

8<sup>TH</sup> HIGH-LEVEL MEETING  
OF THE GOVERNING BOARD  
Development Centre, 24-25 October 2022

# THE FUTURE OF THE OECD DEVELOPMENT CENTRE

High-Level Report  
of the Group of Eminent  
Personalities



**Strong  
Shared  
Green**

Development We Can Do Together

The opinions expressed and arguments employed herein are those of the members of the Group of Eminent Personalities, and do not necessarily reflect the views of the OECD, its Development Centre, or their member countries.

## KEY MESSAGES AND RECOMMENDATIONS

This is a period of change and uncertainty, compounded by increasing complexity. These changes relate to economic, demographic, social, technological and environmental phenomena, which are interconnected and affect the world as a whole. In many cases, developing countries will be adversely affected due to lack of resources and institutional capacity to take advantage of opportunities and protect themselves against risks.

The global economic landscape is changing with the emergence of new growth engines, new development models, and a greater diversity of public and private actors in the development arena. It follows that, for some time now, it has not been possible to understand development co-operation only in terms of flows of money from the Global North to the Global South or from rich countries to poor. Rather, it needs to be understood in a framework in which developing countries are part of an interconnected world and are part of the global solutions to shared challenges.

The international system is fracturing and frustration with multilateralism is growing in both developed and developing countries. Doubts about the effectiveness of the multilateral system have been magnified considerably by the inadequate global response to the coronavirus disease 2019 (COVID-19) pandemic and by high-income countries not contributing as pledged to climate finance for adaptation and mitigation. At the same time, developing countries are increasingly frustrated by their lack of voice in global institutions, which have not adapted to changes in the global centres of political and economic power of recent decades. Amid this fractured and uncertain landscape, exacerbated by divisions over the war in Ukraine and by its spill-over impacts, it will be crucial to enhance the participation of countries across income levels in policy dialogue with the aim of building and expanding mutual understanding and common ground.

Against this backdrop, the Group of Eminent Personalities (GEP) (Annex 2) acknowledges that the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) Development Centre has managed to remain outside the political divides which are adversely affecting the multilateral system, and that it therefore has a unique role to play in the current complex development landscape. The GEP also acknowledges the Development Centre's contribution – both within the OECD and internationally – to broadening and enriching the traditional narrative on development by introducing innovative concepts, demonstrating the value of policy dialogue and mutual learning, and emphasising the importance of evidence and policy co-creation to improve the well-being of people.

With these considerations in mind, the GEP proposes the following recommendations based on five distinct attributes of the Development Centre:

- 1. The intellectual pathfinder and trusted advisor:** The Development Centre should safeguard its intellectual independence, provide evidence and analysis, and offer targeted policy advice.
- 2. The convener:** The Development Centre should further enhance its convening power for policy dialogue across countries and relevant stakeholders.
- 3. The honest broker:** The Development Centre should raise awareness of its neutral role and of how the engagement of its members on an equal footing adds value to multilateral efforts and contributes to their success.
- 4. The inclusive and strategic partner:** The Development Centre should strategically consolidate and expand its membership.
- 5. The bridge builder:** The OECD should leverage the Development Centre's expertise on development matters, as well as engage with non-OECD member countries on the Centre's Governing Board and with its regional partners, as a key asset for the OECD's efforts to build mutual understanding and enhance its global reach.

To be fit for purpose, the Development Centre must keep building on its core strengths, define and make its value proposition known in the international arena and inside the OECD, and consolidate its membership and partnerships. This will ensure that the Development Centre's work is relevant and impactful, and, above all, is valued by its members and partners alike.

## 1. THE GLOBAL DEVELOPMENT LANDSCAPE

**This is a period of change and uncertainty, compounded by increasing complexity. This uncertainty relates to economic, demographic, social, technological and environmental phenomena affecting the world as a whole.** However, the impacts of these phenomena will differ significantly for people and places according to the status quo ante. In many cases, developing countries will be adversely affected due to a lack of resources and institutional capacity to take advantage of opportunities (such as the digital transformation or, in Africa’s case, its young population) and protect themselves against risks (such as climate change, pandemics, or food and energy shortages). A number of these phenomena, such as the climate crisis, social unrest, gender inequality, the COVID-19 pandemic, and the global consequences of the war in Ukraine, are extremely complex and interconnected.

**The global economic landscape is changing with the emergence of new growth engines, new development models, and a greater diversity of public and private actors in the development arena.** The “shifting wealth” phenomenon identified by the Development Centre over a decade ago is changing the global economic landscape, but this change has not been fully appreciated by many policy- and decision-makers in advanced economies. Some countries in the Global South, notably the People’s Republic of China (hereafter: China), have made rapid gains in economic power and geopolitical influence, and their emergence has created opportunities for other developing countries, as well as alternative development models for those who opt to follow them. These actors have become significant trade, investment, and development finance partners, increasing the diversity of international co-operation and sometimes supplanting traditional partners. South-South linkages and co-operation continue to grow in scale – China’s Belt and Road Initiative is a high-profile example of that.

**It follows that, for some time now, it has not been possible to understand development co-operation only in terms of flows of money from the Global North to the Global South or from rich countries to poor.** Rather, it needs to be understood in a framework in which developing countries are part of an interconnected world and are part of the global solutions to shared challenges. This change is reflected in the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development and its 17 Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs), and in the principles of development effectiveness.

**These new approaches – both in development co-operation and (more fundamentally) in development models – ask difficult questions of traditional development donors and new providers alike.** However, the benefits of principles such as “local ownership”, while remaining valid, are being overcome by global conditions that are undermining development progress. There is a need – more than ever – in this new global context to enhance global co-operation to counter transnational threats to development progress.

**Thus, the narratives around and the modalities of development are evolving.** For too long, “development” has been considered a “poor country” issue, to be addressed (or even “solved”) through development assistance. This narrative conflates the “whole” of development (the policies, resources and actors needed to achieve positive change for the people, irrespective of a country’s income level) with a “part” of it (the transfer of financial resources and expertise from rich to poor countries).

**The 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development and the SDGs try to address this bias, stressing that sustainable development is a concern for all countries that requires a broad set of policies, partnerships and means of implementation.** Changes in the needs of developing countries require changes to the rationale and composition of development co-operation and international partnerships. The impediments to accessing support faced by new middle-income countries, which continue to deal with the major structural challenges associated with low-income countries, are a case in point.

**Moreover, countries in the Global South are not the only new actors in development co-operation.**

The emergence of what is termed “triangular co-operation” reflects the growing role of civil society organisations, the private sector, philanthropic organisations, and co-operation between traditional and South-South providers and others in the development space. Development in today’s world is itself a complex process which differs from place to place and involves a broad array of actors. It cannot be measured by a narrow focus on gross domestic product. The Development Centre’s work on development in transition has helped advance this debate. Although other broader indicators are available – for example, the Human Development Index – it is possible that development practitioners are still concentrating too little on some issues of critical importance to developing countries, such as resilience to the impacts of transnational threats and threats to peace and security. Social norms and institutions, both formal and informal, also greatly matter in determining development outcomes, such as those related to gender equality and women’s empowerment.

**Currently geopolitics are dynamic and polarised.** The unipolar world that emerged in the 1990s, led by the United States and bound together by a commitment to economic liberalisation and liberal democracy, no longer holds. Rather, blocs are forming (typically, but not exclusively, along regional lines), often with the goal of increasing resilience. It should be noted that there remain significant inequalities between regions in this emerging global order, as a comparison between North and South America demonstrates. While differences in economic, political, and social models exist between these groups, they should not prevent co-operation in certain areas of common interest, even without shared values. The war in Ukraine sheds light on the fractures in the international community as the subsequent voting in the General Assembly of the United Nations demonstrated. This will have implications for the development arena.

**Economic globalisation has advanced rapidly, contributing to lifting millions out of poverty, but also creating new challenges.** National policies and multilateral processes have been slow to adapt and anticipate or mitigate the implications of a hyper-globalised world, especially for marginalised and vulnerable populations. While attempts have been made to establish more inclusive processes to govern globalisation and address its development dimensions – such as the World Trade Organization’s Doha Round; the Group of Twenty’s (G20’s) response to the global financial crisis; the need to reform the international financial institutions (IFIs); the reform of international taxation; climate negotiations; and, more recently, the establishment of global compacts on migration and refugees, and the negotiations for a new global accord on pandemic prevention, preparedness and response – the results have not been fully satisfactory. Citizens’ growing discontent, the emergence of populism, and the lack of trust in expertise and in institutions across the developed and developing world can have significant implications for efforts to advance sustainable development.

**Frustration with multilateralism is growing in both developed and developing countries.** Doubts about the effectiveness of the multilateral system have been magnified considerably by the inadequate global response to the COVID-19 pandemic and by high-income countries not contributing as pledged to climate finance for adaptation and mitigation. At the same time, developing countries are increasingly frustrated by their lack of voice in global institutions, which have not adapted to changes in the global centres of political and economic power of recent decades. The notion of “common but differentiated responsibility” is falling off the international agenda, even though it is crucial to ensuring that developing countries have the capacity and the willingness to subscribe to multilateral initiatives. This is reflected, for instance, in the failure to provide significant new and additional resources to counter climate change.

**Of particular concern is that ownership of the SDGs appears to have diminished in certain developing countries, notably within Africa.** This reflects frustration over issues such as climate justice, access to technology and finance, and responsibility for the changes in production and consumption behaviours that must accompany a just transition to low-carbon development models.

In a nutshell, the frustration reflects the uncertainty about the future of development and opportunities to achieve the SDGs. Resentment about “elite multilateralism” led by the G20 and the Group of Seven (G7) is becoming more common, while the membership of the United Nations has become ever more polarised.

**The divide between advanced and developing countries is widening once again, as are divides within advanced countries.** The economic convergence which had been occurring was affected by the COVID-19 pandemic. In the vast majority of cases, developing countries will recover more slowly from the pandemic than advanced economies, as they have less fiscal space and a more difficult debt burden to manage. Foreign direct investment, remittances and official development assistance have either been severely reduced or have not sufficiently increased. The setbacks to economic and social progress inflicted by the pandemic in developing countries are likely to be a source of frustration to their populations, risking an intensification of the surge in protests seen prior to the crisis. This divergence is driven by asymmetries and disparities across a number of dimensions, including vaccines, technology, productivity, incomes and wealth. Inequitable access to vaccines and other tools required to fight the pandemic has the potential to disrupt the global recovery as a whole. The war in Ukraine has added food and energy insecurity to the list of vulnerabilities that will affect poorer countries the most. One study<sup>1</sup> suggests that some 40 million people will fall into extreme poverty as a result of the war.

**Developing countries have limited power and resources to respond.** While advanced economies have been able to implement Keynesian stimulus packages and experiment with heterodox policies in response to the COVID-19 pandemic, many developing countries have no choice but to follow orthodox policy prescriptions that tend to hurt the poor most of all. While developing countries need to implement fiscal stimulus policies in order to recover, that is extremely difficult when advanced economies are curtailing their own stimulus policies, underlining the need for greater international co-ordination of financing. Developing countries are now more vulnerable to rising interest rates in advanced economies – and to the knock-on effects for monetary conditions globally – than they were at the time of the “taper tantrum” in 2013, when the United States Federal Reserve unwound quantitative easing in the wake of the 2008-09 global financial crisis; at that time, developing countries had a cushion. Today, amid the recovery from the greatest economic crisis in a century, no such cushion exists.

**Global policy priorities are perceived differently in the Global North and in the Global South.** Given the divergence caused by the pandemic between high-income countries on the one hand and low- and middle-income countries on the other, and the stark disparities in their prospects for the period ahead, it is little surprise that the short-term priorities for those groupings are very different. This is particularly visible on environmental issues. Although developing countries are already suffering significant effects from climate change and biodiversity loss, there is no talk of green recovery packages or green new deals in those countries because they lack the financing on which such approaches rely.

**Global policy support needs to be mindful of developing country realities.** International support across several dimensions is key to promoting inclusive and sustainable recovery in developing countries. However, the policy prescriptions that accompany this support must reflect the realities and capacities of developing countries, particularly of the least developed countries (LDCs). Recovery policies imposed or endorsed by IFIs without the strong buy-in of the countries concerned are likely to take years to implement because they do not reflect the institutional capacity of developing countries or adequately address the political economy of reforms. Helping developing countries to accelerate their recovery requires policy proposals that are more feasible and that support good governance.

**Many people are concentrating on the “what”; far fewer focus on the “how”.** The development landscape is populated by a large number of organisations working on the many complex challenges

1. Mitchell, I., S. Hughes and S. Huckstep (18 March 2022), “Price Spike Caused by Ukraine War Will Push Over 40 Million into Poverty: How Should We Respond?”, Center for Global Development blog, <https://www.cgdev.org/blog/price-spike-caused-ukraine-war-will-push-over-40-million-poverty-how-should-we-respond>.

that developing countries face. Their prescriptions and proposals typically focus on “what” developing countries should do to respond. However, there is a need to focus more on the “how”: greater emphasis is needed on promoting dialogue as a means of building trust and gaining acceptance for reforms, both politically and at the individual level. Listening, learning and compromise are underexploited mechanisms for fostering co-operation and consensus both nationally and internationally.

**Amid this fractured and uncertain landscape, it is important for policy makers and development practitioners in particular to build on areas where consensus exists, including the SDGs (even if this is weakening) and the principles of development effectiveness.** At the same time, the capacity to innovate will be essential. In order to advance a more inclusive and effective multilateral system which can support national development strategies and reforms, it will be crucial to enhance the participation of countries across income levels in policy dialogue with the aim of building and expanding mutual understanding and common ground, and experimenting with new forms of co-operation.

## 2. THE ROLE OF THE DEVELOPMENT CENTRE IN THE CURRENT DEVELOPMENT CONTEXT: DEVISING SOLUTIONS TO SHARED CHALLENGES

The GEP acknowledges that the OECD Development Centre has managed to stand aside from the political divides which are adversely affecting the multilateral system, and that it therefore has a unique role to play in the current complex development landscape. The GEP also acknowledges the Development Centre’s contribution – both within the OECD and internationally – to broadening and enriching the traditional narrative on development (which has often equated “development” with “development co-operation” and “aid”) by introducing innovative concepts, demonstrating the value of policy dialogue and mutual learning, and emphasising the importance of evidence and policy co-creation to improve the well-being of people. With these considerations in mind, the GEP proposes the following recommendations based on five distinct attributes of the Development Centre which were identified through a series of collective deliberations via four virtual meetings and by rounds of written consultations (Annex 3).

## 3. THE GEP RECOMMENDATIONS

### 3.1. The intellectual pathfinder and trusted advisor: The Development Centre should safeguard its intellectual independence, provide evidence and analysis, and offer targeted policy advice.

The Development Centre’s intellectual independence – as established in its mandate<sup>2</sup> – allows it to be a place for constructive criticism of the prevailing economic and social order. The Centre should maintain its engagement in novel and cutting-edge analysis based on rigorous qualitative and quantitative evidence, while continuing to leverage sectoral expertise on specific issues from other parts of the OECD, when relevant. The Development Centre should also continue to establish partnerships with relevant bodies in order to develop vitally important analysis on the shared and multidimensional challenges at regional, national, and sub-national levels; for instance, by building indicators for measuring, reporting and monitoring progress on key issues. At the same time, it should amplify its efforts to build local ownership and contextualise its analysis (such as through evidence co-creation), and to accompany its members – OECD and non-OECD member countries alike – towards the effective and sustained implementation of its evidence-based policy recommendations in light of their respective institutional capacities.

### **3.2. The convener: The Development Centre should further enhance its convening power for policy dialogue across countries and relevant stakeholders.**

The Development Centre convenes a diverse and representative group of countries of all income groups to discuss shared challenges and interests and capture the complexity of development strategies, and it should continue to do so. It should also create opportunities to bring together smaller groups of countries that share similar concerns for example, those in the Small Island Developing States (SIDS) grouping, and also those classified as Least Developed Countries (LDCs). In addition, the Centre should consider creating a platform for engaging with ministers of finance (and/or representatives from ministries of finance) for policy action. Finally, the Development Centre should maintain and further leverage its networks with non-state actors, notably the private sector and foundations from all regions, and enhance their interaction with the members of the Centre's Governing Board.

### **3.3. The honest broker: The Development Centre should raise awareness of its neutral role and of how the engagement of its members on an equal footing adds value to multilateral efforts and contributes to their success.**

The Development Centre can be leveraged as a space where decisions are framed and negotiated, and where consensus is built in support of multilateral efforts and international processes. It should consider developing its own instruments, such as policy guidelines (or other relevant instruments), which would provide additional weight to its analysis.

### **3.4. The inclusive and strategic partner: The Development Centre should strategically consolidate and expand its membership.**

The Development Centre should first enhance its efforts to attract all OECD member countries which are not currently Centre members. But it should also explore options for strategically expanding its membership across regions in a balanced way, and endeavour to include more LDCs and SIDS. In these efforts, it would be crucial for the Development Centre to intensify its efforts to clearly demonstrate its value proposition. Finally, the Centre should be mindful of supporting its membership to maintain high-quality and dynamic policy dialogue.

### **3.5. The bridge builder: The OECD should leverage the Development Centre's expertise on development matters, as well as engage with non-OECD members on the Centre's Governing Board and with its regional partners, as a key asset for the OECD's efforts to build mutual understanding and enhance its global reach.**

The Development Centre is an integral part of the OECD's architecture. As such, as part of its global outreach efforts, the OECD should further leverage the Centre's non-OECD membership, expertise on development matters and deep-rooted partnerships on the ground in order to amplify its global reach efforts. In addition, given the current context in which dialogue is needed more than ever, the OECD should leverage the Centre's existing policy dialogue space. The Development Centre's work and partnerships with regional organisations are acknowledged as instrumental in developing a sense of ownership of its analysis and gaining a better understanding of regional perspectives. It has also contributed to changing some developing countries' and emerging economies' perceptions of the OECD as just a "rich countries' club", which is of value to the OECD.

2. Decision of the Council Establishing a Development Centre of the Organisation [C(62)144(Final)], Article 2; C(2002)181/REV2].

## 4. IMPLEMENTATION OF THE GEP'S RECOMMENDATIONS

Given the complexity of the current development landscape, the polarised geopolitical context, and the shared challenges among developed and developing countries alike, and with only 8 years left to achieve the 2030 Agenda and the SDGs, there is an urgency to act.

We believe that the Development Centre can be a key actor – both as part of the OECD and in its own right in the development arena – in addressing these shared challenges. In order to build accountability in the process, the GEP invites the Chair of the Governing Board to provide an update to the Governing Board one year after the formal launch of this report on the measures taken to implement those of the GEP's recommendations.

To conclude, in order to be fit for purpose, the Development Centre must keep building on its core strengths, define and make its value proposition known in the international arena and inside the OECD, and consolidate its membership and partnerships. This will ensure that the Development Centre's work is relevant and impactful, and, above all, is valued by its members and partners alike.

## ANNEX 1. TERMS OF REFERENCE OF THE GEP<sup>3</sup>

### Background

On 17 May 1961, the US President John F. Kennedy proposed to create the OECD Development Centre in his address to the Canadian Parliament in Ottawa. The Development Centre was formally established in 1962. Since then, the global landscape has significantly evolved along with the role of the OECD and its Development Centre in it. The commemoration of the 60th Anniversary of the Development Centre over 2021-22 will provide the opportunity to go back to its origins, reflect on its trajectory so far, take stock of its key achievements and contributions in shaping the global agenda for sustainable development, and grow stronger for the future. It will also enable high-level representatives, government officials, and other relevant stakeholders to come together and reflect on the key global challenges with national and local impact, scan the horizon for emerging trends, and devise a long-term vision for the Development Centre.

The COVID-19 crisis hit the world with a complex shock, exerting simultaneous economic and social pressures and affecting the most vulnerable, notably in developing countries. At the 6th High-Level Meeting of the Governing Board (GB) of the Development Centre (6 October 2020), the members of the Development Centre recalled the relevant contribution of the Centre and agreed on the importance of establishing a New Deal for Development<sup>4</sup> in order to support developing countries in the recovery from the severe and profound consequences of COVID-19. This will be the overarching theme of the GB Sessions over the current biennium 2021-22 and a key element of the 60th Anniversary.

### Strategic intent & objectives

Against the backdrop of this new global context, in which the Development Centre has a prominent role to play due to its inclusive and representative membership with developed and developing countries engaging on an equal footing, the Chair of the GB proposed at the 4th GB Session for 2020 (18 December) to establish a Group of Eminent Personalities (the Group). The main objective of this Group will be to share their wisdom on how the Development Centre could best respond to emerging development challenges and support the OECD in its mission to be globally relevant in line with its Global Relations Strategy [C/MIN(2021)17] and Vision Statement [C/MIN(2021)16/FINAL]. To that effect, the Group will inform the reflections and the deliberations of the members of the Governing Board to develop a Policy Statement on Future Perspectives for the Development Centre – coherent with and building on its mandate [C(62)144(Final), Article 2].

In order to safeguard the sense of ownership of the GB in this process, the GB itself will provide a framework for the Policy Statement, which will constitute the basis of discussions and be enriched by the Group. Some of the questions to be addressed include:

- What contributions can the OECD Development Centre make to address the major development challenges of the post-COVID era? What policy areas and partnerships would be crucial for the Development Centre to bring forward its vision?
- How can the Development Centre leverage its assets – such as representativeness and multi-sectoral analysis and dialogues with developing countries and OECD non-members – or build new ones to help the OECD position itself in the new development landscape as a centrepiece of global governance?

<sup>3</sup> The Terms of Reference were presented in the document [DEV/GB(2021)4/REV1], which was approved by the members of the Governing Board on 26 November 2021 via written procedure.

<sup>4</sup> A New Deal for development: Laying the foundations for a resilient recovery and beyond (<https://www.oecd.org/dev/HLM-DEV-CoChairs-Summary-2020-EN.pdf>).

The Group is invited to deliberate on the questions provided in the proposed framework and, with the support of a rapporteur, deliver a concise and high-level report, which will inform the GB in the formulation of the Policy Statement of the Development Centre.

As part of these efforts, the Group will examine and consider the specific position of the Development Centre in the international development constellation as a policy dialogue platform, which brings together 53 OECD and developing countries as members on an equal footing and along with important regional partners and non-state actors (e.g. foundations, multinational enterprises). In addition, it will acknowledge and duly take into account ongoing international processes (e.g. the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development, the G7 and G20, the African Union Agenda 2036, among others). To that effect, the Group will receive from the GB, as stated before, a framework with some guiding elements and relevant background information (e.g. strategic documents of the GB, such as the recently completed In-Depth Evaluation of the Governing Board and its Action Plan, the updated Membership and Outreach Strategy, the Programme of Work and Budget 2021-22, policy statements of High-Level Meetings of the Governing Board) as well as substantive reports of the Centre.

### Composition

The Group will be composed of a small group of eminent individuals (approx.10 people) who will act in their personal capacity, with due consideration to balanced geographical (per region and OECD/non-OECD) and gender representation. The members of the Group should have a strong experience and commitment in sustainable development in the national and multilateral arena, the academia, and the non-state sector. The GB Chair will not be a member of the Group but will liaise with it to provide frequent updates from the Group's discussions and ensure smooth co-ordination with the GB. A Chair of the Group will be selected from within the group alongside a rapporteur. The Secretariat will be at the disposal of the Chair of the Group and its rapporteur to provide any support they may require.

### Working methods & expected outcomes

The Group will be established on an ad hoc basis and will have a consultative role to the GB. Its main objective will be to make recommendations and proposals as a result of collective deliberations, consultations and meetings. The Group may decide to arrange consultations with stakeholders from government, international and regional organisations, development agencies, multilateral banks, the private sector, philanthropic foundations, civil society organisations and academia. DEV members, as well as other OECD and non-OECD Members, will be invited to actively support the stakeholder consultation process. The outcomes of the discussions in the Group will be expected to be of high-level nature and inform the debate and actions of the GB regarding the Policy Statement. Given the current circumstances related to COVID-19, the Group is expected to meet virtually. The Group will report to the GB Chair and the GB on the progress achieved and its members will actively participate in the discussions of the GB when relevant.

### Budget

The members of the Group will participate on pro-bono basis. Since the meetings are expected, for the moment, to be held virtually no travel and accommodation costs are expected to incur. In case they need to come to the OECD HQ, the travel cost and accommodation will be covered according to OECD financial rules.

**ANNEX 2. COMPOSITION OF THE GEP<sup>5</sup>**

<b>Co-Chairs</b>	<p><b>CLARK, Helen:</b> Former Prime Minister of New Zealand, former UNDP Administrator</p> <p><b>IGLESIAS, Enrique:</b> Former President of IDB, former Secretary-General of SEGIB</p>
<b>Rapporteur</b>	<p><b>MANSERVISI, Stefano:</b> Former Director General of DEVCO European Commission</p>
<b>Members</b>	<p><b>ATWOOD, Brian:</b> American diplomat, former Administrator of the U.S. Agency for International Development, former DAC chair</p> <p><b>BACHELET, Michelle:</b> Former President of Chile/ UN High Commissioner for Human Rights</p> <p><b>BARCENA, Alicia:</b> Former Executive Secretary of the Economic Commission for Latin America &amp; the Caribbean</p> <p><b>BASRI, Muhamad Chatib:</b> Former Finance Minister, member of the World Bank Group Advisory Council on Gender and Development</p> <p><b>BIRDSALL, Nancy:</b> Founding President of the Centre for Global Development, Former Executive Vice-President of the IDB</p> <p><b>CHINCHILLA, Laura:</b> Former President of Costa Rica, Co-chair of the Inter-American Dialogue, Vice-President World Leadership Alliance – Club de Madrid, Member of the International Olympic Committee</p> <p><b>MAYAKI, Ibrahim:</b> Former Prime Minister of Niger, former Chief Executive Officer of the New Partnership for Africa’s Development (NEPAD) Agency</p> <p><b>SOLANA, Javier:</b> President of EsadeGeo, Former EU High Representative for Common Foreign Policy &amp; Security Policy, Former Secretary-General of NATO</p>

<sup>5</sup> In alphabetical order. The titles of the GEP members are not exhaustive given the rich career path of each one of them.

**ANNEX 3. THE WORK OF THE GEP**

<b>Date</b>	<b>Action</b>
28 January 2022	GEP Inaugural Meeting <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Introductions with the GB Chair &amp; DEV GB Secretariat</li> <li>• Working Modalities, Expected Outcomes, Engagement with the GB</li> </ul>
10 March 2022	1 <sup>st</sup> GEP Meeting The development landscape <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• What are the major sustainable development (social, economic, environmental) issues and emerging trends that will shape the development landscape in the near/mid-term?</li> <li>• What are the key challenges related to multilateralism/multilateral co-operation to address those major issues?</li> </ul>
22 March 2022	2 <sup>nd</sup> GEP Meeting OECD/DEV's engagement with developing countries and emerging economies <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• How should the Development Centre, as part of the OECD, engage with developing countries and emerging economies to address these emerging challenges and seize any opportunities?</li> <li>• How can the Development Centre add value to multilateral efforts and contribute to their success?</li> </ul>
4 April 2022	Presentation of the key messages that have emerged from the GEP discussions so far to the 1st GB Plenary Session for 2022
7 April 2022	3 <sup>rd</sup> GEP Meeting DEV's impact & relevance <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• What kind of recommendations could be made for enhancing DEV's relevance and impact in addressing the issues mentioned above while engaging with developing countries and emerging economies and contributing to an effective multilateral system?</li> </ul>
April-May 2022	Preparation of the first draft of the GEP report
9 June 2022	4 <sup>th</sup> GEP Meeting <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Discussion on the first draft report and its recommendations</li> </ul>
June 2022	Circulation of the draft GEP report to the GB → Presentation of the draft GEP Report to the GB Special Session [29 June]
July-September 2022	Finalisation of the draft GEP Report for publication
October 2022	→ Launch of the GEP Report to the 8th High-Level Meeting of the Governing Board [24-25 October]