working has been achieved in a number of key areas, this is because all departments broadly share the same analysis of the problems and are clear on their individual roles in responding to them. The fact that, contrary to practice in many other countries where the UK is engaged, FCO and DFID are co-located in the same building in Sana'a was also a factor that contributed to closer professional and personal interaction between DFID, FCO and MoD staff.

Part 4

The Challenge of Capacity Development: Working Towards Good Practice

Abstract: This report draws on four decades of documented experience provided by both bilateral and multilateral donors, as well as academic specialists, to help policy makers and practitioners think through effective approaches to capacity development and what challenges remain in the drive to boost country capacity. The analysis is underpinned by a conceptual framework which guides practitioners to view capacity development at three interrelated levels: individual, organisational and the enabling environment. It provides insights into what capacity development is, why it matters and, more importantly, what can be done to support it.

Acknowledgements: This paper is the result of a collaborative effort by members of the DAC Network on Governance (GOVNET) and the Learning Network on Capacity Development (LenCD). Any comments or queries should be addressed to dac.contact@oecd.org.

Foreword

The international development community spent much of 2005 reflecting on the volume and effectiveness of aid and its role in poverty reduction. One conclusion of the major events and reviews of the last year, such as the Commission for Africa, the Millennium Review, the Paris Declaration on Aid Effectiveness and the G8 Gleneagles summit, is clear: capacity development is one of the most critical issues for both donors and partner countries.

The recognition that capacity development is a fundamental component of development and aid effectiveness and a key element in achieving the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs), is what led the DAC Network on Governance (GOVNET) and the Learning Network on Capacity Development (LenCD) to their work on this publication. Individuals from both networks who have contributed to this major publication are too numerous to mention here, but their efforts are gratefully appreciated.

The publication reviews 40 years of development experience and concludes that donors and partner countries alike have tended to look at capacity development as mainly a technical process, or as a transfer of knowledge or institutions from North to South. It explains how donors have often failed to recognize the critical importance of country ownership and leadership, and how they underestimated the importance of the broader political context within which capacity development efforts take place.

It also offers invaluable guidance about how to think systematically through the capacity development challenge. The evidence suggests that what is necessary is a fundamental change in development practice, including focusing on capacity as an endogenous process, agreeing at country level on capacity objectives and monitoring outcomes from the perspective of the beneficiaries. Such changes could have a substantial impact on development outcomes.

I am confident that this publication will help donors and partner countries implement what has been learned and to assist them in the biggest challenge of all: turning well-known good practice into common practice.



Richard Manning
Chair
Development Assistance Committee

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Executive Summary

Why focus on capacity?

Adequate country capacity is one of the critical missing factors in current efforts to meet the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs). Development efforts in many of the poorest countries will fail, even if they are supported with substantially increased funding, if the development of sustainable capacity is not given greater and more careful attention. This is now widely recognised by donor organisations and partner countries alike, as articulated in the 2005 “Paris Declaration on Aid Effectiveness”.

Capacity development is a major challenge. Technical co-operation and various forms of capacity building have absorbed substantial funds over many decades. While a few countries have done well, donor efforts in many countries have produced little to show in terms of sustainable country capacity. This contrast between the importance of the challenge and the difficulty of meeting it is what stimulated the preparation of this paper. The paper draws on a large volume of documented experience provided by bilateral and multilateral donors and academic specialists. It is mainly concerned with capacity and performance in the public sector, but private sector experience is drawn on where relevant.

Capacity development involves much more than enhancing the knowledge and skills of individuals. It depends crucially on the quality of the *organisations* in which they work. In turn, the operations of particular organisations are influenced by the *enabling environment* – the structures of power and influence and the institutions – in which they are embedded. Capacity is not only about skills and procedures; it is also about incentives and governance.

What has been learned?

Until recently, capacity development was viewed mainly as a technical process, involving the simple transfer of knowledge or organisational models from North to South. Not enough thought was given to the broader political and social context within which capacity development efforts take place. This led to an overemphasis on what were seen as “right answers”, as opposed to approaches that best fit the country circumstances and the needs of the particular situation. For related reasons, there was insufficient appreciation of the importance of country ownership of capacity development initiatives.

The new consensus, articulated strongly in the 2005 Paris Declaration, sees capacity development as a necessarily endogenous process, strongly led from within a country, with donors playing a supporting role. According to this vision, political leadership and the prevailing political and governance system are critical factors in creating opportunities and setting limits for capacity development efforts. Country policy ownership is not a simple yes/no issue, however, but a matter of processes and trends. It is also not monolithic. The conditions may be right for donors to support locally-owned processes of improvement in certain organisational spheres even when the conditions in the wider system are suboptimal.

From emerging consensus to better practice on the ground

The concepts of capacity and capacity development are so all-encompassing that practitioners have often found it difficult to make operational sense of them. It is important for practitioners to begin by asking the question “capacity for what?” and focus on the specific capacities needed to accomplish clearly defined goals. The “best fit” approach to capacity development then calls for a systematic effort to think through what might work in the particular circumstances. This can be done by ensuring that adequate attention is given to both individual and organisational issues and to the enabling environment for capacity development at each stage in a process consisting of four main steps or recurrent tasks as follows:

Understanding the international and country contexts

A good understanding of context is fundamental. Help in understanding the enabling environment can be obtained from the “institutional analysis”, “power analysis” or “drivers of change analysis” increasingly being undertaken by donor organisations as the basis for country assistance plans. This type of work uncovers the incentive structures behind the “lack of political will” often blamed for the limited success of capacity development programmes. At the level of particular organisations, standard assessment methods need to be supplemented with thorough diagnostic analysis covering both formal and informal aspects. As organisations are “open” systems, thinking about possible change processes needs to include the role of external as well as internal stakeholders, including the private sector. The negative impact of the international brain drain and the positive potential of the diaspora are among the contextual factors relevant to the individual level of capacity development.

Identifying and supporting sources of country-owned change

The commitment in the Paris Declaration that countries should lead and donors support is more easily said than done. It is clear, however, that the interactions between donors and domestic actors can generate either vicious or virtuous circles of change in regard to the ownership of capacity development efforts. The key thing is to interrupt any vicious circles, in which ownership and capacity are progressively eroded, and build on any tentative steps that might result in the establishment of a more positive trend, for example by encouraging greater “effective demand” for public sector capacity within the country.

In more specific organisational terms, donors should support policy frameworks for capacity development that benefit from genuine commitment at a high level and avoid launching parallel initiatives that fragment efforts and divert critical resources. In the absence of commitment, attention should be given to building it by strengthening client and citizen demands. Capacity needs assessments should begin with the question “capacity for what?” and avoid the trap of providing generic training on broad topics, disconnected from the capacity and performance of specific organisations. Some organisations will be a better focus than others in the sense that improvements in their capacity and performance would have more widespread spill-over benefits for the rest of government and the economy.

Individual professionals within and outside the public sector are potential allies for reformers wishing to promote capacity development, and attention should be given to mobilising this potential. Donors should also be attentive to possible government interest in harmonising salary-supplementation schemes as a transitional measure in moving towards more rational pay policies in the public service, one of the requirements for capacity development in many countries.

Delivering support

In delivering support to a capacity development policy or programme, donors must remain aware of the institutional constraints and ensure that their own approach does not contribute to the problem. For example, Project Implementation Units (PIUs) have often been blamed for diverting resources away from critical government functions and working against sustainable public sector capacity. When working with organisations, reaching agreement on the specific capacity development outcomes that are being pursued is an obvious but often neglected task. As well as clear objectives, programmes need to have the right inputs, selected on the basis of cost-effectiveness and not just what donors have to offer. This may mean giving preference to local suppliers or South-South links. It is very likely to mean engaging the skills and energies of the country's NGOs, think tanks and private sector. There may be a case for large new investments in training capacity, as argued by the Africa Commission among others. However, any rebuilding of training capacity should take account of recent technological changes as well as the lessons of past experience in programme design. Skill creation should always be integrated with the organisational and institutional changes necessary to put new skills to work effectively.

Learning from experience and sharing lessons

Future capacity development initiatives should be designed to maximise learning at each of the three levels of capacity development: individual, organisational, and enabling environment. A particularly high priority should be given to building shared understanding about what works and what doesn't in terms of improving the enabling environment. Monitoring – preferably by independent assessors – of the application of the Paris commitments to support for capacity development is essential, as is better tracking of how money is spent on capacity development initiatives. Monitoring of programmes should be firmly focused on the intended outcomes, so that relevant learning can feed back into programme management and future programme design. Monitoring arrangements that fit this purpose may include efforts to collect the views of clients or end-users of the relevant services, as proxies for measures of capacity enhancement. Monitoring of training impacts should not be limited to the immediate benefits to the individual trainee, but include the effects on organisational capacity.

Capacity development in fragile states

Attention to capacity development issues is no less relevant in “fragile states” than in other developing and transitional countries, though conditions may call for a more selective and limited approach. Focusing on capacity development may be one possible way of engaging different parts of the society in new development efforts in such contexts. Fragile states include a diverse range of country situations, from post-conflict reconstruction to chronic political weakness. Nevertheless, some recent experience from these countries is of quite general relevance.

The idea that applies with special force to fragile environments is that successful capacity development is based on a good multi-level understanding of the country context. Such understanding is what makes possible the design of solutions that best fit the particular circumstances.

Other lessons concern the value of focusing on core state functions, particularly those whose performance directly affects the likelihood of state collapse or further conflict; the desirability of joint planning across the range of security, diplomatic and development actors; the importance of fostering country leadership even where the conditions appear unpromising; taking extra care not to undermine existing, including dormant, capacities; and working with non-state actors in ways that reinforce the development of public sector capacity in the longer term.

Moving forward: Unfinished business

Rising to the challenge of capacity development is not going to be easy. Special and sustained efforts will be needed to take forward the above agenda. In particular, the following items of unfinished business need urgent attention from the DAC and will be the focus of the future work of the DAC's Network on Governance (GOVNET):

- Consolidate the new consensus on capacity development as an endogenous process, make it reach all parts of the aid system and become a central topic of policy dialogue at country level. GOVNET will help by providing operational advice targeted at practitioners leading capacity development thinking within agencies or participating in relevant dialogue at country level.
- Address the systemic factors currently discouraging country-led capacity development as visualised by the Paris Declaration. Donors and partners together should devote more attention to understanding why the enabling environment is so often weak and what could be done to improve this situation. GOVNET will help by sharing more widely information on how Power and Drivers of Change Analyses can assist in understanding the enabling environment for capacity development.
- Make sure that the international community plays its part in delivering on the Paris commitments. GOVNET will help by making available case materials on good and bad practices in supporting country-led capacity development initiatives. This will assist donors to make headway on the commitment to provide support through co-ordinated programmes linked to government-led strategies as per indicator 4 of the Paris Declaration.
- Fully integrate training and human capital formation with the organisational reforms and institutional changes needed to put skills to effective use. Future programme designs should take full account of informal aspects of the way organisations work and how they are influenced by their social and political environment. Future GOVNET guidance will fully reflect what has been learned on these points.
- Work towards policy-relevant technical co-operation statistics. In order to assess whether donor inputs are becoming more relevant to the achievement of capacity development outcomes, the development community needs more disaggregated data. GOVNET will link up with the efforts already being made along these lines by the DAC's WP-STAT, to learn from the experience so far and help to ensure an optimal outcome.
- Build upon recent learning about capacity challenges in fragile states. Well targeted and appropriately delivered capacity development may be one of the keys to reducing state fragility, one of the major challenges of our time. GOVNET will help by providing further operational guidance on this subject through the links to country teams applying the "Principles for Good International Engagement in Fragile States" and through donor headquarters.

I. Why Focus on Capacity?

Context and purpose of this paper

The growing consensus on aid effectiveness and capacity

In reviews of aid effectiveness, the development of capacity is invariably recognised as one of the most critical issues for both donors and partner countries. The 2005 Paris Declaration on Aid Effectiveness highlights the need for significantly enhanced support for country efforts to strengthen governance and improve development performance. In this context, the Declaration calls for capacity development to be an explicit objective of national development and poverty-reduction strategies. The reports of the UN Millennium Project and the Commission for Africa are among those challenging the world to treat capacity development with greater urgency.¹ In Africa, the New Partnership for Africa's Development (NEPAD) has identified capacity constraints as a major obstacle to sustainable development. All sides acknowledge that, without sufficient country capacity, development efforts in many of the poorest countries are unlikely to succeed, even if they are supported with substantially enhanced funding.

It is also recognised that this poses a substantial challenge.² In recent years, about a quarter of donor aid, or more than USD 15 billion a year,³ has gone into technical co-operation, the bulk of which is ostensibly aimed at capacity development. Despite the magnitude of these inputs, evaluation results confirm that development of sustainable capacity remains one of the most difficult areas of international development practice. Capacity development has been one of the least responsive targets of donor assistance, lagging behind progress in infrastructure development or improving health and child mortality. For example, in 2004 the *Global Monitoring Report*, which reviews advancement towards the achievement of the MDGs, noted that improvements in public sector management and institutions – key indicators of public sector capacity – have lagged behind all other MDG benchmarks.⁴

It is the contrast between the increasingly recognised importance of capacity and the difficulty of achieving it that has stimulated the preparation of this paper. The record is mixed, however. Some developing countries have made notable steps forward in capacity development, and donors have played an important role in supporting them. We therefore have a basis on which to learn from our failures and successes.

Aims of the paper

This paper offers a framework for thinking about capacity development, based on the main lessons of experience, both good and bad. It draws on the wealth of evaluations and analysis carried out by bilateral and multilateral donors, as well as on the work of academics.⁵ It is largely concerned with capacity issues in the public sector, although it does not address the full range of public sector issues and cannot deal with the challenges in specific sectors, such as trade or education. It is not a “cookbook” containing detailed instructions on how to do capacity development. Instead, it brings

together the most critical general lessons learned, and spells out their implications for development practice today.

One of the most important lessons from experience is that there are no quick fixes or easy formulas that work well in all circumstances. At the same time, experience does point strongly to a set of core issues which, if tackled intelligently, will improve the results achieved in many particular settings.

The paper's intended audience is a broad range of policy makers and practitioners. But it is directed most particularly to those working on development co-operation at the field level. This reflects the growing appreciation that it is at the field level that decisions about the design of development co-operation are most effectively taken, and where learning and innovation are most likely. **The paper is meant to serve as a framework to guide and stimulate ongoing discussions.** It may also be useful as a basis for dialogue between partner countries and donors.

Basic understandings

What is capacity development and why does it matter?

In this paper, “capacity” is understood as the ability of people, organisations and society as a whole to manage their affairs successfully. The definition is deliberately simple. It avoids any judgement on the objectives that people choose to pursue, or what should count as success in the management of their collective efforts.

However, capacity is important because of its relationship to the *performance* of country systems, particularly in delivering basic goods and services, and providing a suitable policy and regulatory environment for development to take place. The relationship between capacity and performance in human affairs may be illustrated by analogy with the motor car. We are careful to maintain the car's engine, chassis, brakes, tyres, etc. – its capacity – because we value the safe and reliable transportation – the performance – that it provides.⁶ Development co-operation agencies are ultimately interested in the factors that make possible a strong performance in relation to developmental goals and the MDGs. This requires a clear understanding of the various determinants of that performance.

“Capacity development” is understood as the process whereby people, organisations and society as a whole **unleash, strengthen, create, adapt and maintain capacity over time.** The phrase *capacity development* is used advisedly in preference to the traditional *capacity building*. The “building” metaphor suggests a process starting with a plain surface and involving the step-by-step erection of a new structure, based on a preconceived design. Experience suggests that capacity is not successfully enhanced in this way.

“Promotion of capacity development” refers to what outside partners – domestic or foreign – can do to support, facilitate or catalyse capacity development and related change processes. This is by no means equivalent to the provision of technical assistance. Not all that comes under the heading of technical co-operation (TC) or technical assistance (TA) in donor statistics contributes to capacity development. Conversely, there are elements in financial assistance programmes which upon closer scrutiny do qualify as support to capacity development. Examples of roles that donors can play include: facilitating access to knowledge; brokering multi-stakeholder agreements that remove blockages to capacity development; participating in relevant policy dialogue or advocacy; providing incremental resources that help in overcoming bottlenecks in change processes; and creating spaces for learning by doing.

The growing international consensus on the importance of capacity development reflects two connected observations:

- Country capacity is the key to development performance and thus to efforts to accelerate economic growth, reduce poverty and achieve the MDGs. This applies to both generic capacities (e.g. the ability to plan and manage organisational changes and service improvements) and specific capacities in critical fields (e.g. public financial management or trade negotiation). Insufficient capacity in the public sector is a key bottleneck, among other reasons because of the way it affects the enabling environment for private enterprise and private sector capacity development.
- The cornerstone of contemporary thinking about aid and development effectiveness is country ownership. Yet country ownership of policies and programmes is premised on the capacity to exercise it. Ownership will not begin to emerge in the absence of sufficient local capacity.⁷ The relevant capacities include those that allow mediation among the plurality of interests and constituents within the country, so that compromises and shared commitments can be arrived at.

Levels of analysis

Understood as the ability of people, organisations and society to manage their affairs successfully, capacity obviously depends on more than the experience, knowledge and technical skills of individuals. Capacity development at the individual level, although important, depends crucially on the organisations in which people work. In turn, the operation of particular organisations is influenced by the enabling environment – including the institutional framework and the structures of power and influence – in which they are embedded. Power structures and institutions (regular patterns of behaviour governed by social norms, or “the formal and informal rules of the game in a society”) shape and constrain the functioning of particular organisations (“groups of individuals bound by some common purpose”).⁸ In the words of the World Bank Task Force on Capacity Development in Africa, the capacity challenge is fundamentally a governance challenge.⁹

There are therefore three analytical levels on which capacity development objectives may need to be pursued: 1) individual, 2) organisational, and 3) the enabling environment. These terms are used throughout the paper. The term “systemic” is used to refer to the interactions between the levels.

The enabling environment influences the behaviour of organisations and individuals in large part by means of the incentives it creates. For example, whether or not an organisation is able to achieve its purposes depends not just on whether it is adequately resourced but on the incentives generated by the way it is resourced under prevailing rules. Organisations or networks of organisations can be viewed as “open systems”, which are in constant interaction with elements of their context. “The context provides incentives to the organisation(s), stimulating them to act in certain manners. Some incentives foster productivity, growth and capacity development, others foster passivity, decline or even closure”.¹⁰ In turn, organisational and institutional rules influence individuals’ capacities by creating incentive structures that either give or deny them opportunities to make good use of their abilities and skills.

Successful efforts to promote capacity development therefore require attention not only to skills and organisational procedures, but also to issues of incentives and governance. Capacity development initiatives almost always take place in a particular organisational setting, where there will be a particular incentive structure deserving attention. However, the broader process of institutional transformation or stagnation in a country may be no less important as a source of the behavioural incentives and disincentives that affect capacity.

The scope and limits of the capacity challenge

This understanding of capacity development does not make it identical to the building of an effective state or the promotion of good governance. These are both broader, even if closely related, processes.

Another widely used expression, “institutional development”, overlaps with capacity development but is not identical to it.

Strengthening public sector capacity is an important dimension of state formation and a means of improving governance. The experience summarised in the next section suggests that capacity development and general improvements in governance and state effectiveness tend to be linked and to reinforce one another. However, capacity development can also be an entry point in countries with weak governance and not very effective states.

Capacity development is critical not only to the public sector, but also to private firms and to non-profit private organisations and associations. The focus of this paper is on public-sector capacity, including the way it influences and is influenced by the wider economic, political and social context. However, lessons from private sector experience are drawn upon where relevant.

II. What Has Been Learned?

A chronicle of trial and error

Until recently, capacity development was viewed mainly as a technical process, involving the simple transfer of knowledge or organisational models from North to South. Not enough thought was given to the broader political and social context within which capacity development efforts take place. This led to an overemphasis on “right answers”, as opposed to approaches that best fit the country circumstances and the needs of the particular situation.

Capacity and capacity development issues have been on the development agenda for decades. As early as the 1950s and 1960s, donors and academics did considerable work on public sector institution building, with a substantial emphasis on human resource development (education, training and scholarships). This was heavily influenced by notions of knowledge transfer from North to South. Technical co-operation emerged as an instrument for filling perceived institutional or skills gaps. In many poor countries, much of this assistance yielded very low returns, leading to attempts at improvement, but generally within the same broad paradigm.

Donors have only belatedly recognized the critical importance of country ownership and leadership in capacity development. For many years, they severely overestimated the ability of development co-operation to build capacity in the absence of real country commitment. In the 1980s, awareness grew of the importance of countries’ capacities to manage processes of economic reform. However, where – as in much of sub-Saharan Africa – the endogenous demand for capacity enhancement was weak, the resulting approach to capacity “building” still left considerable scope for implanting externally-derived models without serious efforts to adapt them to local cultures and circumstances.

The experience of the next two decades made it increasingly obvious that country ownership needed to be taken much more seriously. **Capacity building would be ineffective so long as it was not part of an endogenous process of change, getting its main impulse from within.**

The new consensus

By the time the DAC agreed on its Principles for Effective Aid in 1992, donors had come some way towards a better approach to capacity development. The 1996 OECD-DAC publication *Shaping the 21st Century* played a pivotal role in defining the features of a new paradigm in development co-operation based on ownership and partnership in the development of capacities.¹¹ More recent initiatives, including the Comprehensive Development Framework (1998), the PRSP initiative (1999) and the Rome (2003) and Paris (2005) Declarations on aid alignment and harmonisation have consolidated this emphasis on increasing country ownership and leadership.

One of the most important elements of the new consensus between donors and developing countries is that capacity development is primarily the responsibility of partner countries, with donors playing a supportive role. According to the Paris Declaration (Box 1) developing countries are expected to lead

the process of capacity development, by setting specific objectives in national development plans. Donors are committed to mobilising their financial and analytical support around partner country objectives, plans and strategies. They are to make full use of existing capacities, and harmonise their support for capacity development.

Box 1. Capacity development in the 2005 Paris Declaration

The capacity to plan, manage, implement, and account for results of policies and programmes, is critical for achieving development objectives from analysis and dialogue through implementation, monitoring and evaluation. Capacity development is the responsibility of partner countries with donors playing a support role. It needs not only to be based on sound technical analysis, but also to be responsive to the broader social, political and economic environment, including the need to strengthen human resources.

Partner countries commit to:

- Integrate specific capacity strengthening objectives in national development strategies and pursue their implementation through country-led capacity development strategies where needed.

Donors commit to:

- Align their analytic and financial support with partners' capacity development objectives and strategies, make effective use of existing capacities and harmonise support for capacity development accordingly.

Source: (2005) Paris Declaration on Aid Effectiveness.

The new emphasis being placed on local ownership recognises the importance of political leadership, and the prevailing political and governance system, in creating opportunities and setting limits for capacity development efforts. It acknowledges the limited role that development co-operation agencies can play when the country conditions are unfavourable. This implies that a key responsibility of country-based donor agency staff is to identify accurately where it is possible to provide support, because country-owned policies exist or could be created in response to new domestic sources of demand, and where it is not, because the essential preconditions do not exist.¹²

This is never likely to be a simple yes/no issue. Ownership is a matter of processes and trends, not the presence or absence of a particular quality. Also, ownership is not monolithic, something that is exercised by a whole nation or its government. Systemic constraints are likely to be important, and the highest level of leadership endorsement should be sought, in all cases. But the potential for real policy ownership may vary across sectors or individual organisations (departments, agencies). The conditions may be right for donors to support locally-owned processes of improvement in certain organisational spheres even when the conditions in the wider system and the overarching structural/institutional environment are unhelpful.

Key conditions favourable to capacity development

The factors favouring or blocking capacity development are often of a systemic kind – meaning that attention needs to be focused on the relationships between the enabling environment and other levels. Within any given systemic context, there is also a need to consider the factors at work in particular organisations or types of organisation. Countries, including China, Chile and Botswana, that have set a home-grown agenda for reform and defined a broad path for addressing capacity constraints have been able to improve performance and retain local talent. Elsewhere, there has been some success in achieving capacity development within restricted organisational spheres despite a weak enabling environment. In both circumstances, donors have been able to help. In the light of these successes, and of other failures, a common understanding has emerged in the development community about the key conditions more favourable to capacity development.¹³

Boxes 2 and 3 draw together some of the main lessons of international experience. Box 2 synthesises findings concerning the systemic conditions that have tended to obstruct capacity development.

Emphasising the positive, **Box 2** suggests that successful capacity development is associated with two sets of factors. First, there is a set of broad enabling conditions that increase the likelihood of success. They include peace and economic growth, and trends in politics and society resulting in the institutionalisation of improved governance and an increase in the legitimacy and influence of formal rules as against informal patronage. Second, there is a series of factors more directly affecting capacity in government, and therefore the possibility of rapid improvements in public sector capacity. These include not only inherited aspects of the structure of government and entrenched patterns in the public service, but also some features over which donors have an important influence – the phenomenon of “reform overload” and the often low predictability of donor resource flows.

Changes in the constraints that are identified in **Box 2** are unlikely without profound transformations that are both led from the highest political level and sustained over an extended period. Although donors can influence some features for better or worse, the scope for donor initiatives or programmes to bring about changes in the public sector when these are not being driven by domestic forces is extremely limited. The same is true for the organisational level, but the degree of country-side leadership that is required for success within a single organisation or organisational sphere may be less. **Box 3** relates more narrowly to the organisational level of capacity development.

Capacity development in particular organisations, the subject of **Box 3**, will always be constrained by the broad factors in the institutional environment emphasised above, but the degree to which these are *binding* constraints appears to vary. The box summarises findings from a broad range of evaluations and studies about the factors commonly found to be responsible for success at this level.

Box 2. Conditions that have made public sector capacity difficult to develop¹⁴

Lack of a broadly enabling environment:

- Lack of human security and presence of armed conflict.
- Poor economic policy that discourages pro-poor growth.
- Weak parliamentary scrutiny of the executive branch.
- Lack of effective voice, particularly of intended beneficiaries. This is generally associated with weak social capital (trust) and with political systems with low participation, unclear and arbitrarily enforced “rules of the game” and/or lack of respect for human rights.
- Entrenched corruption (political and administrative) in core government organisations.
- Entrenched and widespread clientelism or patrimonialism, weakening the pursuit of organisations’ formal tasks.

Aspects of government ineffectiveness:

- Fragmented government, with poor overall capacity for economic and public financial management, and low levels of transparency and accountability.
- Absent, non-credible and/or rapidly changing government policies, and overload of reform and change initiatives.
- Unpredictable, unbalanced or inflexible funding and staffing.
- Poor public service conditions: salary levels incompatible with reasonable expectations of living standards; history of flight of qualified staff to other countries; excessive reliance on donor-funded positions.
- Segmented and compartmentalised organisations, with centralist, strictly hierarchical, authoritarian management.
- Only a formal commitment to a performance-oriented culture, reflected in a lack of rewards for performance and of sanctions for non-performance.

At the organisational level, strong and effective leadership emerges as an important success factor, along with powerful pressures for change coming from outside the organisation. So does active management of the process, so that gains become cumulative and gradually win the support of the different stakeholder groups that might otherwise sabotage it.

Box 3. Conditions favouring capacity development in organisations

- Strong demand-side pressures for improvements are exerted from outside (from clients, political leaders, etc.).
- Top management provides visible leadership for change, promotes a clear sense of mission, encourages participation, establishes explicit expectations about performance, and rewards well-performing staff (recognition, pay, and promotions based on merit).
- Change management is approached in an integrated manner.
- A critical mass of staff members, including front-line staff, are ultimately involved.
- Organisational innovations are tried, tested and adapted.
- Quick wins that deepen commitment for change become visible early in the process.
- Top management and change agents manage the change process strategically and proactively, including both internal and external aspects of the process (communication, sequencing, timing, feedback loops, celebration of victories, and recognition of problems).

Summing up what has been learned

The discussion so far suggests the following as the most important things learned about capacity development:

- Capacity – understood in terms of the ability of people and organisations to define and achieve their objectives – **involves three levels: individual, organisational and the enabling environment**. These levels are interdependent. This approach entails a concern with the wider political economy of change, but continues to treat capacity development as a distinct challenge and entry point for intervention apart from wider efforts to build the state or promote good governance.
- Capacity development – understood as a process of unleashing, strengthening and maintaining of capacity – goes well beyond the technical co-operation and training approaches that have been associated with “capacity building” in the past. The stock of human capital and the supply of general and technical skills are important. However, **a country’s ability to use skilled personnel to good effect depends on the incentives generated by organisations and the overall environment**.
- **Capacity development is necessarily an endogenous process of change**. Because it involves much more than awareness of technical subjects and general organisational principles, it cannot be imported. The best imported advice may be expected to emphasise this point strongly. Donor organisations with a mandate for supporting capacity development should be at the forefront of the movement emphasising country ownership of change initiatives.
- Appreciating the interactions between three levels of the capacity development process – enabling environment, organisational and individual – means recognising the important role of systemic factors in enabling or blocking change. However, **the constraints arising in the enabling environment are not equally binding in all cases, and it is possible to identify factors at the organisational level that make success more likely**. Focusing capacity development on particular organisations may also make good sense in generally unpromising governance situations (as further explored in Section IV).

III. From Emerging Consensus to Better Practice on the Ground

Operationalising what has been learned

What has been learned about capacity development over the past 40 years does not suggest a simple message on “how to do it”. Moving on to better practice on the ground calls for a focus on specific objectives, followed by flexible and imaginative thinking about the methods that are right for the circumstances. The concepts of capacity and capacity development are so all-encompassing that practitioners have often found it difficult to make operational sense of them. It is important, therefore, for practitioners to begin by asking the question “capacity for what?” and focus on the specific capacities needed to accomplish clearly defined goals. As stressed in Section II, what is then needed is an active search for approaches that achieve a “best fit” with the particular circumstances of the country, sector or organisation that is under consideration. This implies a highly flexible search for appropriate ways of supporting capacity development.

Without losing this flexibility, it should be possible to conduct the search in a systematic way. This can be done by ensuring that thought is given to the relevant issues at each stage in a process, paying attention to each of the analytical levels – enabling environment, organisational and individual.

Table 1 illustrates a systematic approach to a flexible, best fit way of thinking and programme design for capacity development. It suggests issues to consider about each level of capacity development (enabling environment, organisational and individual) in a stylised set of steps. The latter are not to be understood as a single, once-only sequence. They represent tasks to be undertaken in what is very likely to be a continuous, iterative process. Four “steps”, understood in this way, are considered to be:

- Understanding the international and country contexts.
- Identifying and supporting sources of country-owned change.
- Delivering support.
- Learning from experience and sharing lessons.

The remainder of this section is structured according to the two dimensions (levels and steps) of this diagram. Not all issues can be covered in all of the relevant sub-sections, but as a whole the section may be thought to provide a good guide to the critical issues to consider and act upon.

Understanding the international and country contexts

A good understanding of context is fundamental. Donors and their partners are increasingly moving towards an approach to capacity development that asks, not “how to do it”, but “what might

Table 1. Achieving a fit between capacity development approaches and country realities:
Issues to consider

Understanding the international and country contexts	Identifying and supporting sources of country-owned change	Delivering support	Learning from experience and sharing lessons	Enabling environment	Organisational level	Individual level
What are the historical and contemporary factors underlying the observed “weakness of political will” behind capacity development? How are power structures and formal and informal institutions changing, and with what effects on politicians’ incentives? How are capacities currently shaped by the informal and “political” aspects of organisations? Are these features generalised or variable across organisations or organisational spheres? Are there private sector pressures and resources that could be mobilised in support of enhanced public sector capacity? How is the availability of skilled and committed individuals shaped by global and local push and pull factors? Under what conditions could the diasporas contribute more strongly to capacity development at home?	Does the interaction between donors and country actors form a “virtuous circle” or a “vicious circle”, from the point of view of the ownership of capacity development initiatives? Are there ways donors can encourage effective demand within the country for greater capacity development? Is capacity development an explicit objective of a plan or policy benefiting from real country ownership? Is there effective ownership of initiatives within particular organisations or organisational spheres, especially in any organisations where there would be substantial spill-over benefits? Are individual professionals able to be mobilised in support of measures to combat the erosion of public sector capacity? Are donors being sufficiently responsive to government initiatives aimed at restoring salary levels in key posts	Are donors doing all they can to promote changes in the institutional environment, for capacity development, e.g. by supporting domestic stakeholder demands? Is support being delivered in ways that enhance, or undermine, the possibility of organisations’ learning by doing? Have the objectives of the supported initiative been clearly defined in terms of the desired capacity development outcomes? Have the inputs and their providers been selected with a view to cost and effectiveness, or have these decisions been supply-driven? Do the training components take full advantage of the potentialities created by modern information technology? Are the training components linked to enhancing organisational effectiveness and putting new skills to use?	Is there monitoring of whether institutional rules are changing in important ways and how this has come about? Is there independent, objective monitoring of the mode of delivery of the support? Is achievement of the agreed capacity development outcomes being effectively monitored and lessons fed back into the process? Do the monitoring arrangements include reasonable proxy measures, with appropriate involvement of clients or service users? Does the follow-up of individual capacity enhancement go beyond knowledge and livelihood benefits? Is it tracking the effects on organisational capacity and performance?	Enabling environment	Organisational level	Individual level

work here?” An obvious precondition for such an approach is a good understanding of the context, as it affects the enabling environment and organisational and individual levels of analysis. Both international (global, regional) and country-specific factors will normally need to be considered.

The enabling environment

In recognition of the importance of understanding the context in effective programme design, many donor organisations are devoting more attention to country-by-country (and/or sectoral) political-economy studies. These are variously named “institutional analysis”, “power analysis” and “drivers of change analysis”. Conflict analysis, or conflict assessments, can play a similar role. What these exercises have in common is an effort to provide more sophisticated understanding of political and social systems, incentive structures, and sources of leadership in developing and transition countries, and to incorporate these understandings into operational work. They provide a means of thinking more systematically about how change occurs, the power relationships at stake and the structural and institutional factors underlying the often-observed “lack of political will” behind reform processes.

Country political economy studies provide a valuable first step in approaching capacity development. In principle, the results of such studies can be widely shared among stakeholders who are interested in promoting capacity development in a country. So far, this has not generally happened. Donors have felt sufficiently challenged by absorbing political-economy analysis into their own operational thinking and have not seen it as material for a broad discussion with country stakeholders. This has been recognised as an issue that needs to be reviewed.¹⁵

Box 4 explains how a “drivers of change” approach suggested a new way of addressing the enabling environment for capacity development for one DFID country office.

A good political-economy analysis in a country will be expected to include both the legacies of history and tradition, and present-day influences on leaders’ incentives. Particularly in sub-Saharan

Box 4. Addressing the enabling environment for capacity development in Nigeria

A number of programme reviews undertaken by DFID in Nigeria between 2000 and 2003 suggested that the impact of technical, transfer-based, capacity development was less substantial than anticipated. DFID set out to discover what factors were diluting the impact of this assistance. A Drivers of Change analysis revealed that apparently significant changes in the formal institutional environment – such as the transition from military to civilian rule – had had less impact than expected on key problems blocking Nigeria’s development: the mismanagement of revenue from oil, the weakness of formal accountability mechanisms and the slowness of non-oil economic growth. As well as highlighting the lack of political will for pro-poor reform, the analysis led to a greater appreciation of the role of powerful quasi-structural constraints on the behaviour of individual agents within and outside government. Informal institutional arrangements – for both private (including business) and public transactions – were more powerful and pervasive than their formal counterparts. These factors have combined to act as a significant barrier to reform.

DFID concluded that in Nigeria, as in many developing countries, pro-poor change requires elements of the status quo, and the apparatus of government that defends it, to be changed. Therefore engagement with the government in isolation from the broader political context would not be productive. Change tends to happen when broad alliances across civil society, often supported by media attention and the private sector, and linked into reform elements within government, coalesce around an issue of political importance and exert pressure for effective change. Recognising this reality, DFID is now taking an “issues-based approach” in Nigeria, aiming to contribute to the institutional changes needed to make successful capacity development a possibility in the longer term. The approach focuses on issues rather than organisations. It is non-prescriptive about both the issues and the organisations it engages with.

Source: DFID (2004).

Africa, some emphasis is likely to be given to the way formal institutions, not being rooted in local culture, generally fail to command society's loyalty or to trigger local ownership.¹⁶ Another central issue will be the degree to which weak principles of accountability based on institutions of the patron-client type have begun to give way to practices based on rights of citizenship. This will affect the degree to which there is actually or potentially a *demand* for capacity development in the country. Incentives arising from the international state system and the architecture and practices of aid are also likely to figure in the analysis. All these types of factors will be relevant in the first stage of thinking about "what might work here?", or whether anything will work at all, with respect to capacity development.

It is very possible that what to do differently at the country level will not arise immediately from an improved understanding of the institutional context. The Nigeria example illustrates a possible approach, but its effectiveness has not yet been demonstrated. Appreciating the institutional context may only have the limited, although healthy, effect of reminding us why simple fixes or massive injections of external resources may have negligible effects on capacity. International factors in the situation call for coordinated international remedies, not just better country-level programming.

The organisational level

Understanding the enabling environment is one necessary part of the analysis. Another is appreciating the strengths and weaknesses of particular organisations. There are several well-known tools of organisational assessment (SWOT analysis,¹⁷ stakeholder analysis, etc.). These can usefully be applied to organisations that may be indicated as sites for capacity development. But they provide only a starting point. **It is important to get beneath the surface of an organisation, and look for both formal and informal, hidden aspects that may crucially affect performance.** A diagnosis of weak capacity that focuses only on the "functional-rational" dimension of the organisation will normally be misleading and ineffective. It is important also to understand the political (or political economy) dimensions, including those that may actually or potentially have a positive effect on performance.¹⁸

In thinking about change, careful analysis is likely to be needed not only to identify the different stakeholders but to consider who are the intended and unintended winners and losers, and how they might block or support any change processes. Relevant stakeholders will include citizens and users of the services and products of the organisation, staff unions, senior officials and leaderships at the local government level, as well as national politicians, NGOs and other donors. The right-hand side of **Box 2** and the whole of **Box 3** together provide a valuable checklist for thinking about these issues.

The relevant stakeholders include the private sector. In many of the countries where notable improvements in public sector capacity have been attained, private sector demand for competent public services and better governance has been a major stimulus to change. Donors should consider ways in which private sector demands for improvement in the investment climate can be harnessed more effectively as a spur to public sector capacity development at the country level. Private sector investment has also been a major source of funds for developing capacity in sectors such as finance, accounting and information technology. In both respects, it is important to ensure that the initial thinking that takes place on the organisational conditions for capacity development includes an effort to think through the structure and potential of the private sector contribution. **Box 5** illustrates the point.

The individual level

Social influences need to be thought about along with personal capabilities and competences. Social influences may affect the individual through the informal culture of the organisation, for example

by generating peer pressures that fail to reward and even penalise excellent performance in terms of its formal objectives. They may also act more directly, for example where family or home-town loyalties interfere with an official's ability to comply with legal or administrative norms. If they are not dealt with, these factors will be likely to weaken the capacity-enhancing effects of any training, even if this is successful in educational terms.

Box 5. Reforming the business environment in Afghanistan

After 23 years of war, the Afghan government has embarked on an ambitious agenda to reform the business environment for private sector development but lacks the capacities to design and implement the reforms. As one of the first steps, and with support from Germany's GTZ, the Afghan Investment Support Agency (AISA) was established. Without a clear regulatory framework, this engagement was quite risky, but is now seen as a success story. The registration time for new businesses was reduced to less than a week. After nearly two years of operations, AISA has registered more than 3300 businesses with a planned investment of 1.3 billion USD and more than 130 000 direct jobs envisaged. According to the newly published report of the World Bank "Doing Business in 2006: Creating Jobs", Afghanistan is the top reformer on business entry in 2004.

Regarding the scope, quality and speed of its own services, but also in its advocacy for private sector concerns, AISA is motivated and challenged by outspoken representatives of the business community. It is on account of this demand that AISA is now also active in analysing and marketing business opportunities at home and abroad. The Agency then goes on to accompany investors before and after the registration procedure to help them in coping with the difficult environment. In the process, AISA itself has become an important voice in the reform of the business environment in Afghanistan.

Source: GTZ (2005).

Donors should consider whether their own governments' policies are part of the problem. In capacity development, policy coherence among different parts of OECD governments poses serious challenges. For example, 70 000 African professionals leave the continent annually.¹⁹ In view of the return flow of remittances, some of this may be genuine "brain gain", from which all can benefit, but there are areas where OECD government policies (together with significant "push factors" within the sending countries) risk stripping developing countries of essential skills. Sweden's Policy for Global Development offers one possible model for highlighting policy inconsistencies in the field of migration through an all-of-government approach.

This should include the role of the diasporas. In many developing countries, the diasporas created by past outflows of human capital have a role to play in rebuilding or developing capacity in their native countries and communities. In every world region, there is evidence that members of diasporas have contributed valuable management skills to governments, NGOs and the private sector, while also bringing financial resources, external contacts and demand for a higher overall standard of performance.²⁰ Finding new ways of tapping into the experience and network of the diasporas has an obvious place in any national capacity strategy.

The first step, however, is to understand better the constraints to be overcome by any diaspora-oriented initiative. Factors to be taken seriously include the obvious labour market and remuneration issues, as well as availability of education and health services, and the general climate of security. Also worth considering is the way organisational cultures and conflicts between formal and informal institutional expectations may inhibit diaspora professionals from reintegrating effectively into responsible positions in their countries of origin.

Identifying and supporting sources of country-owned change

The consensus view is that capacity development is the primary responsibility of partner countries, with donors playing a supportive role. While clear enough in principle, this raises an important set of issues for those responsible for its operationalisation at country level. Once again, there are questions at the enabling environment, organisational and individual levels of analysis.

The enabling environment

Country ownership needs to be treated as a process. As emphasised in the last section, country ownership of capacity development processes is not the sort of feature that either exists, in a fully-fledged form, or does not exist at all. At the level of the overall institutional framework, it is quite clear that forces for change will only arise out of the political and social system of the country. Although national politics may be influenced by international and regional pressures, improvements in institutions cannot be engineered by donors (even where the donor community has the ear of the president or feels that it is engaging in strategic policy dialogue at the highest level). On the other hand, the way donors behave in their dealings with the country can be important in reinforcing the patterns that are emerging in positive or negative ways.

The interactions between donors and domestic actors can generate either vicious or virtuous circles of change in respect of the ownership of capacity development efforts. Annex A illustrates the proposition. In the typical vicious circle, donors perceive bad results as confirming weak capacity and commitment on the recipient side, and respond by assuming leadership themselves. This progressively increases the sense of disengagement and lack of interest in performance standards among recipient organisations and individuals, which results in a further deterioration in capacity. A virtuous circle might start with a donor perception that the recipient is becoming more serious about taking a lead. It would then see the donors holding back, allowing and encouraging country assertiveness to turn into a self-reinforcing process of empowerment, bringing with it capacity improvement and, in due course, better results. **Box 6** provides an example.

The observation that there are both vicious and virtuous circles in aid relationships is central to the debate about programme-based approaches (PBAs).²¹ Neither sector-wide approach programmes nor general budget support can get started without certain preconditions on the country side. Yet as

Box 6. Parliament drives the establishment of external audit function in Montenegro

Inspired by a Transparency International report, the Government of the Montenegro Republic asked Germany for support in establishing an external auditing authority. GTZ's advisory work started at the Prime Minister's Office, but early in the process, parliament's Finance, Economy and Environmental Protection Commission emerged as the truly motivated domestic stakeholder. The Commission energetically took ownership for the drafting of the law establishing the State Auditing Institution in Montenegro, proudly presenting the first law ever tabled by Parliament. Parliament passed the law in April 2004 and elected the Senate of the State Auditing Institution in September of the same year.

Motivated by its mandate from parliament, the State Auditing Institution developed a strong ownership on its own. Its managers and staff eagerly absorbed training such as that provided by the Montenegro private accounting firm which had audited the accounts before. The State Auditing Institution was thus able to present to parliament its first auditing report on Montenegro's state accounts in July 2005, pointing out several omissions and flaws in budget execution and generally in the use of public resources. Its findings were fully endorsed by parliament and passed on as requests for change to the Government. GTZ now focuses its advisory work with both the parliament's Commission and the Auditing Institution on individual organisational audits.

Source: GTZ (2005).

and when those conditions begin to be created, PBAs can contribute to a process in which country policy ownership is progressively built up or rebuilt, with country leadership strengthening and providing a focus for aid alignment. On the other hand, continuation of fragmented or piecemeal donor approaches can cause the process to falter.

An important issue to consider in thinking about capacity development in a particular country is whether the relevant interactions between donors and domestic actors are of the virtuous or vicious circle type. In the latter case, where might it be possible to break into the circle, so that the direction of change is reversed? **One option is for donors to use their influence to encourage the “effective demand” for public sector capacity within the country.** This may be able to be done, for example, by emphasising the importance of parliamentary oversight in budget preparation and execution, or by supporting rights-based movements focused on particular aspects of government performance.

Annex B sets out the default principles that UNDP suggests as starting points for successful capacity development partnerships between donors and developing countries.

The organisational level

The judgement about whether country ownership is being strengthened or weakened by the current pattern of interaction between donors and government needs to be made with care. The mere existence of a capacity development strategy or policy document to which senior officials have put the government's name is not necessarily an indication of real commitment. It will normally help if capacity development is adopted as an explicit objective in the PRSP or other country development strategy, with defined benchmarks and indicators of progress. However, this may or may not imply a high level of country ownership.

The World Bank 2005 Comprehensive Development Framework report *Enabling Capacity to Achieve Results* suggests overall global improvements in capacity to formulate development strategies. In particular, countries which have adopted poverty reduction strategies have a stronger capacity development focus at the strategic level which helps to define goals and helps donors to harmonise their approaches. The report outlines many challenges ahead but highlights the case of Ethiopia, which has developed a comprehensive capacity development strategy supported by external partners. This has provided the framework for gains to be made in technical areas such as public financial management, procurement, budget execution, reporting and review. On the other hand, experience across several countries in sub-Saharan Africa suggests that comprehensive administrative reforms are particularly vulnerable to changes in the political context. For this reason, the approach of “strategic incrementalism” favoured in Tanzania may be a better option in most countries.²²

Whether the donor's preference is for programme or project-based approaches, the modalities of support should work in a way that encourages and strengthens initiatives benefiting from real country commitment. It does not make sense for donors to initiate competing frameworks for capacity development that fragment efforts and divert critical human resources from their main tasks. Where the temptation to mount parallel initiatives arises from a perceived lack of commitment on the government side, donors should consider the scope for enhancing demand-side pressures, by promoting mechanisms such as service delivery surveys or citizen report cards, or by developing civil society and private sector advocacy capacity.

Capacity needs assessments can be a useful way to begin an open dialogue between donors and developing country partners. Successful assessments, described in recent reviews, tend not to be open-ended, country-wide “fishing expeditions”, but focused attempts to link capacity needs to overall development goals. Such assessments usefully begin with the question “Capacity for what?” For example, capacity development strategies for public financial management or for the health

system can define functions that personnel need to deliver, look at the overall system to see if the regulatory framework and incentive system are conducive to the needed changes, and define what interventions may be necessary.

Choosing the right organisational scope is as important as selecting the right organisations as a focus for capacity development. Approaches that have attempted to develop organisational capacities by means of generic training in subjects such as “building partnerships” or “project implementation” have had limited impacts. These generic capacities are needed. However, the way to develop them seems to be securing key changes in the enabling environment – institutional rules placing more stress on accountability and demand for results – and creating or strengthening organisations that focus on achieving specific outputs and outcomes.²³ This choice among alternative training approaches for strengthening organisational capacities is distinct from the issue discussed further on about rebuilding professional training institutes.

Some organisations are more crucial than others. Focusing on capacity development in a single organisation entails the danger of creating “islands of excellence” which contribute very little to overall improvement in the system. From this point of view, it makes sense to target organisations whose enhanced performance will have important spill-over effects on the capacity or performance of a large number of other organisations or the national economy as a whole. The case of the Rwanda Revenue Authority illustrates the point. In just 6 years, it became a high performing and well respected organisation, helping to increase domestic revenue generation from 9.5% to 13% of GDP.²⁴ In another recent example, increased capacity in the Accountant General’s Department has contributed importantly to the overall effectiveness of public financial management in Tanzania.²⁵

The individual level

Many developing countries continue to struggle with public services that are riddled with negative or perverse incentives for individual staff members, including low remuneration, skewed recruitment and promotion criteria, haphazard staffing levels and inadequate tools or facilities. All of these factors have been blamed for capacity erosion. Donors and NGOs frequently add to these demotivating factors by recruiting local personnel at significantly enhanced salaries and with much improved working conditions from the same limited skill pool. **Individual professionals** – both those who remain in post and dedicated to their jobs in spite of the poor conditions, and those who have left the public service but would prefer to return – **are potential allies for reformers wishing to promote capacity development.** Whether it is feasible to mobilise this potential is an important part of the question about the possible scope of country-owned change.

Compensation policies have a role to play along with better human resource management in retaining talent in the public service. Donors can play a role in preserving capacity by avoiding salary structures that make it more attractive to work for donor programmes than for local institutions. They should also be prepared to recognise and respond to any government interest in addressing the problem in a more positive way. **As a transitional approach to sustaining public sector earnings in key posts, it may be feasible for donors to harmonise, under government leadership, around an agreed set of salary supplements and rules of the game.** The Tanzania example in **Box 7** illustrates both the possibility of a government-led initiative of this type and some of the pressures that may be expected to weaken commitment if it is less than robust.

Delivering support

Once a feasible joint approach to capacity development has been agreed, either for a particular organisation or for a set of key state functions, a series of more specific design and delivery questions will arise. At this point a hard look needs to be taken at both what the government is proposing to do

and how the donors are proposing to support it. Again, the approach needs to keep all three levels of the capacity challenge – enabling environment, organisational and individual – in the picture, even when the operational focus is on one concrete organisation or set of functions.

Box 7. From top-ups to sustainable incentives for civil servants, Tanzania

Tanzania institutionalized a nationally owned system of incentives within the public service. The Selective Accelerated Salary Enhancement scheme (SASE) exemplifies a possible solution to addressing salary incentive problems within the wider context of pay reform. It is part of the overall government's Public Service Reform Programme. The SASE scheme was rolled out to four ministries and was selective in two ways: a) by targeting personnel in positions which have the greatest impact on service delivery, the reform effort and the strategic outputs of government; and b) by being phased-in selectively, starting with public service Ministries/Departments/Agencies (MDAs) that have leading roles in change management or are well advanced in implementing strategic plans. In some cases (mainly for lower cadre) SASE doubled take-home pay.

The scheme has faced many challenges including resentment by non-SASE officials and by non-qualifying ministries, especially at local government level. It also engendered political opposition to a selective scheme in a society with strong egalitarian values. Donors remained unconvinced about Government commitment to the scheme, in view of the continued payments of allowances that were supposed to be phased out. They therefore refused to participate in funding of SASE, which would be unaffordable to Government if it was rolled out across other Ministries.

SASE has faced difficulties. However, it offers one of very few experiences of a middle way between the divisive and uncoordinated top-up schemes of the past, and a fully fledged public service pay reform. The underlying reasons why it could not be implemented as planned should be explored more fully, so that they can be overcome in future designs.

Source: Sida (2005).

The enabling environment

The enabling environment does not cease to be relevant when the specific design issues are in focus. Transforming the general institutional rules is only promising if the political commitment is strong and coming from the highest level. Stronger effective demand from parliamentarians, the court system and citizens in general is a likely source of increased commitment, but one that may take some time to evolve, depending on the issue. However, so long as there are some endogenous processes moving in the right direction donors should be prepared to support measures to improve compliance with international conventions, accountability in public financial management, freedom of the press and other reforms expected to strengthen domestic demand for performance and capacity.

Capacity strengthening in a particular organisation may be the most manageable operational objective for donors. However, in this case the operational work should keep a realistic perspective on the way the institutional context will affect the organisational improvements that can be realised, as well as the degree to which there will be spill-over benefits to the wider system. **Also, the operational work should be done in a way that does not undermine any longer-term prospects for wider and more institutional change.**

The way in which the support is delivered is a major factor in this respect. **For example, technical co-operation can be particularly effective when pooled and coordinated, rather than provided separately by individual donors.** The ECDPM study of decentralised education services in Ethiopia indicates the range of current donor practices (Box 8).

Donor-instigated Project Implementation Units (PIUs) should be avoided whenever possible. It is well established that while “getting the job done”, the typical PIU also tends to undermine the

ability of organisations to “learn by doing”.²⁶ Working through national systems and processes, though sometimes cumbersome and challenging, remains an overarching principle for developing capacity. The approach now preferred in many donor agencies is to avoid parallel units and to design interventions or projects so as to build the capacity of line units responsible for projects as part of the project itself. If the design is kept simple, and tailored to the absorptive capacity of the agency, there is less need for PIUs. The Paris Declaration sets a target for reducing the number of parallel Project Implementation Units in partner countries.

Box 8. Forms of donor support to capacity for decentralised education service delivery in Ethiopia

The “balance sheet” regarding donor engagement has positive (capacity enhancing) and negative (capacity draining) features. On the positive side, USAID has supported two systematic and long-term efforts that have begun to have positive effects on education service delivery. A World Bank-led consortium of donors has helped to prepare a nationwide programme of demand-led capacity development, and DFID has sponsored a study of comparative approaches to local government capacity building in Ethiopia and elsewhere. Increasingly, donors are providing aid in the form of budget support, and encouraging evaluation through programme reviews and the production of “tools” to help implementation. On the other hand, despite the existence of formal coordination mechanisms (including one devoted to education), and some budget support, donors have retained bilateral “projects” running parallel to the Education Sector Development Programme, and have retained control of significant funds for TC within the supposedly “pooled” funding arrangements for the new programme.

Source: David Watson and Lissane Yohannes, “Capacity Building for Decentralised Education Services in Ethiopia,” Maastricht: ECDPM, Discussion Paper 57H, July 2005, Summary.

The organisational level

At the organisational level, two important things to think about are whether the objectives are clear and performance-oriented, and whether the methods selected are the most appropriate.

The concern to define objectives may seem obvious. However, evaluations of capacity development programmes in the past are full of examples where the capacity development outcomes being sought by a programme were never clearly articulated. Instead the programme was defined largely by the inputs provided or easily quantified outputs (numbers of staff trained, etc.). Conceptualising capacity in terms of the ability to work effectively towards agreed goals, such as the MDGs, should assist in defining objectives.

Agreeing the desired outcomes of capacity development is fundamental, both for focusing interventions and for setting benchmarks for assessing progress along the way. There are a variety of techniques that can be used in a joint design process to force the participants to articulate objectives in outcome terms. Views differ about whether formal methods (LFA, ZOPP)²⁷ and professional facilitation are the best way to secure the kind of agreement that matters in a multi-stakeholder process. However, whatever approach is adopted there needs to be an effort to identify specific outcome objectives and think about “what might work here” to achieve them.

The selection of methods for attaining outcomes must not be supply-driven. That is, it should not be influenced by what the donor has to offer. It should be based on a considered judgement about the likely effectiveness and comparative costs of the available options.

This may imply considering non-traditional suppliers of certain sorts of input. At the Shanghai Poverty Conference in 2004, and during the consultation process for this paper, developing country representatives expressed a strong preference for local organisations, rather than providers from the developed world. There are examples of this working well, such as the one from Croatia in **Box 9**.

A patient and predictable approach from donors over a decade to the African Capacity Building Foundation has created a strong regional institution capable of delivering human and organisational capacity programmes.

Box 9. Community organisations develop capacity in Croatia

In Croatia, the United States Agency for International Development (USAID) has worked with the civil society sector through a small grants programme that was successfully implemented by three Croatian NGO support and grant-making organisations. This effort resulted in the issuance of 221 small grants to grassroots NGOs that were active in reaching out to their communities to mobilise citizens. In total, 62 000 citizens were mobilised and carried out community development projects that benefited over 37 000 of Croatia's most vulnerable citizens.

For example, one organisation, Odraz, promoted community development by building and developing the capacity of active community leaders. Odraz is a non profit organisation whose mission is to motivate and strengthen initiatives in local communities through partnership in order to develop practical and appropriate ways for improving the local economy and environment. Through its efforts, thirty-five community leaders were trained in collaboration with the training organisation, Smart, and supported in developing and implementing community projects after the training. Since the training, participants have organised over 20 workshops and community actions involving over 1 500 people from eight different communities. Odraz also established a Community Development Coordination Network and published a training manual on community mobilisation.

Source: USAID (2005).

The Shanghai Conference also revealed a preference among developing countries for South-to-South learning. In support of this approach, donors are examining the important role that large emerging markets like India or China, and middle-income countries such as Brazil and South Africa, are playing in supporting poorer countries through the provision of new institutional models as well as access to expertise and knowledge. OECD donors can facilitate this process, as several donors have done in linking capacity development experiences in Brazil and poorer African countries in the field of HIV/AIDS.

Non-governmental actors in the private sector and civil society are crucial sources of capacity that can be unleashed to complement and improve the effectiveness of the public sector. NGOs, including think tanks and training organisations, can be of use in both implementing capacity development plans and monitoring the outcomes of plans implemented by government. Private sector organisations can play an important role in supporting the government in capacity development for the delivery of services. The private sector and civil society can also set benchmarks in their own service delivery against which public sector performance can be assessed. **Box 10** gives an example from Sri Lanka.

The individual level

Educated and capable individuals are an obvious precondition for capacity development. The lessons of experience are that the spread of education and build-up of professional skills and knowledge are not sufficient to develop capacity, because of the importance of organisational and institutional constraints. However, they remain necessary.

In this context, there may be a case for large new investments in training capacity. In some countries, it may be time to be concerned less exclusively with primary and secondary schooling and give greater attention to rebuilding national training organisations – public and private – and the institutional conditions for them to work well. The Commission for Africa has recently made a strong general argument for renewed efforts to support higher education and science and technology.

Box 10. Sri Lanka: Developing independent domestic capacity for poverty analysis

Recognising the need to better understand the impact of development interventions on poverty, the Sri Lankan Ministry of Finance jointly with Germany initiated a process to develop in-country capacity for analysing poverty. As a first step and two-year pilot initiative, the GTZ supported Poverty Impact Monitoring Unit (PIMU) was created to develop appropriate methodologies for poverty impact monitoring and provide its expertise in the form of demand-oriented services to clients.

Following promising results during the pilot phase, PIMU was asked to work towards the institutionalisation of the professional service. This led to the establishment of the Centre for Poverty Analysis (CEPA), a Sri Lankan non-profit company. CEPA works on commercial terms by offering fee-based research and advisory services on poverty issues. Additionally, CEPA provides technical training on poverty assessment and monitoring for local specialists.

CEPA has gained broad-based acceptance for the quality of its services. It receives a large number of assignments from government departments and works not only for several major international donors but also for national NGOs. Currently, CEPA is carrying out a number of Poverty and Social Impact Assessments on critical and controversial PRSP issues. The Centre has contributed to creating sensitivity to poverty-related issues, as well as developing relevant know-how and capacities amongst Sri Lankan and donor-supported development initiatives.

Being in its fifth year of operations, CEPA has consolidated programmatically, financially and institutionally. It is expected to play a significant role as an independent professional organisation in the field of poverty analysis and poverty reduction strategies.

Source: GTZ (2005).

Donors should be clear, however, about the role that such initiatives are to play within the wider field of capacity development, and not just revert to the types of programmes supported in the past. The rebuilding of training capacities needs to be adjusted to both modern technological possibilities, and the lessons of past success and failure.

On the first aspect, the internet makes connectivity to global knowledge easier and increasingly affordable. It supports multi-directional knowledge acquisition and knowledge sharing, rather than knowledge transfer. This crucial change must be reflected in programme designs. Interactive computerised learning may obviate large-scale physical infrastructure, while demanding greater investment in information technology.

Secondly, the build-up of skills needs to be integrated with the means of deploying them. The traditional “capacity building” tools of TC and training have often proved ineffective in helping to improve performance because they have not been linked to the necessary organisational and institutional developments. Experience suggests that most benefits come from highly customised and demand-driven approaches that take context into account and link the focus and design of training to organisations’ capacity development strategies. This implies approaching capacity development in an integrated way, so that individual skills and the organisational settings in which they can be put effectively to work are created simultaneously. Some of the lessons learned from long-running US-funded higher education programmes for Africa are relevant (**Box 11**).

Learning from experience and sharing lessons

Future capacity development initiatives should be designed to maximise learning. What is known about capacity development efforts in the past is derived from a series of useful evaluation studies. But the learning and dissemination of lessons, both positive and negative, has been needlessly slow. There should be more monitoring and evaluation of capacity development experiences and more effective dissemination of the results across countries and agencies. This applies at all three levels.

Box 11. Lessons learned about capacity development through long-term training

USAID's African Graduate Fellowship (AFGRAD) and African Training for Leadership and Advanced Skills (ATLAS) programmes were evaluated over the whole period 1962-2003. The following are some of the lessons drawn:

- It is better to aim at institutional changes in key organisations than to focus on improving the capacity of individuals. Not only does this lead to improvements in organisational performance, but the impact on the individuals is more beneficial.
- The gains to individuals of long-term overseas training in the US include changes in work attitudes, critical thinking, and other "non-technical" attributes (such as self-confidence). These qualities may be less easily instilled by short-term training, yet they may be among the most important for making a measurable difference in trainees' home countries.
- Having a critical mass of staff in a particular organisation that have been trained abroad in the same country may be a factor in making changes more possible, more sustainable and more effective. If so, this is an additional factor in favour of a long-term and selective approach targeted at key organisations.
- The costs of different training options should be assessed in relation to the desired impact. Of critical importance is the cost of obtaining the desired impact, not the cost of providing the training.
- Follow-up support in organisations where trainees are employed should be factored into programmes. Maintaining contact with returned trainees can help those who encounter difficulties in introducing changes in their workplaces, a situation reported particularly by women. This, too, calls for a long-term commitment by the donor.

Source: Adapted from USAID, *Generations of Quiet Progress: The Development Impact of U.S. Long-Term University Training on Africa from 1963 to 2003*.

The enabling environment

High priority should be given to extracting further lessons about what works and what does not in terms of changing the enabling environment. Experiences in the transformation of the institutional "rules of the game" will be of particular value. Where there is the possibility of significant learning at this level, this should be recognised not only in the design of the programme – with a set of outcome objectives clearly defined – but also in its monitoring arrangements. This will enable both internal learning in the programme, so that any necessary adjustments can be made, and the dissemination of any wider lessons to the relevant group of other countries (those where the institutional factors are broadly similar).

The monitoring should extend to whether the donor support is being delivered in a way that assists country ownership of capacity development efforts. This may be covered by the general monitoring of the Paris Declaration targets on harmonisation and alignment. However, almost certainly a more specific and in-depth scrutiny of the aid relationship as it relates to capacity development efforts will be justified.

An independent form of monitoring, capable of generating objective judgements, will usually be the most desirable. Monitoring missions staffed by distinguished individuals who are closely associated with neither donor nor partner interests can help in establishing objective benchmarks and tracking progress by both parties over a number of years. The experience of independent monitoring in Tanzania and Mozambique suggests that it adds significant value. It helps overcome the inherent imbalance of power between donors and recipients and is well suited to the sensitive nature of the issues that need to be tackled. Although it has been applied so far to general issues in the aid relationship, it would be suitable for a more specialised application in the field of capacity development.

The organisational level

Assuming capacity development objectives have been well defined thought needs to be given to selecting and applying corresponding measures of achievement. This is a challenge. There are not many documented examples of the monitoring of capacity itself. Most official programmes use measures of performance as proxies for capacity, while NGOs have tended to use “systems” approaches that avoid specifying objectives in detail at the outset.²⁸ Quantitative indicators may be needed but some form of qualitative assessment may be more appropriate, depending on how the desired outcomes have been defined. **Box 12** provides an example. It is obviously preferable that the monitoring of capacity development outcomes be integrated within a national monitoring system, even if this entails some loss in terms of quality or timeliness.

Box 12. Participatory organisational assessment for setting objectives and monitoring

The Capable Partner Program (CAP) of USAID seeks to strengthen the organisational and technical capacities of NGOs, networks, and other civil society organisations. Objectives are defined using a participatory organisational assessment framework, which generates quantitative and qualitative baseline data on six aspects of organisational strength. Based on this assessment, CAP provides capacity-enhancing technical assistance to address an organisation’s most urgent development needs. Data are collected on the same dimensions after the TA input, and scores are compared to assess the degree to which the desired outcomes have been achieved. Projects in Ghana and Lebanon have used this method.

Source: Adapted from USAID (2005).

One instrument for assessing the outcomes of capacity development initiatives in service-providing sectors is collecting the views of intended clients or end-users. Although it continues in the tradition of using proxy measures, such feedback is an effective way to gauge whether capacity is improving as a result of the initiative. As one analyst has put it, “Whatever the imperfections of client voice and approval in measuring ultimate downstream results, they provide reliable indications of what matters to the intended beneficiaries. At the end of the day, it is better to have approximate information about important issues than to have precise data on those that may be irrelevant to human development”.²⁹

The individual level

Monitoring of success at the individual level is not just about skill enhancement. It is standard procedure in training to obtain feedback from individuals on its effectiveness as a learning experience. However, a principal limitation of traditional TA and training approaches has been that even when learning has been very effective, capacity has not been enhanced, because the individuals do not have the opportunity or incentive to apply these skills in their jobs. Assuming that the programme has been designed with this likely disconnect in mind, the monitoring arrangements will be expected to track the individual’s experience back into the working environment, and if necessary into his or her subsequent professional career (since important benefits in terms of organisational capacity could accrue elsewhere).

Summing up on operationalising the new consensus

In capacity development, general formulas and models do not produce sustainable benefits, and what is needed is an active search for approaches that achieve a *best fit* with the particular circumstances of the country, sector or organisation that is under consideration. In this section, discussion has focused on the practical implications of this approach. The sub-sections have raised issues for operational staff to consider in taking four notional steps in programme design for capacity development. Suggestions have been provided on:

- Tools and topics for understanding the international and country context for capacity development initiatives.
- Ways to go about identifying and supporting factors in country ownership.
- Issues likely to need critical scrutiny when providing support to capacity development initiatives.
- How to support the conditions for learning from experience and sharing the results with others.

IV. Capacity Development in Fragile States

This paper has recognised a growing international consensus about the importance of the capacity development objective and how it is likely to be achieved. Stress has been placed on recognising capacity development as a process that is driven endogenously; on the resulting importance of country policy ownership; and on the need for donors to limit themselves to encouraging and supporting country efforts. This implies that capacity development is most likely to be successful where national policies are strong and stable and that there will be particular difficulties where it is not. However, this does not mean that capacity development concerns are not relevant in the group of countries currently referred to as “fragile states”. **On the contrary, capacity development is no less relevant in fragile states than in other developing and transitional countries.**

The approach to capacity development always depends on country circumstances, and this applies in an obvious way in this section of the paper. The new attention being given to “fragile states” serves the useful purpose of focusing thinking on how to support reconstruction and development efforts in a range of more difficult aid environments that are at risk of being neglected by the international community. However, the category includes a diverse range of countries. They include both countries recovering from conflict, and regimes that are chronically weak or in decline for reasons unrelated to conflict. Social and political backgrounds vary enormously. This means that the degree to which there is political will of the sort needed for successful capacity development differs markedly across countries. Similarly, the degree to which there is residual capacity from earlier periods of the country’s history is quite variable. **A useful rule-of-thumb is: understand the country context and work towards an approach that seems likely to work in those specific circumstances.**

Focusing on capacity development may be a feasible way of engaging different parts of a society in new efforts oriented towards the achievement of development goals. **Box 13** illustrates the point. The urgency of developing capacity, at least selectively in key areas, may be – and be seen to be – especially great in post-conflict and other unstable situations. Capacity is needed to restore basic services quickly; to enable national dialogue and reconciliation; and more broadly to tackle the potential causes of further conflict or social or political breakdown. **The priority capacities for development should be those that contribute directly to reducing fragility.**

Experience to date of working in fragile development environments suggests a few general principles. In fragile environments, development partners need to be highly selective in the instruments they deploy in support of capacity development, and realistic about their expectations. There is the usual requirement to identify the main capacity gaps in respect of core functions, plus an additional need to pinpoint the aspects of state performance that matter most for preventing renewed conflict or collapse. In a preliminary assessment, it will be particularly important to understand what has happened to any previously existing capacity: has it disappeared, or is it dormant and merely invisible? The challenges and entry points for capacity development will vary according to the answers to these questions.

Box 13. Conflict management in Indonesia: A model for fragile states?

Between April 2000 and April 2002, Mercy Corps a U.S.-based non-governmental organisation, implemented a programme funded by the United States Agency for International Development (USAID) in Maluku, Indonesia. The goal of the programme was to alleviate the humanitarian crisis there through the provision of emergency assistance to displaced households and conflict-affected communities. A unique feature of this effort was that Mercy Corps did not implement programme activities; rather the effort was channelled through local partners to ensure sustainability of programme initiative and to build local capacities for peace and development.

Mercy Corps worked with local partners by disbursing grants for their activities and providing training, as well as other assistance to develop capacity. Mercy Corps took this approach based on the belief that local organisations were best placed to respond to the needs to the local population. At a practical level, the programme sought to build local capacity and promote opportunities for peace by building trust among the polarised Muslim and Christian communities. To achieve this, local partners receiving support from Mercy Corps recruited staff from both communities and formed joint teams of Muslims and Christians. This approach helped to foster understanding between the communities and thus influenced public opinion.

Source: USAID (2005).

As in other environments, donors need to identify likely partners and work with them consistently over the short, medium and longer terms. They should be prepared to think through the challenges concerning the enabling environment, as well as the individual and organisational levels of capacity development, with those partners. This may not come naturally to either side. As the PNG case illustrates (**Box 14**), local stakeholders may adopt a more traditional view of capacity building than the one set out in this paper.

Box 14. Perceptions of the capacity problem in PNG's health sector

The ECDPM study for AusAID of Papua New Guinea's health reforms found a series of contextual factors undermining sector performance and efforts to enhance capacity. These had the potential to drain resources and confidence away from important change processes. Some of the successes in the sector highlighted the importance of specific factors, such as attitudes and skills of managers in dealing with important contextual variables, or the ability of organisations or particular units to isolate themselves from "dysfunctions" in the broader system. However, the report concludes by underlining the value of relying on a systems perspective and thinking in terms of a complex "capacity ecosystem".

The study team also reflected on how PNG stakeholders think about the issue of capacity. It appears that capacity is seen substantially (although not exclusively) by most PNG stakeholders as a question of skills, or as an organisational issue. "Higher-level" issues are often described as risks rather than capacity issues to be "managed".

Source: Joe Bolger, Angela Mandie-Filer and Volker Hauck, "Papua New Guinea's Health Sector: A Review of Capacity, Change and Performance Issues", Maastricht: ECDPM, Discussion Paper 57F, Jan 2005, Summary.

The following are some of the lessons that donors have drawn so far from experiences of working on capacity development in fragile states:

- **Where state capacity is weak but political will is present, capacity development efforts need to focus selectively on core state functions with a view to making the state at least minimally effective in providing for its people.** Core functions may include macroeconomic and public financial management, which create the conditions for the restoration of the full range of public services in the medium term, as well as the obvious immediate priorities of restoring essential services and security.

- **Planning tools developed for use in post-conflict environments, such as the Transitional Results Matrix, may be useful in embedding support for capacity development.** Although not a capacity development instrument as such, this tool aims to draw together security, diplomatic and development efforts in support of a country. It has been used to good effect in places as diverse as Timor-Leste (with high anticipated resources and high expectations) and the Central African Republic (with little money and a legacy of mistrust).
- **External support to capacity development should respect the principle of endogenous change and fostering country leadership even when the practical conditions appear to prohibit such an approach.** Even in the most difficult contexts, existing local institutions and the associated social capital are essential starting points. By defining realistic goals, exercising selectivity and subordinating immediate steps to a long-term vision, gradual progress can be made without implanting externally-derived models that do not fit the local situation.
- **It is important that new capacity development initiatives do not erode or duplicate existing capacity, in individual, organisational or enabling environment terms.** This can happen where donors build parallel systems of delivery and accountability. It is particularly difficult to avoid this where donors have moral or political objections to collaborating with the country authorities. But even where it is not possible to support the government, it may be possible to “shadow align” with state systems, such as budget and planning processes, by ensuring that any separate delivery mechanisms use the same categories and rules as apply in the country’s public sector.
- **In other cases, sectoral selectivity, or “partial alignment” can deliver strategic pay-offs.** In Afghanistan, for example, some investments in capacity development in the health sector during the Taliban regime produced only modest returns at first. At the end of the regime, however, service delivery advanced rapidly on the foundations that had been laid earlier. This was also true of Nigeria, where a robust network of NGOs working on service delivery in the health sector allowed gains in health to be sustained and built upon after the transition to democracy.
- **Even in states with acute governance challenges, modest capacity development may still be achievable.** There is some evidence to suggest that capacity can survive in the most unfavourable circumstances. Where national governments are not responding to the needs of the people, more emphasis can be placed on non-state actors. The example of donor support to tackling HIV/AIDS in Burma – a state with some capacity but without political will – illustrates how direct assistance to non-state actors can be balanced with the necessary engagement and communication with state institutions.

V. Moving Forward: Unfinished Business

The experience of the past five decades has shown the need for donors to align with and support **country-driven approaches and systems for capacity development**. The new consensus on this point provides fresh opportunities to improve the results of capacity development efforts. These opportunities are becoming even more salient as we enter an era of scaled-up aid flows to the poorest countries, with the corresponding potential to increase the resources available for well conceived initiatives.

But it is clear that rising to this challenge will not be easy. **Significant efforts will be required**. Both donors and their developing country counterparts will have to live up to commitments they have made. At the same time, more creative, practical thinking is going to be needed in all the areas highlighted in this paper.

Moving on from “right answers” to a “best fit” approach to capacity development implies stepping up donor efforts to understand country contexts, identify sources of country-owned change, design appropriate forms of support, and share lessons from experience. Experience tells us that there are no quick fixes or easy formulas that work in all circumstances. Nevertheless, the paper has been able to point to good advice on many of the particular points that arise in thinking systematically about capacity development in a particular setting.

If the argument of the paper is right, the following are key items in the unfinished business of capacity development. These are the points upon which future work by GOVNET will focus:

- **Consolidating the new consensus on capacity development as a necessarily endogenous process of unleashing, strengthening, creating and maintaining capacity over time.** This message needs to reach all parts of the international aid system and every level of each agency. It must become a central topic of policy dialogue and debate at country level. That implies changes in donor agencies in terms of priorities, internal incentives, skill profiles and operating procedures. **GOVNET will help** by focusing its future work on developing operational advice targeted at practitioners leading capacity development thinking within agencies or participating in policy dialogue on capacity issues at country level.
- **Identifying and addressing the systemic factors currently discouraging the kind of country-owned efforts to develop capacity visualised by the Paris Declaration.** We have learned that capacity development cannot be tackled successfully if it is treated as just a training issue, or as a matter for individual organisations treated in isolation. Donors and partners together are going to have to devote more attention to understanding why the enabling environment for capacity development is often weak and how this can be addressed. **GOVNET will help** by sharing more widely the October 2005 lessons-learned study on Power and Drivers of Change analyses, focusing specifically on how these approaches may help in understanding the enabling environment for capacity development.

- **Making sure that the international community plays its part by providing support in ways that encourage, strengthen and do not displace initiatives by leaders and managers in partner countries. GOVNET will help** by making available case material and examples of good and bad practice in supporting capacity development strategies set by partner governments at the national level or in specific sectors or organisations. This operational guidance will assist donors to make progress with respect to Indicator 4 of the Paris Declaration's capacity-related commitments: the provision of donor funds through coordinated programmes in support of government-led strategies. The guidance will be disseminated through the channels established by the Working Party on Aid Effectiveness to monitor and support implementation of the Paris commitments.
- **Operationalising the new vision in ways that fully integrate human capital formation and technical co-operation with the institutional changes and organisational reforms needed to put skills and advice to effective use.** Future programme designs should be expected to take full account of the lesson learning summarised in this paper, including the importance of incentives and informal "political economy" factors in linking the individual, organisational and enabling environment levels of the capacity development challenge. **GOVNET will help** by ensuring that its operational guidance reflects fully the lessons learned on these points.
- **Working towards policy-relevant disaggregated technical co-operation statistics.** Without prejudice to the new emphasis on outcomes, we need better data on the range of donor inputs that are relevant to capacity development. The DAC Working Party on Statistics (WP-STAT) is already undertaking work to disaggregate DAC statistics on TC. **GOVNET will work** with WP-STAT, first to assess the data gathered so far in the context of the recommendations of this paper, and second to consider whether new subcategories of TC could be formulated and introduced in aid reporting to allow precise assessments of whether TC is contributing to capacity development as an outcome.
- **Constructively using the orientations in this paper in all country situations, while drawing and building further upon recent experience of capacity development in fragile states.** Well targeted and appropriately delivered capacity development may be one of the keys to reducing state fragility, which is recognised as one of the principal challenges of our time. GOVNET will help by providing further operational guidance on handling the particular challenges and trade-offs involved in capacity development in fragile states. This will be conducted in collaboration with the Fragile States Group in the areas of service delivery and state building. Guidance will be disseminated through the links to country teams undertaking the implementation of the "Principles for Good International Engagement in Fragile States" and through donor headquarters.

NOTES

1. *Investing in Development: A Practical Plan to Achieve the Millennium Development Goals*, London and Sterling, VA: Earthscan/UN Millennium Project, 2005, p. 99; *Our Common Interest*, London: Commission for Africa, 2005, pp. 135-40.
2. Capacity development is, of course, a tricky business anywhere in the world, not just in the development context. In some highly industrialised countries, it is possible to devote large amounts of additional public funding to particular services without noticeable improvements in capacity.
3. Some estimates of donor-assisted capacity development efforts suggest that more than a quarter of total net ODA is spent on technical co-operation. DAC members' spending on technical co-operation with developing countries and multilateral organisations amounted USD 20.8 billion in 2004 (27 per cent of total net ODA) and to USD 18.4 billion in 2003 (27 per cent of total net ODA). Source: OECD-DAC, *Development Co-operation Report 2003*, Paris, statistical annex.
4. *Global Monitoring Report 2004: Policies and Actions for Achieving the MDGs and Related Outcomes*, Washington, DC, Development Committee, World Bank and International Monetary Fund.
5. Recent extensive reviews include: World Bank Operations Evaluation Department, "Capacity Building in Africa: An OED Evaluation of World Bank Support" (April 2005); CIDA, "Capacity Development in CIDA's Bilateral Programming: A Stocktaking" (Jan. 2004); DANIDA, "Screening of Danish Sector, Programme Support and Mifresta Interventions" (2003); UNFPA, *Support to National Capacity Development Achievements and Challenges: Evaluation Report 20* (2003); UNDP's *Development Effectiveness Report 2003* and the *Reforming Technical Co-operation for Capacity Development Research* (2001-2003). Other sources include: Boesen, N. "Enhancing Public Sector Capacity: A Literature Review," Operations Evaluation Department, The World Bank (2003); SIDA, "Methods for CD" (2002); Williams et al. "A Vision for the Future of Technical Co-Operation in the International Development System," London: Oxford Policy Management (2003).
6. The car analogy also supports the observation made in the next section – that an organisation's capacity depends on factors in its "enabling environment". Lack of fuel, bad roads and poor maintenance quickly affect a car's performance and may eventually destroy its capacity to deliver transportation at all (EuropeAid, *Institutional Assessment and Capacity Development: Why, What and How?* Brussels: European Commission, 2005, p. 8).
7. Francis Fukuyama argues that this tendency means that donors need to define capacity itself as the primary objective of all development assistance, rather than focusing on the services, infrastructure or other results that donors typically define as the targets of their support. See Francis Fukuyama, *State Building: Governance and World Order in the 21st Century*, Ithaca, NY: Cornell UP, 2004, pp. 82-91. See also pp. 99-104.
8. This threefold distinction of analytical levels is purely conventional. It is one of several conventions current in the capacity development field. They all begin with individuals as the first level; then they use slightly varied terminologies to identify the intermediate organisational levels and the main features of the enabling environment. The important point they have in common is that they describe a system, in which the parts are interdependent. The phrases in quotation marks are from Douglass C. North, *Institutions, Institutional Change and Economic Performance*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1990, pp. 3, 5.
9. *Building Effective States, Forging Engaged Societies*, Washington, DC: World Bank, Sept 2005, Ch 2.
10. EuropeAid, *Institutional Assessment and Capacity Development: Why, What and How?* Brussels: European Commission, 2005, p. 7.
11. OECD-DAC, *Shaping the 21st Century: The Contribution of Development Co-operation*, Paris, 1996, p. 13. The document *DAC Criteria for Donor Agencies' Self Assessment in Capacity Development* (1999) also attempted to provide donor organisations with tools to assess how their policies were contributing to fostering capacity development.
12. Discharging this responsibility calls for a high level of sensitivity to country context. For agencies, it may also mean giving new emphasis to equipping field staff with process and analysis skills.
13. These include the international conferences in Manila in 2003 and Tokyo in 2004 as well as various OECD/DAC documents and research endeavours by UNDP and others.
14. The boxes are adapted from Boesen et al., 2002; Grindle, 1997; Horton, 2002; Nunberg and Nellis, 1995; Tendler, 1989; Kanter, 1983; Senge, 1990; and Robbins and Finley, 1997, as cited in DANIDA's *Capacity Development Evaluation, Between Naivety and Cynicism: A Pragmatic Approach to Donor Support for Public-Sector Capacity Development*; Nils Boesen, Process & Change Consultancy, Ole Therkildsen, Danish Institute for International Studies.
15. OECD-DAC GOVNET, "Room Document 5: Lessons Learned on the Use of Power and Drivers of Change Analyses in Development Co-operation", 7th Meeting of the DAC Network on Governance, Paris, 20-21 Oct 2005, Para 69.

16. Mamadou Dia, *Africa's Management in the 1990s and Beyond: Reconciling Indigenous and Transplanted Institutions*, World Bank Research Study, 1996, p. 1.
17. That is, systematic review of Strengths, Weaknesses, Opportunities and Threats.
18. EuropeAid, *Institutional Assessment and Capacity Development: Why, What and How?* Brussels: European Commission, 2005, Ch. 5.
19. World Bank OED (2005), *Capacity Building in Africa. An OED Evaluation of World Bank Support*.
20. UNDP (2003), *Ownership, Leadership, and Transformation*, Chapter 2.
21. Réal Lavergne, "Program-Based Approaches: The Concept and its Implications", Presentation to Tokyo Forum on PBAs in Asia, 1-3 June 2004.
22. Brian Levy, "Governance and Economic Development in Africa: Meeting the Challenge of Capacity Building" in Brian Levy and Sahr Kpundeh (eds.) *Building State Capacity in Africa: New Approaches, Emerging Lessons*, Washington, DC: The World Bank, 2004, p. 13.
23. Nils Boesen & Ole Therkildsen, *A Results-Oriented Approach to Capacity Change*, Danish Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 2005.
24. Anthony Land, *Developing Capacity for Tax Administration: The Rwanda Revenue Authority*, Maastricht: ECDPM, Discussion Paper 57D, Nov 2004.
25. Daima Associates and ODI, "Joint Evaluation of General Budget Support: Tanzania 1995-2004", Dar es Salaam, Apr 2005.
26. This is the conclusion of a wide range of evaluations and studies. For one example, see the section on PIUs in UNFPA, Evaluation 20.
27. Logical Framework Analysis (LFA) is a project-planning technique involving an effort to work back from agreed goals to defining the outputs and inputs that would be necessary to achieve them and the indicators and data that would be required to monitor progress at each level. ZOPP is the German acronym for Goal-Oriented Project Planning, which is essentially the same technique.
28. Watson, A. "Monitoring and Evaluation Aspects of Capacity and Capacity Development", Working Paper, ECDPM Study on Capacity Change and Performance, Sept 2005.
29. Hauge, A. (2002), "Accountability – To What End?" *Development Policy Journal*, Vol. 2, UNDP.

ANNEX A

VICIOUS AND VIRTUOUS CYCLES OF EMPOWERMENT

Figure 1.4.1. Vicious Cycle of Empowerment





Figure 1.4.2. Virtuous Cycle of Empowerment



ANNEX B

UNDP'S DEFAULT PRINCIPLES FOR CAPACITY DEVELOPMENT

Recognising that country contexts differ widely and that prescriptions do not work, they offer a fairly concrete starting position that can be adapted by the stakeholders on country level. They are not meant to be prescriptive but rather provide some fairly clear starting propositions to permit a genuine exchange on options. Rather than accepting “business as usual” approaches, the partners at country level can customise their rules of engagement for capacity development.

1. **Don't rush. Capacity development is a long-term process.** It is not amenable to delivery pressures, quick fixes and short-term results seeking. Engagement for capacity development needs to have a long term horizon and be reliable.
2. **Respect the value systems and foster self-esteem.** The imposition of alien values can undermine confidence. Capacity development requires respect. Self-esteem is at the root of capacity and empowerment.
3. **Scan locally and globally; reinvent locally.** There are no blueprints. Capacity development means learning. Learning is a voluntary process that requires genuine commitment and interest. Knowledge transfer is no longer seen as the relevant modality. Knowledge needs to be acquired.
4. **Challenge mindsets and power differentials.** Capacity development is not power neutral and challenging vested interest is difficult. Frank dialogue and moving from closed curtains to a collective culture of transparency is essential to promote a positive dynamic for overcoming them.
5. **Think and act in terms of sustainable capacity outcomes.** Capacity is at the core of development. Any course of action needs to promote this end. Responsible leaders can inspire their institutions and societies to effectively work towards capacity development.
6. **Establish positive incentives.** Distortions in public sector employment are major obstacles to capacity development. Ulterior motives and perverse incentives need to be aligned with the objective of capacity development. Governance systems respectful of fundamental rights are a powerful incentive.
7. **Integrate external inputs into national priorities, processes and systems.** External inputs need to correspond to real demand and need to be flexible to respond effectively to national needs and possibilities. Where such systems are not strong enough they need to be reformed and strengthened, not bypassed.
8. **Build on existing capacities rather than creating new ones.** This implies the use of national expertise as prime option, resuscitation and strengthening of national institutions, and protecting social and cultural capital.
9. **Stay engaged under difficult circumstances.** The weaker the capacity the greater the need. Weak capacities are not an argument for withdrawal or for driving external agendas. People should not be hostage to irresponsible governance.
10. **Remain accountable to ultimate beneficiaries.** Even where national governments are not responding to the needs of their people external partners need to be accountable to beneficiaries and contribute to the responsabilisation of national authorities. Sensible approaches in concrete situations need to be openly discussed and negotiated with national stakeholders.

Source: UNDP, *Ownership, Leadership and Transformation*, NY (2003), p. 13.

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