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Emerging providers' international co-operation for development

Willem Luijkx and Julia Benn



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Willem Luijkx and Julia Benn[1]

ABSTRACT

This paper shows that **development co-operation** from **emerging providers** – i.e. countries beyond the OECD Development Assistance Committee (DAC) – significantly increased in recent years, reaching 17% of total global development co-operation in 2014. It also presents a rough estimate, of USD 300 billion, of **broader international co-operation** by emerging providers and it sets out what types of instruments are used to provide this broader international co-operation.

Very little is known about broader international co-operation by emerging providers and the scarce information that is available on different countries cannot be compared. This paper concludes that more information on, and a global measure of, international co-operation for development are needed to enable developing countries to manage the external support they receive and to enable further analysis of the increasingly important role that emerging providers play in developing countries.

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

This working paper builds on the work of the Development Co-operation Directorate on development finance statistics and transparency and on the engagement with countries that are not members of the Development Assistance Committee (DAC). It serves as an input to the discussions on total official support for sustainable development (TOSSD), clarifying the role of emerging providers of development co-operation in the landscape of international co-operation for development. The paper has benefitted from discussions in the DAC and its Working Party on Development Finance Statistics. In particular, it draws on reporting by 19 emerging providers that are not members of the DAC and on exchanges with other emerging providers on their development co-operation programmes. Helpful comments were also received from Mr. Naohiro Kitano from the JICA Research Institute (JICA-RI), a research wing of Japan International Cooperation Agency (JICA) and from Neissan Besharati from the South African Institute for International Affairs. The authors would like to acknowledge review, comments and statistical research received from OECD secretariat colleagues: Juan Casado, Valérie Gaveau, Michael Laird, Pauline Leveneur (intern), Nadine Piefer, Cécile Sangaré, Haje Schütte, Ann Zimmerman (Development Co-operation Directorate) and Simon Scott (Statistics Directorate). Finally, the authors thank Angela Stuart for editing the paper and preparing it for publication.

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Introduction

Development co-operation from **emerging providers** – i.e. countries beyond the OECD Development Assistance Committee (DAC) – amounted to USD 32 billion (gross) in 2014 representing 17% of the global total (table 1). Like DAC members, many of these countries also use instruments beyond development co-operation to engage with developing countries, so their spending on **broader international co-operation** is significantly higher. This paper looks at emerging providers' development co-operation (chapter 1) as well as their broader international co-operation (chapter 2), zooming in on one particular emerging provider for which substantial data are available: South Africa.

Analysing development co-operation and broader international co-operation of all providers is challenging for two reasons. First, there is no single definition or measure of development co-operation and international co-operation that all providers agree on. The most well-established measure is official development assistance (ODA)[2], but not all countries agree to use the ODA definition to measure their development co-operation. Second, transparent statistics are not available for several emerging providers. This paper discusses the availability of information on these countries' programmes and the potential for establishing a measure of development co-operation and broader international co-operation which is used by the whole international development community (chapter 3).

Table 1. Estimated global development co-operation (gross disbursements, current prices)

	2010	2011	2012	2013	2014	2014 (% of total)
ODA from 28 DAC member countries	141.2	150.1	140.1	151.7	150.8	83%
ODA from 19 emerging providers that report to the OECD-DAC	6.7	9.1	6.5	16.7	25.0	14%
Estimated development co-operation flows from 10 non-reporting emerging providers	4.3	5.2	5.6	6.8	7.0	4%
Subtotal: development co-operation from 29 emerging providers	***11.0***	***14.3***	***12.1***	***23.4***	***32.0***	***17%***
Estimated global total	**152.3**	**164.3**	**152.2**	**175.1**	**182.8**	**100%**

Notes: i) From OECD 2016. ii) The 29 providers include 19 countries that report to the OECD (Israel[3], Kazakhstan, Kuwait, Liechtenstein, Russian Federation, Saudi Arabia, Thailand, Timor-Leste, Turkey, United Arab Emirates and the 9 EU members that are not members of the DAC) and 10 countries for which the OECD makes estimates (Brazil, Chile, China, Colombia, Costa Rica, India, Indonesia, Mexico, Qatar and South Africa). iii) Brazil and Qatar have not published data on their development co-operation for 2014. To complete the table, Brazil's, and Qatar's development co-operation in 2014 is estimated to be at the same level as in 2013. Iv) The sum of ODA by 19 reporting providers (14%) and estimates on 10 non-reporting providers (4%) is 17% due to rounding.


[2] See for more information chapter 2 of this paper or visit www.oecd.org/dac/stats/officialdevelopmentassistancedefinitionandcoverage.htm.

[3] The statistical data for Israel are supplied by and under the responsibility of the relevant Israeli authorities. The use of such data by the OECD is without prejudice to the status of the Golan Heights, East Jerusalem and Israeli settlements in the West Bank under the terms of international law.

Chapter 1: Emerging providers' development co-operation

Emerging providers' gross development co-operation reached an estimated USD 32 billion in 2014 compared to USD 23 billion in 2013. These providers – 29 countries that are not members of the OECD Development Assistance Committee (DAC) – together provided an estimated 17% of total global development co-operation in 2014. Although most emerging providers increased their development co-operation in recent years, the significant rise between 2012 and 2014 is largely due to the increase in the programmes of Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates. The OECD estimates that eight of these countries - i.e. Saudi Arabia, United Arab Emirates (UAE), Turkey, China, India, Qatar, Russia and Kuwait - were among the 28 largest providers in the world with gross development co-operation of over USD 500 million in 2014 (see graph 1).

Graph 1. Development co-operation, gross disbursements, 2014



Notes: i) From OECD 2016. ii) Countries with gross development co-operation of more than USD 500 million. Figures are 2014 data unless otherwise specified. Gross national income (GNI) figures are based on World Bank data (unadjusted). Emerging providers are presented with grey bars.

** Estimates; ** 2014 GNI figures not available at the time of publication of OECD 2016.*


Who are these emerging providers?

Many of the countries beyond the current members of the DAC have long traditions of providing development co-operation. The term "emerging" in this paper therefore refers to the fact that these countries' levels of development co-operation have been increasing over the last decade and that their role in global development co-operation is becoming more prominent, not that they are new to providing development co-operation.[4]

Emerging providers are a diverse group of countries which includes several Arab countries, the BRICS (Brazil, Russian Federation, India, China, South Africa), some member states of the European Union (EU) from central Europe and several countries in Asia and Latin America. Most of them are upper middle-income or high-income countries and many are, or have been, both providers and recipients of development co-operation at the same time. Many of them refer to themselves as providers of south-south co-operation. None are currently members of the DAC, although some have more characteristics in common with DAC members than with other emerging providers.

Box 1. Terminology

- **Providers** (of development co-operation): often referred to as "donors".
- **Development co-operation**: support to developing countries in line with the ODA definition.
- **Broader international co-operation** (for development): co-operation with other countries that promotes development, but goes beyond the scope of the ODA definition.
- **International co-operation** (for development): the sum of development co-operation and broader international co-operation.



[4] In the same way as "emerging economies" refers to economies which are becoming more important players in the world economy.

What are the scale and characteristics of development co-operation from emerging providers?

The scale of development co-operation from emerging providers varies considerably. Some countries have modest programmes, starting at around USD 10 million, while nine of the 29 countries spend over USD 300 million annually (see table 2 and Annexes 1 and 2 for the full list of 29 countries). The characteristics of development co-operation differ from one country to another in terms of priority sectors and partner countries. The instruments used range from budget support to projects, technical co-operation, scholarships and humanitarian assistance. Smaller providers usually have a stronger focus on technical co-operation, while bigger providers often use a broader set of instruments and provide finance also in the form of loans and equity investments. In brief, emerging providers are as heterogeneous a group as DAC members. Several emerging providers have a lot in common with the way that many DAC members provide development co-operation.

Table 2. Estimated gross development co-operation from emerging providers with annual expenditures of over USD 300 million (in 2013/2014)

Country	2010	2011	2012	2013	2014
Brazil[1]	500	469	411	316	n.a.
China	2 564	2 785	3 123	2 997	3 401
India[2]	708	794	1 077	1 223	1 398
Kuwait (KFAED)	639	526	482	541	598
Mexico[3]	n.a.	99	203	526	169
Qatar	334	733	543	1 344	n.a.
Russian Federation	472	479	465	714	876
Saudi Arabia[4]	3 494	5 239	1 436	5 825	13 785
Turkey	967	1 273	2 533	3 308	3 591
United Arab Emirates	542	796	854	5 493	5 193

n.a. = not available

1) Brazil's development co-operation is significantly higher according to the official figures published by the Brazilian government. The OECD uses these data but, for the purposes of this analysis, only includes in its estimates: a) activities in low and middle-income countries; and b) contributions to multilateral agencies whose main aim is promoting economic development and welfare of developing countries (or a percentage of these contributions when a multilateral agency does not work exclusively on developmental activities in developing countries). The OECD also excludes bilateral peacekeeping activities.

2) Figures for India are based on its fiscal years. For example, 2012 data correspond to fiscal year 2012/2013.

3) The peak of Mexican co-operation in 2013 is mainly due to a debt relief operation with Cuba.

4) Saudi Arabia's reporting to the OECD on its development co-operation programme consists of aggregate figures on humanitarian and development assistance by region, multilateral aid and loan disbursements by the Saudi Fund for Development.

Emerging providers also use the multilateral system to provide development co-operation (see table 3), including the United Nations (UN), the World Bank, regional development banks and other multilateral organisations. EU members channel a large part of their funding through EU institutions (OECD 2015). In recent years, several emerging providers have established new

multilateral financial institutions such as the Asia Infrastructure Investment Bank and the New Development Bank. [5] This is because they feel that some of the multilateral institutions and the way they allocate their core budgets are dominated by western countries (The Economist 2014).

Table 3. Estimated development-oriented contributions by the BRIICS to and through the multilateral system, USD million (average 2012-14)

In current USD million	Brazil	China	India	Indonesia	Russia	South Africa
Total United Nations	**118.2**	**159.5**	**35.6**	**12.7**	**71.0**	**24.8**
United Nations Organization (18%)	12.4	22.4	4.7	1.5	9.0	2.8
Food and Agriculture Organization (51%)	17.1	13.6	1.7	0.7	4.9	3.0
UN Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization (60%)	17.3	13.5	1.4	2.7	4.7	0.9
UN Department of Peacekeeping Operations (7%)	0.5	30.8		0.1	6.7	0.1
World Health Organization (76%)	9.1	17.4	2.8	1.6	3.0	1.5
World Food Program (100%)	14.5	7.4	1.1			6.7
International Fund for Agricultural Development (100%)	5.6	9.0	10.3	2.0	1.0	0.2
International Labour Organization (60%)	5.4	8.0	1.6	0.5	3.0	3.0
UN Development Program (100%)	1.5	8.9	4.7	0.9	1.2	2.8
Other UN	34.7	28.6	7.1	2.6	37.4	4.0
Total Regional Development Banks	**58.3**	**187.0**	**6.1**	**2.6**	**14.8**	**33.1**
African Development Bank (100%)	7.1	95.1	0.8			33.1
Inter-American Development Bank (100%)	51.2	83.3				
Asian Development Bank (100%)		6.7	5.3			
Other regional development banks		1.8		2.6	14.8	
World Bank Group (total)	**60.4**	**16.7**	**23.7**		**120.0**	**16.9**
International Monetary Fund (total)					**31.8**	
Other multilateral organisations	**4.0**	**10.9**	**15.8**		**35.1**	**34.4**
The Global Fund (100%)	0.8	4.7	2.5		13.3	0.5
African Union (100%)						20.0
Global Environment Facility (100%)	2.7	3.4	2.6		2.5	1.5
Other organisations	0.5	2.8	10.7		19.2	12.4
Overall total	**240.9**	**374.0**	**81.1**	**15.3**	**272.6**	**109.1**

Source: OECD 2016

[5] Countries started contributing to these organisations after 2014, which is why the figures are not yet reflected in table 3.

Chapter 2: Emerging providers' broader international co-operation

As stated in the Addis Ababa Agenda for Action (United Nations, 2015), a range of development finance instruments beyond ODA is needed to reach the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs).[6] This chapter looks at the use of these broader instruments by the emerging providers, zooming in on South Africa, a provider using a diverse set of instruments and for which information is readily available.

Instruments of broader international co-operation

Three different types of instruments of broader international co-operation that potentially contribute to reaching the SDGs can be distinguished:

1. Instruments that have a commercial purpose and are usually not provided in the form of grants or concessional loans[7], but that still have an impact on the development of the developing country.
2. Instruments that focus on broader policy objectives than development, often in the areas of peacekeeping, regional economic integration and foreign policy.
3. Instruments that do not solely focus on developing countries. This covers activities for the promotion of global public goods which concern challenges that go beyond national borders and that need to be addressed through international collective action. Examples of such challenges are climate change, global financial instability, human rights issues, cross-border epidemics or air pollution and international food insecurity. This category may also include activities that countries carry out in support of developed countries instead of developing countries, such as humanitarian assistance after natural disasters.

Some emerging providers consider the above instruments as part of their development co-operation programmes. The OECD has suggested considering them for inclusion in the new measure of total official support for sustainable development (TOSSD). This measure aims to capture broader international co-operation and is further discussed in Chapter 3.

Emerging providers´ instruments for broader international co-operation

This section describes emerging providers' broader international co-operation through a number of examples. As the information available on many emerging providers is limited, it is not possible to present an exhaustive list of instruments used and only a "ball-park figure" of total broader international co-operation from emerging providers can be calculated. In 2014, this amounted to nearly USD 300 billion. Around 96% of this total relates to finance from the Chinese EXIM-bank and the China Development Bank (see below).

[6] This also includes private resources, but this paper focusses on public sector instruments.

[7] In DAC statistics, for ODA headline figures, a loan is concessional if it has a grant element of at least 25%, calculated at a rate of discount of 10 per cent. The calculation for the ODA headline figures will change as from 2018 expenditures, which is explained in: http://www.oecd.org/dac/stats/documentupload/ODA%20Before%20and%20After.pdf.

1. Commercial instruments

In volume terms, the largest category of broader international co-operation instruments is activities that have a principally commercial purpose. This finance can include concessional and non-concessional loans for promoting the provider country's exports, profitable equity investments or financial inputs with specific expected returns such as natural resources.

The Export-Import Bank of China (China EximBank) and the China Development Bank (CDB) are by far the main providers of commercial development finance amongst the emerging providers. The Chinese State is the sole owner of the EximBank. The Bank's mandate is to facilitate Chinese imports and exports (China EximBank 2016). It provides import and export credits, concessional loans, trade financing, guarantees and several other financial products. Estimates indicate that gross disbursements of the EximBank to other countries amounted to USD 149.9 billion in 2014 (Kitano 2016). There is no comprehensive information available on what this amount consists of, but it includes (preferential) export buyers' credits, export suppliers' credits, concessional loans and import credits. It may also include disbursements to developed countries.

CDB, like development banks in other countries, is principally focussed on the domestic market. However, it is also the "largest Chinese bank for foreign investment and financing co-operation" (CDB 2016a). Estimates based on the foreign currency loans of the bank issued in 2015 indicate gross disbursements to other countries reached USD 127.4 billion that year (CDB 2016b); figures are not available for 2014.

Other emerging providers also provide commercial finance to developing countries. Estimates indicate that the Brazilian National Development Bank's (BNDES) total disbursements for the export of goods and services amounted to USD 5.5 billion in 2012 (WTO 2013), while data on 2013 and 2014 are not available. Lines of credit by the Export Import Bank of India amounted to USD 1.7 billion in 2014 (India Exim Bank 2015). Lastly, the Development Bank of South Africa (DBSA) and the South African Industrial Development Corporation (IDC) jointly disbursed almost USD 0.5 billion in 2014 to other developing countries in Africa (see also the next section).

2. Instruments that are focussed on broader policy objectives than development

A. Peacekeeping

Although it decreased in recent years, in 2010 over one-third of what Brazil considered its co-operation for international development, USD 332 million, was used for peacekeeping (IPEA and ABC 2013). This includes financial and non-financial contributions, such as the delivery of troops and materials. However, the figure is net of compensation that Brazil received from the United Nations Department for Peacekeeping Operations (UNDPKO) for its in-kind contributions. Brazil's exceptionally high contribution that year was related to its co-ordinating role in MINUSTAH, the UN peacekeeping mission in Haiti.

Peacekeeping can contribute to a country's recovery and a peaceful society is a precondition for development. Arguably, that is why Brazil includes peacekeeping as part of its co-operation for international development. Emerging providers, such as India, Indonesia and China, are often among the main supporters of peacekeeping missions, especially when it comes to providing military and police forces (UNDPKO 2016a).

The financial contributions to UNDPKO by the 29 emerging providers discussed in this paper amount to a total of USD 1 billion per year (based on 2014 figures). China and Russia are amongst the largest contributors.

B. Regional economic integration

Regional funding mechanisms are often used to promote economic integration. One example is the MERCOSUR Structural Convergence Fund (its Spanish and Portuguese acronym is FOCEM) which finances different types of projects with the purpose of economic development and integration, such as cross-border infrastructure projects, and projects that are focussed on social sectors, such as sanitation. From a DAC perspective, part of the projects could be considered as development co-operation. Brazil's annual contribution to the Fund amounts to USD 70 million. Argentina, and since 2012 Venezuela, both contribute USD 27 million per year. Uruguay and Paraguay, the main recipients of the Fund, have contributed USD 2 million and USD 1 million respectively (MECROSUR 2015).

Other examples of instruments for regional economic integration are customs unions and monetary unions. In a customs union, no taxes are levied on trade between the members of the union and the union has a common external tariff on imports from third countries. In a monetary union, one single currency can be used in all its member countries. In some cases, a redistribution of income takes place among the members of a customs or monetary union, which is why this is relevant in terms of broader international co-operation. (See examples of both types of unions in the section on South Africa.)

C. Other activities focussed on broader policy objectives than development

Activities that are primarily motivated by the foreign policy interests of a provider country can also promote development in developing countries. For example, the United Arab Emirates finances the embassies of some developing countries in its own territory. Another example is activities to manage jointly cross-border natural spaces, such as lakes or rivers. The governments of Cambodia, Laos, Thailand and Viet Nam jointly manage the shared water resources of the Mekong River through the Mekong River Commission (Mekong River Commission 2016). Lastly, investing in international dialogue can be considered to contribute to the common interest, apart from a country's own interest. Participation in organisations such as the Commonwealth of Nations or the Commonwealth of Independent States are examples.

3. Instruments not restricted to developing countries

A. Global Public Goods

Many multilateral organisations' activities have a global reach. Consequently, only part of the contributions to these organisations – those with a specific focus on developing countries – can be counted as development co-operation. However, these global activities, which include setting international standards on vital issues such as health, food security, energy, or human rights, are relevant for developing countries.

Total core contributions by the 29 countries discussed in this paper to 10 UN organisations that do not count fully as development co-operation amounted to USD 1.1 billion in 2014. Further research

covering all multilateral organisations is needed for a comprehensive overview of these global activities.

B. Support to developed countries

After the Great East Japan Earthquake in 2011, Japan received support from 143 countries and 43 international organisations (Government of Japan 2015). Many countries, within and beyond the DAC, included this non ODA-eligible support to Japan in their national figures on international co-operation (Government of Mexico 2014 and reporting by United Arab Emirates to the OECD). The United States includes other instruments supporting high-income countries on their Foreign Aid Explorer website as well, as its domestic definition of foreign aid is different from ODA (Government of the United States 2016). Also, the Financial Tracking System of the United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (UNOCHA), which tracks humanitarian assistance, includes funding to high-income countries.

There is little information available on emerging providers' support to developed (non ODA-eligible) countries. However, it is unlikely to represent a large amount. As an indication, only 0.07% (USD 11 million) of total humanitarian contributions paid in 2014 (as registered through OCHA's Financial Tracking System) was allocated to non-ODA eligible countries.

The case of South Africa

In this section, South Africa's broader international co-operation is discussed. There are two reasons for choosing South Africa as a case study. First, South Africa has a broad range of international co-operation instruments. Second, the government of South Africa as well as several of the public institutions that deliver development finance publish information on their activities in developing countries.

Background

Of all African countries, South Africa is the main provider of development co-operation. Its development co-operation focuses on the African continent and more specifically on Southern Africa. South Africa participates actively in regional organisations, through which it channels a large part of its development co-operation.

Estimated development co-operation from South Africa amounted to USD 163 million in 2014[8], down from around USD 180 million in both 2012 and 2013 (calculations by the authors based on Government of South Africa 2016). Its development co-operation is expected to grow significantly in the coming years, to reach USD 488 million in 2016. This is mainly due to large budgeted contributions to the New Development Bank (often referred to as the "BRICS Bank"). In 2014, South Africa channelled 53% of its estimated development co-operation through multilateral institutions, mainly the African Development Bank, the African Union, the World Bank and the South African Development Community. Its bilateral co-operation is largely channelled through the Africa Renaissance and International Cooperation Fund.

South Africa also has many instruments for broader international co-operation. Its co-operation with other countries can be characterised as a whole-of-government policy, which implies that many different public institutions are involved. For this reason, South Africa is an interesting case to study broader international co-operation. However, even a broader measure of international co-operation could probably not reflect the entirety of South Africa's efforts in this area. The development impact of its role as a broker of peace and stability on the continent, for example, is unquantifiable.

Keeping that caveat in mind, South Africa's broader international co-operation can be estimated at USD 3.4 billion in 2014, an amount over 20 times larger than its development co-operation. This estimate is less solid than the above estimate on development co-operation and further research is needed to obtain more information on the instruments. Some details are provided below, however, following the same structure as in the previous section.

1. Commercial instruments

South Africa has two main institutions that provide commercial development finance to other developing countries: the Development Bank of South Africa (DBSA) and the Industrial Development Corporation (IDC). The DBSA provides financing for commercially viable projects with a strong focus on infrastructure. It supports project planning and development and it promotes regional integration

[8] The figures on South African development co-operation do not include costs for hosting students from developing countries in South Africa, which is part of the ODA definition. According to Besharati and Rawhani (2016) student costs related to students from the Democratic Republic of Congo alone amounted to USD 12.4 million in 2014.

(DBSA 2015). Its loans generally have more favourable terms than those of the market, although not as concessional as the terms of other development banks. In 2014, it disbursed USD 332 million for projects in other developing countries in Africa.

The IDC funds projects for the mutual benefit of South Africa and the receiving country, usually channelling the funding through South African providers of goods and services (IDC 2015). In 2014, it disbursed an estimated USD 151 million.

2. Instruments that are focussed on broader policy objectives than development

A. Peacekeeping

South Africa is strongly involved in UN Peacekeeping Operations. Over the last decade, it has always been among the top 20 contributors of military and police to the UN missions (UNDPKO 2016b). Its financial contribution to the UNDPKO amounted to USD 1.3 million in 2014. South Africa also provides support for logistics, elections, police forces and other types of capacity building through its military and police forces.

B. Regional economic integration

South Africa's main instrument for international co-operation is regional co-operation focussed on economic integration. South Africa and its neighbouring countries – Botswana, Lesotho, Namibia and Swaziland – are members of the oldest still existing customs union in the world which was founded in 1910: the Southern African Customs Union (SACU). This is a unique union because of the differences amongst its members in terms of the size of their economies, both in absolute and per capita terms. The revenue collected through the Union is centralised and then redistributed amongst its member states in a way that is favourable to the poorer countries. This implies a significant redistribution of wealth within the Union, resulting in income for the smaller countries that can reach well over 50% of their government budgets (Besharati 2013 and Vickers 2012).

The redistribution of the income from the Union amongst its members is calculated through a quite controversial formula. The formula is controversial because of the fiscal dependence it creates on South Africa of the other members (Grynberg and Motswapong 2003). South Africa is the treasury of SACU and, according to the Estimates of National Expenditure 2016 (Government of South Africa 2016), South Africa´s payments to the other members of the Union reached USD 4.8 billion in 2014. Several sources have pointed out that USD 4.8 billion is around USD 2.8 billion (30 billion Rand) more than it should pay to the other members, based on the Union's income (Institute for Security Studies 2015 and Besharati 2013).

Apart from a customs union, the same countries (with the exception of Botswana) also share a common monetary area. The four member countries all have their own national currency, but the South African Rand is a legal currency in the whole area. South Africa compensates the other governments for *forgone seigniorage* (IMF 2007, p11), which is the profit that a government can make when printing money, because of the difference between the costs of producing the money and the value of the money (the goods and services that the government can buy for the printed money). Without the South African Rand being a legal currency in all countries, the other three countries would have printed more money and would therefore have had a higher *seigniorage*. The

compensations for the *forgone seignoirage* amounted to USD 54 million in 2014 (Government of South Africa 2016, p105).

South Africa itself greatly benefits from the membership of these unions and the financial transfers to its smaller, neighbouring countries are in fact compensation for the disadvantages of membership. For example, the external tariffs of the customs union protect South African industries, resulting in higher costs for importing goods for the other members (Institute for Security Studies 2015). Because it is in the interest of South Africa, the transfers from South Africa to the other members are usually not considered as development co-operation. Nevertheless, the share of these transfers in the budgets of the smaller countries is very big and, undoubtedly, has an impact on their development, which is why they could be considered for inclusion in the measurement of broader international co-operation.

C. Other activities focussed on broader policy objectives than development

South Africa contributes to many international foreign policy activities and dialogues relevant for other developing countries. For example, in 2014 it spent USD 17 million on managing the Komati Basin together with Swaziland. It is a member of many international co-ordination institutions, such as the Commonwealth of Nations and its subsidiary bodies. South Africa's broader international co-operation in this area is estimated at USD 53 million in 2014.

3. Instruments not restricted to developing countries

A. Global Public Goods

South Africa contributes to the financing of global public goods through both its bilateral and multilateral co-operation. In 2014, it contributed to at least 25 international organisations that have a global scope. UN agencies such as the Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO), the World Health Organization (WHO), the International Labour Organization (ILO) and the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) were among the main recipients. South Africa also contributed USD 1.3 million to the International Criminal Court. On a bilateral level, it contributes to global public goods through international research. This category also includes South Africa's participation in international climate negotiations. Total international support for global public goods identified in this case study amounted to USD 42 million in 2014.

B. Support to developed countries

There is little information available on South Africa's support to developed countries. Humanitarian assistance is often provided regionally, because of the urgent nature of such support. However, South Africa supported Japan after the earthquake in 2011.

Chapter 3. Transparency and comparability of international co-operation for development

Developing countries need transparent and comprehensive information on emerging providers' international co-operation for development so that they can manage and take ownership of their development. Civil society, researchers and international organisations need this information so that they can analyse international co-operation. Transparency on international co-operation for development is therefore essential.[9] Moreover, to analyse international co-operation in a meaningful way, transparency needs to be complemented by comparability of the information provided.

Therefore, to get a complete overview of countries' international co-operation for development, providers should be more transparent and use global standards for their reporting. This will also support comparisons across countries. This chapter first discusses the availability of information and then the potential of establishing a global standard for measuring international co-operation for development.

Countries' transparency on international co-operation

Information on development co-operation is more readily available than information on broader international co-operation. Apart from the 30 members of the DAC, around 20 other countries report on their development co-operation programmes to the OECD. However, currently, only eight of them report detailed information on all projects they carry out. For an additional 10 countries that do not report, the OECD makes estimates on their development co-operation programmes. There are certainly other countries providing development co-operation beyond the scope of this paper, but little quantitative information is available on their programmes.

There are different degrees of transparency amongst the 10 countries the OECD makes estimates for. Brazil has published detailed reports on its programme, but the most recent version is on 2013 flows. Mexico publishes a lot of information on the website of its development co-operation agency (AMEXCID), although also with a time-lag of several years. There is quite a lot of official information available for India and South Africa, coming from their annual budget documents. China has published two White Papers which include some monetary information, but this is not organised by the year in which it is provided or, for example, by recipient country. Lastly, Qatar publishes an annual report with quite some detail on its programme. The report on 2013 flows is the latest available.

The OECD estimates on development co-operation are exclusively based on official sources from the provider countries, plus websites of multilateral organisations for the multilateral share of some of the providers' programmes.[10] However, several organisations and research institutes use other

[9] Transparency is one of the main pillars of the Paris Declaration on Aid Effectiveness, the Accra Agenda for Action, the Busan Partnership Agreement, the Mexico High Level Meeting Communique and the Nairobi Outcome Document.

[10] For the estimates on broader international co-operation in this paper other sources have also been used.

sources to estimate emerging providers' development co-operation. Such estimates can lead to new insights, but they can also create confusion because of the differences between the estimates.

Comparing apples and oranges

There is a lot of interest in the development co-operation of large emerging economies such as China. China itself has published two White Papers on its development co-operation. In the latest version, a figure of USD 14.4 billion is given as the total of the years 2012, 2013 and 2014; annual figures are not provided. Estimates by the JICA Research Institute (JICA-RI), a research wing of Japan International Cooperation Agency (JICA), are similar to the figures of the Chinese government, but broken down by year (Kitano 2016). The estimates by the OECD are more conservative as they do not include what China refers to as "concessional loans". These are loans provided by the Chinese EXIM-bank and subsidised by the Chinese government. ODA only includes the subsidy element of such associated financing packages. The RAND Corporation, an American non-profit organisation, estimated that China's "delivered foreign aid and government-sponsored investment activities" amounted to USD 18 billion in 2010 and USD 169 billion in pledges (Wolf Jr. et al. 2013). The reason behind these differences (see table 4) is a lack of transparent information as well as the fact that the four figures are based on different definitions of development co-operation.[11]

Table 4. China's development co-operation according to:

In USD billions	2010	2011	2012	2013	2014	Total 2012-14
The Chinese government						14.4
JICA – RI			5.2	5.4	4.9	
OECD	2.6	2.8	3.1	3.0	3.4	
RAND	18.0					

In addition, the media make and publish estimates on emerging providers' development co-operation from time to time, which are not always in line with estimates by governments or international organisations (see Box 2 on Brazil).[12]

[11] For a more detailed comparison of estimates on China's development co-operation see: http://www.cgdev.org/sites/default/files/chinese-development-finance-africa.pdf.

[12] Another example is the way The Economist reflects China's development co-operation in a special report published in 2012, as explained by Deborah Brautigam: http://www.chinaafricarealstory.com/2012/01/chinas-foreign-aid-economist-still.html.

Box 2. The Economist on Brazil's development co-operation

The Economist stated in 2010 that: "(…) the value of all Brazilian development aid broadly defined could reach $4 billion a year. That is less than China, but similar to generous donors such as Sweden and Canada (…)" (The Economist 2010). A table in that article clarifies that only USD 1.2 billion is "direct aid". The other part consists of commercial loans from the Brazilian Development Bank, BNDES. However, even the USD 1.2 billion is well above the figure published by the Brazilian government itself of USD 923 million, not to mention the OECD estimates that indicate that USD 500 million out of the USD 923 million would be eligible for reporting as ODA.

What is also interesting is that the figure on BNDES loans includes 2008, 2009 and part of 2010, whereas The Economist compares the total figure of USD 4 billion (which includes the BNDES loans) with annual ODA figures for Sweden and Canada. So, The Economist ends up comparing a figure that includes several years and both ODA and non-ODA instruments with the efforts by Sweden and Canada in development co-operation strictly complying with the ODA definition.

The examples of China and Brazil show that there can be large variations in the estimates on a country's development co-operation. This is especially problematic if the figures are then compared to the development co-operation programmes of other countries. The variations are explained by the lack of transparent information and/or the use of different sources of information. But they are also due to the lack of an internationally agreed upon definition of development co-operation which would ensure the comparability of the different estimates for one provider country as well as facilitate the comparison with other providers of development co-operation.

The need for a new global measure of international co-operation

Official Development Assistance is the most widely accepted measure of development co-operation. It has been developed over decades by the OECD Development Assistance Committee which introduced the concept in 1969 (OECD 2011b). In 1970, the UN General Assembly adopted the following resolution: "Each economically advanced country will progressively increase its official development assistance to the developing countries and will exert its best efforts to reach a minimum net amount of 0.7 per cent of its gross national product at market prices by the middle of the Decade" (United Nations 1970). This resolution affirmed the concept's purpose of measuring and comparing the net budgetary efforts that provider countries undertake specifically to support developing countries. The concept still serves that purpose today and has withstood the test of time (and quite some criticism) without losing its relevance.

However, ODA was not designed to cover all instruments that have an impact on the development of developing countries. Its purpose is to measure countries´ activities that have as their main objective the economic development and welfare of developing countries. Nevertheless, broader international co-operation instruments are becoming more important and this should be

accompanied by increased transparency for which a broader measure of international co-operation is needed.

Moreover, although an increasing number of countries report to the OECD on their ODA, ODA statistics do not cover all providers of development co-operation. Some countries argue that the ODA concept is not suitable for measuring their development co-operation programmes, amongst other reasons because ODA does not cover all the instruments that these countries consider as part of their international co-operation for development.[13] Besides, not all providers of development co-operation are members of the DAC which manages the ODA definition. A different, global standard for international co-operation for development could address this issue.

Different initiatives to establish new standards for measuring international co-operation for development are ongoing. These include efforts to arrive at a measure of south-south co-operation, including both intergovernmental initiatives[14] and initiatives by non-governmental actors, such as the Network of Southern Think Tanks.[15] UN agencies are often supporting these initiatives. The OECD DAC encourages these efforts and collaborates on request. Although such a measure could lead to increased transparency of south-south co-operation, it would not necessarily solve the issue of comparability between all the different provider countries. Depending on how broadly south-south co-operation is defined, it may also not solve the issue of covering all instruments that are relevant for developing countries.

Another example is the work on the concept of total official support for sustainable development (TOSSD).[16] TOSSD attempts to address both points mentioned above. The concept is still under construction, with considerable efforts being made to ensure that all relevant stakeholders have the opportunity to contribute to its development. The objective is to reach a global agreement on a broad, inclusive measure of development finance that can promote transparency and comparability of information.

This paper underlines the need for a broad and inclusive measure, whatever its name. Developing countries, civil society, researchers etc. all need a more comprehensive overview of international co-operation reaching developing countries. Broader international co-operation instruments and emerging providers are a too important part of the story not to be included in the measurement of international co-operation for development.

[13] For a perspective on how Southern providers fit into the current development co-operation architecture see: https://www.die-gdi.de/uploads/media/DP_1.2015.pdf.

[14] For information on the work of the UN Economic and Social Council on this topic see https://www.un.org/ecosoc/sites/www.un.org.ecosoc/files/publications/analytical_study_ssc_-_november_2009.pdf and http://www.un.org/en/ecosoc/docs/pdfs/south-south_cooperation.pdf.

[15] For more information on the Network of Southern Think Tanks see: http://southernthinktanks.org/.

[16] For more information on TOSSD see: http://www.oecd.org/dac/financing-sustainable-development/tossd.htm.

Conclusion

The role of emerging providers of development co-operation is becoming more important. These countries use a broad set of instruments to engage with developing countries including instruments that are not in line with the definition of official development assistance as defined by the Development Assistance Committee. Increased transparency and a global measure of international co-operation for development are needed to enable developing countries to manage the external support they receive and to enable further analysis of the increasingly important role that emerging providers play in developing countries.

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Annex 1. Development co-operation by 19 emerging providers[17]

In USD million, gross disbursements, current prices		2010	2011	2012	2013	2014
Bulgaria	**Total ODA**	**40**	**48**	**40**	**50**	**49**
	Of which multilateral:	40	42	40	49	48
	ODA/GNI	0.09%	0.09%	0.08%	0.10%	0.09%
Croatia	**Total ODA**			**21**	**45**	**72**
	Of which multilateral:			7	21	42
	ODA/GNI			0.04%	0.08%	0.13%
Cyprus[1]	**Total ODA**	**51**	**38**	**25**	**20**	**19**
	Of which multilateral:	21	20	16	17	18
	ODA/GNI	0.23%	0.16%	0.11%	0.10%	
Estonia	**Total ODA**	**19**	**24**	**23**	**31**	**38**
	Of which multilateral:	14	17	15	19	23
	ODA/GNI	0.10%	0.12%	0.11%	0.13%	0.15%
Hungary	**Total ODA**	**114**	**140**	**118**	**128**	**144**
	Of which multilateral:	86	107	97	94	114
	ODA/GNI	0.09%	0.11%	0.10%	0.10%	0.11%
Israel[2]	**Total ODA**	**145**	**206**	**181**	**202**	**200**
	Of which multilateral:	17	18	25	16	24
	ODA/GNI	0.07%	0.09%	0.07%	0.07%	0.07%
Kazakhstan	**Total ODA**				**8**	**33**
	Of which multilateral:				3	6
	ODA/GNI				0.00%	0.02%
Kuwait (KFAED)	**Total ODA**	**639**	**526**	**482**	**541**	**598**
	Of which multilateral:	22	31	31	46	48
	ODA/GNI					
Latvia	**Total ODA**	**16**	**19**	**21**	**24**	**25**
	Of which multilateral:	14	18	20	22	23
	ODA/GNI	0.06%	0.07%	0.08%	0.08%	0.08%
Liechtenstein	**Total ODA**	**27**	**31**	**29**	**28**	**27**
	Of which multilateral:	5	6	5	5	4
	ODA/GNI	0.62%	0.69%	0.75%	0.64%	0.50%
Lithuania	**Total ODA**	**37**	**52**	**52**	**50**	**46**
	Of which multilateral:	20	31	30	33	39
	ODA/GNI	0.11%	0.13%	0.13%	0.11%	0.10%
Malta	**Total ODA**	**14**	**20**	**19**	**18**	**20**
	Of which multilateral:	5	7	7	6	8
	ODA/GNI	0.18%	0.25%	0.23%	0.20%	0.20%
Romania	**Total ODA**	**114**	**164**	**142**	**134**	**214**
	Of which multilateral:	88	135	109	114	144
	ODA/GNI	0.07%	0.09%	0.09%	0.07%	0.11%
Russia	**Total ODA**	**472**	**479**	**465**	**714**	**876**
	Of which multilateral:	170	239	250	352	216
	ODA/GNI	0.03%	0.03%	0.02%	0.03%	0.05%
Saudi Arabia[3]	**Total ODA**	**3 494**	**5 239**	**1 436**	**5 825**	**13 785**
	Of which multilateral:	609	322	342	295	362
	ODA/GNI					
Thailand	**Total ODA**	**40**	**41**	**30**	**55**	**86**
	Of which multilateral:	9	9	6	9	8
	ODA/GNI	0.00%	0.01%	0.00%	0.01%	0.02%
Timor Leste	**Total ODA**					**3**
	Of which multilateral:					0
	ODA/GNI					
Turkey	**Total ODA**	**967**	**1 273**	**2 533**	**3 308**	**3 591**
	Of which multilateral:	47	47	111	151	89
	ODA/GNI	0.13%	0.17%	0.32%	0.40%	0.45%
United Arab Emirates	**Total ODA**	**542**	**796**	**854**	**5 493**	**5 193**
	Of which multilateral:	32	53	64	21	130
	ODA/GNI	0.15%	0.21%	0.20%	1.34%	1.26%

1. Footnote by Turkey: The information in this document with reference to « Cyprus » relates to the southern part of the Island. There is no single authority representing both Turkish and Greek Cypriot people on the Island. Turkey recognises the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus (TRNC). Until a lasting and equitable solution is found within the context of the United Nations, Turkey shall preserve its position concerning the "Cyprus issue". Footnote by all the European Union Member States of the OECD and the European Union: The Republic of Cyprus is recognised by all members of the United Nations with the exception of Turkey. The information in this document relates to the area under the effective control of the Government of the Republic of Cyprus.

2. The statistical data for Israel are supplied by and under the responsibility of the relevant Israeli authorities. The use of such data by the OECD is without prejudice to the status of the Golan Heights, East Jerusalem and Israeli settlements in the West Bank under the terms of international law.

3. Saudi Arabia's reporting to the OECD on its development co-operation programme consists of aggregate figures on humanitarian and development assistance by region, multilateral aid and loan disbursements.

[17] Hungary became a DAC member in December 2016, but was still taken into account as emerging provider in this paper.

Annex 2. Development co-operation by 10 non-reporting emerging providers

(in USD million, gross disbursements, current prices)

Country	2010	2011	2012	2013	2014	Source
Brazil[1]	500	469	411	316	n.a.	Institute of Applied Economic Research (IPEA) and Brazilian Cooperation Agency (ABC)
Chile	16	24	38	44	49	Ministry of Finance
China	2 564	2 785	3 123	2 997	3 401	Fiscal Yearbook, Ministry of Finance
Colombia	15	22	27	42	45	Strategic institutional plans, Presidential Agency of International Cooperation
Costa Rica	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	21	24	Annual Budget Laws
India[2]	708	794	1 077	1 223	1 398	Annual Reports, Ministry of Foreign Affairs
Indonesia	10	16	26	49	56	Ministry of National Development Planning
Mexico	n.a.	99	203	526	169	Mexican Agency for International Development Cooperation (AMEXCID)
Qatar	334	733	543	1 344	n.a.	Foreign Aid reports, Ministry of Foreign Affairs
South Africa	154	229	191	191	148	Estimates of Public Expenditures, National Treasury

1) Brazil's development co-operation is significantly higher according to the official figures published by the Brazilian government. The OECD uses these data but, for the purposes of this analysis, only includes in its estimates: a) activities in low and middle-income countries; and b) contributions to multilateral agencies whose main aim is promoting economic development and welfare of developing countries (or a percentage of these contributions when a multilateral agency does not work exclusively on developmental activities in developing countries). The OECD also excludes bilateral peacekeeping activities.

2) Figures for India and South Africa are based on their fiscal years. For example, 2012 data correspond to fiscal year 2012/2013.


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