

# **Towards a coherent approach to immigrant integration policy(ies) in the European Union :**

by Marco Martiniello

## **I. The Context**

### 1. The general context

The European Union displays a wide variety of ethno-cultural and national affiliations and identities. It has entered a process of “diversification of its diversity”, which calls for a specific European debate about European forms of diversity management.

In the European Union, the diversification of diversity<sup>1</sup> has several sources. First, since May 2004, the European Union is composed of 25 states, each of which is linked to a specific history of nation building and to specific national identities. These states have many points in common but they also nurture their specificity in terms of language, political systems, legal systems and so on. In the future, the process of enlargement will increase the diversity of national identities in the EU.

Secondly in a number of existing Member States and candidate countries, sub-national political mobilisation promotes ethno-regional identities as groups claim recognition as national minorities, as ethnic groups or even sometimes, full independence. In this context, one could mention for example the Basque and Catalan cases in Spain, the Corsican and Breton regions in France, the historical ethno-linguistic divide in Belgium. In Central and Eastern Europe as well, issues of national minorities remain to the fore. In all these cases, claims are put forward for the recognition and the protection of distinctive cultures and identities based on the specific history of the minorities in question, their language or other cultural traits.

Thirdly, the European Union is and will continue to be a region of immigration. Migrants come from all over the world following new patterns of migration. Some of them settle and adapt culturally to their new environment while simultaneously enriching the local culture and the variety of ethno-cultural identities. Others also maintain transnational links and activities. Immigrants and immigrant origin populations in European cities are undoubtedly bound to increase in the future. As a result, new ways of life, new religions, new visions of the world, new cultures are constantly being introduced into the European social fabric.

Fourth, compared with other parts of the world, the issues of indigenous minorities and post-slavery minorities (like the African-Americans) are much less relevant in the European Union. However, the issue of the gypsy or Roma populations is certainly more acute. Roma are present in many EU states. Everywhere they suffer a high level of discrimination and racism while at the same their culture is often celebrated, for example in their music. Their position is specific in the sense they are often forgotten both in migration debates and national minorities' debates.

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<sup>1</sup> In a book published in 1995, the American historian David Hollinger introduced the notion of “diversification of diversity” to describe the dynamics of cultures and identities in the United States. By analogy, one could claim that the European Union has also entered a process of diversification of its diversity.

Fifth, several EU states are home to variably important Jewish communities whose identity is often internally discussed within but also outside their community. Furthermore the situation in the Middle East does have an impact in the EU and anti-Semitism remains a point of contention.

Beyond these national, cultural and ethnic lines of diversification, The European Union is also diversified in many other different ways. Europe faces a fundamental problem, at least for those who suffer from it, namely social, economic and political inequality, between states, between regions and cities within each state and between individuals and groups. Economic, social and political deprivation is on the increase in many European cities with the rise of unemployment, homelessness, petty urban crime, the return of some diseases thought to have been eradicated etc.

Two processes seem to be at work simultaneously. First, exclusion/inclusion processes account for the appearance of a distinct society outside the mainstream. So Conservative moralists stress the distinctive features (cultural, mental, etc.) of this "European permanent underclass". Progressive thinkers prefer to stress the macro-economic and social processes which lead to the formation of a category of excluded pseudo-citizens.

Secondly, new configurations of inequality patterns even within mainstream society can also be observed. Global capitalism has been reshaping the class structure through flexibility, precarious and badly paid jobs, etc. Not all EU citizens are equally 'in': there is a huge difference between a top manager in a big firm and a part-time worker in a restaurant, even though both are part of the 'included' as opposed to the 'excluded'. Clearly, these forms of inequality and imbalance also shape other dimensions of EU diversity that need to be dealt with in relation to ethno-cultural diversity.

In that broad context, developing a European immigration policy without simultaneously framing a European integration policy would be problematic. Issues such as economic and employment integration, public goods sharing, ethnic and cultural diversity, social and political participation should be discussed in terms public policy goals. A holistic approach is clearly needed in order to consider the complexity of the migration and post-migration situations in the European Union.

Furthermore, both traditional assimilationist and multiculturalist dominant « models » have often been debated and have shown their limitations. As a consequence, it is crucial to try to invent new policy tools in order to combine ethnic and cultural diversity, social and political cohesion and equal opportunities in a very diverse Europe. One could in that context advocate the emergence of a new EU model of multicultural citizenship.

Member States acknowledged the economic and demographic challenges faced by the European Union (population ageing, labour needs, transformations of migration flows, global competition) and the necessity to design a common immigration as well as a European immigrant integration policy framework. Debates have so far focused essentially on the legal nature of integration programs and on the type of integration measures. The discussions also have concentrated on the mandatory nature of the texts and consequently on which kind of sanctions (financial or legal) to take in the case of non respect either by member states or by individuals. At the same time, the European social and political context is tense with a regain of far right parties, populist expressions of frustrations, tensions, racist and xenophobic violence, and a mainly negative media coverage on immigration issues.

## 2. The EU policy context

The European Union can use several mechanisms to contribute to the development of integration policy that complement the responsibility of each Member State. References to previous Communications and texts on immigrant integration policy in the European Union should be remembered as they form legal tools and design a specific framework to develop a common base for immigrant integration policy. The 1999 European Council in Tampere stated the necessity to define a stronger involvement in designing a common integration policy in order to offer third-country nationals “*rights and obligations comparable to all European Union citizens*”. For this matter, the fundamental reference is the Charter of Fundamental Rights, which was proclaimed in 2001 (and quoted in principle 8) and does not distinguish among nationals and non-nationals in most of its dispositions. Additional texts include a Communication on family reunification (COM (2002) 225), a Communication on long-term established third-country nationals (COM (2001) 127), and a Communication on admission and stay conditions of third-country nationals’ workers (COM (2001) 386). Other references to integration also comprehend Communications relatives to asylum policy, such as the European Council directive on Member States’ minimum standards in receiving asylum seekers (2003/9/CE), and a legal framework to fight against discrimination applicable to all residents, regardless of their nationality (directives 2000/43/CE and 2000/78/CE). Finally, based on the Lisbon mandate, the EU has intended to define coordination methods in the fields of labor and social integration, such as the revised 1997 European Employment Strategy (mentioned on principle 4), the 2000 Niza European Council goals on integration and social inclusion, the 2001 Laeken European Council propositions to reinforce information exchanges on migration, as well as financial instruments (European Social Fund, EQUAL, URBAN II, European Investment Fund, European Refugee fund, etc.).

In June 2003, the Commission presented a Communication to the Council, to the Parliament, to the European Economic and Social Committee and to the Regions Committee on immigration, integration and employment (COM (2003) 336). The Communication defined the integration as follows: “*it is a two-way process based on reciprocity of rights and obligations of third-country nationals and host societies that foresee the immigrant full participation*”. Integration is conceived as a “*balance of rights and obligations*”. The holistic approach targets all dimensions of integration (economic, social and political rights, cultural and religious diversity, citizenship and participation). Referring to a 2000 Communication (COM (2000) 757), the text determined the targeted population as essentially composed by “*migrant workers and reunited family members, refugees and persons under international protection*”.

In November 2004, The Common Basic Principles (CBP) were aimed at designing a common framework for a European approach to immigrant integration. The paper suggested a framework to serve as a reference for the implementation and evaluation of current and future integration policies. In that sense, it formed a second step coming after the June 2003 *Communication on immigration, integration and employment*. It was followed by the publication of the “*Integration Handbook*” which described and suggested practical implementation policies for the integration of migrants (November 2004) and by the Green Paper on an EU approach to managing economic migration (COM (2004), 811 final).

In 2005, the Commission released its agenda for integration, which was an attempt to move beyond

the Common basic principles<sup>2</sup>. The difficult debate on a framework directive on legal migration continued though with some disruptions. The programme INTI entered a new phases and the new INTA fund was launched. Very recently, the European Parliament contributed significantly to the European policy debate on integration with the publication of its report on Strategies and means for the integration of immigrants in the European Union (Final A6-0190/2006, 17.5.2006). The Policy Plan on Legal Migration published in December 2005 is another important initiative addressing integration policies (COM (2005) 669 final).

Many contributions to that policy debate also emerge from think tanks and various civil society initiatives. Among the recent ones, we can mention the Bertelsman Stiftung and Migration Policy Institute volume on managing integration published in 2005, the European Policy Center Working Paper on integration policies published in April 2006, 2 Challenge papers, one comparing integration Programmes in the EU and one examining the links between immigration, integration and citizenship<sup>3</sup>.

Despite the very intense discussions and the explosion of the number of papers of various kinds dealing with integration, concrete progress in the development of a European Union approach to immigrant integration policy(ies) remains a matter of contention. On the one hand, voices within the Commission display some satisfaction with the results achieved so far. On the other hand, the President of the European Parliament, Josep Borrell Fontelles recently said that in the field of legal immigration, cooperation with third countries and immigrant integration, progress is very thin not to say inexistent<sup>4</sup>.

The present paper is an additional contribution to the policy-debate on immigrant integration in the European Union. It deals with 4 set of issues that remain problematic today: the definition of integration and of the desirable end result as far as immigrant integration is concerned, a presentation of some of the problems to assess integration process at work concretely in the European Union, some thoughts about the shape and content of the future European Union approach to immigration integration policy(ies). The five dimensions of what I call the EU multicultural citizenship will be briefly presented. Finally, some concrete policy-proposals will be presented in the conclusive section.

## **II. The definition of integration: the impossible consensus**

Integration is a concept used to describe social, political, cultural and economic processes that occur when migrants arrive in a new society. It has stimulated lots of debates in academia over the years<sup>5</sup> and nowadays there still is no common understanding of what the concept of integration actually refers to. The lack of academic consensus on the definition of integration is certainly a problem if the idea is to root policy-making in research results.

Furthermore, integration is clearly also a normative category. The various “models of integration “ available throughout the European Union do not describe and explain a process developing when

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<sup>2</sup> Communication (2005) 389 final 1.9.2005 “A common agenda for integration”

<sup>3</sup> CHALLENGE is a European-Commission funded project dealing with security issues in the European Union.

<sup>4</sup> Le Soir, June 27 2006, page 18.

<sup>5</sup> See for example the report written by Han Entzinger and Renske Biezeveld for the European Commission in 2003

migrants arrive into a new society. Rather, these models present an ideal situation, the desirable end result of a process that needs policy stimulation. Both the French republican model and British multicultural model, for example, are idealistic views of the national society. They are not useful to describe and explain how integration takes place in society day after day. Here again, no consensus is possible since each member state has its own model of integration forged over the years. Each nation-state strives to at least to defend and preserve its model, sometimes to export it and to transpose it at the European Union level.

In other words, there is no consensus on a shared thick definition of integration either in academia or in the European policy-making world. There is no consensus on the ideal integrated European society for tomorrow either. To put it differently, there is no consensual European Union model of immigrant integration.

The result is that the European policy debates, discussions and policy-making on integration develop without a clear definition of integration and without a clear vision of the end result to be reached through European policy-making.

This is very clear when one examines the common basic principles on integration, which are nevertheless generally considered to be the cornerstone of the developing European Union integration policy. Why is that document problematic<sup>6</sup>?

The Common Basic Principles (CBP) suggests a framework to serve as a reference for the implementation and evaluation of current and future integration policies. It presents positive points that need to be reinforced:

1. It shows that Member States governments acknowledge that integration can be successful and that it makes the case for investment. Furthermore, the CBP states that equal rights and anti-discrimination policies are at the core of a proactive integration policy.
2. There is a clear acknowledgement that immigration could be a benefit for the overall European Union in economic, social, political and cultural terms. The holistic approach mentions integration and immigration as creating “benefits” (Preamble 1), an “enrichment” (Preamble 2), and “the contributions immigrants make to the host society” (principle 3). This positive approach should be welcomed, although no mention of past immigration benefits are recognized.
3. It is also stated that integration is considered as a “two-way process” including both migrants and their descendants, and the host societies. The references to the actors of integration are threefold: private sector, public sector and NGOs.
4. The fields of intervention appear quite extended. The CBP focus on employment and labour integration (principle 3), linguistic and educational skills (principles 4 and 5), non discriminatory access to public goods (principle 6), urban and social environment (principle 7), cultural and religious diversity (principle 8), citizenship and political participation (principle 9).

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<sup>6</sup> The section on the CBP is based on an unpublished paper written in 2004 by Emmanuelle Le Texier and Marco Martiniello and entitled “CBP for Immigrant Integration in the European Union. A comment”.

5. Principle 9 appears to be very comprehensive and allows for a progressive interpretation on migrants' political participation. It is clearly stated that "*Immigrants could even be involved in elections, the right to vote and joining political parties*", which should be welcomed.

6. There are propositions for mainstreaming integration policies (principle 10) and for an evaluation of Member States actual integration policies (principle 11). These two principles offer a broad range of opportunities to include integration, as gender, in various public policies, and to evaluate, measure, correct and define new mechanisms of integration. It should also include a specific claim to the private sector to help them evaluate and design specific integration mechanisms.

7. More importantly, and beyond the substance and the content of the document, it promotes a European debate on integration in relation to immigrants in Europe. In an undeclared way the document states that the European Union is a continent of immigration in which integration has to be dealt with. This also confirms progresses made in the past five years in the way migration is approached.

But the paper also contains problematic aspects that need to be changed or improved in future documents:

1. To the extent that integration is not explicitly defined in the document for valid political reasons, namely the impossibility to reach a consensus between the 25 Member-States on the mere definition of what integration is and should be, the reader has to consider that the document as such is an attempt to promote empirically a specific definition of integration through CBP. Therefore, the attempted "tour de force" is to agree on common basic principles of integration without an agreement on an explicit definition of integration. This has proved to be politically possible but only at the price of a paper, which is perfectible in terms of consistency, clarity and coherence. In the long term, this might be problematic if the paper is the pillar of the future European Union integration policy.

3. The approach to integration is linear and unidirectional. It is stated that integration may take a more or less long time but it will take place eventually. On the contrary, literature has shown that integration does not necessarily happen this way and that setbacks are always possible. The third generation is not necessarily better integrated than the second and the second that the first. Furthermore, integration cannot be considered as a process with a clear end. Integration is not reached forever. Integrated people and groups in point A can be less so in point A+1 for different reasons.

4. The CBP targeted population is not as precisely defined as it was in the 2003 communication (i.e. "*migrant workers and reunited family members, refugees and persons under international protection*"). The text mentions that illegal immigrants are not included as a target of integration policy, but does not provide a clear definition of its targeted group. Groups as "*flows of immigrants*" (Preamble 1), "*legally residing immigrants and their descendants*" (Preamble 2), "*newcomers*", "*all residents - new and old*" (Preamble 3), "*from temporary workers to permanent residents and to the children of immigrants; from immigrants who have acquired citizenship to long-established third-country nationals; and from highly skilled refugees to individuals who have yet to acquire the most elementary skills*" (Preamble 6) are quoted in the text. So there is indeed an extension of the

definition from first-generation migrants to the population of second and third generation immigration origin. This comprehensive definition has to be clearly stated, because integration policies as well as rights and obligations are divergent depending on the legal status and the nationality. It is also a necessity because it forms a source of confusion, particularly for the media and the civil society, which tend to amalgamate all categories.

Besides the decision of excluding illegal migrants, it remains difficult to address the “problems “of newcomers and of the third generation with one same concept. The latter is in many respects integrated but at a lower level of the society. Whereas the former really need to learn how their new society functions. In other words, it is problematic to treat the following generations as immigrants since they have not migrated from anywhere. They were in many cases born in European countries.

5. Moreover, it is also clearly mentioned that illegal immigrants are not targeted by integration policies. Although regularization legislation in various Member States might be considered as a first step in the integration process, they seemed to be perceived as an appeal for more unlawful immigration flows. Referring to the complexity of the illegal migrants situation, the 2003 Communication recalled that border control and repatriation programs were the first purpose of the EU but that illegal migrants were also protected by international human rights laws. This is not the case anymore in the CBP. The CBP could state clearly whereas the admission process (for instance, for asylum seekers) is considered as a possible field for integration programs.

6. The philosophical and political definition of integration acquires a negative tonality on the CBP. Whereas integration was defined as “*a two-way process based on reciprocity of rights and obligations of third-country nationals and host societies that foresee the immigrant full participation*” and as an “*balance of rights and obligations*” (COM (2003) 336), the first and second common basic principle state that “*integration is a dynamic, two-way process of mutual accommodation by all immigrants and residents of Member States*” (principle 1) and “*implies respect for the basic values of the European Union*” (principle 2). The Annex states that “*The integration process involves adaptation by immigrants, both men and women, who all have rights and responsibilities in relation to their new country of residence*” (principle 1). The use of a different terminology is indeed a source for confusion that carries on different dangers. The terms “adaptation”, “values” and “responsibilities” tend to develop a paternalist vision of integration. Interpretations of adaptation as assimilation is frequent, the definition of “responsibilities” does not have legal implications in comparison with “rights” and the determination of the “European values” could be a point for discussion. In general, the CBP approach immigration essentially as a problem to correct by the adoption of top-down measures. This fact constitutes a paradoxical opposition with the open definition of integration as a “two-way process”. Responsibilities should then be shared between migrants and host societies members instead of relying on the shoulders of immigrants only.

7. Consequently, the document contributes to “problematize” the presence of immigrants considered as individuals and groups suffering from a deficit of integration. As a matter of fact, integration problems are not specific to immigrants and many immigrants have no integration problem. Immigrants are not at all an homogeneous group. This could be avoided by some simple changes. Instead of talking about the integrations of immigrants one could speak about how to build a better integrated and cohesive society out of many diverse components of which immigrants are only one.

8. Approaching integration exclusively for the European point of view implies that transnational links are not considered at all or considered as a danger for the integration process. There seems to be a contraction here between CPC and co-development policies. On the one hand, immigrants are asked to sacrifice their transnational links in order to facilitate their integration. On the other hand, there are by the European Union seem as crucial actors in the development of their country of origin. Without clear time scale, this seems contradictory.

9. The stress on acquiring the language of the country of residence also raises a problem. Obviously, nobody questions the importance of language skills to live decently in a given society but in the EU context the issues has to be related to freedom of movement as well. Learning Swedish is useful to live in Sweden but at the same time it can also be an obstacle to the freedom of movement within the EU. Therefore, the approach to language in the CBP seems over simplistic.

10. Generally speaking, principles 7 and 8 seem the most problematic and could have been phrased differently because they have simultaneously multiple aims that need to be distinguished. For instance, Principle 7 refers only marginally to anti-discrimination policies. It should be emphasized on existing legal framework. It does not either acknowledge that urban ethnic enclaves could also favor integration and provides room for ethnic entrepreneurship, social cohesion and social mobility. It only describes the “poor urban areas” as dysfunctional for immigrants. As for Principle 8, again the mention of “national and European values” is highly debatable. Rights or legislation must be obeyed, but it is debatable to express the will to impose the respect of indefinite values. Especially, the reference to “*the rights and equality of women and the freedom to practice or not practice a particular religion*” as well as the mention of possible “*legal coercive measures*” should be rephrased in terms of rights and obligations, not in terms of values.

11. It seems necessary to point out the CBP legal nature. Regarding the legal status of the text, it is framed as a declaration of common minimum standards that Member States should keep in mind at the time of designing their respective integration policies. No sanctions or incentives are presented to enforce the implementation of such principles. Financial and operational aspects are not mentioned in the CBP. It is then of limited impact on member states policies and its implementation relies on a voluntary basis. Furthermore, even if “*the effective management of migration by each Member States is in the interest of all*” (Preamble 1), it is well stated that “*Integration policy is therefore the primary responsibility of individual Member States rather than of the Union as a whole*” (Preamble 3). Otherwise stated, it is up to individual Member States whether these principles assist them in formulating and/or evaluating integration policies. The CBP could then include more direct references to the existing legal framework mentioned above and to the existence of incentives and sanctions for both member states and individuals (Preamble, aims c). This would give more legal and political strength to the text. It should also be more coherent in stating and detailing the Eleven Principles.

These problematic aspects are to a certain extent balanced by positive important steps in defining integration as a two-way process, multiple actors of integration and numerous fields of intervention but several dimensions are missing in the document

What is missing? What could be possible prescriptions in order to move forward?

1. Who decides the appropriate level of integration immigrants should reach? This is a political

question the answer to which expresses power relations in society. Immigrants should be involved in the process of aim and goals fixing in the field of integration.

2. The implicit conception of integration in CBP is related to previous patterns of migration. It does not consider the importance of transnationalism and transnational communities, which forces us to redefine at least in part what we mean by integration. Attention should clearly be devoted to this issue in the near future.

3. What are the prospects for a peaceful coexistence between CBP and national integration policies in the long term? What will be the impact of the persistence of different national regimes in the field of integration of the competition between member states to attract the most desired migrants ?

4. The links and possible contradictions between integration policies and other policy areas (development, freedom of movement, etc.) should also be examined.

5. Since integration is a disputed academic concept and since there is no long term vision of a European Union integration model, it might be profitable to concretely define integration in terms of **fair participation** of target individuals and groups in the social, economic, cultural and political spheres of the host European societies. In this perspective, a satisfactory level of immigrant integration is achieved when immigrants have similar participation patterns than non-immigrant citizens. Concretely, it means for example similar labour-market participation (economic dimension), similar electoral turnout patterns (political dimensions), similar structure of attitudes towards fundamental democratic values (cultural dimension) and similar access to social goods (social dimension).

6. It is always necessary to make a clear distinction between integration (or participation) and integration (or participation) policies. Some degree of integration (or participation) always takes place, even without integration policies. Integration policies sometimes produce unintended effects. For example, the introduction of compulsory and costly integration programmes for newcomers may result in keeping newcomers at the margins of society for economic reasons. Those newcomers who do not possess the sufficient resources to pay for these programmes may decide not to register and choose alternative modes of living in the new society.

### **III. The process of immigrant integration (or participation) in Europe**

1. A certain degree of social, economic, cultural and political integration (or participation) of immigrants and their offspring always takes place in any society of immigration. In policy terms, it would be useful to make at least a distinction between the initial phase of the integration (or participation) process and the following steps. I propose to call the first step of the integration (or participation) process adaptation. It refers to the insertion of the newcomers into the new society in the first five years of arrival. During that period, the immigrant learns at least some basics of the language of the new country, how the society concretely works, how to have access to housing, schools, the health care system, the labour market, etc. After that period of settlement, the migrant continues her/his path and encounters various difficulties and obstacles in the process of participation in the various spheres of society.

2. The description of the integration process from the arrival onwards faces several difficulties.

There is a widely acknowledged lack of comparable statistics on immigrant integration (or participation) in the European Union but the Commission is trying to tackle the problem. However, it will take time before we can get solid and up-to-date statistical data on integration (or participation) of immigrants in all spheres of activities and in all the member states of the European Union.

3. Besides quantitative accounts, qualitative accounts of the integration process are also very important to have a clear understanding of what type of integration (or participation) develops, where, when and for which group of migrants. Generally, qualitative accounts and studies are neglected because the data provided are not easily presentable in tables and percentages. However, statistics and surveys often lack the depth of qualitative research. Both approaches should be seen as complementary. The Commission should foster qualitative case studies of integration (or participation) in all the relevant spheres (culture, politics, economics, social relations). A special emphasis should be put on the differentiated effects of policies in different settings and on different migrant populations. This would help to understand why the same policy instrument produces different results in different places and for different groups.

4. The process of integration does not take place at the same speed in the sphere of culture, politics, society and economy. For example, excellent labour-market integration can coexist with a very bad social and political integration. The case of Japanese expatriate communities in major European cities is a good illustration of the differentiation in the integration (or participation) process. Usually, they enjoy a privileged position in terms of employment and wages (Japanese in Brussels). But they usually do not take part in local social and political life and they do not participate in the local life. To a lesser extent, the same could be said of many European civil servants and experts living in Belgium. Their job situation is very much valued. They share the European culture and value they contribute to define but their social and political participation in Brussels and Belgium life is not very intense.

This differentiation of the integration (or participation) process is certainly a difficulty. One is to provide a detailed empirical account of integration. It raises the issue not this time of **WHAT** is integration but of **WHEN** is integration. It could be proposed that ideally immigrants reach integration when they fairly participate both socially, economically, culturally and politically in the host society. This approach would also permit to compare immigrants' groups and individuals but also immigrants with the local population as far as integration is concerned. Clearly, not all local citizens are ideally integrated and sometimes immigrants are even better integrated than them.

5. The role of culture, ethnicity, race and religion in the process of integration (or participation) is another crucial and difficult though unavoidable issue. On the one hand, "Culturalist" approaches explain deficiencies in immigrant integration (or participation) by referring to their cultural background. When they are economically, socially or politically disadvantaged, their cultural specificity or difference is presented as the major explanation. On the other hand, "structural" approaches explain the lack of integration by macro economic and political factors such as globalization or ethnic discrimination. This debate is far from being settled and it is not the aim of this paper to do so.

However, it seems undisputable that social links rooted in culture, ethnicity, race and religion also play a positive role both in the first step (adaptation) and in the following steps of the integration (or

participation process. Let us take the example of the Senegalese Mourides immigrants present in several European countries. For the Senegalese Mourides arriving in Europe, the Mourides religious confraternities represented in European cities play an important role in helping him to find accommodation, to find a job and to find his way around the new society. This specific example clearly shows how a religious organisation can help the economic and social adaptation of immigrants<sup>7</sup>.

More generally, it also shows that immigrants do not wait for the implementation of integration policies to start the process of integration (or participation) especially in the economic and social sphere. Historically, cultural, ethnic, racial, religious and national have always played a role in fostering adaptation and participation of immigrants in the new society. Italians arriving in New York at the turn of the century knew that by going to Mulberry Street they would find some help among the *paesani* already settled in order to find a job and accommodation. Poles arriving today in Brussels go directly to Saint-Gilles. They know that help will be available at the Polish Church. The examples could be multiplied. They concern as much informal networks than formal associations formed by migrants and sometimes their supporters.

But there is another side to the coin. Intra-ethnic exploitation is also historically common in places of immigration. The Chinese case consisting in the exploitation of irregular fellow Chinese by Chinese restaurant owners is now quite well documented. It is certainly not the only. Solidarity and exploitation in immigrant groups often develop simultaneously.

After September 11, a question is very often asked more or less explicitly in the integration debates: is there specificity in the Muslim immigrants' experiences? Do Muslim immigrants integrate differently than other migrants? What is the impact of "securitization" and anti-terrorism on integration of Muslim immigrants? A common though disputed view today is that Islam is an obstacle to integration (or participation). Obviously, these questions and this view would need longer developments. Let us just mention three points here:

- Islam and Muslim immigrants should not be homogenized and considered as a single monolithic group. Muslim immigrants are divided along theological, social, economic, political, national and ethnic lines. These divisions explain the variety of mosques and places of prayers in Europe. Therefore, it seems erroneous to claim that Islam is a barrier to integration and participation.
- Some Muslim immigrants are close to the ideal integration or fair participation in the 4 spheres of human activity (social, economic, cultural and political) while others fall short in they attempt to finding a decent place in the European society.
- "Securitization" and anti-terrorism policies to the extent that they target Muslims and encourages anti-Muslim discrimination, have a negative impact on the process of integration (or participation) of Muslim immigrants, mainly on those who lack the social, economic, political and educational resources to compete in the European economy.

6. The integration (or participation) process first empirically develops locally and therefore it varies from one region of the European Union to another. Let us briefly examine successively the economic, social, political and cultural sphere.

- The economic integration (or participation) of immigrants largely depends on the structure

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<sup>7</sup> On this specific case, see 2 recent articles by Joan Lacomba (2005) and Sophie Bava (2004).

of the local and regional labour markets. These specificities have to be taken into account when trying to assess the process of economic integration (or participation) of immigrants. Finding a stable and well-paid job is much more difficult for any job seekers and therefore also for migrants in regions struck by high unemployment rates than in rapidly developing countries. Consequently, these regional disparities should be taken into account when assessing immigrants' economic integration. A same rate of unemployment for an immigrant group, say for example 15% could be considered as an excellent performance in a European region where general unemployment reaches 25 %. It could be considered as a bad performance in regions where the general unemployment rate does not exceed 6%.

- Immigrants' social participation is similarly linked to the local characteristics of the social fabric. It is easier for immigrants to socially fit in places where there is a dense network of associations than in places where the social link is not strong. In a study done in Belgium, the importance of schools for the social integration of immigrants has been evidenced. Through their children attending schools, new immigrants and asylum seekers get to meet other parents and this opens a door into the local community<sup>8</sup>

- Politically, immigrants will find it easier to participate, all other things being equal (i.e. political rights), in regions where there is a general strong political participation than in regions characterized by a political apathy. This explains in part the disparities in political participation of immigrants in different European regions.

- At the cultural level, immigrants do not generally endorse an abstract cultural "model". They participate in the European culture, provided that this expression is meaningful, is mediated through their participation in the local version of that European culture. Cultural participation develops through social interactions between immigrants and the local populations in daily life.

7. The legal status of the incoming migrant has a strong impact on the process of integration (or participation). Migrants arriving with a work permit and a work contract have de facto solved the issue of economic integration. On the contrary, when asylum seekers are legally prevented from working, they are barred from any economic integration and forced into the underground economy to find a job allowing them to survive. Do different "legally defined migrants" follow different patterns of integration?

The 7 points developed in this paragraph can lead to policy recommendations that will be presented in the next section and in the conclusive section.

#### **IV The Shape and Content of the future European Union Approach to Immigration Integration Policy(ies): the Political Incorrect Idea of a European Union Multicultural Citizenship**

The issues discussed in this part of paper are being dealt with through a multilevel governance process involving the European Union, the member states, the components of federal states and the cities. Trying to impose from above a monolithic model of EU multicultural citizenship would encounter strong resistances locally. It is therefore strategically more adequate to try to agree on common general principles and approaches and to respect the autonomy of states and local authorities as provided for by the principle of subsidiarity. Simultaneously, promoting the dialogue and the exchange of good practices in the field of integration, cultural diversity and

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<sup>8</sup> See the study by Gsir, Scandella, Martiniello and Rea published in 2004.

citizenship between the various levels of governance is certainly a good way to progress in the building of a EU multicultural citizenship from below. As far as substantive issues related to EU multicultural citizenship are concerned, at least 5 dimensions should be discussed

### 1.Cultural Diversity and Social Justice.

First, the processes of ethno-cultural identity formation and assertion and the processes of socio-economic exclusion and exploitation are deeply connected. Those who are excluded from the labour market or exploited at the bottom end of it are often also those whose identity and culture are not considered as legitimate or even feared in Europe. Ethnic, racial and religious discrimination and socio-economic discrimination often coincide as shown by the example of migrants coming from Muslim countries. Therefore, the recognition and promotion of ethnic identities and cultures and the struggle against socio-economic exclusion and exploitation should go hand in hand. In other words, the politics of recognition, anti-discrimination and anti-racism are connected though analytically different. It does not make sense to separate issues related to cultural diversity and issues related to social justice. In other words, promoting a cultural citizenship though for example special cultural rights for minorities without granting them a full socio-economic citizenship and an equal access to the labour market, education, health and housing could be counterproductive. One could claim that more social and economic equality brings the development or more open ethno-cultural identities while more social and economic inequality and exclusion favours the development of more closed and exclusive ethno-cultural identities that serves to compensate for the frustration and. Even more simply state, the social and economic “balkanisation” is certainly more threatening for the EU democracy than cultural diversification.

### 2.Equal Basic Rights and Duties

Second, the supporting pillar of any development towards EU multicultural citizenship is the idea of a total equality of basic rights and duties for all legal residents in the EU. The introduction of EU citizenship more than 10 years ago did confirm and legalize three main levels of citizenship, three types of citizens in the European Union depending on the civil rights, the socio-economic rights and the political rights they enjoy.

Only the citizens of a Member State living within the border of their nationality state enjoy the full civil, socio-economic and political rights, that is the full citizenship. In terms of the set rights they enjoy, they are the only fully included category. Even though a growing number of them is effectively excluded from the processes of redistribution of economic, social and political resources.

At a lower level, the citizens of a Member State of the European Union who are living in another Member State than their own enjoy only limited political rights (mainly the right to vote and to be elected at the local and European level). In other respects, their civil rights are not complete. For example, they do not enjoy total freedom of settlement in another European Union country. In order to avoid movements of unemployed workers from Member States with low social protection to Member States that offer a high level of protection, two conditions must be fulfilled by the European Citizens if they want to settle in another Member State, that is financial independence and independence in terms of social security. Furthermore, their opportunity to

have access to the civil service in their country of residence remains limited. Eventually, even though this category of European Citizens is largely protected by European Union law, the full equality between nationals and other European Union Citizens is not yet achieved.

The third category of citizens living in the European Union is actually divided into two sub-categories. The 'denizens', that is the citizens of a third-state legally settled in Europe, are part to a certain extent both of the civil and of the socio-economic European society. As human beings and as workers they do enjoy some civil and socio-economic rights. But they generally enjoy no significant political rights in the European Union. The second sub-category, the 'Margizens'<sup>9</sup>, enjoy extremely limited civil, socio-economic and political rights. In many cases they have almost no rights at all because they live illegally in a member state. Between the Denizens and the Margizens, one could also mention a growing category of legal temporary residents or workers, some of which might be in quite good positions while others are severely marginalized. Anyway, 'Denizens' and 'Margizens' are grouped together in the same category because they suffer analogous mechanisms of exclusion from the cultural and political 'Europeanness'.

This triangular structure of citizenship in the European Union is more complex than the description above may suggest. Here too, the fact that the European Union is a multilevel democracy is highly relevant. For example, Turkish citizens enjoy a similar amount of rights under EU law but Turks who live in France and the Netherlands have different rights under French and Dutch laws. In the first case, Turks have no voting right while in the second case there is a local disenfranchisement since 1985. From a EU perspective, this could be read as a discriminatory treatment contrary to any idea of a EU multicultural democracy.

The solution to that type of problem is not easy to find and the road towards the total equality of rights for all legal residents is still long. However, in order to move in that direction, it could be suggested that EU citizenship as it exists today should be extended to all permanent and legal third-countries residents.

In terms of duties and obligations, the principle of equality between all resident citizens entails that third-countries nationals should respect the laws and the Constitution of the country they live in. They should also, like any other EU citizen, respect the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, European law, the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union and tomorrow, the EU constitution. These documents reflect the set of core values (democracy, human rights, non-discrimination, gender equality, respect for the physical and psychological integrity of the human person, respect for cultural diversity and identities) that are not negotiable and that should be shared by all EU citizens whatever their ethno-national identity and religion.

Those who disagree with the non-negotiable core of values mentioned above should have the right to express their disagreement within the limits of the laws on freedom of expression. They should also be allowed the right to mobilize politically in order to alter the balance of power and promote alternative core-values. But in the meantime, they have to obey the law and those core-values.

### 3.The symbolic Recognition of Diversity

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<sup>9</sup> The expression 'margizens' was introduced for the first time by Martiniello (1992).

Dominant ideas about European culture and identity are often rooted in a somewhat mystified vision of the past of the European continent with the consequence of potentially excluding many non-EU citizens, but also many EU citizens with an ethnic or racial minority background, of a full European belonging. Institutional visions of European multiculturalism which inform and are simultaneously informed by discussions and ideas on European culture, identity and citizenship can actually be interpreted as elements of a widespread concern about the optimal degree of cultural and identificational diversity not only acceptable in the European Union context, but defining the core of a European model of living together based on member states of the European Union.

There seems to be an important gap between the institutional visions of European multiculturalism and *de facto* multiculturalism, identity construction and cultural construction processes that can often be observed mainly in urban Europe. Individuals and groups who consider themselves as deeply European too (they may embrace other identities as well), who locate their social action in Europe are not recognised as 'real' European citizens because of their alleged cultural non-conformity with a European cultural substance mainly defined with reference to the past. Simply stated, whereas Europe is *de facto* increasingly multicultural and multi-identificational, institutional visions of multiculturalism, identity and culture in Europe remain restricted to the past as it is supposed to have forged the national identities and culture of the member states of the EU. European institutional multiculturalism rests on a substantial approach of culture and identity that conditions to a significant extent the opportunities of incorporation within European citizenship.

As seen above, the European Union and most of its member-States are *de facto* increasingly multiethnic, multicultural and multiracial. The various minorities living in the Member States whose presence is a consequence of colonialism, labour migrations processes and other patterns of human mobility are a living challenge to the mythical view of an ethnically, racially and culturally relatively homogeneous Europe which to be fair, is not the only view of how the European Union should look like. In urban Europe, ethnic segregation and discrimination is a reality in the labour market, in the school system, in housing, etc. It is counterbalanced by multicultural practices. European urban youth often display a 'soft' multiculturalism. They are open to the world, to diversity, to 'mélange' and they are attracted by cosmopolitan identities. To them, old national identities often seem obsolete. They prefer to display their multidimensional identities and their multiple affiliations. Sometimes though, very strict and exclusive ethno-national identities are asserted not only in social life but also in politics. Haider, Le Pen and the Vlaams Belang are also supported by parts of the youth. It would certainly be over simplistic to divide the European youth in two groups: the cosmopolitan group and the nationalistic and racist group. It is nevertheless clear that the possession of good educational, cultural and economic and social resources is often more favourable to the assertion of a cosmopolitan identity whereas social dislocation, poor education and economic marginality combined with the collapse of overarching ideologies, like for example the decline of communism, explain to some degree and in some cases the emergence of restrictive ethno-national identities among fractions of urban youth. But in any case, the problem of combining social and political unity with cultural and identificational diversity remains unsolved at the European level.

Recognizing symbolically the multifaceted diversity of the EU is a step in that direction. Therefore, it would be contradictory and discriminatory in the context of a multicultural Europe to mention Christian values as a core European value in a new European Constitution. If historically the religious heritage of the European Identity is undisputable, non-Christians, be they atheists, Muslims, Hindus or Sikhs, have also contributed to the development of Europe and will continue to do so in the future. Therefore, asking citizens to endorse a Constitution that exclude their religious or philosophical identity would stimulate separation instead of unity.

An important question is whether it is possible to recognise symbolically the multifaceted diversity of the EU without constructing sharp boundaries between ethnic groups whose members are supposed to share a distinctive and common culture and identity? The answer to that question is to be found in the developments above. If the diversity talk is a surrogate to the quest for social and economic inclusion and equality, the risk is to stimulate ethnicized opposition and conflict. If the symbolic recognition of diversity takes place at the same time as efforts to bring about more social and economic exclusion, the divisive effect of symbolic recognition of diversity will be very small.

#### 4.Integration, Diversity and Public Policies

Should the state and the supranational EU institutions intervene in the management of cultural diversity and in integration matters? This is a disputed issue in the European Union. On the one hand, in a more free-market approach some advocate the retreat of the state and the non-intervention of the EU in the area of integration and cultural diversity. In their view, those issues should be left to the work of time, to the market or to self-organisation of minorities who claim recognition. On the other hand, others, in a more interventionist approach, argue for an active presence of the state and of EU institutions in cultural and diversity affairs through various policy interventions.

The latter position seems more in line with the experience of nation building in Europe and with the process of European integration. Obviously, the articulation of the states' interventions and of the EU institutions' ones should be discussed carefully. Here again, the principle of subsidiarity might be useful to combine profitably state action and supranational action for the sake of the EU multicultural democracy.

Furthermore, once the principle of a public intervention, either by the states or by the EU institutions or by both, to reinforce multicultural democracy and citizenship is accepted, many other sensitive questions arise that need not only abstract normative treatment but also concrete policy-making: what type of public policies should be developed in order to combine the respect for diversity and the struggle against social and economic exclusion and inequalities ? Should minority groups be legally recognized? Should some groups enjoy special rights and which rights? What type of integration policies should be implemented? How about access to citizenship in European multicultural societies?

Again, there is no simple and global policy answer to those questions. It would be tempting to adopt a "model" of multicultural policies developed elsewhere, for example in Canada or in Australia, but policies do not necessarily travel well. A multicultural policy adapted to a national context in which it promotes efficiently integration can have the contrary effect when

implemented in another national setting. Therefore, policies should take into account the local social and political context as well as the sociological characteristics of the population and the demands of minority and majority groups in the field of cultural diversity.

Furthermore, the preference goes to the recognition of the various facets of diversity as such rather than to groups which identity need not be rigidified. However, groups need recognition as such too and a multicultural democracy needs to listen to identity recognition claims. Policies and subsidising are important forms of recognition that should always be reserved for groups that respect the core of values mentioned above, and whose political agenda is against the democratic system. There is no reason why a democracy should subsidise groups that want to destroy democracy even though it is the case in some countries where for example extreme-right parties have access to public money. On the same line, groups that oppress their members and do not respect their individual freedoms should not be subsidised either.

As to the fixation of collective rights and hence the recognition of ethnic, cultural and religious groups in the Constitutions, this solution must be considered with care. It should be the exception more than the rule. The first risk with constitutional recognition of groups is the give the image of a society made of separate groups more than of individual citizens who can of course form groupings too. In that respect, it favours more separation than integration and unity. The second risk is a “rigidification” of ethnic frontiers and the institutionalization of ethnic conflict between the groups recognized by the Constitution. The third risk is that since the Constitution are very stable, recognizing groups within it does make it more difficult to take into account the dynamics of diversification of diversity at work in Europe. The Belgian case illustrates perfectly the dilemmas of constitutional recognition of diversity. Imagined as a response to separatist tendencies, it has increased the conflict between the Belgian national groups. Obviously, when specific groups are threatened to disappear if not vigorously protected, constitutional recognition may be an element of solution.

Besides constitutional arrangements, many more flexible policies and legislations can be designed and implemented in order to promote and support diversity while simultaneously encouraging integration and unity. An exhaustive list of all multicultural policies available would go beyond the scope of this paper. Nevertheless, some policy interventions seem highly appropriate in the European context.

First, providing some financial support to immigrant associations engaged in actions aimed at encouraging a better knowledge of cultural diversity in a given society and also at bridging the gap between cultural groups is in principle an interesting tool. In many EU countries, intercultural and multicultural initiatives have been supported for quite a while. The Commission has also supported large immigrant associations to develop that type of work.

Second, strong anti-racist and anti-discrimination legislations and policies both at the national and at the EU level are a strong component of any multicultural democracy. The monitoring of racism and discrimination (ethnic, religious, based on sexual orientation, gender, etc.) is a crucial task of the institutions created in relation to those legislations and policies. At the EU level, one could mention the *European Monitoring Centre on Racism and Xenophobia*, which is going to be replaced by the *European Union Agency for Fundamental Rights*. At the national level, one

could mention the *Commission for Racial Equality* in Britain and the *Centre pour l'Égalité des chances et la lutte contre le racisme* in Belgium.

Third, opening up public education to cultural diversity is another crucial and multidimensional policy issue. One aspect of it relates to the issue of language training. Experiments were conducted in the past under the auspices of the Council of Europe to teach immigrant children “their language of origin”. These pilot programs were criticized because of their restrictive character and their potential for unwanted exclusion of immigrant children who were in a way forced to refer to the language of their parents.

A more adequate approach to the language issue would be as follows. Language is crucial to communication and communication is needed to promote a multicultural democracy. The more languages a person speaks, the more she or he will be able to communicate with different people. Therefore, a concrete suggestion is to adopt the principle multilingualism as a basis for language policies in the EU countries. Following that general starting point, it would be logical to encourage all the residents to speak the national language (at least one of the national languages in the cases of EU states that have more than one) of the country they live in. It also makes sense to encourage all the residents to learn as many other EU languages they want to learn and also non-EU languages among which, the languages of the countries of origin of the migrants.

On another matter, it is fair to underline that school curricula do not often incorporate cultural diversity and the contribution of immigration to nation building and EU building. Obviously, the school curricula would not gain in being uniform at the EU level. Nevertheless some general recommendations valid throughout Europe can be made. One of which would be that the national and European history of emigration and immigration should be included in the general courses of history.

A very hot issue in the present global political context is the accommodation of religious diversity. A first point is that especially after 9/11, debates about religious diversity in Europe and even more generally debates about cultural diversity tend to focus explicitly or implicitly on the position of Islam and Muslims. This could seem justified since Islam has become the second religion in many EU countries. But the issue of accommodation of religious diversity concerns all the religions represented in Europe as well as non-religious beliefs. The debate needs therefore to be enlarged also in view of accommodating new religions and beliefs that may appear in the future in the EU.

The member states of the EU differ in their way of dealing with religions. In some states, there is theoretically a sharp separation between churches and the state. In other states, there is an established religion with a privileged status. Finally some other states have developed a “concordat” regime defining the relations between the Catholic Church and the state through an agreement with the Vatican. Two observations can be made. First, the Amsterdam Treaty states that the EU respects the religious legislation specific to each member state. Second, for historical reasons, Islam has not been considered by these arrangements. The question therefore is how to ensure an equality of treatment of all religions and non-religious beliefs by the states of Europe. An equal treatment concretely means, that if Catholic or Protestant schools are accepted and receive public subsidies than Muslim or Buddhist schools should also receive in principle the same treatment. If religious dress codes are accepted or refused in the public space, the measures

should concerns all religious signs. If the principle of religious holidays is accepted, than all religions should be entitled to the same facilities, etc. Is it possible to do so while respecting the national religious legislations? It seems clear that a regime of separation between the state and religions offers the best prospects for an equal treatment of all religions and non-religious beliefs by the state. The German approach of “religious taxes” could be a starting point to discuss how public money should be raised to support fairly all religions and non-religious beliefs.

Access to citizenship is also a point of discussion in multicultural democracies. Some advocate that the acquisition of the nationality of the country of residence is the end point of the integration process. Others claim that making access to nationality easier is a form of recognition of new members of the society that will precisely foster the integration process and the identification with the new country. The debate is heated in many EU countries. In any case, it seems reasonable to liberalize access to citizenship for permanent residents after a period of time to be determined and also to allow for double citizenship. The reason for this is that people have very often double or even multiple identification that need to be respected. It could be claimed that for some immigrants with a long migration history, keeping the nationality of their country of origin is the only link with it and also the only witness of their migration experience. For the rest, they are very often fully integrated in the country of immigration. In such cases, a double citizenship clearly reflects a sociological reality.

Furthermore, the fact that EU citizenship is not accessible directly but only through the acquisition of the nationality of one of the member states is a problem that qualifies the aspirations of the present EU citizenship to be a real citizenship. It could be imagined to introduce a procedure of direct application for EU citizenship that would be discussed and agreed upon in the EU Parliament, in the national Parliaments and in the European Council.

## 5. Political Participation and Representation

Finally, the issues of political participation and representation are also of central importance in any multicultural democracy. In terms of political participation, the local voting and eligibility rights are already a reality in several member states of the EU. Despite resistances in some member states, the trend moves in that direction. Again, the local voting rights do have a symbolic value but they also provide a tool to participate in the management of the cities for all the residents. Forms of consultations could also be discussed in order to promote the local political participation of all residents and of immigrant origin citizens in particular. In that respect, the Council of Europe Convention on the Participation of Foreigners in Public Life at Local Level of February 5 1992 is certainly a document that could be ratified by at least the member states of the EU Union and of the Council of Europe. More generally, promoting various kinds of arenas for dialogue and discussion between citizens and residents is an interesting way to consolidate the EU democracy.

As to the issue of representation, it seems obvious that elected political institutions should reflect the sociology of the citizenry. In many EU countries, women, ethnic and immigrant groups are still largely underrepresented in formal politics. For example, in a country of immigration like France, there is virtually no French-Maghrebian in the Parliament! Positive action may be discussed as a means to encourage minorities to choose the former political career. Furthermore, political parties should be more welcoming to ethnic minority members.

To sum up, the conception of multicultural democracy and of EU multicultural citizenship advocated in this part of the paper is understood as a way to stimulate the discussion and not as a final project. It supposes the constitution of a citizenry made of active citizens who share the same rights and duties, the same public space, support the democratic project and respect the law and the legal and political procedures. These citizens can display varied and multiple identities as different cultural practices both in private and in public. Their identity and cultural choices do not affect their position in the social, economic and political order.

The dimension of gender certainly needs to be discussed in relation to immigrant integration and EU multicultural citizenship. All the ideas and policy suggestions should be discussed by considering their possible impact on gender relationships within immigrant groups but also on the possible differences in the integration process of immigrant women and men. Being gender blind in policy building does not preclude actual gender discrimination and inequality. The question is then how to shape integration policy that not only fosters immigrant integration but that also do it by promoting gender equality amongst immigrants.

Can the insights of the first 4 sections of the paper be translated into concrete policy proposals? I believe so as will be demonstrated in the conclusive section.

## **V. Integration (or participation) policies in Europe: some concrete proposals**

The following list of concrete policy proposals is not exhaustive and it does not pretend to solve all the delicate issues linked to integration and participation in the European Union understood as a continent of immigration. Not society is ever totally integrated whatever policies are implemented. However, they represent various attempts to move forward without repeating errors of the past in the area of immigration and integration policies in Europe.

Furthermore, some of the proposals presented below have either already been discussed or implemented totally or in part.

Finally, they focus on the role of the supranational European level in designing and implementing integration and participation policies.

1. Integration and participation of immigrants in Europe is undoubtedly a question of multilevel governance concerning the European level, the national, level and regional level and the local level. There is a need for a common European approach to integration that accommodate differentiated local policies. This necessity has been acknowledged and it has led to various EU documents. European institutions should continue their efforts since the documents on the table do not provided for a sufficient basis for defining a common, coherent and clear European approach to integration that is accepted by the Member states.

2. In such a hot debate as the integration debate, the principle of unanimity in the decision making process is too be completely and definitely abandoned in order to avoid inertia.

3. Since integration deals with culture, politics, society and the economy, there is a need for an interdepartmental approach in policy-making. Concerning specifically the European Commission, most Directorates-General and services, especially those dealing with Economy and society and with International Affairs, are potentially concerned more or less directly by integration issues. The cooperation between the various services should be stimulated in order to increase the chances to designing transversal policy tools.

4. The content of the national integration programmes for newcomers varies from one country to another. There is however a tendency to move in the direction of compulsory programmes for all immigrants. This is problematic is the idea is to develop a common European approach to integration and participation. In order to avoid incoherence and contradictions and to reaffirm the European democratic principles, the following proposals can be presented:

4.1 The integration programmes should be renamed adaptation programmes and be reserved to all new incoming migrants.

4.2 Adaptation programmes should be offered to any immigrant entering the EU legally. Member states should be strongly encouraged to offer optional programmes to all immigrants

4.3. The content of these adaptation programmes should vary with the type of migrant entering the EU. For example the needs of immigrants entering for family reunification reasons and the needs to short-term circular migrants are different. They need different levels of adaptation to the European society and therefore different adaptation programmes.

4.4. The adaptation programmes should have a strong European dimension, and not only a

national dimension. It would be interesting to inform the migrants about the European integration process, the functioning of the European Institutions and the rights of immigrants under EU law. In the long terms, this could also stimulate the attachment of the migrant to the European society (cultural integration)

5. Admission policies should more clearly be seen as the first step of the integration and participation process

6. Any idea of a one-fit-all integration policy is absurd. Integration policies should vary according to the type of migrant. Migrants whose aim is to become European citizens should be helped to get as close as possible of a fair participation in economics, culture, politics and social relations. Those migrants to come and go and have no intention to become European citizens should be required to obey the law but not necessarily to develop a sense of identification with the European society

7. Progresses in European immigration and integration policies have so far been achieved though what could be called a qualified top-down process involving civil servants, politicians and immigration lobbies. What is certainly missing is the direct voice of immigrants themselves. It could be interesting to solve that problem by thinking about the possibility to reinvent the Forum of Migrants and to involve it in all the preparatory discussions about immigration and integration policies. Practically, this proposal could however take a very long time to concretize.

8. Integration also depends on policies for the natives:

- Fighting the far-right is a good way to work for the integration (or participation) of migrants

- It would be useful to involve directly natives in the immigrants' integration process.

A feasibility study could be launched in that domain.

- The importance of good information campaigns can help to avoid the backlash effect when integration policies are implemented

9. In European policy making, the question of THE priority of integration policies is often asked. Should policies concentrate on labour market integration on social integration on political participation or on developing cultural attachment? In order to avoid that the differentiation of the integration (or participation) process becomes problematic, progress should be made simultaneously in these 4 dimensions.

10. A better integration of immigrants can in part be the result or the by-product of successful social and economic policies. Job creation, urban regeneration, European competitiveness, good health care policies, etc. can help immigrant integration, which can in turn help Europe to achieve these policy goals.

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