Conflict and Fragility

Improving International Support to Peace Processes

THE MISSING PIECE



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BETTER POLICIES FOR BETTER LIVES

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Foreword

Nelson Mandela observed that "if you want to make peace with your enemy, you have to work with your enemy. Then he becomes your partner." From this perspective it is encouraging that the last two decades have seen a substantial increase in the number of peace processes worldwide. International support to such processes has also intensified, with the United Nations and various regional organisations, such as the African Union, playing key roles. New actors have also entered the scene as peacemakers, such as Qatar, Turkey and civil society organisations. All of this suggests an increased willingness to give peace a better chance. Bringing a halt to the violence that affects the lives of so many is a worthy endeavour. At the same time, we must remain aware that violence is sometimes used intentionally in pursuit of private agendas. Also, the exclusion of social groups that can lead to conflict can be purposeful, and geopolitical considerations inevitably impose constraints on peace processes.

Much experience has been accumulated from past efforts to support peace processes. We must learn as many lessons from these experiences as possible because peace processes are as difficult as they are promising. This publication draws together a number of such lessons to help increase the quality of international efforts to bring about peace. Three recent developments suggest that the time is ripe for upping our game:

- The Arab Spring has shown that profound differences in governance and politics can be resolved peacefully as well as violently. It also shows that international support, such as the Gulf Cooperation Council's transition plan for Yemen, can be of significant value during political crises and transitions.
- The value and significance of mediation, conflict resolution and peacebuilding are increasingly recognised within the United Nations system. For instance, UN General Assembly (UNGA) Resolution A/RES/65/283 calls on the UN Secretary-General to draft a report for discussion during the 67th session of the UNGA (2012) on how UN capacities for mediation can be further improved.

- The 40+ members of the International Dialogue on Peacebuilding and Statebuilding (IDPS) have made "legitimate politics" (*i.e.* fostering inclusive political settlements and peaceful conflict resolution) a key international goal. Peace processes are often a first step towards legitimate politics as they attempt to resolve conflict and build inclusive political settlements. Such transitions need to be country-owned and led with sustained support from international partners.

This publication offers building blocks that can help advance these agendas. I hope its recommendations will help senior decision makers and policy experts in general, and members of the OECD's Development Assistance Committee (DAC) and International Network on Conflict and Fragility (INCAF) in particular, to further improve the quality of international support to such vital processes.

Jon Lomoy
Director
OECD Development Co-operation Directorate

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The publication also builds on a number of working papers for which thanks go to Sabine Kurtenbach (GIZ), Katia Papagianni (Centre for Humanitarian Dialogue), Achim Wennmann (Geneva Peacebuilding Platform), Simon Mason (Mediation Support Project (MSP) and Erwin van Veen (OECD). The publication has also benefited greatly from a working paper on political dialogue, produced by Andries Odendaal for the International Dialogue on Peacebuilding and Statebuilding.

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Acronyms and Abbreviations

AIPAC	American Israel Public Affairs Committee
AU	African Union
CAD	Canadian dollar
CMM	Office of Conflict Management and Mitigation (USAID)
CPA	Comprehensive Peace Agreement
DAC	Development Assistance Committee
DDR	Disarmament, demobilisation and reintegration
DPA	UN Department of Political Affairs
DPL	Developmental Leadership Programme
DRC	Democratic Republic of Congo
EITI	Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative
FCO	Foreign and Commonwealth Office (UK)
FDFA	Swiss Federal Department of Federal Affairs
FMLN	*Frente Farabundo Martí para la Liberación Nacional* (Farabundo Martí National Liberation Front)
ICC	International Criminal Court
IDPS	International Dialogue on Peacebuilding and Statebuilding
IMF	International Monetary Fund
INCAF	International Network on Conflict and Fragility
JMC	Joint Monitoring Commission
LTTE	Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam
NGO	Non governmental organisation

OAS	Organisation of American States
ODA	Official development assistance
SDC	Swiss Development Agency
SPLM	Sudan People's Liberation Movement
SSR	Security system reform
START	Stabilization and Reconstruction Task Force (Canada)
UN	United Nations
UNSC	United Nations Security Council
UNSG	United Nations Secretary-General
USAID	United States Agency for International Development
USD	United States dollar
WB	World Bank
WDR	World Development Report

Executive Summary

Violent conflict is bad for development. Peace processes – if conducted well – offer the promise of creating more equitable, resilient and developed societies. Yet such processes are politically, socially and psychologically complex, as well as high-risk. Many fail and such failure does harm by reducing confidence and increasing cynicism amongst conflict parties, citizens and international partners alike. International support can help a peace process to succeed, but the nature and quality of this support matter greatly. "*The Missing Piece*" makes seven recommendations to improve the quality of support provided by states and international organisations to peace processes. These seven recommendations have been drawn from an analysis of the characteristics of violent conflict today (Chapter 1); of ingredients of a successful peace process (Chapter 2); and of the strengths and weaknesses of existing support (Chapter 3). Figure 0.1 summarises the main findings and recommendations.

Violent conflict today is deeply influenced by, and interwoven with, the interdependencies and opportunities of a globalising world. The causes, actors and solutions of violent conflict do not just have local drivers, levers and resources; they are also regional and global. This requires international support to take a comprehensive approach to peace processes that integrates conflict prevention, peacekeeping and development. The characteristics of today's violent conflict also indicate that international actors must stay engaged. A peace agreement is only the start of their involvement, and conflicts can easily flare up again.

The report identifies nine key ingredients of a successful peace process. These have been grouped around three crucial dimensions: context, process and implementation (Figure 0.1). The context of a violent conflict sets the strategic framework and opportunities for its resolution. Next, the process through which peace takes shape is critical to its success. Finally, once reached, a peace agreement is only as good as the quality of its implementation. The nine factors identified offer both a framework for shaping international support to peace processes and a gauge to estimate its chances of success.

The analysis of current strengths and weaknesses of international support to peace processes points to some important shortcomings, including inadequate co-operation among mediation, security and development actors; poor understanding of the nature and intricacies of the conflict; and inadequate resources. These shortcomings are of clear concern and require immediate

action. The picture is not entirely bleak, however; international support can, and does, make a valuable contribution. Three particular strengths include the global set of tools and techniques available to create pressure for peace, including sanctions; the growing ability to take integrated international action; and the ability to channel global resources through regional and local partnerships. The publication's recommendations are mainly targeted at senior decision makers and policy experts of DAC-INCAF member countries who influence the environment in which international support to peace processes takes shape and who determine resource allocations. However, they are also relevant for a much broader audience. These recommendations are already being acted on by a range of countries. The concluding chapter presents contributions from Canada, Germany, Switzerland and the US summarising how they are taking forward many of the recommendations in their own activities to support peace.

Figure 0.1. **How international support to peace processes can be improved: a summary**



Introduction

Peace processes hold the promise of re-starting non-violent efforts towards more equitable, resilient and developed societies. Conflict negatively affects development and peace processes can put a halt to this.[1] Yet, such processes are politically, socially and psychologically complex as well as high-risk. Many fail and such failure does harm by reducing confidence and increasing cynicism.[2] International support can help a peace process to succeed, but the nature and quality of such support matter greatly. Engagement is not a light matter and comes with the responsibility to engage effectively and capably. As the saying goes, "if you can't stand the heat, stay out of the kitchen".

Between 2009 and 2011, the OECD's Development Assistance Committee's (DAC) International Network on Conflict and Fragility (INCAF) explored how international support to peace processes can be improved. INCAF brings international donors and organisations together to enhance the policy and practice of international engagement in situations of conflict and fragility. The project mainly consisted of a series of workshops in Bonn (17-18 September 2009), Ottawa (26-27 January 2010), Berlin (14 September 2010) and Geneva (19-21 September 2011) involving policy experts and practitioners from diplomatic/mediation, development and security communities, researchers and non-governmental organisation (NGO) representatives. Their ideas on how international support to peace processes can be improved generated many of the insights and recommendations that are at the heart of this publication.

The seven recommendations in this publication (Chapter 4) suggest concrete actions to further improve the quality of support that states and international organisations provide to peace processes. They are mainly intended for senior decision makers and policy experts in development, diplomatic/mediation and security ministries and agencies of DAC-INCAF members who influence the environment in which international support to peace processes takes shape and who determine resource allocations.

Throughout this publication, peace processes are considered as non-violent methods of peacemaking that can help replace violence with peacebuilding as the dominant response to conflict. They can do so by

creating agreement around an embryonic political settlement. A political settlement refers to "the balance or distribution of power between contending social groups and social classes, on which any state is based" (Khan, 1995, 2000; cited in Di John and Putzel, 2009, see also OECD, 2011a).[3] By creating or renewing the political settlement, peace processes can be the next step in transforming a society from violence to increased resilience. This makes peace processes critical development opportunities, and so must involve development actors from the start (Wennmann, 2010a; most terms used are explained in the Glossary at the end of this report).

A political settlement perspective on peace processes draws our attention to their extremely political nature. Unfortunately, the implementation of peace agreements is sometimes approached in a rather technical manner. This is a recipe for failure. Because peace agreements are often political compromises on long-standing contentious issues between elites[4] and are arrived at under significant pressure, they do not usually address all conflict drivers, they often feature intentionally ambiguous wording and leave much detail to be sorted out later. This makes their implementation critical to their success and requires continuous political and diplomatic attention.

It also draws our attention to the issue of inclusion. While peace processes offer an opportunity to revisit the nature and level of participation in political and social arrangements (that may have led to violence in the first place), they can also be fairly exclusive affairs between those who hold guns, power or other levers of influence. They are in fact often criticised for replicating earlier patters of power and exclusion, particularly from a gender point of view (Darby and Mac Ginty, 2008).[5] Although empirical evidence is mixed (Evans, n.d.; Jones and Elgin-Cossart, 2011), it is likely that a lack of inclusion makes peace agreements as political settlements less sustainable. This suggests a role for the international community to stimulate inclusion.

This publication focuses on how the contribution of states and international organisations to peace processes can be improved. It looks in particular at the role of development, security and diplomatic/mediation officials and how they can work together for more effective peace processes:[6]

- Development officials are staff working for donor agencies, ministries and international development organisations.
- Security officials are policemen and soldiers in a national or international role (*e.g.* peacekeeping).
- Diplomatic/mediation officials include diplomats, mediators and mediation support staff.

In general, the publication uses the term "international support" as shorthand for these three groups. However, at several points it explicitly outlines the

implications and roles for each set of actors individually. Finally, the publication also considers the role of non-state armed groups (see Glossary), diasporas, civil society and different forms of mediation from the perspective of this international actor-focus. It does not discuss the typical provisions of peace processes in any great detail.[7]

Chapter 1 sets the scene by analysing four characteristics of today's violent conflicts and their implications for peace processes. Chapter 2 subsequently discusses a series of factors that influence the success of a peace process. Next, Chapter 3 analyses the key strengths and weaknesses of much current support to peace processes provided by states and international organisations. On this basis, Chapter 4 advances seven recommendations for how such support can be improved. In Chapter 5, four INCAF member countries (Canada, Germany, Switzerland and the US) outline how they currently support peace processes and how they will work with these recommendations.

Notes

1. See Mack (2012) for an interesting analysis of how this statement might not hold up when the rate of improvement towards achieving the Millennium Development Goals is taken as the quintessence of development.
2. Peace processes can fail in different ways: They can stall temporarily, they can develop into permanent "no war, no peace" situations or relapse into conflict (Mac Ginty, 2010; Mason *et al*., 2011).
3. Note that several definitions exist for "political settlement" (Evans, n.d.). This definition combines the virtues of being simple and well rounded. A broader definition of a political settlement is "the way that leaders of different social groups have divided power amongst themselves, and agreed on 'rules of the game' to resolve conflicts and compete for power. This settlement determines the character of political processes." (OECD 2011b). For a discussion of the associated issue of open *versus* closed access orders, see North *et al.* (2009).
4. "Elites" refer to those small groups of people in formal or informal positions of authority and power who take or influence key economic, political, social and administrative decisions (Leftwich and Hogg, 2007).
5. The international community has recognised the low level of inclusion of gender issues in peace agreements, as well as the underrepresentation of women in peace processes and as high-level track one mediators, as a problem (UNSC resolutions 1325 (2000) and 1889 (2009). These respective resolutions call for the

adoption of a "gender perspective" and "the full, equal and effective participation of women at all stages of peace processes". Despite best intentions, progress seems rather limited. As a result, empirical evaluation of the effects of women's inclusion has proven difficult (Potter, 2008).

6. Earlier work on "whole-of-government" approaches (OECD, 2006) already suggested that the quality of its external action improves significantly when different parts of a government work together purposefully. Moreover, states are the most frequent mediators while the UN is the single most active mediator and regional organisations are the most successful ones (Centre for Humanitarian Dialogue, 2007). This has led the INCAF project underpinning this publication to focus on stimulating discussion and interaction among development, security and diplomatic/mediation communities in national and international administrations. On general issues of collaboration between diplomatic, security and development actors in fragile states: Cliffe and Alfandari (2007).

7. These are discussed in: *e.g.* Darby and Rae, 1999; Arnault, 2006; Mason, 2007; Darby and Mac Ginty, 2008; Kurtenbach, 2009. The UN Mediation Support Unit has also developed a broad range of technical papers on typical provisions of peace processes (UNSG, 2012). Such provisions include governance, security, (transitional) justice, refugees/internally-displaced persons, reconciliation, power, as well as wealth sharing arrangements.

Chapter 1

Violent conflict and organised violence today

This chapter briefly analyses four general characteristics of today's violent conflicts and draws out implications for international support to peace processes. There has been a shift in the nature, frequency, effects and implications of violent conflict and organised violence in the 21st century. Today conflict is relatively simple and cheap to initiate and maintain because of easy global access to finance and weapons, and local access to recruits; it has significant local, regional and global costs; it features a fusion of criminal, political, terrorist and commercial interests, and often recurs. The implications for international support to peace processes include the need to understand both the global and local drivers of conflict, and to make sure that peace agreements contain provisions to reduce access to the resources that fuel conflicts. Peace agreements should place more emphasis on breaking the structures for violence than conventional efforts, including attention to transnational organised crime, rebuilding community conflict resolution mechanisms, educational efforts to reduce the culture of violence and reducing political/commercial incentives for organised violence. Peace support efforts also need a strong focus on restoring social capital. On a positive note, the chapter finds that the international toolkit for dealing with and preventing violent conflict is becoming more successful and sophisticated, though more can be done.

1.1. Twenty-first century conflict largely occurs within states

Analysis of violent conflict shows that the interstate conflicts that resulted in so much destruction during the first half of the 20th century have become rare, especially since 1989. The 1990s proved instead to be a decade of civil wars, with over 50 active in 1994 alone and in nearly all parts of the world. This number dropped to 30 in 2010 and increased again to 37 in 2011. Although high-intensity intrastate conflicts continue today in countries such as Afghanistan, Iraq, Pakistan and Somalia, the majority are comparatively minor in scale, low in intensity but long in duration (HSRP, 2011; Themnér and Wallensteen, 2012). The fact that intrastate conflicts are the dominant form of conflict today makes non-state armed groups key conflict parties and critical interlocutors for successful peace processes. An implication for international support is that the need to provide support to sub-national peace processes over longer periods of time is likely to become more important. High-level peace processes may in fact occur less frequently. This puts a premium on global-regional-local partnerships for peace that combine global resources and experience with regional contextual knowledge, and local networks of "insider mediators" (see Chapter 3).

The dynamics of intrastate conflicts differ from those of interstate wars. Intrastate conflicts, for example, tend to worsen the conditions that triggered them (*e.g.* human rights violations, marginalisation and inequality), affect entire populations (with civilians bearing the bulk of casualties and humanitarian crises) and do substantial damage to the social fabric of a society by deepening levels of distrust and resentment among its constituents (Münkler, 2005; Steenkamp, 2011; Jones and Elgin-Cossart, 2011). As a result, intrastate conflict

Box 1.1. **Violent conflict versus organised violence**

For analytical purposes, it is important to differentiate violent conflict from organised violence. *Violent conflict* can be defined as the use of armed force between at least two organised armed parties, which can include a state, and results in at least 25 battle-related deaths in one calendar year (building on the Uppsala Conflict Data Programme – UCDP).[2]

Organised violence is a broader notion of conflict, which refers to the use or threatened use of force to inflict injury, death or psychosocial harm by collectives (building on OECD, 2009b).[3] Analysis of organised violence shows a blurring between different forms of political, sexual and criminal violence. Such violence caused about 526 000 violent deaths worldwide every year between 2004 and 2009 (of which about 55 000 were direct conflict deaths) (Geneva Declaration, 2011; Small Arms Survey, 2012).[4]

often results in a serious reduction in governance capability with harm done not only to the efficiency of public institutions, but also to their political legitimacy.

This publication focuses on the characteristics of violent conflicts (Box 1.1) because peace processes generally aim to end the use of politically-oriented violence between armed collectives that feature a reasonable level of organisation and domestic legitimacy. However, this does not overlook the fact that terrorist, sexual and criminal violence are often used tactically in such conflicts and therefore need also to be taken into account from a conflict perspective.[1] Yet, peace processes do not primarily address such forms of violence.

1.2. The nature of violent conflict today

The remainder of this chapter discusses the following four characteristics of today's violent conflict and their implications for peace processes:

1. Resources, or the fuel, for starting, continuing and restarting violent conflict are easily accessible.
2. Increased interdependencies ensure that the costs of violent conflict are incurred locally, regionally and globally.
3. Violent conflict is often repetitive and part of a broader panorama of organised violence.
4. The international toolkit for dealing with the linkages between, and diversity of, violent conflict and organised violence needs to be even more sophisticated.

Availability of the fuel for violent conflict[5]

The process of globalisation[6] has significantly increased access to the resources that can fuel violent conflict. These include funds, weapons, ideas and influence of both state and non-state armed groups (including transnational organised criminal networks). For example, economic liberalisation has greatly facilitated trade in, and transit of, both legal and illegal goods. Modern communication technology has made the spread of radical ideas in the service of conflict much easier. It has also facilitated contact between diaspora communities and non-state armed groups. Ineffective regulation of the trade in small arms, light weapons and security services ensures their easy availability across the globe. Since many non-state armed groups operate on a transnational basis, benefiting from often porous borders (consider, for example, the current situation in West Africa and Latin America), they are able to use the weakest links in adjacent systems of national controls and regulations to obtain the material capacities they need to continue or restart conflict. Such groups also easily engage in organised

crime or collude with criminal networks to obtain funds. This characteristic has two important implications for international actors involved in peace processes:

1. The need to understand both the global and local drivers/incentives of conflict. On the global dimension, this suggests the need for mediation teams to have access to sources of intelligence such as INTERPOL, the Financial Action Task Force (FATF) and the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC), as well as businesses and regulators (like banking or financial supervisors). Locally, they need to work closely with development actors.
2. The need to make sure that peace agreements contain provisions to reduce access to such resources. This might include, for example, putting governance mechanisms in place that enable transparent use of natural resource revenues. More broadly, initiatives that make it more difficult to sell and obtain illicit resources through global markets (*e.g.* drugs, diamonds, timber) can help remove conflict incentives. Two examples of such initiatives are the Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative (EITI)[7] and the current discussion on how the supply-side, law-enforcement focused war on drugs reinforces profitability and violence (Global Commision on Drugs Policy, 2011; *The Guardian*, 2011).

The costs of violent conflict: from local to global

It is the gruesome loss of human life associated with conflict, such as in the daytime burning of occupied girls' schools in Afghanistan by Northern Alliance warlords (2001-2003), that captures media and public attention most vividly. However, economically it can take a generation for a society to return to pre-conflict levels of prosperity and growth (World Bank, 2011a). The typical civil war has an estimated price tag well over USD 85 billion in domestic and regional costs (Chauvet and Collier, 2005). From an international perspective, fragile countries tend to be important transit points in the global value chains of drug trafficking, terrorism and other criminal activities. Although insufficiently quantified, anecdotal evidence suggests these activities have harmful and costly impacts on developed economies. For instance, a cautious estimate of the annual global economic cost of piracy ranges from between USD 6 billion and USD 11 billion (WB, 2011a; Geneva Declaration, 2011). A recent study of 18 Western European countries calculates that each additional transnational terrorist incident per million persons reduces economic growth by about 0.4 percentage points (Gaibulloev and Sandler, 2008).[8] This suggests that international support to peace processes that end violent conflict may also have positive economic effects by reducing such negative global flows and impacts. However, better costing is required to substantiate this.

The recurring nature of violent conflict and the broader panorama of organised violence

It is common knowledge that civil wars often recur (Mason *et al.*, 2011). One study shows that between 1945 and 2009, 57% of all countries that underwent a civil war later experienced at least one other conflict (Walter, 2010). Contrary to what one might expect, it is not actually the case that most violent conflict takes place in fragile states, although these do account for a significant portion of them.[9] In addition, the period following a peace agreement regularly sees high levels of organised violence, such as criminal or political violence targeting specific groups (Boyle, 2009; Steenkamp, 2011; Muggah and Krause, 2009).[10] Examples include many of the Latin American countries that have experienced civil wars in the past, and which now have high rates of organised criminal violence (Geneva Declaration, 2011). Facilitated by easier access to illicit goods and services on the global markets, the convergence of political, criminal and commercial motives can perpetuate various forms of organised violence and create new, hybrid political-criminal elites (Miraglia *et al.*, forthcoming; Münkler, 2005). It also helps drive the "repeated cycles of violence" noted by the *World Development Report* (World Bank, 2011b).[11]

Part of the explanation for the persistence of violence lies in the way in which violent conflict generates the structural conditions for its continuation and reduces social capital. For instance, it can lead to the presence of ex-combatants with fighting skills; create a culture of violence (including within the security forces); proliferate weapons; destroy peaceful conflict resolution mechanisms; and create new (financial) incentives, such as wartime revenue-raising strategies like transnational crime (Veron, 2007; Steenkamp, 2011). Such structural conditions encourage the continued use of violence as a rational strategy. Violent conflict also erodes social "bridging" capital, the glue that keeps various groups of a society together. For example, it reduces the trust that enables collective action and, because it takes a long time to re-build, violence casts a long and costly shadow over the future of societies (Jones and Elgin-Cossart, 2011). This characteristic has three important implications for international support to peace processes:

1. Peace agreements should place more emphasis on breaking the structures for violence than conventional Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration, Security System Reform and small arms reduction efforts (Muggah and Krause, 2009; Mac Ginty, 2010). This includes attention to transnational organised crime, rebuilding community conflict resolution mechanisms, educational efforts to reduce the culture of violence and reducing the political/commercial incentives for organised violence. Given that most of the world's population lives in cities in which much post-agreement organised violence occurs, this is likely to require the involvement of sub-national authorities such as municipalities, community leaders and NGOs (OECD, 2011c).

2. Peace support efforts need a strong focus on post-agreement confidence building to restore social capital. A good starting point is to negotiate a convincing set of credible, and preferably difficult-to-reverse, signals and commitment mechanisms as part of a peace agreement. Credible appointments, allowing international monitoring and making policy on the basis of participatory processes can all serve this purpose (World Bank, 2011b). To make this attractive and prevent violence, international actors may well have to provide resources or side-payments, although care should be taken that these do not encourage the strategic use of violence *(e.g.* Boyle, 2009; Podder, forthcoming).

3. The need to give serious thought to whether the international community should also support mediation efforts with criminal actors such as gangs (recent examples include deals in El Salvador and Guatemala on which the jury is still out) (Briscoe, 2012). This is a difficult – and so far unanswered – question.

The international toolkit for dealing with the linkages between, and diversity of, violent conflict and organised violence is imperfect, but expanding.

International intervention is having more success. The Human Security Report Project, for instance, shows that the success rate of peace agreements negotiated since the late 1990s, in terms of their durability, has increased (HRSP, 2011). Confirmation of this trend requires longer-term data and further research, but a few elements of the increase in success of international support to peace processes are worth analysing:

- The volume of peacekeeping operations has more than doubled since 1989 (HRSP, 2011). There is good evidence that such operations are effective in maintaining peace by reducing the risk of conflict relapse by about 70-75% (Jones and Elgin-Cossart, 2011; Hoeffler, 2012). Given the high rates of conflict recurrence and the often high levels of post-agreement violence, peacekeeping operations are thus a key issue in negotiating peace agreements and one of the more effective measures in boosting their sustainability.[12]

- There is some institutional innovation in dealing with the many faces of organised violence that increasingly intersect with violent conflict. For example, over 100 states have now signed the Geneva Declaration on Armed Violence and Development, a high-level diplomatic initiative adopted in June 2006 to support states and civil society actors to achieve measurable reductions in the global burden of armed violence. It is underpinned by solid analysis and evidence on armed violence.[13] Moreover, the establishment of both the Peace

Building Commission (PBC) and the UN's Interagency Team for Preventive Action shows increasing awareness of the need to ensure international intervention is coherent and focused before and after violent conflict. There are good reasons for doing so. For example, every dollar spent on international conflict prevention efforts is estimated to save four dollars in international responses to conflict (Chalmers, 2005).

- Key leaders of armed groups in violent conflict can increasingly expect to be held to account for their actions. Consider, for example, the establishment of the International Criminal Court (2002) and the "Responsibility to Protect" doctrine (2005).

This highlights that effective peace processes require strong linkages with other tools in the international community's repertoire to address the structures and incentives that fuel and support violence (such as community-focused peacebuilding initiatives, armed violence reduction programmes, rule of law efforts, peacekeeping and political dialogue). The notion of "conflict transformation" offers a useful unifying and guiding concept to bring such tools together. It emphasises that conflict is a natural part of human relationships and aims to positively alter the structural, behavioural and attitudinal aspects of violent conflict (Lederach and Maiese, 2003; see also the Glossary). New and better international incentives will also be required to establish the necessary linkages. More comprehensive UN Security Council mandates and integrated funding facilities could be valuable steps in this direction.

Notes

1. For example, sexual violence has become an increasingly common strategy of war (Chhabra, 2005; Banaszak *et al.,* 2005). For further reflection on sexual violence, ethnicity and conflict: Handrahan, 2004.
2. The Uppsala Conflict Data Programme distinguishes between interstate conflict, intrastate conflict, non-state conflict and one-sided violence (UCDP, n.d.). The definition in Box 1.1 combines its definitions of state and non-state based conflict.
3. The main problem with definitions of organised violence is that they cover a broad range of manifestations (*e.g.* forms of political, sexual and criminal violence) that differ significantly in their nature, drivers, effects and responses.

4. Note that although the bulk of the 526 000 figure consists of intentional homicides, it is not entirely clear what percentage results from organised violence.

5. This paragraph is largely inspired by research findings of forthcoming OECD DAC policy papers that investigate the effects of global factors such as liberalisation and organised crime on conflict and fragility. See also: Münkler (2005); Heine and Thakur (2011), Briscoe and Dari (2012).

6. Globalisation is understood as the acceleration of processes of political, social and economic change due to increases in international interdependencies and international access to goods, services, markets, people and ideas. Such increases are primarily enabled by the falling cost and increased ease of transportation and communication (Wolf, 2005).

7. The EITI aims to strengthen the governance of the extractive sector (*e.g.* minerals, oil and gas) by improving its transparency and accountability. Company payments for and government revenues from the exploitation of natural resources are monitored and reconciled under the oversight of public, private and civil society stakeholders (EITI, 2012).

8. By way of illustration, taking the International Monetary Fund's GDP growth figures for Germany for 2010-2011, this would suggest about EUR 36 million in lost growth in 2010 caused by 10 hypothetical transnational terrorist incidents.

9. A background paper to the *World Development Report* shows that in the 1960s almost 70% of wars and conflicts took place in the poorest quartile of countries; little more than 10% took place in the next quartile up (lower-middle income countries). In the 2000s, this had changed. The share of conflicts in the poorest quartile fell below 40%, while the share in the lower-middle income group rose to over 40%. Conflict has become more frequent in lower-middle income countries in particular (Fearon, 2010). Moreover, of the 29 countries with violent death rates of above 20 per 100 000 inhabitants between 2004-2009 (the global average being 6.8), only 10 feature in the top 2 categories of the 2011 Fund for Peace's Failed States Index (data based on Small Arms Survey, 2012).

10. Although violence against women (*e.g.* domestic violence and "honour" killings) tends not to be organised, it is also often very prevalent in the post-agreement period (Handrahan, 2004).

11. In addition, an appreciable number of political crises occur annually (*e.g. coups d'état* and disputed elections). The agreements that resolve them bear some similarities with peace processes, including power-sharing arrangements, transition periods and peace *versus* justice trade-offs (see Call, 2012). Much of the analysis and recommendations on international support to peace processes will therefore also be useful when helping to resolve these political crises. A major difference with classic war-to-peace transitions, however, is that political crises do not necessarily generate the violence that introduces the broad range of additional long-term and self-sustaining negative effects discussed.

12. Compared to the cost of the average civil war, they are also cheap. In fact, the entire UN budget for peacekeeping between 1948 and 2010 (about USD 69 billion) is less than the estimated average cost of a single civil war (USD 85 billion; Chauvet and Collier, 2005; DPKO website (*www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/operations/financing.shtml*, consulted 8 June 2012).

13. For example by the Small Arms Survey: *www.smallarmssurvey.org/* and by the OECD: *www.oecd.org/document/57/0,3746,en_2649_33693550_46341625_1_1_1_1,00.html*.

Chapter 2

What are ingredients for success in a peace process?

This chapter provides international actors with a framework to guide their support to a peace process. It outlines nine key factors which contribute to a successful peace process, grouped around three crucial dimensions: the context, process and implementation. For each dimension, the chapter outlines their implications for the actors involved in supporting peace processes targeted by this publication. These nine factors are as follows:

1. *Engaging international actors jointly and positively in conflict resolution*
2. *Taking care over how the conflict is framed internationally*
3. *Seizing the "ripe" time for resolving a conflict*
4. *Stimulating the ability of leaders to mobilise and engage broad coalitions*
5. *Being well prepared*
6. *Choosing a credible and acceptable mediator*
7. *Ensuring an inclusive process*
8. *Seeing implementation as a process of political dialogue*
9. *Enabling conflict parties to make a successful political transformation*

A peace process consists of three intersecting aspects, each of which can influence whether it succeeds or fails (Figure 2.1). These dimensions interact with each other and unite through the actors involved, whether they are conflict parties, other national stakeholders, neighbours, regional or international actors. It is of course critical to a successful peace agreement that mutually acceptable solutions to key issues can be agreed among the main conflict parties. However, because the range and content of these solutions will be highly dependent on the nature of the conflict, this section focuses on factors that influence whether and how such solutions can be shaped, discussed and implemented.

Figure 2.1. **Three dimensions that influence success and failure in a peace process**



Source: INCAF discussions and literature review.

The **context** is the strategic framework and opportunities for conflict resolution. It has international and national dimensions. Critical international factors include how key actors engage with the conflict and how they frame it. Critical domestic factors include the notion of conflict "ripeness" (the moment when parties decide that engaging in peace talks might be more beneficial than continuing the conflict; Zartman, 2001) and the presence as well as ability of leaders who can mobilize and engage coalitions across divides in pursuit of peace. The context can be strongly influenced by events external to the peace process that offer direct or indirect opportunities for

conflict resolution. An example was the window of opportunity that the 2004 tsunami created for the peace process in Aceh (Podder, forthcoming).

Once an opportunity for peace arises, the **process** through which an agreement takes shape is critical to its success. There are many practical and psychological pitfalls here for conflict parties, mediators and other international actors alike (Brahimi and Ahmed, 2008; Sumbeiywo, 2009). Finally, once reached, a peace agreement is only as good as the quality of its **implementation**. It is at this stage that many agreements fall apart because, for instance, parties renege on their promises *(e.g.* the Darfur Peace Agreement), spoilers wreck the agreement, or international actors reduce their support too quickly. This chapter provides international actors with a framework to guide their support to a peace process. It outlines nine key factors which contribute to a successful process. Figure 2.2 links these nine factors to the three dimensions of a peace process presented in Figure 2.1. While these factors are not complete,[1] they were identified during the series of workshops underpinning this project and through an extensive literature review (see Introduction).

Figure 2.2. **Nine factors that influence success and failure in a peace process**



Source: INCAF discussions and literature review.

2.1. Context

Factor 1: Engaging international actors jointly and positively in conflict resolution

Conflicts are not usually confined to national boundaries. In today's globalising world they are often part of broader networks, sets of stakeholders and interests. Such "external" interests and stakeholders can profoundly influence the course of conflict. Thus, a certain degree of consensus is required among key regional and global powers on the broad direction of a peace process and possible solutions to the conflict if it is to have a chance of success (Whitfield, 2010). For example, the role and views of China and India proved critical to the conclusion of the 2006 Nepalese Comprehensive Peace Agreement (OECD, 2011d).[2] External actors can influence a conflict by providing positive and negative incentives for conflict resolution in at least four main areas: security, economic, social and political. To contribute to a successful peace process these influences will usually need to converge in a positive and aligned manner within and between international actors (Wennmann, 2011):

- **Security**. External actors often have security interests in either the conflict itself (*e.g.* Rwanda in the Eastern Democratic Republic of Congo) or more broadly in relation to the conflict and its parties (*e.g.* Sudan is an "ally" of the US in the war on terror, which had a bearing on the peace process in Darfur and South Sudan). Because conflict complexes are often cross-border in nature and likely to have spill-over effects, regional actors will typically have significant security interests in the conflict (Ramsbotham and Zartman, 2011). They can seek to secure these positively (*e.g.* the involvement of the Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD) in Sudan) or negatively (*e.g.* Sudan funding armed groups in Chad, and Chad funding armed groups in Darfur; Prunier, 2005).
- **Economic**. Economic relations, investments and trade may cause external actors to protect assets or favour certain groups or a government during a conflict. This may in fact be positive, as in the recent Chinese offer to mediate in the oil dispute between Sudan and South Sudan (Sudan Tribune, 2012). However, illicit relations and flows that either involve transnational non-state groups (with or without state acquiescence) or states themselves also profoundly influence conflict and wartime economies. Examples include natural resource smuggling in the Great Lakes region (UN, reports of the group of experts pursuant to resolution 1533 (2004) concerning the Democratic Republic of the Congo), Albanian-Serb crime syndicates operating in (Northern) Kosovo (ICG, 2010b; 2011) and the relations

between international drug cartels and the Columbian *Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias* (FARC).

- **Social**. Three external groups that tend to exercise profound social influence on conflicts are cross-border socio-ethnic groups, religious and diaspora communities. Because of their proximity to the conflict, socio-ethnic groups such as the *Zagawa* in Darfur/Chad and the *Acholi* in North Uganda/South Sudan, can provide both cross-border areas of recuperation and resources as well as acting as insider mediators and bringing about community restraint. Religious groups can shape conflict narratives in important ways via religious framing and resources. For instance, Al Qaeda's religious ideology has inspired non-state armed groups across the world. Finally, diaspora communities are important sources of lobbying and resources for conflict parties, not in the least because of their ability to influence the domestic politics of key external actors. Consider, for example, the influential Jewish lobby in the US[3] (Algemeiner, 2012; *The Guardian,* 2012), or the Tamil diaspora (Zunzer, 2004; Vimalarajah and Cheran, 2010).
- **Political**. External security, economic and social influences can all be mobilised and instrumentalised for broader political purposes. External political influences can also be driven by alliances (*e.g.* Russian support for Syria), regional power politics (*e.g.* Iran's support for Hamas *vis-à-vis* Israel) and ideology (*e.g.* Ethiopian support for the Sudan People's Liberation Movement, SPLM). Such influence can manifest itself in blocking international action, transferring weapons or funds, and political recognition.

From the perspective of a peace process, negative external influences must be mitigated or reframed, while positive influences must be mobilised (for example, see Annan, 2012 on the situation in Syria). Consequentially, a peace process must be designed so that it maximises the chances of bringing critical international and regional actors on board in a positive manner. Methods to engage key international and regional actors include the establishment of so-called "groups of friends", regional organisations, contact groups and *ad hoc* arrangements (Whitfield, 2010). It is vital for those facilitating or sponsoring a peace process to have a deep external stakeholder engagement strategy that enables a variety of engagement styles and packages on the basis of a detailed understanding of international security, economic, social and political interests.

Factor 2: Taking care over how the conflict is framed internationally

An important related factor that influences the success or failure of a peace process is how leading members of the international community perceive and frame a conflict, its parties in particular. Two challenges are worth highlighting:

1. International actors tend to view conflict and shape peace processes from a state-centric viewpoint, underpinned by neo-liberal economic and democratic governance norms. Western notions of constitutionalism, free markets and "Westphalian" governance are deeply ingrained in the international mindset. If these notions prevent the local causes of conflict, social justice and the marginalisation of communities from being addressed, they are likely to undermine the success of a peace process. Research on international support for peace processes in the DRC and Somalia demonstrate how this can happen (Mac Ginty, 2010; Autesserre, 2010 Steenkamp, 2011). Traditional forms of conflict resolution, such as the *Mato-Oput* ceremony in Uganda, the *Nahe Biti* process in Timor-Leste or the *Loya Jirga* in Afghanistan, can offer viable alternatives (Mac Ginty, 2008). Yet, they can also be highly exclusive or corrupted by conflict. In short, sound and contextual conflict analysis is critical to avoid dominant international narratives, operating cultures or mandates becoming the default framework for conflict resolution.

2. The United States' post-9/11 global security agenda has had profound consequences for how non-state armed groups – key parties in today's conflicts (Hottinger, 2008) – are viewed.[4] Non-state armed groups tend now to always be perceived as terrorists. For example, the common position of the Council of the European Union on the application of specific measures to combat terrorism listed 13 groups in 2001, compared to 47 in 2005 (EU, 2001 and 2005). It has also become much easier for states to delegitimise non-state armed groups that challenge their authority by branding them as terrorist organisations. Because non-state armed groups often do not have the same resources as states, they will more readily resort to criminal activities to generate revenue and to terrorism as a method of political mobilisation. This makes them yet more vulnerable to negative labelling (Cronin, 2008). In a number of cases, this might well be appropriate. However, evidence suggests that sustainable conflict resolution requires the inclusion of *all* key conflict stakeholders who have the capacity to either impede or promote constructive social change (Dudouet, 2008; Dudouet, Giessmann and Planta, 2012; Podder, forthcoming).[5] Hence, ruling out political engagement with relevant non-state armed groups increases their isolation, reduces

the utility of dialogue and leaves mostly hard security options on the table (Hottinger, 2008). Where such groups reflect underlying drivers of conflict, such as inequalities and political or economic marginalisation, hardline security approaches may suppress the conflict, but are unlikely to resolve it.

For these reasons, the international community needs to carefully assess the role and legitimacy of non-state armed groups before deciding whether to exclude or include them (see also Factor 7). Podder (forthcoming) offers a useful typology for this purpose, which uses five variables that can inform international engagement: *1)* the support base of non-state armed groups (ethnic/tribal vs. ideological/religious), *2)* domestic legitimacy (high/low), *3)* international legitimacy (high/low), *4)* relations with civilians (abusive/conflicting vs. protective/co-operative) and *5)* resource base (community taxation vs. capital based).Where there is a lack of information or understanding on non-state armed groups, informal contacts through NGOs or individuals held in high esteem by both parties are valuable ways to engage informally and build confidence (Cronin, 2008; Whitfield, 2010).

Factor 3: Seizing the "ripe" time for resolving a conflict

A conflict "becomes ripe for peace" at the moment when parties are open to negotiation or mediation because they either perceive victory as unrealistic, experience high costs of continuing the conflict or can, at least dimly, imagine looking for a way out of it. In other words, timing matters. Ripeness is necessarily perceptual, informed by objective events, issues and facts (Zartman, 2001; 2008). Internal dynamics within parties can influence their perceptions on bringing conflict to an end. Stedman (1991) suggests that party leaders and military factions are key drivers of such perceptions and that not all parties to a conflict have to perceive "ripeness".[6] Leadership challenges or changes can also increase the perception of ripeness, presumably because of the risk of internal crisis they entail. The process of arriving at a ripe moment for peace therefore seems to be largely endogenous. There is, however, nothing linear or automatic about a ripe moment (*e.g.* Hoffman and Svensson, 2012):

1. It must be seized to bear fruit, either by the parties or a mediator. It helps when international actors have credible non-violent options readily available that outline possible ways out of the conflict and can be discussed with parties. For example, Alvaro de Soto spotted – and acted upon – a ripe moment for mediation in El Salvador's civil war after the offensive of the *Frente Farabundo Martí para la Liberación Nacional* (FMLN) in 1989 that penetrated the main cities but did not topple the government (Zartman, 2008).

2. Despite wanting to explore a non-violent solution, parties may not be able to credibly commit to one. This dynamic is particularly acute in land conflicts between ethnic minorities and state-supported migrants of a dominant ethnic group, as well as in contraband-financed insurgencies (*e.g.* natural resource rents). The problem is that in both cases parties are perceived to have a strong incentive for returning to violence and reneging on their commitments if their situation improves after a temporary ripe moment has led them to negotiate (Fearon, 2004). This suggests that agreements may need strong external guarantees and enforcement. International mechanisms, such as the temporary provision of governance (as in Bosnia or Kosovo), or security guarantees in the form of peacekeeping missions, can help resolve this challenge.

While perceptions of ripeness are largely endogenous, external actors can influence developments and events to shape the perception of parties. They can do so by pointing to alternative interpretations or by offering analysis that challenges the perception of conflict parties. Consider, for example, how Norway established trusted communication channels and venues for informal conversations in the run up to the Oslo agreements in 1993. Building political and negotiation capacity can also be influential (Barnes, 2009). Finally, external actors can shape the events that influence parties' strategic calculations. Examples include reducing revenue flows in diamond-fuelled conflicts such as in Liberia and Sierra Leone via the Kimberly process (Kurtenbach, 2009); military measures such as NATO's bombing of Serb forces in Bosnia in 1995; and economic sanctions, such as in South Africa in the late 1980s.[7] It is worth bearing in mind, however, that the risk of overt or latent failure increases the more parties are forced to engage in a peace process (Nathan, 2006; Mezzera *et al.*, 2009; Barnes, 2009). Enforced solutions tend to require enforced implementation; this demands time and resources that are often not available. For example, in Iraq the National Conference of August 2004 organised by the Coalition Provisional Authority and the US-appointed Iraqi Governing Council was a failure because the organisers exercised such one-sided control over the process that it pre-empted meaningful, inclusive dialogue (Papagianni, 2006).

Factor 4: Stimulating the ability of leaders to mobilise and engage broad coalitions

International and domestic leadership is critical for determining the success of a peace process.[8] However, leaders have never been able to achieve much *on their own*. Their capacity to mobilise inclusive and wider coalitions of other leaders and organisations is what ensures that their vision is pursued and achieved. Studies of countries that have been successful in dealing with the challenges of deeply polarised communities and severe poverty illustrate

this fact.[9] The ability of leaders to be effective in forming coalitions has been a decisive factor in their success.[10] "Coalitions" refer to formal or informal groups that come together to achieve goals which they could not achieve on their own. Leadership coalitions may not only refer to formal coalitions between political parties, but also to the fact that leaders with different initial interests and representing different sectors and levels of society agree to work collectively and co-operatively, whether in formal structures or informally (see Box 2.1 for an example from Burundi).

Box 2.1. **The Burundi Leadership Programme**

The Burundi Leadership Programme was supported by the Woodrow Wilson International Centre for Scholars between 2002 and 2008. Months of consultations were held involving a cross-section of Burundian leaders from across all political and social sectors representing a diversity of ethnic, regional, functions and gender. From this process, 95 Burundian leaders who reflected that diversity were strategically selected to take part in an 18-month capacity-building initiative, with follow-up workshops every 2-3 months until 2008. The objective was to build a cohesive, sustainable network of leaders who could work together across all ethnic and political divides in order to advance Burundi's reconstruction. The principal instrument used in the process was experiential learning. A range of simulations and other interactive exercises were used to open up discussions on the nature of interdependence and the value of finding inclusive solutions to problems. The project led to unprecedented levels of social cohesion and collaboration among the political class. This does not mean that final reconciliation has been achieved, or that all instability has been dealt with – collaborative leadership will likely remain a key challenge in Burundi in the foreseeable future. The 2010 elections provided cause for concern, but of interest is that fact that the tensions of 2010 were not inter-ethnic in nature, but rather intra-ethnic.

Source: Wolpe, H. (2011), *Making Peace after Genocide. Anatomy of the Burundi Process*, United States Institute of Peace, Washington, DC, available at *www.usip.org/files/resources/PW_Burundi.pdf.*

The successful formation of coalitions, however, requires that a critical mass of effective and able leaders from a variety of fields will be able to see and reach beyond their immediate interests to a broader, collective interest. It requires leaders that are capable of negotiating, taking, abiding by, and implementing key decisions. Such leaders should have the education, skills and experience to enable them to devise and agree the rules of the game (*i.e.* create institutions) for organising and mediating political and economic relationships (Leftwich and Hogg, 2007; Leftwich, 2009). Interestingly, women have on occasion formed coalitions across political, ethnic or socio-economic divides

on the basis of their gender, for example in Northern Ireland and Somalia (where they negotiated as a "sixth clan").[11] This can help to build bridges across conflict divides and empower their cause (*e.g.* the "sixth clan" secured 25 seats in the Transitional National Assembly in Somalia). However, this should not substitute for women their representation in the delegations of the main negotiating parties (Potter, 2008; UN, 2002; Banaszak *et al.*, 2005).

Programmes exist for building leadership capacity. In addition to the programme described in Box 2.1, these include the World Bank-supported Leadership and Communication Capacity for National Renewal (LCCNR) Programme in Timor-Leste in 2007 (World Bank, 2007) and a recent UNDP-initiated project in Nepal to develop the dialogue and networking capacity of an inclusive group of leaders. It is too early to assess the impact of these projects and collaborative leadership is likely to remain a challenge, but their design accurately reflects the objective of forming leadership coalitions by building dialogue skills and attitudes.

Implications for diplomatic/mediation, security and development actors[12]

This brief analysis of contextual factors that influence success in a peace process suggests the following implications for those actors targeted by this publication:

- **Development actors**, *i.e.* staff working for donor agencies, ministries and international development organisations, should mobilise their knowledge of local history, issues and networks in the early stages of conflict framing to assist diplomatic actors in obtaining a deeper understanding of the causes of conflict and to avoid creating false images of the legitimacy and intentions of conflict parties, especially non-state armed groups (Wennmann, 2010b).
- **Security actors**, *i.e.* policemen and soldiers in a national or international role (*e.g.* peacekeeping), can contribute intelligence for the same purpose. This needs to be broader than a narrow military assessment to avoid excessive securitisation of the response.
- **Diplomats/mediators**, *i.e.* diplomats, mediators and mediation support staff, have a crucial role in shaping international perception and engagement in a positive and inclusive manner, as well as in assessing whether a "ripe" opportunity for negotiation exists. With the aid of their development colleagues they can also start generating ideas for non-violent solutions to the conflict for later consideration by the conflict parties (Mitchell, 2008).

2.2. Process

Getting belligerent parties into the same room and into a conversation is a deeply complex political and psychological process. It must address both the issues that caused violence and the strong emotions (*e.g.* deep distrust, anger, hatred, fear and guilt) that may have built up over generations. Violent conflict can, however, also be a naked struggle for power or a profitable business. Such different emotions and incentives must be taken into consideration and this makes the process of discussing the prospects for peace complex. Three factors influence the nature and quality of this process: the level of preparation, the credibility and acceptance of the mediator, and the level of inclusion. These are each discussed below.[13]

Factor 5: Being well prepared

Sloppy preparation undermines confidence in the mediation and negotiation process, ultimately reducing the chances of reaching an agreement. The responsibility for preparation rests with the facilitation team, but they must negotiate every step of the process with all prospective partners. Reigning conditions will determine what is possible, but ideally the facilitation team should work with a group of people who are representative of the main participants to ensure that the concerns of all parties are addressed. The preparation process is therefore a dialogue about the dialogue (see Annex A). The participation and transparency achieved in this way are important for building confidence in the process. Of course, conditions may not always be favourable for proper preparations, especially in crisis situations where time pressures or physical conditions prevent proper planning. Unfortunately, where this is the case, the dialogue process will suffer proportionally. Adequate preparation depends upon the following:

- High-quality, reliable analysis of the causes of the conflict, as well as of the needs, interests, fears and options of the various parties. Parties must recognise themselves in such analysis and accept it (to a degree) for it to be usable. Consulting with local actors when producing the analysis is therefore essential.
- The use of lessons from past experiences. In many cases, there have been previous attempts to reach an agreement between the same parties. It is important to learn lessons from these experiences: What worked, what did not, and why? Lessons from elsewhere can also be useful, but they will have to be thoughtfully translated to the specific context.
- Sufficient pre-mediation consultation with the different parties to establish a relationship of trust. This includes clarifying and allocating

roles; establishing the venue, frequency and funding of negotiations; identifying the negotiators and mediators; and establishing the broad issues and the co-ordination of negotiating and decision making. This is particularly important in contexts where a broad range of actors, both external and internal, seek to support the facilitation process.

- Setting up a support structure to deal with funding, logistics and financial management.
- Deciding on and planning for an appropriate media communication strategy.
- Allowing sufficient time and dedicated preparatory steps to enable adequate inclusion of women (Box 2.2). Traditional roles and limited access to education can mean that women are likely to need additional time and support to develop a common agenda and strengthen their leadership capacity and negotiation skills. Logistical issues also have to be considered, as the combination of household duties and a remote location for the peace talks can be an obstacle to the effective participation of women (Banaszak *et al.*, 2005). Mediators need to be aware of such gender issues to ensure mediation strategies are as inclusive as possible (Centre for Humanitarian Dialogue 2010).

Factor 6: Choosing a credible and acceptable mediator

The choice of mediator is critical. In any dialogue between deeply distrustful parties, the mediator is the guarantor of trust and of fair, equal treatment. In the absence of shared trust in him/her, constructive dialogue becomes extremely difficult. It is therefore critically important that all parties agree to his/her appointment. For example, some observers of the Burundi mediation felt that the deep-seated distrust between the Burundian President Buyoya and the mediator – Tanzania's President Nyerere – had a negative impact on the process (Nathan, 1999; Wolpe, 2011). In Togo, opposition parties threatened to boycott the second round of summit talks in 2006 because the president did not honour an undertaking to appoint a neutral, international mediator. In Afghanistan, President Karzai's appointments on the High Peace Council, which is charged with the facilitation of dialogue and reconciliation, similarly risked undoing his initiative because of perceptions of bias. A second aspect of the credibility of the mediator is his/her level of standing, professionalism and expertise. Facilitating an encounter between people with deep levels of distrust,[14] anger, fear and even hatred is a highly-skilful undertaking. In addition, there is inevitably a power asymmetry between participating parties that must be adroitly facilitated. The mediator and his team must ensure a level playing field. There is a growing body of knowledge and techniques on mediation and facilitation. There is a similar growth in the

establishment of professional institutions such as the UN's Mediation Support Unit or regional support units, and specialised independent institutions. Ignorance of, or disregard for, the accumulated wisdom and expertise of the field is therefore not only harmful to the process, but also irresponsible (see Brahimi and Ahmed, 2008; Nathan, 2009; Sumbeiywo, 2009; Hay, 2011). Good facilitation cannot ensure success and cannot create sufficient political will out of nothing, but it can create a climate of trust that enables participants to explore what was previously unthinkable. Bad facilitation, on the other hand, certainly contributes to the hardening of attitudes and positions.

Factor 7: Ensuring an inclusive process

The issue of inclusion presents a serious dilemma. For example, the inclusion of Foday Sankoh's Revolutionary United Front (RUF) in a peace arrangement for Sierra Leone was very controversial because of its serious human rights violations. There are further questions that complicate the issue: is inclusion a reward for undemocratic, violent behaviour? Will the inclusion of violent parties undermine the long-term objective of establishing a peaceful, democratic state? How can those pursuing politics with a criminal intent be excluded? And who should make the decisions about inclusion and exclusion?[15]

Ideally, participants in a peace process should be a representative microcosm of the entire conflict system (Pruitt and Thomas, 2007). Excluded groups are particularly prone to return to violent tactics (Gurr, 2000 cited in Jarstad and Sisk, 2008). Moreover, if exclusion, particularly on the basis of identity, is a main cause of violent conflict, it follows logically that the success of a peace process will be determined by the extent of the inclusion it achieves. In practice, the decision of who should participate belongs to the participants (who should own the process), which often equates to the armed groups directly involved in the conflict. It is not a decision that should be imposed by external actors or by the mediator. However, given the fact that the success of a peace process is also determined by its level of inclusiveness, mediators should ensure that such decisions have been informed by relevant and valid concerns and principles. It is an area that may require substantial dialogue in its own right. For example, the inclusion of civil society can moderate the hard-line positions of armed groups. It can also introduce views that highlight different societal concerns than those pursued by political or armed groups. Strategies to promote civil society involvement include social mobilisation efforts, using the good offices of religious institutions or persons of high standing and building capacities and mechanisms to increase its voice, co-ordinate and engage in negotiations. The Catholic Church, for instance, played an important role in enabling civil society collaboration in Guatemala's Civil Society Assembly, which positively influenced the

country's peace process by producing joint consensus positions on six of the seven key topics of the 1994 Mexico Accord that were largely incorporated in the 1996 official peace agreement (Barnes, 2002).

The World Bank has formulated the "inclusive enough" concept (World Bank, 2010). This has emerged from research that indicates that transitions from violence have, in most cases, been achieved by talks that were sufficiently, but not fully inclusive. They have formulated three key lessons on inclusiveness:

1. groups may legitimately be excluded when there is an evolving belief among the population that they have sacrificed their right to participate due to past abuses;
2. there can be trade-offs between wide inclusiveness and the primacy of political decision-making or the efficiency of state decision-making; and
3. inclusion strategies can change over time as it becomes possible to marginalise consistently abusive groups or to include a larger set of stakeholders.

Box 2.2. **Why women should be included in peace processes**

The inclusion of women and women's issues is a topic of particular importance. Conflict is not gender neutral. Because men, women, boys and girls engage in and experience conflict and war in different ways, they require different security, peacebuilding, humanitarian and development responses. Women often find themselves in situations where, on the one hand, their responsibilities to support children and families increase as their access to opportunities and resources decrease. On the other hand they are extremely vulnerable to conflict-related sexual violence with its physical and psycho-emotional damage (UN, 2002; Handrahan, 2004; Onyejekwe, 2005).

Since 1992 women have constituted less than 8% of negotiating delegations in United Nations mediated peace processes, and less than 3% of peace agreement signatories. There are ample grounds for concluding that women's underrepresentation in peace talks has contributed to the relative neglect of women's priorities in the texts of peace agreements and, subsequently in post-agreement planning and financing frameworks. A study of 585 peace agreements concluded between 1990 and 2010 found that just 16% contained references to women (UNSG, 2010). A UN study on *Women, Peace and Security* (UN, 2002) emphasised the gap between important contributions by women in informal peace processes and their relative absence from formal processes.

Box 2.2. Why women should be included in peace processes
(continued)

Importantly, peace processes can offer opportunities to include women in negotiations as change agents. For example, UNDP and UNIFEM successfully helped women gain seats at the table in Burundi and Guatemala (Onyejekwe, 2005; Castillejo, 2011). Specific attention to women's needs and priorities before and after a peace agreement also requires addressing a range of historic and systemic gender gaps, and unequal policies and structures of discrimination that have disadvantaged women and distorted overall development. UN Security Council resolutions 1325 (2000) and 1889 (2009) acknowledge these issues and have committed the international community to including more women and mainstreaming gender issues in peace processes.

For further reading see also: Torry *et al.*, 2010; Banaszak *et al.*, 2005; Chhabra, 2005; Onyejekwe, 2005; Potter, 2008; and Centre for Humanitarian Dialogue, 2010.

Implications for diplomatic/mediation, security and development actors

This brief analysis of process factors that influence success in a peace process suggests the following implications for those actors targeted by this publication:

- **Development actors** can play a critical role in leading participatory analysis of the conflict and its stakeholders to inform mediation efforts. They can also encourage negotiations by committing development assistance to help make peace an attractive option. In addition they can help parties develop longer-term visions, including a realistic assessment of crucial economic issues (Wennmann, 2010b). Finally, they can provide technical expertise and training to parties, *e.g.* in negotiation techniques.
- **Security actors** have a specific role in protecting women participating in peace processes, because they are often threatened due to their visible and controversial roles (Banaszak *et al.*, 2005). Security expertise is also invaluable to ensure credible and realistic security provisions find their way into agreements. Finally, depending on the circumstances, close protection can enable negotiations by ensuring a minimum level of credible personal safety.
- **Diplomats/mediators** have an overall lead role in this phase as they manage mediation efforts. They need to identify capable and credible mediators and mediation support teams with clear mandates and

resources. They also need to make certain that the peace process is as inclusive as the situation permits.

2.3. Implementation

Factor 8: Seeing implementation as a process of political dialogue

Many peace agreements are not implemented as expected. This is a serious matter because of the negative impact it has on confidence and on the risk of conflict relapse. Main factors that can cause implementation to fail include:[16]

- **A shift in political support and incentives for the agreement after its conclusion.** This might occur because groups use strategic violence to outbid their erstwhile rivals, hedge against failure, seek to enrich themselves or to spoil the agreement (Boyle, 2009; Steenkamp, 2011); or because international pressure, presence and resources fail to help make peace sufficiently attractive (Dudouet, 2008).
- **Vital concerns turn out to have been insufficiently addressed** in the agreement (Arnault, 2006). These concerns are anything that jeopardises the survival of the parties or their leaders.
- **Implementation modalities are inadequate.** For example, they do not fit the context (*e.g.* the transitional period is too short or too long), they are too vague (although this is inevitable to some extent, some clarity is needed over who does what, when, how and with what resources) or the implementation capacities of the parties have been overestimated.

However, it should be expected that the implementation of a peace agreement will be a fairly rough and tumble affair. Complex social systems are rarely transformed through one-off events like a peace agreement (Ropers, 2008). Hence, post-agreement struggles will be the norm rather than the exception; the challenge is to keep them peaceful and to prevent general failure of the agreement.[17] To this end, it is essential that the implementation period is seen as an opportunity for space and time for further dialogue, mediation and negotiation supported by enabling mechanisms and resources. Continued mediation can, for instance, create a platform for change for peace champions within former conflict parties (*e.g.* see Hay, 2011 on the Dubai Process). A peace agreement should include provisions for the rapid establishment of conflict resolution mechanisms that benefit from international monitoring and verification (*e.g.* by UN missions), temporary international security provision and international mediation capacities as appropriate and possible (Box 2.3).[18]

Box 2.3. **Lessons from the implementation of the Nuba Mountains Ceasefire agreement**

The 2002 Nuba Mountains Ceasefire Agreement preceded the Comprehensive Peace Agreement of 2005, and was implemented by the Joint Monitoring Commission (JMC) in Nuba and South Kordufan (Sudan) between 2002 and 2005. Although it is clear that ceasefire monitoring by itself cannot and has not brought an end to hostilities, four lessons stand out from this period:

1. Implementation problems were generally resolved swiftly and at the lowest possible level before they became political.
2. A proactive attitude, ceaseless dialogue with a lot of patience and JMC presence on the ground proved vital. For this purpose, the joint monitoring teams often met with local authorities in villages where an incident had been reported. Building trust between international monitors and local authorities and people early also proved critical.
3. Communication was essential. Although the agreement was translated and significant investment was made to spread its key messages (*e.g.* theatre groups performed to 5 000 people), it still took about a year to achieve general awareness.
4. Mediation, security and development roles proved intertwined and inseparable. This meant that security and development actors needed to understand mediation, and mediators needed to understand security and development issues.

Source: Geneva workshop, 21-23 September 2011, for more details see OECD (2011d), *Improving International Support to Peace Processes. Key Workshop Recommendations*, OECD Publishing, Paris, *www.oecd.org/dataoecd/27/34/49071359.pdf.*

Factor 9: Enabling conflict parties to make a successful political transformation

Successful implementation of a peace agreement also requires conflict parties to transform themselves politically, either from rebel group to political party or from a more repressive government to a more inclusive governing arrangement. This transformation involves organisational and attitudinal change on several levels. De Zeeuw (2008) underlines four elements of rebel-to-political party transformation: *1)* demilitarisation of organisational structures; *2)* development of party organisation; *3)* democratisation of decision making; and *4)* adaptation of strategies and goals away from violence. Furthermore, he outlines a number of factors that influence such a transformation process,

including the level of post-agreement power sharing provided for in the peace agreement, the degree of confidence in post-agreement security and stability, the extent to which parties enjoyed civilian support during the conflict that can be converted into votes, the effects of new electoral rules on the ability of parties to gain support and the regional context (de Zeeuw, 2008). Pre-conflict governments will also have to make a similar transformation, if only to accommodate new actors in the post-agreement governance structure. Moreover, the pre-conflict government might have had characteristics that actually contributed to the conflict, such as marginalising policies, oppression and abuse of power. Hence, the four elements of transformation listed above are likely to also have some relevance for governments. Two of these merit particular consideration:

First, demilitarisation of organisational structures is critical, sensitive and contentious. It deserves particular attention because the capacity for violence is often retained as an insurance policy against the failure of a peace agreement (Dudouet, 2008; Boyle, 2009; Mason *et al.*, 2011). Demilitarisation is required for rebel parties and governments alike, especially if the latter include militias or paramilitary groups. This makes effective disarmament, demobilisation, reintegration and security sector reform programmes important for peace (*e.g.* Gamba, 2008; Sedra, 2010). The credible and timely provision of interim security by the international community via peacekeeping can help create the space and confidence that are essential for such programmes to succeed (Jones and Elgin-Cossart, 2011).

Second, parties need to develop co-operative and peaceful ways of working when peace agreements feature power-sharing arrangements. Power-sharing arrangements typically guarantee significant representation of the main contending groups in post-agreement governance, which increases short-term stability by giving them a sufficiently large veto or stake and makes a return to violence unattractive. Such arrangements help, for example, to insulate parties from unfavourable election results (Brancati and Snyder, 2011).[19] However, when parties do not develop more co-operative ways of working together, power-sharing agreements can just as easily lead to long-term political stasis that blocks much-needed change (Sisk, 2008; de Zeeuw, 2008; Papagianni, 2011). The 2008-2009 power sharing agreement in Zimbabwe and the post-2005 implementation of the comprehensive peace agreement (CPA) in Sudan are good examples. A key issue for future research is how power-sharing arrangements can evolve into more flexible and inclusive forms of governance (*e.g.* federalism) in the long-run, as well as how and when elections can support such evolution (Sisk, 2008; Brancati and Snyder, 2011).

Implications for diplomatic/mediation, security and development actors

This brief analysis of implementation factors that influence success in a peace process suggest the following implications for the actors targeted by this publication:

- **Development agencies** can play a key role in helping to create or revitalise peaceful conflict resolution mechanisms, tapping into the power of civil society and local communities. They can also provide resources both for political dialogue and for critical processes such as security system reform (SSR) and disarmament, demobilisation and reintegration (DDR). Finally, they are well placed to support political transformations by providing political training courses, logistical support and direct financial assistance to parties.
- **Security actors** can provide temporary safety from violence and instability – not necessarily through the use of force but by building confidence and alleviating fear. Moreover, security actors can also contribute expertise to SSR and DDR processes.
- **Diplomats/mediators** need to ensure that mediation capacity remains easily available and be aware of political dynamics during implementation. They should also ensure sufficient political and diplomatic engagement with the parties to pressure, cajole and give incentives for the resolution of post-agreement issues in as peaceful and sustainable a manner as possible.

Notes

1. Doyle and Sambanis (2006, cited in Kurtenbach, 2009) developed a peacebuilding triangle showing the outcome of peace agreements and implementation (in the short term) as the result of interaction between the level of hostility and local and international capacities. Reychler *et al.* (2008, also cited in Kurtenbach, 2009) propose a four-step codebook for the analysis of peace processes. The central aim of the codebook is the development of criteria for predicting the success or failure of peace negotiations. However, both approaches focus mostly on armed actors, *i.e.* conflict parties, rather than on the role of international actors.
2. In turn, conflict dynamics influence external interests and stakeholders. For example, the recent massacres in Houla and around Hama (both in Syria) elicited

strong responses from the UN's Secretary-General and the US Secretary of State, and may well influence Russia's position (*Le Figaro*, 7 June 2012).

3. President Obama's and Israeli Prime Minister Netanyahua's recent speeches to the American Israel Public Affairs Committee (AIPAC) offer a good illustration of such influence at work. On the role of diaspora more broadly, see OECD (2010b).

4. The term "non-state armed group" covers a tremendous variety of groups, ranging from criminal to political and terrorist, with a high diversity of motives, resources and levels of legitimacy. Here it is defined as a group that possesses a hierarchical organisation, uses violence for political ends, is independent from state control and has some degree of territorial control over a geographic area (Bruderlein 2000; Policzer 2005). For more in-depth research into the role that resistance and liberation movements can fulfil in shaping peace processes, see Berghof Foundation (2012).

5. However, their inclusion can be sequenced, incremental or made conditional on future behaviour (Dudouet, 2008; World Bank, 2011a).

6. Goerzig (2010) offers an interesting view on the process of radicalisation through identity reduction within Hamas and the resulting perception of group members on the possibilities for, and desirability of, a peace process. Her article illustrates that conflict reframing or reorientation *within* a conflict party can be critical to the likelihood and success of a peace processes.

7. Recent UN-OECD efforts have sought to reduce the chance of mining companies fuelling conflict by buying minerals from conflict parties. To this end, they have encouraged such companies to conduct adequate due diligence along their mineral supply chains with the aim of reducing possibilities to finance violence via selling minerals, primarily by non-state armed groups in the DRC (OECD, 2011e).

8. Much scholarly debate has been devoted to the question of whether animosities are the product of vast impersonal forces in human history, or a more instrumentalist understanding of the role of elites in exploiting differences for political purposes. Increasingly, however, the importance of human agency is recognised. Brown (quoted in Ramsbotham, *et al.*, 2005), for example, has calculated that almost 70% of major active conflicts at the time were triggered by "bad leadership". Current developments regarding the indictment by international tribunals and the International Criminal Court of national leaders confirm that leaders are increasingly being held accountable for the manner in which violence has been used to pursue domestic agendas (see Lutz and Reiger, 2009). However, the most effective prophylaxis for bad leadership is strong democratic institutions. The emphasis on leadership should therefore be read with the need for institution-building and not as an alternative to it, and with the understanding that especially during transition periods, quality leadership networks are needed to build and sustain effective local institutions.

9. See the website of the Developmental Leadership Programme (DPL), *www.dlprog.org*; Leftwich and Hogg, 2007; and Leftwich, 2009.

10. The *World Development Report* states: "… the state cannot address complex stresses and violent challenges on its own but must build momentum through coalitions that are sufficiently inclusive, at both national and local levels, to generate broad support" (World Bank, 2011a).

11. An example from Guinea Bissau suggests that local women and women's organisations can also help to bring conflict parties to the peace table using family ties where efforts of other actors failed (UN, 2002). However, further research is warranted to identify the conditions under which this is feasible.

12. Annex A offers an additional perspective by offering a detailed overview of the different roles that diplomatic/mediation, security and development actors can play at different phases of the peace process.

13. These findings largely agree with the general consensus among facilitation practitioners. See, for example, Pruitt and Thomas (2007).

14. An interview with Julio Balconi, a former Guatemalan defence minister, gives an interesting firsthand account of the mistrust that can prevail between conflict parties (Bauer, 2009).

15. There are clearly no final answers to these questions. Lanz sets out a helpful conceptual framework to analyse the inclusion-exclusion dynamics of peace processes in which he suggests international norms and practical requirements are determining key factors. However, he cautions against overly normative positions and argues that "mediators have to defend 'peacemaking space' from an exaggerated projection of normative concepts and political agendas" (Lanz, 2011).

16. The UNSG outlines the following four factors that influence the durability of an agreement: *1)* the degree of political commitment of the conflict parties; *2)* buy-in from the population; *3)* the extent to which it addresses the root causes of the conflict; and *4)* whether it can withstand the stresses of implementation (UNSG, 2012).

17. Cousens (2008) suggests five types of issues that are likely to arise during implementation: *i)* tough issues that were intentionally left unresolved (*e.g.* the boundary demarcation of Abyei in Sudan); *ii)* interpretation disputes over parts of the agreement; *iii)* new, post-agreement issues (*e.g.* oil discovery in Timor-Leste); *iv)* erupting local conflicts (*e.g.* Democratic Republic of Congo, Lebanon and Somalia); and *v)* broadening the inclusiveness of the original agreement (*e.g.* in Burundi with the *Forces nationals de libération*/National Forces of Liberation after the Arusha agreements).

18. However, for verification to help resolve conflict – rather than enflame it – statements of non-compliance must be followed by sanctions that influence the incentives of the violating party (Arnault, 2006). Interestingly, Fortna (2003) observes that in the particular case of ceasefire agreements the use of mediation

seems a less effective way of dispute resolution than joint commissions. In respect of the availability of professional capacities for mediation the UNSG has, for instance, highlighted that it is important that these are sustained throughout the implementation period (UNSG, 2009a; UNSC, 2009a; Cousens, 2008).

19. In general, elections that take place quickly after conflict ends are associated with an increased likelihood that the conflict will restart (Brancati and Snyder, 2011).

Chapter 3

Strengths and weaknesses of international support to peace processes

How effective is international support for peace processes? What is the international community good at and what needs improvement? How does its support reflect the "ingredients" discussed in the previous chapter? This chapter brings together the main findings from a review of international engagement in recent peace processes. It identifies four key weaknesses and three key strengths, and uses some current examples of peace processes from around the world to highlight good practice:

Weakness 1: The dominance of international views and priorities

Weakness 2: Weak co-operation among development, mediation and security actors

Weakness 3: A lack of "conflict sensitivity" and the ability to learn from mistakes

Weakness 4: A lack of fit-for-purpose financial and human resources

Strength 1: International tools and techniques create pressure for peace

Strength 2: Integrated international resources and action provide vital support to long-term peace

Strength 3: Global-regional-local partnerships generate context-specific, sustainable responses to conflict

Chapter 2 has outlined the key ingredients for a peace process that is likely to hold in the long term. But to what extent does current international support include these ingredients? This chapter analyses the strengths and weaknesses of current international support to peace processes. It does not consider strengths and weaknesses of particular actors or from specific development, mediation and security angles. Rather, it looks at international support as a combination of aid, mediation, and peacekeeping tools and activities, and assesses strengths and weaknesses in an integrated fashion (Table 3.1). The analysis brings together the main findings from a review of international engagement in recent peace processes. Together, Chapters 2 and 3 set the scene for the recommendations outlined in Chapter 4.

Table 3.1. **Overview of key weaknesses and strengths of international support**

Key weaknesses	Key strengths
The dominance of international views and priorities	International tools and techniques create pressure for peace
Weak co-operation among development, mediation and security actors	Integrated international action provides vital support to long-term peace
A lack of "conflict sensitivity" and the ability to learn from mistakes	Global-regional-local partnerships generate context-specific, sustainable responses to conflict
A lack of fit-for-purpose financial and human resources	

3.1. Weaknesses in international support to peace processes

Unfortunately, international support can have a negative impact on peace processes and can even do serious harm by reducing confidence among combatants, civilian populations and international actors alike. A review of the current practice of international support shows that international performance is particularly weak in four areas. This chapter formulates these areas in general terms, based on a number of cases. The extent to which they apply to a particular case will inevitably vary.

Weakness 1: The dominance of international views and priorities

It is a stark reality that international support often lacks neutrality. Whitfield (2008), for instance, suggests that the main strategic and economic interests of states and other actors in peace processes derive from: *1)* colonial or other ties; *2)* concerns about regional security and governance; *3)* human rights and humanitarian agendas; and *4)* preoccupations with terrorism.

International interventions are often driven by the strategic interests of several national governments, which can either converge with or diverge from each other. Where they diverge, the international community tends to take sides in the conflict; support is rendered ineffective at best, and downright harmful at worst. For example, the lack of consensus among UN Security Council members to condemn the Syrian government's crackdown on protesters since 2011 has made it difficult to increase international pressure on the conflict parties. Another example is the diverging response from Western and Arab actors to Hamas' electoral victory in 2006. While Western countries shifted their support to the remaining Fatah-controlled institutions, Arab countries provided Hamas-controlled ministries with budget support (Brynen, 2008). Also, when key international actors agree with each other, but their priorities differ from those of the conflict parties, or where international preferences are very strong, international support can disempower conflict parties and reduce their space to search for political consensus. Somalia is a prime example of this latter problem: most of the high-profile attempts to realise sustainable peace have been driven by the international community (EC and Interpeace, 2010; OECD, 2011d). Only at the recent London Conference on Somalia did the international community belatedly acknowledge the need to work more with regional actors and Somali experiences – while still excluding Al-Shabaab, a Somali-based militant Islamist group (FCO, 2012). Similarly, the Dayton as well as Kosovo status negotiations were strongly dominated by international actors, in particular the US. Although this may help to bring about an agreement and avoid further bloodshed, it can have negative long-term consequences that are often insufficiently accounted for in implementation periods and mechanisms (*e.g.* dysfunctional governance in Bosnia, the unresolved status of North Kosovo, leading to riots and lawlessness).

A peace agreement that reflects the strategic interests of external actors rather than those of the conflict parties is likely to fail. Marginalised groups are, for instance, likely to take up arms again if their interests are not adequately included.[1] Supporting peace processes through international organisations (especially regional ones) and working with "insider mediators" are two ways to avoid excessive dominance of the strategic interests of other states.

Weakness 2: Weak co-operation among development, mediation and security actors

Development, mediation, and security actors all have vital roles in a peace process, but their efforts will be most effective if they are part of an integrated strategy. However, such co-ordination is often ineffective or absent. This is both the case within and between national governments and international organisations.

Because peace agreements are one step in the long process of societal transformation from violence to stability and resilience, they must cover all aspects of development. Mediation, development or security activities occurring in isolation lack sufficient understanding and knowledge to span this range of issues. In fact, each of these actors enters a peace process with different sets of priorities. Mediators usually focus on politics, process and getting to an agreement. Security actors are more likely to zoom in on security issues, ceasefire agreements, disarmament, stabilisation and force projection. Development actors will tend to look at governance, socio-economic issues and inclusiveness. Such different foci are not weaknesses in and of themselves, but demand co-operation (Box 3.1). A lack of co-operation can lead to international efforts being dominated by a particular perspective. For example, security considerations dominated the Kosovo peace process, with the consequence that longer-term governance, corruption and development issues were insufficiently discussed. The impact is still visible today (OECD, 2011d). It can also lead to the neglect of issues that are vital to an agreement's long-term success (such as a viable plan for generating economic growth) and to implementation gaps that arise because of sequencing failures (*e.g.* between DDR and SSR).[2]

Box 3.1. **Co-operation among mediators, security and development experts during the Arusha process**

The Arusha talks (1997-2000), held to resolve the conflict in Burundi, involved four committees working in parallel: *1)* truth and reconciliation, which aimed to deal with the past; *2)* democracy and good governance, to establish a comprehensive coalition and political representation from the different communities; *3)* security, aiming to change the idea that control over the army by one group was the only way to guarantee national security; *4)* reconstruction and development, aiming to explore if and how Burundi was a viable state economically, including land issues.

Although this approach puts high demands on the negotiating parties, its advantage was that these issues could be addressed in parallel. For instance, progress and ideas on what the development of the country could look like helped ease political tensions about economic inequalities, while the political and security working groups were instrumental in designing mechanisms to minimise the risk of one group dominating the other. It offers an interesting model of how security and development experts with mediation know-how can be involved during the peace process.

Source: Geneva workshop 21-23 September 2011, for more details see OECD (2011d), *Improving International Support to Peace Processes. Key Workshop Recommendations*, OECD Publishing, Paris, *www.oecd.org/dataoecd/27/34/49071359.pdf.*

Co-operation, however, needs to be driven by incentives and carries costs. Getting to joint strategies that unite diplomatic, mediation, development and security actors in international coalitions, as well as streamline different objectives, resources, tools and activities, requires at least four ingredients:

1. **Pragmatism.** International actors often have different interests in a peace process (see *Weakness 1*). This suggests that it is unlikely that a single strategy will emerge to guide all international actors. It is more realistic to hope for "coalitions of the like-minded" to engage on a more strategic basis and, over time, reach some sort of agreement with other coalitions.

2. **Clarity over trade-offs.** Different (international) actors often pursue conflicting priorities at the same time, such as peace and justice. This influences the nature and scope of their co-operation. UN engagement in Uganda, for instance, suffers from a double bind: it seeks to enter into a dialogue with the Lord's Resistance Army (LRA), but is also bound by the ICC to extradite wanted commanders (Schomerus, 2008). Joint strategies require such trade-offs to be addressed and should be guided by clear principles.[3] Involving a broad range of actors in strategic deliberations on peace processes from the start, such as those responsible for following up on serious violations of international law, can be good way to stimulate consensus on approaches. However, this requires significant co-ordination capacity and leadership.

3. **Incentives.** Different actors operate on the basis of different mandates, performance objectives and institutional cultures. Even where leaders are willing to co-operate, institutional incentives may nevertheless be stacked against them. Recent work by International Alert for example suggests that World Bank leaders are limited in their ability to provide innovative and dynamic leadership during peacebuilding periods because their job responsibilities tend to be narrowly defined and because internal management systems are time-consuming (Batmanglich and Stephen, 2011).

4. **Structural enablers.** If co-operation is not to be dependent on windows of opportunities and charismatic leaders, staffing, finance and planning mechanisms must structurally encourage it. However, standard operating procedures for strategic co-ordination between the UN and regional organisations, for instance, seem largely non-existent. Too often, co-operation depends on individual personalities, which is a shaky basis for long-term success (see also Call, 2012).

External actors who provide support to peace processes can reduce this weakness by focusing on the leadership incentives they have in place, creating a learning culture and improving institutional flexibility.

Weakness 3: A lack of "conflict sensitivity" and the ability to learn from mistakes

Few international actors use regular, explicit and deep conflict analysis to support peace processes; neither is such analysis well integrated within their strategies and programmes for peacebuilding. Worse, these strategies often lack indicators of progress and feedback loops that allow the quality of support to be improved based on events and experience. While it is human to make mistakes, it is much less acceptable not to learn from them. This lack of conflict assessment, monitoring, and evaluation is making it difficult for international actors to learn and share lessons in a systematic manner. It also makes it difficult to be accountable to those who suffer from the conflict, or to identify the unintended consequences of well-intended actions.

The basic principle of taking the context as the starting point for shaping support to a peace process (also one of the general principles for good international engagement in fragile states) is still not always adhered to (OECD, 2011f). This repetition of failure comes with high costs. In Nepal, for example, the international community was slow to acknowledge that the Maoists enjoyed significant legitimacy among large parts of the local population (Box 3.2; OECD, 2011d). Good conflict analysis could have led to a more rapid understanding. Similarly, external mediation in Somalia has generally been based on thin and questionable knowledge of the country's complex socio-political dynamics. As a result, international support strategies have not generally been well-adapted to the context and featured abysmal success rates (Menkhaus, 2010). In post-agreement peacebuilding, recent evaluations of donor support in DRC, South Sudan and Sri Lanka suggest that development actors often fail to assess needs and analyse local conflict dynamics before getting involved (Bennett *et al.*, 2010; Labda, 2011; Chapman *et al.*, 2009; Autesserre, 2010). A lack of good analysis easily leads to action that is based on incorrect assumptions and will therefore be ineffective. For instance, international actors assumed that they only had to support the reconstruction of northeast Sri Lanka in order to lure the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) back to negotiations in 2003. Yet, the conflict was mainly political in nature, and economic incentives that did not significantly affect key political interests were largely irrelevant to the LTTE (Smith, 2008). However, even sensible recommendations based on an understanding of the conflict can fall on deaf ears for political reasons. For example, in 1998 a UN needs assessment mission in Georgia suggested easing international restrictions on trade and financial relations with Abkhazia in order to create

a better negotiation climate. Yet, this recommendation was largely ignored by external actors who "backed Georgia's demand that all economic development to Abkhazia be channelled through Tbilisi" (Kvarchelia, 2008).

A particular challenge for conflict analysis is to differentiate between local norms and customs that need to be respected on the one hand, and aspects of the pre-conflict society that contributed to conflict on the other. A peace process offers a chance to stimulate positive social change away from conflict, but this requires a good understanding of the situation. For example, it may offer a window of opportunity to address tensions between local norms and global norms, such as the violation of women's rights (Handrahan, 2004; Castillejo, 2011).

This weakness can be addressed by further professionalisation of the skills and careers of those involved in peace negotiations; standardising processes for conducting conflict analysis and making such analysis mandatory and regular; increasing resources available for conflict analysis and creating the mechanisms to link findings to support strategies.

Box 3.2. **The impact of inadequate conflict and context analysis during the Nepalese peace process**

International support to the Nepali peace process was based on insufficient conflict and context analyses. Three key issues have arisen as a result:

- Events and opportunities in the country have historically been (and continue to be) strongly shaped by China and India. International actors were slow to take this into account in their strategies and programming, which reduced their effectiveness.
- Most of the international community was slow to acknowledge the legitimacy that the Maoists enjoyed in the eyes of a substantial portion of the local population, which made them a critical party to any peace process.
- Many in the international community tended to base their support too much on the views and wishes of the Nepalese elite. As a result, issues of social conflict and exclusion were not coherently integrated into many development programmes.

Source: Geneva workshop, 21-23 September 2011, for more details see OECD (2011d), *Improving International Support to Peace Processes. Key Workshop Recommendations*, OECD Publishing, Paris, *www.oecd.org/dataoecd/27/34/49071359.pdf.*

Weakness 4: A lack of fit-for-purpose financial and human resources

Delivering international support to peace processes is a specialised, professional undertaking that involves significant moral responsibility. As highlighted in Chapter 2, the failure of a peace process has profound consequences for the level of trust, the likelihood of conflict escalation or recurrence and later efforts to broker peace. An elementary issue that can contribute to failure is the lack of fit-for-purpose international financial and human resources. To be fit-for-purpose, these resources must be available on a long-term basis via permanent arrangements that allow for easy mobilisation, must be tailored to the specific case at hand and must be of high quality.

Ensuring adequate availability of financial resources for international support to peace processes faces two main challenges:

1. Many international actors only start contributing financially to efforts to initiate a peace processes *after* a crisis or conflict has erupted (Papagianni and Wennman, 2010). Political attention for a conflict – and hence the availability of funds – is often crisis-driven and likely to weaken once an agreement has been reached. Yet, mediation is a critical tool to *prevent* as well as to *respond* to violent conflict. Unfortunately, mediation suffers to some extent from the "conflict prevention conundrum". This means it enjoys strong rhetorical support, but since every crisis can be used as an example of policy failure and credit for success is hard to claim, funding is often not matched to rhetoric.[4]
2. International funding for peace processes tends to be made available on a project and country-specific basis, and for too short a period. This makes it difficult to build permanent capacities for effective support to peace processes. This, in turn, reduces the level of international expertise, the capacity to generate and use lessons, the ability to engage in prevention and contingency planning as well as the ability to take a long-term perspective. The lack of longer-term, sustained funding also makes it difficult to implement peace agreements successfully because it makes implementation dependent on irregular contributions and subject to the vagaries of donor funding cycles.

It should be borne in mind that the financial resources required for conflict prevention and mediation are modest compared to the amounts of funding required for peacekeeping and post-agreement peacebuilding and statebuilding. By way of a rough illustration: the funding of the UN's Department for Political Affairs (DPA) totalled about USD 51 million in 2011 (UNGA, 2011b; UN, 2011), while approved resources for UN peacekeeping were about USD 7.84 billion between July 2011 and June 2012 (UN DPKO,

2012) and OECD donor country aid (ODA) to fragile states amounted to USD 46.7 billion in 2009 (OECD, 2011g). Obviously, DPA's budget does not equate to all global expenditure on conflict prevention and mediation (*e.g.* cost figures for regional organisations involved in mediation as well as specific peace processes would need to be added, while peacekeeping and development expenditure is often necessary to implement agreements), but the significantly lower cost of mediation compared to peacekeeping and development is nevertheless striking and suggests that more investment at the front end, even to a modest amount such as a hundred million dollars, is likely to go a long way.

In addition, the quantity and quality of human resources for mediation support in the UN and in regional institutions can be improved. This issue can be broken down in three key components:

1. The lack of a co-ordinated international approach to skills development and mediation training, as well as to mediation research and evaluation infrastructure. This creates unnecessary competition among and divergence in the approaches of different actors and agencies involved in the business of delivering international support to peace processes. Moreover, international support to peace processes is a multidisciplinary undertaking, but mediators and security and development experts often rely on "traditional" skills and toolsets, rather than being trained in a broader and more integrated manner.
2. Short-term and *ad hoc* staff deployments. These tend to hamper the sustainable implementation of a peace agreement (Papagianni and Wennmann, 2010).
3. A lack of high-level female diplomats and officials in the UN system means that female "Track one mediators" are scarce (see Glossary). The international community has committed itself to increase the number of such mediators, but so far it seems not to meet its own targets (Potter, 2005).[5]

This weakness can be mitigated by paying more attention to *1)* partnerships between international and regional organisations engaged in providing support to peace processes; *2)* financial mechanisms that support mediation efforts; as well as *3)* training and development of mediation support teams.

3.2. Strengths in international support to peace processes

Fortunately, international support for peace processes today also has some significant strengths, three of which are highlighted in this section.

Strength 1: International tools and techniques to create pressure for peace

International actors have a range of tools that can be used to exert political pressure on conflict parties and to encourage the "ripeness" of a peace process. These include formal political condemnation (*e.g.* through resolutions of the United Nations Security Council or the UN's Human Rights Council); sanctions (*e.g.* against individuals or on specific goods or services); embargoes (*e.g.* on arms sales); and the withdrawal of support (*e.g.* aid or military support). International tools that can encourage parties to resolve the conflict include formal political encouragement, security guarantees, the prospect of debt relief and development funding. Less tangibly, external actors can also help establish trusted communication channels, increase confidence in the possibility of a negotiated solution by introducing new ideas and concepts, and build the capacity of the negotiating parties (Barnes, 2009). A recent example was how the threat of international sanctions helped convince Yemen's President Saleh to sign the Gulf Cooperation Council plan that enabled the start of the country's political transition (Lackner, 2012).

Three factors in particular influence the effect of these international tools:

1. The positive or negative pressure that international measures apply must affect directly the intrinsic incentives of the conflict parties, embodied in the notion of "ripeness" (Barnes, *et al.*, 2008).[6] In other words, the pressure must be mobilised on the basis of a sound understanding of the interests and incentives of the conflict parties. It is particularly important that international efforts take account of community dynamics and local conflicts when encouraging ripeness; this requires a more micro-level of analysis than is often applied. Failure to do so might result in international efforts backfiring, as witnessed in Somalia and the DRC (Conciliation Resources, 2009; Autesserre, 2010).

2. Sanctions or pressure must be co-ordinated across the spectrum of international actors involved in the conflict. This emphasises once again the need for a coherent international strategy with common objectives (see next section).

3. The international community must encourage peace forcefully, yet diplomatically given the perceptions, mistrust and sensitivities involved in many conflicts. Roosevelt's quote of the West African proverb: "Speak softly and carry a big stick; you will go far" is a salutary reminder of this need (cited in Miller, 1992).

Strength 2: Integrated international resources and action provide vital support to long-term peace

When international actors have managed to align their mediation, peacekeeping and development efforts strategically – and ground these in a deep understanding of local political interests, illicit economies and hybrid governance systems – they contributed valuable external resources to resource-scarce environments that helped change the dynamics of conflict, exclusion and development.

For example, the Nepal Peace and Development Strategy (UN *et al.*, 2011) takes the country's Comprehensive Peace Agreement as its starting point and unites its key development partners behind a single approach to address short/medium-term (12-24 months) as well as long-term (5 years) peacebuilding objectives by setting out joint priorities, clear co-ordination structures and joint financing mechanisms. Moreover, complementary and joint *Basic Operating Guidelines* set minimum conditions for development aid and dialogue of donors with the conflict parties in Nepal (SDC, 2011) This approach is the kind of integrated action that is required to maximise international contributions to a sustainable peace agreement, and helped to resolve some of the inadequacies described in Box 3.2. The negotiations at Arusha between 1997 and 2000 to bring peace to Burundi are another example of integrated international support (Box 3.1). Four committees were set up in parallel around the issues of reconciliation, democratisation, security and development. This helped both to ease political tensions (by addressing these issues in parallel and facilitating trade-offs across areas) and stimulated an integrated approach (OECD, 2011d).

Realising such integrated approaches will often require joint strategies. The ingredients for devising such strategies are identified above under *Weakness 2* (pragmatism, the ability to deal with trade-offs, incentives and structural enablers). Organisations can foster the leadership required for preparing these strategies through effective talent management and promotion systems, and by devolving as much authority to field staff as possible to ensure context-specific decision-making (OECD, 2012). However, establishing relatively clear but informal hierarchies between leaders of different organisations in the field will also require early high-level conversations among key political leaders and headquarters. Organisational flexibility also demands, paradoxically, that organisations work on the basis of joint standard operating procedures to reduce the variance of inaction and disagreement (Batmanglich and Stephen, 2011).

Strength 3: Global-regional-local partnerships generate context-specific, sustainable responses to conflict

International actors have developed context-specific responses to conflict by supporting regional and local structures for conflict management and by enhancing their financial and human capacity to engage early and effectively.

For example, over the last few years, the UN's Mediation Support Unit has developed into a global resource hub and centre of excellence in mediation. By building strong partnerships with organisations like the African Union (AU), other UN entities, NGOs and insider mediators, it leverages global resources and knowledge through regional and local structures.[7] As part of a global-regional partnership, organisations like the AU and the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) have recently invested significant time and resources to improve their support to peace processes (Papagianni and Wennmann, 2010). For example, between 2006 and 2010, the AU developed a policy framework for the civilian dimension of its African Standby Force that acknowledges the multidimensional nature of contemporary peace operations, including their role in the implementation of peace agreements (Coning and Kasumba, 2010). A good example of how such partnerships can work was the rapid and full international support for the AU/Kofi Annan-led mediation in Kenya after the post-electoral violence in 2008, resulting in a relatively swift agreement (Whitfield, 2010).[8]

At the local level, international actors have come to support so-called "insider mediators": trusted and respected individuals who have a high level of legitimacy and "cultural and normative closeness to the parties, various links to individuals or institutions driving a conflict, and an ability to influence the parties' behaviour and thinking" (Papagianni and Wennmann, 2010). Examples of insider mediation include the Concerned Citizens for Peace structures in Kenya, the Conflict Management Panels in DRC, and the National Peace Architecture in Ghana (Box 3.3).

Both global-regional partnerships and support for insider mediators are useful antidotes to the risk of overly state-centric, top-down processes to peace agreements or their implementation (see Richmond, 2008). This combined strength of global experience and funding with regional proximity and expertise, and the local understanding and credibility of insider mediators, can be developed still further.

Box 3.3. **"Infrastructures for Peace" in Ghana**

"Infrastructures for Peace" are arrangements that combine a political mandate (which can be included in a peace agreement), with new linkages between existing structures (government institutions, civil society organisations, traditional institutions and political parties) at all levels of society and facilitation expertise. They have been used in Nicaragua (1987), South Africa (1991-1994), and Northern Ireland (1996), among other places to help implement peace agreements and continue political dialogue to resolve combustible issues.

The key elements for success are that the infrastructure *1)* legitimises the use of dialogue and consensus-seeking approaches to conflict at all levels of society; *2)* allocates responsibility for violence prevention and peacebuilding to a specific group of actors at various levels and locations; *3)* ensures that sufficient linkages take place between relevant stakeholders and resources at the different levels; and *4)* ensures that expert support in facilitating dialogue is available. A particularly attractive quality of an infrastructure for peace is that it is relatively inexpensive. Apart from full-time technical and administrative staff, it relies on existing capabilities within government, civil society and traditional structures. This means that there is no need for elaborate institution building.

Ghana provides a particularly powerful example of the effectiveness of the approach. The process to establish an infrastructure for peace in Ghana took eight years (2003-2011) and is not yet finished. However, it has managed to resolve a conflict on succession issues in the Northern Region (one of the most important kingdoms of the region) in 2004 and avoided the escalation of tensions during presidential and parliamentary elections in 2008. Ghana's infrastructure for peace now consists of councils of representatives of relevant stakeholders as well as individual Ghanaians who enjoy high levels of trust and respect within society. These councils exist at national, regional and district levels and have a mandate to facilitate dialogue, problem-solving and reconciliation processes at their levels of jurisdiction. They are served by a body of full-time, professional Peace Promotion Officers connected to the ten Regional Peace Advisory Councils. Furthermore, a Peacebuilding Support Unit was established within the Ministry of the Interior to co-ordinate support with and collaboration from government agencies. A National Peace Council was established in 2006.

Source: Political dialogue working group of the International Dialogue on Peacebuilding and Statebuilding.

Notes

1. Recent studies on engagement with non-state armed groups include Hottinger, 2008; Buchanan, 2008; De Zeeuw, 2008; Wennmann, 2009; Dudouet, 2009; Hazen, 2010; Dudouet, Giessman and Planta, 2012.

2. See Ghani *et al.* (2010); for a critique, see van Veen and de Vries (2010).

3. There are, however, limitations to such trade-offs. For instance, UN mediators do not condone amnesties for genocide, crimes against humanity, war crimes or gross violations of human rights (UNSG, 2012).

4. The creation of the UN Inter-Agency Framework for Co-ordination on Preventive Action offers some evidence for a shift in thinking amongst UN member states and departments from response to prevention. However, as long as funding remains at its current modest levels and is provided on an *ad-hoc* basis, the full strategic potential of UN mediation for conflict prevention is likely to remain unrealised.

5. Within the UN, Potter considers the pool from which female Track one mediators can be recruited to consist of the Secretary-General's top staff involved in "running peacemaking, peacebuilding or peacekeeping missions, or acting as envoys in (post) conflict situations". She identifies 61 such positions, of which 4 are staffed by women (6.5%) (Potter, 2005). In recent years, this number has improved slightly; there are currently 10 female Special Representatives and Deputy Special Representatives (UNSG, 2012). Although there are good reasons for increasing the role of women in mediation processes, more empirical evidence for the type of impact this may have would be welcome. The current level of exclusion makes it difficult to generate such evidence.

6. According to Barnes *et al.* (2008), intrinsic incentives are involved "when the solution envisioned in the contents of an agreement is preferable to continued conflict so that parties are motivated to resolve their differences.".

7. For a more detailed overview of UN partnerships with different regional organisations and NGOs: UNSG, 2012.

8. It has since, however, run into a number of implementation difficulties.

Chapter 4

Recommendations to improve international support

This chapter makes seven recommendations to improve international support to peace processes. The recommendations are grouped into two main categories and are mainly addressed to senior decision makers and policy experts from the member countries of the OECD's Development Advisory Committee DAC and of INCAF:

Making sure we have the right tools, by:

1. *Developing practical incentives for more co-ordinated international support for peace processes*
2. *Ensuring that permanent international mediation teams have diverse and up-to-date skill sets*
3. *Re-allocating existing financial resources to increase international support*

Making sure those tools are put to best use, by:

4. *Conducting joint conflict analysis and agree on a joint support strategy whenever possible*
5. *Linking international support more effectively to regional and local conflict resolution mechanisms*
6. *Supporting the implementation of an agreement as a process of continued political dialogue*
7. *Helping leaders develop the ability to build bridges in societies in conflict*

4.1. Who are these recommendations for?

The seven recommendations here are meant to further improve the quality of support provided by states and international organisations to peace processes. They are mainly addressed to senior decision makers and policy experts from the member countries of the OECD's Development Advisory Committee DAC and of INCAF who *1)* influence the environment in which international support to peace processes takes shape; *2)* determine how resources are allocated; and *3)* also act as UN members and represent their governments more broadly, including in defence and diplomacy. However, the recommendations are also relevant for a much broader audience. The recommendations are grouped into two main categories (Table 4.1) and each features (a) lead actor(s): *1)* Making sure we have the right tools to support peace processes; *2)* Making sure those tools are put to best use.

Table 4.1. **Seven key recommendations to improve the quality of international support to peace processes**

Making sure we have the right tools	Who should take action?
1. Develop practical incentives for more co-ordinated support for peace processes	Development, diplomatic/mediation and security actors
2. Ensure that permanent international mediation teams have diverse and up-to-date skill sets	Mainly mediation actors
3. Re-allocate existing financial resources to increase international support	Mainly development actors
Making sure our tools are put to best use	**Who should take action?**
4. Conduct joint conflict analysis and agree on a joint support strategy whenever possible	Development, diplomatic/mediation and security actors
5. Link international support more effectively to regional and local conflict resolution mechanisms	Mainly mediation actors
6. Support the implementation of an agreement as a process of continued political dialogue	Development, diplomatic/mediation and security actors
7. Help leaders develop the ability to build bridges in societies in conflict	Mainly development actors

4.2. Making sure we have the right tools to support peace processes

Tools refer broadly to mechanisms and incentives such as human resource management, finance and leadership that, if fit-for-purpose, can structurally enable higher quality support for peace processes. Without the right tools, the quality of international support becomes overly dependent on improvisation, personal relations and institutional goodwill. Such reliance can be inefficient in terms of time, effort and effectiveness. Before engaging, it is important that international actors consider whether they actually have the capability and tools to do so responsibly. Three recommendations will help improve the international toolkit.

1. Develop practical incentives for more co-ordinated support for peace processes

Co-operation among security, diplomatic/mediation and development actors often comes naturally to practitioners in the field if they are able to put aside institutional stereotypes and constraints. The critical added value of the experience, tools and resources of the three professional fields is generally recognised. Yet collaboration is often problematic at headquarters because of institutional, domestic and geopolitical considerations. Leaders in foreign affairs and defence ministries, aid agencies and international organisations can create incentives for better co-operation between security, development and mediation experts by stating frequently, and with consequence in terms of career incentives, that they view co-operation as vital to successful support. Bureaucracies that shape, fund and deliver international support to peace processes are sensitive to the signals of their senior and political leaders. Without clear, top-down messages it is easy to hide behind existing mandates and institutional silos.

Steps for action:

- Create or reinforce concrete performance incentives for mediation, security and development staff that stimulate co-operation across agencies, ministries and international organisations as part of regular performance management systems and procedures.
- Make cross-postings between organisations standard practice for staff who work on peace processes. This will create a cadre of international leaders who are more familiar with different working methods and cultures and who command trust across organisations.
- Agree standard co-operation procedures for supporting peace processes among key international organisations (for instance, how will analysis be conducted and how will resources be mobilised jointly?). Institutionalising joint working methods and decision making will provide a clearer roadmap for building integrated support.

2. Ensure that permanent international mediation teams have diverse and up-to-date skill sets

The complexity of violent conflict and peace processes means that mediators, security and development experts often have to engage in areas outside their immediate areas of expertise. The organisation of international support to peace processes on the basis of a classic mediation/ security/ development sequencing of roles and activities does not reflect the messy reality of most situations. Teamwork is essential and mediation teams require well-rounded skills, diversity of composition and the ability to constantly learn.

Steps for action:

- Create permanent mediation teams with a specific regional focus and a good gender balance that can provide swift support on the basis of continuous contingency planning and good preparation. It is not realistic to hire individual experts, randomly team them up and expect that they perform well in the field.[1]
- Ensure that experts engaged in international support to peace processes complement expertise in a functional area with a broader and more varied skill set that includes strong interpersonal skills and the ability to see the bigger picture. Recruitment, training and roster composition should reflect this.
- Consider making a mediation "learning and development trajectory" mandatory for high-level diplomats who come to lead mediation teams (programs already exist for junior and mid-level staff, at least in the UN (UNSG, 2012). Diplomatic and mediation skills are similar, but not identical. Training should focus on the soft skills needed in peace processes, management skills to guide international support and substantive knowledge of typical conflict issues and peace agreement provisions. It could be packaged as "executive development" and based on experience-sharing retreats.
- Help women and young professionals to enter the field; half of those suffering from conflict are women who have specific priorities and needs that often go unnoticed. This could be achieved through a mentoring scheme, or by the UN or AU setting up a young talent pool to develop highly qualified mediation (support) staff with development funding.

3. Re-allocate existing financial resources to increase international support

Despite the significant amount of attention paid by the UN and regional organisations like the AU to building mediation and mediation support capabilities, much of the current mediation architecture operates on a shoestring. This cannot deliver the world-class analysis, long-term engagement and high-quality support required to resolve today's violent conflicts. It is not so much a matter of mobilising additional resources, but of reallocating existing resources in recognition of the cost effectiveness of preventing conflict and its recurrence (see Chapter 3). To this end, more effective support to peace processes can make a significant difference.

Steps for action:

- Consider suggesting a financial needs assessment of the UN's Mediation Support Unit and regional organisations like the AU. Match this to the aspirations and priorities in the UN Secretary-General's forthcoming report on mediation of the UNSG with a view to reallocating some development resources in a sustainable and gradual manner.
- Ensure that financial support for peace processes (such as ODA) is flexible and sustained. Funding conditions (*e.g.* duration and use) must recognise the fluidity and turbulence of peace processes and the fact that quick deployments or decision making are often needed to exploit a window of opportunity. Financing arrangements between funders and recipients need to be flexible to allow early investment and rapid action. Such flexibility can be generated by shifting financial assistance from earmarked to unearmarked contributions. A results-focused approach can be maintained through rigorous audits of organisations with such unearmarked contributions.

4.3. Making sure our tools are put to best use

Having the right tools and the right skills to use them does not always ensure they are used well. The analysis in Chapters 1, 2 and 3 has thrown up a number of bottlenecks to successful support for peace processes. Four further recommendations will help address these issues. In respect of Recommendation 4, security and mediation actors should enable development actors to take a lead on conflict analysis in fragile, low-income settings because of their "competitive advantage". In middle-income settings, however, this will be a more joint endeavour.

4. Conduct joint conflict analysis and agree on a joint support strategy whenever possible

International support is most effective when security, mediation and development actors work together, guided by a joint assessment of the conflict and a joint support strategy. The discussion involved in producing joint assessments and support strategies can allow for perspectives to converge. However, a high degree of realism is necessary. Due to varying national interests, levels of trust and resources, it will often be impossible to include all international actors in joint assessments. Nevertheless, the quality of international support could be improved considerably if key international actors joined forces on an "inclusive enough" basis with a few trusted strategic partners.

Steps for action:

- Sponsor permanent partnerships between the UN and regional organisations such as the AU and OAS so that joint conflict analysis benefits from their legitimacy and expertise. This analysis (described in the next step) can subsequently feed into discussions on joint support strategies between like-minded states. Where this is not possible, undertake such analysis with other international partners on a voluntary basis.
- Use joint conflict analysis for five critical tasks that are often neglected: *1)* to map the "structures for violence" (Chapter 1) that have been created during the conflict; *2)* to assess the level of relevance and legitimacy of non-state armed groups from a community and domestic perspective to inform discussions on their inclusion (Section 2.1, Factor 2); *3)* to identify and discuss trade-offs among security, justice, development and mediation objectives (Section 3.1, Weakness 2); *4)* to consider what additional tools will be needed to support long-term implementation of any future peace agreement (Section 3.2, Strength 3); and *5)* to assess how to build women's capacity to participate in informal or formal peace negotiations (Section 2.2, Factor 7).
- Ensure that joint support strategies can mobilise a changing mix of development, security and mediation expertise and resources before, during and after a peace process. This may benefit from establishing dedicated envelopes in country-specific or thematic trust funds. Such strategies should also inform poverty reduction strategy papers (PRSPs) and post-conflict needs assessments (PCNAs), where these exist.

5. Link international support more effectively to regional and local conflict resolution mechanisms

Regional and local conflict resolution mechanisms are likely to have existed before the conflict. Regional mechanisms might include cross-border migration or grazing arrangements, while local mechanisms might be community or religion-based, and enjoy high levels of legitimacy. Such mechanisms often continue to function during a conflict (*e.g.* in Lebanon, Nepal, Somalia and Sudan), but they can also be destroyed or reduced in significance. It is therefore important to assess their resilience and legitimacy early on in the peace process. Where local conflicts are rife and have an important bearing on the prospects for national peace, as in the DRC and Somalia, exploring which local mechanisms exist, how they work and how they can support peace, is critical (Interpeace and CRD, 2008; Autesserre, 2010). The role of women in such mechanisms merits particular attention because of the informal and untraditional contributions they can make to a peace process (Centre for Humanitarian Dialogue, 2010; Chhabra, 2005).

Steps for action:

- Build and deepen global, regional and local partnerships among international organisations like those of the UN family (*e.g.* its Department for Political Affairs, its Development Programme and its Department for Peace Keeping Operations), regional organisations (*e.g.* the AU and Organisation of American States) and international or national NGOs. The UN's Mediation Support Unit (MSU) is becoming a global knowledge hub and provider of mediation services (Section 3.2). This role should be strengthened as part of a "network partnership" model to combine local/regional versatility, understanding and political legitimacy with global resources and experience. Such partnerships are also a cost-effective way to pool the specialised human resources needed for the fine-grained assessment of the nature, legitimacy and effectiveness of local conflict resolution mechanisms.
- Encourage international and regional organisations to develop networks of insider mediators: individuals who enjoy a high level of legitimacy and are recognised by society for their achievements, personality and skills. Enable women to become part of such networks as much as possible. This may require addressing issues of safety (*e.g.* to enable travel or ensure protection from more conservative actors) and logistics (*e.g.* transport to a location). Insider mediators should be at the heart of peace support efforts and dispute resolution platforms at the district, municipal, provincial or national levels. This will give conflict resolution efforts more staying power during long and complex low-intensity conflicts and enhance social resilience.

6. Support the implementation of an agreement as a process of continued political dialogue

Many peace processes are not implemented as expected. While this may point to a lack of political will or the cynical misuse of dialogue, it may also be an indication of a fairly normal post-agreement struggle that takes place within and between conflict parties as they negotiate the more difficult and contentious issues. Hence, international actors must accept and plan for the need to continue to mediate conflict after the agreement has been concluded. This requires monitoring systems, diplomatic and security response capacities, resources and conflict sensitive leadership. International and regional organisations are often best placed to maintain this kind of presence, but appropriate mandates and funding are required.

Steps for action:

- Ensure that the political leaders who sign agreements have sufficient time to consult their constituencies before and after signing. Help to build and finance the capacity of these leaders and their parties to make successful political transitions (Chapter 2).
- Ensure that mediation and mediation support capacity remain available after the agreement and in-country. This will help to prevent the inevitable post-agreement arguments from turning violent (UNSC, 2009a; UNSG, 2009a).
- Inform citizens of the agreement's contents and engage in continual discussion about implementation. A peace agreement must be validated as broadly as possible (*e.g.* by public meetings, referendums or opinion polls). An active civil society can make an important contribution. Diplomats, mediators, development and security actors must have the expertise, resources and time to engage in this manner, and funding arrangements should make this possible.
- Ensure that post-agreement planning is conducted as an extension of the political dialogue that drove the peace process. As the International Dialogue on Peacebuilding and Statebuilding shows, the post-agreement period requires an iterative and political approach to planning (IDPS, 2011a). It is also critical that planning processes are conducted in a conflict-sensitive manner.
- Establish processes and institutions dedicated to peaceful conflict resolution to monitor and guide implementation.[2] This can include "Infrastructures for peace" (Box 3.3), which increase a society's conflict resolution potential by creating local mechanisms to address controversial issues.

7. Help leaders develop the ability to build bridges in societies in conflict

The quality of leadership is crucial at all stages of a peace process. There is no quick way to develop the leadership qualities of individuals or their abilities to build coalitions across divides in fragmented societies. Leadership is nurtured by upbringing and quality education (de Ver and Kennedy, 2011). However, through dialogue and coalition forming leaders can learn to work together (Section 2.1). This process can be stimulated through dedicated interventions to strengthen the dialogue skills of leaders, as well as their ability to form productive coalitions. It is important to focus on leadership in a broad sense as much as possible, *i.e.* including youth, religious and business leaders, and with particular attention to women.

Steps for action:

- Increase support for interventions that aim to strengthen the ability of leaders to form productive leadership coalitions (see Section 2.1). What stands out from past and current experiences with such interventions is the longer-term perspective of their planning. Successful support programmes must be sustained rather than short-term, one-off events. It is important to base such programmes on solid analysis, substantive consultation, and sufficient evidence of political ownership.
- Consider stimulating societal demand for collaborative leadership approaches through longer-term civic education.[3] This can be encouraged on the back of broader outreach and validation efforts once a peace agreement has been signed.

In conclusion, better quality support will not guarantee success, but it will increase its likelihood. It will also reduce the risk of enhancing the mistrust and damage that can result from non-professional support. In other words, at the very least it will help avoid causing harm.

Notes

1. This is in line, for example, with the UN Secretary-General's report *Civilian Capacity in the Aftermath of Conflict* (UNSG, 2011). A step in this direction is the current UN DPA Standby Team of Mediation Experts (UNSG, 2012).
2. In Zimbabwe, for example, the Southern African Development Community (SADC) has a mandate to monitor and guide the deeply troubled implementation

of the 2008 Global Political Agreement. In Kenya, a specific institution was created to assist implementation.

3. Von Kaltenborn-Stachau (2008) and van Brabant (2011) argue this is an important longer-term condition for the usefulness of leadership oriented programmes, but that it can only be externally stimulated to a limited extent.

Chapter 5

From recommendations to action: Country responses

In this final chapter, four INCAF members – Canada, Germany, Switzerland and the United States – outline how they currently support peace processes and how they are taking forward many of the recommendations of Chapter 4. These contributions demonstrate the productive interaction that has taken place during the project of which this publication is the final outcome. They highlight how these countries have led the way on some of the recommendations and also indicate how efforts by other countries can be further strengthened through the project's findings.

The two years and four workshops that underpin this publication enabled intensive discussions on the policy and practice of international support to peace processes. They were essential for producing the recommendations made in Chapter 4 as they brought INCAF members, academics, NGO representatives, diplomats and mediators together in rich and free flowing discussions. The combination of the flexibility that INCAF offers as a community of practice with its structure as a network facilitates implementation of recommendations such as those made in this publication. Four INCAF members have been particularly involved: Canada, Germany, Switzerland and the United States. These countries have written the sections below to outline how their support to peace processes takes account of several of the recommendations. They are intended as concrete and inspiring examples of what can be done, all the while appreciating that much remains to be improved.

5.1. Canada

Canada recognises that in a globalised world, our prosperity and our values are ultimately connected to the freedom, development and security of others. With this view in mind, Canada plays a strategic role in international mediation – through direct engagement by Canadian officials, and support to processes led by international organisations such as the United Nations, African Union, and the Organisation of American States (OAS), and by NGOs. Canada's Stabilization and Reconstruction Task Force (START) within Foreign Affairs and International Trade Canada (DFAIT) has provided more than USD 27 million since 2006 to projects contributing to four distinct areas of mediation support:

1. **Canadian-led conflict management efforts** such as the currently active Afghanistan Pakistan Co-operation Process, an exercise in which Canada has facilitated discussions on border management and co-operation between Afghan and Pakistani senior officials since 2007.
2. **Diplomatic and financial support to internationally-led peace processes**, including to the joint AU-UN mediation team supporting peace negotiations in Darfur, and to the OAS Office working to support Guatemala and Belize in resolving their long-standing territorial dispute.
3. **Building the mediation capacity of international actors leading peace negotiations**, such as the UN Mediation Support Unit, the Organisation of American States or the African Union.
4. **Developing local-level mechanisms to mediate and prevent conflict** around such common root causes as land tenure in places like the Democratic Republic of Congo, Sudan, South Sudan and Colombia.

Canada has been actively working to implement many of the recommendations outlined in this report, recognising that *ad hoc* and unco-ordinated policy, programme and operational responses to complex international crises are insufficient and unsustainable. START is designed to provide Canada with a platform for the co-ordination of whole-of-government policy, programming, and operations in support of international crises response, whether a natural disaster, a sudden-onset conflict situation, or efforts at conflict management, peace-building and mediation.

Recommendation 1: Developing practical incentives for more co-ordinated support for peace processes

Recent Canadian experiences demonstrate that truly comprehensive co-operation among security, diplomatic/mediation and development actors involves building better systems and patterns of co-operation through joint training and exchanges, standard operating procedures to decrease a reliance on personality-driven co-operation, joint analysis based on shared intelligence, and through joint after-action reviews in order to share lessons.

Recommendation 2: Ensuring that permanent international mediation teams have diverse and up-to-date skill sets

Canada is also working to improve its own national capacity to support and lead mediation efforts, building on past experience in the field, by improving training opportunities for Canadian officials, and conducting outreach with Canadian and international civil society and private sector actors.

Recommendation 3: Re-allocating existing financial resources to increase international support

START provides the Government of Canada with the capacity to deliver timely and effective conflict management and peacebuilding programmes. For example, in 2011 START provided CAD 600 000 to the UN Department of Political Affairs (DPA) to allow it to deal with the political crisis in Libya. In 2012, it provided DPA with CAD 250 000 to support Special Envoy Kofi Annan's peace work in Syria.

Much remains to be done to improve the quality of financial and other support that states and international organisations provide to peace processes. For example, the forthcoming report of the UN Secretary-General – *Strengthening the Role of Mediation in the Peaceful Settlement of Disputes, Conflict Prevention and Resolution* (UNSG, 2012) – notes that the majority of UN mediation work must be resourced through voluntary contributions. Donors contributed USD 12 million in 2011 to the DPA's multi-year appeal,

just 67% of what was needed. The Secretary-General also concludes that more should be done to promote women's participation in mediation processes.

Recommendation 4: Conducting joint conflict analysis and agreeing on a joint support strategy whenever possible

Canada has also established a rigorous process for conducting shared whole-of-government conflict analysis, in order to inform collective decision making and to identify the most appropriate tools from the Government of Canada "toolbox." Canada also recognises the important need to support the implementation of peace agreements. For example, Canada chairs the Sudan-South Sudan Contact Group of like-minded countries, which co-ordinates policy approaches and support for peace efforts in the Sudans. In Darfur, Canada serves on both the Implementation Follow-up Commission, which is tasked with monitoring the implementation of the Doha Document for Peace in Darfur, and the agreement's Joint Ceasefire Commission.

Canada will continue working to prevent and resolve violent conflict through support to mediation and political dialogue, building on the recommendations contained in this report to build prosperous, free, democratic and open societies with respect for human rights and the rule of law.

5.2. Germany

Support for peace processes is a critical component of Germany's development strategy. Germany sees such processes as a first stepping stone out of violent conflict and fragility. Germany's own experiences resonate closely with the analysis and recommendations contained in this publication. It has made a number of advances over the last few years to ensure its policy and practices reflect both the lessons learned from these experiences as well as the recommendations made.

Recommendation 1: Developing practical incentives for more co-ordinated support for peace processes

Joint planning and decision making on peace and security take place between the relevant federal ministries. A special focus is given to fragile states. Country-specific and cross-ministry working groups are created in the Foreign Office on a case-by-case basis. Germany strengthens co-operation between diplomatic, development and security actors by enforcing cross-postings in the three most relevant ministries. In the German federal ministry for economic co-operation and development (BMZ), officers from both the Foreign Office and Ministry of Defence work in the Division for Peace and Security, which covers peace processes from the development policy perspective.

Recommendation 2: Ensuring that permanent international mediation teams have diverse and up-to-date skill sets

Germany trains development experts in peace, security and mediation to build teams working on peace processes. Training is available at different levels and for different target groups. Staff of the Civil Peace Service are trained specifically in community-based mediation support. Advisors at ministry level are trained in designing relevant support programmes for peace processes based on sound conflict analysis. Germany has also developed training modules for cross-ministry training in supporting peace and security in developing countries. This was piloted by the *Führungsakademie der Bundeswehr* (German Armed Forces Command & Staff College).

Recommendation 3: Re-allocating existing financial resources to increase international support

Germany supports a variety of peace and mediation programmes worldwide. A 2011 mapping study analysed many of these support programmes and concluded that the programmes strengthened peace processes via institutional and capacity development, financial assistance and logistical support. Main contributions are at the level of track 2 and 3 mediation, with strategic links to tracks 1 and 1.5 (see glossary). For example, Germany supports the mediation capacity of the African Union, including the Panel of the Wise, the Reference Group for mediators and its unit for logistical and technical support. In many conflict and post-conflict countries like Afghanistan, Nepal, Sri Lanka, South Sudan and DRC, BMZ provides flexible funds to support peace processes and initiatives in order to allow early investment and rapid action.

Recommendation 4: Conducting joint conflict analysis and agreeing on a joint support strategy whenever possible

Germany promotes cross-ministry conflict analysis and has developed a range of tools to support this. These include a four-step peace and conflict assessment, as well as guidelines for dealing with non-state armed groups and involving local partners in the implementation of support programmes. Special support is given to women's participation in peace processes. Germany will develop a national action plan to ensure implementation of UN Resolution 1325 (UNSC, 2000).

Recommendation 5: Linking international support more effectively to regional and local conflict resolution mechanisms

To develop local mediation capacities, German development co-operation builds upon existing local conflict resolution mechanisms where possible. For example, in Yemen, traditional mediators working in the chambers of commerce have been trained in professional business mediation. In Ethiopia, the German Civilian Peace Service co-operates with traditional mediators at community level. Insider mediators are also trained in Thailand.

Recommendation 6: Supporting the implementation of an agreement as a process of continued political dialogue

Peace processes do not end once an agreement has been signed. For this reason, Germany's support focuses strongly on implementation. For instance, it has financed the institutionalisation of mediation support capacity in many cases, including Nepal (Box 5.1) and South Sudan.

Box 5.1. **Supporting the Nepal Peace Agreement**

The Nepal Peace Agreement was threatened with failure in 2007, a year after its formal conclusion. The problem was the living conditions of the demobilised Maoist fighters. Since the signing of the peace accords they had been living in unacceptable conditions in temporary compounds without water or electricity, and disease was spreading. The German government supported its Nepalese counterpart in enhancing the delivery of basic services to these demobilised rebels and providing them with vocational training. Thus potential threats to the peace process were brought under control and a contribution was made to the long-term reintegration of ex-combatants. German development co-operation has been supporting the Nepalese peace process directly since 2009 through technical and financial co-operation to the Nepal Peace Trust Fund run by the Ministry of Peace and Reconstruction.

To raise awareness of the need for development co-operation actors to support peace processes effectively, BMZ and GIZ issued a fact sheet on peace processes in 2012 (GIZ, 2012). It underlines the importance of a long-term approach, the need to ensure financial support for the implementation of peace processes, the need to connect with local expertise and to develop capacities for mediation and conflict resolution (Box 5.2).

Box 5.2. **Strengthening capacity to negotiate in Northern Uganda**

The German Civil Peace Service in Yumbe, Northern Uganda supported the negotiations between the Ugandan Government and the Ugandan National Rescue Front from the preparation phase to the follow-up (2001-2006). The local partner organisation raised awareness of the causes and consequences of violence and trained village elders, government representatives and rebels in negotiation skills and reaching alternative conflict solutions.

5.3. Switzerland

Switzerland has a longstanding and recognised tradition of striving for peace across the globe. It continuously seeks to further improve its support and welcomes the recommendations in this publication as a way to do so. Here, the Swiss Agency for Development and Cooperation (SDC) and the Human Security Division (HSD) of the Swiss Federal Department of Federal Affairs (FDFA) outline how they are and will be using these recommendations.

Recommendation 1: Developing practical incentives for more co-ordinated support for peace processes

The FDFA engages directly in peace promotion and mediation activities in countries such as Armenia-Turkey, Burundi, Colombia, Cyprus, Indonesia-Aceh, Israel-Palestine, Nepal, Uganda, Sri Lanka, and Sudan. In the field, Switzerland habitually works with the UN, other states and specialised NGOs. The complexity of peace processes, the respective comparative advantages of different actors and the ensuing and inevitable competition require consultation with these actors at the very least, although co-operation is ideal. In general, significant scope for improvement remains. At headquarter level, the FDFA has also been active in advancing policy coherence at the UN, for instance via its guidance on mediation (UNSG, 2012).

In addition, the Swiss Development Agency (SDC) recently commissioned an external evaluation of its performance in fragile and conflict-affected contexts to improve its security and risk management, and to ensure the timely deployment of competent staff.[1] In response to its findings, it is now putting measures in place to ensure country strategies in fragile states take account of the causes of conflict and prioritise peace-building objectives in a more focused manner. These measures have been agreed collaboratively across the Swiss government, and in consultation with international partners

and civil society. They are supported by appropriate staffing conditions and security guidelines that are fit-for-purpose. These measures will help improve Switzerland's personnel contribution to peace processes.

Recommendation 2: Ensuring that permanent international mediation teams have varied and up-to-date skill sets

The FDFA organises an annual Peace Mediation Course,[2] which helps a range of actors to develop their mediation skills, knowledge and attitudes. It also organises tailor-made training for mediators and mediation teams. For instance, the FDFA has contributed to the Norwegian-led 2012 UN Ceasefire Mediation and Management Course, which brought together security experts and mediators. It also supports local mediators to enhance their informal, but often critical, contributions to peace. Nevertheless, Switzerland recognises the current global shortage of professional peace mediators and topical experts with in-depth knowledge of peace processes. This issue requires sustained international attention.

Recommendation 3: Re-allocating existing financial resources to increase international support

The FDFA has increased the amount allocated to peace promotion over the past few years via its annual *Messages to Parliament on Peace Promotion*. In addition, the SDC will increase its contribution to fragile and conflict-affected states by 15% between 2013 and 2016. These funds aim to mobilise more resources for international support to peace processes. Because of the many unknowns in this area, a new major six-year research programme *Causes of, and Solutions to, Social Conflicts in Contexts of Weak Public Institutions or State Fragility* was launched recently by SDC.[3]

Recommendation 4: Conducting joint conflict analysis and agreeing on a joint support strategy whenever possible

In South Sudan and Nepal, the FDFA has used regular interdepartmental working groups to bring all Swiss actors involved around the table (defence, development and peacebuilding), to ensure joint analysis and to develop a joint strategic approach. The department is currently working on how the pooling of resources and more unified, country programme-based leadership can further increase cross-governmental collaboration. New country strategies, for example for the Horn of Africa and the South Caucasus, are undertaken in full collaboration from the start. Joint conflict analysis and joint country strategies by Swiss actors are now standard practice. Conducting fragility assessments, as agreed in the *New Deal for Engagement in Fragile States* (IPDS, 2011c), could further stimulate these efforts.

Recommendation 5: Linking international support more effectively to regional and local conflict resolution mechanisms

The FDFA considers collaboration with local actors critical to increase the effectiveness of activities in support of peace. It supports such actors via on-demand training and workshops to discuss comparative practice. Capturing their experiences and lessons helps to ensure these become part of the global knowledge pool on peace processes and mediation (Mason, 2009). The FDFA has also consistently supported regional organisations, such as the Organisation for Security Cooperation in Europe (OSCE), which often lead mediation processes in their region. Supporting conflict transformation is a key aim of SDC country programmes, and use of the Conflict Sensitive Programme Management (CSPM) methodology has become mandatory for SDC staff as a result. This contributed, for example, to a collaborative international effort to support the Nepali peace process via the SDC's establishment of *Basic Operating Guidelines* and the Nepal Peace and Development Strategy (Section 3.2).

Recommendation 6: Supporting the implementation of an agreement as a process of continued political dialogue

A longer-term focus is essential for the success of a peace agreement. Switzerland's involvement in this respect is particularly strong in Nepal, where it has integrated peacebuilding goals – derived from the peace agreement – within its country strategy and employed a senior peacebuilding advisor in a long-term post. Both measures help to ensure a continued focus on implementation of the peace agreement.

5.4. United States

Development agencies play a critical role in the sustainability of peace agreements given that many agreements call for long-term reforms that require both financial and technical support. After all, at the time of negotiations, the full range of issues, their implications and the "how" of implementation is not always fully vetted or understood. The experience of the United States Agency for International Development (USAID) highlights the importance of bringing the development voice closer to the peace negotiation table. In particular, its strong record of providing technical and programmatic support has frequently played a key role in ensuring that the results of a peace process are implemented at multiple levels, particularly at grassroots and community levels. USAID activities include the following.

Thought leadership

The Office of Conflict Management and Mitigation (CMM) serves as USAID's thought leader on peace processes. CMM's staff provide technical guidance to other offices and bureaus within USAID, as well as to the interagency and implementing partners to ensure development practitioners can serve as effective counterparts to their diplomatic colleagues during negotiations. CMM also commissions key studies to advance the office's understanding of how USAID and development practitioners can best support peace processes.

Technical support

In the past USAID assistance has taken different forms, depending on the specific needs of the parties and the context under which the negotiations are taking place. Support has included conducting conflict analyses; supporting the development of local peace structures to support negotiations; funding people-to-people reconciliation programmes to support collaboration around negotiations; and training adversarial individuals or groups to improve their technical capacity to develop strategies that fulfil common interests. For example:

- USAID's Access Project convened government officials from East Africa to discuss persistent land conflicts in the region. Through these discussions, representatives found they could more easily identify solutions to their neighbour's problems, generating new perspectives, ideas, and approaches to address their own conflicts. This offers an example of how USAID contributed to ***Recommendation 7: Helping leaders develop the ability to build bridges in societies in conflict.***
- In Kosovo and Serbia, USAID commissioned the Knowledge-Attitudes Practice Survey to demonstrate to parties involved in the Vienna talks that there was strong public support for negotiations to resolve Kosovo's future status.
- In Guatemala, the US Mission convened a diverse group of individuals with different perspectives on the civil war and compiled their personal stories together into a book. This was widely distributed throughout the country to advance public knowledge on the period and to share the perceptions of the various groups involved or affected. This is an example of how USAID has implemented ***Recommendation 6: Supporting the implementation of an agreement as a process of continued political dialogue.***

- In Bosnia, CMM is supporting the development and realignment of the country's constitution to ensure its consistency with key principles of the Dayton Peace Accords.
- In Nepal, CMM funded the Nepal Transition to Peace Initiative to conduct a three-day conflict transformation training for Peace Secretariat staff. This NTTP initiative proved instrumental in addressing the lack of technical expertise around negotiations among political parties and within the Secretariat.

Conflict analysis

Whenever possible, USAID conducts country or regional conflict assessments to inform USAID strategy and programme design. USAID has recently updated its Conflict Assessment Framework and its application guide in order to better diagnose the causes and consequences of conflict, and to develop appropriate responses with other parts of the US Government. This actions ***Recommendation 4: conducting joint conflict analysis and agreeing on a joint support strategy whenever possible.***

Public events

In October 2011, USAID hosted a panel discussion with US policy makers, practitioners and peace negotiation participants to highlight the critical role practitioners play in ensuring an end to violent conflict through the implementation of durable peace agreements. The panel discussion also reinforced USAID's commitment to elevating the role of women in peace negotiations, as outlined in the National Action Plan for UN Security Council Resolution 1325.

Future USAID engagement

In addition to continuing to provide its current services of thought leadership, technical support and conflict analysis, USAID (CMM) is committed to completing the following activities:

- Continuing to develop its research agenda on the relationship between development and peace processes. This research is examining the evidence to better understand two questions: how development investments can support negotiations and whether there is a correlation between successful interventions and the sustainability of peace agreements.

- Issuing a technical brief in 2012 outlining research conducted to date on peace processes, which aims to serve as a reference for development professionals.
- Helping to develop a series of training courses on peace negotiations for USAID personnel and partners. This aims to enhance the ability of development practitioners to support peace processes at the Track 1 and Track 2 level (see Glossary) to ensure the development voice is heard at the negotiating table. This helps to fulfil ***Recommendation 2: Ensuring that permanent international mediation teams have varied and up-to-date skill sets.***

Notes

1. The review and management response can be found at: *www.deza.admin.ch/en/Home/Themes/Conflict_prevention_and_transformation*.
2. This course is co-organised with the Mediation Support Project, a joint project between the Center for Security Studies ETH Zurich and swisspeace. See: *www.peacemediation.ch*.
3. For more information on the research programme see *www.r4d.ch/e/news-newsletter/news-archive/pages/newsarchiv.aspx?NEWSID=1715&WEBID=F6B532FB-64ED-466F-8816-193D4DE8DC94*.

Glossary

Conflict	A perceived divergence of interests, a belief that the parties' current aspirations are incompatible (Pruitt and Kim, 2004)
Conflict prevention	Actions undertaken to reduce tensions and to prevent the outbreak or recurrence of violent conflict. It consists of operational prevention (*i.e.* immediate measures applicable in the face of crisis) and structural prevention (*i.e.* measures to ensure that crises do not arise in the first place or, if they do, that they do not recur) (OECD, 2009a).
Conflict sensitivity	Systematically taking account of the positive and negative impacts of interventions, in terms of conflict or peace dynamics, on the contexts in which they are undertaken, and, conversely, the implications of these contexts for the design and implementation of interventions (Conflict Sensitivity Consortium, 2004).
Conflict transformation	Actions and processes that aim to positively alter the structural, behavioural and attitudinal aspects of conflict in order to transform negative, violent conflict into positive, constructive conflict. It incorporates notions such as conflict prevention and conflict resolution, and goes beyond conflict settlement or conflict management (building on Austin, Fischer and Ropers, 2004).
Fragility	A fragile region or state has weak capacity to carry out basic governance functions, and lacks the ability to develop mutually constructive relations with society. Fragile regions or states are also more vulnerable to internal or external shocks such as economic crises or natural disasters. More resilient states exhibit the capacity and legitimacy of governing a population and its territory. They can manage and adapt to changing social needs and expectations, shifts in elite and other political agreements, and growing institutional complexity. Fragility and resilience should be seen as shifting points along a spectrum (OECD, 2011b)

Mediation	A process of conflict management related to, but distinct from, the parties' own negotiations, where those in conflict seek the assistance of, or accept an offer of help from, an outsider to change their perceptions or behaviour without resorting to physical force or invoking the authority of law (Bercovitch, 2006)
Non-state armed group	Groups that possess a hierarchical organisation, use violence for political ends, are independent from state control and have some degree of territorial control over a geographic area (Bruderlein 2000; Policzer 2005).
Peacebuilding	Actions and policies aimed at reducing the risk of lapsing or relapsing into conflict and creating the necessary conditions for sustainable peace by building trust and addressing the deep-rooted structural causes of violent conflict in a comprehensive manner (UNSG, 2009b; OECD, 2011b).
Peacekeeping	Actions undertaken to preserve peace, however fragile, where fighting has been halted and to assist in implementing agreements achieved by the peacemakers (UNSG, 1992).
Peace process	A political process in which conflicts are resolved by peaceful means that include a mixture of politics, diplomacy, changing relationships, negotiation, mediation and dialogue in both official and unofficial arenas (Saunders, 2001)
Political settlement	The balance or distribution of power between contending social groups and social classes on which any state is based (Khan, 1995, 2000; cited in Di John and Putzel, 2009).
Peace agreement	A form of political settlement intended to end or significantly transform a violent conflict so that it can be addressed more peacefully.
Statebuilding	An endogenous process to enhance capacity, institutions and legitimacy of the state, driven by state-society relations (OECD, 2011b)
Track 1 diplomacy or mediation	Involves state and/or official actors in formal discussions to resolve conflict with the authority of, and on behalf of, their state or multinational organisation ("track" definitions have been derived from the UN peacemaker website (UN DPA, n.d.)
Track 1.5 diplomacy or mediation	Involves the engagement of non-governmental organisations in conflict-related activities of diplomacy and peacemaking, often preceding the engagement of official state / international organisation representatives.

Track 2 diplomacy or mediation	Involves individuals of high personal standing and non-governmental organisations in unofficial dialogue or negotiations at the grassroots level via informal mechanisms to resolve conflict.

Annex A

Key roles of diplomatic/mediation, development and security actors in different phases of the peace process

The roles of development, security and diplomatic/mediation actors have been extensively discussed in this publication on the basis of the context, process and implementation dimensions of peace processes. The table below complements this overview by outlining possible roles on the basis of the different "chronological" phases of a peace process.

	Diplomatic/mediation actors	Development actors	Security actors
Talks-about-talks	• Conduct informal outreach to warring parties and pass messages among them • Assess the seriousness of offers to talk • Seek best available knowledge on the parties and conflict	• Use existing networks to identify local individuals with strong dispute management skills (insider mediators) • Support pro-peace constituencies to foster a dynamic for peace • Lead conflict analysis	• Provide intelligence and communication support to mediators if appropriate

	Diplomatic/mediation actors	Development actors	Security actors
Formal talks & negotiations	• Identify an appropriate venue for talks • Field mediation support teams of diverse composition and with diverse skill sets and experiences • Facilitate peace talks and negotiations • Spend a significant portion of time in-country to get to know the conflict parties and the complexities of their societies • In collaboration with development actors, facilitate the negotiation capacity of parties as appropriate	• Provide technical and developmental expertise that is accessible to the conflict parties • Organise technical workshops to reduce the asymmetries of skills and knowledge between the conflict parties • Create networks among local stakeholders to prepare peace implementation • Conduct Post-Conflict Needs Assessments (PCNAs) to set out a realistic strategy for recovery and development that is supported and owned by the parties and society • Make credible commitments of assistance at donor conferences	• Separate arms and armies to create space for a peace process • Investigate armed incidents between the warring parties during the talks • Convene military councils with the warring parties to build trust • Ensure deployments deter the use of force and build confidence • Protect the civilian population from the consequences of conflict or criminal violence
Peace agreement	• Maintain communication with development, defence, and peacebuilding actors throughout the process • Ensure multiple sources of information and verify controversial news with the parties • Ensure final outcomes take a balanced account of the interests of conflict and non-conflict parties • Ensure that agreements include realistic targets and timeframes	• Ensure development issues are placed on the agenda in a realistic way • Ensure peace agreements pay sufficient attention to implementation modalities and the role that external actors, flows and influences can have	• Ensure military issues are placed on the agenda in a realistic way • Ensure that, where appropriate, third parties are given robust mandates to assist in DDR and SSR.

	Diplomatic/mediation actors	Development actors	Security actors
Implementation	• Provide a full account of the meaning and limits of the peace agreement to development partners and international financial institutions • Remain available to mediate disputes emerging during implementation	• Provide (some of) the financing required to implement the peace agreement • Support dispute resolution platforms at different levels • Support leadership development efforts • Ensure programmatic interventions are designed and managed in a conflict sensitive manner	• Provide credible security to build confidence and create space for implementation • Provide assistance, expertise in DDR and SSR programmes • Use intelligence to manage post-agreement crime and violence

Based on: Ball and Halevy (1996), World Bank and UNDP (2007), USIP and PKSOI (2009) and with thanks to Achim Wennmann.

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Conflict and Fragility

Improving International Support to Peace Processes

THE MISSING PIECE

Violent conflict negatively impacts development. Peace processes – if conducted well – offer the promise of creating more equitable, resilient and developed societies. Yet such processes are politically, socially and psychologically complex, as well as high-risk. Many fail and such failure does harm by reducing confidence and increasing cynicism amongst conflict parties, citizens and international partners alike. International support can help a peace process to succeed, but its nature and quality matter greatly.

This publication makes seven recommendations to improve the quality of support provided by states and international organisations to peace processes. These recommendations have been drawn from an analysis of the characteristics of violent conflict today; ingredients of a successful peace process; and key strengths and weaknesses of existing support. This publication aims to help senior decision makers and policy experts to further improve the quality of international support to peace processes.

Contents

Chapter 1. Violent conflict and organised violence today

Chapter 2. What are ingredients for success in a peace process?

Chapter 3. Strengths and weaknesses of international support

Chapter 4. Recommendations to improve international support

Chapter 5. From recommendations to action: Country responses

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