OECD Development Co-operation Peer Reviews

# POLAND

## 2017



The Development Assistance Committee: Enabling effective development

OECD

# OECD Development Co-operation Peer Reviews: Poland 2017



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# *20th anniversary of Poland's accession to the OECD*

*In 2016, we celebrated the 20th anniversary of Poland's accession to the OECD.*

*For Poland, the membership in the OECD is a sign of quality; it also confirms the affiliation to a group of like-minded countries.*

*Recommendations and guidelines formulated by the OECD often contain tailored-made advice on how the country might want to tackle problems in economic and social spheres.*

*The OECD is not just a group of economically significant nations. It is also a policy forum covering a broad spectrum of areas. Poland can share its experience and learn from the practices of the other members, how to address current challenges.*

*The OECD sustains working relationships with over 100 non-member economies. Poland thus benefits from the dialogue and consultations with almost all major international players. It is particularly important to bear in mind that an increased interdependence and globalisation demand global rules of the game.*

*The twenty years of Poland's membership in the OECD is a history of rich and unique, multidimensional cooperation with the Secretariat and member states. It has engaged different people, involved setting foot in various places, covered multiple topics, comprised numerous events and produced a variety of products. All these activities, however, have had one single objective: working together to promote policies that will improve the economic and social well-being of people around the world.*

*We are looking forward to further strengthening the collaboration with the OECD and its member states to promote the OECD's goal worldwide: "better policies for better lives".*

# Conducting the peer review

The OECD Development Assistance Committee (DAC) conducts periodic reviews of the individual development co-operation efforts of DAC members. The policies and programmes of each member are critically examined approximately once every five years, with six members examined annually. The OECD Development Co-operation Directorate provides analytical support, and develops and maintains, in close consultation with the Committee, the methodology and analytical framework – known as the Reference Guide – within which the peer reviews are undertaken.

The objectives of DAC peer reviews are to improve the quality and effectiveness of development co-operation policies and systems, and to promote good development partnerships for better impact on poverty reduction and sustainable development in developing countries. DAC peer reviews assess the performance of a given member, not just that of its development co-operation agency, and examine both policy and implementation. They take an integrated, system-wide perspective on the development co-operation and humanitarian assistance activities of the member under review.

The peer review is prepared by a team, consisting of representatives of the OECD Development Co-operation Directorate working with officials from two DAC members who are designated as "examiners". The country under review provides a memorandum setting out the main developments in its policies and programmes. Then the review team visits the capital to interview officials, parliamentarians, as well as civil society and non-governmental organisations representatives of the donor country to obtain a first-hand insight into current issues surrounding the development co-operation efforts of the member concerned. The field perspective is gained by assessing how members are implementing the major DAC policies, principles and concerns, and reviewing practices in recipient countries, particularly with regard to poverty reduction, sustainability, gender equality and other aspects of participatory development, and local aid co-ordination. The peer review team consults representatives of the partner country's administration, parliamentarians, civil society and other development partners.

The Secretariat then prepares a draft report on the member's development co-operation which is the basis for the DAC review meeting at the OECD. At this meeting senior officials from the member under review respond to questions formulated by the Committee in association with the examiners.

This review contains the main findings and recommendations of the Development Assistance Committee and the analytical report of the Secretariat. It was prepared with examiners from Austria and Portugal for the peer review of Poland on 10 November 2016.

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# Abbreviations and acronyms

| | |
|---|---|
| CCOE | NATO Civil-Military Cooperation Centre of Excellence |
| CERF | Central Emergency Response Fund |
| COHAFA | Working Party on Humanitarian Aid and Food Aid |
| CRS | Creditor Reporting System |
| CSR | Corporate Social Responsibility |
| CSSPS | Civil Society Platform for Peacebuilding and Statebuilding |
| DAC | Development Assistance Committee |
| DDC | Department of Development Cooperation |
| EADRCC | Euro-Atlantic Disaster Response Coordination Centre |
| EaP | Eastern Partnership |
| EED | European Endowment for Democracy |
| EU | European Union |
| FDI | Foreign direct investment |
| FIU | Financial Intelligence Unit |
| GENE | Global Education Network in Europe |
| GHD | Good Humanitarian Donorship |
| GIZ | Deutsche Gesellschaft für Internationale Zusammenarbeit |
| GNI | Gross national income |
| HIPC | Heavily indebted poor country |
| ICRC | International Committee of the Red Cross |
| IDA | International Development Association |
| IDPs | Internally displaced persons |
| INCAF | International Network on Conflict and Fragility |
| ISAF | International Security Assistance Force |
| LDCs | Least developed countries |
| MFA | Ministry of Foreign Affairs |
| NGO | Non-government organisation |
| NOHA | Network on Humanitarian Action |
| OCHA | Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs |
| ODA | Official development assistance |
| OECD | Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development |
| OOF | Other official flows |
| OSCE | Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe |

| | |
|---|---|
| PCD | Policy coherence for development |
| PISA | Programme for International Student Assessment |
| SDGs | Sustainable Development Goals |
| SRD | Strategy for Responsible Development |
| UN | United Nations |
| UNDO | United Nations Development Organization |
| UNDP | United Nations Development Programme |
| UNRWA | United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East |

**Signs used:**

| | |
|---|---|
| PLN | Polish Zloty |
| EUR | Euro |
| USD | United States dollars |
| ( ) | Secretariat estimate in whole or part |
| - | (Nil) |
| 0.0 | Negligible |
| .. | Not available |
| … | Not available separately, but included in total |
| n.a. | Not applicable |
| p | Provisional |

Slight discrepancies in totals are due to rounding.

**Annual average exchange rate: 1 USD = PLN**

| 2010 | 2011 | 2012 | 2013 | 2014 | 2015 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 3.0145 | 2.9621 | 3.2518 | 3.1596 | 3.1543 | 3.7702 |

# Poland's aid at a glance

## POLAND


*Gross bilateral ODA, 2013-14 average, unless otherwise shown*

| Net ODA | 2013 | 2014 | 2015[P] | Change 2014/15 |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Current (USD m) | 487 | 452 | 442 | -2.1% |
| Constant (2014 USD m) | 490 | 452 | 528 | 16.8% |
| In Złoty (million) | 1 539 | 1 425 | 1 668 | 17.0% |
| ODA/GNI | 0.10% | 0.09% | 0.10% | |
| Bilateral share | 26% | 18% | 22% | |


P. Preliminary figures.

| Top Ten Recipients of Gross ODA (USD million) | |
|---|---|
| 1 Angola | 28 |
| 2 Belarus | 21 |
| 3 Ukraine | 18 |
| 4 China (People's Republic of) | 13 |
| 5 Ethiopia | 12 |
| 6 Georgia | 3 |
| 7 Moldova | 3 |
| 8 Afghanistan | 2 |
| 9 Viet Nam | 2 |
| 10 Syrian Arab Republic | 2 |
| Memo: Share of gross bilateral ODA | |
| Top 5 recipients | 74% |
| Top 10 recipients | 83% |
| Top 20 recipients | 89% |


**By income group (USD m)**




**By region (USD m)**




**By Sector**




*Source:* OECD-DAC; www.oecd.org/dac/stats

# Context of the peer review of Poland

Poland celebrated its 20th anniversary as an OECD member in 2016. On this occasion, it emphasised that the central objective of its active membership of the OECD is "working together to promote policies that will improve the economic and social well-being of people around the world". Over the past 20 years, Poland has experienced significant economic growth and development. It is for example, catching up with other OECD countries in terms of GDP per capita, which stood at USD 25 825 in 2015 (OECD, 2016a; OECD, 2016b).

Poland, which has a population of about 38 million, has one of the highest levels of educational attainment in the OECD according to How's Life in Poland 2016. 90.5% of the adult working-age population has completed at least an upper secondary education, which is well above the OECD average of 76.4%. However, job, housing and health indicators are less favourable. People in Poland live in rather poor housing and environmental conditions compared to other OECD countries, labour market insecurity is high compared to the OECD average and life expectancy (77.1 years) is among the lowest in the OECD (OECD, 2016d).

The OECD's 2016 economic survey of Poland found that the country was remarkably resilient to the 2009 world economic and financial crisis. Economic activity has been expanding at a solid pace, and real GDP growth is projected to increase from around 3% in 2016 to 3.5% in 2017 (OECD, 2016c). Growth will be driven by private consumption thanks to rising employment and wages, higher social transfers, low energy prices and investment including from the European Union (EU) funding (ibid).

Poland has combined robust economic growth with reducing some of the pressures on its environment (OECD, 2015). It has also brought environmental laws closer to European norms but more needs to be done to lessen its economy's reliance on fossil fuels and to make growth greener. In the context of the goals agreed at the 2015 United Nations Climate Change Conference in Paris, a key challenge for Poland will be to develop a broad-based strategy to reduce greenhouse gas emissions, which are causing substantial health costs and contributing to climate change (OECD, 2016c).

Foreign policy in Poland is shaped by a range of international issues including security concerns in its Eastern and Southern neighbourhoods, European Union integration and expanding Poland's global economic engagement. Development co-operation and humanitarian assistance are seen increasingly as relevant tools for advancing on foreign policy priorities. As a DAC member, Poland committed to deliver official development assistance (ODA) according to international norms and standards. Its legal and strategic framework for development co-operation is helping it along this path.

This is the first development co-operation peer review of Poland. There are therefore no recommendations from previous DAC peer reviews against which to assess Polish progress. However, the peer review holds Poland accountable for the commitments it has made domestically and internationally. In this first peer review a strong emphasis is placed on learning and on setting a baseline for Polish development co-operation in the future.

*Sources:*

OECD (2016a), Population (indicator), http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/d434f82b-en, accessed 18 August 2016.
OECD (2016b), Gross domestic product (GDP) (indicator), http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/dc2f7aec-en, accessed 18 August 2016.
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# The DAC's main findings and recommendations

# 1 Towards a comprehensive Polish development effort

***Indicator: The member has a broad, strategic approach to development and financing for development beyond aid. This is reflected in overall policies, co-ordination within its government system, and operations***

**Main findings**

Since joining the Development Assistance Committee (DAC) in 2013, Poland has made progress with strengthening its strategic framework and systems for development co-operation thanks to the active leadership and co-ordination role played by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Greater cross-government ownership is exemplified by the 2016-2020 Multiannual Development Cooperation Programme – a whole-of-government strategy approved by the Council of Ministers. The findings and recommendations of this first peer review provide a baseline and a guide for building on these foundations.

Poland contributes to the global development effort through several channels. Its strong support for Sustainable Development Goal (SDG) 16 reflects how central democracy and respect for human rights are to its foreign policy. Recent responses to insecurity and conflict in the Middle East and Ukraine, and plans to increase Polish economic presence in Africa and Asia show the comprehensive nature of its global engagement. Poland also works actively within the European Union (EU), the United Nations and NATO for greater stability, including through continued support for the EU's Eastern Partnership initiative.

Like other DAC members, Poland has started to identify how it will contribute to Agenda 2030. For example, the Ministry of Economic Development, which is responsible for national implementation of Agenda 2030, is finalising Poland's strategy for Responsible Development which applies a sustainability lens to its domestic development model. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs considers that the 2016-2020 development co-operation programme is in line with the SDGs. Poland has an opportunity to reflect the universal and holistic nature of Agenda 2030 by integrating the development co-operation pillar of Agenda 2030 into its national debate, strategy and institutional set-up for the SDGs.

Poland has taken several steps towards having a systematic approach to making its policies development friendly. These include raising awareness through the intra-governmental network of focal points on policy coherence for development; its work on illicit financial flows; adding a question on development in the Guidelines for Regulatory Impact Assessment; and mandating, in 2016, the Development Cooperation Policy Council to provide recommendations to the government on priority issues to address.

Now that Poland has put these instruments in place, it needs to ensure that they bear fruit. Going forward, Poland would need to clarify institutional mandates and mechanisms for moving from technical discussions to political decisions. While the Development Cooperation Policy Council has potential to raise awareness and debate issues, it is too early to tell if it has the capacity to provide solid recommendations to the government. The requirement for including development in regulatory impact assessments is a step in the right direction, however there appears to be limited capacity in government to conduct such assessments. At the same time, Polish non-government organisations (NGOs) and research institutes have strong analytical capacity and potential to advocate on policy coherence for development which can be harnessed by the government to stimulate debate and action.

Poland draws on its experience with small and medium-sized enterprise development to promote local private sector development in partner countries and territories. It is also considering how to engage the Polish private sector in development. The Corporate Social Responsibility Advisory Board to the Minister of Economic Development has the potential to stimulate debate on how Polish businesses can contribute to sustainable development through their own investments. Poland can also learn from the experience of other DAC members on this issue.

**Recommendations**

**1.1** As it develops its approach to implementing Agenda 2030 Poland should integrate development co-operation and its other international commitments on sustainable development.

**1.2** To deliver policies that are coherent with the aspirations of developing countries, Poland should

(i) clarify institutional roles, responsibilities and mechanisms for making its policies coherent with development objectives; and

(ii) ensure that government departments have resources and capacity to conduct regulatory impact assessments.

# 2 Poland's vision and policies for development co-operation

***Indicator: Clear political directives, policies and strategies shape the member's development co-operation and are in line with international commitments and guidance***

**Main findings**

Poland's clear overall vision and priorities for development co-operation are underpinned by principles of democracy, good governance, respect for human rights and solidarity. Poland considers its own transformation experience a comparative advantage in its development co-operation with Eastern Partnership countries looking to learn from Poland's experience.

The 2011 Development Cooperation Act has proven to be a fundamental guide and tool for the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in building cross-government ownership of the aid programme. The stronger geographic and thematic focus of the second Multiannual Development Cooperation Programme 2016-2020 and the explicit objective to increase efficiency and impact are informed by lessons arising from the first programme. In addition, the ministry selected its priority countries on the basis of criteria and consultation with key stakeholders and the six thematic priorities reflect Polish expertise and comparative advantage.

Poland has great potential to increase the strategic focus and scale of its aid allocations, notably by ensuring the various components of its bilateral portfolio work towards the objectives of the Act and multiannual programme. For example, the special reserve budget for development co-operation is ring-fenced for priority countries and territories but it only accounts for one third of bilateral aid. Loans and scholarships make up over half of bilateral aid. However, lending by the Ministry of Finance and ODA qualifying scholarships offered by the Ministry of Science and Higher Education are not strictly required to align with geographic and thematic priorities of the multiannual programme.

Multilateral aid accounts for almost 80% of Poland's development co-operation and is therefore an important channel for advancing its objectives. Reflecting this, Poland works strategically to influence EU development and humanitarian policy as outlined in its 2016-2020 multiannual programme. In addition, it feeds lessons from its participation in EU development policy-making into the bilateral strategy and programme. Poland could, nevertheless, be more active and strategic in communicating how its multilateral aid contributes to development – and raise visibility domestically and internationally of this important component of Polish aid.

Polish development co-operation policy is evolving in line with the international development agenda – such as the SDGs – and has gained credibility as a tool for supporting Polish foreign, economic and security policy. These changes are evident in its humanitarian aid to the Middle East, its increased support to least developed countries and expanding economic presence in Africa and Asia (exemplified by its new priority countries of Senegal and Myanmar). However, as a relatively new provider of development co-operation in least developed countries, it will be a challenge to have an impact on development with its limited budget and country presence unless it has a clear idea of how it can add value and respond to local priorities.

The 2011 act commits Poland to "support long-term social and economic development through actions to reduce poverty". Evidence from Ukraine shows that Polish development co-operation supports sectors which benefit poor and marginalised people but it lacks dedicated guidance for focusing aid to reduce poverty. Such guidance could also strengthen project and programme design, and provide a baseline for monitoring impact of the various channels of bilateral aid, including loans and scholarships.

Finally, clearer objectives and guidance for mainstreaming cross-cutting goals such as gender equality and women's empowerment and the environment could help translate general commitments into practice and ensure they are addressed systematically in programming and policy dialogue.

**Recommendations**

**2.1** To strengthen its strategic framework, Poland should:

(i) have a policy for providing loans and scholarships that aligns with principles for aid effectiveness, the objectives of the Development Cooperation Act, multiannual programmes and Agenda 2030.

(ii) provide clear objectives and guidance for delivering on priorities such as reducing poverty and cross-cutting issues such as gender equality and environmental protection.

(iii) define a strategic approach to meeting the needs of different partner countries in a way that adds value and complements support provided by other development partners.

# 3 Allocating Poland's official development assistance

***Indicator: The member's international and national commitments drive aid volume and allocations***

**Main findings**

In 2015 Poland provided USD 528 million in net ODA (in 2014 constant prices) – an increase of 16.8% in real terms compared to 2014 (USD 452 million). ODA as a share of gross national income (GNI) also grew from 0.09% in 2014 to 0.10% in 2015. However, Poland has some way to go to reach the target of 0.33% ODA/GNI by 2030 in line with the 2015 Addis Ababa Action Agenda.

Poland has no overall plan for scaling up ODA to meet these international targets. Changes in Poland's ODA volume are generally determined by (1) increases in its EU contributions, which are indexed to the size of the economy; and (2) new credit lines. These increases are unlikely to raise significantly the ODA/GNI ratio which has ranged between 0.08% and 0.10% over the past decade. While the special reserve budget for bilateral co-operation increased from PLN 100 million to PLN 130 million between 2015 and 2016 (from about USD 26.5 million to USD 34.5 million), this fund accounts for about 6% of total gross ODA. The increase is too small to affect the ODA/GNI ratio.

Public and political support will be crucial to give the government legitimacy to allocate more resources to meet its aid target. Both government and civil society have an opportunity to build support for increasing aid: a 2015 survey found that 65% of Polish people support development co-operation for least developed countries, and there is growing political awareness of the need to address the development-related causes of global problems affecting Poland – including economic migration and climate change.

Multilateral aid accounts for a high share of total gross ODA: 78% in 2014 (USD 370 million). It mainly consists of assessed contributions to the EU (91.6% of multilateral aid). Poland's small earmarked contributions support activities in geographical areas that Poland cannot reach bilaterally. However, with core and earmarked contributions of USD 21 million (in 2014) spread across 28 UN funds and agencies there is scope, as identified in the 2016-2020 programme, for Poland to rationalise its allocations for greater impact and synergies with its bilateral cooperation.

At USD 104 million, Poland's bilateral aid accounted for one-fifth of its total ODA in 2014. Allocations reflect priorities to a certain extent. In 2014, about half of bilateral ODA went to agriculture, 16% to post-secondary education (reflecting the scholarships) while government and civil society received 10% of bilateral aid. In addition, 47% was allocated to the European region and 41% to sub-Saharan Africa. The focus on Belarus and Ukraine is evident in their relatively large allocations (USD 21 million and USD 19 million in 2013-14 – 34% of bilateral allocable aid, combined).

A closer look at the data shows that the recipients of bilateral aid are not always priority countries. China was, for example, among the top recipients of Polish aid (mostly loans) in 2013-14. In addition, time lags between lending commitments and disbursements can affect the final allocation of bilateral aid. For example, Angola, which was a priority country when it signed loan agreements with Poland (in 2006 and 2010) but which ceased to be a priority country in 2011, was the main recipient of Polish aid in 2013-14, receiving 22% of gross bilateral ODA.

Poland has committed to increase funding for least developed countries (LDCs) to reach 50% of its total ODA. Meeting this target will be a challenge. While bilateral net disbursements to LDCs were relatively high in 2014 (at 49.5%, explained partly by a tied aid credit to Ethiopia), funding for LDCs represented just 28.8% of total net ODA (or 0.02% of Poland's GNI). In addition, priority countries such as Myanmar, Senegal and Tanzania are not yet top 10 recipients. In 2013-14 Tanzania was among the top 20 recipients of Poland's bilateral aid but received less than USD 1 million; aid to Myanmar and Senegal was negligible.

To achieve its target for least developed countries, Poland will need to enlarge its budget envelope for bilateral aid, reallocate aid to its geographic priorities, and be open to working with new partners with knowledge and experience in these countries.

**Recommendation**

**3.1** As it increases ODA to meet its commitments Poland should allocate more resources to the bilateral budget.

**3.2** Poland should focus its bilateral aid, including loans and scholarships, on priority countries and themes.

**3.3** Poland should allocate its multilateral contributions in a strategic, whole-of-government way to support implementation of its development co-operation priorities.

# 4 Managing Poland's development co-operation

***Indicator: The member's approach to how it organises and manages its development co-operation is fit for purpose***

**Main findings**

Poland has sound institutional foundations for its development co-operation. It continues to strengthen its structures and systems on the basis of experience and the roles and responsibilities outlined in the 2011 act. It is a significant achievement since joining the DAC in 2013 that the Ministry of Foreign Affairs – and its Department of Development Cooperation – is now recognised as the institutional leader on strategic priorities and for co-ordinating the system.

The Ministry of Foreign Affairs is effective in using the multiannual programming process and annual planning to co-ordinate Polish aid. By getting cross-government engagement in annual planning and statistical reporting, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs has achieved a good degree of ownership for the strategic objectives of the Multiannual Development Cooperation Programme.

Poland is still in the early stages of developing a whole-of-government approach in partner countries. Its recent success in scaling up its programme in Ukraine, which responds to demands from the Ukrainian Government, shows that it can adapt its tools and innovate to meet partner country demands, work more flexibly, and capitalise on cross-government expertise in a co-ordinated way. Poland's growing emphasis on economic diplomacy, including through development co-operation, gives it an opportunity to develop strategic whole-of-government approaches more systematically in partner countries.

The Department of Development Cooperation's set-up reflects its responsibilities and the current project-based business model. The department works closely with embassies and the part-time development counsellors in partner countries, who engage in policy dialogue, manage small grants and conduct some monitoring. Nevertheless, achieving the optimal organisational set-up, systems, procedures and key capabilities for delivering aid remains an issue for Poland. In particular, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs recognises that it needs to adapt its business model in order to deliver Polish aid in a more efficient, flexible, timely and innovative way that responds to partners' expressed needs. Key challenges it needs to address include:

- the high administrative costs of managing five annual calls for proposals, annual project contracting, monitoring and reporting
- the limited time for staff to plan, programme and develop new tools and instruments (e.g. project management guidelines) required to increase efficiency and potential impact
- constraints in the calls for proposal to working with a broad range of partners as these are issued only to Polish entities.

Human resource management is evolving at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, which is looking to introduce some specialisation in the diplomatic corps. Since 2011, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs has built up its development co-operation capacity with more experienced staff working in the department. However, acquiring and retaining the right expertise in the right place for the right length of time is a significant concern for the department, especially keeping diplomatic staff in more technical posts. The ministry should consider including development co-operation as a specialisation given its growing policy relevance, generally limited experience of the ministry's staff in development co-operation, and the need for more technical expertise in the Department of Development Cooperation.

The department has limited resources to recruit expertise. However, recent experience of seconding an expert from the Ministry of Agriculture to support the programme in Moldova is a good example of capitalising on relevant technical expertise from within the system. Development training is also limited in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs at present.

**Recommendations**

**4.1** To strengthen and make more efficient its business model and free up staff time for other strategic activities, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs should rationalise the overall number of channels for the special budget reserve and streamline calls for proposals.

**4.2** Poland should make greater effort to bring different parts of the aid system together and draw on technical capacity throughout the system.

# 5 Poland's development co-operation delivery and partnerships

***Indicator: The member's approach to how it delivers its programme leads to quality assistance in partner countries, maximizing the impact of its support, as defined in Busan***

**Main findings**

Poland's 2016-2020 Multiannual Development Cooperation Programme contains an explicit priority to deliver aid in line with the commitments it agreed to in Busan. These include more transparent and less fragmented aid and enabling greater partner country ownership. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs plans to engage in more systematic strategic dialogue and planning with partner governments – as it does in Ukraine. These are the right objectives and can drive reforms needed to aid programming and budgeting.

Partners value the experience, knowledge and people-to-people link that Poland offers. Poland also adds value and gains visibility through joint approaches with other donors, as shown by its engagement in EU joint analysis in Moldova.

Poland delivers aid in fragile states such as Ukraine. While it does not have specific guidance for addressing conflict and fragility through its development co-operation, by channelling its support mainly through the multilateral channel, it increases the overall coherence of aid in these contexts.

The Ministry of Foreign Affairs' growing experience with delivering the special budget reserve – through the calls-for-proposals, an annual contract with the Solidarity Fund and the small grants scheme – helps it to identify ways to improve the quality and impact of this part of bilateral aid. There is less emphasis, at present, on ensuring that loans and scholarships are delivered in line with Busan as they are outside the remit of the MFA.

The ministry's immediate priority is to make a solid case to the rest of the government for updating the overall business model for delivering Polish aid. In particular, the MFA would like to engage more actively in strategic dialogue and planning with partner governments to respond better to local needs and priorities. Poland is not starting from scratch: its more strategic, demand-driven co-operation with Ukraine is an example on which to build.

The Ministry of Foreign Affairs has the flexibility to reallocate resources between instruments in the special reserve budget. It can take advantage of this flexibility to achieve a better match between aid modalities and partner countries' priorities and needs. It has also started to support multi-year projects, which shows that it is trying to increase predictability. Polish NGOs welcome this approach as an improvement on the short timeframes, high administrative costs and uncertainty of annual projects. In making multi-year projects standard practice, the ministry will need to build mutual trust over resource availability and partner capacity to design and manage longer-term projects. While it cannot make financial commitments beyond one year, it could communicate 3-5 year indicative future flows to partner countries.

Poland values NGOs as implementers of development co-operation and relies heavily on Polish NGOs to deliver its bilateral aid. However, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs sets too broad a scope in the type of projects they can propose through calls for proposals. This can translate into supply-driven projects, fragmented aid, and limited country ownership.

The Ministry of Foreign Affairs recognises Poland could enhance aid quality through partnership approaches based on mutual accountability. To make partnerships successful, it will also need to develop appropriate tools and instruments. For example, more comprehensive analysis of risks and opportunities to achieving development results can inform its choice of partners and aid modalities to respond best to needs.

Finally, Poland started to report on the tying status of its ODA in 2013. The fall in the share of untied aid from 62.7% in 2013 to 10.6% in 2014 is explained by a tied aid credit to Ethiopia. This credit does not comply with the DAC Recommendation on Untying ODA. This credit also reduced the grant element of aid to LDCs to 82%, below the 90% standard in the DAC Recommendation on Terms and Conditions of Aid.

**Recommendations**

**5.1** Poland's objective to increase aid transparency, predictability, ownership and focus should shape its aid modalities and partnerships.

**5.2** The Ministry of Foreign Affairs should communicate its vision, strategy and criteria for reforming its aid modalities to help implementing partners, such as NGOs, to work in a different way.

**5.3** Poland should bring its ODA in line with the Revised DAC Recommendation on Untying ODA to the Least Developed Countries and Heavily Indebted Poor Countries (2014) and the DAC Recommendation on Terms and Conditions of Aid (1978).

# 6 Results management and accountability of Poland's development co-operation

*Indicator: The member plans and manages for results, learning, transparency and accountability*

**Main findings**

Poland is taking steps to strengthen the results focus of its development co-operation. For example, from 2016, development co-operation plans list broad development results targeted for Polish aid in priority countries and territories. The 2016 plan also includes expected results and measurement indicators for some of its priority countries and territories. At the project level, results indicators must be included in logical frameworks.

Experience from other DAC members shows that success in planning and managing for development results goes hand-in-hand with having a development co-operation strategy that focuses on results and an organisational culture which values learning. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs can build on its current bottom-up approach to results by broadening its results approach to all partner countries and linking these results with overall objectives. Building staff and partners' understanding and capacity in results monitoring will also be crucial. As it takes the results agenda forward Poland can learn from and share its experience with the DAC Results Community. Given the high share of aid to bilateral loans, scholarships and multilateral co-operation (about 90% of total ODA) there is also scope to apply a results focus to these channels.

Poland places a high priority on raising public awareness and understanding of development issues in order to build a good foundation of public and political support for development co-operation. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs' global education strategy follows good practice through a multipronged approach: the ministry leverages the expertise and scope of the Ministry of National Education and NGOs to achieve global education objectives. In addition results from regular public opinion surveys feed into the strategy.

Nevertheless, Poland could step up communication about the needs and benefits of development co-operation to the general public, especially as it is gaining profile in foreign policy. The ministry's growing emphasis on results management and monitoring provides an opportunity for Poland to start communicating its results – both good and bad. This will highlight the complexity and risks associated with development activities, while being transparent and accountable.

Poland has made progress with establishing an evaluation system. It has created an evaluation unit with one dedicated member of staff within the Department of Development Cooperation. The evaluation specialist manages all evaluation planning and procedures. Since 2012 11 thematic evaluations have been conducted, covering about 200 projects and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs ensures transparency of evaluation results by publishing them on the website. Learning from evaluation is promoted through annual meetings to discuss findings with members of the Development Cooperation Policy Council.

A challenge for Poland – as for other DAC members with limited resources and a relatively light system for managing aid – is ensuring that the evaluation process is impartial and independent of policy and implementation. In addition, the current evaluation set-up does not appear to have authority to commission evaluations for ODA managed outside the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. There is scope for greater clarity over the role and responsibilities of evaluation within the Polish aid system, as well as the institutional arrangements for ensuring independence.

Poland is improving transparency, especially through its increasingly comprehensive reporting to the DAC Creditor Reporting System. It also plans to modernise its technology for statistical reporting with a view to adopting the common standard for publishing timely, comprehensive and forward-looking information. These plans are heading in the right direction and should be implemented. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs could also increase transparency and promote knowledge sharing by making information currently stored in its information technology system more publicly available and promote its use.

**Recommendations**

**6.1** Poland should build a culture of working towards results and develop an approach to managing for results throughout the portfolio.

**6.2** Building on progress with evaluation so far, Poland should guarantee the independence of evaluation from policy and programming and broaden its scope to all aid channels.

# 7 Poland's humanitarian assistance

*Indicator: The member contributes to minimising impact of shocks and crises; and saves lives, alleviates suffering and maintains human dignity in crisis and disaster settings*

**Main findings**

Poland's humanitarian strategy is founded on international humanitarian laws, the Good Humanitarian Donorship principles and the EU Consensus on Humanitarian Aid. Its humanitarian assistance is also evolving in response to international trends in humanitarian policies and practices, as agreed at the 2016 World Humanitarian Summit. Poland is already planning to introduce multi-year projects funding into its humanitarian programming, which is in line with the Grand Bargain.

Poland's humanitarian budget has been increasing annually since 2012. While limited at USD 5.7 million (in 2015), it has become increasingly concentrated on a few priority humanitarian crises – essentially Ukraine and the Middle East. This consistent focus ensures good continuity in its engagement in complex crises. At the same time, Poland has a growing interest in increasing the scope of its humanitarian action. However, to meet this objective it also needs a corresponding budgetary increase to avoid the risk of fragmenting its assistance and reducing effectiveness.

New crisis patterns are blurring the lines between humanitarian action, development, security and migration management. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the Ministry of Interior already have a solid co-ordination mechanism for responding to disasters.

However, there is scope to expand cross-government co-ordination in response to other crises. Indeed, strengthening the Ministry of Foreign Affairs' co-ordinating role in humanitarian affairs across the central administration is a priority of the Multiannual Development Cooperation Programme 2016-2020. Given their high profile and the complex nature of the response, priority could be given to co-ordinating migration management and civil-military relations to ensure that Poland's assistance remains bound to humanitarian principles. Ensuring that support to a foreign military force is not labelled as humanitarian aid is also important so as to avoid creating misconceptions.

Internationally, Poland participates in global humanitarian co-ordination fora. In countries such as Ukraine, with which Poland has a strong partnership, it uses humanitarian assistance to complement its development co-operation. Poland's extensive global diplomatic network ensures good early warning of emerging crises. When providing support in crisis contexts, Poland could become a more prominent humanitarian donor by engaging more actively with the rest of the humanitarian community in dialogue about humanitarian issues with the relevant authorities. Specific training on humanitarian issues for embassy staff could prompt more exchanges on humanitarian issues and needs assessments with partners and other donors in the field to further improve the response.

Poland's engagement with multilateral organisations is fluid, efficient and allows a flexible response. Core funding support, responses to UN appeals and contributions to the Central Emergency Response Fund (CERF) are valued by partners and allow early response when a crisis occurs. Poland could, however, improve the predictability of its support to multilateral organisations.

By contrast, a long selection process and heavy administrative procedures for bilateral humanitarian funding through Polish NGOs prevent Poland from reacting rapidly to humanitarian crises through this channel. While reporting requirements are quite light, Poland's knowledgeable humanitarian team spends too much time administering grants instead of strengthening partnerships to address complex humanitarian challenges. However, Poland's most capable humanitarian NGOs expressed some reluctance to apply for funding due to heavy and difficult procedures.

**Recommendations**

**7.1** Poland should avoid spreading its humanitarian aid too thinly by focusing on a few priorities where it can play a valuable role during a humanitarian and crisis response.

**7.2** Poland should explore ways of forming strategic partnerships with Polish NGOs, for example to enable a timely response.

# Secretariat's report

# Chapter 1: Towards a comprehensive Polish development effort

## Global development issues

**Poland participates actively in international efforts to address global public risks and to promote development-relevant global public policies. Within the European Union, Poland has initiated and strongly promotes the Eastern Partnership initiative as a key factor in promoting stability and successful transformation in the European Union's neighbourhood. Poland should make sure that its new Strategy for Responsible Development takes a coherent approach to supporting the implementation and monitoring of Agenda 2030 at both national and global levels.**

### Poland pursues closer ties between the Eastern Partnership countries and the EU

Poland contributes to reducing global public risks and promotes development-relevant public policies through various international organisations and forums, notably the European Union (EU), United Nations (UN) and NATO (the latter for security related risks). For example, to achieve closer and more effective co-operation between NATO and the EU, Poland plans to become involved in strengthening the EU's Common Security and Defence Policy (MFA, 2016a). Poland is also running for a non-permanent seat on the UN Security Council for the Eastern European Group in 2018-19. Within the context of current humanitarian crises (e.g. Syria and Ukraine), Poland aims to "actively participate in activities aimed at eliminating the causes and effects of crises and seek to strengthen partner countries' ability to cope with them" (MFA, 2016b).

Poland is committed to promoting stability and successful transformation in the EU's neighbourhood (MFA, 2015). As the initiator – together with Sweden – of the Eastern Partnership programme, Poland endeavours to share with these countries[1] "its own experience with the process of political, economic and social transformation" (MFA, 2016b). In particular, Poland is a strong advocate for closer links between Ukraine and the EU (World Bank, 2015). Poland believes that there are ties between promoting democracy and supporting social and economic transformation (MFA, 2011a). It was for this reason that Poland also created, under its EU Presidency in 2011, the European Endowment for Democracy (EED), a response mechanism to support democracy activists and actors in the Eastern Partnership and European neighbourhood.

Democracy and respect for human rights are an important focus of Poland's foreign policy, as confirmed by the Polish Minister of Foreign Affairs' 2016 Annual Address to Parliament (MFA, 2016a). In the inter-governmental negotiations for Agenda 2030 it prioritised good governance, respect for human rights and the rule of law, and will place a special emphasis on implementing sustainable development goal (SDG) 16 (OECD, forthcoming).

The Ministry of Economic Development is taking the lead in setting out a new development model for Poland based on the concept of sustainability. This model is outlined in its draft Strategy for Responsible Development.[2] According to the Polish authorities this comprehensive strategy will contribute to delivering on the 2030 Agenda in Poland. It is not yet clear whether the strategy takes a holistic approach, linking national efforts on the SDGs with their global dimension.

# Policy coherence for development

**Indicator: Domestic policies support or do not harm developing countries**

**Poland has renewed its commitment to make its policies development-friendly. It has done so by incorporating the principle of policy coherence for development (PCD) into the new Multiannual Development Cooperation Programme 2016-2020, which is approved by the Council of Ministers, and by introducing a PCD-related question in the national Guidelines for Regulatory Impact Assessment. Poland has demonstrated that it can work on specific issues – such as illicit financial flows. It can build on this experience as it identifies and works on other priority issues. There is scope, however, to clarify where in government responsibility and accountability lie for ensuring that Poland's domestic policies support or do not harm developing countries. The Development Cooperation Policy Council, Polish NGOs and research institutes have the potential to stimulate political and public debate on policy coherence for development.**

### Translating Poland's commitment to policy coherence for development into practice is a work in progress

The 2011 Development Cooperation Act commits Poland to make its policies coherent with development by asking the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA) to provide "opinions on government programmes and strategies with regards to their cohesion vis-à-vis development co-operation" (GOVPL, 2011). The 2012-2015 Multiannual Development Cooperation Programme states also that one of the main foundations of development co-operation is to ensure coherence of government programmes and strategies with the objectives and priorities of development co-operation (MFA, 2011a). Poland takes this agenda further in the 2016-2020 Multiannual Development Cooperation Programme, which states that a key to policy coherence for development is to "to change national policies with a view to fostering global development" (MFA, 2015).

In March 2015, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs introduced in the *Guidelines for Regulatory Impact Assessment*[3] a new question concerning the impact of national policies on socio-economic development in Poland's development co-operation priority countries (MFA, 2016b). Since the Ministry of Economic Development and the Chancellery of the Prime Minister are responsible for co-ordinating the regulatory impact assessment's process (OECD, 2016a), Poland has the opportunity to raise awareness of the importance of development-friendly policies at a high policy level. At the same time, the MFA should be mindful, that Poland, like many countries, faces challenges to ensure that regulatory impact assessments are actually used to improve decision making (OECD, 2015). Poland also has the opportunity to step up national efforts on PCD by positioning it as a part of the national strategy for implementing and monitoring Agenda 2030.

### Inter-ministerial co-ordination mechanisms help stimulate debate on PCD and select priority issues

Inter-ministerial co-ordination on policy coherence for development happens through the intra-governmental network of PCD focal points, created in 2012. The network usually meets twice a year and is composed of experts representing various line ministries. The focal points established within line ministries are responsible for intra-ministerial co-ordination of policy coherence for development issues. Interviews in Warsaw revealed a good degree of understanding[4] of Poland's commitment to development-friendly policies among the PCD focal points, some of whom were already reflecting on the impact of specific policy areas on development (e.g. migration, remittances). Through this intra-governmental network, Poland has identified a priority issue that it will address in a strategic and systematic way: "fighting illicit financial flows". The experience gained in taking this agenda forward can inform similar initiatives in other policy areas.

The Development Cooperation Department of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs is the national focal point for PCD vis-à-vis the European Union, OECD and for reporting to the Development Cooperation Policy Council.[5]

While Poland is making efforts to integrate the development perspective in its policy making – whether through regulatory impact assessment or raising awareness with line ministries – it has yet to provide a lead institution with a clear mandate for ensuring that its policies are supportive towards developing countries. The Development Cooperation Policy Council[6] has the potential to raise awareness of policy (in)coherences among line ministries. It can also make recommendations to the Council of Ministers or the Committee for European Issues on priority issues that could be more development-friendly. This new mandate is mentioned in the 2016-2020 Multiannual Development Cooperation Programme 2016-2020 and it is too soon to determine its impact on policies. There is also potential to ensure that Poland's policy co-ordination on EU questions – through the Committee for European Issues (composed of deputy ministers) – applies a development lens to government instructions and positions that are approved before EU Council meetings (MFA, 2016).

**Poland is laying the foundations for analysing, monitoring and reporting on development-friendly national policies**

With the introduction of a PCD-related question in the national Guidelines for Regulatory Impact Assessment, Poland has laid the groundwork for evaluating the impact of national policies on developing countries (MFA, 2016b). Poland should make sure it provides appropriate resources, capacities and tools to carry out these assessments.

To monitor progress with "fighting illicit financial flows", the Ministry of Finance will submit annual written reports to the Development Cooperation Policy Council starting in early 2017 (OECD, 2016a). Polish authorities expect that similar monitoring will be conducted for other priority areas, once identified.

Polish civil society – NGOs and think tanks – conduct analysis and actively advocate for more development-friendly policies. Poland has an opportunity to harness this knowledge, analytical capacity and policy advocacy further to stimulate public debate on policy coherence for development and take action on specific issues. For instance, research by the Institute of Global Responsibility on international tax avoidance suggests that Poland should conduct a spill over analysis to assess the impacts of Polish tax policies on poorer countries, given its growing economy (Eurodad, 2014).

Through its research, Poland's NGO platform *Grupa Zagranica* provides recommendations for Poland to enhance policy coherence for development in foreign direct investment (FDI). The research emphasises that coherence between development and FDI policies can make markets more attractive for future investment. Another study highlights incoherence between Polish climate policy and international efforts to combat climate change. The study recommends that institutional mechanisms for PCD be reinforced, and that awareness should be raised among Polish decision makers (Grupa Zagranica, 2015; Worldwise Europe, 2014). *Grupa Zagranica* has also played an important advocacy role for the introduction of the question on policy coherence for development in the "Guidelines for Regulatory Impact Assessment" mentioned above. The group's plan to support and follow up on implementation of this question can help take the commitment forward.

**Poland is taking action to fight illicit financial flows**

So far, Poland has identified "fighting illicit financial flows" as a priority issue in its Multiannual Development Cooperation Programme 2016-2020. The expertise and leadership of the Ministry of Finance in the area of fighting illicit financial flows and the emphasis put on the importance of domestic resource mobilisation within the context of the Financing for Development Conference in Addis Ababa have been, according to interviews, important factors for choosing this issue. Poland could build on this experience by identifying other issues of strategic priority which it can make more coherent with development.

To take action to fight illicit financial flows, the Ministry of Finance has drafted an action plan for 2016 in collaboration with the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. The plan took shape following consultations with other ministries and was discussed and approved by the Development Cooperation Policy Council in November 2015. Priorities include tackling tax avoidance and money laundering, in line with the SDG target 16.4 "By 2030, significantly reduce illicit financial and arms flows, strengthen the recovery and return of stolen assets and combat all forms of organised crime" (UN, 2015).

Specific actions that Poland is undertaking include workshops, training, study visits and technical assistance for priority and non-priority countries and territories. Topics covered range from fighting money laundering from corruption and terrorist financing to improving tax administrations, customs procedures and fighting border crime. Poland also concluded agreements with Ethiopia and Sri Lanka to avoid double taxation and prevent tax evasion and is negotiating agreements with several other countries (MFA, 2016b). These activities should help beneficiary countries to fight illicit financial flows and at the same time expand their tax base, with the potential for increasing their resources for development.

## Financing for development

**Indicator: The member engages in development finance in addition to ODA**

**In its approach to financing for development, Poland emphasises creating the conditions in developing countries for mobilising domestic and international resources other than official development assistance (ODA). Recognising that the private sector is also central to achieving the SDGs, Poland is promoting local private sector development in partner countries and territories. It is also reflecting on how to engage the Polish private sector in development. The Corporate Social Responsibility Advisory Board of the Minister of Economic Development has the potential to stimulate meaningful debates on this issue. The MFA is working to develop a systemic approach to tracking additional flows for reporting as "other official flows" and private flows in the future.**

**Poland recognises that ODA has a role to play in mobilising other resources for sustainable development**

In its new Multiannual Development Cooperation programme 2016-2020, Poland notes the increasing importance of other (i.e. non-ODA) official and private flows for development, and the even more important development role of mobilising developing countries' own public funds (MFA, 2015). In line with the outcomes of the Addis Ababa Conference on Financing for Development (UN, 2015), Poland states that "the responsibility of donor countries will increasingly focus on fostering favourable conditions (trade policy, creating capital flows monitoring systems, sharing experiences of building efficient tax systems, fighting corruption, tax evasion and money laundering) that enable developing countries to build efficient institutions and tax systems, and to prevent the illegal outflow of funds" (MFA, 2015).

Poland does not have a specific policy or instrument to mobilise non-ODA resources for sustainable development. However, it supports developing countries' efforts to mobilise domestic resources through projects on tax and custom co-operation, by fighting illicit financial flows and by promoting aid for trade (OECD, 2016). Moreover, Poland has pledged USD 0.1 million (PLN 0.4 million) to the Green Climate Fund. The fund plays a role in channelling resources to developing countries and catalysing climate finance at the international and national levels (ibid).

**Poland promotes local private sector development and is looking into engaging the Polish private sector in development**

Poland recognises the growing role of the private sector in helping to achieve the SDGs in developing countries. The local private sector in developing countries can spur job creation, investments, technological progress, innovations and revenue while the Polish private sector can participate in development co-operation through investments, knowledge transfer, and commerce and business-to-business co-operation with partners in developing countries (MFA, 2016b). This is why promoting entrepreneurship and supporting the private sector in developing countries are key priority areas in Poland's Multiannual Development Cooperation Programme 2016–2020 (MFA, 2015).

Poland has some tools to engage the Polish private sector in development co-operation, such as a special grant scheme to engage Polish companies in vocational training and promotion of entrepreneurship in developing countries. From a policy perspective, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs is still trying to work out how to best use the potential of the private sector in promoting development. As Poland goes further in developing its approach it could learn from the experience of other DAC members. For example, according to the DAC peer learning exercise on the private sector members get the most out of partnering with the private sector when it is best placed to help realise specific development outcomes and provides the greatest value for money (OECD-DCD/DAC, 2016b). However, the use of development co-operation to support domestic commercial interests in provider countries undermines aid effectiveness (ibid). The Corporate Social Responsibility Advisory Board of the Minister of Economic Development could foster debate on this issue and help to prepare Polish companies to better engage with the private sector in developing countries in the future (MFA, 2016b).

**Poland is developing an approach to report on other official and private flows**

The MFA plans to report on other official flows (OOF) and private flows in the future. It is working on a systemic approach to track additional flows that could be reported as OOF and is analysing the institutional capacity to collect data on private flows. The MFA foresees that this process will take up to two years (MFA, 2016b).

# Notes

1. The Eastern Partnership (EaP) countries are: Armenia, Azerbaijan, Belarus, Georgia, the Republic of Moldova and Ukraine.

2. The Ministry of Economic Development is the lead ministry for taking forward Agenda 2030 in Poland and its draft of the Strategy for Responsible Development was open for public consultation until 30 September 2016. According to the Polish authorities, the strategy sets out a vision, principles, objectives and priorities for Poland's economic, social and spatial development by 2020 and 2030. A monitoring committee for the strategy will be appointed by the Minister of Economic Development. This committee will sit within the Coordination Committee for Development Policy. The committee will consist of representatives of ministries, institutions and other entities responsible for implementing the strategy.

3. The guidelines were approved in May 2015 by the Council of Ministers. Regulatory impact assessment consists of the analysis of the potential impact of an official regulation on economy, society and environment and must be conducted before the proposed regulation is submitted to parliament for debate and enactment.

4. In September 2014, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs organised two meetings in Warsaw on policy coherence for development. These were run jointly with the OECD and Sweden's Ministry of Foreign Affairs to raise awareness and understanding of approaches, methods, instruments and implementation tools for making policies more development-friendly and on the link between policy coherence for development and the post-2015 framework (OECD, 2016).

5. The national focal point, in co-operation with PCD focal points in other line ministries, prepares implementation reports for the OECD, the European Commission, and since 2015, for the Development Cooperation Policy Council, with suggestions for policy changes. It also analyses various documents in order to develop – in co-operation with the ministries responsible for PCD priority areas – an annual plan for PCD implementation in priority areas. Finally, it prepares material for promoting PCD issues.

6. The Development Cooperation Policy Council was established following the Development Cooperation Act of 16 September 2011 (Journal of Laws 2011, No. 234, item 1386). Functioning alongside the MFA, the council is composed of representatives of ministries, parliament, NGOs and civil society. Its main responsibility is to define development co-operation priorities. The council meets twice a year and reviews and makes suggestions on draft government documents relating to development co-operation (e.g. programming documents, geographic and thematic priorities). The council is also informed about evaluation plans and results of evaluations.

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# Chapter 2: Poland's vision and policies for development co-operation

## Policies, strategies and commitments

**Indicator: A clear policy vision and solid strategies guide the programme**

**Poland's clear overall vision and priorities for development co-operation are underpinned by principles of democracy, the rule of law, respect for human rights and solidarity. Development co-operation has gained credibility as a tool of Polish foreign policy. Going forward, Poland should clarify how the focus on development co-operation in foreign policy aligns with the socio-economic and poverty reduction objectives of the 2011 Development Cooperation Act. Poland has vetted its new multi-annual programme from the perspective of the SDGs. It could build on this by making a clear statement on how its development co-operation will contribute to achieving Agenda 2030 and ensuring that its development co-operation commitments are integrated into national efforts to achieve the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs).**

### Poland's vision and strategic priorities for development co-operation are evolving with new foreign policy priorities

Over the past five years Poland's 2011 Development Cooperation Act has been a fundamental guide and tool for building and implementing the aid programme: it provides a whole-of-government vision and objectives and a flexible legal framework for an evolving and potentially growing aid programme (GOVPL, 2011).[1] Poland states that its actions in the international arena reflect the values on which the state was founded: democracy, the rule of law, respect for human rights and solidarity (MFA, 2012). The 2016 Foreign Policy Statement confirmed that promoting human rights and democracy will continue to be a priority of Polish foreign policy (MFA, 2016a).

Poland's strategic framework is broadly owned across government and by civil society, reflecting the relevance of the objectives to stakeholders, as well as the Ministry of Foreign Affairs' efforts to achieve a social and political consensus on development aid (MFA, 2012).

Ensuring that development co-operation is aligned with the SDGs is also a priority for the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA). The ministry considers that the priorities and focus outlined in the Multiannual Development Cooperation Programme 2016-2020 are in line with the sustainable development goals (SDGs), especially SDG 16. A more comprehensive and explicit statement on how Polish development co-operation contributes to the SDGs, however, would allow Poland to highlight this important pillar of Agenda 2030 in the national SDG debate, strategy and institutional set-up, led by the Ministry of Economic Development (Chapter 1).

Poland's foreign policy objectives are evolving and development co-operation has gained traction as an integral part of its response to geo-political issues. This is evident in Poland's engagement in Ukraine and the Middle East, as well as in plans to increase Polish economic presence on the African continent (MFA, 2016a). In order to be better-placed to manage potentially conflicting interests among its foreign, development, economic and security goals and to safeguard the overall objectives of Polish aid, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs should have a comprehensive and coherent strategy for pursuing its various goals while remaining consistent with the 2011 Act and the SDGs.

# Approach to allocating bilateral and multilateral aid

**Indicator: The rationale for allocating aid and other resources is clear and evidence-based**

**Poland's rationale for allocating bilateral aid is pragmatic and evidence-based. Its choice of 10 partner countries or territories is founded on clear criteria. While broad in nature, its six overall thematic priorities reflect Polish areas of expertise. However, Poland needs to increase its scale in partner countries and territories to have a greater impact on development and the SDGs. There is also scope for increasing the consistency of its various aid channels with the government-approved strategic priorities outlined in the multi-annual programme. Poland has a clear idea of the complementarity between its bilateral and multilateral co-operation. Support to UN agencies could be more strategic and rationalised, however, to align better with strategic priorities and reinforce synergies.**

### Thematic and geographical priorities are solid, but limited resources undermine impact

Poland has a clear rationale for allocating bilateral aid. There is coherence among its vision, multi-annual programme and annual development co-operation plans.[2] By focusing on fewer priorities in the 2016-2020 programme, Poland hopes to increase efficiency and effectiveness – an explicit objective of the new programme (MFA, 2015). The selected priorities also reflect a commitment to continue to capitalise on Polish comparative advantage and expertise, especially in the Eastern Partnership (EaP) countries.[3]

Poland's transformation experience gives it a comparative advantage in its development co-operation. This is especially the case for Eastern Partnership countries looking to learn from Poland's experience in improving its own systems to build independent civil society institutions and democratic administrative structures. The Multiannual Development Cooperation Programme 2016-2020 seems to place less emphasis on this comparative advantage than the previous 2012-2015 programme, which included political and economic transformation as a cross-cutting thematic area. Nevertheless, sharing the transition experience is evident in the priorities for Eastern Partnership (EaP) countries in the new Multiannual Development Cooperation Programme. The focus on entrepreneurship and the private sector in most of its priority countries also stems from Poland's experience with developing small and medium-sized enterprises and its agricultural sector.

However, finding a niche and delivering on its comparative advantage in other priority regions (Africa and Asia) is more of a challenge. At present the development co-operation objectives for partner countries or territories in these regions remain broad and generic. Meeting these objectives depends, significantly, on the capacity of Polish civil society to design and deliver projects in these countries (Chapter 5).[4] Poland needs to develop clearer strategic guidance for ensuring that its development co-operation adds value and targets poverty reduction outside the Eastern Partnership region.

By cutting in half (from 20 to 10) the number of priority countries and territories, Poland has achieved an appropriate level of geographic concentration. The MFA reached a consensus on the geographic priorities on the basis of five criteria,[5] experience with implementing the previous programme, and extensive consultation with key stakeholders through the Development Cooperation Policy Council. The geographic priorities also reflect a political interest in matching foreign and development policy priorities with allocations, as shown by the continued focus on Eastern Partnership countries. Decisions to add

Senegal and Myanmar as priority countries reflect Poland's plan to increase its presence in West Africa and Asia for economic diplomacy and to support least developed countries.

Given resource constraints, the MFA is committed to concentrating aid allocations for greater effectiveness (Chapter 3). For example, 90% of the special reserve budget for development co-operation is ring-fenced for priority countries or territories. According to the government, "more concentrated support should make Poland's development cooperation more effective and increase its impact within the available financial and organisation means" (MFA, 2015). At the same time, the MFA is aware that Poland's budget envelope for priority countries and territories needs to grow to achieve impact. However, the volume of the special reserve budget and its share of overall bilateral aid remain small, and two key channels of bilateral aid – scholarships and aid credits – are not required to follow the priorities of the multi-annual programme. If these channels also focused on priority countries, Polish support could be increased (Chapter 3). The responsible ministries should be guided by a clear policy vision how ODA-qualifying scholarships and loans contribute to delivering Poland's development objectives as outlined in the Act, the multi-annual programme and Agenda 2030.

**Poland uses its multilateral contributions to advance its development co-operation objectives**

Through its multilateral co-operation, which accounts for nearly 80% of its ODA, Poland contributes to the Sustainable Development Goals, advances its own development objectives and can gain visibility as a provider of development assistance. According to the 2016-2020 multiannual programme, Poland seeks to influence international debate especially in relation to its priorities of good governance and human rights. It would also like to promote and accomplish its political and economic priorities and strengthen its position as a reliable and trustworthy partner.

Poland works strategically to influence EU development co-operation policy, in particular through its support for the European Neighbourhood policy, the Pre-Accession instrument and through the Council Working Party on Humanitarian Aid and Food Aid (COHAFA) and the development committees. Poland's EU involvement is also an opportunity for raising the quality of the bilateral programme and enhancing political and public support for aid in general. As stated in the multiannual programme, exposure to EU development co-operation also influences how Poland implements its aid programming, project implementation and other initiatives (MFA, 2015). Poland could gain greater visibility domestically and internationally for the development results it contributes to via the multilateral system by communicating more actively and strategically about it.

The Ministry of Finance and Central Bank engage quite actively with the international financial institutions – mostly the World Bank – in pursuing Polish priorities. For example, Poland promoted good governance as a special theme for the International Development Association (IDA).[6] These two Polish institutions are becoming more strategic, with plans to share more information across government on policy issues addressed by the World Bank.

A wide range of government bodies contribute to multilateral organisations from their own budgets (MFA, 2016) which fragments the small share of core and voluntary contributions being allocated (Chapter 3, Table 3.2). Poland could have greater influence and impact through more strategic allocations. The MFA would like to concentrate aid on fewer multilaterals but there is also political pressure to support more rather than fewer organisations.[7] Having a more focused multilateral portfolio would require strong political leadership to reach cross-government agreement on priority organisations to support.

# Policy focus

**Indicator: Fighting poverty, especially in LDCs and fragile states, is prioritised**

**Poland prioritises development co-operation in middle-income and least developed countries, and works in sectors which can raise the socio-economic development of poor and marginalised people. However, in the absence of monitoring there is limited evidence of impact on poverty. Moreover, the poverty focus of ODA qualifying credit lines and scholarships could be reinforced. Clearer guidance, solid tools and greater capacity are needed to integrate cross-cutting issues into programming.**

### There is scope to reinforce the poverty focus of Polish aid

Poland's 2011 Act states that development aid will support long-term social and economic development through actions to reduce poverty (GOVPL, 2011). This commitment to reduce poverty is reflected in the priorities of the Multiannual Development Cooperation Programme, in particular the greater emphasis on least developed countries, and on some of its thematic priorities. For example, by supporting human capital Poland seeks to improve education, health care and social integration for people at risk of social exclusion such as disabled people, children deprived of parental care, victims of domestic violence and the internally displaced (MFA, 2015). It is also focusing on food security in its support to agriculture.

Poland could, nevertheless, strengthen its poverty focus by clarifying its objectives and the results its wants to achieve. By doing so, it would also set a baseline for systematic monitoring of the major channels of bilateral aid, including scholarships run by the Ministry of Education and the aid credits provided by the Ministry of Finance. In addition, Poland needs:

- A clear policy and principles to ensure that loans qualifying as ODA contribute to the act's development objectives and abide by international commitments (Chapter 5).
- To demonstrate the development impact of the scholarship programmes, which account for one-third of bilateral aid, and learn from the experiences of DAC members (e.g. Portugal and Austria) that reformed scholarships to make them more effective instruments for development.
- To identify and explain how its comparative advantage helps reduce poverty in least developed countries. Aid to these countries seems set to increase under the 2016-2020 programme. Like other small-sized providers, adding value and getting visibility in large aid-recipient countries such as Ethiopia, Kenya or Tanzania is a challenge. Polish aid resources here are limited[8] and understanding the context and local needs is hard when aid is managed centrally from headquarters.[9]
- To manage carefully the opportunities and risks for development and poverty reduction of pursuing its economic interests in Africa and Asia.

**Disaster risk reduction aligns with humanitarian and development activities**

Humanitarian aid is integrated into Poland's overall development co-operation strategy and aims to build foundations for long-term development in the affected areas (MFA, 2015). However, humanitarian aid is not integrated into country strategies, even in crisis-affected countries such as Ukraine. Humanitarian aid only aligns with long-term objectives in disaster risk reduction activities, which have natural links with development objectives. In Georgia, for instance, the humanitarian programme's flood early warning and prevention system align well with Polish support to Georgia's rescue service reorganisation. In protracted crises, Poland's humanitarian projects are too limited to be really coherent with development co-operation activities.

**Fragility is not a focus of Poland's development co-operation**

Poland is a participating member of the International Dialogue on Peacebuilding and Statebuilding,[10] but has not formally endorsed the New Deal for Engagement in Fragile States.[11] While Poland engages in development co-operation with fragile states and states affected by conflict, it has no specific strategy for such engagement. As Poland is gaining experience in these contexts, including through NATO-led peacekeeping missions, a specific strategy could give Poland a more efficient approach in fragile and vulnerable partner countries.

**Poland needs specific guidance, tools and resources for integrating cross-cutting issues**

Poland's four cross-cutting priorities reflect the principles which underpin its development co-operation: respect for human rights, good governance, gender equality among project recipients, and environmental and climate impact (MFA, 2015). As these issues overlap with the thematic priorities for Polish development co-operation, Polish Aid has specific projects on these topics. However, the additional purpose of cross-cutting issues is, according to MFA, to take the issues into account when "carrying out programmes, projects and development" (MFA, 2015).

Mainstreaming cross-cutting issues such as gender equality and the environment means that all development initiatives should have a positive effect on them (OECD, 2014). However, mainstreaming cross-cutting issues into programming is notoriously challenging and requires sustained political leadership and champions for each issue. Clear guidelines, tools and good practices as well as sufficient financial and human resources are also needed to influence the design and implementation of interventions and to provide policy and technical support to partner countries (ibid).

The Development Cooperation Department of the MFA has designated focal points for cross-cutting issues who provide input on Polish policy positions and explain the cross-cutting issues in calls for proposals. However, lack of clarity and guidance on Poland's objectives and the results it wants to achieve make it difficult to translate this general commitment into practice. The MFA and implementing partners need, in particular, to have clear objectives and guidance to promote gender equality and women's empowerment, which seems to be too narrowly focused in Poland.[12] Poland should also ensure that environment mainstreaming tools, such as environmental impact assessments, are applied systematically to Poland's support, especially for infrastructure related activities.

# Notes

1. It should be noted that aid credits provided by the Ministry of Finance are not governed by this act.

2. The objectives set out in the 2011 act translate into strategic priorities through two complementary channels: the multiannual development cooperation programmes and the annual Development Cooperation Plan. The 2016-2020 Multiannual Programme for Development Cooperation was adopted by the Council of Ministers in 2015 and is a whole-of-government strategy that builds on experience. Several Polish stakeholders acknowledged that the priorities are more strategic, focused and clear than those of the previous programme. The annual Development Cooperation Plan translates the priorities into budget allocations by the MFA, in co-operation with other stakeholders and in consultation with the Development Cooperation Policy Council.

3. The six thematic priorities are: good governance, democracy and human rights, human capital, entrepreneurship and the private sector, sustainable agriculture and rural development, and environmental protection. The ten priority countries or territories are: Belarus, Georgia, Moldova, and Ukraine (Eastern Partnership programme); Ethiopia, Kenya, Myanmar, West Bank and Gaza Strip, Senegal and Tanzania (Africa, Asia and Middle East).

4. According to the 2016 Annual Development Cooperation Plan (MFA, 2016), government administrative bodies can only submit projects for selected EaP countries, and the West Bank and Gaza Strip (page 20). This leaves the main partners for the non-EaP countries as NGOs, local government, public and higher education institutions and research institutes.

5. These criteria are similar to other DAC members: development needs, implementation of development co-operation, bilateral co-operation, coherence with EU activities, and security. Current political and economic relations and prospects for developing them were also taken into account.

6. The Central Bank has a unit with three staff for liaising with the World Bank. The Ministry of Finance provides some multi-bi support to trust funds which it is willing to scale up when the right initiatives are created.

7. The MFA plans to contribute to “the funds and programmes which have particular importance in terms of priorities of Poland’s development cooperation and foreign policy goals (MFA, 2015:50). As it takes this, and other objectives forward, Poland will need to co-ordinate its approach, have a plan and outline the results it wants to achieve with the various ministries which provide core contributions.

8. The budget envelope for each of these countries ranges between PLN 1 and 3 million per year (PLN 1 million is about EUR 232 000).

9. Moreover, the key implementers – Polish NGOs and universities – have limited presence and contextual knowledge of these countries.

10. The International Dialogue on Peacebuilding and Statebuilding is the first political dialogue forum to bring together countries affected by conflict and fragility, development partners, and civil society. The International Dialogue is composed of members of the International Network on Conflict and Fragility (INCAF), the g7+ Group of fragile and conflict-affected states, and the Civil Society Platform for Peacebuilding and Statebuilding (CSPPS). See www.pbsbdialogue.org/en/.

11. The New Deal for Engagement in Fragile States is a key agreement between fragile and conflict-affected states, international development partners and civil society to improve current development policy and practice in fragile states. Signatory countries commit themselves to pursuing more political ways of working to address the root causes of conflict and fragility and to channel investments in fragile states

in line with basic but adapted aid effectiveness principles (see http://www.pbsbdialogue.org/en/new-deal/about-new-deal).

12. The term "gender equality" goes beyond promoting sexual and reproductive rights, an issue on which Poland has a clear political position, and encompasses several activities intended to advance gender equality and women's empowerment or to reduce discrimination and inequalities based on sex. The OECD-DAC gender equality policy marker includes all measures which: i) reduce social, economic or political power inequalities between women and men, girls and boys, and ensure that women benefit equally with men from the activity or compensate for past discrimination; or ii) develop or strengthen gender equality or anti-discrimination policies, legislation or institutions.

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# Chapter 3: Allocating Poland's official development assistance

## Overall ODA volume

**Indicator: The member makes every effort to meet ODA domestic and international targets**

**At the 2015 Financing for Development Conference in Addis Ababa, Poland reiterated its commitment to providing 0.33% of its gross national income as official development assistance (ODA) by 2030. Delivering on this commitment will require strong political leadership and an ambitious plan for increasing ODA. Poland is improving its statistical reporting to the DAC's Creditor Reporting System. It should increase the grant element of bilateral aid to least developed countries, untie this aid and improve aid predictability.**

### Poland's ODA is largely multilateral

In 2015, Poland provided USD 442 million in net ODA, according to preliminary data (OECD, 2016a). Net ODA increased by 16.8% in real terms between 2014 and 2015 (from USD 452 million to USD 528 million in 2014 constant prices) and the ODA-to-gross national income (GNI) ratio increased from 0.09% to 0.10%.

Poland's ODA is characterised by a high share of multilateral aid (78% of total gross ODA in 2014, going mainly to the EU); a high share of bilateral loans (37% of gross bilateral aid or 8% of total gross ODA in 2014) and imputed student costs (19% of bilateral aid or 4% of total gross ODA in 2014); and a relatively small and stable special reserve budget dedicated to implementing the multi-annual programme (approximately 29% of gross bilateral aid or 6% of total gross ODA) (Table A.2, Annex A). Changes in Polish aid volumes tend to be determined by increases in multilateral aid to the EU (which are linked to Poland's economic growth) and by extending new credit lines (Figure 3.1).

### Poland needs stronger political will and public support to achieve its ODA/GNI target by 2030


At the 2015 Financing for Development Conference in Addis Ababa, Poland re-committed to providing 0.33% of GNI as ODA by 2030. Delivering on this commitment will be challenging for Poland on the basis of current trends. Poland's ODA/GNI ratio has been stagnating around 0.08% to 0.10% since 2006. According to the Polish authorities, the special reserve fund managed by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs will increase from PLN 100 million to PLN 130 million between 2015 and 2016 (approximately from USD 26.5 million to USD 34.5 million).[1] Over the medium-term, changes in the ODA volume will be mainly driven by increasing contributions to EU special funds which are unlikely to raise the ratio of ODA to GNI as the Polish economy continues to grow (see Context).

Poland has yet to deliver a road-map and timeline for increasing its ODA/GNI in line with its commitments. It will need strong political will and cross-government buy-into backed by public support to scale up its ODA to reach the target. These factors seem to be lacking at present. However, there appears to be growing awareness in Poland of the need to address the root causes of the global public risks that are affecting Poland in the form of the refugee and migrant crisis. This could be an opportunity for Poland to raise public and political interest and understanding – including through its global education programme - of the role that development co-operation plays in addressing development challenges and

global public risks (Chapter 6). Raising public and political awareness can also help Poland to gain support for increasing aid. The Polish NGO community also has an important advocacy role to play.

**Figure 3.1 Composition of Polish gross ODA, 2009-2014**

USD million, 2014 constant prices




*Source:* authors' calculations based on OECD (2016), "Detailed aid statistics: Official and private flows", OECD International Development Statistics (database), accessed 5 July 2016), http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/data-00072-en.

**Poland is working on improving its reporting to the DAC**

Since joining the DAC in 2013, Poland has improved its statistical reporting to the Creditor Reporting System and it started reporting against gender and environment markers in 2013.

The extent to which Poland meets the DAC Recommendation on Terms and Conditions of Aid (OECD-DAC, 1978) is linked to its lending to LDCs in particular. For example, in 2014 the grant element of bilateral aid commitments to LDCs was 82% which is lower than the minimum of 90% required by the recommendation, while it was 100% in 2013 (see Table A.7, Annex A). This reflects the new credit extended to Ethiopia in 2014. The rationale for this DAC recommendation is to provide LDCs with the softest terms of aid, that is, grants or extremely soft loans so that DAC members do not increase LDCs' debt burden and to provide ODA with the softest terms to the countries most in need. There is scope, therefore, for Poland to bring its ODA into line with these terms and conditions. Moreover, in 2014 just 10.6% of Polish bilateral aid was untied which contravenes another DAC Recommendation - on Untying ODA to the LDCs and HIPCs (OECD, 2014; see Chapter 5; Table A.6, Annex A).

Meeting commitments to making aid predictable is a challenge. Poland provides forecasts on ODA spending for the year ahead in its annual development co-operation plans (Chapter 5). It started responding to the DAC Survey on Donors' Forward Spending Plans in 2015, but provides information only for the current year. To improve predictability of its aid Poland would need to provide regular, timely, indicative three-to-five-year forward expenditure plans for its partner countries or territories, as agreed in Busan.

# Bilateral ODA allocations

**Indicator: Aid is allocated according to the statement of intent and international commitments**

**Poland's geographic allocations broadly reflect its priorities at the regional level but are less evident in country allocations. Poland is committed to increasing funding to least developed countries to reach the UN target of 0.15-0.20% of gross national income, and to allocate 50% of total ODA to least developed countries in the medium term. There is scope for Poland to increase the budget envelope for its priority countries or territories, several of which are LDCs, now that has decided to focus on fewer (10) partners. Sectoral allocations concentrate on productive sectors and post-secondary education which reflect the large share of aid spent on imputed student costs and the credit lines rather than the thematic priorities of the 2012-2015 multiannual programme: democracy and human rights, and political and economic transformation.**

### Geographic allocations broadly reflect Poland's regional priorities; allocations to priority countries are less focused

Poland's gross bilateral aid amounted to USD 104 million in 2014, or 22% of total gross ODA (Table A.2, Annex A). To ensure the special reserve funds are allocated according to the Multiannual Development Cooperation Programme, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs attaches a breakdown of how these funds will be used to the annual development co-operation plans.[2] This breakdown includes specific lines to be allocated to calls for proposals, government department projects and activities implemented by the Solidarity Fund.[3] The 2016-2020 Multiannual Development Cooperation Programme also states that "Every year, no more than 10% of the special purpose reserve administered by the MFA will be allocated to bilateral development co-operation with countries other than priority countries" (MFA, 2015a). Allocations to credit lines and scholarships are discussed with the MFA but are not required to follow thematic and geographic priorities (Chapter 2).

Total bilateral ODA allocations are concentrated in Europe and Africa, which received respectively 47% and 41% of gross bilateral allocable aid in 2014 (Table A.3, Annex A). This broadly reflects Poland's commitment in its Multiannual Development Cooperation Programme 2012-2015 to focus on Eastern Partnership countries and Africa (MFA, 2011). The significant increase in bilateral aid to Africa between 2012 and 2013 (from USD 4 million to USD 45 million) is explained by the payment of a tied aid loan to Angola in 2013 (Table A.3, Annex A). This level was sustained in 2014 by an additional USD 14.6 million to Angola and the first payment under the tied loan agreement signed with Ethiopia (USD 23.2 million). The significant decrease in aid to Asia between 2012 and 2014 (from USD 82 million to USD 9 million) is due to expiring disbursements of loan agreements for China and Vietnam in 2012 and 2013.

Polish bilateral aid was concentrated in its top 10 recipients countries in 2013-14, which received 83% of gross bilateral ODA (8% was unallocated by country). Six of these were priority countries and territories for Poland (Belarus, Ukraine, Ethiopia, Georgia, Moldova and Afghanistan), together receiving half of all gross bilateral aid (Table A.4, Annex A). The impact of credit lines on Poland's bilateral ODA allocations at country level is evident: Angola was the top recipient of Polish ODA in 2013-14, receiving 22% of gross bilateral aid which was almost entirely comprised of loans from the Ministry of Finance. Poland's aid to China (Poland's fourth ODA recipient, receiving 11% of gross bilateral aid) also consisted almost entirely of loans from the Ministry of Finance (Table A.4, Annex A and OECD, 2016b). While Angola was a priority country for Poland's development co-operation at the time that the loan was approved, China has not been a geographic priority.

In 2014, 41% of gross bilateral allocable aid (49.5% in net disbursements) was allocated to least developed countries (LDCs) (Table A.3 and A.7, Annex A). Total ODA to LDCs amounted to 0.02% of GNI in 2014, and to 28.8% of total net ODA. The majority of funds to LDCs were channelled through multilateral agencies (Table A.7, Annex A). Poland is committed to increasing funding to LDCs to 0.15-0.20% of GNI and to allocate 50% of total ODA to LDCs in the medium term (MFA, 2016). In its new Multiannual Development Cooperation Programme 2016-2020, Poland halved its priority countries and territories from 20 to 10. Four of these (Ethiopia, Myanmar, Senegal and Tanzania) are LDCs (compared to 7 out of 20 in the previous programme) (MFA, 2015a). Poland will need to increase the bilateral budget envelope for these priority LDCs to help meet its 50% target.

**Sector allocations do not reflect Poland's priorities**

Poland's Multiannual Development Cooperation Programme 2012-2015 prioritised democracy, human rights and political and economic transformation. However, it is difficult to see this prioritisation in the latest ODA allocations, partly due to the make-up of bilateral aid. In 2013-14, the highest share of Polish bilateral ODA (49%) went to the productive sector of agriculture, forestry and fishing, financed mainly through Ministry of Finance credit lines. Education, mostly post-secondary education financed through scholarships, received 16%, while government and civil society received only 10% (Table A.5, Annex A). However, according to DAC Creditor Reporting System (CRS) data, at least 43% of the MFA's funds were allocated to government and civil society in 2014, showing its focus on this sector, in accordance with Polish Aid priorities.

# Multilateral ODA channel

**Indicator: The member uses the multilateral aid channels effectively**

**Seventy-eight percent of Poland's total gross ODA was channelled through the multilateral system in 2014. Multilateral allocations mainly fulfil assessed contributions – largely to the EU. There is scope, however, to allocate Poland's contributions to UN agencies, funds and programmes more strategically: at present USD 20.8 million is allocated to 28 UN agencies or funds. While small, earmarked contributions are directed strategically to multilateral agencies which operate in geographical areas that Poland cannot reach as a bilateral donor.**

**Poland's multilateral ODA is mainly driven by mandatory assessed contributions to the EU**

Poland's core multilateral allocations amounted to 78% of total gross ODA in 2014 (Table A.2, Annex A), mainly mandatory assessed contributions to the EU institutions (91.6%). Polish authorities expect these contributions to increase further in 2016 and 2017, especially in response to current developments (e.g. to resource the EU Regional Trust Fund to aid the Syrian crisis).

An additional 3.3% of Polish bilateral ODA was allocated to projects implemented by multilateral organisations (earmarked contributions) in 2014, for a total use of the multilateral system amounting to 78.8% of gross bilateral ODA. According to the Polish authorities, Poland uses earmarked contributions to pursue objectives that it cannot pursue as a bilateral donor (e.g. to reach non-government controlled areas in conflict-affected countries and territories). In 2014, these earmarked contributions mainly went to the World Bank and the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) for activities in Afghanistan; to the ICRC, the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) and Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE) for

activities in Ukraine; to the United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA) and UNHCR for activities in Syria; and to the United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees to support activities in the Middle East. According to the MFA's 2016 Development Cooperation Plan, Poland will continue using earmarked contributions to reach conflict-affected areas (MFA, 2015b).

In 2014, Poland made several contributions to the UN system, accounting for 5.6% of total core and earmarked contributions and spread across 28 different agencies and funds (Table 3.1). These allocations reflect its membership of and commitment to the UN. However, allocating such a small share to 28 organisations risks diluting its focus. Poland should consider reallocating these contributions to where they can achieve greatest impact in pursuing Polish development priorities (Chapter 2).

**Table 3.1 Poland's total use of the multilateral system in 2014**

| | Core and earmarked contributions (USD million, 2014 constant prices) | In % of total core and earmarked contributions | Number of agencies/funds financed |
|---|---|---|---|
| **United Nations agencies, funds and commissions** | 20.8 | 5.5% | 28 |
| **European Union institutions** | 339.1 | 90.2% | 2 |
| **World Bank Group** | 7.13 | 1.9% | 3 |
| **Regional development banks** | 0.01 | 0.0% | 1 |
| **Other multilateral institutions** | 8.7 | 2.3% | 6 |
| **Total** | 375.7 | 100% | |

*Source:* authors' calculations based on OECD (2016), "Creditor Reporting System: Use of the multilateral system", International Development Statistics (database), accessed 5 July 2016, http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/data-00828-en.

# Notes

1. Calculated using the 2015 USD/PLN exchange rate of 1 USD= 3.7702 PLN.

2. Polish aid's annual development co-operation plans can be found at www.polskapomoc.gov.pl/Documents,and,Publications,208.html. The table below shows a (simplified) breakdown of the special reserve fund as presented in Poland's 2016 Development Cooperation Plan (MFA, 2015b).

3. The solidarity Fund is a State Treasury Foundation with a narrow mandate to work on democracy and human rights.

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# Chapter 4: Managing Poland's development co-operation

## Institutional system

**Indicator: The institutional structure is conducive to consistent, quality development co-operation**

**Poland has sound institutional foundations for its development co-operation. It continues to strengthen its structures and systems on the basis of experience. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs uses the multiannual programming process and annual planning effectively as tools to co-ordinate Polish aid and to raise awareness and ownership of the overall strategic objectives. Poland should build on these achievements by making the most of synergies among activities financed by the special reserve budget and other ministries. The structure and systems in the Development Cooperation Department reflect its responsibilities and the current business model. However, the business model needs to be adapted to ensure that Polish aid is capable of responding in a timely manner to changing development co-operation priorities, including the Sustainable Development Goals, and needs in partner countries.**

### The Ministry of Foreign Affairs takes a strong lead on policy and strategy, but less on implementation

Since joining the DAC in 2013, Poland has continued to strengthen its system for delivering development co-operation (see Annex B for an illustration of the system). This is evident in the stronger leadership role played by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs' (MFA) Department of Development Cooperation (DDC). A range of Polish stakeholders acknowledged this positive evolution to the peer review team.

The MFA has strengthened its position and legitimacy as institutional leader. It has done so through its growing exposure to and experience with managing development co-operation, and its greater understanding of how to improve the delivery and impact of Polish aid (Chapter 2) in line with international good practice.[1]

A challenge for Poland as it seeks to increase the efficiency and effectiveness of its ODA (MFA, 2015a) is to ensure that all institutional actors in the system meet their policy priorities and international commitments. As the "authorising officer" of ODA transfers from the special reserve budget, the MFA has the authority and capacity to approve and evaluate projects, ensure they focus on priorities and follow principles for making aid effective aid. However, at PLN 113 million (EUR 28.3 million), the special reserve budget accounts for just 29% of Poland's bilateral ODA and 10% of total ODA.[2] Other aid-spending ministries (e.g. Finance and Education) are responsible for a large share of bilateral ODA (Figure 4.1). These ministries have all committed to deliver on Poland's strategic priorities, which are approved by the Council of Ministers, but it is hard to tell how the priorities influence their ODA decisions in reality. In addition, the 2011 Act for Development Cooperation gives the Ministry of Finance autonomy to decide on Poland's concessional lending and debt relief, although it should consult with Foreign Affairs (GOVPL, 2011, article 9).

### Annual financial planning ensures internal, cross-government co-ordination


As mentioned in Chapter 2, the 2011 act provides a solid and flexible foundation for building and co-ordinating the Polish aid system. The act provides clear governance rules. It makes the Ministry of Foreign Affairs the institution responsible for defining development co-operation policy and strategy, and for co-ordinating, planning and implementing the Multiannual Development Cooperation Programme (MFA, 2015a) and the annual financial plans for development co-operation.

Since 2011, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs has played an active role in building ownership of the multiannual programmes, in approving and evaluating projects, and in gathering statistical and monitoring reports as stipulated by the 2011 Act. Given Poland's relatively short history of development co-operation, building awareness of good practice and getting buy-in from a range of institutional actors is crucial for building a cohesive, whole-of-government development programme that is in line with international good practice. The MFA uses the multiannual cooperation programme and the annual plans effectively to co-ordinate development co-operation and for increasing the transparency and awareness of the activities supported and implemented by Poland.

The current process whereby other government departments submit project proposals to be financed by the special reserve budget is useful for ensuring consistency with overall objectives, although there is scope to improve synergies among the various activities financed by the special reserve. Involving the Ministry of Foreign Affair's geographical units in reviewing project proposals supports the Department of Development Cooperation with in-house expert knowledge, while also promoting more coherent foreign and development policy messages about priority countries.

The Development Cooperation Policy Council, which meets twice a year, is a forum for exchanging views among its diverse membership[3] on strategic priorities and as a channel for members to provide opinions on strategic priorities (MFA, 2016). Its broad membership gives the council the potential to encourage more active communication about Polish aid to members' constituencies and to stimulate political and public debate on development.

**Figure 4.1 Share of Polish gross bilateral ODA managed by different ministries, 2014**




*Source:* Authors' calculations based on OECD (2016), "Creditor Reporting System: Aid activities", *OECD International Development Statistics* (database), accessed 5 July 2016, http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/data-00061-en; OECD (2016), "Detailed aid statistics: Official and private flows", *OECD International Development Statistics* (database), accessed 5 July 2016 http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/data-00072-en.

**Poland's whole-of-government approach in Ukraine could serve as a model for the rest of its co-operation**

With the exception of its whole-of-government engagement in Ukraine (Annex C), Poland is still in the early stages of creating comprehensive development strategies for its partner countries and territories.[4] Embassies in, or covering, a priority partner country or territory support the programme through the work of part-time development counsellors who manage small grants, conduct some project monitoring, engage in policy dialogue, and channel information about the country to headquarters. Polish project implementers – whether government or non-government – are not required to inform the embassy about their activities. However, it seems that they usually do according to feedback from embassy staff consulted for this review.

The Department of Development Cooperation recognises that there is scope for Poland to develop more strategic bilateral partnerships on development co-operation. At the same time, it needs to be pragmatic and realistic about what it can achieve and commit to given the relatively small budget envelope for partner countries, the fragmented nature of its portfolio of annual projects and the seemingly weak prospects for scaling-up bilateral aid (Chapter 3). Nevertheless, the growing foreign policy emphasis on economic diplomacy and interest in linking this objective with development co-operation could be an opportunity for Poland to start developing complementary and whole-of-government approaches in partner countries.

**The MFA's organisational structure reflects its key functions and the current business model**

Roles and responsibilities are clear across the development co-operation system: the MFA sits at the heart of the system, and its tasks are clear as outlined in Article 13 of the Act. The Ministry of Finance has specific responsibilities while other government departments and public institutions tend to be implementers – through technical assistance, scholarships and training (Annex B, Figure B.1).

Within the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the Department of Development Cooperation has built a functioning structure for development co-operation and works closely with embassies, and the part-time development counsellors, in partner countries (Annex B, Figure B.2).[5] Thematic experts straddle the various units, partly because they also fill other functions. The current set-up and management system reflect the main channels and objectives of Polish development co-operation and the projectised business model. However, this business model carries high administrative costs stemming from the need to manage five annual calls for proposals, project contracting, monitoring and reporting. In 2015, the department integrated programming and implementation functions into the same unit in an attempt to increase quality and consistency and to promote institutional learning. According to the MFA, achieving these objectives is proving difficult in practice because staff time is taken up managing and administering projects rather than planning, programming and developing tools and instruments (e.g. project management guidelines) for delivering development co-operation more efficiently and for greater impact.

The MFA recognises that it needs to adapt its business model in order to deliver Polish aid in a more efficient, flexible and innovative way (Chapter 5).[6] Identifying the optimal model and organisational set-up and key capabilities for delivering bilateral aid is a work-in-progress. The administration debates from time-to-time whether having an implementing agency with dedicated project and programme management and other technical expertise, would help overcome challenges with implementing the multiannual programme. At the same time, Poland is also being pragmatic given the relatively small size of bilateral aid and the costs that come with setting up and running an agency. It is also aware that it can potentially find other ways to address challenges with delivering the programme and administrative costs.[7] Whatever the decision, Poland needs to re-think its

business model for delivering development co-operation and ensure that it has the key capabilities it needs to increase efficiency and development impact.

## Adaptation to change

**Indicator: The system is able to reform and innovate to meet evolving needs**

**Poland's development co-operation is becoming increasingly valued as an instrument for responding to global and regional challenges. To respond effectively to new demands, there seems to be growing awareness within the Ministry of Foreign Affairs that the system needs to be more flexible, creative and capable, while also capitalising on Poland's comparative advantage.**

**The Department of Development Cooperation can adjust its structure as needs evolve**

The Department of Development Cooperation has the flexibility to adjust the organisational set-up according to changing needs, as shown by the recent re-organisation of the department described in the Memorandum (MFA, 2016). The department's management team and political leadership are reflecting on how the organisational set-up and business model should evolve in the future. In order to build a case and win political support for reform, they will need to identify and communicate the constraints and risks inherent in the current structures and systems.

**The system can change and innovate in response to partner country demands and changing priorities**

In its Multiannual Development Cooperation Programme 2016-2020 Poland recognises that development co-operation needs to evolve in a changing world. Within the MFA, there is an appetite for stepping up efforts to make Polish development co-operation more innovative and responsive. However, rules governing Polish aid's key delivery channels (e.g. NGOs) can discourage innovation. For example, the MFA must rely on the available capacity of Polish implementing partners, and detailed contracting, financing and accounting rules administrative costs and leave little room for flexibility to adapt to changing contexts (Chapter 5).

Nevertheless, Poland's recent success in scaling up and providing a strategic development co-operation response following demands from the Government of Ukraine shows that it can work more flexibly (Annex C). In addition to capitalising on its own transformation experience, deep historical ties and understanding of the context in Ukraine, Poland was capable of using its various aid modalities to provide a relevant, timely and flexible response with a long-term perspective (though planning remains annual). While the drivers of response may be unique, it can still serve as a model for more innovative co-operation with other partner countries.

## Human resources

**Indicator: The member manages its human resources effectively to respond to field imperatives**

**The Ministry of Foreign Affairs has built up its development capacity over the past five years and now has a core cadre of development staff in the Department of Development Cooperation. Current key staffing issues facing the ministry and the department include providing incentives to keep staff in posts for a reasonable length of time; being able to hire the right expertise as programme needs evolve; and providing staff with development co-operation training opportunities.**

**The Department of Development Cooperation needs the right incentives to encourage staff to stay in posts**

Polish development co-operation appears to be well-staffed, with about 81 Poland-based employees dedicated to development co-operation across the system. Over half of these employees work in the DDC, an additional 16 full-time employees are responsible for development co-operation in embassies and permanent representations and about 33 part-time employees work on the small grants projects (MFA, 2016).

Human resource management at the department is shaped, as in other DAC member countries, by the Ministry of Foreign Affair's overall human resource policy and management system. According to senior management within the ministry, it is considering developing a human resource cadre comprising generalists with some specialisation. As it takes this agenda forward, it should consider including development co-operation as a specialisation, especially as it is growing in policy relevance (Chapter 2) and diplomats appear increasingly interested in working on it.

Since 2011, the DDC has built up a core cadre of staff interested in pursuing careers in development co-operation and whose development expertise is deepening. The Director of the department also has some say in rotation decisions for embassies in partner countries and is responsible for recruiting ministry staff into the department. At the same time, it must recruit from the pool of staff available within the ministry which tends to be generalists with limited experience and exposure to development co-operation and the more technical aspects of project management.

The main human resource challenge for the department is therefore to acquire and retain the development expertise it needs. According to the DDC, project management and implementation is less attractive to diplomats than the more political work of the ministry and there are few incentives to keep them in posts for a reasonable length of time. In addition, limited staff mobility between Polish ministries and resource constraints for hiring Polish consultants make it difficult for the department to hire in external expertise. As it takes on new priorities and modernises its business model, the department will need to acquire, build or have access to new competencies. These include greater technical capacity in programming and project cycle management, humanitarian assistance and migration issues, results-based and risk management, and quality and financial control. A first step in making project management more attractive would be to give the department resources for project managers to monitor projects directly in partner countries and gain an insight into development co-operation in practice.

**The MFA needs to invest in staff training in development co-operation**

The Department of Development Cooperation does not have dedicated resources for training. Moreover, Polish universities do not offer courses and trainings on development co-operation, although Warsaw University is a member of the Network on Humanitarian Action (NOHA) – an international association of universities that aims to enhance professionalism in the humanitarian sector.[8] Staff development at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the department and in embassy consists of information sessions with Ambassadors ahead of their postings to developing countries. In addition the Diplomatic Academy and Civil Service Academy cover development as a topic for young diplomats.

The MFA plans to integrate staff training into its internal human resource management. The DDC should use this as an opportunity to include training on key aspects of development co-operation. Most DAC members have developed a range of relevant and transferrable training material that Poland could borrow or use. In addition, it should consider joining international networks that conduct training on development, for example the Learn4Dev network on Joint Competence for Development (www.learn4dev.net/).

# Notes

1. These international good practices include the EU Consensus on Development, the Busan Partnership for Effective Development Co-operation, Agenda 2030 and the Addis Ababa Action Agenda on Financing for Development.
2. Of this, the Solidarity Fund gets about 10%; flagship scholarships 20%; TV in Belarus 15%; HA 5% NGOs; small grants; ministries; global education. Most allocations based on historical amounts. Senegal has 300K in 2016 for two NGO projects.
3. Members are listed in page 33 of Poland's Memorandum to the peer review (MFA, 2016).
4. At present it sets out two or three thematic priorities for each partner in the multiannual programme and annual plan, which serve as a guide for implementing bodies when submitting projects through calls for proposals.
5. The role of the embassy and development counsellor is to engage in dialogue with partners; monitor projects; and engage in EU dialogue. Development counsellors are consulted for calls for proposals and for training programmes; they check project proposals from the perspective of local needs.
6. For example, through more government-to-government support and a stronger field presence; partnerships with civil society and the private sector; multiannual programme-based approaches, including EU joint programming; and having more targeted demand-driven projects. The MFA engages in an annual framework agreement with the Solidarity Fund which has the authority to re-grant to NGOs. While this framework agreement is a form of programmatic support, Polish aid does not generally engage in strategic partnerships or programmatic funding.
7. Other options for reinforcing technical project management and implementation capabilities and thematic expertise could include capitalising further on the skills within line ministries, delegating bilateral projects to other providers, recruiting consultants, and capitalising on more flexible instruments already at the MFA's disposal, such as the Solidarity Fund.
8. More information available at: http://noha.uw.edu.pl/master-programme-in-humanitarian-action/future-proof-studies/.

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# Chapter 5: Poland's development co-operation delivery and partnerships

## Budgeting and programming processes

**Indicator: These processes support quality aid as defined in Busan**

**Poland seeks to increase the efficiency and effectiveness of its development co-operation, including by meeting its Busan commitments. Its 2016-2020 multiannual programme prioritises greater transparency, less fragmented aid and greater partner country ownership. Poland should adapt and refine its budgeting and programming processes to achieve these objectives. It needs especially to increase aid predictability, develop more demand-driven programmes with its partner countries and untie its aid.**

### Polish aid could be more predictable by communicating indicative future flows

The current approach to state budgeting[1] prevents the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA) from providing regular, timely rolling three-to-five year indicative forward expenditure and/or implementation plans to developing countries, as agreed in the Busan Partnership for Effective Development Co-operation. Financial planning and budgeting for Polish ODA is conducted on an annual basis. However, while it cannot "commit" beyond one year, it could increase predictability by communicating "indicative" future flows to partner governments. It could learn from other DAC members who are increasing predictability by providing indicative budget envelopes with country strategies for priority partners (for example, the Czech Republic, Ireland).

Although the Ministry of Foreign Affairs must spend its budget within the financial year, it is free to reallocate resources between instruments of the special reserve budget.[2] Rules governing financing of NGOs prevent the MFA from topping-up successful NGO projects – doing so could be considered unfair competition vis-à-vis other unfunded NGO project proposals.

To increase predictability, effectiveness and impact, Poland is starting to support "modular" projects. Through this new way of working, NGOs and the central administration can design longer-term interventions but have a financial commitment for the first year. Successive modules will be approved as long as there are appropriate resources in subsequent budget acts and other conditions are met.[3] Implementing partners are interested in these modular projects given the short implementation timeframe for annual projects. They need, however, to build up their capacity in designing and managing longer-term projects. A successful move to multi-annual projects also requires mutual trust over medium-term resource availability. The MFA can help build trust by defining its programming vision and strategy, and criteria for and by developing guidance (and training) for designing modular projects.

**More context-specific country programming and demand-driven project design would improve alignment**

Aligning development programming with national strategies and building country ownership is a work in progress. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs recognises that it could engage more actively in strategic dialogue and planning with partner governments to respond better to local needs and priorities. Poland's more strategic, demand-driven co-operation with Ukraine is an example on which to build (Annex C). In addition, the Ukraine programme capitalises on flexibility provided by the 2011 Act and budgeting processes to allocate the annual budget to the various aid modalities.[4]

According to Poland's development counsellors based in Moldova and Georgia, the overall thematic focus of the programme aligns well with these countries' priorities. Partners say they value the experience, knowledge and people-to-people link that Poland offers.[5] At the same time, Poland needs to take a more programmatic approach. Doing so could also help improve the sustainability and visibility of Polish aid. To achieve this objective, it needs to deliver aid differently. Currently it relies mostly on Polish NGOs for implementation which tends to result in supply-driven projects (see Chapter 4). Other disadvantages with this modality are the high administrative costs and, according to stakeholders consulted for the peer review, the many one-off projects with little measureable effect, visibility or partner country ownership.

Poland can improve its alignment by adapting other aid modalities such as the small grants scheme. While the budget for the small grants scheme is relatively small in partner countries (about USD 170 000 per year in priority countries), the scheme has the potential to be transformed into an instrument for aligning with national strategies, working directly with local partners, and engaging in multi-donor projects. This is evident in Moldova.[6] Poland's network of embassies and development counsellors in priority countries could play a greater role in delivering larger country programmes, provided that headquarters develops tools and guidance for project cycle management and there is appropriate capacity and delegated authority in embassies. The Solidarity Fund is also proving to be a flexible instrument in Ukraine (Annex C).

**Poland is not yet using country systems**

While Poland is not using partner systems for programme design, management, expenditure, monitoring or reporting, Article 4 of the 2011 Act does allow it to "transfer funds to the state budget of a developing country" (GOVPL, 2011). The Ministry of Finance's concessional aid credits could also be considered as a form of budget support. Moreover, some technical assistance supports institutional reform which can pave the way for using country systems in the future - notably in Eastern Partnership countries – e.g. local government reform and support for agricultural reform. Going forward, Poland should look into finding ways to use and strengthen partner systems, notably by ensuring aid is on-budget and by engaging in programme-based approaches.

**Systematic analysis of risks and opportunities is needed**

Poland does not have an overall risk management strategy for its development co-operation, although partners should conduct project risk analysis. Poland should develop a clear understanding of the risks to, and opportunities for, achieving its strategic objectives through the lens of sustainability. The findings could also reinforce the MFA's efforts to reform the current business model and develop the right tools and partnerships for working effectively in complex situations, least developed countries and fragile contexts in Africa and the Middle East (Chapter 2).

**Poland should conform with the DAC recommendation on untying aid**

In line with its commitment to increase transparency, Poland started to report on the tying status of its ODA in 2013. In the two years for which data are available, Poland's share of untied aid fell from 62.7% in 2013 to 10.6% in 2014. This significant decline is explained by a tied aid credit extended to Ethiopia in 2014. The Ministry of Finance manages the credit lines, which on average annually account for about one-third of total bilateral ODA.[7]

Despite Poland's membership of the DAC, the Ministry of Finance continues to operate this tied aid credit scheme in the least developed and heavily indebted countries that are covered by the 2014 Revised DAC Recommendation on Untying. Moreover, Poland has committed to "accelerate efforts to untie [all] aid" (OECD, 2014). Poland needs to untie its aid and should prioritise, in particular, efforts to meet the DAC Recommendation on Untying. An important first step would be to have an explicit policy and timeline for ensuring that loans qualifying as ODA align with Poland's development co-operation objectives and international commitments. In that context clear evidence should be provided to substantiate the claim of the Ministry of Finance that only part of the credit lines are tied.

**Poland does not attach conditions**

Poland does not attach policy or any other conditions to its development co-operation.

## Partnerships

**Indicator: The member makes appropriate use of co-ordination arrangements, promotes strategic partnerships to develop synergies, and enhances mutual accountability**

**Poland shares effectively its lessons from its own history of democratic, educational and other reforms and is a valued partner in the Eastern Partnership region. It could benefit from more strategic partnerships, guided by a clear vision. In particular its reliance on NGOs to deliver the bulk of its bilateral aid requires the Ministry of Foreign Affairs to play a stronger steering role and to support NGOs to build their capacity in project design, quality control and managing for results.**

**Poland adds value, gains visibility and enhances impact through joint and co-ordinated approaches**

In its Eastern Partnership priority countries (e.g. Georgia, Moldova, and Ukraine), Poland adds value by sharing its transformation experience with the government and other development co-operation providers. These providers value and benefit from Poland's deep knowledge of the context and its expert advice on institutional reform, as shown by the close co-operation between Switzerland and Poland in Ukraine on decentralisation.

While the scale of Poland's portfolio and field-based operations is relatively small, embassy-based development counsellors participate in EU joint programming discussions and joint analysis. This engagement is starting to raise the visibility of Poland's technical assistance and capacity building. In Moldova, for example, the embassy took responsibility for the agriculture chapter in an EU joint analysis. It capitalised on its own experience by contracting an expert from Poland's Ministry of Agriculture to lead the analysis, with costs covered by Polish aid. This is one good example of how Poland can share transformation experience within the framework of joint programming.[8] The PISA partnership between Poland, the OECD and Ukraine is another good example (Box 5.1).

Poland should continue to engage in joint approaches and draw on its experience in Ukraine, Moldova and Georgia as it participates in co-ordination arrangements in other

priority countries (e.g. those in Africa). In these contexts, Poland can learn from other providers about the context and local needs. It should also try to target and fit its support within sector approaches for greater impact and visibility.

**Box 5.1 Peer-to-peer learning partnership in education in Ukraine**

The OECD's Programme for International Student Assessment (PISA) is a triennial survey that aims to evaluate education systems worldwide by testing the skills and knowledge of 15-year-old students. Poland is one of the strongest education reformers and performers among PISA participating countries. It is now putting its experience and valuable lessons at the disposal of Ukraine, a new participant in the 2018 edition of the programme. With funding from Poland's development co-operation programme, the Educational Research Institute in Warsaw – the National Centre for PISA in Poland – is working with the OECD's Directorate for Education and Skills to help prepare Ukraine for participating in the survey and to support implementation of the assessment.

The PISA partnership between Poland, the OECD and Ukraine has a medium-term perspective: it will be in place for the duration of the four-year PISA 2018 cycle. This peer-to-peer learning partnership between Poland and Ukraine is designed to strengthen the institutional capacity of the Ministry of Education, particularly the Ukrainian Center for Educational Quality Assessment and to manage PISA and other large-scale learning assessments.

To achieve the partnership's objectives, the Educational Research Institute, supported by the Polish Ministry of Education, will provide training and share knowledge to help the Ukrainian Center for Educational Quality Assessment to analyse its PISA data, interpret the results and disseminate and use them. This is an excellent example of how Poland is adding value through partnerships with a key partner in an important sector.

*Source:* information provided by the Directorate for Education and Skills, OECD and the Ministry of Education, Warsaw, Poland.

### There is scope to increase mutual accountability

Poland participates in global mutual accountability exercises, such as the second global monitoring round of the Global Partnership for Effective Development Co-operation which will be published in November 2016, its statistical reporting to the OECD and country-led donor co-ordination. In Georgia, for example, Poland provides comprehensive information to the government on the activities it supports. It could strengthen mutual accountability by sharing information more systematically with all partner governments and by ensuring, as planned, that its projects align better with partner governments' needs and demands.

### Poland would like to build more strategic partnerships

Poland is not yet engaging in partnership approaches but sees the added value of moving away from contract based co-operation. To move forward, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs should develop a clear vision of the strategic partnerships it would like to prioritise, with whom and why. A clear partnership policy could frame efforts to build tools and instruments for adapting its contract-based development co-operation to create win-win partnerships that capitalise on partners' added-value, have a long-term perspective and focus on results. The MFA will need to identify the bottlenecks (e.g. financing rules) for contributing funds to strategic partners and make a case for amending these rules.

**There is a tension between Poland's principles and approach to funding NGOs and development effectiveness**

Poland has a clear overall legislative framework for channelling public finance to social partners.[9] Through this legislation, which also governs aid delivered through Polish NGOs, Poland recognises the important role that these partners play in performing public tasks. In particular, it relies on them to deliver the bulk of bilateral aid for its priority countries and territories (MFA, 2015b). While Polish NGOs are relatively new to development co-operation, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs values their expertise in promoting democracy and human rights and in fostering solidarity through their close links with beneficiaries (MFA, 2011). The ministry's 2016 directive on co-operating with NGOs in 2016-17 sets out the objectives, principles, tasks and aid modalities for all its co-operation with NGOs. Key principles include partnership, efficiency and fair competition.

While Poland has sound principles and objectives for co-operating with Polish NGOs in delivering ODA, the MFA is aware that the current annual, generic calls for proposals for development projects in priority countries are not conducive to responding to partners' needs and priorities. NGOs have too broad a scope in the type of projects they can propose and the small, one-year projects that are supported increase aid fragmentation and undermine sustainability. It is hard to see how Polish aid can be more effective and have greater impact without reforming the calls for proposals.

Several Polish stakeholders interviewed by the peer review team flagged weak NGO capacity in development co-operation, including administration, research and innovation, and knowledge and presence in partner countries, especially in Africa and Asia. There is scope for the MFA to play a stronger role in shaping projects so that they can meet objectives. It could have more specific calls for proposals; introduce stricter, transparent criteria for approving projects; and support NGOs to build their capacity in project design, quality control, and managing for results so they can deliver larger aid budgets.

The MFA has an opportunity to address some of these challenges through the work of the Prime Ministers' intergovernmental group on NGOs. The group's task is to "improve the quality of co-operation through annual or multi-annual cooperation programmes with NGOs and to develop a framework model for these programmes". The Department of Development Cooperation can also learn from the experiences of other DAC members that have moved from issuing generic calls for proposals to partnership approaches, programme support and framework agreements (see Box 5.2 and OECD, 2011).

**Box 5.2 Learning from DAC members: How Portugal reformed its co-operation with NGOs**

Portugal has established a strategic dialogue with NGOs through the Portuguese NGO Platform to consult on topics of common interest and to clarify procedures for annual calls for proposals. The goal is to foster sustainable and long-term development programmes with broader impact and get the most out of the scarce ODA resources allocated to NGOs. To reduce transaction costs, Portugal adopted the European Commission's call for proposals model and moved to project proposals with a three-year timeframe. This also helped establish a roll-out plan for more than one year even within a framework of an annual budget. NGOs that could ensure financing from other sources, including from the European Commission, were prioritised for funding.

Clarifying the procedures for the call for proposals was important to improve the effectiveness of Portuguese development co-operation, and to increase the impact and the accountability of the programmes and NGOs vis à vis partner countries. Criteria, sectoral and geographic priorities were clarified and strategically aligned with partner countries' priorities. The approved projects integrate, when possible, the objectives of Portugal's country strategies for priority countries.

To ensure equal treatment of all Portuguese NGOs for ODA funding, regardless of their size or capacity, incentives were created to foster partnerships between Portuguese NGOs and with international civil society organisations (CSOs). Foundations were also invited to support the capacity building of Portuguese civil society. For example, the Gulbenkian Foundation supports projects that aim to internationalise small Portuguese CSOs through smart partnerships.

The Camões Institute, which has a mandate for development co-operation, is also helping to enhance the capacity of Portuguese civil society. For instance it requires the Portuguese NGDO Platform to spend part of its public grant on NGO training and capacity building.

*Source*: Contribution by Portuguese examiners for the Polish Peer Review, 2016.

# Fragile states

**Indicator: Delivery modalities and partnerships help deliver quality**

**Poland does not have a specific strategy or approach to addressing conflict and fragility through its development co-operation. However, it channels ODA to countries which are considered to be fragile mainly through the multilateral system. This is good practice, as it increases the overall aid coherence.**

### Poland has no specific approach to fragility

Although four of Poland's ten priority countries in the Multiannual Development Cooperation Programme 2016-2020 are fragile states (MFA, 2015), addressing fragility is not an explicit policy priority. For example, Poland's new, reduced list of priority countries no longer includes crisis-affected fragile states such as South Sudan, Burundi, and Afghanistan (Chapter 2). Poland tends to support lower-risk sectors such as the social sectors and environment in its priority countries in Africa. Good governance is a priority, however, in all Eastern Partnership countries.

Poland's engagement in crisis contexts is essentially military. It participates in international peacebuilding efforts and favours contributions to NATO missions rather than UN peacekeeping operations.[10] Through its long-standing presence in Afghanistan, Poland gained experience of interaction between military and civilian personnel in a crisis context. Poland could build upon this experience to incorporate the peacebuilding perspective into its co-operation in fragile countries and take into account factors contributing to fragility other than security (e.g. the climate).

| | |
|---|---|
| **Poland participates in co-ordination mechanisms** | Among Poland's Eastern Partnership priority countries, Ukraine is crisis-affected. In Ukraine, Poland co-ordinates with other providers in its key sectors and builds institutional capacity through its relevant expertise, but not necessarily through the lens of the Fragile States Principles. |
| **Poland's support to fragile states is mainly through the multilateral system** | In its bilateral programme, Poland applies the same procedures and delivery mechanisms in all countries – predominantly through NGOs. Multilateral channels tend to ease the burden on partner countries in fragile situations. While Poland does not have a dedicated strategy for fragile states it invests in them via the high share of its total ODA that is channelled through the multilateral system. For example, by supporting multilateral organisations such as the United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East (UNRWA), Poland helps to increase aid coherence, which is good practice. |

# Notes

1. According to OECD research (the Budgeting and Public Expenditures Division of the Public Governance and Territorial Directorate), Poland's state budgeting process sets the budget one year in advance, although certain capital elements of the budget are set in multi-year envelopes. While Poland has a multi-year framework in the sense of preparing three-year projections, it is not "binding" in setting expenditure ceilings, so the budget is for all practical purposes determined on an annual basis. Line ministries have substantial flexibility in re-allocating funds across sections of their individual budget (Downes et al, forthcoming).

2. Unspent resources tend to go to the humanitarian budget or multilateral organisations.

3. These conditions are outlined in the Call for Proposals and referred to in the 2016 Annual Development Cooperation Plan.

4. Articles 4 and 13 of the 2011 Act seem to allow for flexibility in stepping up engagement directly with developing countries. Poland's network of embassies can support such an approach. Poland has negotiated a special contract with the Solidarity Fund to provide institutional support for decentralisation, and it seems to be targeting better the small grants funding, technical assistance, humanitarian aid and NGO projects.

5. In Moldova, for example, Poland supports the development of an agricultural system. According to local authorities, Poland's support to agriculture is positive: they are learning from a partner with whom they can relate and which has overcome similar challenges.

6. While the annual volume of the small grant fund in Moldova is about EUR 120 000, the embassy identifies projects and co-manages them directly with local partners – often the local government administration. To increase efficiency and impact, the embassy is now funding fewer projects – just five projects in 2016 compared to around 11 in previous years. In 2015 it designed its first multiannual project within a larger multi-donor project in the water sector. This joint project – in collaboration with GIZ, UNDO and the government of Moldova – is seen as a good way for Poland to contribute to better results by working with others.

7. Tied aid credits averaged around 34% of bilateral aid between 2005 and 2014.

8. There are other examples: in Ukraine Poland attracted Canadian and Swiss financing to expand a training programme for mayors who shadow Polish mayors in the context of the decentralisation programme. In Georgia, Poland contributes information and knowledge to sector analysis but it lets larger providers lead the work.

9. See for example, the Act of April 24th 2003 on Public Benefit and Volunteer Work (consolidated text, last amended on 22 January 2010); the Prime Minister of Poland's Special Directive on organising an intragovernmental group on co-operation between the public administration and NGOs (July 20, 2016); and the Minister of Foreign Affairs' Directive on the Programme of Co-operation between the MFA and NGOs (June 29, 2016).

10. As of June 2016, Poland contributes 9 personnel to the UN peacekeeping operation www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/resources/statistics/contributors.shtml. In comparison, up to 2 600 military and civilian personnel were deployed in Afghanistan to the NATO International Security Assistance Force, and 150 personnel are still deployed in Afghanistan within the NATO mission "resolute support" (http://isaf.wp.mil.pl/en/10_2490.html).

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# Chapter 6: Results management and accountability of Poland's development co-operation

## Results-based management system

**Indicator: A results-based management system is in place to assess performance on the basis of development priorities, objectives and systems of partner countries**

**Poland is taking steps to plan for results and monitor results indicators through its projects. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA) could take its results-based management system a step further by promoting an institutional culture that values and learns from results and making stronger links between programme and project results. Poland would also benefit from a more coherent overview of how its total bilateral and multilateral co-operation activities contribute to the development co-operation objectives set out in the 2011 Development Cooperation Act. As it works towards strengthening the results focus of its development co-operation, Poland can learn from the experiences of other providers on results chains, aligning with partner country's results frameworks and using results for decision making.**

**Poland is taking steps to develop a systematic approach to managing for development results. It needs a more coherent view of its development goals**

The MFA is strengthening the results focus of Polish development co-operation. Initial steps in the right direction include:

- setting out broad development results in the focus areas for its priority countries and territories in the 2016 Development Cooperation Plan (MFA, 2015b)
- introducing expected results and measurement indicators for some of its priority countries and territories in the Development Cooperation Plan[1]
- requiring logical frameworks and the use of results indicators in calls for proposals for projects to be financed by Polish aid.

These steps will allow the Ministry of Foreign Affairs to test its approach, reflect and learn from its own experience, and ultimately build an institutional culture that focuses on development results. Now that the ministry identifies expected results in the development co-operation plan and project logframes use results indicators, the next step could be to make clearer links between the various levels of results, focusing on outputs and outcomes. Evaluations which aggregate results at sectoral or country level can help Poland to define what it can achieve with its interventions. The MFA could also consider reducing the number of existing measurement indicators it is using for projects and standardising them across the programme. By building staff awareness and capacity in managing for results it can strengthen the results focus of its development co-operation.

In light of the high share of multilateral aid, scholarships and credit lines in its total ODA, Poland would benefit from developing a coherent view on how the results of its bilateral and multilateral interventions as a whole can contribute to the democracy and social economic development objectives laid out in the 2011 Development Cooperation

Act (GOVPL, 2011). Building a results-management system requires time and commitment from managers, staff and implementing partners. As Poland builds a results culture and puts in place a system, it can also learn from the experiences of other providers with results chains, aligning with partner country's results frameworks and using results for decision making.

**Monitoring is based more on financial control than on development results**

The Ministry of Foreign Affairs monitors projects financed through calls for proposals during monitoring missions (that should cover at least 50% of the projects) carried out at the end of the year and through the analysis of reports received from implementing partners. Embassies help monitor these projects and are directly involved in monitoring the small grant scheme.

The results that are to be monitored are included in the logical framework that the MFA now requires for each project and financial agreement. However, project monitoring is based less on development results than on controlling financial and operational activities (by analysing receipts) to decide whether the total grant amount can be disbursed before the end of the year. Since Poland finances one-year projects, monitoring findings are not used to correct existing development interventions. Instead they are used to select new projects in the next call for proposals.

**There is no specific approach to monitoring results in fragile states**

Poland does not have a specific approach towards monitoring the conflict sensitivity of its programmes and projects in fragile states.

## Evaluation system

**Indicator: The evaluation system is in line with the DAC evaluation principles**

**Poland has made progress in putting in place a system for evaluating development co-operation, including a dedicated post, annual evaluation plans and budgets. A dedicated evaluation policy would improve transparency, promote accountability and strengthen the role of evaluation in assuring the quality of Polish development interventions. Evaluations should be impartial and be managed independently from policy and programming.**

**Poland could reinforce the role and added value of evaluation by having a clear statement on its purpose, coverage and independence**

The 2011 Development Cooperation Act asks the MFA to "evaluate the effectiveness of implemented development co-operation goals set out in the [Multiannual Development Cooperation] Programme" (GOVPL, 2011). In 2012 an evaluation unit (called "Independent post for evaluation") was created in the Department of Development Cooperation, staffed with a senior expert advisor. The unit is responsible for evaluation procedures, including drafting the evaluation plan; selecting external evaluators through tenders; and following up on evaluation findings. Between 2012 and 2015, the unit has commissioned and followed up 11 thematic evaluation studies, aggregating about 200 projects by themes/initiatives and geographical areas and covering a period of one to four years.

The Multiannual Development Cooperation Programme dedicates a chapter to evaluation and monitoring, describing the key objectives of evaluation; the types of evaluations to be conducted (ex-post evaluations of projects and programmes and mid-term review of the

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| | programme); the role of the evaluation plan in setting out the evaluation process; the principles and criteria to be used for evaluation; and specifying that evaluations will be carried out by independent external entities (MFA, 2015a). While this is useful, Poland would benefit from a specific evaluation policy defining the role and responsibilities of evaluation within the Polish aid system. This should include its role in evaluating aid components not included under the Multiannual Development Cooperation Programme (e.g. credit lines and scholarships), set out the institutional arrangements to ensure independence of evaluation, and clarify how the system will learn from evaluation. This would improve transparency and strengthen the role of evaluation in providing a basis for accountability and in assuring the quality of Polish development interventions. |
| **Poland should ensure evaluation is independent from policy and programming** | Poland tries to ensure the independence and impartiality of individual evaluation studies by commissioning independent consultants selected through a tender procedure.[2] However, the independence of the whole evaluation process could be affected by the influence that the management of the department can have on the choice of activities to be included in the evaluation plan.[3] There is a possible conflict of interest between policy, programming and evaluation. As Poland continues to institutionalise evaluation, it should review and identify how to guarantee the overall independence of the evaluation function. |
| **Poland plans and budgets strategically for evaluating development activities** | Through its annual evaluation plans, available in English on the Polish Aid website,[4] Poland ensures a strategic selection and coverage of thematic and geographical areas to be evaluated, describing the scope of the studies, their timeline, their rationale and the total planned cost. The plans are prepared by the evaluation unit of the MFA, which prioritises the future importance that specific topics will have for the Department of Development Cooperation. Plans are approved by the Undersecretary of State for Development. The resources allocated through the special reserve of the MFA in the 2016 Development Cooperation Plan also include a specific budget for evaluation activities (MFA, 2015b). |
| **Involving aid beneficiaries in evaluation activities is a challenge** | Involving the beneficiaries of Polish aid in evaluations would increase transparency and reinforce mutual learning and accountability. Poland recognises that, as for many Development Assistance Committee (DAC) members, involving beneficiaries is a challenge, especially given the small size and relatively stand-alone nature of its individual bilateral activities (Chapter 3). Although Polish embassies are informed of the results of evaluations, Poland could increase stakeholder dialogue and involvement for instance by sharing draft terms of reference through the embassies, presenting the preliminary findings of evaluations in partner countries and inviting representatives to stakeholders' meetings in Warsaw when evaluation result are presented (see next section). |

## Institutional learning

**Indicator: Evaluations and appropriate knowledge management systems are used as management tools**

**Poland is learning from its evaluations to improve the quality and relevance of its development interventions. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs could capitalise on the existing knowledge available within the Polish system by promoting a culture of learning among its staff and sharing knowledge with all the actors involved in development co-operation.**

**Poland ensures follow up and use of its evaluation findings**

The Department of Development Cooperation within the MFA ensures the systematic and transparent dissemination of evaluation results. It publishes them on the ministry's website in Polish and English, and organises annual meetings to present and discuss the results with the Council of Development Cooperation and staff, with side events open to the broader public (e.g. NGOs).

To ensure it learns from evaluations, the department organises special meetings with evaluators, management and staff to discuss all recommendations. Managers sign a special protocol to indicate their agreement or disagreement with the evaluation findings and recommendations. The evaluation unit is in charge of systematising and aggregating the findings of evaluations, dispatching recommendations within the department and following up on their implementation.[5] According to the evaluation unit, recommendations are usually implemented.[6] The department should continue promoting a culture of learning from evaluations, including by promoting greater ownership of the findings, in order to improve policy and practice in development co-operation.

**Improving knowledge use within the Polish system would enhance development quality**

The Ministry of Foreign Affairs has an internal searchable information technology system (Diplopedia), accessible also by embassies, which stores all project proposals, logical frameworks, project reports, evaluation reports and recommendations. In 2015, the ministry took steps to improve internal communication between planners and implementers of development co-operation projects by grouping these functions into territorial teams (MFA, 2016). The MFA could play a co-ordinating role and promote a culture of learning to ensure that knowledge available within the Polish aid system is used by all relevant actors to improve development interventions (including other central and local government authorities and NGOs).

## Communication, accountability and development awareness

**Indicator: The member communicates development results transparently and honestly**

**Since joining the DAC in 2013, Poland has been increasing transparency. It plans to create a more practical system for collecting, processing and reporting statistical data in the near future. An important priority is to raise public awareness of the interdependencies between countries and of the existence and need for the development co-operation programme. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs is strategic in building public awareness through communication and global education, working with key partners such as the Ministry of Education and NGOs. As Poland gathers information on results it will be able to step up efforts to communicate successes and challenges while continuing to increase transparency.**

**Poland is taking steps to increase transparency**

Since joining the DAC in 2013, Poland has been increasing the transparency of its development co-operation. Poland's reporting to the DAC Creditor Reporting System (CRS) has improved and it started reporting against gender and environment markers in 2013. Poland also publishes the results of its calls for proposals in the Public Information Bulletin and in the joint government database on public expenditures.[7] However, in 2014, the Aid Transparency Index "Publish What You Fund" still rated Poland's transparency as "very poor".[8] Since the current information technology (IT) system limits what Poland can report, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs plans to create a new system for collecting, processing and reporting of statistical data to implement the common standard for the electronic publication of timely, comprehensive and forward-looking information.

**Clear communication of the results achieved can increase public support**

Raising public awareness and maintaining a high level of public support for the Polish development co-operation programme are important goals for Poland (MFA, 2015a). Increasing public support is essential to gain political backing for development co-operation, especially since Poland is a relatively new donor. Since 2004, the Public Communication Unit of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (staffed with seven people) has monitored public support to development co-operation through annual opinion polls.[9] This unit has a good communication strategy, involving a variety of means including the Polish Aid and the ministry's websites (which both have an English version), annual reports, brochures, social media (Twitter, YouTube), and TV and radio broadcasts.[10]

The Public Communication unit has also developed an online repository containing basic information and narratives on the results of development co-operation projects financed by Polish aid.[11] This is a good first step. Experience from other DAC members has found that effective public engagement requires clear and coherent messages that go beyond isolated events, facts or statistics to communicate progress over the long-term (OECD, 2013). Poland's emerging system for monitoring and aggregating the results of its bilateral interventions provides an opportunity to develop a clearer and more coherent narrative on the overall results of its development co-operation, including successes and challenges.

**Poland is working in global education**

Global education is an important priority for Poland, and is one of the objectives of the Development Cooperation Act (GOVPL, 2011). Poland's Global Education programme aims to make global education more present at all levels of formal education; raise public awareness of global interdependencies; enhance the quality of educational initiatives on global education; and ensure coherence between global education in Poland and abroad (MFA, 2015a).

Through a partnership involving the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the Ministry of Education and the Zagranica Group,[12] Poland is working to raise public awareness, enhance the competence of teachers and educators in global education and incorporate development issues into school curricula. Global education activities are financed through the annual MFA's Global Education call for proposals.[13]

A 2013 study was commissioned by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs to evaluate 17 global education projects in 2010-12. It found that while the projects contributed to a change in participants' attitudes and provided practical and useful knowledge which could be used by schools, they did not result in a structural change of the education system, calling for a more in-depth and systematic co-operation between the MFA and the Ministry of National Education (EGO s.c, 2013). Poland should continue to support and strengthen co-operation between the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the Ministry of Education and Polish NGOs to reinforce and increase awareness and understanding of development issues as a basis for public and political support to its development co-operation programme.

# Notes

1. Annexes I and II of the 2016 Development Cooperation Plan include expected results and proposed measurement indicators for Polish support to internally displaced persons (IDP) in Ukraine and for aid activities in Tanzania, Kenya, Ethiopia and Senegal (MFA, 2015b). According to MFA staff, the choice of results (which are not quantified, but defined with measurable indicators) is based on past outcomes from NGOs projects and partially from partner countries' strategies.

2. According to interviews carried out in Warsaw by the peer review team, DDC managers do not influence the choice of the evaluation team.

3. The evaluation unit, which reports to the Deputy Director responsible also for the Unit for EU Development Policy and Multilateral Cooperation and for the Humanitarian Aid Section, prepares the proposal for the annual evaluation plan. The plan is discussed by deputy directors of the Department of Development Cooperation and approved by the Undersecretary of State for Development.

4. Polish Aid website dedicates a page to evaluation with annual plans, evaluation results and reports at www.polskapomoc.gov.pl/Evaluation,2033.html#plany.

5. The evaluation unit produces a table of the evaluation findings and allocating recommendations to specific units within the DDC. It also records how many times the recommendations have to be applied, by whom, when and how. The table is approved by the management of the Department of Development Cooperation and the senior evaluator checks twice a year if the recommendations have been implemented and discusses implementation with management.

6. During peer review meetings in Warsaw, the senior evaluator gave the team some examples of how recommendations have been applied: new technologies have been included in the new Global Education calls for proposals (2013 recommendation); the Scholarship Programme for Specialised Eastern Studies at the Centre for East European Studies in Warsaw has been improved (2014 recommendation); and certain criteria and considerations have to be checked before financing democracy support projects in Moldova through the Solidarity Fund.

7. Data provided to the joint governmental database on public expenditures provided by the MFA can be found under the provider "MSZ" here (in Polish): https://danepubliczne.gov.pl/en/organization?sort=&q=&page=2. The Public Information Bulletin (also in Polish) can be found at www.msz.gov.pl/en/ministry/public_information_bulletin/.

8. Details of the scoring can be found at http://ati.publishwhatyoufund.org/2014/donor/poland/.

9. According to the last poll carried out in December 2015, 65% of the Polish population believe that Poland should support the development of less developed countries. However, public support has been decreasing in recent years (it has fallen from 84% in 2008 to 74% in 2012 and 71% in 2014; MFA, 2016).

10. For instance, on the occasion of the European Year of Development, the MFA organised a global education event which was broadcast on public television.

11. The repository can be found at www.polskapomoc.gov.pl/Repository,of,projects,1945.html.

12. These three bodies signed a Memorandum of Understanding in 2011 on the Development of Global Education in Poland in order to further strengthen the capacity of the governmental institutions and their non-governmental partners involved in global education, and to provide a joint platform for structured dialogue and strategic planning (MFA, 2016).

13. This financing amounted to PLN 2.7 million (USD 0.72 million) in the 2016 Development Cooperation Plan (MFA, 2015b).

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# Chapter 7: Poland's humanitarian assistance

## Strategic framework

**Indicator: Clear political directives and strategies for resilience, response and recovery**

**Poland has a solid policy and strategic humanitarian framework. Within its limited budget, Poland has clear priorities which shape its humanitarian assistance. However, Poland's humanitarian aid could be more coherent with its development co-operation objectives, notably in Ukraine where Poland is using a broad spectrum of instruments to respond to the crisis. Poland is becoming a more ambitious humanitarian donor, particularly in Africa. Within the existing budget Poland should avoid fragmentation and continue focusing on a few priorities where it can play a valuable role during a humanitarian and crisis response.**

**The policy framework is improving and takes into account some of the World Humanitarian Summit outcomes**

Poland's humanitarian policy framework is evolving in response to international trends in humanitarian policies and practice. Although Poland did not formally endorse the Grand Bargain at the 2016 World Humanitarian Summit (The Grand Bargain, 2016), it is already working on policy adjustments that are in the spirit of the Grand Bargain, notably the ability to support a multi-annual humanitarian response. The 2011 Development Cooperation Act provides a broad legal framework for Poland's humanitarian aid (GOVPL, 2011). The Multiannual Development Cooperation Programme gives some strategic orientations to humanitarian assistance (MFA, 2015), but also focuses on the necessary institutional arrangements to address global humanitarian challenges. The development co-operation strategy highlights the need to give the MFA a co-ordinating role in humanitarian crisis responses involving other government ministries[1] as well as non-government partners. Building such a whole-of-government approach to crisis response requires strong political leadership to manage systemic changes between ministries.

**Poland can add value as part of a holistic response**

In countries like Ukraine, where political co-operation is strong, Poland uses the full range of its crisis response instruments. In such countries, Poland is a respected member of the donor community. However, humanitarian aid has been left out of country strategies. With better links between humanitarian and other co-operation instruments, Poland could use its position to advocate for humanitarian issues, such as administrative impediments for humanitarian organisations, or to gain access to Government-controlled areas. Humanitarian support is not only financial – a limited budget should not prevent Poland from maximising its added value as part of the overall international humanitarian response to important crises (Ukraine and the Middle East).


**Disaster risk reduction is integrated into development co-operation**

Poland is now supporting disaster risk reduction activities through its development co-operation, notably through its environmental protection thematic priority in Ethiopia, Tanzania and Kenya and through rescue service training in Ukraine and Georgia (MFA, 2016a). Separate from Poland's humanitarian activities, disaster risk reduction is a more sustainable feature of Poland's development co-operation.

**Poland's small budget risks being spread too thinly**

The humanitarian budget is growing steadily (Figure 7.1), but remains limited. Since 2012, Poland's humanitarian budget has become increasingly concentrated on a few priority crises, essentially the Middle East and Ukraine. Besides support in its priority countries, Poland has a growing interest in engaging in Africa. If the scope of the programme is extended without a corresponding increase in budget, Poland's humanitarian assistance risks becoming fragmented and thus ineffective. Before expanding its priorities further, Poland should also ensure it has the capacity to follow up and monitor projects and that it only responds to crises in which it has something specific to offer based on its comparative advantage.

**Figure 7.1 Poland's humanitarian aid concentration**




*Source:* MFA (2016c), "Memorandum of Poland: 2016 DAC Peer Review"; EDRIS (https://webgate.ec.europa.eu/hac/ August 2016), OECD Credit Reporting System (http://stats.oecd.org/Index.aspx?datasetcode=CRS1; August 2016)

# Effective programme design

**Indicator: Programmes target the highest risk to life and livelihood**

**Poland has a good policy framework and a comprehensive early warning system thanks to its diplomatic network and multilateral partners. The humanitarian strategy gives a high level of programming responsibility to operational partners and Poland provides flexible and rapid support to humanitarian multilateral organisations. But Poland's ambition as a humanitarian donor is constrained by its inflexible administrative arrangements with Polish NGOs.**

**Poland is flexible in its crisis response**

Polish humanitarian aid is well-concentrated with the Middle East and Ukraine being clear priorities over the medium-term. This ensures good continuity in Poland's engagement in complex crises. Apart from these, Poland has no predefined geographical priorities, giving it the flexibility to respond to any crisis arising, although its decision as to which crisis to respond partly also depends on capacity and available funds.

**Despite a good early warning network, response can be slow**

Solid links with the European institutions, multilateral organisations and Poland's 88 diplomatic missions worldwide ensure multiple channels through which it can be warned rapidly of an emerging humanitarian crisis. However, its reliance on responding through NGOs slows down the process because it requires a call for proposals to be launched for each crisis response. This can delay fund disbursement by several weeks after the disaster.[2] In such situations, channelling funds through the multilateral system is more effective to ensure early humanitarian action.

**Poland could support local responders in its priority countries better**

Poland has no specific mechanism to ensure participation from the communities affected by a humanitarian crisis. It could consider providing more support and funding to local and national responders, especially in the priority countries where it has a good knowledge of local capacity and local networks. Poland could also support cash-based programmes systematically, especially in Ukraine and the Middle East, which are cash-based economies. Delivering cash gives beneficiaries greater control over the assistance they receive, and implies a greater understanding of the beneficiary household economy on the part of relief partners.

## Effective delivery, partnerships and instruments

### Indicator: Delivery modalities and partnerships help deliver quality

**Poland's delivery mechanism is efficient for emergency civil protection deployment. To increase efficiencies in responding to complex crises, Poland could reinforce its use of the multilateral channel since it does not have the capacity to deliver rapid and flexible responses through Polish NGOs. In its priority countries such as Ukraine, Poland could use a reinforced partnership with multilateral operational actors to increase its leverage and advocacy role. Several administrative constraints would need to be addressed to build a strategic humanitarian partnership with Polish NGOs.**

**Tools for protracted crises and recovery are available**

Poland has the capacity to use all its available tools in a coherent way to support crisis recovery. This is epitomised in Ukraine, where humanitarian support has come to complement existing development tools, especially in relation to sustainable development goal 16 and pursuing good governance. However, humanitarian aid remains separate from the other instruments in the Multiannual Development Cooperation Programme. While respecting the mandate of different instruments, humanitarian aid could be better integrated within country strategies in those protracted crises that are a priority for Poland.

**Civil protection is efficient and co-ordinated**

The Polish contribution to international disaster relief operations is provided through the European Union Civil Protection Mechanism[3], and Poland is also part of the Euro-Atlantic Disaster Response Coordination Centre (EADRCC/NATO).[4] When the civil protection service is not mobilised, a classical humanitarian response is programmed. When humanitarian partners are mobilised through a call for proposal, the humanitarian

response is delayed significantly which prevents a timely emergency response. Poland is also a regular yet decreasing contributor to the Central Emergency Response Fund (CERF).

**Multilateral partnerships work well**

Poland's approach to working through the multilateral channel is fluid, allows flexible response and reporting requirements are light. This is valued by international organisations, even if they would like to have more predictability from the Polish response – annual and/or ad hoc appeals. Poland also provides core funding to multilateral organisations working in its priority countries, providing them with flexible support.

By contrast, administrative procedures hamper Poland's relations with Polish NGOs. While the process to access Polish funds is transparent it is also complex when considering the low level of funding available. As a result, the most capable NGOs are reluctant to apply for Polish funds, which is detrimental to Poland's profile as a humanitarian donor. Financial procedures are a major constraint to the overall Polish humanitarian architecture, undermining effectiveness and predictability, and putting NGO partners at financial, operational and security risk.[5] NGO partners acknowledge that flexibility has improved somewhat thanks to the introduction of a 10% budget flexibility in partner's budgets. More importantly, Poland has introduced a multiannual element in its most recent call for proposals for the Middle East and Ukraine.[6] This is good practice and Poland could consider expanding it.

**Poland could strengthen its leverage role in priority countries**

Poland co-ordinates with other donors at headquarter level, essentially within the European framework. It also participates in the Committee for Humanitarian Affairs and Food Aid (COHAFA), and is part of the UN-OCHA donor support group. Poland plays a prominent role in priority countries such as Ukraine, although humanitarian partners believe Poland could use its leveraging position to better support the humanitarian community as a whole, for instance in advocating for humanitarian access in government-controlled areas. In other countries and when relevant, Poland could increase its co-ordination with other donors and the broader humanitarian response by engaging in joint humanitarian planning and joint monitoring.

## Organisation fit for purpose

**Indicator: Systems, structures, processes and people work together effectively and efficiently**

**Poland is aware of the administrative and co-ordination constraints to its efficiency as a humanitarian donor and has clear ambitions to address these constraints, notably through better co-ordination across the central administration. Its knowledgeable humanitarian team is spending too much time administering grants instead of strengthening partnerships to address the country's priority and complex humanitarian challenges.**

**Cross-government co-ordination needs to improve**

Co-ordination with the Ministry of Interior is well-established and procedures are clear and efficient, especially for natural disasters requiring the deployment of civil protection assets. Co-ordination with other ministries remains more ad-hoc, for instance with the Ministry of Health for the Ebola crisis response. As mentioned in the Multiannual Development Cooperation Programme, an important aspect of Poland's humanitarian aid will now be to "streamline and adopt systemic solutions for the mechanism of coordinating humanitarian action and the central administration" (MFA, 2015). This

evolution will require institutional changes, and the MFA will need to carve itself a co-ordination role to ensure coherence with the other bodies involved, including the Ministry of Interior, the Ministry of National Defence, the Government Centre for Security, the Ministry of Health and non-governmental partners in crisis response. This will require strengthening the co-ordination mechanism that already exists with the Ministry of Interior, while preserving Poland's humanitarian principles.

**Civil-military co-ordination exists but distinctions can be blurred**

Poland abides by the Oslo Guidelines on the use of foreign military and civil defence assets in disaster relief,[7] and uses its military logistical capacity to bring assistance to disaster areas, such as in Nepal after the 2015 earthquake. Poland is an active member of the NATO Civil-Military Co-operation Centre of Excellence (CCOE),[8] and regularly organises training in civil-military affairs for NATO military personnel. This is particularly important, as Poland participates regularly in international military coalitions.[9] Some serious misconceptions remain, however. The Ministry of National Defence labels its military assistance to the Ukrainian army during a conflict or the handing over of uniforms at the end of the Polish participation in the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) mission as humanitarian.[10] This blurs the lines between humanitarian and military support and therefore puts humanitarian workers at risk of being perceived as parties to the conflict. It also highlights the challenges of co-ordination within government on humanitarian issues and crisis response.

**Staffing is adequate but roles could be better prioritised**

The humanitarian team in the MFA is composed of three people of varied backgrounds, including law, civil protection and evaluation. The team is dedicated only to humanitarian assistance, making it adequate for managing a limited budget. Due to the complex project identification process, the team spends a great deal of time administering grants. Meeting Poland's ambitions to increase its humanitarian aid efficiency will require the humanitarian team to spend more time on strengthening partnerships, including in the field, and devising strategies with other donors, rather than on managing internal procedures.

## Results, learning and accountability

**Indicator: Results are measured and communicated, and lessons learnt**

**While Poland is strengthening its institutional capacity, notably through evaluations and a results-based approach, humanitarian programming is not benefiting fully from these internal developments. This restricts Poland's ability to learn and adjust its humanitarian country strategy within the annual Development Cooperation Plans. Poland has a well-designed communication strategy that reflects public support to humanitarian activities. However, the complexity of the migration crisis calls for more robust communication with the public and political leaders.**

**Humanitarian assistance is side-lined in the evaluation reform**

Humanitarian aid is not specifically targeted in Poland's annual evaluation plans, even if humanitarian actions have occurred in the countries being reviewed.[11] During protracted crisis and long-term humanitarian support, such as in the Middle East and Ukraine, Poland could usefully include humanitarian action within its evaluation plans to reflect on the coherence between its development and humanitarian instruments. In 2016, Poland is introducing a results framework so as to manage its development projects based on results. This framework could effectively be used for humanitarian issues as well.

**Diplomat training in humanitarian issues could enhance monitoring**

Project monitoring is part of the normal management process. It is undertaken either by the humanitarian team in Warsaw, or by the embassies. Monitoring depends on project accessibility; largely because of security risks, only around 50% of humanitarian projects are monitored (according to the MFA). Development diplomats have limited knowledge of humanitarian assistance according to Poland's partners. Specific training on humanitarian issues could prompt more exchanges and needs assessment with partners and other donors in the field to further improve the humanitarian response.

**Public communication is effective but political understanding could be deepened**

Poland has a good public communication strategy (Chapter 6) and 65% of the general public have a good opinion of development co-operation, including humanitarian assistance (Polish Aid, 2016b). Although this represents a general decline in support since 2008,[12] it is still a sound basis on which to build more robust communication with political leaders and decision makers. Such communication could help build a deeper understanding of the humanitarian challenges in complex situations such as migration crises, and prompt stronger support for the institutional changes required for Poland to better address those challenges.

# Notes

1. Notably the Ministry of Interior, and its subordinate services, the Ministry of National Defence, the Government Centre for Security; and the Ministry of Health (MFA, 2015).

2. For instance, Poland launched a call for proposals on 21 October 2015 for humanitarian operations in Ukraine. The tender result was published on 26 November 2015, with a deadline of 31 December 2015 to complete the operation. See www.polskapomoc.gov.pl/Konkursy,2015,2125.html.

3. The EU Civil Protection Mechanism was established in 2001 to enable co-ordinated assistance from the participating states to victims of natural and man-made disasters in Europe and elsewhere. The mechanism currently includes all 28 EU Member States in addition to Iceland, Montenegro, Norway, Serbia, the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, and Turkey (http://ec.europa.eu/echo/what/civil-protection/mechanism_en).

4. More information about the Euro-Atlantic Disaster Response Coordination Centre can be found at: www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/topics_117757.htm.

5. Irrespective of when a crisis occurs in the year, the partner must stop its accounting on 31st December and report on its activity and expenditure before submitting a follow-up call for proposal. There is no certainty that the follow-up proposal will be retained by the selection committee. If selected, the NGO has to meet its expenditure between the 1st January and the signature date of the new contract, as expenses are not eligible retroactively. This puts partners at financial, operational and security risks as not all field costs can be stopped by 31 December.

6. This is a first attempt at supporting multiannual humanitarian projects. It requires the NGO to deliver a first financial and technical report by 31 January 2016 and second one by 31st January 2017. This protocol has been primarily used in development projects (Polish Aid, 2016a).

7. The updated Guidelines on the Use of Military and Civil Defence Assets in Disaster Relief (the "Oslo Guidelines"; UN-OCHA, 2007), and the 2003 Guidelines on the Use of Military and Civil Defence Assets to Support United Nations Humanitarian Activities in Complex Emergencies www.refworld.org/pdfid/3f13f73b4.pdf.

8. The CCOE offers specialised training and education in order to enhance the general knowledge of CIMIC and to enable military and civil operators to conduct CIMIC-related tasks in various missions and scenarios (www.cimic-coe.org/products/training-education).

9. About 3 500 Polish soldiers and military personnel currently participate in 14 international operations carried out under the auspices of the UN, NATO and the EU Ministry of National Defence, http://en.mon.gov.pl/missions/.

10. For instance see: http://en.mon.gov.pl/news/article/latest-news/2014-08-27-aid-for-ukrainian-soldiers-kicked-off/ or http://en.mon.gov.pl/news/article/latest-news/2014-12-05-we-finish-participation-in-isaf-mission/.

11. Each year, several countries and themes are selected for evaluation. In 2016, Poland will evaluate programmes from 2012 to 2015 related to 1) education and vocational and social empowerment; 2) environmental protection; and 3) health care. In the West Bank and Gaza Strip, Poland will look at education, water and sanitation, small and medium-sized enterprises and job creation. More information on Poland's evaluation programme at: www.polskapomoc.gov.pl/Ewaluacja,2033.html#2015.

12. The 2008 opinion poll showed that 84% of Poles believed that Poland should provide development assistance to less developed countries. All opinion polls available at: www.polskapomoc.gov.pl/Public,Opinion,Polls,197.html.

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# Annex A: OECD/DAC standard suite of tables


**Table A.1 Total financial flows**

USD million at current prices and exchange rates

| Poland | Net disbursements 2000-04 | 2005-09 | 2010 | 2011 | 2012 | 2013 | 2014 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| **Total official flows** | **45** | **323** | **378** | **417** | **421** | **487** | **452** |
| Official development assistance | **45** | **323** | **378** | **417** | **421** | **487** | **452** |
| Bilateral | 19 | 100 | 96 | 91 | 112 | 127 | 82 |
| Multilateral | 25 | 223 | 282 | 327 | 310 | 360 | 370 |
| Other official flows | - | - | - | - | - | - | - |
| Bilateral | - | - | - | - | - | - | - |
| Multilateral | - | - | - | - | - | - | - |
| **Net Private Grants** | - | - | - | - | - | - | - |
| **Private flows at market terms** | - | - | - | - | - | - | - |
| Bilateral: *of which* | - | - | - | - | - | - | - |
| Direct investment | - | - | - | - | - | - | - |
| Export credits | - | - | - | - | - | - | - |
| Multilateral | - | - | - | - | - | - | - |
| **Total flows** | **45** | **323** | **378** | **417** | **421** | **487** | **452** |
| ***for reference:*** | | | | | | | |
| *ODA (at constant 2013 USD million)* | *72* | *345* | *385* | *405* | *438* | *490* | *452* |
| *ODA (as a % of GNI)* | *0.03* | *0.08* | *0.08* | *0.08* | *0.09* | *0.10* | *0.09* |
| *Total flows (as a % of GNI) (a)* | *0.03* | *0.08* | *0.08* | *0.08* | *0.09* | *0.10* | *0.09* |
| *ODA to and channelled through NGOs* | | | | | | | |
| *- In USD million* | - | - | - | - | 0 | 13 | 16 |
| *- In percentage of total net ODA* | - | - | - | - | 0 | 3 | 3 |
| *- DAC countries' average % of total net ODA* | *9* | *7* | *9* | *13* | *13* | *13* | *13* |

a. To countries eligible for ODA.


**ODA net disbursements**
**At constant 2014 prices and exchange rates and as a share of GNI**




## Table A.2 ODA by main categories

*Disbursements*

| Poland | Constant 2014 USD million | | | | | Per cent share of gross disbursements | | | | | Total DAC |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | 2010 | 2011 | 2012 | 2013 | 2014 | 2010 | 2011 | 2012 | 2013 | 2014 | 2014% |
| **Gross Bilateral ODA** | **104** | **95** | **134** | **147** | **104** | **27** | **23** | **29** | **29** | **22** | **72** |
| Budget support | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | 2 |
| of which: General budget support | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | 1 |
| Core contributions & pooled prog.& funds | - | - | - | 9 | 4 | - | - | - | 2 | 1 | 14 |
| of which: Core support to national NGOs | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | 1 |
| Core support to international NGOs | - | - | 0 | 0 | 0 | - | - | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 |
| Core support to PPPs | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | 0 |
| Project-type interventions | - | - | - | 108 | 66 | - | - | - | 21 | 14 | 40 |
| of which: Investment projects | - | - | - | - | 5 | - | - | - | - | 1 | 14 |
| Experts and other technical assistance | - | - | - | 3 | 2 | - | - | - | 1 | 1 | 4 |
| Scholarships and student costs in donor countrie | - | - | - | 26 | 29 | - | - | - | 5 | 6 | 2 |
| of which: Imputed student costs | - | - | - | 17 | 20 | - | - | - | 3 | 4 | 1 |
| Debt relief grants | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | 1 |
| Administrative costs | - | 1 | 0 | 0 | 1 | - | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 4 |
| Other in-donor expenditures | - | - | - | 1 | 1 | - | - | - | 0 | 0 | 5 |
| of which: refugees in donor countries | - | - | - | - | - | | | | | | |
| **Gross Multilateral ODA** | **287** | **317** | **322** | **362** | **370** | **73** | **77** | **71** | **71** | **78** | **28** |
| UN agencies | 5 | 11 | 18 | 17 | 19 | 1 | 3 | 4 | 3 | 4 | 5 |
| EU institutions | 274 | 303 | 296 | 333 | 339 | 70 | 73 | 65 | 65 | 72 | 9 |
| World Bank group | 2 | 1 | 2 | 4 | 4 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | 1 | 6 |
| Regional development banks | - | - | - | - | 0 | - | - | - | - | 0 | 3 |
| Other multilateral | 6 | 2 | 6 | 8 | 8 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 2 | 2 | 6 |
| **Total gross ODA** | **391** | **412** | **456** | **509** | **473** | **100** | **100** | **100** | **100** | **100** | **100** |
| of which: Gross ODA loans | - | - | - | 71 | 38 | - | - | - | 14 | 8 | 12 |
| Bilateral | - | - | - | 71 | 38 | - | - | - | 14 | 8 | 12 |
| Multilateral | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | 0 |
| **Repayments and debt cancellation** | **- 6** | **- 7** | **- 18** | **- 19** | **- 21** | | | | | | |
| **Total net ODA** | **385** | **405** | **438** | **490** | **452** | | | | | | |
| ***For reference:*** | | | | | | | | | | | |
| *Free standing technical co-operation* | - | - | - | *28* | *41* | | | | | | |
| *Net debt relief* | - | - | - | - | - | | | | | | |








**Table A.3 Bilateral ODA allocable[1] by region and income group**

*Gross disbursements*

| Poland | Constant 2014 USD million | | | | | % share | | | | | Total DAC |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | 2010 | 2011 | 2012 | 2013 | 2014 | 2010 | 2011 | 2012 | 2013 | 2014 | 2014% |
| **Africa** | 3 | 4 | 4 | 45 | 42 | 3 | 4 | 3 | 34 | 41 | **41** |
| Sub-Saharan Africa | 3 | 3 | 3 | 44 | 41 | 3 | 3 | 3 | 34 | 41 | **35** |
| North Africa | 0 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 0 | 0 | 1 | 1 | 0 | 0 | **4** |
| **Asia** | 69 | 26 | 82 | 42 | 9 | 67 | 28 | 67 | 32 | 9 | **33** |
| South and Central Asia | 17 | 20 | 17 | 11 | 7 | 17 | 22 | 14 | 8 | 7 | **19** |
| Far East | 51 | 5 | 66 | 31 | 1 | 50 | 6 | 54 | 24 | 1 | **12** |
| **America** | 0 | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | **10** |
| North and Central America | 0 | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | **4** |
| South America | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | **5** |
| **Middle East** | 1 | 1 | 2 | 4 | 3 | 1 | 1 | 2 | 3 | 3 | **10** |
| **Oceania** | - | - | 0 | 0 | 0 | - | - | 0 | 0 | 0 | **2** |
| **Europe** | 29 | 60 | 34 | 40 | 47 | 28 | 66 | 27 | 30 | 47 | **5** |
| **Total bilateral allocable by region** | **102** | **91** | **123** | **131** | **100** | **100** | **100** | **100** | **100** | **100** | **100** |
| **Least developed** | 10 | 12 | 13 | 47 | 41 | 9 | 13 | 10 | 36 | 41 | **40** |
| **Other low-income** | 0 | 1 | 4 | 1 | 2 | 0 | 1 | 3 | 1 | 2 | **4** |
| **Lower middle-income** | 26 | 28 | 24 | 32 | 33 | 26 | 31 | 20 | 24 | 33 | **35** |
| **Upper middle-income** | 65 | 50 | 82 | 51 | 23 | 64 | 55 | 67 | 39 | 24 | **21** |
| **More advanced developing countries** | 0 | - | - | - | - | 0 | - | - | - | - | **-** |
| **Total bilateral allocable by income** | **102** | **91** | **122** | **131** | **99** | **100** | **100** | **100** | **100** | **100** | **100** |
| ***For reference:*** | | | | | | | | | | | |
| *Total bilateral* | 104 | 95 | 134 | 147 | 104 | *100* | *100* | *100* | *100* | *100* | ***100*** |
| *of which: Unallocated by region* | *1* | *4* | *12* | *16* | *4* | *1* | *4* | *9* | *11* | *3* | ***27*** |
| *of which: Unallocated by income* | *2* | *4* | *12* | *16* | *4* | *2* | *5* | *9* | *11* | *4* | ***36*** |




1. Each region includes regional amounts which cannot be allocated by sub-region. The sum of the sub-regional amounts may therefore fall short of the regional total.

## Table A.4 Main recipients of bilateral ODA

*Gross disbursements*


| Poland | 2003-07 average | | | Memo: DAC | | 2008-12 average | | | Memo: DAC | | 2013-14 average | | | Memo: DAC |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | Current USD million | Constant 2014 USD mln | % share | countries' average % | | Current USD million | Constant 2014 USD mln | % share | countries' average % | | Current USD million | Constant 2014 USD mln | % share | countries average % |
| Angola | 19 | 22 | 24 | | China (People's Republic of) | 31 | 31 | 30 | | Angola | 28 | 28 | 22 | |
| China (People's Republic of) | 15 | 16 | 20 | | Belarus | 17 | 17 | 17 | | Belarus | 21 | 21 | 16 | |
| Serbia | 8 | 11 | 10 | | Ukraine | 12 | 12 | 11 | | Ukraine | 18 | 19 | 15 | |
| Nicaragua | 6 | 6 | 8 | | Afghanistan | 7 | 7 | 7 | | China (People's Republic of) | 13 | 13 | 11 | |
| Ukraine | 5 | 6 | 7 | | Georgia | 6 | 6 | 6 | | Ethiopia | 12 | 12 | 10 | |
| **Top 5 recipients** | **53** | **62** | **70** | **31** | **Top 5 recipients** | **72** | **73** | **70** | **31** | **Top 5 recipients** | **92** | **92** | **74** | **23** |
| Belarus | 5 | 6 | 7 | | Bosnia and Herzegovina | 6 | 5 | 5 | | Georgia | 3 | 3 | 2 | |
| Uzbekistan | 3 | 4 | 4 | | Angola | 3 | 3 | 3 | | Moldova | 3 | 3 | 2 | |
| Montenegro | 3 | 3 | 4 | | Viet Nam | 3 | 3 | 3 | | Afghanistan | 2 | 2 | 2 | |
| Ethiopia | 2 | 3 | 2 | | Kazakhstan | 2 | 2 | 2 | | Viet Nam | 2 | 2 | 2 | |
| Kazakhstan | 2 | 2 | 2 | | Moldova | 2 | 2 | 2 | | Syrian Arab Republic | 2 | 2 | 2 | |
| **Top 10 recipients** | **67** | **79** | **88** | **41** | **Top 10 recipients** | **87** | **87** | **85** | **45** | **Top 10 recipients** | **104** | **105** | **83** | **36** |
| Moldova | 1 | 1 | 1 | | Kyrgyzstan | 1 | 1 | 1 | | Kazakhstan | 1 | 1 | 1 | |
| Mongolia | 1 | 1 | 1 | | Armenia | 1 | 1 | 1 | | Kosovo | 1 | 1 | 1 | |
| Afghanistan | 1 | 1 | 1 | | Montenegro | 1 | 1 | 1 | | West Bank and Gaza Strip | 1 | 1 | 1 | |
| Georgia | 1 | 1 | 1 | | West Bank and Gaza Strip | 1 | 1 | 1 | | Kenya | 1 | 1 | 1 | |
| Viet Nam | 1 | 1 | 1 | | Democratic People's Republic of Kore | 1 | 1 | 1 | | Mongolia | 1 | 1 | 1 | |
| **Top 15 recipients** | **71** | **83** | **93** | **46** | **Top 15 recipients** | **90** | **90** | **88** | **51** | **Top 15 recipients** | **109** | **109** | **87** | **42** |
| Iraq | 0 | 1 | 1 | | Mongolia | 1 | 1 | 0 | | Tajikistan | 1 | 1 | 0 | |
| West Bank and Gaza Strip | 0 | 0 | 0 | | Kenya | 0 | 0 | 0 | | Armenia | 0 | 0 | 0 | |
| Sudan | 0 | 0 | 0 | | Syrian Arab Republic | 0 | 0 | 0 | | Tanzania | 0 | 0 | 0 | |
| Tanzania | 0 | 0 | 0 | | Tanzania | 0 | 0 | 0 | | Tunisia | 0 | 0 | 0 | |
| Albania | 0 | 0 | 0 | | Rwanda | 0 | 0 | 0 | | Uzbekistan | 0 | 0 | 0 | |
| **Top 20 recipients** | **72** | **84** | **94** | **51** | **Top 20 recipients** | **92** | **92** | **89** | **56** | **Top 20 recipients** | **111** | **111** | **89** | **46** |
| **Total (96 recipients)** | **75** | **88** | **99** | | **Total (89 recipients)** | **98** | **98** | **95** | | **Total (86 recipients)** | **115** | **115** | **92** | |
| Unallocated | 1 | 1 | 1 | 33 | Unallocated | 5 | 5 | 5 | 31 | Unallocated | 10 | 9 | 8 | 38 |
| **Total bilateral gross** | **76** | **89** | **100** | **100** | **Total bilateral gross** | **103** | **103** | **100** | **100** | **Total bilateral gross** | **125** | **124** | **100** | **100** |

**Table A.5 Bilateral ODA by major purposes**

at constant prices and exchange rates

*Commitments - Two-year average*

| Poland | 2003-07 average | | 2008-12 average | | 2013-14 average | | 2013-14 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | 2014 USD million | % | 2014 USD million | % | 2014 USD million | % | % |
| **Social infrastructure & services** | .. | .. | .. | .. | **56** | **30** | **38** |
| Education | .. | .. | .. | .. | 30 | 16 | 8 |
| of which: basic education | .. | .. | .. | .. | 1 | 0 | 2 |
| Health | .. | .. | .. | .. | 1 | 1 | 5 |
| of which: basic health | .. | .. | .. | .. | 1 | 0 | 3 |
| Population & reproductive health | .. | .. | .. | .. | 0 | 0 | 7 |
| Water supply & sanitation | .. | .. | .. | .. | 1 | 1 | 4 |
| Government & civil society | .. | .. | .. | .. | 19 | 10 | 11 |
| *of which: Conflict, peace & security* | .. | .. | .. | .. | 2 | 1 | 2 |
| Other social infrastructure & services | .. | .. | .. | .. | 4 | 2 | 2 |
| **Economic infrastructure & services** | .. | .. | .. | .. | **2** | **1** | **19** |
| Transport & storage | .. | .. | .. | .. | 0 | 0 | 8 |
| Communications | .. | .. | .. | .. | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| Energy | .. | .. | .. | .. | 1 | 0 | 7 |
| Banking & financial services | .. | .. | .. | .. | 1 | 0 | 2 |
| Business & other services | .. | .. | .. | .. | 1 | 0 | 2 |
| **Production sectors** | .. | .. | .. | .. | **93** | **50** | **7** |
| Agriculture, forestry & fishing | .. | .. | .. | .. | 93 | 49 | 5 |
| Industry, mining & construction | .. | .. | .. | .. | 0 | 0 | 1 |
| Trade & tourism | .. | .. | .. | .. | 0 | 0 | 1 |
| **Multisector** | .. | .. | .. | .. | **31** | **16** | **9** |
| **Commodity and programme aid** | .. | .. | .. | .. | - | - | **3** |
| **Action relating to debt** | .. | .. | .. | .. | - | - | **2** |
| **Humanitarian aid** | .. | .. | .. | .. | **5** | **3** | **11** |
| **Administrative costs of donors** | .. | .. | .. | .. | **0** | **0** | **6** |
| **Refugees in donor countries** | .. | .. | .. | .. | - | - | **5** |
| **Total bilateral allocable** | .. | .. | .. | .. | **188** | **100** | **100** |
| *For reference:* | | | | | | | |
| *Total bilateral* | - | - | *67* | *18* | *189* | *32* | *73* |
| *of which: Unallocated* | *0* | - | *67* | *18* | *2* | *0* | *1* |
| *Total multilateral* | *155* | *100* | *297* | *82* | *394* | *68* | *27* |
| ***Total ODA*** | ***155*** | ***100*** | ***363*** | ***100*** | ***583*** | ***100*** | ***100*** |



## Table A.6 Comparative aid performance

| | Official development assistance | | | Net disbursements: Share of multilateral aid | | | | Net disbursements: Grant element of ODA commitments | Commitments: Untied aid |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | 2014 | | 2008-09 to 2013-14 Average annual % change in real terms | 2014 % of ODA | | 2014 % of GNI | | 2014 | % of bilateral commitments Year |
| | USD million | % of GNI | | ( b ) | ( c ) | ( b ) | ( c ) | % ( a ) | (d) |
| Australia | 4 382 | 0.31 | 4.5 | 20.2 | | 0.06 | | 99.9 | 89.1 |
| Austria | 1 235 | 0.28 | -3.5 | 48.4 | 23.1 | 0.14 | 0.07 | 100.0 | 48.2 |
| Belgium | 2 448 | 0.46 | -1.4 | 46.0 | 25.2 | 0.21 | 0.12 | 99.9 | 96.7 |
| Canada | 4 240 | 0.24 | -1.6 | 22.7 | | 0.05 | | 97.2 | 93.0 |
| Czech Republic | 212 | 0.11 | -0.5 | 70.5 | 10.6 | 0.08 | 0.01 | 100.0 | 32.4 |
| Denmark | 3 003 | 0.86 | 0.7 | 29.0 | 19.9 | 0.25 | 0.17 | 100.0 | 95.1 |
| Finland | 1 635 | 0.60 | 4.0 | 42.6 | 30.6 | 0.26 | 0.18 | 100.0 | 90.4 |
| France | 10 620 | 0.37 | -1.0 | 38.7 | 16.5 | 0.14 | 0.06 | 85.6 | 92.3 |
| Germany | 16 566 | 0.42 | 3.2 | 30.0 | 12.7 | 0.13 | 0.05 | 83.6 | 83.6 |
| Greece | 247 | 0.11 | -16.8 | 81.4 | 8.1 | 0.09 | 0.01 | 100.0 | 22.0 |
| Iceland | 37 | 0.22 | -3.5 | 17.1 | | 0.04 | | 100.0 | 100.0 |
| Ireland | 816 | 0.38 | -5.2 | 36.4 | 18.8 | 0.14 | 0.07 | 100.0 | 98.0 |
| Italy | 4 009 | 0.19 | -1.7 | 65.8 | 24.3 | 0.12 | 0.05 | 99.9 | 93.7 |
| Japan | 9 266 | 0.19 | 3.4 | 35.1 | | 0.07 | | 87.0 | 78.1 |
| Korea | 1 857 | 0.13 | 13.1 | 24.8 | | 0.03 | | 95.1 | 53.2 |
| Luxembourg | 423 | 1.06 | -1.0 | 29.0 | 20.9 | 0.31 | 0.22 | 100.0 | 97.5 |
| Netherlands | 5 573 | 0.64 | -3.4 | 27.7 | 16.1 | 0.18 | 0.10 | 100.0 | 98.4 |
| New Zealand | 506 | 0.27 | 1.4 | 19.2 | | 0.05 | | 100.0 | 81.8 |
| Norway | 5 086 | 1.00 | 2.7 | 23.5 | | 0.24 | | 100.0 | 100.0 |
| Poland | 452 | 0.09 | 5.2 | 81.8 | 6.7 | 0.07 | 0.01 | 90.0 | 10.6 |
| Portugal | 430 | 0.19 | -3.4 | 42.7 | 4.0 | 0.08 | 0.01 | 89.7 | 34.5 |
| Slovak Republic | 83 | 0.09 | 0.6 | 80.3 | 6.9 | 0.07 | 0.01 | 100.0 | 0.0 |
| Slovenia | 62 | 0.12 | -1.8 | 67.1 | 11.5 | 0.08 | 0.01 | 100.0 | |
| Spain | 1 877 | 0.13 | -19.8 | 75.3 | 20.7 | 0.10 | 0.03 | 100.0 | 83.6 |
| Sweden | 6 233 | 1.09 | 2.8 | 30.3 | 23.8 | 0.33 | 0.26 | 100.0 | 85.8 |
| Switzerland | 3 522 | 0.50 | 5.4 | 21.1 | | 0.11 | | 100.0 | 93.9 |
| United Kingdom | 19 306 | 0.70 | 9.0 | 41.8 | 31.9 | 0.29 | 0.22 | 98.9 | 99.9 |
| United States | 33 096 | 0.19 | 1.5 | 16.9 | | 0.03 | | 100.0 | 62.5 |
| **Total DAC** | **137 222** | **0.30** | **1.4** | **31.0** | | **0.09** | | **94.2** | **80.6** |
| Memo: **Average country effort** | | **0.39** | | | | | | | |

*Notes:*

a. Excluding debt reorganisation.
b. Including EU institutions.
c. Excluding EU institutions.
d. Excluding administrative costs and in-donor refugee costs.
.. Data not available.

## Table A.7 Comparative aid performance to LDCs

| | Bilateral ODA to LDCs 2014 | | | Total ODA to LDCs (Bilateral and imputed multilateral ODA) 2014 | | | Grant element of bilateral ODA commitments[a] to LDCs (two alternative norms) | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | *Net disbursements* | | | | | | *Commitments* | | |
| | | | | | | | Annually for all LDCs Norm: 90% | | 3-year average for each LDC Norm: 86% |
| | USD million | % bilateral ODA | % of GNI | USD million | % total ODA | % of GNI | 2013 | 2014 | 2012-2014 |
| Australia | 886 | 25.3 | 0.06 | 1 219 | 27.8 | 0.09 | 100.0 | 100.0 | c |
| Austria | 157 | 24.7 | 0.04 | 362 | 29.3 | 0.08 | 100.0 | 100.0 | c |
| Belgium | 474 | 35.9 | 0.09 | 829 | 33.9 | 0.16 | 99.6 | 99.6 | n |
| Canada | 1 039 | 31.7 | 0.06 | 1 398 | 33.0 | 0.08 | 100.0 | 100.0 | c |
| Czech Republic | 14 | 22.9 | 0.01 | 52 | 24.4 | 0.03 | 100.0 | 100.0 | c |
| Denmark | 614 | 28.8 | 0.17 | 900 | 30.0 | 0.26 | 100.0 | 100.0 | c |
| Finland | 325 | 34.7 | 0.12 | 568 | 34.7 | 0.21 | 100.0 | 100.0 | c |
| France | 1 255 | 19.3 | 0.04 | 2 553 | 24.0 | 0.09 | 90.4 | 82.2 | n |
| Germany | 2 258 | 19.5 | 0.06 | 3 833 | 23.1 | 0.10 | 98.8 | 98.7 | c |
| Greece | 2 | 4.0 | 0.00 | 50 | 20.0 | 0.02 | 100.0 | 100.0 | c |
| Iceland | 13 | 42.1 | 0.08 | 15 | 40.6 | 0.09 | 100.0 | 100.0 | c |
| Ireland | 309 | 59.6 | 0.14 | 397 | 48.7 | 0.18 | 100.0 | 100.0 | c |
| Italy | 172 | 12.6 | 0.01 | 961 | 24.0 | 0.04 | 100.0 | 99.1 | c |
| Japan | 2 175 | 36.2 | 0.05 | 3 521 | 38.0 | 0.07 | 93.8 | 93.0 | c |
| Korea | 542 | 38.8 | 0.04 | 714 | 38.5 | 0.05 | 95.4 | 94.4 | c |
| Luxembourg | 135 | 45.0 | 0.34 | 172 | 40.7 | 0.43 | 100.0 | 100.0 | c |
| Netherlands | 590 | 14.6 | 0.07 | 1 120 | 20.1 | 0.13 | 100.0 | 100.0 | c |
| New Zealand | 113 | 27.7 | 0.06 | 139 | 27.5 | 0.07 | 100.0 | 100.0 | c |
| Norway | 968 | 24.9 | 0.19 | 1 424 | 28.0 | 0.28 | 100.0 | 100.0 | c |
| Poland | 41 | 49.5 | 0.01 | 130 | 28.8 | 0.02 | 100.0 | 82.0 | n |
| Portugal | 74 | 29.9 | 0.03 | 119 | 27.7 | 0.05 | 84.2 | 87.9 | n |
| Slovak Republic | 1 | 7.1 | 0.00 | 18 | 21.0 | 0.02 | 100.0 | 100.0 | c |
| Slovenia | 0 | 2.2 | 0.00 | 11 | 17.5 | 0.02 | 100.0 | 100.0 | c |
| Spain | 124 | 26.7 | 0.01 | 487 | 25.9 | 0.03 | 100.0 | 100.0 | c |
| Sweden | 985 | 22.7 | 0.17 | 1 628 | 26.1 | 0.29 | 100.0 | 100.0 | c |
| Switzerland | 579 | 20.8 | 0.08 | 872 | 24.8 | 0.12 | 100.0 | 100.0 | c |
| United Kingdom | 3 807 | 33.9 | 0.14 | 6 615 | 34.3 | 0.24 | 100.0 | 100.0 | c |
| United States | 8 636 | 31.4 | 0.05 | 10 846 | 32.8 | 0.06 | 100.0 | 100.0 | c |
| **Total DAC** | **26 290** | **27.8** | **0.06** | **40 952** | **29.8** | **0.09** | **97.4** | **97.6** | **..** |


***Notes:***

**a.** Excluding debt reorganisation. Equities are treated as having 100% grant element, but are not treated as loans.

**b.** c = compliance, n = non compliance.


**..** Data not available.

**Figure A.1 Net ODA from DAC countries in 2015 (preliminary data)**




# Annex B: Organisational structure

**Figure B.1 The organisation of the Polish development co-operation system, 2016**




*Source:* MFA (2016), "Memorandum of Poland: 2016 DAC Peer Review", unpublished, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Warsaw.

**Figure B.2 The Polish Development Cooperation Department's organisational chart, 2016**




*Source:* MFA (2016), "Memorandum of Poland: 2016 DAC Peer Review", unpublished, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Warsaw.

# Annex C: Perspectives from Ukraine on Polish development co-operation

**Poland's development co-operation is centrally managed with limited physical presence and direct implementation in partner countries. To get a perspective on how Poland delivers its development co-operation in its priority countries, the peer review team – made up of examiners from Austria and Portugal and OECD secretariat – conducted a review of Polish co-operation in Ukraine. This involved conference calls and face-to-face meetings with Ukraine's Minister for Development and other Ukrainian officials, Poland's Ambassador and staff to Ukraine, and representatives of the Solidarity Fund responsible for implementing aid projects. To deepen the field perspective, phone interviews were also organised with two Development Assistance Committee (DAC) members who work closely with Poland in Ukraine, and development counsellors in Poland's embassies to Georgia and Moldova.**

## Poland's policies, strategies and aid allocations to Ukraine

**Poland's co-operation with Ukraine builds on shared history, culture, and interdependence and solidarity between neighbours**

Ukraine is an important neighbour and partner for Poland. Development co-operation has come to complement the political partnership between Ukraine and Poland which began in 1991, when Poland recognised Ukraine's independence (MFA, 2010). Polish co-operation with Ukraine – and other Eastern Partnership countries – is underpinned by its belief in the strong links between the promotion of democracy and support for social and economic transformation. Poland believes that external aid – not only financial, but also practical assistance supporting the development of democratic institutions – can be an important supporter for transformation (MFA, 2011a).

Ukraine aims to become a democratic and flourishing economy and to succeed in the task of EU integration. In doing so, it can benefit from Poland's national and regional development experience in transforming its own economy and society and in joining the EU. A common political history, long-standing social interaction between the countries, and a shared border and language (Russian) give Poland a good insight into the local context, culture and systems and ease communication between the two countries. Their similar starting points – evolving from a Soviet-style administrative system – mean that Poland's experience in decentralisation and reform of the public administration is particularly valuable to Ukraine. Ukraine values highly the support Poland offers on local government reform, education and public financial systems and custom procedures. This support comes in the form of study tours, training to civil servants in co-operation with the National School of Public Administration, advice and twinning projects.

## Annex C: Perspectives from Ukraine on Polish development co-operation

### Poland is responding to requests of the Government of Ukraine and capitalises on its comparative advantage and transition expertise

Poland has been providing official development assistance (ODA) to Ukraine since 2005, one year after it joined the EU. Ukraine has been a priority country for Poland since its first Multiannual Development Cooperation Programme 2012-2015. This programme outlined Poland's development co-operation with Ukraine around three main priorities: 1) public security and border management; 2) regional development and capacity building (of public and local administration); and 3) small and medium-sized enterprises and job-creation (MFA, 2011b). Since the onset of Ukraine's recent crisis in 2014, Poland has stepped up its co-operation. Poland is responding to explicit requests for support from Ukraine's Prime Minister, notably to support its decentralisation reform and internally displaced people. Poland's more strategic and long-term engagement was declared by President Andrzej Duda during his first state visit to Ukraine in December 2015.

A significant new feature of this bilateral partnership with Ukraine is that it is Poland's first experience of preparing development co-operation that meets the specific requests of its partner government. A memorandum of understanding details the long-term partnership between the two governments. This experience can serve as a model for Poland's bilateral government co-operation with other partner countries.

Poland's development co-operation in Ukraine is mainly implemented in three regions – Lviv, Vinnytsia and Rivne (Western Ukraine) – and Kiev. Co-operation in Eastern Ukraine is limited, since partnerships with local authorities are weaker and because of the limited presence of Polish NGOs (MFA, 2015a).

### Ukraine is the largest recipient of Poland's grant aid


Polish bilateral ODA to Ukraine has been increasing since 2009 (Figure C.1) and reached an all-time high of USD 21.95 million USD in 2014 (representing 21% of Polish bilateral ODA). In 2013-14 Ukraine was the third largest recipient of Polish aid after Angola and Belarus (Table A.4, Annex A).

Poland was the eighth largest bilateral donor in Ukraine in 2013-14, after the European Union, the United States, Canada, Germany, Japan, Sweden and Switzerland. Within the context of a worsening security situation and growing tensions in the eastern part of the territory, total ODA to Ukraine from all donors nearly doubled between 2013 and 2014 (from USD 792 million to USD 1.4 billion).

The 2014 revolution in Ukraine created momentum for donors to offer their support to democratic and economic reform. The Ukrainian Government has established a donor council to improve co-ordination among the increasing number of donors working in Ukraine, and to avoid duplication through an action plan with immediate priorities, though this is still work in progress. According to interviews carried out by the peer review team, donors are asking the government for a clearer picture on where their support is needed.

**Figure C.1 Poland's bilateral ODA disbursements to Ukraine, 2005-2014**

Gross disbursements, USD million, 2014 constant prices




*Source:* OECD (2016), "Geographical distribution of financial flows: Flows to developing countries", *OECD International Development Statistics* (database), http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/data-00566-en (accessed on 22 August 2016)

**Poland uses a mix of aid modalities in Ukraine**

Poland's development co-operation activities support the process of political and socio-economic transformation in Ukraine and are implemented in collaboration with the Polish Embassy in Kiev, Polish NGOs, Polish central and local government administration bodies and the Solidarity Fund. Poland supports the development projects of Ukraine's central government bodies, NGOs, local authorities, universities, and scholarships (MFA, 2015a).

Polish projects are financed through the MFA's calls for proposals directed to Polish NGOs, central administration entities, public and non-public universities and research units. The Polish Embassy in Kiev also finances projects under the Small Grants Fund. This fund is a useful tool for the embassy to transfer money directly to local partners (NGOs, local authorities, public institutions) and therefore to finance projects initiated at the local level. The embassy tries to reach vulnerable people in need of support. However, the small budget for these grants limits their potential impact. In addition, the timeframe for implementing annual projects can be as short as six months if there are delays in approving them in headquarters. While there is an appetite to design modular projects over two to three years, the embassy's local partners will need training to be able to design and manage such projects.

**Scholarships and imputed student costs account for more than half of Polish aid to Ukraine**

According to the DAC Creditor Reporting System (CRS), imputed student costs, project-type interventions (carried out mostly by Polish NGOs) and scholarships represented the biggest share of Polish bilateral aid to Ukraine in 2014 (respectively 48%, 25% and 18%). According to Poland's Development Cooperation Department, every year an average of 130 Ukrainian nationals receive scholarships financed by Polish aid (MFA, 2015a). Interviews carried out by the peer review team on this subject revealed that Ukraine finds scholarship co-operation with Poland valuable, smooth and efficient, although communication with Poland's Ministry of Science and Higher Education can falter due to staff turnover.

**Humanitarian aid focuses mainly on internally displaced people**

Polish humanitarian assistance to Ukraine has mainly been providing support to internally displaced persons (IDPs) through Polish NGOs and multilateral organisations. Through its partnership with the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), Poland is linking its humanitarian aid with supporting IDPs to build their entrepreneurship capacities, thus mixing humanitarian, development aid and economic development.

**Poland is a valuable partner for local government reform**

Poland is a key partner in supporting local government reform in Ukraine. Polish government administration activities in this area are co-ordinated by the office of a Government Plenipotentiary for Supporting Reforms in Ukraine, established by the Polish Council of Ministers in March 2015 (MFA, 2015b). This support is managed and implemented by the Solidarity Fund in the framework of a 2014 memorandum of understanding between the Polish MFA and Ukraine's Ministry of Regional Development, Construction, and Communal Living.

The Solidarity Fund, in collaboration with the MFA, organises a range of activities to support local government reform in Ukraine. These activities include: the constitution of a team of experts to provide advisory services for draft legislation and institutional arrangements on the reform; organisation of seminars, internships and study tours; and project implementation (MFA, 2015a).

The Solidarity Fund has established an implementation unit within the Ukrainian Ministry of Regional Development, Construction, and Communal Living which supports the local government reform in Ukraine. This unit reports and exchanges information with the Polish Embassy and the Department of Development Cooperation in the MFA, and links with Poland's aid implementation partners, journalists, civil society, and other donors working on decentralisation in Ukraine.[1] According to the Solidarity Fund, Poland's support has been critical to Ukraine's progress in carrying out a very complex fiscal decentralisation and the reform of its local administration. For example, 847 small communities have been consolidated into 172 larger communities and local tax receipts have increased.

The Polish MFA also supports a three-year (2014-16) joint Polish-Canadian Democracy Support Programme (with a budget of approximately USD 4.1 million for 2015-2017). This is implemented by the Solidarity Fund, and aims to support pro-democratic changes in Ukraine, in particular strengthening local democracy and independence of local media through co-operation between Polish and Ukrainian public institutions and civil society.

In addition, the Solidarity Fund has signed a memorandum of understanding with Switzerland to co-finance study tours to Poland (for Ukrainian journalists, representatives of local government and parliament) to learn best practices on decentralisation. This project (known as DESPRO) receives very positive feedback from partners and beneficiaries.

# Partnerships, results and accountability

**Partners at all levels in Ukraine value Poland's deep knowledge of the country and its targeted support**

Thanks to the shared political and historical background that facilitates understanding between the two countries, Poland has established a good dialogue with the central and local authorities in Ukraine and responds to local need. One of the outcomes of this dialogue has been the signature of a memorandum of understanding with Ukraine's Ministry of Development in 2014.

Poland partners indirectly with local NGOs through Polish NGOs participating in calls for proposals managed by the MFA. It also engages directly with local NGOs through the embassy's small grant scheme. According to interviews, Ukrainian NGOs sometimes feel overlooked by bigger donors, and so appreciate the quality of the personal contact with Polish actors, who pay more attention to local needs.

The Polish Embassy in Kiev is active in regular donor co-ordination meetings (once a month or every two months). Poland is actively engaged in co-ordinating regional reform as one of the lead donors. Discussions with the Ukrainian Government are held in thematic donor groups, and while the functioning of the co-ordination mechanism has not been optimal in the past, it has improved in recent months. International partners appreciate Poland's role as an emerging donor and in advocacy with the Ukrainian government, thanks to the strong ties between the two countries.

**Poland defines the results expected and measureable indicators for some of its activities in Ukraine**

The 2016 Development Cooperation Plan presents broad development results for the three focus areas of development co-operation with Ukraine (good governance, human capital, and entrepreneurship and the private sector; MFA, 2015c). In addition, the plan introduces for the first time results expected – although not quantified – and proposed measurement indicators for its support to internally displaced persons in three provinces (Kharkiv, Zaporozhye and Dnipropetrovsk; MFA, 2015c). The expected results concern two sectors: 1) human capital (easier access to social services and heath care infrastructure and closer social integration of internally displaced persons); and 2) entrepreneurship and the private sector (entrepreneurship built among internally displaced persons).

**Monitoring largely assesses financial and operational outputs**

Project managers from Warsaw, in co-operation with the embassy, monitor the activities of projects financed through the Polish Aid Call for Proposals. Activities are monitored directly by the embassy for the Small Grant Scheme. Monitoring is based on field visits and reports drafted by beneficiaries. However, monitoring is still largely based on checking financial and operational outputs. The short timeframe (one year) for projects is also a constraint in monitoring for development results.

Monitoring of the results of the Polish-Canadian programme is carried out by the Solidarity Fund based on its logical framework, as well as reports, surveys and visits. Canada has also commissioned an evaluation of the programme.

# Organisation and management

**The Polish Embassy is active in policy dialogue and overseeing the programme**

The Polish Embassy in Kiev supports the Department of Development Cooperation in co-ordinating Polish development assistance to Ukraine. The embassy has 18 staff (including local attachés), including one full-time development counsellor. The development counsellor fulfils a range of functions, which include engaging with the government to identify and discuss needs and priorities; consulting on the multiannual development programme; participating in co-ordination meetings with other development partners; managing and monitoring the Small Grant Scheme; participating in monitoring the projects of Polish NGOs; and supporting implementing partners and connecting them with the government.

The part-time development counsellor is struggling to deliver the many daily tasks, deal with all projects and assess results. The embassy in Kiev relies on the help of other colleagues working in five Polish consulates in Ukraine (Kharkiv, Lviv, Lutsk, Odessa and Vinnytsia).

# Notes

1. Especially Canada and Switzerland, with which the Solidarity Fund has a multi-annual agreement, but also the EU, Germany, Sweden and the US.

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To achieve its aims, the OECD has set up a number of specialised committees. One of these is the Development Assistance Committee (DAC), whose mandate is to promote development co-operation and other policies so as to contribute to sustainable development – including pro-poor economic growth, poverty reduction and the improvement of living standards in developing countries – and to a future in which no country will depend on aid. To this end, the DAC has grouped the world's main donors, defining and monitoring global standards in key areas of development.

The members of the DAC are Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada, the Czech Republic, Denmark, the European Union, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Iceland, Ireland, Italy, Japan, Korea, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Poland, Portugal, the Slovak Republic, Slovenia, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, the United Kingdom and the United States.

The DAC issues guidelines and reference documents in the DAC Guidelines and Reference Series to inform and assist members in the conduct of their development co-operation programmes.

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## OECD Development Co-operation Peer Reviews

# POLAND

The OECD's Development Assistance Committee (DAC) conducts periodic reviews of the individual development co-operation efforts of DAC members. The policies and programmes of each DAC member are critically examined approximately once every five years. DAC peer reviews assess the performance of a given member, not just that of its development co-operation agency, and examine both policy and implementation. They take an integrated, system-wide perspective on the development co-operation and humanitarian assistance activities of the member under review.

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Chapter 3. Allocating Poland's official development assistance

Chapter 4. Managing Poland's development co-operation

Chapter 5. Poland's development co-operation delivery and partnerships

Chapter 6. Results management and accountability of Poland's development co-operation

Chapter 7. Poland's humanitarian assistance

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*Annex B.* Organisational structure

*Annex C.* Perspectives from Ukraine on Polish development co-operation



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