



The Southward Shift in International Migration: Social Challenges and Policy Implications

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Abstract

South-South migration flows outnumber the flows between South and North, and a series of developing countries have, over time, become net immigration countries. This phenomenon implies new challenges, in particular at the social level, for both the countries of origin and destination, and requires a different approach in the way we think about the governance of migration flows. This paper first describes recent trends and changing patterns in global migration, focusing on South-South migration. It discusses the new geography of migration, induced by both more restrictive migration policies in the North and more opportunities in the fast-growing converging economies of the South. The paper then highlights the social challenges that an increasing inflow of migrants entails for developing countries, in particular with regards to the integration of immigrants. Finally, building on the experience of both OECD and non-OECD countries, the paper draws a series of policy recommendations aimed at fostering better integration of immigrants in developing countries, and hence at enhancing national social cohesion.

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Introduction

The changing geography of economic growth has come with a marked shift in global wealth. The world's economic centre of gravity has moved both eastwards and southwards, and developing countries are playing a bigger and increasing role in international governance. Channels of interaction between developing countries have also been intensifying, especially with regards to South-South trade and factor mobility. Migration between developing countries, in particular, has significantly increased over the last two decades. South-South migration flows outnumber the flows between South and North, and they are likely to rise relatively faster in the future, not only because migration policies in developed economies are increasingly restrictive, but also because the fast-growing economies in the South represent new magnets for would-be migrants.

As the number of immigrants in developing countries rises, problems of discrimination and integration also arise. Like in developed countries with a longer tradition of immigration, local populations do not always view in a favourable light the arrival and settlement of foreign workers. As a result, foreigners may serve as scapegoats for the economic and social problems of the country. They are blamed for the rise in unemployment and insecurity, and in some extreme cases, can be victims of anti-immigrant riots, like those which occurred in South Africa in 2008. Moreover, immigrants in developing countries often lack basic protection of their rights, especially at the social and civic levels. The situation of refugees and transit migrants is particularly worrying, above all when their "temporary" status tends to become permanent.

However, the issues of integration and discrimination in the South need to be analysed from a different angle than in South-North contexts. In many developing countries, even local populations do not have access to formal employment, decent housing or social protection. In these conditions, how can public authorities provide immigrants with things not even their own citizens have? At the same time, the absence of comprehensive welfare states in many developing countries lowers economic and social discrepancies between foreign-born and local-born populations, and makes integration less of a central issue.

But this does not mean that specific policies should not been adopted to improve the living and working conditions of immigrants and reduce discriminations. Social cohesion actually implies that populations on the fringe of society are not excluded from it. In this respect, when immigrants

are socially excluded, that is, when they live in ghettos, cannot access the formal labour market, or do not benefit from any social protection mechanism, the entire society suffers from the repercussions in terms of unhealthy and insecure environment. This is why countries of immigration need to better take into account the specific problems faced by foreigners on their soil and to enhance migration-related social cohesion.

Against this background, the purpose of this paper is to show that the lack of immigrant integration in developing countries might have disruptive effects on society, and that specific policies to fight against discrimination and foster integration should be promoted. In this respect, Section I describes recent trends and changing patterns in global migration, focusing on South-South migration. It discusses the new changing geography of migration, induced by both more restrictive migration policies in the North and more opportunities in the fast-growing converging economies of the South. Section II then highlights the social challenges that an increasing inflow of migrants entails for developing countries, in particular with regards to the integration of immigrants. Finally, building on the experience of both OECD and non-OECD countries, Section III draws a series of policy recommendations aimed at fostering better integration of immigrants in developing countries, and hence at enhancing national social cohesion.

I – Shifting wealth, shifting migration flows

The global shift in wealth of the 1990s-2000s has contributed to modifying the geography of international migration. The decline of international transport costs, better and more accessible information and telecommunication technologies, and the income growth in converging economies have contributed to lowering the financial constraints required to emigrate, thus enabling potential migrants to move to more distant destinations. The number of countries affected by international mobility has significantly increased, resulting in a wide diversification of migration corridors. Latin American migrants, for instance, can be found in other countries of the region, but also in North America, in Europe, and increasingly in countries such as Australia, Israel and Japan. In turn, migrants from other continents head again to Latin America.¹

As a result of the diversification of flows, the division between countries of immigration and emigration is not pertinent anymore. An increasing number of countries are at the same time

¹ During the entire nineteenth century and until the Great Depression of the 1930s, Latin America was a continent of net immigration. Foreigners came not only from Europe, but also from Asia, mainly China and Japan (Hatton and Williamson, 2005).

countries of origin, transit and destination. OECD member countries like Mexico and Turkey offer a good illustration of this emerging pattern. They both have a long tradition of emigration, but as their economies grow, they attract an increasing number of immigrants, who partly substitute for those who went abroad. Both countries have also become transit corridors for undocumented migrants in the way to North America or Europe. A growing number of non-OECD countries, especially in North Africa and Eastern Europe, face the same situation, being simultaneously countries of emigration, transit and immigration.

In this changing geography, South-South migration is slated to occupy a prominent place. Besides the major petroleum exporters, which have traditionally attracted workers from other developing countries, newly industrialised countries have also recently turned into net recipients of immigration. Countries such as Costa Rica in Central America, Ghana in West Africa, the Republic of South Africa in Southern Africa, and Malaysia in East Asia have become centres of attraction for labour in their respective regions.

1. South-South migration outnumbers South-North flows


Undocumented migrants crossing the Sahara or the Sonora deserts, stranded boat people in the Mediterranean Sea, refugees fleeing conflicts areas attempting to reach the stable countries of Europe and North America...The media coverage of international migration often gives a false impression of the actual movements of population in the world. Most migrants actually cross borders with documents (generally on a plane), and economic factors prevail over political or conflict-related motives (World Bank, 2010). In addition, and contrary to conventional wisdom, migrants from developing countries mainly go to other developing countries. In 2005, an estimated 58.4 million migrants from developing countries (50.5% of total migrants from developing countries) lived in another developing country, against 55.9 million (48.2%) in developed economies and 1.5 million (1.3%) in transition economies (see Figure 1).²

Taken globally, developed economies still represent the primary *destination* for international migrants, with 51% of the global migrant stock. There are two core reasons for this. First, a strong

² The University of Sussex and the World Bank have built a bilateral migration matrix with estimates of the stock of migrants by country of origin and destination (see Ratha and Shaw, 2007, for more details). Based on census data, these estimates are subject to the inherent limits of counting migrants (Dumont and Lemaitre, 2005; Dumont *et al.*, 2010). The number of undocumented migrants as well as the differences from a country to another in the definition itself of “immigrant” make the exercise more difficult. Estimating South-South flows is even trickier than in the case of developed countries as borders are generally more porous than in the North, and that the statistical system might be deficient.

asymmetry characterises international flows: while nearly 56 million migrants from developing countries live in developed economies, only 5 million people from developed countries can be found in developing economies. The same situation applies to migration flows between transition and developed economies (0.9 million migrants from developed economies live in transition economies vs. 9 million the other way around). Second, North-North migration itself represents a significant part of migration to developed economies: 32 million migrants, that is, 33% of the stock of immigrants in developed economies, originate from other developed economies.

Figure 1. **Global stock of international migrants, 2005**
Millions



Notes: Data are derived from a bilateral migration matrix built by the University of Sussex and the World Bank. They provide estimates of the stock of migrants at the country level, that is, the number of immigrants by country of origin and the number of emigrants by country of destination.
Source: Own calculations based on Ratha and Shaw (2007). The categorisation between developed, transition and developing countries comes from UNCTAD (2010).

This said, migrants from developing economies still constitute more than 60% of the global stock of migrants. But when compared to the demographic weight of developing countries (80% of

world population in 2005), they are actually underrepresented. By contrast, migrants from developed economies (20% of total migration) and above all from transition economies (19.2%) are overrepresented (15.3% and 4.6%, respectively, of world population). This situation reflects the fact that developed economies set the international mobility rules, and that it is easier for people from developed economies to migrate than for potential migrants from developing countries. Together with other motives that will be developed below, these two factors also explain the prevalence of South-South flows.

Table 1 shows the biggest migration corridors in the world in 2010. With almost 12 million Mexican migrants living in the United States, the Mexico-US corridor is the largest. But most corridors (11 out of 20) concern migration between developing economies, mainly in Asia, while only two corridors correspond to migration between developed countries (Puerto Rico to the US, and the UK to Australia). India is involved in six of these corridors either as a country of origin (in three cases to other developing countries, in one case to a developed economy) or as a country of destination (in two cases). The main country of final destination remains the United States (in 7 out of 20 cases).

Table 1. Top 20 migration corridors (excluding transition economies), 2010

Millions of migrants


	<i>Between developing economies</i>	<i>From developing to developed economies</i>	<i>Between developed economies</i>
1		<i>Mexico → USA</i> 11.6	
2	<i>Bangladesh → India</i> 3.3		
3		<i>Turkey → Germany</i> 2.7	
4	<i>China → Hong Kong</i> 2.2		
5	<i>India → United Arab Emirates</i> 2.2		
6		<i>China → USA</i> 1.7	
7		<i>Philippines → USA</i> 1.7	
8	<i>Afghanistan → Iran</i> 1.7		
9		<i>India → USA</i> 1.7	
10			<i>Puerto Rico → USA</i> 1.7
11	<i>West Bank and Gaza → Syria</i> 1.5		
12	<i>India → Saudi Arabia</i> 1.5		
13	<i>Indonesia → Malaysia</i> 1.4		
14	<i>Burkina Faso → Côte d'Ivoire</i> 1.3		
15			<i>UK → Australia</i> 1.2
16		<i>Vietnam → USA</i> 1.2	
17	<i>Pakistan → India</i> 1.2		
18		<i>El Salvador → USA</i> 1.1	
19	<i>Malaysia → Singapore</i> 1.1		
20	<i>India → Bangladesh</i> 1.1		
Total	18.5	21.7	2.9

Note: Main corridors in transitions economies are Russia-Ukraine (3.7 million migrants), Ukraine-Russia (3.6), Kazakhstan-Russia (2.6), and Russia-Kazakhstan (2.2).

Source: World Bank (2010)

A significant share of migration between developing countries consists of intra-regional migration. In this respect, intra-regional migration is particularly high in Sub-Saharan Africa, while it is significantly lower in East Asia and Latin America (Table 2).³ One reason is the respective level of income, and hence of financial constraint, in each region. While most countries in Africa are poor, East Asia and Latin America are mainly composed of middle and high-income countries. It is relatively easier for their inhabitants to emigrate to developed economies than for the average African worker.

Table 2. Share of intra-regional migrants
Percent



Source: World Bank (2008 and 2010).

The relative weight of South-South migration is particularly significant in the case of refugees. While the worldwide stock of refugees (16.3 million in 2010) corresponds to 7.6% of total migration flows, refugees in developing countries (80.5 million) represent 13.8% of total immigrants (World Bank, 2010). As a matter of fact, movements of refugees mainly concern developing countries, both as sending and receiving areas. About 82% of the 8.2 million refugees concentrated in the top 20 countries of destination found asylum in another developing country (Table 3). Only five of these countries are developed countries. At the end of 2009, Afghanistan and Iraq were the two main

³ In its recent work on the profile of international migrants in developed, emerging and developing countries, the OECD (Dumont *et al.*, 2010) finds that intra-regional migration corresponds to 85% of total migration in Africa, 75% in Asia and 62% in Latin America. The large difference between the World Bank and the OECD figures might be due to the size of the sample. The extended bilateral database of international migrants, DIOC-E (release 2.0), actually provides more information (in particular the level of skill) than the bilateral migration matrix of the University of Sussex and the World Bank, but includes – so far – less countries. In Latin America for instance, the database consists of five countries (Argentina, Brazil, Costa Rica, Puerto Rico, and Venezuela), which receive a high proportion of immigrants from the region.

countries of origin, while Pakistan, Iran and Syria were the major recipients, with more than one million refugees in each case. Hatton and Williamson (2005) show that beyond the changes in population, violence and migration policies, a *network effect* (that is, cumulative past flows of asylum seekers) plays a significant role in the increase in global applications.

Table 3. **Top 20 asylum countries, end 2009**
Thousands of refugees


	<i>Developing economies</i>	<i>Developed economies</i>
1	Pakistan (Afghanistan) 1,741	
2	Iran (Afghanistan, Iraq) 1,070	
3	Syria (Iraq) 1,054	
4		Germany (Serbia, Turkey) 594
5	Jordan (Iraq) 451	
6	Kenya (Somalia) 359	
7	Chad (Sudan, Central African Rep.) 338	
8	China (Vietnam) 301	
9		USA (China, Colombia) 275
10		UK (Somalia, Afghanistan) 269
11	Bangladesh (Myanmar) 229	
12	Venezuela (Colombia) 201	
13		France (Sri Lanka, Cambodia) 196
14	Sudan (Eritrea) 186	
15	DR Congo (Angola, Rwanda) 186	
16	India (China, Sri Lanka) 185	
17	Yemen (Somalia) 171	
18		Canada (Sri Lanka, China) 169
19	Uganda (DR Congo, Sudan) 127	
20	Ethiopia (Somalia, Eritrea) 122	
Total	6,721	1,503

Notes: Main origin countries are in brackets.

Source: UNHCR (2010)

Migration is not a one-way road, and most countries both receive and send migrants. Even the first country of immigration, the United States, has a large community abroad (around 2.4 million emigrants in 2010), mainly in Mexico and Canada. Moreover, two of the primary countries of destination in the South (Table 4), India and Pakistan, have more citizens abroad (11.4 and 4.7 million, respectively, in 2010) than foreigners on their soil (5.4 and 4.2 million). In fact, most developing countries are net emigration countries. 11.8 million Mexicans live abroad, essentially in the United States, while only 726 thousand foreigners are officially settled in Mexico. Likewise, 8.3 million Chinese have left their country, while only 686 thousand foreigners live in China.

Table 4. **Top 20 immigration countries in the South, 2010**



Source: World Bank (2010)

However, a growing number of developing countries receive more immigrants than they send emigrants abroad. Table 5 classifies these net immigration countries according to their income group and their speed of growth.⁴ The income level of receiving countries does not seem to play a prevalent role here, since most countries of net immigration are low-income economies (13 out of 34). By contrast, the rate of growth matters, 28 of the net recipients in the South being classified by the OECD (2010) as either *affluent* or *converging* economies (i.e. being either classified as high income countries, or with a per capita growth rate over the decade of double the OECD rates). This confirms that beyond the wage gap between sending and receiving countries, migrants are attracted by current economic opportunities.

Table 5 also includes sectoral categories like major manufactured goods and petroleum exporters. In this respect, oil is a significant driver of South-South migration. Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates, for instance,⁴ have many more immigrants (7.3 and 3.3 million, respectively, in 2010) than emigrants (187.7 and 55.9 thousand). Altogether, 8 out of 34 net immigration countries are major petroleum exporters, five of them being both high-income and affluent economies. Major

⁴ Based on Wolfensohn (2007), the OECD (2010) develops the concept of a “four-speed” world, divided between countries described as affluent (high-income countries), converging (countries catching up to the living standards of the affluent), struggling (countries facing a middle-income “glass ceiling”), and poor (under the weight of extreme poverty).

manufactured goods exporters, like Hong Kong and Singapore, also attract foreign workers, although not in the same proportion as petroleum exporters.

Table 5. **Net immigration countries in the South, 2010**

<i>4-speed world</i> \ <i>Income group</i>	<i>High</i>	<i>Middle</i>	<i>Low</i>	Number of countries
Affluent	Bahrain (P) Brunei (P) Hong Kong* (M) Kuwait* (P) Macao Singapore* (M) Saudi Arabia* (P) UAE* (P)			8
Converging	Argentina Venezuela (P)	Botswana Costa Rica Iran (P, R) Jordan* (R) Lebanon (R) Malaysia (M) Namibia South Africa* Syria* (P, R) Thailand (M)	Chad (R) Djibouti (R) Gambia Ghana* Nepal Nigeria (P) Rwanda Tanzania (R)	20
Struggling		Gabon (P)	Côte d'Ivoire*	2
Poor			Comoros Kenya (R) Malawi Zambia (R)	4
Number of countries	10	11	13	34

Notes: * Top 10 net immigration countries (in volume); (M): major manufactured goods exporters (manufactured products represent more than 50 per cent of total exports); (P): major petroleum exporters (petroleum represents more than 50% of total exports); (R): major asylum countries (refugees represent more than 20 per cent of immigrants).


Sources: The four-speed-world classification comes from OECD (2010); income groups, petroleum and manufactured goods exporters correspond to categories coined by the UNCTAD (2010); migration and refugees data come from World Bank (2010)

2. Migration between developing economies often represents a second-best option

The fact that South-South outnumbers South-North flows does not mean that going to another developing country is the first choice of migrants from the South. In most cases, the choice is not theirs to make. Administrative barriers in developed countries are so high, even for high-skilled workers, that most would-be migrants have no other option than to try their luck in other developing countries. In addition, the financial cost of moving to far-away rich countries prevent most candidates from the South to do so. This explains why South-South migration often corresponds to movements between poor countries. As shown in Figure 2, while migrants from middle and high-

income countries mainly go to developed economies (in 67% and 74% of the cases, respectively), migrants from low-income developing countries have as their first destination a developing country (63%). In 26 out of 40 cases (65%), the first destination is another low-income country (Table 6).

Figure 2. First destination of migrants from developing countries by income group, 2005



Source: Authors' calculations based on Ratha and Shaw (2007).

Table 6. First destination of migrants from developing countries by income group

Source \ Destination	Low-income	Middle-income	High-Income	TOTAL
Low-income	26	9	5	40
Middle-income	3	5	7	15
High-income	2	1	5	8
TOTAL	31	15	17	63

Source: Authors' calculations based on Ratha and Shaw (2007).

One of the main reasons could be that would-be migrants in low-income countries are generally too poor to go to developed economies (Martin and Taylor, 1996). The financial constraint only enables them to move to neighbouring countries, with similar levels of development. As a matter of fact, 45 out of 63 developing countries (71%) whose emigrants have as their first destination another developing country share a border with this country. By contrast, only one developing country (out of 78), Mexico, has a common border with the first country of destination of its emigrants, the United States, when this country is developed. Among the 23 countries with at

least 50% of emigrants having as their first destination another developing country, 19 share a border with the only exceptions being the dyads of Bhutan and Nepal, Egypt and Saudi Arabia, Jordan and West Bank and Gaza, and West Bank and Gaza and Syria. Even In these four cases, the distance between countries of origin and destination is not really significant.

The neighbour effect is strengthened by the prevalence of common languages between countries of origin and destination. Low-skilled workers, in particular, find easier to move to countries where they can speak their own language. However, there are no significant differences between the countries whose migrants' first destination is another developing country (in 60% of the cases, the two countries share the same language) and those whose migrants primarily choose a developed economy (62%). But when at least 50% of emigrants have as their first destination another developing country, the importance of language tends to increase (in 74% of the cases, that is, in 17 out of 23 countries).

The neighbour effect is particularly significant in the case of refugees. Among the 15 developing economies that belong to the top 20 asylum countries (Table 3), refugees systematically come from a neighbour country. Even though, technically, India and Sri Lanka and Yemen and Somalia do not share the same border, they can still be considered "neighbouring" countries. Such geographical proximity is not a coincidence, as refugees need to quickly flee situations of civil unrest or ecological disaster, and do not have time to consider, at least in the short run, the possibility of moving to distant countries. In the longer run, resettlement in developed countries is possible and even highly desired by refugees.

Another reason why South-South migration has increased over the last decades is the restrictive nature of migration policies in the North. The conjunction of administrative barriers (for instance with the external borders of the Schengen Area) and physical barriers, with the erection of walls (like at the US-Mexican or Spanish-Moroccan borders), has forced would-be migrants from developing countries to either abandon their plans and stay home, move to another nearby developing country, or try to cross borders through irregular channels. The result is an increase in South-South migration, in particular migrants stuck in transit. Some countries, like Mexico, Libya, Morocco and Turkey, have become the focal point for thousands of migrants trying to reach developed economies. However, international statistics are still unable to give an accurate account of this phenomenon.

In many cases, South-South migration therefore constitutes a second-best option. Restrictive migration policies in the North deter would-be migrants from developing countries, who then have

no other option than to head to other developing countries. The prevalence of financial constraint in low-income countries is also a significant factor in South-South migration, mainly between countries with common borders. The result is that migrants from middle and high-income developing countries primarily go to developed economies, while people from low-income developing economies tend to move to richest (or at least less poor) neighbouring countries. This is, for instance, the case of Bolivians going to Argentina, while Argentineans migrate to Spain or the United States, and Bangladeshis moving to India, while Indians opt for Gulf countries and the United States.

In theory, second-best options can also mean second-best impacts in terms of developmental potential. The positive welfare effects associated with migration are generally lower for South-South than South-North flows. On the one hand, the (negative) lost-labour effect associated with emigration is higher when migrants go to other developing countries. Due to the lack of complete labour markets in developing countries, emigration tends to lower household production, mainly in rural areas. As a result, migrant households are liable to suffer from a drop in income as well as an increase in food insecurity. Evidence from Burkina Faso (Wouterse, 2010) and Nicaragua (Filipski and Taylor, 2010) shows that the lost-labour effect is higher when migrants go to other developing countries than when they go to developed countries. On the other hand, the (positive) remittance effect is higher when migrants go to developed countries. Remittances indeed contribute to offsetting the lost-labour effect by providing an additional source of income for households with migrants abroad. In a context of incomplete credit markets, remittances provide financial liquidity for productive investment. In retrospect, Filipski and Taylor (2010) and Wouterse (2010) both show that the remittance effect is higher in South-North than in South-South migration contexts.

3. South-South flows are expected to increase faster than South-North flows

Migration between developing countries is likely to increase at an accelerated pace during the coming decades. A first reason is that developed economies have hardened their immigration policies as a reaction to the global economic crisis, making South-North migration more difficult. Fighting against unauthorized immigrants has actually become one of the top priorities on the migration-policy agenda since the beginning of the crisis. Recent – and controversial – legislation has made irregular immigration a crime punishable by fines and imprisonment in several OECD countries (*i.e.* Italy), and deportations from Europe to Africa or from the United States to Latin America have increased over the last three years. Countries of immigration hit by the crisis also pretend to reduce regular immigration. In 2009, for instance, the American Senate adopted the *Employ American Act*, which limits the possibility for companies receiving public subsidies, in particular financial

institutions, to recruit high-skilled foreign workers, even on a temporary basis. Migration policies have also evolved to include voluntary return programmes. Countries such as the Czech Republic, Japan and Spain offer financial packages to immigrants who accept to return, for a long-term period, to their countries of origin. Beyond the debate on their legitimacy, it is likely that these measures suffer from a *ratchet effect*, due to the difficulty that policy makers will face to remove the new legislation on immigration.

A second reason for the rapid increase in South-South flows is the demographic boom in Africa. Between 2010 and 2050, the still-in-motion demographic transition will contribute to expanding working-age population from 0.58 to 1.3 billion (+125%) (UNDP, 2009). This implies high levels of labour market competition for young adults, and consequently few economic opportunities and low real wages. Against this background, incentives to migrate out of Africa are very high, in particular when considering the wage differential with high-income OECD countries as well as the demographic imbalances in ageing developed economies. On the other hand, the restrictive nature of migration policies in the North has led to an increasingly selective migration process, which should translate into even more intra-regional movements.

A third reason is that environmental changes, in particular those induced by global warming, will strengthen the impact of demographic pressures on South-South migration. The deterioration of the natural environment in Sahelian countries, as witnessed in Burkina Faso and Mali, is already driving intra-regional migration in West Africa (OECD, 2009). But the volume of displaced people from developing countries may increase as disruptive phenomena such as deforestation, desertification and floods affect livelihoods dependent on stable ecosystems. In this respect, estimates of the number of migrants generated by climate change (between 200 million and 1 billion by 2050) are questionable, mainly because they do not consider the capacity of populations to adapt to new conditions, above all in the case of gradual environmental changes (UNDP, 2009). The number of migrants will also depend on public policy responses to environmental challenges. In any case, low-income developing countries are likely to be more exposed to the consequences of climate change, both because of the higher degree of livelihood vulnerability of the poorest populations, and the lower responsiveness of public authorities. The lack of legal status for so-called eco-refugees increases their vulnerability.

A fourth reason is the rapid economic growth in converging economies, which should both decrease emigration from these countries to the North and increase immigration from other developing countries. Fast-growing developing economies offer more labour opportunities to their citizens, who also benefit from a rise in real wages. The incentives to migrate should then decrease

as working conditions improve in developing economies. In this regard, Hatton and Williamson (2010) show that emigration from Latin America and Asia will significantly drop in the next two decades, while migration from Sub-Saharan Africa, where demographic pressures remain high, are likely to increase. But precisely, the improvement in economic conditions in converging countries implies a widening of the wage gap with poor and struggling economies, which makes the former increasingly attractive to would-be migrants.

The conjunction of restrictive migration policies in the North, the demographic boom, environmental changes in the South, and high growth rates in converging economies will probably translate into a faster increase in South-South than South-North migration. At the same time, a wider diversification of flows should occur, migrants from the South looking for better opportunities in other developing countries from different regions. The Chinese diaspora, for instance, has significantly expanded over the last decade both in Africa and Latin America. In this respect, three categories of migrants emerge: traders, temporary workers in Chinese multinational companies, and transit migrants on the way to Europe or North America (Ma Mung, 2009). In the same way, Sub-Saharan Africans have begun to emigrate to Latin America: first because the wage differential between most African and Latin American countries is significant enough to convince would-be migrants to cross the Atlantic; second because border controls are less stringent than in Europe and North America; third because Latin American countries serve as a beachhead to the United States.

As a result of the expansion and diversification of South-South migration flows, countries of transit and destination have to face new challenges. The arrival of a growing number of migrants, either temporary or permanent, implies an increase in competition with native workers in the – formal or informal – labour market. Besides, a bad allocation of resources might jeopardise the access of both foreign and local populations to housing, social protection or education. The risk is that social tensions increase and lead not only to more discriminations against immigrants, but also, in extreme cases, to civil unrest.

II – The social challenges of South-South migration

Despite the many changes occurring in labour mobility around the world the primary motivation for migrating remains economic in nature. The immense and growing wage gap between the South and the North continues and will continue to draw potential workers to the North. South-South migration is however on the rise for many reasons, as outlined above, and the list of challenges for new receiving countries is growing, particularly in terms of immigrant integration. The following section argues that South-South migration is different than the conventional migration story, that integration in the South rests on an active part by immigrants themselves but also native workers and employers, and that the strengthening of social cohesion hinges on the successful integration of immigrants.

1. Integration in the South is different than the typical South-to-North story

The typical migration story unfolds in the following way: a productive member from an above-subsistence household is sent away to earn money and remit it back to the household; the original household can in turn invest or consume it, as an insurance against idiosyncratic shocks to its own income streams. Following the argument above, South-South migration is not different from the migratory movements from the South to the North. There are however two major reasons why the challenges associated with South-South migration require a different approach: the administrative capacity to properly manage flows is weaker, and the cultural and physical distances separating countries are smaller. South-South migration therefore needs to be tackled from another angle.

Limited administrative capacity

With a limited administrative capacity, migration and integration concerns are often overlooked. Stretched-out government budgets in countries in the South means that indeed, more pressing issues need to be dealt with, in an effort to lower poverty and sustain the often barely functioning economy. In many parts of the developing world, migrant integration requires such a high amount of resources that it is deemed secondary to otherwise priorities such as creating a good investment climate, providing social security and boosting agriculture. When it is dealt with, it is usually and increasingly done under the pretence of national security concerns.

Moreover, as is often the case in developing countries, what is regulatory and legal is not necessarily reflected in reality. In this respect, borders are extremely porous and thus ignored by most workers. The fact that immigrating to a nearby country is often safer, quicker, shorter and cheaper than going to a richer country in the North, suggests there are possibly even more potential migrants. This in effect exacerbates the problems of controlling borders in the South, particularly when economic and social equilibria are shaken in a nearby source country.

In addition, some migration routes are hundreds of years old and permanently etched into the social fabric of those who travel them. While these routes cross international borders, workers often ignore them, while administrative officers from both sides are usually powerless or resourceless to stop irregular flows. Although most of these migration routes are harmless, and even bring more good than bad, the fact that they are not monitored means illegal and harmful practices do take place. Beyond trading of illicit goods, human trafficking has become the focus of many international protocols, in particular to stop the use of children in diverse commercial activities. The ILO (2009) estimates, for instance, that between 12 000 and 50 000 women and children are trafficked into India from nearby countries every year. Beyond the ethical debates, international child labour trafficking leads to a country devoid of future labour resources with higher human capital, and its high prevalence in the South adds a characteristic which makes South-South migration different.

Another consideration for the prevalence of South-South migration to nearby countries is the fact that many developing countries are small in geographic size, such as in West Africa, Southeast Asia and Central America. Workers are therefore more likely to look beyond international borders for work – particularly when shocks are generalised nationally (*i.e.* economic shocks). Increasingly, these regions are part of larger regional agreements for the free movement of labour, such as the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS). But while ECOWAS enables the free movement of labour since 1979, national priority clauses have continuously ensured that truly free movement of labour has never taken place, contrasting it with regions like the European Union, where labour can move with minimal hassle between most countries. In the most fluid border crossing regions in West Africa, immigrants must declare their presence within three months of entering; but as their work remains largely informal and takes place in remote rural areas, registration seldom happens and workers are unaccounted for.

While international borders do not seem to stop immigrants from entering neighbouring countries, once across the border, the formal economy is relatively so small that the private sector has a smaller role to play than in the North in the integration of new workers. Multinational companies are few, and the few jobs they produce are often filled through international recruiting. In

Africa and Asia, for instance, it is common to have an economy dominated by an informal sector, reaching relative totals as high as 90% vis-à-vis the formal sector (IILS, 2009). Because of the way they enter the country and the lack of formal jobs in the destination country, immigrants usually work informally, like their hosts – whether they arrive with assets or not. This is consistent with the story that most immigration to the South is undertaken by low-skilled workers, often in seasonal timeframes. This means that differentiating between regular and irregular immigrants, is largely futile.

This has been confirmed empirically. Amin (2010) finds that, in a survey of 350 informal businesses in Burkina Faso, Cameroon and Cape Verde, roughly half of the businesses are owned by immigrants. Immigrants find the informal sector convenient for the same reasons as native workers: low entry and exit costs, and little initial capital required to start an informal business. De Vreyer *et al.* (2009) also find that immigrants in West Africa are likely to work in the informal sector.

Because immigrants easily blend into the informal sector of their destination country, authorities often have little capacity to count and manage their inflow. In many countries, identification cards do not even exist for natives, let alone immigrants. Although some countries in the South, such as Ghana, India, Mexico and South Africa are currently spending millions for such identification systems⁵, it is not clear whether this will help or deter the integration of immigrants.

Distance

A second important factor is that of *distance*, not only physically, but also culturally and socially. The story of immigrants going from South to North is mainly an economic story. While language and colonial ties often act as facilitators, these determinants are slowly disappearing, with many Sub-Saharan Africans finding opportunity in non-historically linked countries like Italy, Spain and the United States, and many Southeast Asians finding work in the Gulf countries. South-South migrants' reliance on proximity means that economic concerns are lessened: borders are porous, the amount of assets and in-kind cash required to emigrate is lower and informal labour markets have low entry costs – this all equates to a selection of immigrants likely to be selected from the less privileged sections of society; more people can afford to make the choice to emigrate.

The little empirical evidence available indeed points to a picture of lower selection amongst South-South migrants. Both Filipski and Taylor (2010) on Nicaragua to Costa Rica and Wouterse

⁵ These programs usually cost enormously to implement since they include expensive counterfeiting mechanisms such as biometric technology, including fingerprints and optical security features.

(2010) on Burkina Faso to Côte d'Ivoire find that the drop in agricultural production in the source country due to emigration (lost-labour effect) is higher in South-South contexts than in South-North contexts, suggesting that emigrant households rely more on agricultural production (and as a consequence suffer more the loss of the emigrant). The fact that South-South migrants remit smaller amounts also attests that the lost-labour effect is not counterbalanced with income – or in any case does not translate to a transition from agriculture to informal self-employment to the same degree found in South-North migration. In a survey featuring seven West African Economic Monetary Union (WAEMU) capital cities, De Vreyer *et al.* (2009) find that migrants tend to be less educated than non migrants in both their origin and destination country; migration within West African the sub-region seems to concern mainly low-educated individuals. Marquette (2006) and Gindling (2010) confirm that emigrants from Nicaragua to Costa Rica exhibit low levels of education, often working in agriculture, construction and domestic services.

This is not always true however. Because of the increasing difficulty in emigrating to richer countries, because relatively good opportunities are rising in developing countries and because the supply of qualified workers in the South is relatively low (and decreasing due to brain drain), self-selection is likely to be positive, as found by Cerrutti and Parrado (2003) in their study on Paraguayans going to Argentina. Amin (2010) also finds that the human capital of immigrants in West Africa is high (as high as natives); immigrants are on average male, unmarried, younger, with a level of education similar to native workers – and they run more efficient businesses than the average native business. One major difference in the Amin (2010) study is that immigrants favour the service sector over manufacturing and are more likely to operate from their household – likely demonstrating lower levels of assets. The longer immigrants stay in their new city however, the more they converge towards the socio-economic characteristics and tendencies of their native counterparts.

While in the North language and cultural distance play less of a role, in the South the opposite holds, perhaps because of the higher proportion of negative self-selection on skill level: Bengali speakers from Bangladesh favour neighbourhoods in Delhi where they can find people speaking their language; Ewe from Togo seek seasonal work in the Eastern regions of Ghana where Ewe is the primary language. International borders split groups with similar languages and cultures, and the migratory links that continue to bind them today are international in nature.

These ties go beyond language of course: religion, food, working habits and family customs all help in forming immigration routes between developing countries. Some languages have evolved as primary migratory-route languages, joining together people with similar customs across large

spaces. Such is the case with the Hausa language and Islamic faith, favoured for trade relations in various capitals in West Africa. In a larger way, this also explains why we find high migration between some Latin American countries, despite the large divergence between the average low-skilled pay in the United States and the average low-skilled pay in most Latin American countries. Almost all Latin American countries feature characteristics such as Spanish and Catholicism as primary language and religion.

Thus, as a result of lower administrative capacity and shorter cultural, physical and linguistic distances to migrate, South-South migration exhibits a different set of migrant characteristics, determinants and impacts. Its break with the typical South-North migration story implies that immigrant integration has to be considered in another way. However, measured from two points of view – the active participation of immigrants and their discrimination by native workers and employers – few countries in the South have yielded successful stories of immigrant integration.

2. What does integration mean in developing countries?

There are two parts to integration: an active one on behalf of the immigrant, and a receptive one on behalf of native workers and employers. Three components make up the possible active part on behalf of immigrants: economic, social and civic integration.

Economic integration

Economic integration concerns the conditions and extent to which immigrants as well as the host country reap the economic benefits of the labour provided. Economic integration is often assured since most South-South migrants have economic motives for moving and have good knowledge of the opportunities which await them. However, economic integration of immigrants in developing countries depends on many key characteristics and motivations of immigrants: temporary vs. permanent immigration, education levels, and the types of jobs and sector in which they work. For instance, seasonal workers often economically integrate quite easily since their motivation and reason for circulating is economic in nature. Moreover, once they have reached their savings target or when the job is complete, they return. But their integration is almost solely economic. Besides, the term “integration” has to be put into perspective. The high level of informality in developing countries actually implies that immigrants are often subjected to the same economic and market fluctuations as native workers, that is, unstable working conditions.

One key group where economic integration is not assured is refugees. The sporadic conflicts that occur in the South give rise to refugees fleeing to nearby countries, hoping to either one day return to their home country, integrate into their new country, or resettle in a third country. The Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) is the primary international authority on decisions made for refugees; it is also responsible for their temporary and long term integration. But even though UNHCR insures that refugees have access to health, education and specific skill-training for jobs, it does not mean that there is no resentment from nationals. Xenophobia arises naturally because nationals see the new arrivals obtain special treatment from the U.N. The opportunity for integration is somewhat limited however; the fact that UNHCR normally organises refugees in camps also means it is facilitating the formation of enclaves – perhaps contradicting any chance of it happening.

Socio-cultural integration

A second component of immigrant integration in the South is socio-cultural, that is, how immigrants deal with both the cultural and social ties that make up society in which they work. But what is meant by socio-cultural integration and how does it differ in South-North and South-South migration contexts? Socio-cultural integration is the movement of immigrant workers into the mainstream of society, granting immigrant workers access to the opportunities, rights and services typically associated to everyday life in the host country. According to UNRISD (1994), socio-cultural integration conjures at least three types of understanding of the concept:

- Positive: with the goal of inclusion of a group with another;
- Negative: with the goal of forced assimilation;
- Neutral: simply the result of established patterns of human relations over time.

Socio-cultural integration also refers to the principles by which individuals or actors are related to one another in a society. As mentioned above, the fluidity and porous borders mean that South-South migrants make choices that go beyond simple economic ones: language and culture are important, particularly in border areas, and make the integration process easier. In this respect, Table 7 shows some examples of migration corridors where vernacular languages play a more significant role than official languages. In such a scheme, irregular flows tend to prevail.

Table 7. Examples of irregular immigration corridors facilitated by language

<i>Country/regional dyad</i>	<i>Official languages</i>	<i>Common language</i>	<i>Number of mother tongue speakers</i>
Ghana-Togo	English/French	Ewe	2.8 million/1.2 million
West Bengal (India)-Bangladesh	English/Bengali	Bengali	70 million/156 million
Malaysia-Indonesia	Malay/Indonesian	Malay/Indonesian	9 million/23 million
Myanmar-Thailand	Burmese/Thai	Shan	3.2 million/0.1 million
South Africa-Botswana	Tswana	Tswana	3.4 million/1 million
India-Nepal	Hindi/Nepali	Nepali	2.5 million/11 million
Nigeria-Niger	English/French	Hausa	18.5 million – 5.5 million

Source: www.ethnologue.com

Hometown associations (HTAs) have been particularly useful for low-skilled workers from the South migrating to the North. They have gradually moved beyond their role as integration facilitators to becoming links for development between the diaspora and the home country. In the South, these types of institutions have also been growing, but have focused primarily on facilitating integration and particularly in urban areas, where natural social networks (*i.e.* linguistic and cultural links) are less present. Over time, these HTAs have formalised and organised themselves. In the rural areas, migrant associations are usually organised informally, based on cultural and linguistic ties. Even in cases where immigrants have little in common with local workers, they often rely on informal networks of previous workers from their hometown and do not move beyond their zone of comfort. However, once immigrant groups rise in relative numbers, a reverse arrangement may take place, with immigrants holding economic power.

In addition to social and cultural ties between immigrants and native workers, health, education and accommodation are all important social aspects of successful immigrant integration. The lack of private and public sector initiatives for integration means immigrants have to find a way to integrate themselves into society on their own, including coping with the lack of social security measures. Beyond arguments of equity (workers should be compensated for injuries or disease they incur while working), a healthy, well-rested and educated worker is a productive and happy one. Supplying education also spurs better understanding of other cultures and norms, notably through linguistic training. Many immigrants travel in families. Without appropriate education services, children of immigrants are exposed to working, and/or parents are forced to spend time watching them instead of working.

Civic integration

A third important component for the integration of immigrants in developing countries is civic integration. As South-South immigration is fluid and temporary, economic and socio-cultural integration may be more important determinants for social cohesion. Nevertheless, civic integration matters, particularly if economic and socio-cultural integration are less-than-perfect. Complete integration requires immigrants to be able to be represented, to assemble and to be free in speech (at least as much as local-born citizens).

In practice, citizenship rights are rarely allocated to immigrants in the South, and naturalisation is rare. Even when immigrants have children, *ius sanguinis*⁶ citizenship rights are usually followed, often making children of immigrants stateless (Sadik, 2009). A case can be made that immigrants however desire civic rights. Sadik (2009) demonstrates that immigrants in Southeast Asia have been forging fake documentation for years in order to gain “documentary citizenship”, thus giving access to citizenship rights.

In the end, building a strong social contract through civic rights between citizens, immigrants and the state will determine social cohesion. Two reasons make this more difficult in South-South migration contexts. The first is the lack of capacity. The state struggles to have information on its own citizenship, let alone immigrants. The second is linked to the concept of local integration. Because states in the South are often far from being integrated themselves and immigrants tend to settle in regions with cultural traits similar to their own, the social contract often lies elsewhere and often at a lower level than national. The social contract may lie within the region of influence of an ethnic group, within a particularly isolated geographic part of the country, in a region where the main language is not the national one or in an area led by traditional leaders, tolerated by the central government.

3. The lack of integration in the South directly affects the living conditions of immigrants

Successful immigration is not the same as successful integration. Immigrants in the South may find it easier to immigrate, due to lower costs and less stringent formalities, but this does not mean that their acculturation into new society is always easy. Immigrants often find resentment and opposition when they arrive, forcing them to seek or create enclaves of poverty-stricken ghettos, where thousands of other workers live and speak their language, practice their faith and eat the

⁶ *Jus sanguinis* is the attribution of citizenship through the parental nationality, while *jus soli* is through location of birth.

same food. Migrants will always integrate into their host country. The question is whether they will integrate into the greater norms and culture of society or rather into their own social circles, mindless of the society they live in. Instead, they tend to create networks for their own people to find jobs and to assist in bringing more migrants.

The notion of immigrants establishing their culture and lifestyle within enclaves can be seen as a form of local citizenship, with local integration (Sadik, 2009). But, integration in this sense has put immigrants in vulnerable situations to attacks and to further marginalisation in society. Recent examples from as diverse a set of countries as Côte d'Ivoire, Malaysia, Mexico, Morocco and South Africa have shown that non-integration with the mainstream of society has led to scapegoating and violence against immigrants. Similar examples in the South are becoming prevalent, but not always in the spirit of social cohesion. In fact, almost every expulsion episode from Sub-Saharan African countries between 1960 and 2000 has been targeted towards other Sub-Saharan Africans (Adida, 2011).

In South Africa, angry workers turned their anger towards immigrants blaming them for the economic and social woes of the country in 2008. In September 2009, in a move to restrict immigration to their country, Singapore passed legislation making it more difficult to legally enter and work in the country, after years of taking in approximately 100 000 workers per year, mostly from Indonesia. About 25% of the population living in Singapore today does not have the right to permanent residency. In Morocco and Mexico, the government was responsible for hazing makeshift neighbourhoods of immigrants and sending them back home in late 2010.

While immigrants may have the greatest incentive and motivation to economically integrate, they face challenges by those already in place. If locals deliberately discriminate against immigrants, the integration process is much more difficult. Immigrants are a potentially vulnerable group for discrimination. One of the reasons for an attack on immigrants worldwide is the general belief that immigrants, particularly low-skilled immigrants, come to take jobs away and put pressure on the salary and bargaining power of workers. Part of this argument is true, as most immigrants have economic motives. But the continued abundant supply of very low-cost workers worldwide has slowed down the growth rate of total employee compensation (UNCTAD, 2010). The surplus low-skilled-labour in the world has made it difficult for these workers to bargain for better wages.

In times of crisis, immigrants also become the scapegoats for all that ails. This was evident during the worse times of the recent crises (financial, food), primarily in the North, but also in the South. For instance in 2008 the governments of the Dominican Republic and Malaysia used the

negative image of the financial crisis as an opportunity to send home thousands of immigrants in irregular situations. Immigrants were blamed for a diversity of problems and many were sent home. This reflected a similar reaction by several countries during the 1997-1998 Asian financial crisis (Koser, 2009).

There are reasons to believe that in the South, however, discrimination is lower. For one, when cultural and social distances are shorter, there is less anxiety by the locals. It is more difficult to start a fight with someone when they speak your language, follow the same faith and have the same habits⁷. A second reason is that, as most work is done within the informal sector, drastic structural changes are not part of the equation. Supply and demand in the labour market closely follows market-based stimuli, as entry and exit costs are close to zero. This also means that foreign-born and local-born populations are subject to similar economic shocks. And because borders are porous, immigrants can return home easier and without the anxiety that they may not be able to return.

In cases where immigrants arrive in fast-growing and politically-stable countries like Costa Rica or Ghana, the skill distribution of immigrants may also not be the same as the locals. Empirical evidence points to complementarity between locals and immigrants in Costa Rica. Gindling (2010), for instance, finds no evidence of discrimination on the labour market against Nicaraguans. Amin (2010) finds no evidence of discrimination in West African labour markets against immigrants either.

But immigrants may be discriminated against in other ways. For instance, Amin (2010) suggests that immigrants are at a disadvantage in getting a job in an established business, subject to higher crime and difficulty in starting a large size business. Discrimination may go beyond economic aspects. Immigrants may be barred, for instance, from freely practicing their faith, as is the case for Christians, mainly Filipinos, in Saudi Arabia.

Stranded migrants in transit countries like Mexico, Libya, Morocco or Turkey, are particularly vulnerable to the violation of human rights. Because of their irregular status, they are subject to a wide range of abuses and human rights violations committed not only by smugglers and traffickers, but also by border guards, immigration and police officers, as well as members of local society. Main violations include extortion and exploitation, arbitrary detention in inhumane conditions, lack of due process, deprivation of access to basic services, as well as physical abuses and harassment. Unaccompanied children and women are the primary victims. In this respect, the lack of access to

⁷ It is important to note that Adida (2011) provides a counter argument. Her claim is that cultural similarity between immigrants and hosts may harm relations between the two groups when immigrant leaders act to preserve their identity and host members fear they will blend in and gain relative power. She cites the Hausa in Accra (non-integration) and Niamey (integration) as a comparative example.

social networks and legal aid services increase risks, like being forced into commercial sex, contracting sexually transmitted infections, and being subject to unwanted pregnancies. Stranded migrants are also victims of xenophobia as well as racial and ethnic discrimination.

4. Problems of integration also have disruptive effects on the society

Immigration and social cohesion are naturally linked. Local integration and the forming of enclaves can have a profound impact on the social fabric of the country. Failure to integrate immigrants can lead to rises in inequality, lower productivity and even crime.

Immigrants, in their marginalised spaces in society, produce less and avoid circulating between home and the destination country out of fear of not returning and being caught. Ghettos are thus reinforced, and tend to become increasingly exclusive as a result of protective measures against xenophobic attacks. Divisions between immigrants and locals therefore grow. As ghettos develop, they deal a strong blow to the environment and eventually become vectors of extreme poverty. In addition, because these enclaves form the rock bed of very low forms of sanitation, they act as vectors for powerful disease, such as HIV/AIDS and resistant influenza pandemics. Human capital is also affected because schools and clinics are not available.

Pockets of extreme poverty not only breed disease and circular poverty traps but also growing negative sentiments against native workers and government. The social contract erodes while organised crime and popular forms of justice develop. As the infringement of local laws and customs by immigrants rises, costs also increase for the receiving country in providing more administrative services (*i.e.* police) to maintain order. In many cases, tension escalates to violence, as recently witnessed in Gabon, Mexico, Morocco and South Africa.

Ethnic and racial tensions can in some cases generate civil unrest and long-term political instability, like it has been the case in Côte d'Ivoire. Failure to integrate immigrants can have an element of wider contagion: it can induce immigrants to go back (or forced back) to their countries of origin, thus spreading conflict. In this respect, migration movements were partially to blame for the expansion and length of the conflict in Central and Eastern Africa in the late-90s; conflict in Rwanda quickly engulfed Angola, Burundi, the Democratic Republic of the Congo and Uganda into their own conflicts. Recently, pressure to deport Zimbabweans back to their country from South Africa has been inciting arguments that it would lead to conflict in the origin country, as many immigrants would certainly face persecution upon their return. Fearon and Laitin (2010) show that, in one third

of the ethnic civil wars since 1945, conflict erupted between local “sons of the soils” and recent internal migrants from the dominant ethnic group. Moreover, more than half (53%) of all wars since 1945, according to them, were ethnic in nature.

III – How to enhance migration-related social cohesion?

Most developing countries have, so far, conducted benign-neglect integration policies. Two main reasons explain this situation: the lack of financial and administrative capacity (low and middle-income countries, in particular, consider they cannot spend money on immigrants); the lack of political will (public authorities do not perceive immigrant integration as a priority in the political agenda). But neglecting integration has costs too, not only for immigrants in their everyday lives, but also, as seen previously, for the whole society. In fact, the economic, social and civic integration of immigrants constitutes a factor of social cohesion.

After providing evidence on the necessity of integration policies, this section develops a three-pronged approach based on the three key components of social cohesion: social inclusion, social capital and social mobility.

1. National integration policies are necessary for social cohesion

As many countries were not conventional immigration countries in the past, legislation is often outdated and does not take into account integration. Low capacity to control migration may also lead to a low priority for migration reform. Governments may be discouraged by institutional weakness and the fact that the monitoring process is difficult. This was also the case in Europe where countries like Greece, Italy and Spain were confronted with outdated migration legislation after becoming immigration countries in the 1990s.

Moreover, most countries of immigration, and not only in the North, have not signed the *International Convention on the Protection of All Migrant Workers and Members of their Families* yet (Table 8).⁸ Among the top 20 immigration countries in the South (see Table 4), only four actually ratified it: Argentina, Ghana, Nigeria and Turkey. Even the ratification of the Convention is not a

⁸ The U.N. *International Convention on the Protection of All Migrant Workers and Members of their Families* was originally drafted in 1990, but did not enter into force until 2003, with the ratifications of El Salvador and Guatemala. It has, so far, 44 ratifications (as of January 2011), none of them by Northern industrialised countries.

guarantee that it is fully applied. Indeed, many countries signed the Convention because they were more concerned by the lack of their populations abroad than by the protection of immigrants in their soil.

Table 8. Major immigration countries of the South and the International Convention on the Rights of Migrant Workers and their Families

<i>Country</i>	<i>Signed/ratified convention</i>	<i>Country</i>	<i>Signed/ratified convention</i>
Argentina	2007 (ratified)	Malawi	No
Bahrain	No	Malaysia	No
Brunei	No	Mexico	1999 (ratified)
Botswana	No	Morocco	1993 (ratified)
Chad	No	Namibia	No
Comoros	2000 (signed only)	Nepal	No
Costa Rica	No	Nigeria	2009 (ratified)
Côte d'Ivoire	No	Pakistan	No
Djibouti	No	Rwanda	2008 (ratified)
Gabon	2004 (signed only)	Saudi Arabia	No
Gambia, The	No	Singapore	No
Ghana	2000 (ratified)	South Africa	No
Hong Kong	No	Syria	No
India	No	Tanzania	No
Iran	No	Thailand	No
Jordan	No	Turkey	2004 (ratified)
Kenya	No	UAE	No
Kuwait	No	Venezuela	No
Lebanon	No	West Bank and Gaza	No
Libya	2004 (ratified)	Zambia	No
Macao	No		

Source: available at: <http://www2.ohchr.org/english/law/cmw.htm>

However, immigrant integration policies have begun to grab the attention of the highest policy-makers and authorities. In November 2010, the UN Special Rapporteur on Racism stated that migrants form the group subject to “the most insidious contemporary forms of racial discrimination”, and warned against the “deeply marked tendencies to characterise migration as a problem and a threat to social cohesion”. In South Africa, for instance, immigration from the North has alerted the upper echelons of government policy-making, due to a rise in xenophobia and violence against Zimbabweans. In response, the Institute for Democracy in Africa (IDASA) launched a “project on migration and social cohesion in South Africa” to help propose and implement programmes and policies to better integrate immigrants into South African society (see Box 1).

Box 1. Migration and Social Cohesion in South Africa

A project linking migration and social cohesion was implemented by IDASA, an independent public interest organisation in August 2008 just after ‘the dark days of May’ (when South African citizens attacked foreign nationals in communities across the country). The series of riots started in a township of Johannesburg and then spread to Gauteng, Western Cape, Cape Town, Durban and other provinces. Migrants from Mozambique, Malawi, Somalia and Zimbabwe were targeted, 62 had been killed, several hundred injured, thousands displaced and many of their properties were looted and destroyed. This wave of violence happened in a context of growing migration flows (especially from Zimbabwe) and a deterioration of socioeconomic conditions in deprived areas.

The government immediately condemned these xenophobic attacks and deployed police forces to restore order and arrest suspects. It also created temporary camps and implemented reintegration plans. After this wave of violence against foreigners, social cohesion and integration policies became a matter of concern and a subject of study. In this respect, the Migration and Social Cohesion Project aims at fighting against the perception of migration as a threat to social cohesion, and to show that migrants can be positively incorporated into society. The two main assumptions are that integration enhances migrants’ contribution to the economic, social, cultural and political development of the host society, and that diversity is an opportunity and a source of enrichment.

To foster the participation of migrants into South African society, the Project promotes research and publication. After gathering policy-relevant information, the team organises workshops for the authorities, so that they can implement proactive programmes and change legal framework. The Project also encourages collaborative engagement and mutually-reinforcing relationships between migrants and locals. It finally improves public awareness of the role, status and contribution of immigrants.

The first recommendation based on commissioned studies is to work at all policy levels beginning at the local level, where the process of integration occurs primarily. The two city projects that have been implemented in Cape Town and Johannesburg have followed this advice, with the establishment of a loan and savings scheme in the first town and a Migrants Help Desk in the other (these initiatives encourage interactions between refugees and citizens and ease integration). A second way to enhance social cohesion is through partnerships between the government and other stakeholders, and to involve at each level a large range of actors. The IDASA project also presents legislation as a preferred tool to guarantee equality, non-discrimination and to fight against exploitation and abuse of migrants (in particular women, children and undocumented migrants).

An immigrant integration policy also needs to consider the native working population: first, because they may feel like the ones being marginalised and paying the price of immigration; second, because many stereotypes linked to immigration are not true, and the authorities have an educational role to downplay certain myths. Gindling (2010) shows, for instance, that low-skilled Nicaraguan immigrants in Costa Rica do not take away jobs from Costa Ricans, nor do they lower their salary. The jobs they come to take are in fact complementary to the ones done by Costa Ricans.

2. From integration to social cohesion: a three-pronged approach

In the North, the debate on integration has long revolved around the concepts of multiculturalism and assimilation – looking beyond aspects of economic motivation for migrating. According to the Migrant Policy Integration Index (MIPEX), a project that evaluates and compares what governments are doing to promote the integration of immigrants in EU Member States and several non-EU countries, integration rests on the concept of equal opportunities for all, in both socio-economic and civic terms. Based on this simple definition, MIPEX evaluates integration on the following six quantifiable notions:

- Labour market access
- Family reunion
- Long-term residence
- Political participation
- Access to nationality
- Anti-discrimination


MIPEX also monitors a seventh element, unrelated to policy: public perception on immigration and immigrants, indicating the importance on the role not only of immigrants and governmental policies, but also local workers. However, integration policies in the South require a different approach than in the North, and the elements of the MIPEX and the facts stated on South-South immigrant integration need to be re-visited. Considering the stretched budgetary limits of many countries in the South, integration policies should follow a strategy that takes into account the particularities that make up developing economies.

In particular, policies need to internalise the fact that migration flows are highly informal, react quickly to economic fluctuations and involve a demographic with low human capital. In essence, they need to facilitate regular migration routes, formalise immigrant statuses and foster integration by extending the same freedoms and services provided to the locally born. This implies granting elements of decent living such as access to education, health services and housing. Furthermore, policies must be decentralised enough to react adequately to the intricacies of local regions. This means that at the regional level, cooperation needs to be strengthened to increase the benefits of South-South migration and reduce its social costs. As integration in many developing countries is not national, regional policies can help better handle and absorb an influx of immigrants, tailored to local economic tendencies and culture. A more functional liberalisation of regional flows would foster labour mobility and reduce the number of irregular migrants.

Against this background, integration policies should follow a strategy clearly oriented towards social cohesion and aimed at:

- Fighting social exclusion;
- Building social capital;
- Promoting social mobility.

Figure 3. **Integration and social cohesion: a three-pronged approach**



Fighting social exclusion

The first element of a coherent policy on immigrant integration is on the fight against the social exclusion of immigrants. The social exclusion of immigrants in their host society includes the notion of isolated individuals and groups, not participating in society, in large part because they lack access to the institutions of civil society, and the basic educational, health and financial levels necessary to access them. The policy recommendations below, based on the need for the formulation of a rights-focused approach, contain three components.

- **Discrimination.** Host countries must play their part in protecting the human rights of immigrants and fighting against abuses. Immigrants should be free of discrimination on the

labour market and have their rights protected. There should be no reason for an immigrant with certain characteristics to be paid less than a native with similar characteristics for the same job. In this respect, host countries should facilitate regular immigration and formalise and define various immigrant statuses. They also need to ensure that immigrants, particularly those who are stuck in bad and/or informal jobs, are not further pushed away into unsafe and hazardous jobs. Finally, because discrimination legislation is difficult to enforce, governments of all levels as well as local leaders need to fight against negative public perceptions.

- Fighting against the establishment and development of immigrant enclaves. This can be achieved first by extending the benefits of social security not only to immigrants but generally to informal workers. The integration of immigrants should be more about the challenge of lowering the incentives for forming enclaves rather than pushing for assimilation. Achieving social cohesion while integrating immigrants into society means creating an environment for immigrants to share and participate in the social, economic and political process of the country. The need for short-term services, such as housing and health services, is the primary requirement South-South migrants, to raise their living and working standards, regardless of temporary and permanent immigration. Moreover, for those that work for extended periods or seasonally, social security portability should be considered.
- Granting the freedom to organise and practice various components of one's culture. While integration should feature an element of learning and accepting the host country's culture, immigrants should also be granted the freedom to organise associations, practice their faith or follow particular eating habits, or other particularities uncommon in the host country's social norms. Failure to do so increases immigrant anxiety and may incite a backlash against those seeking to limit these practices. Public authorities should rely on hometown associations, which can complement policies and play a significant role in facilitating the freedom to express one's culture.

Building social capital

Building social capital implies generating social relations that can have productive benefits. In the context of this chapter we mean fostering the positive bonding taking place between (various groups of) immigrants and the local population and bridging the potential gaps that can arise when diverse sets of norms bisect. The goodwill this provokes can have positive effects for productivity and social cohesion. *Three* policy elements should be targeted in building the social capital of immigrants

and their interactions with the local population: education and training, cultural freedom, support of organisations.

- There are three reasons to target education and training policies to facilitate building social capital between immigrants and the local population. The first is that immigrants often travel by family, including spouse, children and sometimes extended family members. Child guardians are often over-burdened between work, providing food and watching over children that one of three scenarios play-out: children either work with their parents, are sold, trafficked or forced into child labour, or spend the day toiling unproductively in the ghettos. By extending, subsidising and making mandatory to send immigrant children to school, host countries avoid such situations. But they also increase potential human capital as children learn elements of local culture and language at school and increase ties with local children. A second reason to target education and training of immigrants is that specific training of skills and languages increases the facilitation of interaction between immigrants and locals. Finally, host countries should create a degree-equivalency programme with immigrant countries – particularly useful for higher skilled immigrants. This enhances the fluidity of job-matching for immigrants.
- A second important element towards promoting social capital is to allow for freedom to practice and share elements of one's culture. This implies a two-way interaction, where immigrants practice and perhaps share cultural traits with locals, but also learn and take some in from locals. This should extend to religion, food, festivals and other rituals linked to cultures and social norms. Of course education and training, as stated above, is a good vector of cultural learning and understanding.
- A final component of social capital building in an immigration society is the support of hometown, cultural and social associations. First, they help vehiculate messages quicker to many people since one, or a few people, represent these situations and act as their voice. Messages need to come across quickly, particularly when tensions spiral out of control. Second, they provide leadership for underrepresented group of society. For the many immigrants who do not speak or read the local language, it brings an aspect of representation and communication, for information gathering or even for venting. Cultural organisations also become instruments of expression, helping share cultural traits to society, an important point as suggested above.

Promoting social mobility

Social mobility pertains to the degree to which immigrant workers or groups of immigrants are able to increase their position in the host country's social hierarchy. Immigrants are often deliberately pushed to the bottom of their host country's class system, often because of their low levels of material wealth and (perceived) human capital. Yet their ascension in society would permit a better and more efficient incentive mechanism and increase productivity, thus enhancing social cohesion. Immigrant social mobility highly depends, however, on whether immigrants are low or high-skilled, whether they project to stay permanent or short-term, and whether they are working in a rural or urban region. Four policy interventions can help promote the social mobility of immigrants in developing countries:

- As labour markets are highly imperfect in the South, policies should enhance the benefits derived from working and the mobility between the formal and informal sectors. This includes helping immigrants organise themselves in their informal enterprises. Promoting entrepreneurship can be attained through the provision of loans, organisation of marketplaces and by targeting sub-groups which suffer higher discrimination (low-skilled, women). Social security measures should be extended to informal workers, to at least include housing, health and pension portability.
- Access to education and vocational skills-training can also help promote social mobility. Training not only leads to better jobs but also safer, more organised and productive ones. Education should also be extended to immigrant children, as already argued, as it will accelerate intergenerational social mobility. Finally, policies aimed at promoting brain circulation, such as the fostering of student mobility through regional grant programmes can contribute to a better allocation of human capital.
- Job matching in and out of the immigration country, can lead to a better allocation of skills and jobs. It also reduces problems of labour shortages in seasonally high labour demand periods, and the prevalence of unfair job allocation – by adding transparency to the allocation process. The porous borders and limited capacity to control flows in the South means that host countries have less control over who enters the country in comparison to countries in the North. As such, job-matching helps host countries steer immigrant labour flows to the most in-demand sectors and/or provide a flexible hiring mechanism so that the economy can easily absorb workers and quickly change according to the available supply of workers and structure of the economy. By creating job-matching centres outside of the

country, host countries can already provide the information directly to immigrants before emigration decisions are made, further reducing labour market frictions.

- A final component of social mobility targets the equality of opportunity of immigrants. As mentioned above, the creation of job matching centres enhances some of the transparency in the recruitment process. But, host countries need to also ensure that immigrants, particularly those who are stuck in bad, informal jobs, have equal opportunity to jobs, by fighting discrimination on the labour market or for access to services. Authorities also have responsibility in fighting against negative public perceptions of immigrants and ensuring the protection of their human rights, particularly those which are part of international conventions.

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