EVALUATION OF LOCAL INTEGRATION

FINAL REPORT

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Evaluating the Effectiveness of Humanitarian Engagement and Programming in Promoting Local Integration of Refugees in Zambia, Tanzania, and Cameroon

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Evaluating the Effectiveness of Humanitarian Engagement and Programming in Promoting Local Integration of Refugees in Zambia, Tanzania, and Cameroon

Submitted to:
Office of Policy and Resource Planning, Bureau of Population, Refugees, and Migration (PRM), U.S. Department of State

Prepared by:
Development and Training Services, Inc. (dTS)
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# ACRONYM LIST

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Acronym</th>
<th>Full Form</th>
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<tr>
<td>CAR</td>
<td>Central African Republic</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GRC</td>
<td>Government of the Republic of Cameroon</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GOT</td>
<td>Government of the United Republic of Tanzania</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GRZ</td>
<td>Government of the Republic of Zambia</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IRD</td>
<td>International Relief and Development</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NGO</td>
<td>Non-Governmental Organization</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NNTs</td>
<td>Newly Naturalized Tanzanians</td>
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<tr>
<td>PRM</td>
<td>Bureau of Population, Refugees, and Migration</td>
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<tr>
<td>UNHCR</td>
<td>Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees</td>
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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

Introduction
The purpose of this evaluation is to identify best practices in promoting local integration of refugee populations through humanitarian diplomacy and programming supported by the U.S. Department of State’s Bureau for Population, Refugees, and Migration (PRM) and one of its primary partners, the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR). The evaluation consisted of (1) a global desk review and historical analysis of local integration policies and practices, and (2) three field-based evaluations in Cameroon, Tanzania, and Zambia.

The desk review and site visits focused on three key questions:

1. To what extent has the programming and engagement of PRM and UNHCR promoted local integration?
2. What programmatic and diplomatic interventions, as identified by PRM and UNHCR, were most and least successful?
3. What should PRM and its partners be doing to support the self-reliance of refugee populations for whom voluntary return and resettlement are not feasible?

This one-year evaluation was conducted by two-person teams for the desk review and each of the country visits. The desk review included a review of hundreds of published and unpublished documents, including reports, articles, newspaper stories, websites, and databases. They represent perspectives of UNHCR and donor organizations, implementing partners, think-tanks, scholars, and journalists.

The country visits were three weeks each, for a total of 51 days in the three countries. The team conducted a series of interviews, made observations, and reviewed additional documentation. The interviews included key informants in the host government, U.S. government, other donor governments, UNHCR, other multinational organizations, and implementing partners. Site visits were made to all five relevant settlements in Tanzania and Zambia and a few villages with spontaneously settled refugees, and to a representative sample of host villages in Cameroon. In all, the evaluation team interviewed 694 refugees from settlements and in host villages, 306 nationals from the host villages, and 180 officials from host governments, governments of origin, UNHCR and other international organizations, partner governments, and implementing partners.

Findings and Conclusions
Refugees in Cameroon, Tanzania, and Zambia have experienced considerable success in local integration, especially when compared to most of the countries in the desk review portion of this evaluation.

In all three countries, economic integration has been reached as defined by refugees achieving self-reliance and a standard of living similar to the host community. The successes have been the result of a combination of factors: host governments providing fertile land, UNHCR and partner governments providing agricultural inputs and livelihood support, host communities’ openness to the refugees, and the refugees’ willingness to integrate with their host community. Unfortunately,
the standard of living is low and the vast majority of refugees from the Central African Republic (CAR), Burundi, and Angola continue to live in extreme poverty in the poorest regions of their host countries. It is not known how much better off the refugees would be if they were given access to wage-earning employment, more educational opportunities, full freedom of movement with greater access to markets, or legal recognition, given the also relatively limited economic status of the host communities. The refugees’ economic progress, like the nationals’ progress, is limited by insufficient access to water, sanitation facilities, health care, education and training, credit, roads, transportation, and communication systems.

The level of social integration is also high. Refugees are accepted into the host communities and the refugees feel safe and at home, live in similar housing, participate in personal and national celebrations, and develop relationships with nationals including intermarriage. This has mostly been a natural process because the refugees in these three cases share much in common with the nationals: language, religion, tribe, cultural, and history. The lack of freedom of movement in Tanzania and Zambia has somewhat limited the extent to which social integration has been achieved, but not significantly. In Cameroon, where refugees live in host villages, the opportunities for social integration are much greater.

Providing refugees rights, entitlements, and a pathway to citizenship makes legal integration a more challenging process. At this point in time, there is no indication that legal integration of CAR refugees will take place in Cameroon. Zambia is progressing nicely with its local integration strategy and will be successful in integrating 10,000 Angolans if all potential barriers are addressed. (Please see: Field Evaluation of Local Integration of Former Refugees in Zambia Field Visit Report, April 15, 2014 for more information on the potential barriers.) Of the three countries visited, Tanzania is the furthest along in terms of legal integration. The GOT has naturalized 162,156 Burundians and, as of October 17, 2014, has resumed providing certificates of citizenship. The GOT will also start the naturalization process for the children that have been born since the local integration program was put on hold in 2011, thus bringing the total to around 200,000 people benefiting. This is, by far, the largest group that has been offered naturalization by a country of first asylum.

The most critical factors in economic, social, and legal integration are controlled by the host government and host villages. The factors can be supported through diplomatic interventions by UNHCR, PRM, and other partner governments as specified in the recommendations below. Also specified in the recommendations below are opportunities for UNHCR, PRM, and partner governments to support local integration programs through supporting relevant programs.

**Recommendations**

Based on the findings and conclusions from the desk study and subsequent field visits to Zambia, Tanzania, and Cameroon, the evaluation team recommends the following actions that will increase the likelihood of successful local integration:

**Host Governments**

1. Adhere to the Refugee Convention of 1951. Host governments that have signed the Convention (144 countries to date) and are interested in supporting local integration should pay special attention to the following Articles of the Convention:
“17. Wage-Earning Employment - The Contracting State shall accord to refugees lawfully staying in their territory the most favourable treatment accorded to nationals of a foreign country in the same circumstances, as regards the right to engage in wage earning employment.

22. Public Education – The Contracting State shall accord to refugees the same treatment as is accorded to nationals with respect to elementary education. The Contracting States shall accord to refugees treatment as favourable as possible, and, in any event, not less favourable than that accorded to aliens generally in the same circumstances, with respect to education other than elementary education and, in particular, as regards access to studies, the recognition of foreign school certificates, diplomas and degrees, the remission of fees and charges and the award of scholarships.

26. Freedom of Movement – Each Contracting State shall accord to refugees lawfully in its territory the right to choose their place of residence to move freely within its territory, subject to any regulations applicable to aliens generally in the same circumstances.

27. Identity Papers – The Contracting State shall issue identity papers to any refugee in their territory who does not possess a valid travel document.

34. Naturalization – The Contracting State shall as far as possible facilitate the assimilation and naturalization of refugees. They shall in particular make every effort to expedite naturalization proceedings and to reduce as far as possible the charges and costs of such proceedings.”

2. Make birth certificates more accessible to refugees (and nationals). Based on the countries included in this evaluation, doing so may require revising the current national system so that birth certificates are accessible at the community level, eliminating the need for refugees (and nationals) to travel significant distances to obtain a birth certificate. Effective information campaigns are necessary to help refugees (and nationals) to learn the process for obtaining the certificate in a timely manner so that they are free of charge and to understand the importance of securing birth certificates for their children.

3. Carefully consider the disadvantages of restricting refugees to camps or settlements especially given the recognition that the vast majority of refugee situations are protracted. Disadvantages include:

- The implications of creating an enclave via camps or settlements, especially in terms of social integration; this could be mitigated if nationals are allowed and encouraged to live within the settlements or if settlements are in close proximity to host communities.
- Potential impact on the environment especially if considering designating protected lands for a camp or settlement.
- The challenges and cost of relocating refugees once they have been naturalized and/or the settlement has been degazetted.
• The stigma of being a refugee in a camp or settlement that may limit the full potential of the refugees and subsequently the positive impact they can have on the host country’s general socio-economic development indicators.

4. Make land available to refugees to promote self-reliance. The plots should be large enough to feed the household and generate some cash for non-food expenses such as clinic and school fees. The host government should seek the support of UNHCR and partner governments to provide training and other inputs to help farmers maintain the fertility of their land. At a minimum, this should include techniques such as crop rotation and natural fertilizers.

5. Survey the refugees to determine what skill sets they can use to contribute to the development process within the host communities. For example, those who have experience as teachers or nurses should be employed in the host communities’ schools and clinics. UNHCR is in a good position to facilitate this effort with the host country government.

6. Provide health workers and teachers to staff the clinics and schools constructed by UNHCR and partner governments as this type of assistance is not traditionally supported by donor governments.

7. Ensure the safety and security to refugees and refugee camps and/or settlements. Collaborate with UNHCR in learning and applying the rights within the Refugee Convention and the expectations on safety and security through orientation and training programs.

For recommendations specific to the countries included in this evaluation, please see the country reports for each:

• Field Evaluation of Local Integration of Former Refugees in Zambia: Field Visit Report, April 15, 2014
• Field Evaluation of Local Integration of Former Refugees in Tanzania: Field Visit Report, September 8, 2014
• Field Evaluation of Local Integration of Former Refugees in Cameroon: Field Visit Report, September 22, 2014

UNHCR

Diplomatic

1. Encourage and work with host governments to do all of the above, recognizing their sovereignty. In particular, support host governments in adhering to the Convention. This includes orientation at the highest levels of government and training local officials (immigration officers, police, school officials, etc.) and village chiefs regarding the rights of refugees.

2. Facilitate dialogue and share lessons among countries that are pursuing local integration. By connecting key people among hosting governments, circulating key documents related to local integration, and convening meetings, officials responsible for local integration will have guidance and encouragement to help them avoid problems experienced in other countries.
3. Engage the host country early regarding the three durable solutions, emphasizing the likelihood – and assisting host governments in preparing for – a protracted situation and how best to approach local integration. At a minimum, this could be done by encouraging host governments to provide land to help refugees become self-sufficient and by allowing freedom of movement. Focus the government on how the assistance and programs for refugees can contribute to the national development plan.

4. Establish and maintain good working relations with host governments at the national and local levels, village chiefs, and NGOs. Involve them in key decisions. This may include such things as meeting and orienting new officials, regular in-person meetings, and collaborating on key decisions. At the local level, UNHCR should seek their implementing partners’ help. While this requires additional time on individuals who are already stretched, the investment in developing good relations with the host government will have great dividends.

5. Design and implement communication strategies that keep refugees and local officials informed of the current refugee situation and the efforts toward each of the durable solutions. This is especially important when efforts to promote local integration have direct impact on refugees, host communities, and government districts and/or regions. The strategy should include both oral and written information in the major languages used by the refugees and in village meetings.

6. Build and maintain momentum among partner and donor governments to ensure continual support for local integration. Such efforts may include orienting new officials when they arrive in-country; conducting familiarization trips to see the conditions of the refugees; coordinating communication among partner government, NGOs, and multilateral actors; and convening coordination meetings.

**Programmatic**

1. Continue to place emphasis on all aspects of protection – both physical security and access to services and rights – given that peace and security are what refugees value most. Legal assistance programs are key for refugees to exercise and access their rights and services.

2. Provide agricultural inputs such as tools and seeds to help move refugees toward food self-reliance. (See Sphere Handbook for livelihood standards.) UNHCR should work with implementing partners to distribute the inputs and to provide training on farming techniques (especially important if refugees come from a non-agricultural background) and on ways to maintain the fertility of the land given the likelihood of a protracted situation.

3. Work with local and national government officials, as well as implementing partners, to ensure that refugees have access to water, latrines, health care, and education in compliance with international standards or, at a minimum, at parity with host communities. This should also include coordination with development partners and the host government to ensure long-term sustainability of services and infrastructure. If there is a shortage of civil society actors, government and donors may need to turn to and/or leverage the private sector to assist and invest in development priorities.
4. Develop a strategy that benefits host communities in every situation. When water points, latrines, health clinics, and schools are constructed, they should be available to both refugees and the host community.

5. Where assistance and services are provided post-emergency to vulnerable refugees, UNHCR should incorporate vulnerable host community members as well. This will help ease tensions between refugees and nationals and ensure that the host communities continue to welcome refugees.

6. Provide legal assistance including legal aid programs and access to the national legal system. Access to legal aid can facilitate access to birth certificates, work permits, identification documentation, legal immigration, and due process for refugees that have been detained or arrested.

7. Explore the possibility of funding national NGOs to establish microcredit programs in areas where local integration is being pursued. This will help refugees make investments in education, training, modern equipment and other things that will help them break the cycle of poverty.

PRM

Diplomatic. PRM needs to dedicate an appropriate level of human and financial resources to promoting and operationalizing local integration efforts. This can include the following:

1. Deploy high-level officials to encourage host governments to adhere to the Convention, especially in terms of naturalization. For example, PRM should take advantage of the travel of the Assistant Secretary, or his/her designees, to promote local integration or to address barriers to ongoing local integration efforts. In countries where the barriers are at a high-level within the host government, PRM should request an intervention of a U.S. government official at the corresponding level.

2. Designate at least one local integration officer in Washington who is exclusively focused on monitoring local integration efforts and providing troubleshooting and problem-solving support where progress is lagging; liaising with UNHCR local integration officers and U.S. embassy personnel; sharing information and convening meetings regarding local integration strategies and best practices; and identifying resources to support local integration.

3. Encourage Embassy Chiefs of Mission to allow foreign service officers with refugee portfolios in U.S. embassies to devote a greater percentage of their time to refugee issues. Where local integration is being pursued, refugees should not be a marginal or add-on responsibility.

4. Increase dialogue and coordination within the government, especially USAID, to address post-emergency, development needs. A written policy with a mandate between USAID and PRM to coordinate post-emergency needs may be necessary to outline the steps for development projects in refugee protracted areas.
5. Clarify which part of the U.S. government should take responsibility for addressing water supply and sanitation needs in host communities, as well as health care and education.

6. Improve tracking of PRM’s diplomatic efforts through written documentation that is accessible to PRM in Washington. This will allow PRM to track its interventions and contributions and determine where it has had an impact and where efforts could be strengthened.

Programmatic. PRM should focus programmatic resources on the following types of activities:

1. Support livelihood interventions through international and local NGOs. The support should include both the relevant inputs and related training. For the most part, this will focus on agricultural and agricultural-related activities and include seeds and tools, as well as training in ways to maximize productivity of the land. It should also be at a large enough scale that the households can move beyond a subsistence existence.

2. Explore the possibility of funding international NGOs to establish microcredit programs in areas where local integration is being pursued. This will help refugees make investments in education, training, modern equipment and other things that will help them break the cycle of poverty.

3. Improve the administration of one-year funding to eliminate delayed start dates and funding gaps from year to year. PRM has the ability to award a total amount and can obligate in smaller amounts as the funds become available. In addition, inform implementing partners about the possibility of multi-year funding.

4. Continue requiring that all PRM implementing partners submit reports to PRM and that they are maintained in a central location. PRM should also consider requiring a final, cumulative report for a series of one-year programs implemented by the same partner with similar objectives for the same refugee situation and country. This will provide a more comprehensive account of the successes and challenges of local integration.
CHAPTER I: INTRODUCTION

A. SCOPE OF WORK

The purpose of this evaluation is to identify best practices in promoting local integration of refugee populations through humanitarian diplomacy and programming supported by the U.S. State Department’s Bureau for Population, Refugees, and Migration (PRM) and one of its primary partners, the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR). The evaluation consisted of (1) a global desk review and historical analysis of local integration policies and practices, and (2) field-based evaluations in Cameroon, Tanzania, and Zambia.

Please see Historical Desk Review and Analysis of Refugee Local Integration Efforts: Initial Findings and Conclusions, December 2, 2013 for a broader analysis of local integration. Please also see Field Evaluation of Local Integration of Former Refugees in Zambia: Field Visit Report, April 15, 2014; Field Evaluation of Local Integration of Former Refugees in Tanzania: Field Visit Report, September 8, 2014; and Field Evaluation of Local Integration of Former Refugees in Cameroon: Field Visit Report, September 22, 2014 for more details on local integration efforts in the three countries studied.

The desk review and site visits focused on three key questions:

1. To what extent has the programming and engagement of PRM and UNHCR promoted local integration?
2. What programmatic and diplomatic interventions, as identified by PRM and UNHCR, were most and least successful?
3. What should PRM and its partners be doing to support the self-reliance of refugee populations for whom voluntary return and resettlement are not feasible?

Not all countries were examined in the global review. Likewise, the site visits did not look at all refugee populations within the three countries. In Cameroon, the evaluation focused on the 2005 caseload and did not include the ongoing arrivals; in Tanzania it focused on the 1972 Burundians and did not include the 1993 caseload; and in Zambia the evaluation included all Angolan refugees, although the government’s local integration program focuses on refugees in settlements who arrived between 1966 and 1986.

B. METHODOLOGY

This one-year evaluation was conducted by two-person teams for the desk review and each of the country visits. The desk review included a review of hundreds of published and unpublished documents including reports, articles, newspaper stories, websites, and databases. They represented perspectives of UNHCR and donor organizations, implementing partners, think-tanks, scholars, and reporters.
The country visits were three weeks each, for a total of 51 days in the three countries. The team conducted a series of interviews, made observations, and reviewed additional documentation. The interviews included key informants in the host government, U.S. government, other donor governments, UNHCR, other multinational organizations, and implementing partners. Site visits were made to all five relevant settlements in Tanzania and Zambia and a few villages with spontaneously settled refugees, and to a representative sample of host villages in Cameroon. In all, the evaluation team interviewed the following:

- 694 Refugees from settlements and in host villages
- 306 Nationals from the host villages
- 180 Officials from host governments, governments of origin, UNHCR and other international organizations, partner governments, and implementing partners

The team aimed to have an even split of males and females among refugees and nationals, as well as representation of various ages groups: under 18, 18-29, 30-50, and over 50. In the settlements, interviews were conducted in a variety of sectors and villages. In the case of Cameroon, UNHCR and its partners were careful to select villages that represented a variety of perspectives, factoring in the amount of assistance that had been given to the village, religious make-up of the refugees and nationals, and geography. Within the villages and sectors, the team could not determine how representative the sample was because the recruitment of participants was done by village leaders, implementing partners, and settlement officials.

Interviews were conducted either in focus groups or one-on-one. In all cases, semi-structured interview guides were used to help ensure comparability across groups and countries. The guides were adapted to the situation in each country visited.
CHAPTER II: BACKGROUND

A. LOCAL INTEGRATION AS A DURABLE SOLUTION

Naturalization of a refugee in the country of refuge is a key principle in the refugee convention. As stated in Article 34, “The Contracting States shall as far as possible facilitate the assimilation and naturalization of refugees. They shall in particular make every effort to expedite naturalization proceedings and to reduce as far as possible the charges and costs of such proceedings” (UNHCR Website: 1951 Convention and Protocol). This fundamental principle is again mandated in the statute that governs the office of UNHCR whereby the organization is required not only to protect refugees, but also must seek “durable solutions” for refugees. According to the UNHCR Resettlement Handbook, the three durable solutions are:

- **Voluntary repatriation**, in which refugees return in safety and with dignity to their country of origin and re-avail themselves of national protection
- **Local integration**, in which refugees legally, economically and socially integrate in the host country, availing themselves of the national protection of the host government
- **Resettlement**, in which refugees are selected and transferred from the country of refuge to a third country which has agreed to admit them as refugees with permanent residence status

While priorities have changed over time, voluntary repatriation is currently the favored option and less than one percent of the refugee population benefit from resettlement as a durable solution (U.S. Department of State, Refugee Admissions). Given that not all refugees can or will go home and few resettle to a third country, effectively promoting and implementing local integration is important. Discovering and applying best practices to promote local integration through humanitarian diplomacy and programming is of critical value. All three durable solutions must be equally explored, adapted, and then applied to all refugee settings. The priority of this review is local integration.

B. DEFINING AND MEASURING LOCAL INTEGRATION

In order to explore the practices of local integration, it must first be defined. There is a plethora of definitions for local integration, yet no single, universal definition. Nor does the Refugee Convention provide a legal definition of local integration except in Article 34, which clearly states that it should include naturalization, and there be a step toward full citizenship. Based upon the literature, local integration is most commonly defined as a process involving three broad categories: economic, social, and legal integration where a refugee achieves certain minimum standards within the host country’s social, economic, and legal frameworks (UNHCR Website: 1951 Convention and Protocol).

Economic integration is the process wherein a refugee is able to participate in the job or self-employment market, including farming, that is commensurate with their skills and/or they obtain a standard of self-sufficiency or a standard of living that is similar to the host country population. Examples of key economic factors that lead to self-sufficiency are access to land for at least
subsistence farming and/or cash crops, access to local markets to sell goods, access to daily worker or casual labor markets, access to credit, livelihood training, and access to professional licenses and/or work permits (Kuhlman, Aug 1990:3).

Social integration is a reciprocal process wherein the host community and state accepts the refugee into their community without fear of discrimination, intimidation, or repression and the refugee is able to create and maintain social bonds and links within the host community (Crisp, 2004:1-2). When refugees are socially integrated they feel at home in the host country, feel safe, live in similar housing, speak the same language as the host community, participate in national celebrations, and develop relationships with members of other communities including inter-marriages.

Legal integration is best defined as a process “…whereby refugees are granted a progressively wider range of rights and entitlements by the host state…The process whereby refugees gain and accumulate rights may lead to the acquisition of permanent residence rights and ultimately to the acquisition of citizenship in the country of asylum” (Crisp, 2004:1-2). Indicators of legal integration are freedom of movement, travel documents (such as a passport), residential permits, work permits, and the ultimate final step of official citizenship or permanent residency.

The processes of economic, social, and legal integration are interdependent. The three processes can also be catalysts for further integration. For example, a refugee who is employed within the host community will by default increase the social links and knowledge of the community. If a refugee has access to health and education services, this also serves as a greater social and cultural catalyst through the exposure and contact the refugee will have within a host community. Certain elements of legal integration, such as freedom of movement, increase the ability of a refugee to have access to markets thus increasing the chances of economic integration and self-sufficiency. Additionally, one of the most important indicators of local integration that encompasses all integration processes is safety and security. A refugee must feel safe and secure in order to even begin to locally integrate. If harassment, discrimination, violent and/or criminal acts are a constant threat to a refugee this will severely constrain the ability of a refugee to integrate economically, socially, and/or legally (Kuhlman, Aug 1990:3).
CHAPTER III: INDICATORS AND BEST PRACTICES

A. REFUGEES ARE SELF-RELIANT

Economic integration of refugees is most often defined in terms of achieving self-sufficiency. It can be measured by the extent to which refugees rely on external assistance to meet their basic needs; when they no longer rely on any assistance they are deemed fully self-sufficient. In the cases of Cameroon, Tanzania, and Zambia, the absence of food assistance – except to the most vulnerable – means that the refugees from Central African Republic (CAR), Burundi, and Angola are self-sufficient.

Another possible way to measure economic integration is whether refugees have achieved a standard of living that is comparable to the host community. In all three countries studied in this evaluation, the refugees have a standard of living comparable to the host population. If however, economic integration were measured by comparing the standard of living in the host country to the standard of living they enjoyed in their country of origin, the conclusion for the CAR refugees would be less positive. Before they were forced from CAR, many refugees owned cattle which translated into greater income than they currently enjoy. Likewise, if economic integration were defined by the absolute standard of living, the conclusion is even more dismal for refugees in these three countries. The refugees in this study live in three of the least developed countries in the world, according to their ratings in the UNDP Human Development Index Report. Furthermore, they live in remote locations that are among the least developed regions of the country where the majority of people are subsistence farmers. With their hand-to-mouth existence, they are among the poorest of the poor.

The best practices in helping refugees achieve economic integration are providing access to land and access to employment or other forms of livelihoods. The theory at the beginning of the study was that access to credit and skills training were also key factors, but unfortunately there were too few examples in the three countries to draw strong conclusions regarding the role of credit or skills training. However, based on the literature review, the theory that livelihoods can be improved through credit and skills training remains a valid theory.

Access to Land. The governments of Tanzania and Zambia designated land to establish refugee settlements and gave plots to refugees where they could construct homes and cultivate crops. In Cameroon, where refugees live in host villages rather than settlements, it has been left to the village chiefs to determine the location and amount of land for refugees. There are also examples in Cameroon of refugees renting land or buying it.

In Tanzania, refugees received approximately five hectares of land and in Zambia 2.5 hectares per household. In these two countries, the land that refugees have for farming is generally adequate for feeding their families and producing a little cash income. They eat better just after the harvest
and less well as they approach the next year’s harvest. In Tanzania, some farmers also produce cassava and tobacco as cash crops.

Refugees in Tanzania and Zambia also benefited from receiving seeds and tools to establish their farms. The refugees desperately wish fertilizer were more accessible because, after farming the same plots for 40-50 years, the fertility of the land has decreased and so it is no longer as productive as it once was. Another challenge is that the plots that were originally given to each household are now shared by multiple households. For example, a Tanzanian family with two parents and six children received four hectares of land in 1972, which averaged to 0.5 hectares per person. If each of the children married and had six children, there would be 50 people sharing that same plot of land now, which would average 0.08 hectares per person. In both Tanzania and Zambia, there are now grandchildren sharing the land. Some families have worked around this challenge by taking over land left by those who repatriated or land that has not yet been claimed.

The refugees in Cameroon have been there for less than 10 years and face different challenges. Before fleeing to Cameroon, the CAR refugees’ livelihoods were based on herding. Unfortunately, many lost their cattle during the conflict and arrived in Cameroon with no livestock and no experience in farming. UNHCR and implementing partners have helped the refugees negotiate for land to farm. In the best cases, this effort resulted in refugees getting plots of land close to their homes that were large enough to feed their families. In other villages, the chief has opted to make land available for community farms. In one such village, the chief has made 27 hectares available for a community farm that 39 families cultivate. If the average family size is eight, that is 0.09 hectares per person. However, the average family size is likely much higher, as one of the refugees interviewed has four wives and 40 children. This particular family does not get enough from the community farm to feed their family at least two meals a day and must rely on income-generating activities that involve the wives and children. Another challenge with this community farm is that it is far from the village center and the refugees must walk for hours to reach it (it took 30 minutes to reach it by truck). This makes the community farm an inefficient solution.

Implementing partners, funded by PRM and other donors, have also provided agricultural training, seeds, tools, and cattle for animal traction to the refugees in Cameroon. This has helped them transition from herders to farmers toward self-sufficiency. This is a tentative status, however; with a poor rainfall or if cattle – owned either by refugees or the host community – destroy their fields, all will be lost and they must turn to their extended family and neighbors for help.

So, while access to land is critical to becoming self-reliant and economically integrated, the relatively small plots of land, reliance on hand tools, and the lack of fertilizer, make it difficult for the refugees in Cameroon, Tanzania, or Zambia to escape the cycle of poverty.

**Access to Employment.** Countries that have signed the Convention are expected to “accord to refugees…the most favourable treatment acceded to nationals of a foreign country in the same circumstances, as regards the right to engage in wage earning employment.” The evaluation team did not closely review the treatment of non-refugee foreigners, but learned that only a handful of refugees are engaged in wage-earning employment. The two main challenges refugees face is that they do not know the process for getting a work permit or it is thought to be impossible because refugees generally do not have the required documentation (birth certificates). The lack of
understanding is not only among refugees, but also government officials who believe that refugees do not have the right to engage in employment in the formal sector.

Refugees are often precluded from working in the formal sector because they seldom have the required skills. The majority of refugees from CAR, for example, are limited by their prior experience as herders and their newly acquired skills as farmers.

In the cases of Tanzania and Zambia, refugees are also limited to working in the formal sector because they lack freedom of movement. Refugees must obtain exit passes to leave their settlements and generally these are valid for a short-time. While this precludes them from formal employment, it gives them limited opportunity to engage in casual labor. This is somewhat common in Zambia where refugees get permission to leave the settlements to do things such as manual labor for large-scale farmers or construction work.

Livelihood Support. The primary source of income for refugees in Cameroon, Tanzania, and Zambia is agriculture-related and therefore the focus of livelihood support has been providing seeds and tools. In Cameroon it has also included agricultural training because CAR refugees arrived with no farming experience.

The livelihood support in Tanzania and Zambia stopped some time ago, so it is difficult to learn much about it. However, livelihood support is on-going in Cameroon so the evaluation team was able to observe it and talk to refugees who are benefitting from it.

UNHCR, PRM, and others have been supporting livelihood efforts in Cameroon. One example of livelihood support is the funding that PRM has provided to International Relief and Development (IRD), a U.S.-based organization. For three years (fiscal years 2010-2012), PRM provided a total of $2.2 million for agricultural and livelihood programs in the East and Adamawa regions. Despite repeated requests, interviews with IRD-specific beneficiaries of this program were limited. PRM provided the evaluation team with some reports and IRD provided the team with their fourth quarter report for their final year of funding, but the required reporting format makes comprehensive analysis challenging. Despite the limited information from interviews with beneficiaries and IRD reports, the evaluation team finds IRD’s self-reporting to be credible based on observations and interviews with a wide range of refugees.

Overall, with PRM funding, IRD has helped teach a nomadic, non-farming culture how to cultivate and harvest crops for household consumption, income generation, and contributing to community crop storage. IRD believes that one of its main contributions has been helping refugees negotiate with village leaders and landowners or land to produce crops for household consumption and for cash income.

Other income-generating activities in Cameroon include community chicken farms, machines for manually grinding beans and ground nuts, hand carts for hauling wood from the bush to the road where they can sell it, and materials for drying cassava. These are relatively small investments, require considerable labor, and generate very little income for the beneficiaries. So despite these investments, the refugees continue to live hand-to-mouth. They have no surplus income to invest
in expanding the activity to generate more income and thus are likely to continue living in extreme poverty with no real prospects for progressing.

**Skills Training.** Theoretically, if refugees could obtain additional skills, they would expand their employment opportunities. In Cameroon, Tanzania, and Zambia, this is not happening because of the lack of skills training opportunities.

In one of the settlements in Tanzania, there is a technical school, but the evaluation team did not encounter anyone who had attended it or who knew about it. In the settlements where tobacco is grown, tobacco companies provide training to the farmers who sell to them. In Zambia, technical training was provided years ago, but few were able to apply their training because they did not have the required resources. For example, those trained in tailoring lacked a sewing machine and those trained in business management did not have start-up capital to create a business.

**Access to Credit.** Access to credit has the potential to strengthen self-reliance through refugees starting businesses or purchasing greater quantities and varieties of seed, fertilizer, and ultimately modern farm equipment and means to transport crops to markets. Through credit, one can also pay for education which leads to additional economic opportunities and greater self-reliance.

Refugees in this study do not have experience with credit, either in their home countries or their host countries. They are hesitant to borrow large sums of money because they are afraid they will not be able to repay it. They also do not believe they can access credit without being citizens of the host country. In one settlement in Tanzania, refugees get around this by joining cooperatives with nationals and borrowing money through the cooperatives. In all three countries studied, it is common for refugees to borrow money from friends, neighbors, or shop owners to pay for medical fees or to buy food while waiting for the next harvest.

Access to credit is also limited by the fact that banks, lending institutions, or micro-credit programs are not available in most of the villages and settlements where refugees live. If refugees had access to credit, they said they would use it to start businesses or buy fertilizer or other things that could potentially lift them out of poverty.

**B. REFUGEES FEEL AT HOME**

An indication of refugees’ social integration is the extent to which they feel at home in their host country and are interested in making it their new home. This feeling may come from being safe and secure, have permanent – or at least semi-permanent – housing structures, and by being socially connected to the home community.

In the three countries studied, refugees feel very much at home to the extent that they identify themselves as nationals of the host country rather than their birth country. The best practices in helping promote social integration include ensuring that refugees are safe, allowing them to build homes, and promoting social connections.

**Safety and Security.** The most basic right a refugee has is the right to a safe asylum. At a minimum, they should have protection from political or other forms of persecution (1951
To feel safe, they need physical protection – protection from torture, rape, abuse, and human trafficking. Ideally, they “should receive at least the same rights and basic help as any other foreigner who is a legal resident, including freedom of thought, of movement and freedom from torture and degrading treatment” (UNHCR Protecting Refugees).

In Cameroon, Tanzania, and Zambia, refugees are physically safe. In their host countries they no longer feel that their lives are in danger and they can sleep peacefully at night. Of all the things heard from refugees in the three countries visited during this evaluation, “peace” was mentioned more than any other thing. Given what they escaped from in their home country, they certainly do not take for granted the peace and safety they feel in their host country.

They also believe that there is a low incidence of crime. While some are aware that there is theft, rape, defilement, domestic abuse, beatings, and murder, they recognize that every community has its share of crime. They know that when a crime is committed, they should report it to the village chief, the neighborhood watch committee (where one exists), or police. Unfortunately, communication with the police is challenging because their offices are few and far between and these areas have poor communication systems, a lack of transportation, and poor roads.

Some exceptions to feeling of safety include the constant threat of deportation that refugees in Zambia feel who do not live in one of the settlements. In Cameroon, refugees as well as host communities, feel some threat to their safety from the newly arrived refugees from CAR who have caused security incidences. However, this is mitigated by the protection they have from the police and special forces.

**Housing.** To help refugees socially integrate, they need a place to call home. Ideally, they should be given a plot of land and allowed to build a permanent or semi-permanent structure on par with the host community’s housing.

The refugees in the settlements in Tanzania and Zambia were given plots of land and allowed to build semi-permanent or permanent structures to live in. The most common construction is mud brick with thatched roofs. However, refugees also use cement to build their homes and/or corrugated iron roofs. Glass windows and hinged doors are also used to construct homes. These are the same materials that are used by the host community to build their homes. There is a full range of size and quality of house construction among the refugees, just as there is among the host community. Based on housing, it appears that the refugees in this study are fully integrated.

Some refugees in Cameroon have been given a plot of land where they could build a home, but in some villages they rent homes. The self-settled in Tanzania and Zambia are at the mercy of the village chiefs who may or may not give them a plot of land to build a house.

**Social Connections.** Refugees tend to flee to neighboring countries where a common language is spoken and where they may have family, tribal, cultural, religious, or historical ties. In some cases, they have similar names and similar features, making it difficult to distinguish refugees from nationals. When refugees are allowed to settle near the border or locations where they have a lot in common with the host community, their social integration is natural. In Tanzania, when the government was considering requiring relocation to other regions as part of the naturalization
process, there was concern that the social integration of refugees would experience a set-back because they would be moved to a location where they may not have much in common with their new village neighbors.

The refugees from CAR, Burundi, and Angola face no significant social barriers with their host communities. They attend school together; play sports together, worship together, and celebrate holidays together. Marriages between refugees and nationals are also common and well accepted. In Tanzania and Zambia, the breadth of integration would be greater if refugees had more freedom of movement or if the nationals were encouraged to live in the settlements among the refugees.

C. EQUALITY BETWEEN REFUGEES AND HOST COMMUNITIES

When refugees are completely integrated – economically, socially, and legally – the host government will treat them similar to nationals. The host government will follow the best practices of allowing refugees to move as freely as nationals, granting them equal access to services, encouraging them to participate in managing the villages and settlements where they live, providing documentation, and creating a pathway to citizenship. To date, there is only one case – Guatemalans in Mexico – where refugees are completely integrated.

In the three counties studied, refugees are generally treated equally in terms of access to services and collaboration in managing villages and settlements. However, their freedom of movement is very limited, thus limiting their economic and social integration, and their legal integration is limited by their lack of documentation. There is currently no intention on the part of Cameroonian government to facilitate the naturalization process for CAR refugees. However, the Zambian government is implementing a plan that will give 10,000 Angolan refugees the opportunity to become citizens and the Tanzanian government is in the final stages of granting citizenship to more than 162,000 former Burundi refugees. Specifically, the Zambian Government (GRZ) remains committed to durable solutions for its former refugee population, including a local integration program to resettle former refugees among local Zambians in government-provided zones. GRZ officials emphasize the importance of continued international donor support, however, for infrastructure projects to build community schools, attract commerce and business, and provide basic services for the population in the resettlement area.

Freedom of Movement. Freedom of movement is a basic right included in the Convention. Respecting this right allows refugees to move freely around the host country and mix socially with nationals. It also allows refugees to access employment (if the right to employment is respected) or casual labor beyond their village or settlement, as well as to access markets for buying and selling goods, which contributes to economic integration. Freedom of movement also allows refugees to leave their villages for secondary and tertiary education.

CAR refugees in Cameroon generally have freedom of movement. Refugees are required to carry with them their UNHCR identification card and are penalized if they are stopped by police or immigration officers and do not have their card. This requirement is being enforced more now that the government is trying to keep the newly arrived refugees in the camps near the border. This has made the old caseload refugees feel as if their freedom of movement is threatened.
Refugees in the settlements in Tanzania and Zambia do not have freedom of movement. Despite the lack of fences or secure “gates,” refugees are required to get exit passes to leave the settlements. While few refugees are denied exit passes, the passes are somewhat inaccessible given that it can take several hours to walk to the administrative office that issues them and several hours back home. The passes are valid for travel anywhere in the country but only for short periods of time; up to 14 days in Tanzania and several weeks to several months in Zambia. There are, of course, exceptions for medical treatment and education. And, naturally, there are refugees that leave the settlements without the required passes.

Spontaneously settled refugees in Tanzania and Zambia technically have freedom of movement. In Zambia, however, they live in constant fear that if they are stopped and cannot prove they are refugees (they are not registered with UNHCR and therefore have no identification cards), they will be deported. Nor are identification cards common among the spontaneously settled refugees in Tanzania so they feel compelled to request written permission from their village chief to travel to another village.

In all three countries, there is a lack of understanding among government officials, especially immigration officers and police, about the rights of refugees. They do not understand or respect their right to freedom of movement. This can result in beatings, detainment, imprisonment, or extortion.

**Access to Services.** According to UNHCR, refugees should have access to medical care and schooling ([UNHCR Protecting Refugees](https://www.unhcr.org/protection/refugees.html)). While a handful of refugees reported that they feel discrimination when it comes to health care and education, refugees in Cameroon, Tanzania, and Zambia generally have access to health clinics and primary education similar to the host communities’ access. Refugees also have access similar to nationals when it comes to water supply and sanitation.

Distance to health facilities and schools limits access because sick or pregnant refugees and schoolchildren may have to walk for hours to receive services. Health care and education are even more limited when it comes to advanced health care at hospitals or to secondary schools because the distances are greater. Cost can also limit accessibility, especially when it comes to medications as well as secondary school tuition and boarding fees.

The number of health care and education facilities is insufficient for the number of refugees and nationals. And where facilities exist, they are generally not well staffed in terms of medical doctors (there were no doctors in any of the settlements or villages visited as part of this study) or qualified teachers. Partner governments, UNHCR, and UNICEF have contributed to the construction of clinics and schools, but it is the responsibility of the host government to ensure that they are staffed with appropriately trained medical professionals and teachers.

The services offered to refugees and their host communities are at a basic level and will not help them escape poverty. Similarly, the lack of good roads and telecommunication will limit refugees’ participation in the national economy and impede sustainable development. Ideally, these issues would be addressed by development donors and partners, but this is not the case in the areas of Cameroon, Tanzania, and Zambia where refugees live. Unfortunately, there are no significant
development activities in these areas or indication that development partners intend to work in these areas in the foreseeable future. As in so many other places in the world, there is inadequate coordination between those who fund and implement emergency assistance and those who fund and implement development assistance. In addition, there are funding constraints, competing priorities, as well as mandate and authority questions.

**Access to Legal Services.** Obtaining equality between host community and refugees often requires legal assistance for refugees. Legal assistance can break through barriers or create administrative procedures that help refugees secure their rights. For example, most refugees have difficulty obtaining a birth certificate because they do not understand the bureaucratic process. In this case, legal assistance can facilitate the bureaucratic process, inform communities, and potentially develop a streamlined process for birth registration and obtaining birth certificates. Another example is that refugees in Tanzania are allowed to request work permits, but this is not widely known information and there is no service to facilitate access to work permits.

Legal services also provide for greater rule of law. For example, in the Mishamo settlement in Tanzania, legal disputes and conflicts are more easily resolved because the government has placed the lower courts system within the settlement boundaries. This allows refugees to access the same court processes as Tanzanians. However, it was unclear how the Burundians are accessing legal representation, thus legal aid services are essential.

There is a lack of legal assistance for refugees who do not wish to repatriate but who have been excluded, for now, from the process of naturalization or permanent residency. For example, in Zambia, the pathway to citizenship is only being offered to Angolans who arrived from 1966 to 1986. For those who arrived after 1986 and do not want to return to Angola, it remains unclear how will they access any assistance for appealing or seeking a different solution so that they are not stateless. The 1972 Burundians who spontaneously settled in villages in the Kigoma region of Tanzania are in a similar situation. They have not yet been offered naturalization and thus remain refugees without any clear status for their future. This will become especially problematic if cessation of refugee status for 1972 arrivals is implemented by the GOT after finalizing the citizenship process for the larger group.

The governments of Tanzania and Zambia designated land to establish refugee settlements and gave plots to refugees where they could construct homes and cultivate crops. While there is a plan in place in Zambia for land ownership for the refugees who obtain permanent residency, there was no indication of a plan in Tanzania for new citizens to obtain land titles. The same is true for Cameroon, but there is currently no pathway to citizenship so the issue of land ownership is less urgent at this time. A legal aid service can help secure land titles and, if there are land disputes or burdensome administrative procedures, the service can resolve disputes and can facilitate common land and property issues.

**Collaboration in Managing Villages.** Providing opportunities for refugees to collaborate with nationals in managing the settlements and villages where they live has given them a voice so that their concerns and interests are known.
In Tanzania and Zambia the Ministries of Home Affairs provide oversight of the settlements. Refugees then serve in elected positions such as chairman, vice chairman, block or sector leader, etc. Refugees are involved in various committees for water, school, neighborhood watch, community development, and welfare. The refugee leaders also communicate with traditional leaders in neighboring host communities. At the time of the evaluation, no thought had been given to governance issues in Zambia when refugees are relocated under the local integration program or how governance responsibilities will change once the newly naturalized Tanzanians’ citizenship is recognized and they are no longer required to live in settlements.

Unfortunately, the spontaneously settled refugees generally do not have a strong voice in management of their host villages. In Tanzania, for example, the refugees are under the leadership of the village chairperson and are not allowed to run for office or formally participate in village councils or committees.

In Cameroon refugees participate in the management of their host villages, but not to the same extent as nationals. For example, refugees participate in village water or health committees, and may even lead the committees, but the role of village chief is filled by a Cameroonian. Villages may also have a person who represents the refugees and works closely with the chief.

While collaboration gives refugees a voice, it also gives nationals a voice. In Cameroon, for example, village chiefs made UNHCR and implementing partners aware of the fact that nationals were unhappy that all the benefits were going to the refugees and the host community was getting nothing. Their voice was heard and now, in addition public services being available to refugees and nationals, other assistance such as income-generating activities are given to both refugees and nationals according to a 70-30 ratio. This has helped ease tensions between the two groups and built stronger communities. In Zambia, UNHCR is funding Quick Impact Projects that specifically benefit the host communities.

**Documentation.** In addition to being a best practice, it is the responsibility of the host government to provide identify papers to refugees who do not have valid travel documents (1951 Convention).

There is a system in Zambia for registering hospital births and providing birth certificates within a reasonable period of time. If births happen at home, refugees seldom follow-up to get birth certificates. The same holds true for nationals. The lack of birth certificates is not seen as critical because refugees and nationals are rarely asked to produce a birth certificate, even when registering for primary school.

In Tanzania and Cameroon, births are registered and parents are given a clinic card for their newborns. They are then required to go to a government office to obtain a birth certificate. Most of the refugees interviewed for this evaluation are unaware of the process or believe birth certificates are not available to refugees. If they are aware of the process, the distance to the district office is likely to deter them from getting the certificate. Again, nationals often do not get birth certificates because of lack of awareness of the process or the distance required to travel. This challenge is compounded by a lack of appreciation on the part of refugees and nationals, as well as government officials, of the importance birth certificates.
In all three countries, UNHCR cards may be the only form of identification that adult refugees have. And, unfortunately, many do not have valid cards. In Zambia, refugees in settlements were given UNHCR refugee cards but most have been lost over the years. Furthermore, the cards are no longer valid because the Angolans are technically no longer classified as refugees. They are nevertheless important if the Angolans wish to repatriate or apply for permanent residency. Some Angolans have taken advantage of the opportunity to buy an alien card for about US$10 as an additional form of identification. However, this is cost-prohibitive for many Angolans who barely have the means to feed their families. Others question the efficacy of the alien cards based on stories of immigration officers issuing fines of approximately US$600 to Angolans who show the alien card as their only form of identification.

In Tanzania, UNHCR gave “photo slips” when the refugees became “Newly Naturalized Tanzanians” in 2010. These are simply pieces of paper with a photograph of each member of the household, along with their name, birthdate, and other identifying information. While these pieces of paper do not have the characteristics of a formal government identification document, including the government emblem, they are the only form of identification for those who were born after their families arrived in 1972. (Those who arrived in 1972 were given refugee cards and the 1972 caseload who spontaneously settled still have these cards while those who have gone through the process of naturalization were required to return the cards.)

The 2005 refugee law in Cameroon includes a provision for refugee identity cards. In 2007 the government authorized UNHCR to issue identity cards to refugees and in 2008 UNHCR started issuing cards to replace the less durable certificates. The cards are credit card size and are laminated. They have the holder’s photo and UNHCR’s emblem. In most cases, the cards are the only form of identification that the refugees hold, so it is problematic when the validity period has expired. UNHCR is now in the process of renewing the cards.

The Government of the Republic of Cameroon (GRC) Department of National Security will take over issuance of identification cards at some point and will include the Cameroonian government emblem on the card along with the UNHCR emblem. This will be helpful because their current cards are not always recognized by police, banks, and government workers as being official. UNHCR expects that officials will need to be sensitized when the new cards are issued so that they understand what the card means and what rights come with the card.

**Pathway to Citizenship.** To complete the process of local integration, refugees must be on a path that leads to citizenship. Citizenship will then provide full protection and access to employment, civic participation, land ownership, credit, and other rights granted to citizens of the host country. This process begins with documentation, which is discussed above and may include a change in status from refugee to permanent resident or some similar designation.

The Government of the United Republic of Tanzania (GOT) has been laying the groundwork for many years for refugees to be fully integrated. In particular the GOT began the process in 2007 to pursue durable solutions for 1972 Burundians. After a repatriation census and registration study, the GOT and UNHCR began to facilitate voluntary repatriation in 2008 followed by naturalization in 2010 of approximately 162,000 refugees who chose not to repatriate. Shortly following the announcement regarding naturalization, the GOT informed the Newly Naturalized Tanzanians
NNTs) that they would receive their certificates of citizenship only after they relocated to various regions of the country. The plan to relocate ran into roadblocks and was put on hold in 2011. The NNTs have lived in limbo since that time, no longer Burundians after having denounced their Burundian citizenship, but not yet being able to exercise their rights as Tanzanian citizens and technically no longer classified as refugees. This has been a frustrating period for all, but is now ending because the president of Tanzania announced in October 2014 that the certificates of citizenship would be issued. Once the certificates are issued, this will represent the most significant effort any government has made to naturalize a large group of refugees all at once, with Mexico in a distant second place having naturalized 10,000 Guatemalans.

Hopefully, Zambia is not far behind in this process. In December 2012, the Government of the Republic of Zambia (GRZ) pledged to establish a pathway to citizenship for 10,000 Angolans who arrived in Zambia between 1966 and 1986. The first step is to offer them permanent residency and the opportunity to apply for citizenship ten years from the date of receiving permanent residency status. The plan for “alternative legal status” is on track but may face challenges when it comes to relocating the new permanent residents from where they currently live and farm or resistance from the Angolan refugees who arrived after 1986. (See country report for more details.)

According to the GRC 2005 refugee law, naturalization is possible. However, it is well beyond the means of refugees to pay for the first step which is permanent residency because it costs approximately US$500. After holding permanent residency for ten years, refugees over the age of 18 will be eligible for naturalization. For the time being, the GRC is not willing to reduce the price or to facilitate a mass application process like the governments of Tanzania and Zambia have done. This is likely to remain the case while an indefinite number of CAR refugees continue to cross the border. The GRC wishes to follow the law precisely and indicates that previous efforts to get a reduction in the price failed. Furthermore, the preference is to grant citizenship to those who add value to the country. Unfortunately, CAR refugees are not in a position to contribute to the national economy because they are living as subsistence farmers and did not come with any formal education.

**D. OTHER BEST PRACTICES**

**Host Government Establishes Refugee-friendly Practices and Policies.** Perhaps the most fundamental requirements for successful local integration are that the host government warmly welcomes refugees in their country, they follow the 1951 Convention, and they develop policies and practices that help refugees become self-sufficient and build relationships with the local population.

The governments of Cameroon, Tanzania, and Zambia have genuinely welcomed refugees from CAR, Burundi, and Angola in their countries. The welcoming has been broad and deep. It has included physical protection, land, and access to services. The welcome has been extended over many years: Zambia has hosted Angolan refugees for 48 years, Tanzania has hosted Burundian refugees for 42 years, and Cameroon has hosted CAR refugees for nine years and continues welcoming them. At the peak, there were 188,000 Angolans in Zambia and 610,000 Burundians in Tanzania.
All three countries in this study signed the 1951 Convention and Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees. However, they are not all following the Convention in terms of access to employment and education, freedom of movement, identity papers, and naturalization. All of these are discussed in previous sections.

These hosting governments have also passed laws, established policies and regulations, and supported initiatives that have supported local integration to varying degrees. Policies that have had a significant impact on local integration have been those related to camps and settlements.

When Zambia started welcoming Angolans in 1966, they let them spontaneously settle in villages near the border with Angola. However, by 1971 the GRZ created the Refugee Control Act which focused on controlling where refugees lived by designating settlements. After passing the Act, the government tried to round up the Angolans and transport them to the settlements, but it was not until the late 1980s that the government put the Act into full implementation. At that point, there were approximately 72,000 spontaneously settled Angolans in Zambia. Significant numbers of refugees avoided the “scheme settlements” but those who moved to the settlements received food, shelter, land, livelihood assistance, and security. Based on the interviews and observations of the evaluation team, the refugees in the settlements have become self-sufficient and have a higher quality of life than the spontaneously settled Angolans who did not receive any assistance and who do not have any official documentation.

The Burundians who started arriving in Tanzania in 1972 went directly to settlements that were managed by a national NGO. (Approximately 22,000 spontaneously settled in villages near the border with Burundi.) The government gave the refugees in settlements five hectares of land and farming tools, as well as access to all social services. UNHCR funded the programs and gave advice on technical and refugee rights issues. The attitudes and policies of the government changed in the mid-1990s when hundreds of thousands of refugees flowed into Tanzania. New refugees were forced into refugee camps, and by 1998 Tanzania had enacted a restrictive new refugee law that: (1) limited the number of refugees entering Tanzania; (2) limited the refugees to traveling within four kilometers of their camp; and (3) prohibited refugees from having wage-earning jobs. Very few Burundians still live in camps, as most have been repatriated. Approximately 88 percent of the Burundians who remain in Tanzania live in one of the three settlements. Despite the fact that most of them have been naturalized, they still live under the restrictions associated with the settlements. When they were naturalized, they were told they would need to relocate. The relocation plan was met with resistance among the officials in regions expected to host the refugees because of security concerns and the costs of forced relocation. It also left the refugees in a difficult situation because they were told not to plant long-term crops or build permanent structures, thus impeding their progress.

The GRC is currently committed to a “no encampment” policy and is supportive of local integration. The 2005 caseload lives in villages in the East and Adamawa regions or has migrated to other parts of Cameroon. However, camps (which UNHCR Cameroon refers to as “refugee sites”) have been established for the 2013 caseload. The GRC and UNHCR believe that concentrating the new refugees at designated sites is necessary for security reasons and to efficiently and effectively provide emergency response. The short-term plan is to stabilize their health, orient them to school, and build capacity in agriculture and other income-generating
activities and then move them into host villages. Holding them at the refugee sites also allows time to conduct an assessment of potential hosting villages and to coordinate with local leaders regarding access to land. At the time of the evaluation, UNHCR did not have a clear timeline or criteria for moving people from camps to villages.

**UNHCR Provides Diplomatic and Programmatic Support.** UNHCR’s primary role in relationship to refugees is to coordinate the provision of protection and assistance. This includes both diplomatic and programmatic support.

Programmatic support was challenging to assess in the case of Tanzania and Zambia because there is little memory of the support given the number of staff changes there have been since the bulk of it was delivered decades ago. UNHCR assistance in Cameroon is ongoing, but at the time of the evaluation, staff of UNHCR and implementing partners were preoccupied with the current crises and influx of CAR refugees. Despite these challenges, UNHCR was as helpful as could be expected and some documentation was available to help complete the picture.

Diplomatic support was even more challenging to assess because it is more subjective and documented less well than programmatic support. The evaluation then had to rely on institutional memory within UNHCR, which again is challenging given staff turnover and competing priorities that require the attention of senior staff.

Despite these challenges, it was obvious that UNHCR in Cameroon, Tanzania, and Zambia has worked with the respective host governments to coordinate all three durable solutions. The fact that UNHCR works with the host government to support economic and social integration early on, the foundation is laid for full local integration and potentially legal integration. This is true for Tanzania and Zambia, but it is too early to see if these will also hold true for Cameroon.

In terms of diplomatic support, UNHCR has worked with host governments, partner governments, and implementing partners to develop and implement strategies focused on local integration as a durable solution. Some examples are:

1. **Cameroon** – UNHCR has developed a strategy that focuses on economic integration, with an emphasis on promoting self-reliance. Their diplomatic support has included negotiating with village leaders to make land available for CAR refugees. They have been very successful in some villages to get reasonable sizes of plots in convenient locations, yet in other villages have only managed to get refugees small or shared plots of land in inconvenient locations.

2. **Tanzania** – UNHCR has been diplomatically active in Tanzania, especially since 2007 when the GOT decided to focus on durable solutions for the 1972 Burundians. UNHCR provided guidance and support in conducting a registration study, the Tanzania Comprehensive Solutions Strategy (TANCOSS), naturalization efforts, and the National Strategy for Community Integration Program (NaSCIP).

3. **Zambia** – UNHCR worked with the GRZ on several key strategies: (a) the Zambia Initiative, launched in 2002, which was a government-led Development through Local
Integration (DLI) project that focused on the needs of host communities; (b) the Comprehensive Strategy (2009) that included a component for pursuing opportunities for local integration or alternative legal status in countries of asylum; and (c) the Strategic Framework for the Local Integration of Former Refugees in Zambia, which was officially released in January 2014, and includes three pillars: alternative legal status, an integrated resettlement program, and advocacy for refugee affected areas.

UNHCR has also served as a convener and coordinator, facilitating tripartite meetings with the governments of origin and hosts governments, coordinating meetings among partner governments and implementing partners, and facilitating information sharing. In Tanzania, for example, UNHCR helped establish a working group on the promotion of durable solutions and continues to facilitate the Technical Working Groups of the Tripartite Commission on the Situation of Burundians Refugee Living in Tanzania. In Cameroon, UNHCR has established a Humanitarian Country Team to address humanitarian issues. It is led by the UNDP resident representative and includes heads of mission of donor governments from the United States, the European Union, France, Switzerland, Germany, Canada, and Japan in addition to NGOs. UNHCR coordinates roundtable discussions and information sharing among UN agencies and partner governments in Yaoundé. They also send updates via email on what various partner governments are doing. On the flip side, UNHCR supports an inter-ministerial committee that was established in spring 2014 by the Ministry of External Relations.

In addition, UNHCR host familiarization missions to help donor governments and stakeholders get a better sense of the situation in the settlements and villages. Donor governments (which ones?) in all three countries report that these are useful in promoting understanding. However, it is not clear the extent to which these missions increase the likelihood of donor governments contributing financial resources to promoting local integration.

UNHCR’s efforts to convene meetings and coordinate efforts has helped them maintain good relationships with both partner governments and host country officials. It was observed; however, that UNHCR’s engagement with partner governments in Tanzania has waned a bit over recent years and partner governments’ expectations for local integration has lowered.

Unfortunately, UNHCR has been less effective in working with host governments in keeping refugees in the loop. While it is somewhat obvious what UNHCR has done to promote economic integration through programmatic efforts, in all three countries there was a low awareness of UNHCR’s diplomatic efforts to promote legal integration as well as the status of these efforts. Unfortunately, this has led to misunderstandings and frustration, especially among refugees in Tanzania and Zambia.

It was not clear to the evaluation team the extent to which UNHCR offices in each of the three countries were sharing information or communicating with each other about their successes and challenges. The only evidence available to the evaluation team of any communication between countries is that the ministry official overseeing the local integration efforts in Tanzania had obtained a copy of the local integration strategy for Zambia.
Lastly, diplomatic efforts are occasionally addressed directly with senior officials of the host government. In Cameroon, UNHCR sent a letter to the GRC regarding permanent residency for the refugees. The letter requested a reduced fee and simplified process. At the debriefing of the evaluation team, it was reported that the Ministry of External Relations has endorsed the idea and forwarded it to the president. UNHCR in Tanzania has had direct contact with several senior officials in the GOT to advocate for giving the Newly Naturalized Tanzanians their citizenship certificates and allowing them to exercise their rights as citizens. Minimal contact with the president and prime minister – the ones who will make the decision about moving forward – was reported.

In terms of programmatic support, UNHCR has provided a full range of activities in the three countries studied. In Zambia, UNHCR has funded activities including community services, crop production, environmental, domestic, education, food, forestry, health and nutrition, income generation, legal assistance, livestock, sanitation, shelter and other infrastructure, transport, and water. While many of these have addressed basic protection and assistance needs, others have helped the refugees to integrate socially and economically. UNHCR also provided programmatic support to refugees in Tanzania from their arrival in 1972 until 1985. While the records are not readily available, it is safe to assume that much was done to support self-reliance, given that the refugees had achieved self-reliance by 1985, which is why UNHCR support there was no longer needed.

In Cameroon, UNHCR is providing on-going programmatic support in support of local integration. The main focus is on economic integration and empowerment of refugees. UNHCR is supporting agriculture, livestock, income-generating activities, and water points. It appears that these efforts are successful in that the majority of refugees (except the most vulnerable) no longer rely on food or other external assistance.

**PRM Provides Diplomatic and Programmatic Support.** PRM defines humanitarian diplomacy as “persuading decision makers and opinion leaders to act in the interests of vulnerable people and with full respect for fundamental humanitarian principles. PRM’s definition of humanitarian diplomacy includes official demarches to other governments on humanitarian issues; efforts to influence decisions within the Department and the inter agency to reflect humanitarian equities; and collaboration with partner organizations (including international organizations and NGOs) to ensure policies and programming protect vulnerable populations” (PRM 2013 Monitoring and Evaluation Workshop).

Evaluation efforts on the country visits did not reveal much “field-level diplomacy,” which would include issue-specific diplomacy with “specific implementing partners, colleagues at the embassy or USAID, or other donors in the field” (PRM 2013 Monitoring and Evaluation Workshop). It is not clear whether this is because not much field-level diplomacy had been conducted or because documentation or interviews in the field did not reveal it.

In Zambia, the U.S. embassy and USAID indicated that there were no barriers anticipated in pursuit of the local integration for which diplomatic intervention may be required. UNHCR has been successful in coordinating the local integration process with the governments of Zambia and Angola, who are both committed to pursuing durable solutions. In Tanzania, the U.S. embassy was
involved when local integration was a focus between 2007 and 2011, but at the time of the evaluation the embassy was more focused on an upcoming resettlement effort for the Congolese refugees and on bringing a new ambassador on board. In Cameroon, the point person for refugees has many other things on her plate and refugees are not a top priority in her portfolio. Should the need for diplomatic support arise, it is likely that she would be more engaged.

Little information was available to the team in terms of mid-level operational or high-level strategic diplomacy. However, in the case of Tanzania, the U.S. Ambassador led a high-level intervention. On September 30, 2013 the ambassadors of partner governments sent a letter to President Jakaya Mrisho Kikwete congratulating his government for granting citizenship to 162,000 former Burundian refugees and setting an example for other countries. In the same communication, the partner governments stressed the importance of promptly resolving questions regarding the Newly Naturalized Tanzanians and “that they be issued appropriate documentation confirming their legal status.” In October 2014, UNHCR sent an informal communication to the evaluation team to indicate that President Kikwete had determined to move forward with issuing the certificates of citizenship to the former Burundians.

In terms of programmatic support in Tanzania and Zambia, no institutional memory or documentation were made available to the team. In both countries, however, there will be opportunities in the near future to provide programmatic support as the legal integration programs roll forward.

PRM provided the team with Performance Progress Reports from International Relief and Development (IRD) for their work on agricultural and livelihood activities in fiscal years 2010-2012. When the team arrived in Cameroon, it was revealed that PRM had also funded PU-AMI for water supply and sanitation projects and IMC for health (including a medical mobile clinic), nutrition, HIV/AIDS, and gender-based violence.

The IRD livelihood activities, which are discussed in greater detail in the section above on livelihood support, have mostly achieved their targets and helped CAR refugees attain self-sufficiency. While the refugees now have skills and resources to care for themselves and have a similar standard of living to the host communities, they continue to live in extreme poverty.
CHAPTER IV: CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

A. CONCLUSIONS

Refugees in Cameroon, Tanzania, and Zambia have experienced considerable success in local integration, especially when compared to most of the countries in the desk review portion of this evaluation.

In all three countries, economic integration has been reached as defined by refugees achieving self-reliance and a standard of living similar to the host community. The successes have been the result of a combination of factors: host governments providing fertile land, UNHCR and partner governments providing agricultural inputs and livelihood support, host communities’ openness to the refugees, and the refugees’ willingness to integrate with their host community. Unfortunately, the standard of living is low and the vast majority of refugees from the Central African Republic (CAR), Burundi, and Angola continue to live in extreme poverty in the poorest regions of their host countries. It is not known how much better off the refugees would be if they were given access to wage-earning employment, more educational opportunities, full freedom of movement with greater access to markets, or legal recognition, given the also relatively limited economic status of the host communities. The refugees’ economic progress, like the nationals’ progress, is limited by insufficient access to water, sanitation facilities, health care, education and training, credit, roads, transportation, and communication systems.

The level of social integration is also high. Refugees are accepted into the host communities and the refugees feel safe and at home, live in similar housing, participate in personal and national celebrations, and develop relationships with nationals including intermarriage. This has mostly been a natural process because the refugees in these three cases share much in common with the nationals: language, religion, tribe, cultural, and history. The lack of freedom of movement in Tanzania and Zambia has somewhat limited the extent to which social integration has been achieved, but not significantly. In Cameroon, where refugees live in host villages, the opportunities for social integration are much greater.

Providing refugees rights, entitlements, and a pathway to citizenship makes legal integration a more challenging process. At this point in time, there is no indication that legal integration of CAR refugees will take place in Cameroon. Zambia is progressing nicely with its local integration strategy and will be successful in integrating 10,000 Angolans if all potential barriers are addressed. (Please see: Field Evaluation of Local Integration of Former Refugees in Zambia Field Visit Report, April 15, 2014 for more information on the potential barriers.) Of the three countries visited, Tanzania is the furthest along in terms of legal integration. The GOT has naturalized 162,156 Burundians and, as of October 17, 2014, has resumed providing certificates of citizenship. The GOT will also start the naturalization process for the children that have been born since the local integration program was put on hold in 2011, thus bringing the total to around 200,000 people.
benefiting. This is, by far, the largest group that has been offered naturalization by a country of first asylum.

The most critical factors in economic, social, and legal integration are controlled by the host government and host villages. The factors can be supported through diplomatic interventions by UNHCR, PRM, and other partner governments as specified in the recommendations below. Also specified in the recommendations below are opportunities for UNHCR, PRM, and partner governments to support local integration programs through supporting relevant programs.

B. RECOMMENDATIONS

Based on the findings and conclusions from the desk study and subsequent field visits to Zambia, Tanzania, and Cameroon, the evaluation team recommends the following actions that will increase the likelihood of successful local integration:

Host Governments

1. Adhere to the Refugee Convention of 1951. Host governments that have signed the Convention (144 countries to date) and are interested in supporting local integration should pay special attention to the following Articles of the Convention:

   “17. Wage-Earning Employment - The Contracting State shall accord to refugees lawfully staying in their territory the most favourable treatment accorded to nationals of a foreign country in the same circumstances, as regards the right to engage in wage earning employment.

   22. Public Education – The Contracting State shall accord to refugees the same treatment as is accorded to nationals with respect to elementary education. The Contracting States shall accord to refugees treatment as favourable as possible, and, in any event, not less favourable than that accorded to aliens generally in the same circumstances, with respect to education other than elementary education and, in particular, as regards access to studies, the recognition of foreign school certificates, diplomas and degrees, the remission of fees and charges and the award of scholarships.

   26. Freedom of Movement – Each Contracting State shall accord to refugees lawfully in its territory the right to choose their place of residence to move freely within its territory, subject to any regulations applicable to aliens generally in the same circumstances.

   27. Identity Papers – The Contracting State shall issue identity papers to any refugee in their territory who does not possess a valid travel document.

   34. Naturalization – The Contracting State shall as far as possible facilitate the assimilation and naturalization of refugees. They shall in particular make every effort to expedite naturalization proceedings and to reduce as far as possible the charges and costs of such proceedings.”
2. Make birth certificates more accessible to refugees (and nationals). Based on the countries included in this evaluation, doing so may require revising the current national system so that birth certificates are accessible at the community level, eliminating the need for refugees (and nationals) to travel significant distances to obtain a birth certificate. Effective information campaigns are necessary to help refugees (and nationals) to learn the process for obtaining the certificate in a timely manner so that they are free of charge and to understand the importance of securing birth certificates for their children.

3. Carefully consider the disadvantages of restricting refugees to camps or settlements especially given the recognition that the vast majority of refugee situations are protracted. Disadvantages include:

- The implications of creating an enclave via camps or settlements, especially in terms of social integration; this could be mitigated if nationals are allowed and encouraged to live within the settlements or if settlements are in close proximity to host communities.
- Potential impact on the environment especially if considering designating protected lands for a camp or settlement.
- The challenges and cost of relocating refugees once they have been naturalized and/or the settlement has been degazetted.
- The stigma of being a refugee in a camp or settlement that may limit the full potential of the refugees and subsequently the positive impact they can have on the host country’s general socio-economic development indicators.

4. Make land available to refugees to promote self-reliance. The plots should be large enough to feed the household and generate some cash for non-food expenses such as clinic and school fees. The host government should seek the support of UNHCR and partner governments to provide training and other inputs to help farmers maintain the fertility of their land. At a minimum, this should include techniques such as crop rotation and natural fertilizers.

5. Survey the refugees to determine what skill sets they can use to contribute to the development process within the host communities. For example, those who have experience as teachers or nurses should be employed in the host communities’ schools and clinics. UNHCR is in a good position to facilitate this effort with the host country government.

6. Provide health workers and teachers to staff the clinics and schools constructed by UNHCR and partner governments as this type of assistance is not traditionally support by donor governments.

7. Ensure the safety and security to refugees and refugee camps and/or settlements. Collaborate with UNHCR in learning and applying the rights within the Refugee Convention and the expectations on safety and security through orientation and training programs.

For recommendations specific to the countries included in this evaluation, please see the country reports for each:
UNHCR
Diplomatic
1. Encourage and work with host governments to do all of the above, recognizing their sovereignty. In particular, support host governments in adhering to the Convention. This includes orientation at the highest levels of government and training local officials (immigration officers, police, school officials, etc.) and village chiefs regarding the rights of refugees.

2. Facilitate dialogue and share lessons among countries that are pursuing local integration. By connecting key people among hosting governments, circulating key documents related to local integration, and convening meetings, officials responsible for local integration will have guidance and encouragement to help them avoid problems experienced in other countries.

3. Engage the host country early regarding the three durable solutions, emphasizing the likelihood – and assisting host governments in preparing for – a protracted situation and how best to approach local integration. At a minimum, this could be done by encouraging host governments to provide land to help refugees become self-sufficient and by allowing freedom of movement. Focus the government on how the assistance and programs for refugees can contribute to the national development plan.

4. Establish and maintain good working relations with host governments at the national and local levels, village chiefs, and NGOs. Involve them in key decisions. This may include such things as meeting and orienting new officials, regular in-person meetings, and collaborating on key decisions. At the local level, UNHCR should seek their implementing partners’ help. While this requires additional time on individuals who are already stretched, the investment in developing good relations with the host government will have great dividends.

5. Design and implement communication strategies that keep refugees and local officials informed of the current refugee situation and the efforts toward each of the durable solutions. This is especially important when efforts to promote local integration have direct impact on refugees, host communities, and government districts and/or regions. The strategy should include both oral and written information in the major languages used by the refugees and in village meetings.

6. Build and maintain momentum among partner and donor governments to ensure continual support for local integration. Such efforts may include orienting new officials when they arrive in-country; conducting familiarization trips to see the conditions of the refugees; coordinating communication among partner government, NGOs, and multilateral actors; and convening coordination meetings.
Programmatic
1. Continue to place emphasis on all aspects of protection – both physical security and access to services and rights – given that peace and security are what refugees value most. Legal assistance programs are key for refugees to exercise and access their rights and services.

2. Provide agricultural inputs such as tools and seeds to help move refugees toward food self-reliance. (See Sphere Handbook for livelihood standards.) UNHCR should work with implementing partners to distribute the inputs and to provide training on farming techniques (especially important if refugees come from a non-agricultural background) and on ways to maintain the fertility of the land given the likelihood of a protracted situation.

3. Work with local and national government officials, as well as implementing partners, to ensure that refugees have access to water, latrines, health care, and education in compliance with international standards or, at a minimum, at parity with host communities. This should also include coordination with development partners and the host government to ensure long-term sustainability of services and infrastructure. If there is a shortage of civil society actors, government and donors may need to turn to and/or leverage the private sector to assist and invest in development priorities.

4. Develop a strategy that benefits host communities in every situation. When water points, latrines, health clinics, and schools are constructed, they should be available to both refugees and the host community.

5. Where assistance and services are provided post-emergency to vulnerable refugees, UNHCR should incorporate vulnerable host community members as well. This will help ease tensions between refugees and nationals and ensure that the host communities continue to welcome refugees.

6. Provide legal assistance including legal aid programs and access to the national legal system. Access to legal aid can facilitate access to birth certificates, work permits, identification documentation, legal immigration, and due process for refugees that have been detained or arrested.

7. Explore the possibility of funding national NGOs to establish microcredit programs in areas where local integration is being pursued. This will help refugees make investments in education, training, modern equipment and other things that will help them break the cycle of poverty.

PRM
Diplomatic. PRM needs to dedicate an appropriate level of human and financial resources to promoting and operationalizing local integration efforts. This can include the following:

1. Deploy high-level officials to encourage host governments to adhere to the Convention, especially in terms of naturalization. For example, PRM should take advantage of the travel of the Assistant Secretary, or his/her designees, to promote local integration or to address barriers to ongoing local integration efforts. In countries where the barriers are at a high-level within
the host government, PRM should request an intervention of a U.S. government official at the corresponding level.

2. Designate at least one local integration officer in Washington who is exclusively focused on monitoring local integration efforts and providing troubleshooting and problem-solving support where progress is lagging; liaising with UNHCR local integration officers and U.S. embassy personnel; sharing information and convening meetings regarding local integration strategies and best practices; and identifying resources to support local integration.

3. Encourage Embassy Chiefs of Mission to allow foreign service officers with refugee portfolios in U.S. embassies to devote a greater percentage of their time to refugee issues. Where local integration is being pursued, refugees should not be a marginal or add-on responsibility.

4. Increase dialogue and coordination within the U.S. government, especially USAID, to address post-emergency, development needs. A written policy with a mandate between USAID and PRM to coordinate post-emergency needs may be necessary to outline the steps for development projects in refugee protracted areas.

5. Clarify which part of the U.S. government should take responsibility for addressing water supply and sanitation needs in host communities, as well as health care and education.

6. Improve tracking of PRM’s diplomatic efforts through written documentation that is accessible to PRM in Washington. This will allow PRM to track its interventions and contributions and determine where it has had an impact and where efforts could be strengthened.

**Programmatic.** PRM should focus programmatic resources on the following types of activities:

1. Support livelihood interventions through international and local NGOs. The support should include both the relevant inputs and related training. For the most part, this will focus on agricultural and agricultural-related activities and include seeds and tools, as well as training in ways to maximize productivity of the land. It should also be at a large enough scale that the households can move beyond a subsistence existence.

2. Explore the possibility of funding international NGOs to establish microcredit programs in areas where local integration is being pursued. This will help refugees make investments in education, training, modern equipment and other things that will help them break the cycle of poverty.

3. Improve the administration of one-year funding to eliminate delayed start dates and funding gaps from year to year. PRM has the ability to award a total amount and can obligate in smaller amounts as the funds become available. In addition, inform implementing partners about the possibility of multi-year funding.

4. Continue requiring that all PRM implementing partners submit reports to PRM and that they are maintained in a central location. PRM should also consider requiring a final, cumulative report for a series of one-year programs implemented by the same partner with similar
objectives for the same refugee situation and country. This will provide a more comprehensive account of the successes and challenges of local integration.
ANNEX A: BIBLIOGRAPHY


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