

# **Evaluation of the DFID-AFDB Technical Cooperation Agreement (TCA)**

## **Final Report**

**Prepared by David Nyheim**

**11 May 2014**

**Evaluation Period: January-May 2014**

## TABLE OF CONTENTS

Acronyms.....	3
Executive Summary.....	4
Introduction.....	4
Evaluation Findings.....	4
Lessons Learnt and Recommendations.....	8
1. Introduction.....	10
1.1. Evaluation purpose and objectives.....	11
1.2. Evaluation framework and research process.....	11
1.3. Caveats.....	12
1.4. Report structure.....	13
2. Evaluation Findings.....	14
2.1. Test assumptions.....	14
Question 1: Does the TCA strengthen the AfDB capability to achieve results (i.e. does the TCA strengthen AfDB capability to effect transformational change)?...14	
Question 2: Does the TCA help the AfDB achieve results (i.e. there is will for transformational change)?.....	18
Question 3: How relevant is the TCA to the AfDB strategic goals (i.e. how strategic were the interventions financed by the TCA)?.....	20
2.2. Assess efficiency.....	23
Question 4: Were TCA funds used efficiently and could they have been used more efficiently?.....	23
Question 5: How well did the partnership and management arrangements work (taking into account how they developed over time)?.....	25
Question 6: Were the risks properly identified and well managed?.....	27
2.3. Assess effectiveness.....	28
Question 7: Did the use of TCA funds represent good Value-for-Money? Were costs incurred appropriate and proportionate to results achieved?.....	28
Question 8: To what extent were the intended outputs and results achieved in relation to targets set in original and revised project documents (including logical framework analyses)?.....	30
Question 9: How effective and appropriate was the project approach? With hindsight, how would the implementers have changed it?.....	34
3. Lessons Learnt and Recommendations.....	36
3.1. Draw Lessons.....	36

Question 10: What lessons emerge from the TCA for the AfDB in relation to its broader trust fund management and strategy? .....	36
Question 11: What are the implications of lessons from the TCA evaluation for the planned AfDB-DFID Framework Agreement (FA)? .....	37
3.2. Recommendations.....	38
Annexes .....	40
Annex 1: Excerpts from the draft Board memorandum on the TCA.....	40
Annex 2: Terms of Reference – Evaluation of the DFID-AFDB TCA (October 2013) .....	42
Annex 3: List of TCA Projects.....	46
Annex 4: TCA Evaluation Inception Report.....	54
Annex 5: Sources Consulted .....	67
Annex 6: Implementation schedule .....	72
Annex 7: List of Bilateral and Thematic Trust Funds .....	73
Annex 8: Overview of Online Surveys.....	78
Annex 9: VfM Assessments .....	86
Annex 9.1: Value for Money Assessment – Integrated Training Programme on Climate Change .....	86
Annex 9.2: Value for Money Assessment – TCA-Funded Financial Management Reforms .....	93
Annex 10: List of Interviewees .....	99
Annex 11: TCA Results Framework .....	101

## ACRONYMS

---

AfDB	African Development Bank
ARD	Africa Regional Department
DAC	Development Assistance Committee
DFID	Department for International Development
FA	Framework Agreement
IFID	International Financial Institutions Department
KPI	Key Performance Indicators
MENAD	Middle East and North Africa Department
OECD	Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development
RMCS	Regional Member Countries
TA	Technical Assistance
TCA	Technical Cooperation Arrangement (or Agreement)
TOR	Terms of Reference
VfM	Value for Money

## EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

---

### INTRODUCTION

The United Kingdom (UK) has been part of the African Development Fund (ADF) and the African Development Bank (AfDB) since 1973 and 1983, respectively. Its contributions to the ADF and AfDB make it the Bank's largest bilateral donor. Beyond its contributions to the ADF, today and through DFID, the UK supports a range of Bank trust funds and initiatives, including the Technical Cooperation Arrangement (TCA) (see Annex 1), which is evaluated here.

### Evaluation objectives

The objectives of the TCA evaluation are to:

1. Test critical assumptions that technical assistance (TA) provided through the TCA helps the AfDB become a more effective, results orientated and responsive development institution.
2. Monitor and evaluate the performance of the TCA as a whole; particularly gather evidence that the TCA has contributed to poverty reduction in Africa and that the TCA has used funds effectively and efficiently to deliver results.
3. Draw lessons from the TCA experience and assess the implications of these for new DFID support modalities beyond 2014 and the AfDB Trust Fund Policy which is planned to be revised in 2015.

### Evaluation framework and process

The evaluation framework used integrates questions and process from the Terms of Reference (TOR) (see Annex 2) with the elaboration of hypotheses to be explored and a set of qualifiers that help nuance evaluation findings. The evaluation process involved: (a) an extensive document review; (b) interviews and group discussions with 19 AfDB and 10 DFID staff members; (c) online perception and outcome surveys; and (d) a VfM assessment of two TCA-funded projects. It was completed over 40 consulting days in January-May 2014.

### EVALUATION FINDINGS

#### Test Assumptions

**Q1. Does the TCA strengthen the AfDB capability to achieve results (i.e. does the TCA strengthen AfDB capability to effect transformational change)?**

A key challenge in assessing the TCA's contribution to the Bank's ability to achieve results is clearly drawing causality. An additional challenge is assessing whether the mix of policy activities (50% of spending) and institutional strengthening/knowledge activities (14% of spending) is appropriate both in terms of substance and emphasis when it comes to bolstering Bank capability. In the absence of a more granular initial (and then updated) institutional capacity-needs assessment, beyond the MAR, MOPAN and Bank performance reviews, judging whether the TCA provided the right mix of activities is therefore difficult to answer.

However, the following observations can be made:

- The TCA was aligned to the Bank's own strategic priorities and the funding of activities was evidenced on broad assessments of Bank needs.
- The responsiveness of the TCA and its ability to accommodate requests from key departments, alongside the TCA's 'downstream' position, is likely to have enhanced the institutional impacts of 'upstream' Bank reform initiatives.
- The most important contributions of the TCA to the Bank's ability to achieve results are in the policy domain; with significant contributions to climate change, private sector development, and governance; and modest contributions to infrastructure and fragile states.
- A decision not to approve new activities related to institutional strengthening in 2011 was perhaps too hastily taken considering the need for a balanced policy-institutional strengthening mix in the TCA portfolio.

## **Q2. Does the TCA help the AfDB achieve results (i.e. there is will for transformational change)?**

There is a clear and obvious value added of trust funds for the Bank. However, their potential as an instrument to enhance the Bank's ability to achieve results appears under-utilised. This is recognised by the Bank and efforts are made to address trust fund challenges.

The TCA appears to be among the most appreciated trust funds in the Bank by Task Managers. Its untied nature, flexibility, responsiveness to needs, and association to DFID is at the heart of this appreciation. Obstacles to its use are associated to limited awareness of it in the Bank and procurement processes.

TCA disbursement rates are relatively high when compared to other Bank trust funds. This would indicate that accessing the fund is followed through by implementation, although delays in project completion have affected more than half of TCA funded projects.

With perceptions among 75% of Task Managers who had used the TCA that projects have had positive results, and spot-check beneficiary surveys returning favourable results, there seems to be evidence to suggest that the TCA has helped the AfDB achieve results.

## **Q3. How relevant is the TCA to the AfDB strategic goals (i.e. how strategic were the interventions financed by the TCA)?**

Alignment of the TCA to Bank strategy, as well as MAR (2011) and MOPAN findings made the TCA relevant to Bank strategic goals. The main TCA investments have been on Bank policy areas (private sector development, climate change, institutional strengthening, and governance) and institutional strengthening. The responsiveness of the TCA to Bank needs in these sectors has probably added to the relevance of the TCA to the Bank's strategic goals.

There is a sense among many interviewees that the strategic relevance of many TCA funded activities is still unfolding. Examples cited are in the Financial Management Reforms project, but also in several funded activities related to climate change, governance, and fragile states.

## **Assess Efficiency**

### **Q4. Were TCA funds used efficiently and could they have been used more efficiently?**

Without a full and detailed review of TCA-funded project documentation it is not possible to confidently answer whether TCA funding was used efficiently. However, based on the available data, the following is noted:

- Although Bank consultant rates are broadly aligned to other IFIs and multilateral agencies, delays in project start up and procurement are likely to negatively affect efficiency in TCA spending.
- The limited use of logical frameworks or results frameworks in the formulation of projects for TCA funding is likely to have negatively affected efficiency in projects, and consequently the efficiency of TCA funding.
- Where Bank departments were encouraged to submit programmes (a package of inter-linked activities) for funding, this is likely to have positively affected efficiency in TCA funding.
- With suboptimal TCA spending estimated to be at 3.1% of total disbursements, obvious inefficiency in the TCA portfolio appears limited.

### **Q5. How well did the partnership and management arrangements work (taking into account how they developed over time)?**

The AfDB and DFID partnership on the TCA has evolved over time; from initial expectations challenges to one of functional management of the TCA. Although transaction costs associated to the TCA have been high for both institutions, the partnership between the Bank and DFID on the TCA is generally good.

Both the AfDB and DFID have upheld robust management arrangements on the TCA. These management arrangements have translated into mostly positive pressure on Task Managers implementing TCA projects to deliver well.

### **Q6. Were the risks properly identified and well managed?**

The largest TCA funded projects have benefited from varying degrees of risk identification. In terms of financial significance, this means that slightly below 50% of the TCA project portfolio has considered risk. Proposals for smaller TCA projects normally do not include a risk assessment and mitigation element.

## Assess Effectiveness

### **Q7. Did the use of TCA funds represent good Value-for-Money? Were costs incurred appropriate and proportionate to results achieved?**

Data on Value-for-Money in relation to TCA funded projects is limited. This is in part due to the fact that many project activities were implemented several years ago and that staff turnover in the Bank makes it difficult today to access relevant documentation. However, there is also a limited collection of baseline data, definition of measurable indicators, and use of results frameworks – which adds to the challenge of conducting VfM assessments on specific Bank projects.

Data gaps also affected the VfM assessment of the two TCA-funded projects reviewed. However, one is deemed to have offered VfM (Integrated Training Programme on Climate Change), while for the other (Financial Management Reforms project) VfM conclusions cannot be drawn. However, given the strategic importance of the second project and its likely impact on Bank contracting, it is seen as having made ‘good investment sense’ for the TCA.

The diversity of projects in the TCA portfolio (see Annex 3), means that it is unlikely that the projects selected for VfM assessments are broadly representative. Furthermore, a rigorous assessment of whether costs incurred for TCA projects are appropriate and proportionate to the results achieved requires a project-by-project review, which is beyond the scope of this evaluation.

### **Q8. To what extent were the intended outputs and results achieved in relation to targets set in original and revised project documents (including logical framework analyses)?**

Data provided indicates that to varying degrees TCA funded projects have delivered on intended outputs and results. Two examples used for a ‘deeper dive’ into project outputs and results show that institutional strengthening projects that tackle highly specialised Bank operations appear to require a longer timeframe for output and results delivery.

### **Q9. How effective and appropriate was the project approach? With hindsight, how would the implementers have changed it?**

The TCA project approach appears to have been premised on an assumption that spending departments know what Bank capacity-gaps need to be filled and will use the TCA to address these gaps. The assumption is valid. Discussions within sector departments, and between sector departments and counter-parts in DFID on prioritisation has resulted in several TCA projects and programmes adding significant value to the Bank. However, limited awareness of opportunities with the TCA in Bank spending departments probably reduced the volume of projects that could have been funded and consequently the effectiveness of the project approach.

A decision to limit funding for institutional strengthening in 2011 may not have benefited from adequate strategic thinking on the best policy-institutional strengthening mix for the Bank. Limited strategic consideration of what would have

constituted the most effective mix raises questions about whether the results framework drawn up for the TCA in 2011 is a useful instrument with which to measure TCA performance. With this caveat, the evaluation affirms the conclusions drawn in DFID's Annual Review of the TCA (2013), which assesses and rates individual outputs given in the TCA Results Framework (see Annex 11).

The absence of a more structured capacity-needs assessment of TCA focus-areas in the Bank, in conjunction with limited awareness of the TCA among Bank spending departments, is likely to have reduced the effectiveness of the project (and programme) approach – but not its validity. A detailed and updated capacity-needs assessment would also have better informed the TCA results framework.

## **LESSONS LEARNT AND RECOMMENDATIONS**

### **Q10: What lessons emerge from the TCA for the AfDB in relation to its broader trust fund management and strategy?**

The TCA experience affirms the value added of trust funds for the Bank. Four lessons from the TCA are relevant to the AfDB in relation to its broader trust fund management and strategy. First, the TCA experience shows that using capacity-needs assessments in key sectors to guide trust funds focused on Bank capacity development may strengthen their performance. Second, integrating the use of results frameworks and collection of baseline data where relevant for Bank trust funds will bolster efficiency and effectiveness and be in line with the Bank's overall results agenda. Third, developing procurement processes that enable flexibility and speed in trust funds is important. And finally, enabling greater trust fund awareness across the Bank will increase their use.

### **Q11: What are the implications of lessons from the TCA evaluation for the planned AfDB-DFID Framework Agreement (FA)?**

Lessons learnt from the TCA to the FA need to focus on how to make the FA run effectively. Five lessons from the TCA are relevant in this regard. First, undertaking sector-specific capacity-needs assessments on MAR follow-up areas at the beginning of the FA and at intervals of 24 months will enhance its effectiveness. If new funding from DFID is provided for other areas under the FA with a specific capacity-development element, then a template for completion should be shared with relevant departments on how to articulate capacity-needs. Second, ensuring that relevant spending departments in the AfDB are aware of the FA is necessary. Third, an AfDB-DFID conversation on FA strategy should be considered. Fourth, the FA should develop its own eligibility criteria and ensure that at least 80% of funded projects are directly eligible. And fifth, developing an evidenced and shared AfDB-DFID results framework for the FA will help overcome some of the expectations challenges that faced the TCA.

## **Recommendations**

### **Recommendations for AfDB trust fund strategy and management**

1. Ensure that trust funds that support Bank capacity development are part of the Bank's trust fund portfolio.
2. Consider making sector-specific capacity-needs assessments of relevant sectors an integral part of priority-setting for trust funds that support Bank capacity-development.
3. Integrate the Bank's results agenda into how trust funds operate.
4. Consider developing procurement processes that enable trust funds to play their role well and in a timely manner, or at a minimum to allocate a dedicated procurement officer to facilitate trust fund related procurement.
5. Enable greater trust fund awareness across the Bank.

### **Recommendations for FA set-up and implementation**

1. Conduct a Bank capacity-needs assessment on FA priority areas.
2. Prepare and disseminate a FA fact sheet for relevant Bank spending departments.
3. At the outset of the FA, hold an AfDB-DFID meeting to clarify FA strategy.
4. Develop FA eligibility criteria and ensure that at least 80% of funded projects are directly eligible.
5. Be patient with institutional strengthening projects as these take time.
6. Use the capacity-needs assessment and outcomes of AfDB-DFID meeting on FA strategy to develop a shared FA results framework.

## 1. INTRODUCTION

---

The United Kingdom (UK) has been part of the ADF and the AfDB since 1973 and 1983, respectively. Its contributions to the ADF and AfDB make it the Bank's largest bilateral donor.

Beyond its contributions to the ADF, today and through DFID, the UK supports a range of Bank trust funds and initiatives<sup>1</sup>, including the Technical Cooperation Arrangement (TCA), which is evaluated here. The TCA, agreed in 2007 and amounting to GBP13 million, is the first Bank trust fund that is fully aligned to the Technical Cooperation Fund Reform Programme (TCFR) approved by the Bank's Board of Directors in September 2006.

The TCA was intended to support the AfDB to improve its organisational effectiveness through the provision of training, technical assistance, capacity building and institutional support. The TCA focuses support on sectors and themes prioritised as strategically important by the AfDB and Regional Member Countries (RMCs). The AfDB is a critical actor in the development of Africa – both at the continental level and within RMCs. By supporting the AfDB to implement capacity building reforms, the TCA was expected to contribute to poverty reduction in Africa by strengthening the effectiveness of the AfDB, including the African Development Fund (ADF). Its aim was to enable the Bank to fulfil its role as a regional driver of African economic growth and development.

The TCA completely untied funds, introduced thresholds for approval by the Bank without resorting to the donor, and included time-frame/deadlines for approvals and other flexible features (see Annex 1).

The AfDB-DFID agreement (2007) specified that the TCA was to be used for consulting services and technical assistance in support of project cycle activities, policy and sector studies; training, capacity building, and provision of critical institutional support; institutional support for the Bank; and other interventions to be decided by the AfDB and DFID. It was focused on infrastructure and water, governance, climate change and clean energy, institutional strengthening, the Enhanced Collaboration Initiative, knowledge management, and other areas to be agreed upon (TCA, 2007).

Focus areas were later adjusted to be in line with the Bank's Mid-Term Strategy (2008-2012) and Multilateral Aid Review (2011) findings to cover infrastructure, governance, fragile states, private sector development, and climate change, in addition to specific institutional strengthening areas. Following negotiations between AfDB and DFID, the TCA was extended to June 2014.

Although no results framework was developed at the inception of the TCA, one was developed by DFID and agreed by the AfDB in January 2011 (see Annex 11).

---

<sup>1</sup> These include the African Water Facility (AWF) (GBP 15 million), Congo Basin Forest Fund (CBFF) (GBP 50 million), Infrastructure Consortium for Africa (ICA) (GBP 1.5 million), NEPAD Infrastructure Project Preparation Facility (NEPAD-IPPF) (GBP 6 million), Zimbabwe Multi-Donor Trust Fund (Zim-Fund) (GBP 10 million), and Multi-Donor Trust Fund for Countries in Transition (TFT) (GBP 2.4 million).

## 1.1. EVALUATION PURPOSE AND OBJECTIVES

The overall purpose of the evaluation of the Technical Cooperation Agreement (TCA) is to inform decision-making in the African Development Bank (AfDB) and Department for International Development (DFID) on modalities for future support to strengthen the effectiveness of the AfDB.


The evaluation objectives are to:

1. Test critical assumptions that technical assistance (TA) provided through the TCA helps the AfDB become a more effective, results orientated and responsive development institution.
2. Monitor and evaluate the performance of the TCA as a whole; particularly gather evidence that the TCA has contributed to poverty reduction in Africa and that the TCA has used funds effectively and efficiently to deliver results.
3. Draw lessons from the TCA experience and assess the implications of these for new DFID support modalities beyond 2014 and the AfDB Trust Fund Policy which is planned to be revised in 2015.

The target audience of the evaluation is primarily AfDB and DFID management and staff.

## 1.2. EVALUATION FRAMEWORK AND RESEARCH PROCESS

The evaluation framework used integrates questions and process from the Terms of Reference (TOR) (see Annex 2) with the elaboration of hypotheses to be validated/invalidated and a set of qualifiers that help nuance evaluation findings. A multifaceted research methodology (document review, project expenditure review, surveys/questionnaires, and interviews) underpins the evaluation framework.



From the 17 evaluation questions listed in the TOR, the Inception Report (see Annex 4) prepared in the run up to this evaluation reduced these to 11 focus questions

under the headings of test assumptions, assess efficiency, assess effectiveness, and draw lessons.

A set of hypotheses linked to the evaluation questions have been explored in the course of this evaluation. Data gathered in relation to hypotheses was in turn analysed in view of institutional, contextual, and comparative qualifiers (see Box 1).

The evaluation process has involved the following activities:

- An extensive document review (see Annex 5)
- Interviews and group discussions with 14 AfDB Task Managers, 3 Directors, and 2 TCA fund managers
- Interviews and group discussions with 10 DFID staff from ARD and IFID
- Online perception and outcome surveys, with 23 responses from AfDB, DFID and RMCs
- A VfM assessment of two TCA-funded projects (operations and policy)

Three visits to Tunis were made by the consultant and one to London. The evaluation was implemented over 40 consulting days in the period January to March 2014 (see Annex 6).

### 1.3. CAVEATS

There are four main caveats that the reader of this evaluation should keep in mind.

The first is that the TCA was signed in September 2007. Staff turnover in both AfDB and DFID means that accessing interviewees to give a complete retrospective has been challenging. The picture pieced together here may be incomplete.

The second is that there are several non-TCA initiatives aimed and improving AfDB performance; these upstream institutional processes are different from the more downstream project work done through the TCA. Clearly and robustly evidencing causality between TCA activities and changes in the Bank therefore becomes challenging.

The third is that the activities funded under the TCA are numerous, diverse, and complex (see Annex 3) and have been carried out at different points over 5-6 years. It is beyond the scope of this evaluation to undertake a detailed review (activities analysis, accounts review, etc.) of all TCA projects. Where 'deep-dives' have been done into specific projects, the paper-trail has often been found to be incomplete and accessing staff involved has been difficult.

#### Box 1: Evaluation Qualifiers

**Institutional qualifiers** focus on institutional dynamics (e.g. mandates, reform processes, institutional performance enhancers/blockers, inter-departmental dynamics, resource access, etc.) and how these enable (or disable) the organisation to deliver as planned.

**Contextual qualifiers** involve looking at the operating environment (e.g. the complexity of delivering services in target areas, access to and availability of effective delivery mechanisms, magnitude of need and complexity of issues, etc.) and, conversely, the impact that the operating environment has on institutional performance.

**Comparative qualifiers** help benchmark performance in relation to other similar projects, support modalities, and organisations. Attention is also given to what is considered good practice (e.g. in Trust Fund management) and alignment to such good practice.

And fourth, much time and effort has been placed in trying to evidence answers to the evaluation questions given in the TOR. At times, robust evidence has been unavailable and conclusions have been drawn based on professional opinion. As with most opinions, these conclusions, of course, can be disputed.

#### **1.4. REPORT STRUCTURE**

The report structure follows broadly that which is outlined in the TOR:

Section 2 provides evaluation findings as they relate to TCA assumptions, efficiency and effectiveness

Section 3 gives key lessons learnt and recommendations

The Annexes include the Excerpts from the Draft Board Memorandum on the TCA (Annex 1), Terms of Reference for the Evaluation of the DFID-AfDB TCA (Annex 2), List of TCA Projects (Annex 3), TCA Evaluation Inception Report (Annex 4), Sources Consulted (Annex 5), Implementation Schedule (Annex 6), List of Bilateral and Thematic Trust Funds (Annex 7), Overview of Online Surveys (Annex 8), VfM Assessments (Annex 9), List of Interviewees (Annex 10), and the TCA Results Framework (Annex 11).

## 2. EVALUATION FINDINGS

The following sections on testing assumptions, assessing efficiency, and assessing effectiveness seek to answer the questions raised in the evaluation TOR as adjusted in the Inception Report (see Annex 4). Each question is answered by making explicit the hypotheses explored, presenting the data considered, and providing analytical findings.

### 2.1. TEST ASSUMPTIONS

**Question 1: Does the TCA strengthen the AfDB capability to achieve results (i.e. does the TCA strengthen AfDB capability to effect transformational change)?**

#### Hypotheses


There are three hypotheses that were explored in order to answer “Does the TCA strengthen the AfDB capability to achieve results (i.e. does the TCA strengthen AfDB capability to effect transformational change)?” These are:

- The African Development Bank achieved results in the period of TCA implementation.
- The TCA has targeted areas of Bank capability that need to be strengthened.
- The TCA can affect change in areas where capabilities need to be strengthened.

#### Data

The African Development Bank achieved results in the period of TCA implementation. It is, of course, beyond the scope of this evaluation to assess whether the Bank has delivered results in the period of TCA implementation. It should suffice to say that DFID’s Multilateral Aid Review (MAR 2011 and update of 2013) considers the Bank as having achieved results. This is supported by the Bank’s Annual

Summary performance scorecard 2012



For Level 1 Africa's relative performance is measured by comparing its progress with progress in Africa's peer group (low-and middle-income countries around the world); for Level 2 the Bank's performance is measured by comparing expected and actual achievements for all operations that have been completed; for Levels 3 and 4 the Bank's progress is measured against its progress in achieving its 2012 targets set out in the Bank's Results Measurement Framework.

- **Good progress:** More than half of the indicators in the group improved over baselines or reference groups.
- **Moderate progress:** Results are mixed, with equal numbers of indicators showing improvement or little / no progress.
- **Progress stalled or regressed:** More than half of indicators in the group stalled or regressed.
- **Progress could not be measured.**


Development Effectiveness Review 2013 summary performance scorecard (see above).


**The TCA has targeted areas of Bank capability that need to be strengthened**

The MAR (2011 and update of 2013), MOPAN (2009 and 2012), the Bank's own internal assessments, and interviews flag several areas where operational capability needs to be strengthened. These include: (a) managing human resources; (b) delegating authority; (c) results management; and (d) procurement processes. Policy areas where capability is seen as requiring strengthening include fragile states and governance.

**The TCA can affect change in areas where capabilities need to be strengthened**

As of March 2014, 38 TCA activities were completed, 10 are ongoing, and 3 had been cancelled. A total of GBP9,558,602 has been spent (see Figure 1 for spending allocations). Spending itself can be classified according to whether it was focused on policy, institutional strengthening, in-country projects, or other (see Figure 2).





As mentioned above, TCA policy focus areas (infrastructure, governance, fragile states, private sector development, and climate change) are supportive of the Bank’s own strategic priorities; while support for institutional strengthening has concentrated on human resources, procurement, financial management, and fiduciary safeguards in the context of decentralisation.

DFID’s Annual Review of the TCA (October 2013), which assesses and rates individual outputs given in the TCA results framework (2011) is summarised in Table 1.

**Table 1: Summary of the DFID Annual Review of the TCA (October 2013)**

Output	Score	Description
<b>Output 1: Enhanced capacity of AfDB to deliver high quality and high priority infrastructure investment</b>	C (Output did substantially not meet expectations)	“As indicated in the 2012 review, this output and indicators are not an appropriate measure of this component’s performance.”
<b>Output 2: Improved AfDB capacity to define and pursue its governance agenda effectively</b>	A (Output met expectations)	“Most activities under the governance component have been completed during the year under review.”
<b>Output 3: Enhanced capability to support climate change adaptation and exploitation of low carbon growth opportunities</b>	A (Output met expectations)	“The Bank has made real progress under its climate change work-stream.”
<b>Output 4: Improved AfDB human resources and procurement capacity</b>	B (Output moderately did not meet expectations)	Although progress is recognised, “the speed of procurement and other administrative procedures is an area that requires on-going attention, ensuring an appropriate balance with management of fiduciary risk.”
<b>Output 5: Infrastructure, social sector and governance operations contribute to development of dynamic competitive private sectors</b>	A (Output met expectations)	“The TCA has supported the successful finalisation and approval of a PSD strategy and translation of this into a number of Country Strategy Papers. It has also supported extensive training and sensitisation across the organisation to this new approach.”

In relation to its ability to affect change in focus areas (policy and operations), the DFID Annual Review (2013) scores the TCA as meeting expectations on policy (governance, climate change, and private sector development) and moderately not on operations (procurement).

## **Analysis**

A key challenge in assessing the TCA's contribution to the Bank's ability to achieve results is clearly drawing causality. Several interviewees pointed out that the TCA operates 'downstream'; it addresses weaknesses and gaps in larger 'upstream' Bank reform initiatives (e.g. decentralisation, delivery accountability, etc.) aimed at helping the bank achieve results.

An additional challenge is assessing whether the mix of policy activities (50% of spending) and institutional strengthening/knowledge activities (14%) is appropriate both in terms of substance and emphasis when it comes to bolstering Bank capability. In the absence of a more granular initial (and then updated) institutional capacity-needs assessment, beyond the MAR, MOPAN and Bank performance reviews, judging whether the TCA provided the right mix of activities becomes difficult to answer.

However, the following observations are made:

- The TCA was aligned to the Bank's own strategic priorities and the funding of activities was evidenced on broad assessments of Bank needs.
- The responsiveness of the TCA and its ability to accommodate requests from key departments, alongside the TCA's 'downstream' position, is likely to have enhanced the institutional capability impacts of 'upstream' Bank reform initiatives.
- Based on interviews and project output analyses, the most important contributions of the TCA to the Bank's ability to achieve results are in the policy domain; with significant contributions on climate change, private sector development, and governance; and modest contributions on infrastructure and fragile states.
- In March 2011, the Bank and DFID agreed that due to slow implementation of the activities under the institutional strengthening category, no new activity under that category would be approved. Whether this decision was strategic can be questioned, as a more balanced policy-institutional strengthening mix may have been more beneficial for the Bank.

## **Question 2: Does the TCA help the AfDB achieve results (i.e. there is will for transformational change)?**

### **Hypotheses**

There are four hypotheses that were explored in order to answer “Does the TCA help the AfDB achieve results (i.e. there is will for transformational change)?” These are:

- Trust Funds add value to the Bank.
- The TCA can be accessed by relevant Bank departments.
- The TCA has been used to help the Bank achieve results.
- The TCA has helped the Bank achieve results.

### **Data**

**Trust funds add value to the Bank** Although trust funds have grown in the AfDB portfolio, they amount to less than 1% of funding when compared to funds for AfDB/ADF lending. In relation to other IFIs, the number of trust funds at the Bank is limited and disbursement levels are low. Average disbursement across AfDB trust funds in 2011 was 31% for thematic funds and 40% for bilateral funds (see list of bilateral and thematic trust funds in Annex 7).

As explained in the independent evaluation of Trust Fund Management at the African Development Bank (April 2013), “Today, trust funds are an important source of financing for pre-investment studies, enhanced project cycle work, capacity building and analytical studies”. As one Bank director stated in an interview for this evaluation, “We use trust funds to sponsor specific activities in countries with new partners, to test out new approaches, to seize opportunity, and use smaller amounts of funding to enable new initiatives to happen. They play a catalytic role.”


**The TCA can be accessed by relevant Bank departments** Among AfDB interviewed users of the TCA, stated key drivers of access and use include: (a) flexibility and responsiveness of the TCA to Department requirements; (b) explicit thematic coverage of the TCA; (c) possibility of experimenting with new ways of getting results through the TCA; and (d) complementary nature of TCA funding to the Bank’s own.

None of the interviewed Task Managers reported any problems associated with using the TCA. The most frequent complaints expressed by interviewed Task Managers were not knowing enough about trust funds (and the TCA in particular) and delays stemming from standard Bank procurement processes.

Among AfDB interviewees (Directors and Task Managers) who had experience in accessing the TCA and other Bank trust funds, all 10 respondents surveyed on the question of how the TCA compared to other Bank trust funds placed it among the top three trust funds in the Bank.

**The TCA has been used to help the Bank achieve results** Data on TCA funded activities (48 activities that are either completed or in process of completion) has been given above. Disbursement rates across sectors funded by the TCA average

85%, indicating relatively high level of follow-through to implementation. However, high disbursement rates have also been facilitated by the flexibility of the TCA, including flexibility in time extensions for projects.



**The TCA has helped the Bank achieve results** A survey of 12 interviewed Task Managers in the Bank who had projects funded by the TCA showed that 9 (75%) felt their projects had helped the Bank achieve results, and 3 (25%) saw mixed results. These results, of course, have to be considered in light of some likely bias. The quotes in Box 2 are illustrative of the types of results seen from TCA funded projects.

Primary beneficiaries for most TCA-funded activities have been Bank staff, with benefits often extending to RMCs. Some projects, however, have benefited RMCs and non-Bank constituencies, such as some climate change projects (e.g. Capacity-building on Nationally Appropriate Mitigation Actions), private sector development (e.g. Establishment of Secretariat for Private Sector Development Partnership for North Africa), and the Monrovia Water and Sanitation Rehabilitation Programme, to mention some.

**Box 2: Perspectives on TCA results**

“The TCA has given us leverage to mainstream a focus on renewable energy and climate change in the Bank”

“TCA funded capacity-building projects have transformed the Bank. Our [procurement] timelines are coming down as a result”

“The TCA has been catalytic in key policy areas, including private sector development, climate change, and governance”

“We prepared a set of knowledge products, but did not disseminate them, really. There are a lot of knowledge products in the Bank, but no library or place where you can find them all.”

A spot check on results of the 2011 Capacity-building on Nationally Appropriate Mitigation Actions (NAMAs) (disbursed: GBP57,526.00) via an online survey (see Annex 8), to which 5 (out of 24) African negotiators/delegates and national authority representatives replied showed that: (a) 100% of respondents found the workshop highly relevant to their work on climate change; (b) 100% of respondents felt the workshop raised their understanding of NAMAs; (c) 100% of respondents felt the workshop gave them an understanding of current policy debates around NAMAs; (d)

100% of respondents felt that the workshop helped them understand current NAMA developments in Africa, particularly regional differences and sector specificities; and (e) 80% used what they learnt at the workshop in their subsequent work.

## Analysis

There is a clear and obvious value added of trust funds for the Bank. Trust funds hold a strategic and complementary space in Bank operations. However, their potential as an instrument to enhance the Bank’s ability to achieve results appears under-utilised. This is recognised by the Bank and efforts are made to address trust fund challenges.

Interviews indicate that the TCA appears to be among the most appreciated trust funds in the Bank by Directors and Task Managers. Its untied nature, flexibility, responsiveness to needs, and association to DFID is at the heart of this appreciation. Obstacles to its use seem primarily associated to limited available information about the TCA in the Bank and among Task Managers.

TCA disbursement rates are relatively high, when compared to other Bank trust funds. This would indicate that accessing the fund is followed through by implementation – and therefore that there is a will among those using the TCA to see results emerge. Here, however, delays in project completion (discussed below) should be seen as a qualifier to this last statement.

With perceptions among 75% of Task Managers who had used the TCA that projects have had positive results, and spot-check beneficiary surveys returning favourable results, there seems to be evidence to suggest that the TCA has helped the AfDB achieve results. The respondent who felt the TCA’s performance was less favourable felt transaction costs and disbursement delays were challenging (see Annex 8).

**Question 3: How relevant is the TCA to the AfDB strategic goals (i.e. how strategic were the interventions financed by the TCA)?**

### Hypotheses

There are two hypotheses that were explored in order to answer “How relevant is the TCA to the AfDB strategic goals (i.e. how strategic were the interventions financed by the TCA)?” These are:

<b>Results and Performance</b>
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Alignment of business processes with results and performance focus at project preparation, implementation and evaluation level</li> <li>• Improved monitoring of results both at operational and non-operational level through key performance indicators</li> <li>• Mainstreaming of results measurement through improved statistical and database management</li> <li>• Publication and dissemination of flagship reports on selected topics in line with the Bank’s sector focus</li> </ul>
<b>Decentralization</b>
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Enhanced delivery of products and services through field office presence and improved field office infrastructure</li> <li>• Decentralization of business processes through delegation of authorities and operational involvement of field office staff</li> <li>• Further deployment of sector staff to field offices to strengthen project monitoring and implementation</li> </ul>
<b>Streamlined Internal Processes</b>
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Embedding of operational selectivity and results focus in organizational structure through creation of new departments</li> <li>• Integration of strategic planning, programming and budgeting; introduction of results based budgeting and performance monitoring to ensure optimized allocation of resources</li> </ul>
<b>Staffing, Knowledge, Financials, and Partnerships as Foundation</b>
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Implementation of new HR strategy to strengthen allocation of staff and skills</li> <li>• Improvement of statistical capacity and publication and dissemination of flagship reports on selected topics in line with the Bank’s sector focus</li> <li>• Review of the Capital Adequacy Framework to ensure safeguarding the Bank’s financial integrity and maintaining the AAA rating</li> <li>• Work in more effective partnerships with other development agencies</li> </ul>

- Alignment to AfDB strategic goals makes TCA interventions more strategic.
- The TCA can contribute to AfDB strategic goals.

## Data

**Alignment to AfDB strategic goals makes TCA interventions more strategic** As mentioned above, post-signature, TCA focus areas were adjusted to be in line with the Bank's Mid-Term Strategy (2008-2012) to cover infrastructure, governance, fragile states, private sector development, and climate change. Institutional strengthening was concentrated on human resources, procurement, financial management, and fiduciary safeguards in the context of decentralisation – and received further attention following the Multilateral Aid Review (2011).

The summary of the Bank's strategic framework above and immediately below, drawn from the Bank's Mid-Term Strategy (2008-2012) show priority sectors/issues for the bank, both at the policy and institutional strengthening level.




**The TCA can contribute to AfDB strategic goals** As shown above in Figure 1, the TCA's top five spending areas were in water, private sector development, climate change, institutional strengthening, and governance. All projects in these sectors were initiated in the period 2008-2012 and constitute 83% of all funds spent as of March 2014. Spending on other Bank priority areas (infrastructure, knowledge, aid effectiveness, and fragile states) amounted to 10% of total disbursements.

If we consider that the main water project (Monrovia Water and Sanitation Rehabilitation Programme) is an anomaly in the TCA portfolio<sup>2</sup>, then the main TCA investment in support of the Bank's capacity-strengthening came in four main sectors (private sector development, climate change, institutional strengthening, and governance) and constituted 54% of overall TCA spending.

Out of the 54% significant TCA spending allocated to Bank priority areas, 41% was for policy-related work and 13% for institutional strengthening.

<sup>2</sup> The TCA was used to co-finance the Monrovia Water and Sanitation Rehabilitation Programme as the Bank did not have another vehicle to receive funding for it.

Figure 4: Top TCA spending areas



Whereas policy-related investment was driven by shared Bank-DFID interests and aligned to the Bank's strategic priorities, the targeting of TCA spending for institutional strengthening was based on Bank internal demand (with DFID engagement) and MAR (2011) and MOPAN findings.

Beyond the strategic alignment of the TCA to Bank priorities, interviews conducted for this evaluation indicate that the process of selecting projects for funding was driven in part by Bank staff and in part by DFID. DFID engagement in project identification, formulation, and approval was significant. Many TCA-funded projects saw close cooperation between Bank Task Managers and DFID technical advisers, which is seen by most Bank respondents as a contributing factor to project success.

Some Bank and DFID respondents, however, viewed DFID engagement in project identification, formulation and approval as at times diluting the strategic focus of the TCA. Without detracting from the intrinsic merits of these projects, examples cited are the Monrovia Water and Sanitation Rehabilitation Programme, Souk Attanmia: Social Entrepreneurship in Tunisia, and Establishment of Secretariat for Private Sector Development Partnership in North Africa. In these cases, the TCA was used to fund initiatives that would otherwise perhaps be outside its scope. It is important to stress that all three projects mentioned have benefitted the Bank in a variety of ways – including ways aligned to the intended outcomes for the Bank of the TCA.

## Analysis

Alignment of the TCA to Bank strategy, as well as MAR (2011) and MOPAN findings made the TCA relevant to Bank strategic goals. The main TCA investments have been on Bank policy areas (private sector development, climate change, institutional strengthening, and governance) and institutional strengthening.

The responsiveness of the TCA to Bank needs in focus areas has probably added to the relevance of the TCA to the Bank's strategic goals. Here two points should be made. First, the TCA has balanced its strategic focus with flexibility, which has enabled it to fund projects that were perhaps slightly outside of its scope, but

nonetheless important for the Bank. And second, Bank and DFID technical cooperation on TCA projects has been significant. Such cooperation was particularly effective on projects where Bank and DFID strategic interests converged.

There is a sense among many interviewees that the strategic relevance of many activities is still unfolding. Examples cited are in the Financial Management Reforms project, but also in several funded activities related to climate change, governance, and fragile states.

In addition to criticism of the potential dilution of the TCA’s strategic focus from the funding of some activities that were perhaps outside its scope, there is also concern that some TCA funded activities should have come out of the Bank’s other budget lines. In terms of the last point, TCA funding of strategy development in key policy areas is seen as problematic by some.

## 2.2. ASSESS EFFICIENCY

**Question 4: Were TCA funds used efficiently and could they have been used more efficiently?**

### Hypotheses

There were two hypotheses that were explored in order to answer “Were TCA funds used efficiently and could they have been used more efficiently?” They are:

- The drivers of inefficient spending in the TCA are poor economy, poor planning, delays, and project abandonment or failure.
- TCA funds were used more efficiently in some projects and less so in others.

### Data

**The drivers of inefficient spending in the TCA are poor economy, poor planning, delays, and project abandonment or failure** Over 30 (of a total of 48) TCA projects were implemented by regional or international consultants or consulting firms. Whereas a review of each project for economy is beyond the scope of this evaluation, economy can be partly gauged by the Bank’s rates for consultants (see the rate overview for international consultants). The type required for most TCA projects (experienced and skilled) follow remuneration given in Column C, and are generally in line with the rates offered by other IFIs and multilateral agencies.

Daily Fees in UA				Monthly Lump Sum Fees in UA			
Experience In Years	Assignment Category			Experience In Years	Assignment Category		
	A	B	C		A	B	C
2	90			2	1 540		
3	120			3	2 050		
4	160			4	2 740		
5	210	250	280	5	3 650	4 290	4 940
6	220	260	300	6	3 780	4 440	5 110
7	230	270	310	7	3 910	4 600	5 290
8	240	280	320	8	4 050	4 760	5 480
9	250	290	330	9	4 190	4 930	5 670
10	260	300	350	10	4 340	5 100	5 870
11	270	310	360	11	4 490	5 280	6 070
12	280	330	370	12	4 650	5 470	6 290
13	290	340	390	13	4 810	5 660	6 510
14	300	350	410	14	4 980	5 860	6 730
15	310	370	420	15	5 150	6 060	6 970
16	320	380	440	16	5 330	6 270	7 210
17	340	400	460	17	5 520	6 490	7 460
18	350	410	470	18	5 710	6 720	7 730
19	360	430	490	19	5 910	6 950	7 990
20	380	450	510	20	6 120	7 190	8 270
21	390	460	530	21	6 270	7 370	8 480
22	400	470	540	22	6 420	7 560	8 690
23	410	490	560	23	6 580	7 740	8 910
24	430	500	580	24	6 750	7 940	9 130
25	440	520	590	25	6 910	8 130	9 350
26	450	530	610	26	7 080	8 330	9 590
27	470	550	630	27	7 260	8 540	9 820
28	480	560	650	28	7 440	8 750	10 060
29	490	580	670	29	7 620	8 970	10 310
30+	510	600	690	30+	7 810	9 190	10 570

There was no data available on the number of TCA funded projects that were based on a logical framework or results framework. However, before 2011, ORRU did not necessarily require a logical framework for proposals under trust funds. When used, interviews indicate that logical frameworks were useful to monitor progress and track achievements.

In terms of project delays, delays in TCA project implementation and completion appear to have affected, to varying degrees, more than half of the projects in the TCA portfolio. Significant project launch delays make consultant identification and retention difficult. Interviewees attributed these delays to a variety of factors, including slow or difficult procurement procedures, change of Task Managers responsible for the project, time consuming and cumbersome Bank decision-making or adoption processes, or TCA funded projects being low on departmental priority lists.

However, the stated time period given by interviewed AfDB task managers from request for TCA funding to procured expertise varied from six to 12 months, indicating that many projects experienced delays during implementation, rather than during start up.

Of the 38 completed TCA activities, interviews with AfDB and DFID staff, confirmed by output reviews as part of this evaluation, identified four projects that failed to deliver fully on intended purpose or did not meet quality expectations:

- Study: Strategic Framework for Infrastructure Development (disbursed: GBP45,544.00)
- Independent Review of the Bank's Fiduciary Safeguards in the Context of the New Decentralisation Roadmap (disbursed: GBP140,439.00)
- African Governance Outlook (disbursed: GBP93,590.00)<sup>3</sup>
- External Evaluation of the TCA (disbursed: GBP16,982.00)

This would constitute a 3.1% of total TCA spending that is seen as having been suboptimal. Another two projects (3 Joint AfDB-World Bank Sub-Regional Workshops on Climate Change and Communications Specialist and Intranet Revamping) were cancelled without disbursements made.

**TCA funds were used more efficiently in some projects and less so in others**  
13 TCA funded projects meet criteria of on time completion (or delays of less than six months) and disbursement rates of 90% or above. These are projects involving:

- The recruitment of long term experts

---

<sup>3</sup> The AfDB governance team response to the inclusion in the draft evaluation of the African Governance Outlook in this list is helpful; "On the Africa Governance Outlook, the report suggests that this activity did not meet quality expectations. It should be noted that the AGO was a pilot, an important component of which focused on institutional capacity building which as noted in the report takes time. Some progress has been made on the implementation of the AGO. Ten draft country reports were produced and the pilot has provided substantial learning in both the application of the methodology and analysis of emerging trends in financial governance. A synthesis report was also prepared which consolidated the findings of the pilot phase and this was presented at the Bank Groups 2012 Annual Meeting in Arusha, Tanzania. In 2014, the Bank has identified additional resources to continue with the implementation of the AGO. This will allow the updating of the ten country reports with the latest (2014) data and analysis as well as capacity building support to the Africa Capacity Building Foundation (ACBF). It is anticipated that the remaining funds allocated to the AGO under the DFID TCA, which amount to 156,398 pounds sterling, will be disbursed during the second quarter of 2014."

- Contributions to projects with funding from other sources
- Contributions to conferences, roundtables and workshops
- Clearly defined and one-off studies
- Budgets of less than GBP100,000 (with two exceptions)

Interviewees, however, have noted trade-offs in relation to one-off projects versus a package of activities, and small projects (cost-wise) versus large ones. In terms of the former, interviewees indicated that time lost in negotiating funding for additional activities after the completion of one-off projects was inefficient. Proposing a package of activities for TCA funding from the outset is seen by some as a better approach. Similarly, although small and specific projects were seen as valuable by many Bank respondents, all of those interviewed that had received larger amounts of TCA funding felt results generated were greater.

## Analysis

Without a full and detailed review of relevant project documents of TCA-funded projects it is not possible to confidently answer whether TCA funding was used efficiently. However, based on the available data presented in this section and above, the following is noted:

- Although Bank consultant rates are broadly aligned to other IFIs and multilateral agencies, delays in project start up and procurement are likely to negatively affect efficiency in TCA spending; with the best consultants not always available to implement projects when the Bank is ready to do so.
- The limited use of logical frameworks or results frameworks in the formulation of projects for TCA funding is likely to have negatively affected efficiency in projects, and consequently the efficiency of TCA funding.
- Where Bank departments were encouraged to submit programmes (a package of inter-linked activities) for funding, this is likely to have positively affected efficiency in TCA funding.
- With suboptimal TCA spending considered to be at 3.1% of total disbursements, obvious inefficiency in the TCA portfolio appears limited.<sup>4</sup>

## Question 5: How well did the partnership and management arrangements work (taking into account how they developed over time)?

### Hypotheses

Two hypotheses were explored in order to answer “How well did the partnership and management arrangements work (taking into account how they developed over time)?” They are:

---

<sup>4</sup> It is important to flag here that optimism bias in this assessment may be a possibility.

- The AfDB-DFID partnership benefited from significant investment (time and resources) from both organisations.
- AfDB and DFID investment in management arrangements contributed to TCA performance.

## Data

**The AfDB-DFID partnership benefited from significant investment (time and resources) from both organisations** Interviews suggest that the first few years of the TCA were characterised by expectations management challenges. According to interviewees, these challenges were rooted in:

- No shared understanding of what constituted transformational change and institutional effectiveness of AfDB - and that the TCA was aimed at this;
- Absence initially of a results framework, which could be used to measure TCA results;
- DFID engagement in TCA project identification, formulation, and approval – along with disagreement on approval thresholds for the financing of activities;
- The late development of project eligibility criteria for the TCA;
- Staff turn-over in both AfDB and DFID, which meant “having to start over” with new staff on issues previously agreed; and
- Challenges around estimating annual TCA disbursement requirements and consequent difficulties in understanding Bank requirements.

As explained by one DFID staff member, “We ended up in the beginning spending a lot of time with ORRU on clarifying TCA expectations. That led to the development of criteria for eligibility. We then helped shape projects so these could be funded.” And conversely from the AfDB, “There was a time when I was on the phone every week discussing project details with DFID. In terms of transaction costs, they were significant for us in the beginning, and probably more for DFID”.

An online perception survey of the AfDB-DFID partnership among four TCA fund managers/supervisors (from both the Bank and DFID) affirms the above and shows: (a) 50% of respondents see transaction costs associated to the TCA as “high”, while 50% see it as “medium”; and (b) 75% of respondents see the AfDB-DFID partnership on the TCA as “good”, while 25% feel it was “challenging” (see Annex 8).


**AfDB and DFID investment in management arrangements contributed to TCA performance** Documentation reviewed and interviews indicate that both AfDB and DFID applied robust management arrangements to the TCA.

On the Bank side, this involved initially (2007-2011) brokering/serving as an entry-point for requests to the TCA, facilitating discussions between Bank and DFID technical staff, ensuring adequate progress and financial reporting, and servicing DFID and Bank requirements in relation to the TCA. From 2011-present, management arrangements involved: (a) encouraging the use of results frameworks for TCA proposals and screening them for eligibility; (b) collecting and working on project progress reports, project completion reports; (c) preparing annual progress reports; (d) engagement with DFID on technical proposals, approval of proposals, feedback on reports, and visits to Tunis; and (e) managing the TCA evaluation.

DFID management arrangements involved: (a) lead advisers working with programme officers on TCA proposals, project (progress and spending) reporting and annual reviews; (b) coordination between ARD and IFID on annual reviews, TCA adjustments, visits to the Bank; and (c) facilitation and management of DFID technical staff engagement on specific TCA projects and with Bank Task Managers.

Among eight Bank Task Managers asked about the impact of TCA management arrangements on project performance, seven (87.5%) felt these created positive pressure to ensure successful project implementation. One respondent (12.5%) felt management arrangements created unnecessary burdens on Task Managers. Perceptions of the overall success of the TCA among TCA fund managers/supervisors support these findings, with 75% seeing the TCA as successful and 25% as unsuccessful.

**Figure 6:** What are your perceptions of how successful the TCA has been?



### Analysis

The AfDB and DFID partnership on the TCA has evolved over time; from initial expectations challenges to one of functional management of the TCA. Although transaction costs associated to the TCA are high for both institutions, the partnership between the Bank and DFID is mostly good.

Both the AfDB and DFID have upheld robust management arrangements on the TCA. These management arrangements have translated into pressure on Task Managers implementing TCA projects to do so well. Overall, this may partly explain the TCA’s relatively better performance when compared to other Bank trust funds.

### Question 6: Were the risks properly identified and well managed?

#### Hypotheses

One hypothesis was explored in order to answer “Were the risks properly identified and well managed?” It is:

- Risks in TCA projects were identified and managed

#### Data

There is limited data on risk identification and management in TCA funded projects. Risks are identified in larger projects, such as:

- The Monrovia Water and Sanitation Rehabilitation Programme (disbursement: GBP2,798,181.00) (Appraisal Report, November 2007)
- Enhanced Private Sector Development Impact (disbursement: GBP1,306,027.00) (Draft Proposal. AfDB/DFID Collaboration for Enhanced Private Sector Development Impact, April 2011)
- Support to ORPF Procurement and Financial Management Reforms Project (requested total: GBP780,000.00) (Support to ORPF Procurement and Financial Management Reforms Project, No Date)

For smaller TCA projects, proposal formats vary and risks are rarely identified. However, it is important to note that these projects are not considered by the evaluator as high risk. DFID engagement in project identification, formulation, and approval – in addition to the project review processes of different Bank departments seeking to access TCA funding, appears to have been a sufficiently robust mechanism to identify and avoid risks in projects.

Among the four projects that failed to deliver fully on intended purpose or did not meet quality expectations, the identification and mitigation of risk in the proposals is unlikely to have made much of a difference.

## **Analysis**

The largest TCA funded projects have benefited from varying degrees of risk identification. In terms of financial significance, this means that slightly below 50% of the TCA project portfolio has considered risk. Proposals for smaller TCA projects normally do not include a risk assessment and mitigation element.

### **2.3. ASSESS EFFECTIVENESS**

**Question 7: Did the use of TCA funds represent good Value-for-Money? Were costs incurred appropriate and proportionate to results achieved?**

#### **Hypotheses**

Two hypotheses were explored in order to answer “Did the use of TCA funds represent good Value-for-Money? Were costs incurred appropriate and proportionate to results achieved?” These are:

- From the projects reviewed, the use of TCA funds represented fair Value-for-Money.
- From the projects reviewed, the costs incurred were largely appropriate and proportionate to results achieved.

#### **Data**

VfM assessments were carried out on two projects (one related to policy and the other to institutional strengthening) in the TCA portfolio to explore these hypotheses:

- Integrated training on climate change (disbursement: GBP166,300.00)
- Financial management reforms project (disbursement: GBP163,843.00)

Data in relation to both hypotheses and for both projects is given in Annex 9. For the two projects reviewed, a summary of VfM findings is given below.

**The Integrated Training Programme on Climate Change** targeted 27 Bank staff members for two training of trainers events at Cambridge University in 2012 and 2014. Data is incomplete (no results framework, limited cost breakdown, etc.), but a number of documents were made available for the VfM assessment, which enable a qualitative assessment of value for money of the programme. In addition, a post-event survey of 14 participants (from both training events) was carried out as part of this evaluation.

Key findings are:

- Economy and efficiency gains for the project could have been made by having one training for 27 Bank staff as opposed to two trainings for 12 and 15 staff, respectively. It is clear, however, that if this was done, it would have negatively impacted Bank operations. No competing proposals were reviewed, which limits insights on economy.
- Available data and extrapolation sets the unit cost at GBP9,307/Bank staff trained and GBP5,026/Bank staff sensitised. No comparative international unit costs were accessible. However, this unit cost is considered by the evaluator as high from an efficiency perspective.
- It is not possible to determine the cost per measure of outcome. However, the available evaluation report (2012) and a survey conducted of trainees (2012 and 2014) indicates a high percentage of outcome achievement.
- The appropriate targeting of Bank staff for training participation is seen as contributing towards cost-effectiveness. The subsequent awareness-raising activities carried out by trained Bank staff for their colleagues increases cost-effectiveness further.
- With caveats associated to data weaknesses, the programme is seen as having delivered value for money.

**The Financial Management Reforms project** was for the preparation of six documents (policy, guidance, manuals) and revision of one. Over the course of implementation, there were some adjustments to the envisaged deliverables. The project itself fits within a broader strategy for procurement reform – and a broader set of related TCA-funded activities. The project is outlined in a results framework and there are several progress and financial reports that explain project implementation and challenges. There is, however, insufficient available data to complete a VfM assessment. Nonetheless, the following conclusions are drawn:

- The project is a key component of broader procurement reforms. It is well-articulated and consistent with the overall procurement reform strategy.

- Procurement is an area that fundamentally affects overall Bank performance and its ability to deliver on its mandate. TCA targeting of procurement as a sector for support was and is appropriate.
- Although it is not possible to complete a VfM assessment, it seems intuitively clear that the development of financial management policy/guidance documents makes good investment-sense, considering the size of Bank annual contracting.

## Analysis

Data on Value-for-Money in relation to TCA funded projects is limited. This is in part due to the fact that many project activities were implemented several years ago and that staff turnover in the Bank makes it difficult to access relevant documentation. However, there is also a limited collection of baseline data, definition of measurable indicators, and use of results frameworks, which adds to the challenge of conducting VfM assessments on specific Bank projects.

Data gaps also affected the VfM assessment of the two TCA-funded projects reviewed in detail for this evaluation. However, one is deemed to have offered VfM (Integrated Training Programme on Climate Change), while for the other (Financial Management Reforms project) VfM conclusions cannot be drawn. However, given the gap the second project fills and its likely impact on Bank contracting, it is seen as having made ‘good investment sense’ for the TCA.

Whereas unit costs are seen as somewhat high for the Integrated Training Programme on Climate Change, costs incurred for the Financial Management Reforms project are reasonable, although it is a project with significant delays in implementation.

Given the diversity of projects in the TCA portfolio (see Annex 3), it is unlikely that the projects selected for VfM assessments are broadly representative<sup>5</sup>. Furthermore, a rigorous assessment of whether costs incurred for TCA projects are appropriate and proportionate to the results achieved requires a project-by-project review, which is beyond the scope of this evaluation.

**Question 8: To what extent were the intended outputs and results achieved in relation to targets set in original and revised project documents (including logical framework analyses)?**

## Hypotheses

Two hypotheses were explored in order to answer “To what extent were the intended outputs and results achieved in relation to targets set in original and revised project documents (including logical framework analyses)?” They are:

---

<sup>5</sup> Criteria for selecting TCA funded projects for VfM assessment in this evaluation included: (a) relevance to policy and institutional strengthening; (b) differences in output types (training, policy documents, etc.); and (c) the strategic importance of these projects for the Bank.

- The achievements of the TCA, in relation to intended outputs and results as set out in the original and revised project documents, are mixed.
- TCA achievements have become more pronounced as the AfDB-DFID partnership has grown over time.

## Data

**The achievements of the TCA, in relation to intended outputs and results as set out in the original and revised project documents, are mixed** In relation to the overall TCA portfolio, the following data drawn from the above sections should be recapped:

- A survey of 12 interviewed Task Managers in the Bank who had projects funded by the TCA showed that 9 (75%) felt their projects had helped the Bank achieve results, and 3 (25%) saw mixed results.
- More than half of TCA funded projects experienced delays. Such delays make consultant identification and retention difficult, which has implications for the achievement of intended outputs and results.
- 3.1% of total TCA spending that is seen as having been suboptimal, while another two projects were cancelled without disbursements made.
- 13 TCA funded projects (27%) meet criteria of on time completion (or delays of less than six months) and disbursement rates of 90% or above.

Table 2 and Table 3 below provide further illustration of variations in TCA funded project delivery.

**Table 2: Outputs and Results of the Integrated Training Programme on Climate Change**

	<b>Intended</b>	<b>Actual</b>
<b>Outputs</b>	<p>A training program to be held in a highly reputable institution for professional staff who have responsibility related to addressing climate change in different fields e.g. water, agriculture, energy, health, finance and procurement.</p> <p>Training of trainers to train a number of the Bank staff drawn from key climate change-relevant departments, in order to contribute to the on-going efforts of building the capacity of the Bank staff as well as the RMCs and ensure sustainability of the program.</p> <p>A training package for future use in capacity development.</p>	<p>Training program at The University of Cambridge Programme for Sustainability Leadership (CPSL) provides guidance on needs and means for integrating environmental concerns and climate change measures.</p> <p>Included in the training of 12 + 15 Bank staff members from different departments in 2012 and 2014.</p> <p>Provided.</p>
<b>Results</b>	<p>Improve the knowledge of Bank staff about climate change and its consequences</p> <p>Provide a good understanding of international and regional climate change agreements, policies and programmes</p> <p>Appreciate the urgent need for adaptation in Africa and the means to minimise risk, build resilience and maximise business opportunities</p> <p>Understand and appreciate the key drivers towards a low carbon economy and the implications for development</p> <p>Provide insights through the use of examples and case studies from other regions and organisations</p>	<p>Based on available evaluations and surveys, all results assessed to have been achieved for 12 + 15 Bank staff.</p>

**Table 3: Outputs and Results of the Financial Management Reforms project**

	Intended	Actual
<b>Outputs</b>	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> <li>1. A Financial Management Policy Document</li> <li>2. A Financial Management Practice Manual</li> <li>3. A Financial Management Manual for Borrowers</li> <li>4. A revised version of the Bank's "Guidelines For Financial Management And Financial Analysis Of Projects"</li> <li>5. Country fiduciary risk assessment framework</li> <li>6. A Guidance Note to Assess the Capacity of Supreme Audit Institutions (AFROSAI)</li> <li>7. A Bank Strategy for the Use of Country FM Systems</li> </ol>	<p>Completed (February 2014)</p> <p>Completed (April 2014)</p> <p>Not available</p> <p>Completed (April 2014). "Financial Management Implementation Guidelines For Bank Group Funded Operations"</p> <p>Completed (April 2014)</p> <p>Not available</p> <p>Completed (February 2014) "Promoting the Use of Country Public Financial Management (PFM) Systems"</p>
<b>Results</b>	<p>Bank-wide quality assurance mechanism set-up to ensure FM functions in Bank operations are carried out in accordance with international standards and best practices</p> <p>Number of available FM materials for use by Bank and Borrowers' Staff</p> <p>Percentage of Bank projects and programmes running with new FM arrangements</p>	<p>Completed project outputs are in different stages of Bank Board approval</p> <p>Upon Board approval of project outputs, these will be made available on Bank website</p> <p>Data unavailable, but presumed to still be at 0% until Board approves project outputs</p>

**TCA achievements have become more pronounced as the AfDB-DFID partnership has grown over time** There is no data to substantiate that TCA achievements have improved as the AfDB-DFID partnership has grown.

Data outlined above indicates that 87.5% of Bank Task Managers felt that Bank and DFID management arrangements for the TCA created positive pressure to ensure successful project implementation.

### Analysis

Data provided indicates that to varying degrees, excluding those deemed to have delivered poorly, TCA funded projects have delivered on intended outputs and results. The two examples used for a 'deeper dive' into project outputs and results show that institutional strengthening projects that tackle highly specialised Bank operations areas appear to require a longer timeframe for output and results delivery.

## **Question 9: How effective and appropriate was the project approach? With hindsight, how would the implementers have changed it?**

### **Hypotheses**

Two hypotheses were explored in order to answer “How effective and appropriate was the project approach? With hindsight, how would the implementers have changed it?” They are:

- The project approach was appropriate to the AfDB context when agreed.
- The effectiveness of the project approach is affected by the AfDB institutional context.

### **Data**

**The project approach was appropriate to the AfDB context when agreed** The TCA portfolio (see Annex 3) includes a mix of one-off projects (approximately 32) and what can best be described as programmes (3), or a package of related projects that support the achievement of a specific objective. One of the programmes (procurement reform support) is accounted for on a project-by-project basis.

As mentioned above, most TCA funding went to projects and programmes in four main Bank priority sectors (private sector development, climate change, institutional strengthening, and governance), while other Bank priorities (infrastructure, knowledge, aid effectiveness, and fragile states) received a smaller amount of funding.

TCA projects and programmes were generated partly in response to demand from spending departments, and partly through DFID engagement with Bank departments in the identification and formulation of projects. In some cases where Bank and DFID interests converged, projects were also funded through the TCA that would normally be considered outside its scope. These cases absorbed around 26% of TCA funding.

**The effectiveness of the project approach is affected by the AfDB institutional context** There is limited data on how the AfDB institutional context affected the effectiveness of the project approach. However, the following observations were made by Bank and DFID interviewees:

- The relative small size of trust fund projects (in thousands) compared to other Bank projects (in millions) managed by Task Managers appears to have affected the attention TCA-funded projects received in spending departments.
- There is limited awareness among Bank spending departments of criteria and donor preferences for each trust fund. Limited internal Bank ‘marketing’ of the TCA seems to have affected the volume of demand for its use.
- Staff turnover at the Bank and at times poor handover of TCA projects from one Task Manager to the next meant that some projects ‘fell between the cracks’.

- There was no structured capacity-needs assessment (beyond the more general analysis provided by MAR and MOPAN) undertaken to inform focus and priority-setting of the TCA. Over five years, the institutional context also changed – and limited attention was given to track the implications of these changes for the TCA.

## **Analysis**

The TCA project approach appears to have been premised on an assumption that spending departments know what capacity-gaps need to be filled and will use the TCA to address these gaps. The assumption is valid and several TCA projects and programmes have added significant value to the Bank. However, limited awareness of opportunities with the TCA in Bank spending departments probably reduced the volume of projects that could have been funded.

As indicated in earlier sections, a decision in 2011 to limit institutional strengthening funding may have been taken too hastily. There are also questions around whether the policy-institutional strengthening mix was appropriate – and therefore, whether the results framework drawn up for the TCA in 2011 is a useful instrument with which to measure TCA performance. With this caveat, the evaluation supports the conclusions drawn (see Table 1 above) in DFID’s Annual Review of the TCA (October 2013) and its assessment and rating of the individual outputs given in the TCA Results Framework (see Annex 11).

The absence of a more structured capacity-needs assessment of TCA focus areas in the Bank, in conjunction with limited awareness of the TCA among Bank spending departments, is likely to have reduced the effectiveness of the project (and programme) approach – but not its validity. Discussions within sector departments and between sector departments and DFID counter-parts helped priority-setting. A detailed and updated capacity-needs assessment would nonetheless have better informed the TCA results framework.

### 3. LESSONS LEARNT AND RECOMMENDATIONS

Lessons learnt and recommendations are drawn directly from the analysis given in Section 2 above. Recommendations in particular are focused on implications of the TCA for broader Bank trust fund management and how to make the FA work better based on TCA lessons.

#### 3.1. DRAW LESSONS

##### **Question 10: What lessons emerge from the TCA for the AfDB in relation to its broader trust fund management and strategy?**

The TCA experience affirms the value added of trust funds for the Bank. They enable the bank to reach out to new partners, test out new approaches, address capacity-gaps, seize opportunity, and enable new initiatives to become bankable. Four lessons from the TCA are relevant to the AfDB in relation to its broader trust fund management and strategy.

First, the absence of a structured capacity-needs assessment at the outset of the TCA (and updated during its implementation) reduced the ability of the fund to prioritise and focus on Bank needs. Introducing such capacity-needs assessments, which can be done by departments covered by trust funds that target the Bank's capacity development (currently limited to the TCA) may strengthen the impact of funding.

Second, the use of results frameworks and the collection of baseline data were limited in TCA funded projects. However, these would have helped better formulate and evidence proposals – and enabled a better assessment of results. Integrating the use of results frameworks and collection of baseline data where relevant for Bank trust funds will bolster efficiency and effectiveness and be in line with the Bank's overall results agenda.

Third, TCA funded projects were at times affected by cumbersome and rigorous Bank procurement processes, that affected project efficiency and effectiveness. Developing procurement processes or other approaches that enable trust funds to play their role well and in a timely manner will be important.

And finally, the TCA was not well-known to many staff members in different AfDB spending departments. Similarly, interviewed Bank staff felt that knowing what was

#### **Box 3: Structured capacity-needs assessments**

**What?** A structured assessment of departmental/sector capacity-gaps, opportunities, and new initiatives that should be addressed by a Bank trust fund.

**Why?** Although departments/sectors in the Bank are aware of their capacity-gaps, formulating these internally (and where relevant with other departments) into thought-through strategic programmes for trust fund funding will bolster the effectiveness of funds spent.

**How?** There are many ways in which a capacity-needs assessment can be undertaken. For example, it could involve a series of departmental/ sector meetings focused on identifying priority capacity-gaps, opportunities, and new initiatives. These are followed by consultations with other relevant departments, joint planning sessions if relevant, and the write-up of the proposed capacity-strengthening programme in a logical framework format.

**When?** Once a decision is made to access trust funds and 24 months after funds are accessed to align plans with institutional changes.

on offer and requirements to access trust funds would be valuable. Enabling more effective trust fund awareness across the Bank will be important.

### **Question 11: What are the implications of lessons from the TCA evaluation for the planned AfDB-DFID Framework Agreement (FA)?**

Negotiations between the AfDB and DFID on the FA are almost concluded<sup>6</sup>. Lessons learnt from the TCA to the FA should therefore be focused on how to make the FA run effectively. Five lessons from the TCA are relevant in this regard.

First, going beyond the MAR and MOPAN reviews to a more structured capacity-needs assessment of Bank requirements in key areas of support would have enhanced the effectiveness of the TCA. Undertaking such capacity-needs assessments, which can be done by Departments covered by the FA, at the beginning of the FA and at intervals of 24 months will be important for planning and prioritisation of funding.

Second, TCA effectiveness was impacted by low awareness of its existence among relevant Bank spending departments. Ensuring that relevant spending departments in the AfDB are aware of the FA will be important.

Third, the TCA would have benefitted from more strategic thinking about: (a) the most appropriate policy-institutional strengthening mix; (b) the most appropriate mix of project and programmes; and (c) alignment between Bank 'upstream' initiatives and trust fund 'downstream' activities. An AfDB-DFID conversation on these issues in the beginning of FA implementation should be considered.

Fourth, there was some tension between a TCA strategic focus and its flexibility. Building upon the work done later to develop TCA eligibility criteria will be important for the FA. The FA should develop its own eligibility criteria and ensure that at least 80% of funded projects fall directly within its scope. Eligibility criteria might need to be developed for each new funding programme agreed under the FA. Some flexibility in eligibility criteria should be kept to allow for projects (20% of total funding) that may benefit the Bank or RMCs in other ways, along the lines of TCA-funding for the Establishment of Secretariat for Private Sector Development Partnership for North Africa.

And fifth, the TCA results framework was developed in 2011, a few years after the launch of the fund. It would have benefitted from a stronger evidence-base (capacity-needs assessment, conversations on the optimal mix of measures to support the Bank, etc.) and AfDB-DFID technical exchange on it in order to align understanding of performance between the two institutions. Developing an evidenced and shared AfDB-DFID results framework for programme interventions under the FA will help overcome some of the expectations challenges that faced the TCA.

---

<sup>6</sup> The FA is an umbrella for future bilateral projects, the first of which is a specific capacity development project linked to the MAR. Additional funding for other policy and operational projects may be accommodated under the FA.

## 3.2. RECOMMENDATIONS

**Recommendations for AfDB trust fund strategy and management.** The following recommendations are specifically for Bank consideration.

- 1. Ensure that trust funds that support Bank capacity development are part of the Bank's trust fund portfolio.** TCA-type trust funds are greatly valued by Bank staff and play an important 'downstream' role in support of 'upstream' Bank reform processes.
- 2. Consider making sector-specific capacity-needs assessments of relevant sectors an integral part of priority-setting for trust funds that support Bank capacity-development.** Such capacity-needs assessments (see Box 3), carried out by relevant Bank departments, would identify key capacity-gaps, opportunities, and potential new initiatives that would support the Bank's strategic priorities. They should be updated every 24 months.
- 3. Integrate the Bank's results agenda into how trust funds operate.** Options to be considered are to make results frameworks or logical frameworks part of templates for submitting proposals and to allocate 5% of trust funds to generating relevant baseline data.
- 4. Consider developing procurement processes that enable trust funds to play their role well and in a timely manner.** Flexibility and speed are critical for the effectiveness of trust fund activities – and at the heart of their value added for the Bank. Adapted procurement processes that enable such speed and flexibility should be considered; or at a minimum a procurement officer should be appointed to focus on supporting procurement for trust funds.
- 5. Enable greater trust fund awareness across the Bank.** Trust funds at present remain underutilised in the Bank. Part of the reason for this is limited awareness of trust funds among Bank spending departments. Creating trust fund fact sheets and disseminating these will be beneficial.

**Recommendations for FA set-up and running.** These recommendations are for the Bank and, where indicated, for DFID or both institutions.

- 1. Conduct a capacity-needs assessment on FA priority areas (AfDB responsibility).** Ensure that a more granular understanding of FA relevant Bank capacity-gaps, opportunities, and potential new initiatives is generated by conducting a capacity-needs assessment (see Box 3). Update the capacity-needs assessment every 24 months. Conduct additional capacity-needs assessments with relevant departments when additional funding envelopes are provided by DFID under the FA for Bank capacity-development.
- 2. Prepare and disseminate an FA fact sheet for relevant Bank spending departments (AfDB responsibility).** Ensure that the FA fact sheet includes information on eligibility criteria, templates required for proposals, and the proposal submission/approval process. This would need to be done for each

programme agreed under the FA, starting with the MAR-related capacity development resources.

3. **At the outset of the FA, hold an AfDB-DFID meeting to clarify FA strategy (AfDB and DFID responsibility).** Discuss at this meeting: (a) the most appropriate policy-institutional strengthening mix; (b) the most appropriate mix of project and programmes; and (c) alignment between Bank 'upstream' initiatives and FA 'downstream' activities.
4. **Develop FA eligibility criteria and ensure that at least 80% of funded projects are directly eligible (AfDB and DFID responsibility).** Ensure that eligibility criteria reflect agreement reached on FA strategy and findings of capacity-needs assessments. Adhere to these eligibility criteria in the main contribution and set a target of at least 80% of funded projects being directly eligible.
5. **Be patient with institutional strengthening projects as these take time (DFID responsibility).** Build in expected project implementation delays in the planning of disbursements.
6. **Use the capacity-needs assessment and outcomes of AfDB-DFID meeting on FA strategy to develop a shared FA results framework (AfDB and DFID responsibility).** In support of the results framework, allocate also 5% of FA funds for the collection of relevant baseline data for results measurement. Take this approach also for other contributions made under the FA.

END

### ANNEX 1: EXCERPTS FROM THE DRAFT BOARD MEMORANDUM ON THE TCA

#### “III. FEATURES OF THE DRAFT TECHNICAL COOPERATION ARRANGEMENT

3.1 The £13 Million UK (DFID) grant for the next 5 years is to be used to support sectoral and thematic priorities of strategic importance to the Bank and RMCs, namely, Infrastructure and Water; Governance, Institutional Strengthening; Knowledge and statistics, Enhanced Collaborative Initiative (ECI); and Climate Change and Clean Energy; and such other areas as may be agreed by both parties (see further details in annex II).

3.2 Specific activities to be funded in the selected themes and sectors would be in the form of:

- i) consulting services and technical assistance in support of: project cycle activities, policy and sector studies;
- ii) training and capacity building;
- iii) institutional support for the Bank; and
- iv) any other activities that may be mutually agreed upon by both parties.

3.3 The resources are completely untied and allows for procurement of goods and engagement services of consultants from all member countries of the Bank;

3.4 The Bank is granted authority to approve the equivalent of £100,000 or less in line with the delegation of Authority matrix without resorting to the UK. Whilst the Bank would seek approval from the UK representative in the Bank for activities requiring amounts exceeding the equivalent of £100,000 but less than £ 250,000. The Government of the UK would approve amount exceeding £ 250,000 but less than the equivalent of 1 million dollars, while approval of requests for funding amounting to or exceeding USD 1 million shall be approved by the Board of Directors in accordance with the TCFR.

3.5 A 5% administrative fees is charged to defray part of the cost of managing the funds; and grant resources are to be invested by the Bank with the interest income generated ploughed back into the grant.

3.6 The 5 year duration of the Arrangement can be modified by both parties through simple exchange of letters when conditions under the reform program are met. Finally, when it comes into force, this arrangement will replace and supersede the 2005 Memorandum of Understanding signed with DFID. Outstanding Grants under the 2005 Memorandum of Understanding may be continued within the framework of the new Arrangement, subject to the terms of the new Arrangement.

#### IV ADMINISTRATION OF FUNDS

4.1 Technical Review Process: In line with the TCFR, a Technical Committee will be set up to review all requests for financing under the DFID grant. Permanent Members of this Committee would be ORRU (Chair) GECL, FFCO, ORPC and

ORPU. The Committee will work closely with the user departments in drawing up quarterly request and annual work programs to be discussed with DFID during consultation meetings.

4.2 Coordination and intra-institutional relations: Given the diversity of eligible themes and sectors under the DFID arrangement, ORRU will handle the overall coordination, administration and reporting to DFID through interaction with all the organizational units FFCO, GECL, AUDT, User Departments of the funds, ORPU and others that would be involved in administering/using the funds. It is expected that the Trust Fund Administration portal being tested by CIMM and to be introduced shortly would facilitate the administration, reporting and information disclosure on the use of these funds.

## V CONCLUSION

5.1 The Technical Cooperation programme is, once again, a demonstration of the strong support of the UK in assisting the RMCs in meeting the challenges of eradicating poverty. It is also a manifestation of the growing strategic partnership between the two parties in channelling resources and building the capacity of RMCs. Being the first of fund created after the TCFR programme adopted by the Board, it has in-built flexibility and is better aligned to the Paris Declaration Harmonization Agenda. The Arrangement has been negotiated and endorsed by the UK authorities and discussions are ongoing among the staff of the two institutions to draw up the first year work program. Consequently, utilization of funds under this Arrangement is expected to be fast and not subject to the long delays witnessed in the past.”

## ANNEX 2: TERMS OF REFERENCE – EVALUATION OF THE DFID-AFDB TCA (OCTOBER 2013)

### Programme Information

#### Purpose

AfDB is a more effective, results orientated and responsive development institution.

#### Resources

The TCA has a nominal size of £13 million of which just over £12 million is allocated and DFID has disbursed about £10 million.

#### Further detail

- The TCA is intended to strengthen the Bank’s effectiveness and capacity to deliver DFID’s priorities for the ADF.
- The TCA is focused on reforms to build capacity in areas of strategic importance to the Bank (see *below*) that would otherwise not be resourced through its core operating funds
- It is not intended that the TCA will support activities, including operational, that should be funded by the Bank’s core operating funds / administrative budget or the Bank’s African Development Fund (ADF).

#### DFID ADF Priorities matched with TCA Project Lines

<b>DONORS/AFDB AGREED PRIORITY POLICY COMMITMENTS AND REFORMS FOR ADF 12 (2010-13)</b>	<b>DFID TCA AGREED COMPONENTS</b>
• Addressing Africa’s infrastructure needs in the 21st century	Infrastructure
• Promoting accountable and transparent governance	Governance
• Harnessing Africa’s potential through economic integration	
• Helping fragile states build economic capacity and stability	Fragile States
• Enhanced support for private sector development	Private Sector Development
• Putting Africa on a low-carbon, climate-resilient growth path	Climate Change
• Promoting food security and agricultural productivity	

### Context and background for the evaluation

1. DFID’s Africa Regional Board met on 24 January 2012 to provide their response to the ARD paper “Africa Regional Governance Programme: Review and Future Direction” The paper reviews the programmes and projected results of the Africa Regional governance programme and prioritises the programme’s work over the period 2012-15 under the Africa Regional Programme (ARP) Operational Plan. The Board was not wholly convinced by the case for, the value-added of and the results offered by this area of ARD’s work. The board agreed that ARD should see through existing commitments, while testing programmes with regional institutions and divesting them to other parts of DFID with associated resources where possible. The bar needed to be set high for regional work on governance.
2. ARD’s support for institutional strengthening of AfDB is conducted through the DFID-AfDB Technical Cooperation Agreement (TCA) 2007-2014. The TCA is a bilateral Trust Fund of up to £13m. It is focused on priority areas: infrastructure & private sector development; and second order priority areas: governance and climate change. The March 2011 AR stated. *“Given evidence of good progress ... and the contribution this is making towards AfDB developing into a more effective, results orientated and responsive development institution, it is likely that the purpose of the TCA will be largely achieved. Good progress is especially noted in governance, climate change and infrastructure component”*. Historically the TCA also focused on procurement, human resource management, fragile states and aid effectiveness but these areas were closed down due to either poor performance or reprioritisation. The history illustrates how different

stakeholders in DFID (different Advisers and Directors of ARD, IFID and MENAD) and AfDB (different VPs, sector/spending departments, task managers) understand the TCA differently – for example, should it be flexible and responsive to meet AfDB needs as they arise, or tightly focused on a few mutually agreed strategic and priority areas critical to the success of AfDB/Africa.

3. The TCA is managed between ARD/DFID and ORRU/AfDB. Lead ARD/IFID Advisers work with AfDB counterparts to identify priority reform needs requiring TA funded through the TCA. A selection of key reform projects funded through the TCA include: development of AfDB's Governance Action Plan (GAP); critical technical assistance provided through long term Climate Change experts; gender Quality Assurance of all infrastructure projects; a fiduciary risk project related to the implementation of the decentralisation roadmap; development of e-training provision for staff; and development of new procurement rules and guidance. Such projects were approved on the agreed understanding that they would not only result in satisfactory outputs but also contribute to the achievement of the higher level outcome (*AfDB is a more effective, results orientated and responsive development institution*) and towards the realisation of impact (*poverty reduction in Africa*) – shorthand for an implicit Theory of Change.

#### **Purpose and objectives of the evaluation**

4. The purpose / objective of the evaluation, given that the TCA ends in March 2014 and has few unallocated funds remaining, is to inform future decision making within DFID and AfDB on whether, and, if so, how, DFID should provide support to strengthen the effectiveness of the AfDB. It will:
  - *Test critical assumptions that the TA provided through the TCA helps AfDB to become a more effective, results orientated and responsive development institution;*
  - *Monitor and evaluate the performance of the TCA as a whole i.e. gather evidence that the TCA is contributing to the reduction of poverty in Africa and demonstrating, for public accountability purposes, that the TCA has used funds effectively and efficiently to deliver results; and*
  - *Assess whether a new TCA project beyond 2014 would help DFID deliver results as outlined in operational plans (notably ARD, PRD, IFID and Africa country offices) and be a worthwhile investment for DFID, and its units.*

#### **EVALUATION QUESTIONS (key questions are in bold)**

##### **5. Testing the Assumptions:**

- **Does the TCA strengthen the AfDB capability to achieve results** (*i.e. does the TCA strengthen AfDB capability to effect transformational change*)?
- **Does the TCA help the AfDB achieve results** (*i.e. there is will for transformational change*)
- **How relevant is the TCA to the AfDB strategic goals** (*i.e. how strategic were the interventions financed by the TCA*)

##### **6. Assessing efficiency of TCA**

- **Were TCA funds used efficiently and could they have been used more efficiently?**
- **How well did the partnership and management arrangements work (taking into account how they developed over time)?**
- **Did the use of TCA funds represent good Value-for-Money? Were costs incurred appropriate and proportionate to results achieved?**
- How well did the financial systems and their administration work? How far funding, personnel, regulatory, administrative, time, other resources and procedures contributed to or hindered the achievement of results?
- How was the beneficiary involved, how effective was this and what have been the benefits of or difficulties with this involvement?
- Were the risks properly identified and well managed?

- How well was the TCA managed to minimize transaction costs of various processes involved, particularly for Bank operations staff?

#### 7. Assessing Effectiveness of the TCA

- **To what extent were the intended outputs and results achieved in relation to targets set in original and revised project documents (including logical framework analyses)?**
- How effective and appropriate was the project approach? With hindsight, how would the implementers have changed it?
- Assess the relative impact of the TCA and other forms of assistance including secondees or positions paid for (i.e. climate change)

#### 8. Assessing the potential of the TCA to help DFID deliver its planned results<sup>7</sup>

- Is the current structure of the TCA “fit for purpose” to help DFID deliver its results, as outlined in various departmental operational plans?
- What management structure of a potential follow-up programme of support to AfDB (TCA-II) would deliver results that would deliver greatest impact?
- Are there any recommendations for the optimal conditions for and future architecture of any potential TCA-II?
- How can both institutions mutually agree on the priority sectors and the eligible activities of any potential TCA-II?

#### Outputs from the Evaluation

9. The evaluator(s) will produce an **Evaluation Report** (no more than 30 pages excluding any appendices, in Microsoft Word using Arial font, 12 point).

10. The report should include:

- Basic Information (1 A4 page maximum): Project title, Organisation name, Name of person/s who compiled the evaluation report, Period during which the evaluation was undertaken;
- Executive Summary (3 A4 page maximum): Main findings and recommendations for the future;
- Main Report:
  - i. Evaluation:
    - Test of assumptions of the TCA
    - Assessment of efficiency of TCA
    - Assessment of effectiveness of TCA
    - Assessment of the potential of the TCA
  - ii. Lesson Learning and Recommendations:
    - Key lessons to guide future DFID support for institutional strengthening of AfDB?
    - Recommendations to guide the architecture of any future funding facility in order to deliver AfDB/DFID mutual objectives in Africa?

#### Methodology

11. DAC evaluation quality standards should be adhered to when undertaking the evaluation.

12. Preparation at home to review and analyze the relevant documentation, starting on xx/xx/xx. Communicate with AfDB and DFID for clarification as needed (5 working days);

---

<sup>7</sup> See <http://www.dfid.gov.uk/About-us/How-we-measure-progress/DFID-Results-Framework/>, attached Results Framework, ARD Operational Plan etc – to be provided by ARD

13. Submit Inception Report on xx/xx/xx **(+1 week from the onset)** describing the evaluation framework and methodology (e.g. how each question will be answered), including setting out a process map, work plan, timeline and responsibilities. Revise Inception Report as needed according to the comments from AfDB and DFID (2 working days);
14. Commence subsequent activities on xx/xx/xx **(+4 weeks from the onset)** in Tunis at the Temporary Relocation Agency of AfDB, following DFID and AfDB approval of Inception Report;
15. Review relevant TCA documentation i.e. programme documents, programme memorandum, Logical Framework Analyses, Theory of Change, Annual Reviews, Mid-Term Reviews, Back-to-Office-Reports, samples of outputs (e.g. *GAP, others*) etc.;
16. Review DFID/AfDB corporate plans and Results Frameworks: DFID Business Plan, Africa Regional Department Operational Plan, AfDB Results Frameworks etc.;
17. Interviews with: -
  - DFID officials from Africa Regional Department (ARD), International Financial Institutions Department (IFID), Middle East and North Africa Department (MENAD) in London;
  - AfDB officials from ORRU and relevant spending departments of AfDB;
18. Submit Draft Evaluation Report on xx/xx/xx **(+9 weeks from the onset)** and meet with DFID and AfDB to present Draft Evaluation Report;  
(Task15.-18. : 28 working days)
19. Completion work at home to reflect comments and feedback from stakeholders and complete the evaluation (5 working days);
20. Submit Final Evaluation Report on no later than xx/xx/xx **(+13 weeks from the onset)**;
21. Once agreed, the final evaluation report will be published on DFID and AfDB websites (in line with DAC evaluation principles of transparency).

### **Service Providers**

22. It is anticipated that the Evaluation would require a team of at least one consultant with the following expertise and/or experience:
  - Proven experience of evaluation of complex governance / Trust Fund / technical assistance programmes in sub-Saharan Africa and preferably the AfDB;
  - In-depth knowledge of results-based management and the development of results-based management frameworks;
  - Experience in designing or leading institutional strengthening support, provision of technical assistance and organisational development in Africa

### **Timeline**

23. The work will take place between xx/xx/xx and xx/xx/xx **(no more than 40 consultancy working days)**.
  - Inception Report to be submitted on xx/xx/xx (+1 week from the onset)
  - Draft Report to be submitted on xx/xx/xx (+9 weeks from the onset)
  - Final Report to be submitted on xx/xx/xx (+13 weeks from the onset)

### **Reporting Arrangements**

24. The consultants will report to Marlène Kanga, Officer-In-Charge, Partnerships and Cooperation Unit (ORRU), and the project officer will be Shingo Kikuchi, Senior Cooperation Officer, ORRU.

## ANNEX 3: LIST OF TCA PROJECTS

### AfDB - DFID Technical Cooperation Agreement: List of Approved Activities (as of 31 March 2014)

Item	Project/Activity + Beneficiary <b>Red colour = Completed (FinState)</b>	Approved amount in GBP(*)	Amount Disbursed (GBP) as of 31 Mar 2014	Disbursement Rate (%)	User Dept	Comments
<b>Total 51 Activities (10 On-going, 38 Completed, 3 Cancelled)</b>						
<b>Climate Change (11: 3 on-going, 7 completed, 1 cancelled)</b>						
C1	Consultancy Services for the development of a Climate Change Adaptation Strategy	33,242	33,242	100.0%	ORQR	Approved by the Bank on 12 December 2007. Completed and unspent balance returned into the pool of TCA funds.
C2	International Conference on Congo Basin	109,369	109,369	100.0%	ORQR	Approved by the Executive Director representing the UK on 30/01/08. Event held and unspent balance returned into the pool of TCA funds.
C3	Climate Change Expert	53,469	53,469	100.0%	ORQR	Approved by the Bank on 12 December 2007. Completed in line with Bank / DFID discussion on Clean Energy Investment Framework.
C4	3 Joint AfDB - World Bank Sub-Regional Workshops on Climate Change	0	0			Approved by the Bank on 20 May 2008. Cancelled after due internal consultations at the AfDB.
C5	Climate Change Adaptation Expert	283,842	283,842	100.0%	ORQR	Approved by DFID on 17 July 2008. The TA assumed duty on 01 December 2009. Initially the expert's term was 2 years. Extension of 1 year was approved on 24 August 2011. The contract has ended in November 2012.
C6	Low Carbon Development and Climate Change Mitigation Officer	270,702	270,702	100.0%	ORQR	Approved by DFID on 17 July 2008. The TA assumed duty 01 October 2009. Initially the expert's term was 2 years. Extension of 1 year was approved on 24 August 2011. The contract has ended in September 2012.

C7	Development of a Monitoring & Evaluation Framework to guide the implementation of the Bank Climate Change Action Plan	96,136	96,136	100.0%	ORQR	Originally approved on 02 August 2010 under part of GBP 633,464 of "Strategic Climate Change Support". This figure was changed to GBP 812,000 for 5 activities on 1 March 2011. This is one of those 5 activities.
C8	Three sets of Executive Trainings on Climate Change with Senior Management	93,093	93,093	100.0%	ORQR	Originally approved on 02 August 2010 under part of GBP 633,464 of "Strategic Climate Change Support". This figure was changed to GBP 812,000 for 5 activities on 1 March 2011. This is one of those 5 activities. Three senior management trainings have been conducted.
C9	Energy Strategy Development Services	287,000	192,205	67.0%	ONEC	Originally approved on 02 August 2010 under part of GBP 633,464 of "Strategic Climate Change Support". This figure was changed to GBP 812,000 for 5 activities on 1 March 2011. This is one of those 5 activities. Full set of strategy was received and approved by SMCC. An energy strategy blog started and core stakeholders network was established. Additional studies and analytical works are ongoing. Stakeholder consultation is being undertaken.
C10	Capacity building on Nationally Appropriate Mitigation Actions (NAMAs)	125,000	76,547	61.2%	ORQR	Originally approved on 02 August 2010 under part of GBP 633,464 of "Strategic Climate Change Support". This figure was changed to GBP 812,000 for 5 activities on 1 March 2011. This is one of those 5 activities. Consultation workshop was held in October 2010. Implementation is ongoing.
C11	Mainstreaming Environment and Adaptation issues into RMCs' sector policies and regulations	170,000	166,300	97.8%	ORQR	Originally approved on 02 August 2010 under part of GBP 633,464 of "Strategic Climate Change Support". This figure was changed to GBP 812,000 for 5 activities on 1 March 2011. This is one of those 5 activities. The activity was implemented in cooperation with Cambridge University.
<b>Sub-total</b>		<b>1,521,853</b>	<b>1,374,904</b>	<b>90.3%</b>		
<b>Governance (9: 1 on-going, 8 completed)</b>						
G1	Development of AfDB Africa Governance Action Plan	142,257	142,257	100.0%	OSGE	The activity was originally approved on 29 January 2008. Several budget increases were approved to allow the activity to expand its scope. The

	(GAP)					activity has been completed.
G2	Revision of the Bank approach to governance analysis	143,213	143,213	100.0%	OSG E	Approved on 29 January 2009. Completed in 2010.
G3	Public Financial Management (PFM) & Accountability Africa	128,649	128,649	100.0%	OSG E	Approved on 29 January 2008 and completed in 2010. The Bank prepared three guidance notes on : i) PFM ; ii) Procurement and iii) Audit. These notes were finalized, translated and were distributed to the Board on 23 November 2010.
G4	Operational guidance: Institutional & Capacity Development in Financial Governance	115,130	115,130	100.0%	OSG E	Approved on 29 January 2008. Guidance on: Addressing Sector Governance and Corruption Risk in Infrastructure projects was completed in November 2009.
G5	AfDB Support to the Africa Peer Review Mechanism (APRM)	433,973	433,973	100.0%	OSG E	Approved on 29 January 2008. Technical research institutes were recruited by the secretariat to carry out the exercise. This work was validated during a stakeholder validation workshop, and cleared by the APRM panel in 2012.
G6	Management arrangements	16,473	16,473	100.0%	OSG E	Approved by the Bank in 2008. Activity was closed in June 2010.
G7	African Governance Outlook	249,988	93,590	37.4%	OSG E	Approved on 23 July 2010. In order to implement African Governance Outlook (AGO), A Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) was signed between the two institutions in December 2010. Updating of the ten country reports with the latest (2014) data and analysis will be carried out.
G8	PEFA for African Countries	78,750	80,042	101.6%	OSG E	Approved on 23 July 2010. Two support activities in Cape Verde and Sierra Leone have been completed.
G9	African Network of Public Procurement	1,952	1,952	100.0%	OSG E	Part of the resources has been used to finance the meeting of the Technical Committee which is in charge of the establishment of the Procurement Forum. The Technical Committee of Procurement Experts (TCPE) was organized on 13-14 September 2010 in Nairobi.
<b>Sub-total</b>		<b>1,310,385</b>	<b>1,155,280</b>	<b>88.2%</b>		

Private Sector (3: 3 on-going)						
P1	Enhanced Private Sector Development Impact	1,700,000	1,467,144	86.3%	OPSM	Proposal was approved by DFID on 11/May/2011. Implementation is ongoing with three components (A. CSPs, B. Sector Strategies, and C. Capacity Development).
P2	Establishment of Secretariat for Private Sector Development Partnership for North Africa	205,000	47,649	23.2%	ORNA	Proposal was approved by DFID on 06/Dec/2011. Implementation is ongoing. The management of Secretariat for IFI Platform has been completed in 2012. SME study is being undertaken.
P3	Souk Attanmia: Social Entrepreneurship in Tunisia	48,000	43,244	90.1%	ORNA	Proposal was approved by DFID on 06/Dec/2011. The management of Secretariat for Souk Attanmia is ongoing including communication experts and outreach events.
<b>Sub-total</b>		<b>1,953,000</b>	<b>1,558,037</b>	<b>79.8%</b>		
Infrastructure (5: 4 completed, 1 cancelled)						
I1	Guidelines for Effective Integration of Gender in Infrastructure	26,498	26,498	100.0%	OITC	Completed in December 2008.
I2	Support to ADB's Taskforce on Public Private Partnerships	156,527	156,527	100.0%	OITC	Approved on 21 February 2008.
I3	Study on Promoting Domestic Road Construction Industry in Africa	311,824	311,824	100.0%	OITC	Approved in September 2010. To enable Francophone countries to be included in the list of pilot countries, additional budget increase was approved on 20/Dec/2011. The activity has been completed.
I4	Study on Enhancing the Monitoring of Lending process, Outputs & Outcomes	118,039	118,039	100.0%	OITC	Approved on 27 January 2009. This was launched in 2010 and the consultant's preliminary findings were sent at the end of the year. The final report has been completed in March 2011.
I5	Study : Strategic Framework for Infrastructure Development	45,544	45,544	100.0%	OITC	Approved on 02 November 2009. The study started April 1, 2011. However, due to the quality of the inception report, the contract was terminated. The remaining amount has been returned to the Fund.
<b>Sub-total</b>		<b>658,432</b>	<b>658,432</b>	<b>100.0%</b>		
Water Sector (2: 1 on-going, 1 completed)						

W 1	Monrovia Water and Sanitation Rehabilitation Programme	3,060,0 00	2,798, 181	91.4%	OWA S	Approved on 12 Feb 2008 on a lapse of time basis by the AfDB Board. PCR was submitted in Works were completed in 2012. All the remaining payments including an audit will be made shortly.
W 2	Africa Water Week 26 - 28 March 2008	100,00 0	100,00 0	100.0%	OWA S	Approved by the ADB Internal Technical Review Committee on 07 March 2008.
<b>Sub-total</b>		<b>3,160,0 00</b>	<b>2,898, 181</b>	<b>91.7%</b>		
<b>Institutional Strengthening (15: 1 on-going, 13 completed, 1 cancelled)</b>						
IS 1	Communicatio ns specialist and intranet revamping	0	0			Approved on 17 July 2008. This activity was agreed to be cancelled during DFID Mission March 2011. The unspent balance was returned into the pool of TCA funds.
IS 2	Revision of Staff Rules	36,210	36,210	100.0%	CHR M	Approved by the Bank on 01 May 2008 after an extended consultation with DFID. The document has been developed and was presented to the Senior Managements in January 2012. This activity is completed.
IS 3	Customised capacity building action plan	77,595	77,595	100.0%	CHR M	Approved by the Bank on 01 May 2008. It was completed in March 2011.
IS 4	Revised Bank Group Procurement Rules - Preparation of Operational Materials for Implementatio n of the Revised Procurement Policies	308,44 4	308,44 4	100.0%	ORP F	Approved by DFID on 17 July 2008. Completed in 2009. Training Manuals prepared and several training sessions organised by the Bank's Procurement and Fiduciary Services Department.
IS 5	Roundtable on Public Procurement in Dakar Senegal	11,479	11,479	100.0%	ORP F	Approved by the UK ED in consultation with DFID on 20 May 2009. Event held successfully in Dakar during the Bank Group Annual Meetings. Unspent balance returned to the pool of TCA funds.
IS 6	Revision of the Bank's Operations Manual	95,723	95,723	100.0%	ORP C	Approved on 16 February 2010. The document under this activity (one of the Chapter of the Operations Manual) has been developed and verified.
IS 7	Training of Trainers (TOT) and Full Training of Bank staff	150,00 0	127,37 5	84.9%	ORP F	Approved on 17 September 2010. Training of ORPF Staff completed in 2011 with 212 Bank Staff trained on Basic, 168 on Intermediate and 70 on Advanced level. The activity is completed.

IS 8	Procurement E-Learning for Bank staff	51,278	51,278	100.0%	ORP F	Approved on 17 September 2010. The recruitment process for the study aiming at drafting the Procurement CB Strategy and design e-learning modules (Bank staff and Borrowers) is completed and the joint venture KOSI/CIPS was selected for undertaking the assignment. The E-learning material is being formatted for compatibility with Bank's E-learning platform before being published. The activity is completed.
IS 9	Upgrading DACON System	36,445	36,445	100.0%	ORP F	Approved on 17 September 2010.
IS 10	Procurement E-Learning for RMCs	41,222	41,222	100.0%	ORP F	Approved on 17 September 2010.
IS 11	Assessment of E-Procurement in Africa	45,000	45,400	100.9%	ORP F	Approved on 17 September 2010. Comprehensive study on e-GP developments in the 54 RMCs was carried out. The activity is completed.
IS 12	Automation of Procurement Plan in Bank's website	35,000	0	0.0%	ORP F	Approved on 17 September 2010. Task carried out under activity IS13 by the selected consultant. Final Mission Report was issued in November 2011. Savings (35,000.00 GBP) under this activity is utilized for recruiting a firm who will prepare an operational strategy for IT procurement tools (e-Consult, Procurement Website and SharePoint) and develop some applications.
IS 13	IT Technical & Administrative Support	150,000	72,232	48.2%	ORP F	Approved on 17 September 2010. The TOR of the consultant has been revised to encompass all of the activities targeting through IS9 (e-consult), IS12 (Procurement website) and the Bank's new internal collaboration platform (SharePoint). The activity is completed.
IS 14	Financial Management Reforms	200,000	163,843	81.9%	ORP F	Approved on 17 September 2010. All of the planned financial management policy documents and related guidelines/manuals have been prepared by a consultant and reviewed/approved by the Bank. A workshop was held to peer-review the draft documents. The activity is completed.
IS 15	Independent Review of the Bank's Fiduciary Safeguards in the Context of the New Decentralization Roadmap	140,439	140,439	100.0%	PEC OD	Approved on 28 June 2011. A draft report was submitted in March 2012 and the report was approved by the Bank's senior management. The activity was completed in May 2012.

<b>Sub-total</b>		<b>1,378,835</b>	<b>1,207,685</b>	<b>87.6%</b>		
<b>Knowledge Management &amp; Statistics (1: 1 completed)</b>						
K1	China-Africa Research Initiative	101,073	101,073	100.0%	EDR E	Approved by the UK ED on 20 May 2009. The publication of the "China and Africa: an Emerging Partnership for Development?" was completed.
<b>Sub-total</b>		<b>101,073</b>	<b>101,073</b>	<b>100.0%</b>		
<b>Aid Effectiveness (2: 2 completed)</b>						
AE 1	African Partnership Facility (APF) on Development Effectiveness	136,649	136,649	100.0%	ORQ R	Approved on 23 February 2010. The Regional Conference on Aid Effectiveness in Tunisia was held in November 2010. The activity was completed.
AE 2	Evaluation of ADB & Paris Declaration	2,504	2,504	100.0%	OPE V	Approved on 01 September 2010. A part of this activity was paid by the administrative budget of OPEV due to the emergency situation. Based on the meeting at DFID Annual Review in March 2011, this activity was decided to be closed.
<b>Sub-total</b>		<b>139,153</b>	<b>139,153</b>	<b>100.0%</b>		
<b>Fragile States (2: 1 on-going, 1 completed)</b>						
F1	Evaluation of African Development Bank Assistance to Fragile States (1999 - 2009)	61,903	61,903	100.0%	OPE V	Approved 02 August 2010. A Literature Review, Portfolio Review and Country Strategy papers review were completed in 2010. The HQ Case study and the 3 Country visits were completed in October 2011. The final report was presented to SMCC in March 2012.
F2	Scaling up development effectiveness in fragile states	75,270	9,782	13.0%	OSF U	Approved in July 2013. A final report is being prepared.
<b>Sub-total</b>		<b>137,173</b>	<b>71,685</b>	<b>52.3%</b>		
<b>Other Studies &amp; Sundry (1: 1 completed)</b>						
O1	Africa Region preparations for the Accra High Level Forum, Kigali Workshop, 28-30 April 2008	227,204	227,204	100.0%	ORP C	Approved in 2008 by the UK ED. The unspent balance is returned to TCA pool.
<b>Sub-total</b>		<b>227,204</b>	<b>227,204</b>	<b>100.0%</b>		

Management & Administration						
	External Evaluation	27,000	16,982	62.9%	FRM B	The evaluator assumed his duties on 31 October 2012. The contract was terminated in February 2013 due to the quality of the draft evaluation report.
	Management Fees	650,000	402,888	62.0%	FFC O	Represents 5% administrative fee in accordance with paragraph 2.8 of the TCA. The maximum amount of the Management Fees against current agreed total budget of GBP 13 million is GBP 650,000.
	Audit fees	15,000	5,127	34.2%	FFC O	The TCA provides for the cost of external audit to be charged to the funds.
	<b>Sub-total</b>	<b>665,000</b>	<b>424,997</b>	<b>63.9%</b>		
	<b>Grand Total</b>	<b>11,252,108</b>	<b>9,816,631</b>	<b>87.2%</b>		

## **ANNEX 4: TCA EVALUATION INCEPTION REPORT**

### **Acronyms**

AfDB	African Development Bank
ARD	Africa Regional Department
DAC	Development Assistance Committee
DFID	Department for International Development
IFID	International Financial Institutions Department
MENAD	Middle East and North Africa Department
OECD	Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development
TA	Technical Assistance
TCA	Technical Cooperation Arrangement (or Agreement)
TOR	Terms of Reference

### **1. Introduction**

This Inception Report for the Evaluation of the DFID-AfDB Technical Cooperation Report is the first deliverable outlined in the Terms of Reference (TOR) and makes explicit the evaluation framework and methodology. It has benefited from AfDB and DFID comments on an earlier draft (dated 17 January 2014) and reflects adjustments suggested to the evaluation purpose and objectives, questions outlined in the TOR, the evaluation framework and methodology, and work plan.

### **Evaluation Purpose and Objectives**

The overall purpose of the TCA evaluation is to inform decision-making in the African Development Bank (AfDB) and Department for International Development (DFID) on modalities for future support to strengthen the effectiveness of the AfDB.

The evaluation objectives are to:

4. Test critical assumptions that technical assistance (TA) provided through the TCA helps the AfDB become a more effective, results orientated and responsive development institution.
5. Monitor and evaluate the performance of the TCA as a whole; particularly gather evidence that the TCA has contributed to poverty reduction in Africa and that the TCA has used funds effectively and efficiently to deliver results.
6. Draw lessons from the TCA experience and assess the implications of these for new DFID support modalities beyond 2014 and the AfDB Trust Fund Policy which is planned to be revised in 2015.

### **Guidance and Process**

The TOR specify that the evaluation of the TCA is to adhere to OECD/DAC evaluation quality standards (overarching considerations; purpose, planning, and

design; implementation and reporting; follow-up, use, and learning)<sup>8</sup> – and answer a specific set of questions (“testing assumptions”; “assessing efficiency of the TCA”; “assessing effectiveness of the TCA”; “assessing the potential of the TCA to help DFID deliver its planned results”) – questions which are now revised.

The evaluation process involves:

- An initial review of documentation to prepare an inception report that makes explicit the evaluation framework and methodology. The inception report is submitted for comment to AfDB and DFID, and then revised.
- Interviews, document reviews and other activities are then carried out in Tunis and London – according to the evaluation framework and methodology defined in the inception report.
- The drafting and submission of a draft evaluation report to AfDB and DFID. The draft report is to be no more than 30 pages and follow the outline given in the TOR. AfDB and DFID comment on the draft and comments are incorporated into a final report, which is then submitted.

## **Inception Report Structure**

This Inception Report is structured as follows:

Section 2 provides the evaluation framework and research methodology, including evaluation ground rules and presentation format.

Section 3 outlines the work plan for the evaluation; specifically the envisaged evaluation process, timeline, requirements, and expected challenges.


Section 4 lists the sources consulted for this inception report.

## **2. Evaluation Framework and Research Methodology**

The TOR for the evaluation provides both a set of questions to be answered and an evaluation process. The proposed evaluation framework given here integrates these (questions and process), and adds two elements; the elaboration of hypotheses (based on a document review process) to be validated/invalidated and a set of qualifiers that help nuance evaluation findings. A multifaceted research methodology (document review, process audit, project expenditure review, surveys/questionnaires, and interviews) is used to underpin the evaluation framework.

---

<sup>8</sup> See <http://www.oecd.org/development/evaluation/dcdndep/36596604.pdf>



## 2.1. Evaluation Questions

The TOR lists 17 evaluation questions under the headings of: (a) test assumptions; (b) assess efficiency; (c) assess effectiveness; and (d) assess potential. Following AfDB and DFID comments, evaluation implementation planning, and considering current discussions on future DFID support to the Bank, evaluation questions are reduced to 11 focus questions – and (d) is changed to draw lessons. Details of these changes are explained in the box below.

### Test assumptions

1. Does the TCA strengthen the AfDB capability to achieve results (i.e. does the TCA strengthen AfDB capability to effect transformational change)?
2. Does the TCA help the AfDB achieve results (i.e. there is will for transformational change)?
3. How relevant is the TCA to the AfDB strategic goals (i.e. how strategic were the interventions financed by the TCA)?

### Assess efficiency

4. Were TCA funds used efficiently and could they have been used more efficiently?
5. How well did the partnership and management arrangements work (taking into account how they developed over time)?
6. Were the risks properly identified and well managed?

### Assess effectiveness

7. Did the use of TCA funds represent good Value-for-Money? Were costs incurred appropriate and proportionate to results achieved?

8. To what extent were the intended outputs and results achieved in relation to targets set in original and revised project documents (including logical framework analyses)?
9. How effective and appropriate was the project approach? With hindsight, how would the implementers have changed it?

### Draw lessons

10. What lessons emerge from the TCA for the AfDB in relation to its broader trust fund management and strategy?
11. What are the implications of lessons from the TCA evaluation for the planned AfDB-DFID Framework Agreement (FA)?

Emphasis in answers to these questions is placed on **relevance** (i.e. of TCA activities to AfDB overall objectives) and **sustainability** (i.e. have the results of TCA activities catalysed change within the AfDB and been integrated into how the Bank operates).

### 2.2. Hypotheses

A set of hypotheses to the evaluation questions are tested (validated/invalidated) and explored through the document review, in interviews with AfDB and DFID staff, as well as through process audits (if possible), project expenditure reviews, and surveys/questionnaires (see 2.4 below). The data gathered from this process of testing hypotheses is then considered in view of identified qualifiers (see 2.3. below). Preliminary hypotheses in relation to the 11 focus questions are given below.

### Assumptions

1. Does the TCA strengthen the AfDB capability to achieve results (i.e. does the TCA strengthen AfDB capability to effect transformational change)?
  - The TCA has contributed to strengthen AfDB capability to achieve results.
  - Some TCA activities have been more efficient and effective than others in their contributions to AfDB capability.
  - The TCA is among several

#### Box: Changes to TOR evaluation questions

##### Test assumptions

All TOR questions remain.

##### Assess efficiency

Four of the TOR questions are dropped, but are likely to be addressed in answers to focus questions. The dropped questions are:

1. How well did the financial systems and their administration work? How far funding, personnel, regulatory, administration, time and other resources and procedures contributed to or hindered the achievement of results?
2. How was the beneficiary involved, how effective was this and what have been the benefits of or difficulties with this involvement?
3. How well was the TCA managed to minimize transaction costs of various processes involved, particularly for Bank operations staff?

##### Assess effectiveness

One of the TOR questions is dropped, but is likely to be addressed in answers to focus questions. The dropped question is:

1. Assess the relative impact of the TCA and other forms of assistance, including secondees or positions paid for (i.e. climate change)?

##### Assess potential

All TOR questions are replaced by two focus questions on lessons learnt. The replaced questions are:

1. Is the current structure of the TCA “fit for purpose” to help DFID deliver its results, as outlined in various departmental operational plans?
2. What management structure of a potential follow-up programme of support to AfDB (TCA-II) would deliver results that would deliver the greatest impact?
3. Are there any recommendations for the optimal conditions for and future architecture of any potential TCA-II?
4. How can both institutions mutually agree on the priority sectors and the eligible activities of any potential TCA-II?

initiatives/processes that have strengthened AfDB capability to achieve results.

2. Does the TCA help the AfDB achieve results (i.e. there is will for transformational change)?
  - The AfDB has used the TCA to achieve internal and external results.
  - Some TCA activities have been more and less relevant to AfDB efforts to achieve results.
3. How relevant is the TCA to the AfDB strategic goals (i.e. how strategic were the interventions financed by the TCA)?
  - The TCA contributes to key AfDB strategic goals.
  - Some TCA activities have been more efficient and effective than others in their contributions to AfDB strategic goals.

## **Efficiency**

4. Were TCA funds used efficiently and could they have been used more efficiently?
  - Compared to some other AfDB trust funds, TCA funds were used efficiently.
  - Ongoing AfDB reform processes provide room for improved efficiency in TCA spending.
5. How well did the partnership and management arrangements work (taking into account how they developed over time)?
  - The AfDB-DFID partnership benefited from significant investment (time and resources) from both organisations.
  - AfDB and DFID investment in management arrangements contributed to TCA performance.
  - AfDB and DFID commitment to ensure TCA performance strengthened partnership and management arrangements.
6. Were the risks properly identified and well managed?
  - Risks in TCA projects were identified and managed.

## **Effectiveness**

7. Did the use of TCA funds represent good Value-for-Money? Were costs incurred appropriate and proportionate to results achieved?
  - From the projects reviewed, the use of TCA funds represented fair Value-for-Money.

- From the projects reviewed, the costs incurred were largely appropriate and proportionate to results achieved.
8. To what extent were the intended outputs and results achieved in relation to targets set in original and revised project documents (including logical framework analyses)?
- The implementation of the TCA has happened in the context of significant institutional changes in the AfDB.
  - The achievements of the TCA, in relation to intended outputs and results as set out in the original and revised project documents, are mixed.
  - TCA achievements have become more pronounced as the AfDB-DFID partnership has grown over time.
  - TCA-funded capacity-building projects have been well-received by internal and external beneficiaries
9. How effective and appropriate was the project approach? With hindsight, how would the implementers have changed it?
- The project was appropriate to the AfDB context when agreed.
  - The effectiveness of the TCA as a project approach changed over time as the AfDB institutional reform process progressed.
  - The effectiveness of the TCA as a project approach is determined by the AfDB institutional context.
  - AfDB-DFID regular engagement on the TCA implementation approach was appropriate.

## Lessons

10. What lessons emerge from the TCA for the AfDB in relation to its broader trust fund management and strategy?
- Lessons from the TCA provide numerous insights that are relevant to the broader AfDB trust fund management and strategy.
11. What are the implications of lessons from the TCA evaluation for the planned AfDB-DFID Framework Agreement (FA)?
- The future AfDB-DFID Framework Agreement management will be improved if lessons from the TCA are applied.

### 2.3. Key Qualifiers

Qualifiers refer to factors that need to be considered when drawing conclusions on results. For evaluations involving institutional performance, they can be categorised under institutional, contextual, and comparative.

**Institutional qualifiers** focus on institutional dynamics (e.g. mandates, reform processes, institutional performance enhancers/blockers, inter-departmental

dynamics, resource access, etc.) and how these enable (or disable) the organisation to deliver as planned.

**Contextual qualifiers** involve looking at the operating environment (e.g. the complexity of delivering services in target areas, access to and availability of effective delivery mechanisms, magnitude of need and complexity of issues, etc.) and, conversely, the impact that the operating environment has on institutional performance.

**Comparative qualifiers** help benchmark performance in relation to other similar projects, support modalities, and organisations. Attention is also given to what is considered good practice (e.g. in Trust Fund management) and alignment to such good practice.

Qualifiers are defined as the evaluation progresses – and a final list is presented in the draft evaluation report.

## 2.4. Research Methodology

The research methodology involves a set of research techniques that are used to test hypotheses and quantify/qualify answers to the evaluation questions.

### Document Review

The document review involves the study of programme documents, programme memorandum, Logical Framework Analyses, Theory of Change, Annual Reviews, Mid-Term Reviews, Back-to-Office reports, samples of outputs, DFID Business Plan, ARD Operational Plan, AfDB Results Framework, to mention some.

### Process Audit

If possible within the timeframe of the evaluation, select process audits may be conducted or carried out retrospectively. This involves: (a) that processes are followed from inputs (e.g. a request for TA from a Task Manager) to outcomes (e.g. TA is delivered from the TCA) and assessed; and (b) that certain processes (e.g. training of staff) are assessed for outcomes (e.g. better skills). The advantage of this approach is that it may reveal process efficiencies/inefficiencies and sometimes catalyses change during the evaluation process itself.

### Project Expenditure Review

Where possible and if data is available, and as part of the Value-for-Money assessment, the evaluation will go beyond the sub-category level (Climate Change, Governance, Infrastructure, PSD, Institutional Strengthening, etc.) to review expenditure for 2-3 selected projects. As data may be incomplete, an adapted Value-for-Money framework to DFID's own guidance<sup>9</sup> is likely to be developed and used for this part of the evaluation.

---

<sup>9</sup> See, for example, [https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment\\_data/file/204382/Guidance-value-for-money-social-transfers-25Mar2013.pdf](https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/204382/Guidance-value-for-money-social-transfers-25Mar2013.pdf)

## Surveys and Questionnaires

The evaluation mixes both qualitative and quantitative methods – and seeks to draw out views also by administering online (surveymonkey.com) surveys/questionnaires. These are focused on target groups for specific projects (e.g. Task Managers, beneficiaries of TA and training, etc. – both at the AfDB level and externally), where emphasis was placed on capacity-building through training and other activities. The use of surveys/questionnaires depends on the willingness of those targeted to provide feedback. Guidance is taken here from the AfDB TCA evaluation focal point on whether surveys/questionnaires can be effectively administered.

## Interviews

Interviews are envisaged with AfDB officials from FRMB and relevant spending departments. DFID officials are also consulted from the Africa Regional Department (ARD), International Financial Institutions Department (IFID), Middle East and North Africa Department (MENAD).

### 2.5. Evaluation Ground Rules

Ultimately, the evaluation aims to reflect the views and experience of TCA stakeholders – while providing an external and evidence-based analysis of data relevant to the evaluation questions. In the evaluation process, several ground rules will be adhered to:

- **Hear everybody** The evaluator will hear as many respondents as possible and enable them to provide their feedback in person or through questionnaires.
- **Be fair** The evaluator will strive to present a fair assessment of the performance of the TCA as a whole, as well as some of the key achievements of individual activities.
- **Be constructive** The evaluator will offer constructive recommendations keeping in mind that the AfDB and DFID are considering options for post-TCA support to the Bank.

### 2.6. Presentation Format

The final evaluation report will strive for balance and be based on as good an evidence-base as possible. It is written in unambiguous and direct language and provides actionable recommendations.

In order to present findings effectively and enable a focus on key successes and challenges, answers to specific evaluation questions (particularly those related to efficiency and effectiveness) are summarised using a scorecard format. The scorecards provide the evaluator's assessment of the level of difficulty, effort put in

by the AfDB, and attainment in relation to key evaluation questions<sup>10</sup>. The scorecards inform where more or less effort is required to tackle different levels of difficulty associated to deliverables – and where work has gone to plan, and what key challenges require attention.

It is important to note that the use of scorecards (and their format) depends on whether the evaluator decides that evaluation questions are best answered in the final evaluation report at the sub-category (e.g. Climate Change, Governance, Infrastructure, PSD, Institutional Strengthening, etc.) level. With multiple Task Managers (and several Departments, in some cases) involved in one sub-category, the scorecard would present a synthesised view of results. If such a decision is made then specific evaluation questions will be incorporated into a scorecard as exemplified below.

<b>SUB-CATEGORY:</b> (E.g. Climate Change)	<b>DIFFICULTY</b>	<b>EFFORT</b>	<b>ATTAINMENT</b>
<b>ASSESS EFFICIENCY</b>			
<input type="checkbox"/> Were TCA funds used efficiently and could they have been used more efficiently?	Low/Medium/High	Low/Medium/High	A/B/C/D
<input type="checkbox"/> How well did the partnership and management arrangements work (taking into account how they developed over time)?			
<input type="checkbox"/> Were the risks properly identified and well managed?			
<b>ASSESS EFFECTIVENESS</b>			
<input type="checkbox"/> Did the use of TCA funds represent good Value-for-Money? Were costs incurred appropriate and proportionate to results achieved?	Low/Medium/High	Low/Medium/High	A/B/C/D
<input type="checkbox"/> To what extent were the intended outputs and results achieved in relation to targets set in original and revised project documents (including logical framework analyses)?			
<input type="checkbox"/> How effective and appropriate was the project approach? With hindsight, how would the implementers have changed it?			

<sup>10</sup> Level of difficulty (low, medium, or high), level of effort put in by implementing agencies (low, medium or high), and attainment (A=well above expected level; B=above expected level; C=at expected level; D=below expected level; and E=well below expected level)

### 3. Work Plan

#### 3.1. Evaluation Process

The evaluation process involves the following elements:

- An inception report is prepared that makes explicit the evaluation framework and methodology. The inception report is submitted for comment to AfDB and DFID (deadline: 17 January 2014) and revised version submitted on 5 February 2014.
- A first visit is made to Tunis to discuss inception report and feedback with the AfDB, collect documents, prepare for engagement with relevant AfDB staff, and start the evaluation process (3-16 February 2014).
- A second visit to Tunis is made on 3-28 March 2014. Engagement with relevant AfDB staff starts and process audit entry-points are identified.
- At an agreed date between 3 and 28 March 2014, consultations with DFID follow in London with interviews of staff involved in the TCA.
- The draft evaluation report is completed in this period and submitted on 28 March 2014.
- Feedback is received on the draft evaluation report by 1 May 2014 and the final report is submitted to AfDB and DFID on 9 May 2014.

#### 3.2. Timeline for Deliverables

The timeline for deliverables is given below.

<b>Deliverables</b>	<b>January 2014</b>	<b>February 2014</b>	<b>March 2014</b>	<b>April 2014</b>	<b>May 2014</b>
Inception report	17 January	5 February			
Draft evaluation report			28 March		
Final evaluation report					9 May

Frequent updates to the AfDB focal person for the evaluation are given throughout the evaluation period.

#### 3.3. Requirements

A number of key requirements for the evaluation are outlined in the TOR, including:

- Access to documents, including programme documents, programme memorandum, Logical Framework Analyses, Theory of Change, Annual

Reviews, Mid-Term Reviews, Back-to-Office reports, samples of outputs, DFID Business Plan, ARD Operational Plan, AfDB Results Framework, etc.

- Access to AfDB officials from FRMB and relevant spending departments; and DFID officials from the Africa Regional Department (ARD), International Financial Institutions Department (IFID), Middle East and North Africa Department (MENAD).

The nature of the TCA evaluation, however, requires an iterative approach. As data is analysed, lines of inquiry are likely to throw up new requirements. The evaluator will try to raise these new requirements with the AfDB evaluation focal person in a structured and timely manner. Nonetheless, it needs to be stressed here that the evaluation process itself is likely to be tasking and require significant time and facilitation from the AfDB evaluation focal point.

### **3.4. Challenges**

There are a range of identified challenges associated to the evaluation:

- The TCA was signed in September 2007. Staff turnover in both AfDB and DFID means it may be difficult to find interviewees who can give a complete retrospective. Piecing together such a picture (from 2007 to present) may be challenging.
- Given that there are several non-TCA initiatives aimed improving AfDB performance, clearly and robustly evidencing causality between TCA performance-enhancing activities and changes in the Bank is likely to be tricky.
- The activities funded under the TCA are numerous, diverse, and complex – and have been carried out over 5-6 years. There is not enough time in the evaluation for a detailed review (activities analysis, accounts review, etc.) of all projects. At the same time, data for some activities may be incomplete.
- There is an ongoing AfDB-DFID discussion on next steps – post the TCA, which is focused on a Framework Agreement (FA). How these discussions evolve – and options considered – may colour the views conveyed to the evaluator of interlocutors in both institutions.

The measures to address these (and other) challenges include:

- Work closely with AfDB and DFID TCA evaluation focal points to identify documentation and interviewees who together provide a good enough retrospective of TCA implementation.
- Explore causality fully, delineate and qualify cause-effect relationships related to the TCA carefully.
- Identify (2-3) specific TAC funded activities that are representative of the full portfolio and assess each in detail.

- Understand fully the different options for post-TCA support that are part of AfDB-DFID discussions. This will help the evaluator identify bias in the course of interviews.
- Use online questionnaires to reach a broader audience of target beneficiaries. This will help the evaluator capture a breadth of perspectives on the TCA that may otherwise be limited by an exclusive focus on AfDB Task Managers and DFID staff involved in the TCA.

#### 4. Sources Consulted

AfDB (2013), “AfDB-DFID Technical Cooperation Agreement: List of Approved Activities (as of 31 December 2013). Partnerships and Cooperation Unit (ORRU). December 2013.

AfDB (2013), “TOR: Evaluation of the DFID-AfDB Technical Cooperation Agreement (TCA)”. November 2013.

AfDB (2013), “Trust Fund Management at the African Development Bank. An Independent Evaluation. Final Report.” Operations Evaluation Department (IPEC). 10 April 2013.

*And*

AfDB (no date), “Management Response”. No date.

AfDB (2013), “2012 Annual Progress Report – African Development Bank and Government of United Kingdom – Technical Cooperation Arrangement”. Partnerships and Cooperation Unit (ORRU). April 2013.

AfDB (2009), “Trust Fund Reform Program – New Directions” Partnerships and Cooperation Unit (ORRU). March 2009.

AfDB (2006), “Memorandum: A Proposal for Technical Cooperation Fund Reform at the African Development Bank – Revised”. ABD/BD/WP/2005/102/Rev.3. 14 July 2006.

DFID (2011), “DFID-ADB Technical Cooperation Arrangement (TCA) 2007-2012 Annual Review: Back to Office Report. (No date).

(No author) (2013), “AfDB-DFID TCA: Agreed Financial Positions and Projections as of 31 December 2013”. December 2013.

(No author) (2013), “Annual Review: DFID-African Development Bank Technical Cooperation Arrangement”. October 2013.

(No author) (2011) “AfDB-DFID Technical Cooperation Arrangement” [Results Framework]. January 2011.

(No author) (2007) "Technical Cooperation Arrangement between the Department for International Development of the Government of the United Kingdom and the African Development Bank and the African Development Fund" 17 September 2007.

(No author) (No date), "Annex 1: Detailed Findings and Recommendations in Full".

END

## **ANNEX 5: SOURCES CONSULTED**

AfDB (2014), "Back-to-Office-Report: AfDB Integrated Training Programme on Climate Change, University of Cambridge; February 16 – 22, 2014" 2014.

AfDB (2014), "Cooperation Framework with UK: Submission to the Standing Committee on Partnerships". 27 January 2014.

AfDB (2013), "AfDB-DFID Technical Cooperation Agreement: List of Approved Activities (as of 31 December 2013). Partnerships and Cooperation Unit (ORRU). December 2013.

AfDB (2013), "TOR: Evaluation of the DFID-AfDB Technical Cooperation Agreement (TCA)". November 2013.

AfDB (2013), "Trust Fund Management at the African Development Bank. An Independent Evaluation. Final Report." Operations Evaluation Department (IPEC). 10 April 2013. *And* AfDB (no date), "Management Response". No date.

AfDB (2013), "2012 Annual Progress Report – African Development Bank and Government of United Kingdom – Technical Cooperation Arrangement". Partnerships and Cooperation Unit (ORRU). April 2013.

AfDB (2013), "Annual Development Effectiveness Review 2013. Towards sustainable growth for Africa" 2013.

AfDB (2013), "Taking AfDB's development impact to scale in fragile states – A contribution to the new Fragile States Strategy of the AfDB" 9 May 2013.

AfDB (2013), "Financial Management Policy Documents Peer-review Workshop from April 23 to 26 April 2013 in Pretoria, South Africa" 2013.

AfDB (2012), "Back-to-Office-Report: AfDB Integrated Training Programme on Climate Change, University of Cambridge; November 19 – 23, 2012." 19 December 2012.

AfDB (2012), "CLIMATE CHANGE ACTION PLAN (CCAP) 2011-2015" ADB/BD/WP/2012/109/Approval. 7 September 2012.

AfDB (2012), "Presidential Directive 01/2012 Concerning the Creation of the Bank Coordination Committee on Climate Change". 6 February 2012.

AfDB (2012), "ENERGY STRATEGY OF THE AFRICAN DEVELOPMENT BANK GROUP REVISED VERSION." ADB/BD/WP/2011/182/Rev.1 8 January 2012.

AfDB (2012), "ENERGY STRATEGY OF THE AFRICAN DEVELOPMENT BANK GROUP. TECHNICAL ANNEXES - REVISED VERSION." ADB/BD/WP/2011/182/TD/Rev.1 9 January 2012.

AfDB (2012), "EVALUATION OF THE ASSISTANCE OF THE AFRICAN DEVELOPMENT BANK TO FRAGILE STATES" ADB/BD/WP/2012/48 6 April 2012.

AfDB (2012), "EVALUATION OF THE ASSISTANCE OF THE AFRICAN DEVELOPMENT BANK TO FRAGILE STATES. MANAGEMENT RESPONSE." ADB/BD/WP/2012/48/Add.1 13 April 2012.

AfDB (2012), "Procurement Specific Capacity Development Strategy (2012-2015)." July 2012.

AfDB (2012), "Mid Term Review of the Governance Strategic Directions and Action Plan (2008-2012) Draft". March 2012.

AfDB (2012), "EVALUATION OF THE DFID-AFDB TECHNICAL COOPERATION AGREEMENT (TCA) 2009-2013". 16 December 2012.

AfDB (2012), "Independent Review of the African Development Bank Group's Fiduciary Safeguards Framework" IBTCI Consortium, May 2012.

AfDB (2012), "Enhanced Private Sector Development Impact of AfDB Operations. Inception Report." Maxwell Stamp Plc. May 2012.

AfDB (2012), "Project completion report: Monrovia Water Supply and Sanitation Rehabilitation Programme." February 2012.

AfDB (2011), "CONSULTANCY MEDIUM TERM REVIEW OF THE GOVERNANCE STRATEGIC DIRECTIONS AND ACTION PLAN 2008-2012 (GAP) TERMS OF REFERENCE" 28 July 2011.

AfDB (2011), "Progress report: Monrovia Water Supply and Sanitation Rehabilitation Programme." 8 June 2011.

AfDB (2011), "DFID FINANCING ORPF FINANCIAL MANAGEMENT MANUALS". 28 October 2011.

AfDB (2011), "DFID/AfDB COLLABORATION FOR ENHANCED PRIVATE SECTOR DEVELOPMENT IMPACT". April 2011.

AfDB (2011), "Elaboration of a Strategic Framework for Infrastructure. Inception Report. Draft Version 2". 22 June 2011.

AfDB (2011), "An Update of ORPF Progress Report on Activities Funded by DFID TCA". 2 March 2011.

AfDB (2010), "ADDRESSING SECTOR GOVERNANCE AND CORRUPTION RISK IN INFRASTRUCTURE PROJECTS – GUIDANCE NOTE." ADB/BD/IF/2010/57 4 March 2010.

AfDB (2010), "Proposal for additional funding under the governance component of the TCA between AfDB and DFID". OSGE. August 2010.

AfDB (2010), "ENHANCING AND MONITORING OITC AND ONEC (OINF) LENDING PROCESSES, OUTPUTS, AND OUTCOMES". Aria Consult, Paris. 24 December 2010.

AfDB (2009), "Trust Fund Reform Program – New Directions" Partnerships and Cooperation Unit (ORRU). March 2009.

AfDB (2007), "Liberia. Monrovia Water Supply and Sanitation Rehabilitation Programme. Appraisal Report." OWAS. 2007.

AfDB (2006), "Memorandum: A Proposal for Technical Cooperation Fund Reform at the African Development Bank – Revised". ABD/BD/WP/2005/102/Rev.3. 14 July 2006.

AfDB (no date), "PROPOSAL FOR BILATERAL FUNDING DFID TECHNICAL COOPERATION ARRANGEMENT SUPPORT TO ORPF PROCUREMENT AND FINANCIAL MANAGEMENT REFORMS PROJECT." No date.

AfDB (no date), " AfDB's Framework for Procurement Capacity Development". No date.

AfDB (no date), "Update: Financial Management Reforms under TCA of DFID (200 000 £)" No date.

AfDB (no date), "Progress report on DFID Contribution for Establishment of Secretariat for the Private Sector Development Coordination Platform". No date.

AfDB (no date), "STUDY ON PROMOTING DOMESTIC CONSTRUCTION INDUSTRY Status Brief". No date.

AfDB (no date), "Completion Report: AfDB Strategic Framework for Infrastructure Development". No date.

AfDB (no date), "Completion Report: Enhancing and Monitoring OITC and ONEC (OINF) Lending Processes, Outputs, And Outcomes". No date.

AfDB (no date), "Request for Bilateral Technical Cooperation Funds: Cote d'Ivoire Public Expenditure Management and Financial Accountability Review (PEMFAR)." No date.

AfDB (no date), "REQUEST FOR FINANCIAL SUPPORT FROM DFID FOR AN INDEPENDENT REVIEW OF THE AFRICAN DEVELOPMENT BANK GROUP'S FIDUCIARY SAFEGUARDS IN THE CONTEXT OF THE NEW DECENTRALISATION ROADMAP" No date.

AfDB (no date), "Completion Report: AFDB Fiduciary Safeguard". No date.

AfDB (no date), "Status of Governance activities under the DFID Technical Cooperation Agreement." No date.

AfDB (no date), "Progress report on DFID Contribution to the Partnership "Souk At-tanmia", a Development Marketplace model". No date.

AfDB (no date), "Completion Report: African Network of Public Procurement." No date.

AfDB (no date), "African Development Bank Group. Medium-Term Strategy 2008-2012" No date.

AfDB (no date), "At the Center of Africa's Transformation Strategy for 2013–2022" No date.

AfDB (no date), "TERMS OF REFERENCE Integrated Training Program to support the integration of climate change issues into the Bank's policies and operations" No date.

AfDB (no date), "Funding Request for the development of a Monitoring & Evaluation Framework to guide the implementation of the Bank Climate Change Action Plan" No date.

AfDB (no date), "Funding Request for the organization of a workshop on capacity building on Nationally Appropriate Mitigation Actions (NAMAs)" No date.

AfDB (no date), "Funding Request for the organization of three sets Executive trainings on climate change with senior management" No date.

AfDB (no date), "Organization of three sets of Executive trainings on climate change with Bank's senior management". No date.

AfDB (no date), "Climate Screening and Adaptation Review & Evaluation Procedures Booklet". Compliance & Safeguards Division (ORQR.3). No date.

AfDB (no date), "Terms of reference TA/ Climate change adaptation and Low-Carbon Development Experts 2011-2012". No date.

AfDB (no date), "Progress Report for the China-Africa Research Initiative". No date.

*African Development Review (2010)*, "Introduction: China's Increasing Engagement in Africa: Towards Stronger Trade, Investment and Development Cooperation". By Richard Schiere and Peter Walkenhorst. Vol. 22, No. S1, 2010, 559–561

DFID (2013), "Multilateral Aid Review Update Driving reform to achieve multilateral effectiveness" December 2013.

DFID (2013), "DFID-ADB Technical Cooperation Arrangement (TCA) 2007-2012 Annual Review: Back to Office Report. (No date).

DFID (2013), "Guidance on measuring and maximising value for money in social transfer programmes –second edition Toolkit and explanatory text". Philip White, Anthony Hodges and Matthew Greenslade. April 2013.

DFID (2011), "DFID's Approach to Value for Money (VfM)". July 2011.

DFID (2011), "Multilateral Aid Review Ensuring maximum value for money for UK aid through multilateral organisations" March 2011.

DFID (no date), "Business Case and Intervention Summary. Support to African Development Bank to establish a Secretariat for a Private Sector Development Coordination Partnership for the Middle East and North Africa". *And* DFID (no date), Logical Framework: Support to the African Development Bank for a Private Sector Development Coordination Platform

DFID (no date), "Business Case and Intervention Summary. Support to the African Development Bank to Pilot Social Entrepreneurship in Tunisia." No date.

MOPAN (2010), "MOPAN Common Approach 2009: AfDB" 19 February 2010.

MOPAN (2012), "Assessment of Organisational Effectiveness and Reporting on Development Results African Development Bank (AfDB)" Volume 1. December 2012.

MOPAN (2012), "Assessment of Organisational Effectiveness and Reporting on Development Results African Development Bank (AfDB)" Volume 2. December 2012.

MOPAN (no date), "Management Response - African Development Bank". (No date)

(No author) (2013), "AfDB-DFID TCA: Agreed Financial Positions and Projections as of 31 December 2013". December 2013.

(No author) (2013), "Annual Review: DFID-African Development Bank Technical Cooperation Arrangement". October 2013.

(No author) (2011) “AfDB-DFID Technical Cooperation Arrangement” [Results Framework]. January 2011.

(No author) (2007) “Technical Cooperation Arrangement between the Department for International Development of the Government of the United Kingdom and the African Development Bank and the African Development Fund” 17 September 2007.

(No author) (No date), “Annex 1: Detailed Findings and Recommendations in Full”.

ODI (2014), “Taking the African Development Bank’s development impact to scale in fragile states. Final Report”. Alastair McKechnie, Tom Hart, Fiona Davies. 10 January 2014.

OECD (2010), “DAC Guidelines and Reference Series. Quality Standards for Development Evaluation”. Paris, 2010.

## ANNEX 6: IMPLEMENTATION SCHEDULE

2014				
January	February	March	April	May
Contract signed	First field visit to Tunis (3-16 February)	Second field visit to Tunis (2-11 March)	AfDB and DFID review of Draft Evaluation Report	Feedback from AfDB and DFID on Draft Evaluation Report received
Initial document review	Inception Report formally submitted (5 February)	Interviews with AfDB staff		
Inception Report drafted	Document collection and review	Project selection and data collection for VfM assessment		Revision of Draft Evaluation Report
Feedback on Inception Report received	Interview questions developed; interviews scheduled (AfDB and DFID)	Online questionnaires designed and responses collected		Final Evaluation Report submitted (12 May)
	Interviews with AfDB staff	Visit to London (12-16 March)		
		Interviews with DFID staff		
		Overall evaluation data review and assessment		
		Draft Evaluation Report submitted (31 March)		

## ANNEX 7: LIST OF BILATERAL AND THEMATIC TRUST FUNDS

### ANNEX 4: UNTIED THEMATIC TRUST FUNDS/SPECIAL FUNDS RESOURCES AVAILABLE FOR COMMITMENT AS OF 31 DECEMBER 2013

N°	Trust Fund	Managed By	Donor Currency	Total Funds (Received + net interest)	Cumulative Commitment	Total available for commitment UA	Cumulative Disbursement	(%) for Admin Fees	Sectors	Activities	Max. Amt per Project
1	<b>African Water Facility (AWF)</b> Algeria Austria Austria AFDB Bilil-Belinda Gates Foundation Burkina Faso Canada Denmark DFID European Union Egypt France Norway Senegal Sweden Spain	OWAS	Euro 100 000 Euro 3 900 000 Euro 6 009 250 Euro 11 271 800 Euro 3 749 358 Euro 82 222 Euro 21 902 249 Euro 3 361 083 Euro 17 052 415 Euro 25 000 000 Euro 15 000 Euro 12 000 000 Euro 10 788 685 Euro 174 963 Euro 12 195 623 Euro 12 000 000	134 842 008	101 497 890	33 344 117	67 673 660	covers direct and indirect costs	• Water Sector	Technical Assistance, Studies, Operational Support	BoD approves operations above Euro 5 million
2	<b>Multi-donor Water Partnership Programme (MDWPP)</b> Canada Denmark SIDA Support to the First African Water Week IsDB Support to the First African Water Week	OWAS	Euro 3 302 815 Euro 2 010 841 Euro 10 324 Euro 13 690	4 923 988	4 829 896	94 091	3 729 876	5%	• Water Sector	Policies, Workshops, Conferences, Training, Studies and Seminars	N/A

N°	Trust Fund	Managed By	Donor Currency	Total Funds (Received + net interest)	Cumulative Commitment	Total available for commitment UA	Cumulative Disbursement	(%) for Admin Fees	Sectors	Activities	Max. Amt per Project
3	<b>Rural Water Supply and Sanitation Initiative Grants (RWSSI)</b> Burkina Faso Canada Denmark France Italy Switzerland The Netherlands	OWAS	EUR 82571 EUR 26 404 626 EUR 30 829 647 EUR 53 000 000 EUR 500 000 EUR 17 936 470 EUR 9 287 804	125 815 533	118 493 523	7 322 010	47 976 092	5%	• Water Sector	Policy and strategy, capacity building, training, programmes and project preparation	BoD approves operations above Euro 2 million
4	<b>NEPAD Infrastructure Project Preparation Facility Fund (NEPAD-IPPF)</b> Denmark Canada Norway Government DFID/United Kingdom Germany Government SPAIN ABD Contribution Danish fund for Technical assistance DFID Co-financing Project USAID	ONRI	DKK 17 700 000 CAD 19 750 000 NOK 43 000 000 GBP 9 000 000 EUR 12 000 000 EUR 2 001 194 UA 6 300 000 DKK 5 000 000 USD 193 670 USD 1 000 000	50 810 707	43 681 152	7 129 555	18 036 575	0%	• ICT • Transport • Energy • Water and Sanitation	Regional Project Identification, Preparation, Workshops, Seminars in line with NEPAD Agenda, REC2 Capacity Building	BoD approves operations above USD 3 million

N°	Trust Fund	Managed By	Donor Currency	Total Funds (Received + net interest)	Cumulative Commitment	Total available for commitment UA	Cumulative Disbursement	(%) for Admin Fees	Sectors	Activities	Max. Amt per Project
5	Congo Basin Forest Fund (CBFF) UK DFID Norway Canada	OSAN	Euro 37 679 513 Euro 61 251 956 Euro 14 226 775	101 850 357	73 960 499	27 889 857	32 137 127	Real costs	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Environment:</li> <li>Reduce deforestation and degradation</li> <li>poverty reduction</li> <li>sustainable forest management</li> <li>sustainable development</li> <li>capacity building</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Assessment and funding of Projects, establishment of CBFF secretariat and systems, Governing Council meetings, Preparation of annual work plan, monitoring missions of CBFF projects. Sensitization workshops and seminars. Establish Monitoring &amp; Evaluation system.</li> </ul>	UA 10 million
6	Migration and Development Initiative Fund France IFAD USAID	OSHD	Euro 7 000 000 Euro 162 613 Euro 154 906	6 601 458	2 123 012	4 478 445	462 558	5%	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Migration and Development</li> </ul>	Studies, Technical Assistance	BoD approves operations above USD 1 million
7	Microfinance Capacity Building Fund Spain UNCDF	OSHD	Euro 5 000 000 Euro 119 550	4 588 286	331 799	4 256 486	61 188	5%	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Microfinance</li> </ul>	Consultancy services, Training and Capacity Building, Preparation of policy and sector studies	BoD approves operations above USD 1 million
8	Africa Trade Fund (AFTRA)	ONRI	CAD 15 000 000	9 273 697	1 807 771	7 465 925	41 116	5%	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Trade</li> <li>Economic Growth</li> <li>Regional Integration</li> <li>Infrastructure (water and energy)</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Technical Assistance</li> <li>Training</li> <li>Capacity Building</li> <li>Preparation of Policy and Sector Studies</li> </ul>	BoD approves operations above USD 1 million
9	Fund for African Private Sector Assistance (FAPA) Japan Austria ADB	OPSM	USD 37 260 000 USD 2 648 047 USD 10 645 670	34 002 179	28 317 818	5 684 360	13 342 137	5%	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Private Sector Development</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Technical Assistance</li> <li>Capacity building</li> </ul>	BoD approves activities above USD 1 million

N°	Trust Fund	Managed By	Donor Currency	Total Funds (Received + net interest)	Cumulative Commitment	Total available for commitment UA	Cumulative Disbursement	(%) for Admin Fees	Sectors	Activities	Max. Amt per Project
10	Governance Trust Funds (GTF) Norway Switzerland Finland Denmark Sweden	FRMB, OSGE	USD 1 201 868 USD 3 131 525 USD 84 068 USD 84 308 USD 2 286 789	4 423 611	4 296 221	127 389	2 077 627	5%	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Governance</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Measures to analyse and improve governance and reduce corruption.</li> <li>Promotion of credible audit.</li> <li>Accountability mechanisms and oversight institutions</li> <li>Good Financial management including public procurement</li> <li>Support to investment climate and business environment</li> </ul>	BoD approves operations above USD 1 million
11	South - South Cooperation Trust Fund (SSTF) Brazil	FRMB	USD 5 999 802	3 895 975	3 235 825	660 150	458 656	5%	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Agriculture and Agribusiness</li> <li>Private Sector Development</li> <li>Clean Energy</li> <li>Governance</li> <li>Health</li> <li>Social Development</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Technical Assistance</li> <li>Capacity Building</li> <li>Human Resources Development</li> <li>Seminars</li> <li>Workshops</li> </ul>	
12	Sustainable Energy Fund For Africa (SEFA) Denmark	ONEC	USD 45 552 009	29 579 227	4 946 960	24 632 266	744 581	5%	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Renewable Energy</li> <li>Energy Efficiency</li> </ul>	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Project preparation for projects of total investment needs of USD 30-200 million (Support of projects with an independent power producer or within a PPP structure; sovereign entities are not eligible as project sponsors)</li> <li>Contribution of equity to a Private equity fund</li> <li>creation of an enabling environment for private investments in sustainable energy</li> </ol>	BoD approves operations above USD 1 million

N°	Trust Fund	Managed By	Donor Currency	Total Funds (Received + net interest)	Cumulative Commitment	Total available for commitment UA	Cumulative Disbursement	(%) for Admin Fees	Sectors	Activities	Max. Amt per Project
13	Zimbabwe MultiDonor Trust Fund (ZIMFUND)	SARC/ZWFO	USD 124 509 390	81 177 005	53 711 713	27 465 291	12 303 465	at least 5%	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Infrastructure investments in water &amp; sanitation</li> <li>Energy</li> </ul>	Rehabilitation of infrastructure projects	BoD approves operations for UA 2 million and above
14	Trust Fund for Countries Transition (TFT) DFID DANIDA	ORNA	Euro 2 758 009 Euro 1 244 468	3 581 621	3 483 189	118 431	650 458	5%	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Finance</li> <li>Trade</li> <li>Governance</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Technical Assistance</li> <li>fosters partnerships for technical cooperation Projects</li> </ul>	BoD approves operations above USD 1 million
15	Africa Legal Support Facility (ALSF)	ALSF/GECL	Euro 21 187 188	19 088 420	15 117 618	3 970 801	6 397 790	covers direct and indirect costs	Legal Support	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>a) commercial creditor litigation;</li> <li>b) negotiations of complex commercial transactions; and</li> <li>c) enhancing the capacity of RMCs to carry out those services themselves</li> </ul>	
16	African Community Practice (AFCOP) ADF	ORQR	USD 3 843 000	2 500 664	2 496 793	3 911	749 569	covers direct and indirect costs	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Regional Integration</li> <li>Capacity building</li> <li>Technical assistance</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Knowledge sharing on MFRD</li> <li>Linking MFRD knowledge to regional processes</li> <li>Synergies between regional and national processes</li> <li>Project management</li> </ul>	
17	Agriculture Fast Track Fund (AFT) SIDA USAID Denmark	OSAN	USD 5 000 000 USD 2 000 000 USD 1 800 000	1 313 745	1 148 714	165 031	3 465	5%	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Agricultural infrastructure</li> <li>Health</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Market research</li> <li>Financial modeling</li> <li>Business plan development</li> <li>Environmental and social impact studies.</li> </ul>	BoD approves operations above USD 1 million

N°	Trust Fund	Managed By	Donor Currency	Total Funds (Received + net interest)	Cumulative Commitment	Total available for commitment UA	Cumulative Disbursement	(%) for Admin Fees	Sectors	Activities	Max. Amt per Project
18	Global Strategy to Improve Agriculture & Rural Statistics	ESTA	USD 3 051 935	1 981 775	1 981 694	82	65 365	2%	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Agricultural statistics</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Technical assistance</li> <li>Training</li> <li>Improvements in the coverage and quality of the minimum core data set, focusing on both national and regional priority data needs;</li> <li>Greater integration of agricultural statistics into the NSSs;</li> </ul>	
19	Infrastructure Consortium for Africa (ICA) DFID Russia Canada Italy USAID EIB KfW South Africa	ICA	USD 3 020 990 USD 200 000 USD 1 147 871 USD 472 749 USD 81 840 USD 400 570 USD 130 613 USD 99 900	3 608 407	3 033 021	575 387	1 937 038	covers direct and indirect costs	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Help improve the lives and economic well-being of Africa's people through encouraging, supporting and promoting increased investment in infrastructure in Africa, from both public and private sources.</li> </ul>		
20	Making Finance Work for Africa (MFW4A) AFD DFID EIB GIZ Netherlands SIDA DANIDA USAID MinBuza AfDB	OSGE	Eur 500 000 Eur 166 298 Eur 269 950 Eur 1 324 960 Eur 300 000 Eur 143 315 Eur 120 464 Eur 758 266 Eur 380 678 (in Kind Contribution)	3 545 111	3 260 574	284 537	2 245 159	covers direct and indirect costs	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Financial sector development ranging from access to finance to Capital Markets.</li> </ul>		

N°	Trust Fund	Managed By	Donor Currency	Total Funds (Received + net interest)	Cumulative Commitment	Total available for commitment UA	Cumulative Disbursement	(%) for Admin Fees	Sectors	Activities	Max. Amt per Project
21	Special Fund for Reconstruction and Development for the Great Lakes Region (SFRD)	ONRI	USD 4471643	2 903 665	2232748	670 917	635 123	covers direct and indirect costs	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• security</li> <li>• democracy and good governance</li> <li>• economic development</li> <li>• regional integration</li> <li>• humanitarian, social and environmental issues.</li> </ul>	address the specific needs and circumstances of the Great Lakes Region	
22	Value for Money Sustainability & Accountability in Social Sectors (VFM)	OSHD	USD 714 261	463 806	275 368	188 437	143 410	5%	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Health</li> <li>• Education</li> <li>• Social protection</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• evidence-based sector policies and strategies;</li> <li>• systems' results orientation and performance;</li> <li>• stakeholder cooperation,</li> <li>• value for money, sustainability and accountability for health results;</li> <li>• planning and budgeting for results, governance and accountability structures and tools</li> </ul>	BoD approves operations above USD 1 million
<b>Total</b>				<b>630 968 015</b>	<b>474 450 636</b>	<b>156 517 378</b>	<b>212 082 903</b>				

#### ANNEX 7: DETAILS OF RESOURCES AVAILABLE UNDER BILATERAL TRUST FUNDS AS OF 31 DECEMBER 2013

N°	Donor Country	Donor Currency	Total Funds (Received + net interest)	Cumulative Commitment	Total available for commitment UA	Cumulative Disbursement	(%) for Admin Fees	Sectors	Activities	Tied Nature	Max. Amt per Project
1	Nigeria Technical Cooperation Fund (NTCF)	USD 25 000 000 Maximum of USD 2.5 million can be committed per year.	18 714 411	8 370 140	10 144 270	6 133 023	5%	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Capacity Building &amp; Regional integration in the areas of: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Science &amp; Technology</li> <li>• Human Development (Health &amp; Education)</li> <li>• Agriculture</li> <li>• Public Administration</li> <li>• Business &amp; Finance</li> </ul> </li> </ul>	Pre-feasibility and feasibility studies, Project identification, Preparation, Appraisal, Post-evaluation, Mid-term review, Rehabilitation of existing projects experiencing difficulties, Training, Capacity building	100% Untied	n/a
2	United Kingdom DFID	GBP 13 000 000	11 206 405	12 756 401	- 1 549 996	10 050 296	5%	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Infrastructure</li> <li>• Private Sector Development</li> <li>• Governance</li> <li>• Climate Change</li> <li>• Fragile States</li> <li>• Institutional Strengthening</li> <li>• Knowledge Management</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>i) Consulting services and technical assistance in support of project cycle activities, policy and sector studies</li> <li>ii) Training, capacity building and provision of institutional support</li> </ul>	100% Untied	n/a
3	Canada 2008 Technical Cooperation Arrangement	CAD 5 023 528 CAD 373 187 from the CATF	3 462 063	2 472 481	989 581	2 097 809	5%	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Gender</li> <li>• Good Governance</li> <li>• Natural resource management</li> <li>• Private sector development</li> </ul>	Policy articulation, Studies, Capacity building	100% Untied	n/a
4	Korea	USD 5 000 000 + USD 1 500 000 + USD 3 381 605 + USD 8 526 558 + USD 6 200 000	28 370 205	21 391 827	6 978 377	13 092 909	5%	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Infrastructure and natural resources</li> <li>• information and communication technology</li> <li>• knowledge sharing on Korea's economic development experience</li> <li>• human resources development</li> </ul>	Implementation of Korea-Africa Economic Cooperation (KOAPEC) Action Plan	100% Untied	n/a
5	China	USD 2 000 000	1 343 334	1101045	242 288	962 077	0%	• All sectors	Project identification, Preparation, Studies	90% Tied 10% Untied	USD 100,000

N°	Donor Country	Donor Currency	Total Funds (Received + not interest)	Cumulative Commitment	Total available for commitment UA	Cumulative Disbursement	(%) for Admin Fees	Sectors	Activities	Tied Nature	Max. Amt per Project
6	India	USD6 733 685	4 138 331	4 002 173	156 157	1 061 804	5%	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Infrastructure</li> <li>Private sector</li> <li>Information and Communication Technology</li> <li>Trade</li> <li>Science and Technology</li> </ul>	Technical Assistance, Capacity Building, Training, Seminars, Workshops, Consultation and Knowledge sharing on policy issues	100% Untied	n/a
7	Japan Policy and Human Resources Development Grant (PHRDG)	JPY 2 336 393 740	15 899 460	13 316 380	2 383 079	12 728 385	2%	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Trade and Customs +social Business</li> </ul> Education (work Programme agreed in TICAD V)	Analytical work, Capacity Building and Workshops	100% Untied	n/a
8	Norway	NOK 21 000 000	2 061 450	950 079	1 111 371	750 476	5%	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Gender and provision of Technical Assistants</li> </ul> balance earmarked for AWIB	Consultancy services and provision of Technical Assistants	100% Untied	n/a
9	Portugal	Euro 2 000 000	2 096 832	1 306 139	790 693	1 104 485	5%	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Private sector development</li> <li>Infrastructure</li> <li>Renewable Energy and Energy Efficiency</li> <li>Good governance and Capacity building</li> <li>Agriculture</li> <li>Water</li> <li>Promotion of Portuguese language in the Bank's operations</li> </ul>	Project cycle activities including pre-feasibility and feasibility studies, Capacity building and human resource development, policy and sector studies, institution and policy dialogue	100% Untied	n/a
10	Finnish Consultancy Trust Fund II	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>1st Contribution Euro 851 492</li> <li>2nd Contribution Euro 1 130 000</li> <li>3rd Contribution Euro 1 350 000</li> <li>4th Contribution Euro 10 000 000</li> <li>5th Contribution Euro 48 000</li> <li>6th Contribution Euro 600 000</li> <li>7th Contribution Euro 1 042 000</li> </ul>	12 909 771	11 703 744	1 206 026	6 498 000	5%	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Environment</li> <li>Climate Change Adptation and Mitigation</li> <li>Science and Technology related to Renewable and Clean Energy</li> <li>Forestry Management</li> <li>Water and Irrigation</li> <li>Education</li> </ul>	Studies, Technical Assistance	100% Untied	n/a
11	Sweden	SEK 50977894	5 086 118	4 892 138	193 980	4 880 791	2%	All sectors	Earmarked for Private Sector Strategy	100% Untied	n/a
12	Italy	Euro2 783 573	2 964 568	2 929 237	35 330	1 584 302	2%	Risk Mitigation	Fully earmarked for IRMA	100% Untied	n/a
13	France	Euro 3 350 000	3 699 478	3 240 044	459 432	2 599 193	2%	All sectors	Studies, Technical Assistance	100% Untied	n/a
14	Switzerland	CHF 5 576 413	4 061 747	3 773 346	288 400	3 654 527		Resources available only for the payment of TA position		100% Untied	n/a
<b>Total</b>			<b>116 034 173</b>	<b>92 405 180</b>	<b>23 628 994</b>	<b>67 138 094</b>					

## ANNEX 8: OVERVIEW OF ONLINE SURVEYS

### Introduction

Three online surveys were conducted as part of the evaluation of the TCA:

- A survey of participants of the AfDB's training for Task Managers on climate change issues through the University of Cambridge Programme for Sustainability Leaders (CPSL). Its purpose was to: (a) understand how activities implemented under the TCA added value to Bank staff; and (b) provide additional data for a VfM assessment of climate change activities funded under the TCA.
- A survey of participants of the AfDB's Inception Workshop on Efforts to Mitigate Climate Change in Africa. Its purpose was to understand how activities implemented under the TCA add value to Bank member country officials.
- A survey of perceptions of AfDB and DFID staff involved in the direct management and supervision of the TCA. Its purpose was to understand staff perceptions of TCA performance and of the AfDB-DFID partnership.

These surveys are briefly described here and raw data is provided.

### Overview of Surveys

A summary of design, implementation dates, target groups, response-rates and gender-disaggregation of the surveys is given below.

	Design	Date Implemented	Target group	Respondents and response	Gender-disaggregated
<b>Survey of participants of the AfDB's training for Task Managers on climate change issues through the University of Cambridge Programme for Sustainability Leaders (CPSL)</b>	Questions were aligned with project document and to verify whether objectives set were deemed met by participants	March 2014	AfDB staff members who participated in the training	25 requested to respond; 14 responses	Yes
<b>Survey of perceptions of AfDB and DFID staff involved in the direct management</b>	Questions were designed to allow free expression of discontent if not already	March 2014	AfDB and DFID staff members who were involved in TCA management and	5 requested to respond; 4 responses	No

<b>and supervision of the TCA</b>	captured during interviews		supervision		
<b>Survey of participants of the AfDB's Inception Workshop on Efforts to Mitigate Climate Change in Africa</b>	Questions were aligned with project document and to verify whether objectives set were deemed met by participants	March 2014	Experts and representative from regional member states who were involved in climate change negotiations	24 requested to respond; 5 responses	Yes

## Raw Data

### Survey of participants of the AfDB's training for Task Managers on climate change issues through the University of Cambridge Programme for Sustainability Leaders (CPSL)

Start Date	End Date	IP Address	Are you male or female?	What was your job title and department at the time of the Cambridge training?	How long have you been with the AfDB?	The training was highly relevant to my work at the Bank	The training raised my understanding of climate change issues	The training gave me the confidence to discuss climate change with other stakeholders in the Bank	The training helped me identify tangible actions I could take to mainstream climate change within the Bank	I used what I learnt from the training in my subsequent work at the Bank	Compared to other training programmes I have participated in, the Cambridge training was...	I recommend the Cambridge training to other colleagues	I recommend the training to Senior Management (yes/no - and if yes, please explain why)
03/18/2014	03/18/2014	197.242.170.75	Female	Principal Renewable Energy Engineer	1-5 years	I agree	I agree	I agree	Yes	Yes	Good	Yes	Because buy in for further training activities starts from the top. Implementation is made easier when management understands the real issues it is also good for them to be aware of what is happening out there and to be able to have a clearer vision
03/18/2014	03/18/2014	196.203.216.99	Female	Climate Change Expert, Quality Assurance and Results Department	1-5 years	I agree	I agree	I agree	Yes	Yes	Good	Yes	Yes, it will help them think about how the institution can creatively, effectively and consistently contribute to the dialogue on climate change issues and also take concrete

													action to address climate change impacts within the institutions areas of influence.
03/17/2014	03/17/2014	196.203.216.130	Male	Chief Urban Development Officer Transport & ICT Department	1-5 years	I agree	I agree	I agree	Yes	Yes	Excellent	Yes	YES But this should be more focused on strategic challenges and rationale to take action, than technical issues, for Senior Management.
03/17/2014	03/17/2014	196.203.216.130	Male	Chief Power Engineer	1-5 years	I agree	I agree	I agree	No	Yes	Excellent	Yes	no
03/17/2014	03/17/2014	196.203.216.130	Female	Senior Climate Change Specialist, Climate Change Coordination Committee	1-5 years	I agree	I agree	I agree	Yes	Yes	Excellent	Yes	Yes; as this will go a long way in facilitating the much needed mind-set shift required to carry out climate change interventions within the institution at the requisite level.
03/11/2014	03/11/2014	196.203.216.99	Male	Chief Quality Assurance Officer, ORQR.2	1-5 years	I agree	I agree	I agree	Yes	Yes	Excellent	Yes	Yes. The training was excellent. It is important that all Senior Management are sensitized on climate change issues.
03/10/2014	03/10/2014	197.254.3.233	Male	Senior Economist EARC	6-10 years	I agree	I agree	I agree	Yes	Yes	Excellent	Yes	Yes. This training addresses one of the fundamental challenges facing Africa today. In this regard, it is important that Senior Management is well versed in the current thinking

													around this challenge and options to address it.
03/10/2014	03/10/2014	196.203.216.130	Male	Senior Water and Sanitation Engineer, OWAS	1-5 years	I agree	I agree	I agree	No	Yes	Excellent	Yes	Yes. We need management's buy-in and support in order to make difference in the Bank's operation. I strongly believe Bank management, especially managers and directors need to be sensitized through this one week training. There is also a need to train critical mass of staff. Given the quality of the Cambridge training and calibre of the trainers, the idea of "training of trainers" would not work.
03/10/2014	03/10/2014	196.203.216.130	Male	ONEC-Environment Officer	1-5 years	I agree	I disagree	I disagree	Yes	Yes	Good	Yes	Specially to: 1- Senior Management 2- People who are reluctant about CC
03/07/2014	03/07/2014	196.203.216.99	Male	Chief Safeguard Policy Officer	1-5 years	I agree	I agree	I agree	Yes	Yes	Excellent	Yes	World-class leaders in business, academic and government are involved in shaping the agenda and interacting with the group.
03/07/2014	03/07/2014	41.215.181.185	Male	Chief Fisheries Expert	Over 15 years	I agree	I agree	I agree	Yes	Yes	Excellent	Yes	Yes. Bring them more confidence to discuss cc issues with partners, and

03/07/2014	03/07/2014	197.254.3.233	Male	Climate Change Officer, ORQR.3	1-5 years	I agree	I agree	I agree	Yes	Yes	Excellent	Yes	to integrate it in the implementation agenda of the Bank Ten-Year Strategy. Yes. Senior Management needs to understand the urgency and scale of the climate challenge for development, particularly in Africa where the impacts are already being felt.
03/07/2014	03/07/2014	196.203.216.130	Male	Chief Agricultural Economist - Land	6-10 years	I agree	I agree	I agree	Yes	Yes	Excellent	Yes	Yes - Management needs to understand the nature and magnitude of climate change impacts so as to appreciate and subsequently allocate adequate resources for adaptation and mitigation activities
03/07/2014	03/07/2014	196.203.216.130	Female	Senior climate change specialist	1-5 years	I agree	I disagree	I agree	Yes	Yes	Excellent	Yes	Yes - the issue of "how much we can change things within the Bank" has been discussed extensively during the training, and all staff mentioned that there is no point in training staff if Management does not lead/guide/understand and CC issues. We have been told that other MDBs have sent their

Management in training and this is what can make a difference.

## **Survey of perceptions of AfDB and DFID staff involved in the direct management and supervision of the TCA**

Data withheld for confidentiality reasons.

## Survey of participants of the AfDB's Inception Workshop on Efforts to Mitigate Climate Change in Africa

Start Date	End Date	IP Address	Are you male or female?	At the Panama workshop, I was...	The workshop was highly relevant to my work on climate change	The workshop raised my understanding of Nationally Appropriate Mitigation Actions (NAMAs)	The workshop gave me an overview of the current policy debates around NAMAs	The workshop helped me understand current NAMA development in Africa, particularly regional differences and sector specificities	I used what I learnt from the workshop in my subsequent work	Compared to other workshops I have participated in, the AfDB inception workshop on NAMAs was	I would like to see more AfDB workshops and work on NAMAs
03/12/2014	03/12/2014	41.138.50.169	Male	An African negotiator and delegate	I agree		I agree	Yes	No	About the same	Yes
03/11/2014	03/11/2014	41.214.121.56	Male	An African negotiator and delegate	I agree	I agree	I agree	Yes	Yes	Excellent	Yes
03/11/2014	03/11/2014	213.136.102.2	Male	An African negotiator and delegate	I agree	I agree	I agree	Yes	Yes	Excellent	Yes
03/11/2014	03/11/2014	197.255.233.91	Female	A designated National Authority representative	I agree	I agree	I agree	Yes	Yes	Excellent	Yes
03/11/2014	03/11/2014	41.159.145.98	Male	A designated National Authority representative	I agree	I agree	I agree	Yes	Yes	Good	Yes

## ANNEX 9: VFM ASSESSMENTS


### Annex 9.1: Value for Money Assessment – Integrated Training Programme on Climate Change

#### 1. DATA

##### 1.1. Programme description

The training program at The University of Cambridge Programme for Sustainability Leadership (CPSL) provides the Bank's relevant departments with guidance on needs and means for integrating environmental concerns and climate change measures. It supplements the M&E Framework for

the Climate Change Action Plan and the Climate Change Safeguard System by providing: (a) General orientation for the Bank's Task Managers on climate change issues and provide practical tools and guiding questions to structure the actions to be taken; and (b) training of trainers on different climate change issues (adaptation, mitigation and finance) related to the key sectors e.g. water, energy, agriculture forests and health. The training is customized to address some of the Bank's major concerns related to the implementation of the CCAP and the Ten Years Strategy (TYS); both require the recruitment of new staff and training of existing ones. A total of 27 Bank staff (12 in 2012 and 15 in 2014), in addition to the Climate Change Task Manager, have gone through the CPSL training.



## Outputs and Results of the Integrated Training Programme on Climate Change

	Intended	Actual
<b>Outputs</b>	<p>A training program to be held in a highly reputable institution for professional staff who have responsibility related to addressing climate change in different fields e.g. water, agriculture, energy, health, finance and procurement.</p> <p>Training of trainers to train a number of the Bank staff drawn from key climate change-relevant departments, in order to contribute to the on-going efforts of building the capacity of the Bank staff as well as the RMCs and ensure sustainability of the program.</p> <p>A training package for future use in capacity development.</p>	<p>Training program at The University of Cambridge Programme for Sustainability Leadership (CPSL) provides guidance on needs and means for integrating environmental concerns and climate change measures.</p> <p>Included in the training of 12 + 15 Bank staff members from different departments in 2012 and 2014.</p> <p>Provided.</p>
<b>Results</b>	<p>Improve the knowledge of Bank staff about climate change and its consequences</p> <p>Provide a good understanding of the international and regional climate change agreements, policies and programmes</p> <p>Appreciate the urgent need for adaptation in Africa and the means to minimise risk, build resilience and maximise business opportunities</p> <p>Understand and appreciate the key drivers towards a low carbon economy and the implications for development</p> <p>Provide insights through the use of examples and case studies from other regions and organisations</p>	<p>Based on available evaluations and surveys, all results assessed to have been achieved for 12 + 15 Bank staff.</p>

### 1.2. Costs

Cost Items	Qualitative Assessment	Cost (GBP)
<b>Programme costs</b>	Fair	166,300.00
<b>Administrative</b>		
- Set up	Limited	N/A
- Roll-out	Significant	85,000.00*
- Operational	N/A	N/A
- M&E	Outsourced to contractor	N/A
<b>Other</b>		
- Personal costs	N/A	N/A
- Institutional costs	Limited	N/A

\* Figures from “Justification for a 2<sup>nd</sup> Edition of the Integrated training Program to support the integration of climate change issues into the Bank’s policies and operations” (no date)

### **1.3. Inputs**

With TCA funding, Bank procured supplier services for the delivery of the six-day training of trainers. Supplier designed and delivered course, including inputs from 17 experts for course delivery. Supplier also provided venue, meals, course material, and excursions. Bank identified staff to participate in course, procured flight tickets and financed accommodation for Bank staff. Bank also financed follow-up for first course, including the procurement of a TCA funded second iteration of the course, alongside the identification of staff to participate and procurement of flights/accommodation for Bank staff to participate in course. Trained Bank staff organized and delivered awareness-raising for an estimated 50 other staff members on climate change issues.

### **1.4. Process**

Activities include:

1. Procurement by Bank with TCA funds of CPSL training for Bank staff
2. Contracting by Bank of CPSL for first training of Bank staff in 2012
3. Engagement of Bank Task Manager with CPSL to support customization of training of Bank staff
4. Identification by Bank’s Directors and Task Manager of Bank staff to participate in CPSL training
5. Engagement of CPSL with the identified staff to improve the design of the program and tailor it to their needs and interests
6. Complete the design by CPSL of customized training for Bank staff
7. Procurement by Bank of Bank participant flights and accommodation arrangements in Cambridge
8. Delivery by CPSL of customized training for Bank staff
9. Evaluation by CPSL of customized training for Bank staff
10. Negotiation by Bank Task Manager and TCA Fund Manager with DFID for funding to deliver a second CPSL training for Bank staff
11. Contracting by Bank of CPSL for second training of Bank staff in 2012
12. Engagement of Bank Task Manager with CPSL to support the review of first training to deliver second training to Bank staff
13. Revised design by CPSL of customized second training for Bank staff
14. Identification by Bank Task Manager of Bank staff to participate in second CPSL training
15. Procurement by Bank of Bank participant flights and accommodation arrangements in Cambridge
16. Delivery by CPSL of second customized training for Bank staff
17. Internal awareness-raising activities carried out by trained Bank staff for 50 colleagues in other departments (see figure below from Inter-Office Memorandum, 19 December 2012)

Who	What	Timeframe
Uzoamaka and Richard	Develop Back to Office Report (BTOR) outline – this should include responsible staff by section.	Week commencing 26/11/2012
Olufunso	To develop a plan for contributing to knowledge work in the fields of climate policy and sustainability within the Bank.	Week commencing 10/12/12
Salami & Richard	To suggest a climate change theme for the next African Economic Outlook publication.	Next Year
Balgis	To organise a feedback seminar on the Cambridge Training as well as COP18	Week commencing 10/12/2012
Sebastian	Develop a critical mass of staff to take the climate change agenda forward – to consult with the training participants and develop recommendations.	On-going and recommendations to be included in the Back to Office Report
Ignacio	Develop cross sectoral Global Environment Facility Projects and to engage more with Regional Directors.	3 Projects to be developed during 2013
Mwila and Elizabeth	Organise a 2013 Environment Day Activity at the Bank	June 5, 2013
Mwila and Uzoamaka	Develop and contribute to a blog on sustainability. The participants and other staff would also be encouraged to blog.	On-going
Elizabeth	To pursue plans that will help make the headquarters building in Abidjan a green one.	On-going
All	"Just do it!"	On-going

## 1.5. Benefits

Benefit type	Specified Results Framework	in Actual
<b>Outputs</b>	N/A	Two customised 6-day training of trainers for 27 Bank staff at Cambridge
<b>Outcome</b>	N/A	27 Bank staff members trained in adaptation, mitigation and finance 50 other Bank staff sensitized in climate change issues by trained cohort
<b>Impact</b>	N/A	Increased sensitivity in Bank to climate change adaptation, mitigation and finance
<b>Other</b>	N/A	Creation of strategic relationships among Bank staff sensitized to climate change and with experts who delivered the training

## 2. ANALYSIS

### 2.1. Economy and Efficiency

Point in VfM Chain	Observations
<b>Economy</b> Are we minimizing programme input costs in different programme areas?	Delivery of one training of trainers to 27 Bank staff, rather than two training of trainers to 12 and 15 Bank staff would have reduced costs. However, it would have not been possible to send a 27 staff member to go for one-week training without impacting the Bank's operations.
<b>Efficiency</b> Are we over/under-spending on overall costs of delivering the programme?	Over-spending may have occurred with the delivery of two trainings, instead of one. However, gains in quality from the first training to the second are likely; along with sensitizing a new cohort of Bank staff, who may be new to their positions.

Caveats: Proposals for programme implementation from other potential providers were not available.

## 2.2. Cost-efficiency

Cost-efficiency	Observations
<b>Ratio of costs</b> Ratio of administrative costs to total costs	Given the incompleteness of cost data, a ratio of 0.66 has limited significance
<b>Unit costs against international benchmarks</b> Unit costs (total cost per trained Bank staff) Unit costs (total cost per Bank staff subsequently sensitized) Comparative unit costs	GBP9,307/trained Bank staff GBP5,026/sensitized Bank staff N/A – however, unit cost estimated as comparatively high

## 2.3. Cost-effectiveness

Cost-effectiveness	Observations
<b>Cost per measure of outcome</b>	Even if the post-training survey (2012 and 2014) conducted for this evaluation is representative and accurate, it is difficult to provide a cost per measure of outcome. It can be stated, however, that the cost for each trained Bank staff delivered a high level of perceived benefit – and outcomes for the Bank.
<b>Cost-effectiveness drivers</b>	Cost-effectiveness will be bolstered as trained Bank staff members deliver further in-house awareness-raising and training to colleagues. Data on planned awareness-raising is unavailable. The list of participants indicates appropriate targeting of Bank staff (sectors, job titles) selected for the training – which enhances cost-effectiveness of the programme.

### Notes:

Evaluation report prepared by contractor (2012) scored the training learning experience as “excellent” and “very good”.

In a post-training survey (for the 2012 and 2014 trainings), conducted for the TCA evaluation and answered by 14 respondents:

- 100% of respondents found the training to be highly relevant to their work at the Bank
- 87% felt the training raised their understanding of climate change issues
- 92% felt the training had raised their confidence to discuss climate change issues with their colleagues in the Bank
- 85% had identified tangible measures to mainstream climate change in the Bank following the training
- 100% had used what they learnt from the training in their work
- 100% recommended the training to senior management

Caveats: A key data weakness inherent in the above analysis is limited understanding of the knowledge point of departure of participating Bank staff members.

### **3. CONCLUSIONS**

The Integrated Training Programme on Climate Change targeted 27 Bank staff members for two training of trainers events at Cambridge University in 2012 and 2014. Data is incomplete (no results framework, limited cost breakdown, etc.), but a number of documents were made available for the VfM assessment, which enable a qualitative assessment of value for money of the programme. In addition, a post-event survey of 14 participants was carried out as part of this evaluation.

Key conclusions are:

- Economy and efficiency gains for the project could have been made by having one training for 27 Bank staff as opposed to two trainings for 12 and 15 staff, respectively. It is clear, however, that if this was done, it would have impacted Bank operations. No competing proposals were reviewed, which limits insights on economy.
- Available data and extrapolation sets the unit cost at GBP9,307/Bank staff trained and GBP5,026/Bank staff sensitised. No comparative international unit costs were accessible. However, this unit cost is considered by the evaluator as quite high from an efficiency perspective.
- It is not possible to determine the cost per measure of outcome. However, the available evaluation report (2012) and a survey conducted of trainees (2012 and 2014) indicates a high percentage of outcome achievement.
- The appropriate targeting of Bank staff for training participation is seen as contributing towards cost-effectiveness. The subsequent awareness-raising activities carried out by trained Bank staff for their colleagues increases cost-effectiveness further.
- The programme has created a network among the participants and with the CPSL program.
- With caveats associated to data weaknesses, the programme is seen as having delivered value for money.

## Annex 9.2: Value for Money Assessment – TCA-Funded Financial Management Reforms

### 1. DATA


#### 1.1. Programme description

The Bank's financial management mission is to help build effective and efficient public financial management systems that reduce corruption, deter fraud and waste. This in turn will facilitate sustainable economic growth, help reduce poverty and improve the delivery quality public services. For this to

happen, it is essential that the Bank as sound fiduciary arrangements ranging from an appropriate regulatory framework, good policies, and effective public financial management systems that promote transparency and accountability throughout the budget or project cycle. TCA support to Bank Financial Management Reforms is focused on: (a) the production of comprehensive reports on generic financial management challenges faced by the Bank in its operations. The exercise will be based on a review of the current Bank financial management literature, the tools and techniques being employed by programmes and projects, lessons learned, and emerging "best" practices in the promotion and support of sound financial management throughout the Bank's borrowing Regional Member Countries (RMCs); and (b) the preparation of several policy documents, manuals, frameworks and guidance notes. Specifically, these are:

1. A Financial Management Policy Document
2. A Financial Management Practice Manual
3. A Financial Management Manual for Borrowers
4. A revised version of the Bank's "Guidelines For Financial Management And Financial Analysis Of Projects"
5. Country fiduciary risk assessment framework
6. A Guidance Note to Assess the Capacity of Supreme Audit Institutions (AFROSAI)
7. A Bank Strategy for the Use of Country FM Systems

TCA funding for Financial Management Reforms is part of a broader package of TCA support for ORPF's reform initiatives, which aim to contribute to ensuring that the proceeds of any financing made or guaranteed by the Bank are used for the



purposes intended in an economic and efficient manner. The objectives of this larger TCA support package are to strengthen the Bank’s internal structure and capacity to perform its Procurement and Financial Management (FM) fiduciary functions for projects; streamline policies, processes and instruments; and augment client capacity, enhance partnership and improve outreach, and thereby, improve service delivery while minimizing fiduciary risk and enhancing accountability.

### **Outputs and Results of the Financial Management Reforms project**

	<b>Intended</b>	<b>Actual</b>
<b>Outputs</b>	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> <li>1. A Financial Management Policy Document</li> <li>2. A Financial Management Practice Manual</li> <li>3. A Financial Management Manual for Borrowers</li> <li>4. A revised version of the Bank’s “Guidelines For Financial Management And Financial Analysis Of Projects”</li> <li>5. Country fiduciary risk assessment framework</li> <li>6. A Guidance Note to Assess the Capacity of Supreme Audit Institutions (AFROSAI)</li> <li>7. A Bank Strategy for the Use of Country FM Systems</li> </ol>	<p>Completed (February 2014)</p> <p>Completed (April 2014)</p> <p>Not available</p> <p>Completed (April 2014). “Financial Management Implementation Guidelines For Bank Group Funded Operations”</p> <p>Completed (April 2014)</p> <p>Not available</p> <p>Completed (February 2014) “Promoting the Use of Country Public Financial Management (PFM) Systems”</p>
<b>Results</b>	<p>Bank-wide quality assurance mechanism set-up to ensure FM functions in Bank operations are carried out in accordance with international standards and best practices</p> <p>Number of available FM materials for use by Bank and Borrowers’ Staff</p> <p>Percentage of Bank projects and programmes running with new FM arrangements</p>	<p>Completed project outputs are in different stages of Bank Board approval</p> <p>Upon Board approval of project outputs, these will be made available on Bank website</p> <p>Data unavailable, but presumed to still be at 0% until Board approves project outputs</p>

## 1.2. Costs

Cost Items	Qualitative Assessment	Cost (GBP)
<b>Programme costs</b>		163,843.00
<b>Administrative</b>		
- Set up	Limited	N/A
- Roll-out	Significant	N/A
- Operational	Significant	N/A
- M&E	Limited	N/A
<b>Other</b>		
- Personal costs	N/A	N/A
- Institutional costs	N/A	N/A

## 1.3. Inputs

Bank staff developed a proposal for the TCA, which included support for Financial Management reforms activities. With TCA funding, the Bank procured the services of three individual consultants (Peter Talbot, Norman Flynn, and Olaseni Moraino)<sup>11</sup> to prepare documents (Financial management Policy; Financial management Manual (for the use of AfDB Borrowers); Country Fiduciary Risk Assessment Diagnostic Tool; Strategy Note on the Use of Country PFM systems; Supreme Audit Institutions Capacity Assessment Diagnostic; Financial management Manual (for the use of Bank FM specialists); and Financial Management Guidelines) and revise the Bank Audit Reports Monitoring System. Allocated Task Managers supervised and closely guided the consultants, and provided substantive inputs into the reports. Several documents were peer-reviewed during a workshop by several Bank staff members. Task Managers also facilitated the Bank approval and adoption process of documents produced.

## 1.4. Process

Activities include:

1. Integration by Bank staff of a Financial Management reform component into the broader ORPF reform support package submitted to the TCA
2. Procurement by Bank of three consultants to prepare key financial management documents and revise Bank Audit Reports Monitoring System
3. Engagement by two Bank Task Managers with consultants on document preparation, including feedback on drafts, etc
4. Organisation by Bank of Bank peer review workshop for selected Financial Management reform documents
5. Procurement by Bank of Bank staff flights and accommodation for peer review workshop
6. Participation of Bank staff in peer review workshop
7. Reporting by Bank Task Managers on progress to TCA

---

<sup>11</sup> The project used one more consultant (un-named) whose contract was terminated due to poor performance.

8. Engagement by Bank staff in finalization of documents, along with process management for adoption of documents by Bank

## 1.5. Benefits

Benefit type	Specified in Results Framework	Actual
<b>Outputs</b>		
Number of available FM materials for use by Bank and Borrowers' staff	7	5*
<b>Outcome</b>		
Percentage of Bank projects and programmes running with new FM arrangements	100%	N/A**
<b>Impact</b>		
Effective and efficient public financial management systems that reduce corruption, deter fraud and waste	N/A	N/A
<b>Other</b>	N/A	

\* Evaluator is unable to find these on AfDB website. Further documents are currently being finalized.

\*\* Readiness Reviews were not accessible to evaluator.

## 2. ANALYSIS

### 2.1. Economy and Efficiency

Point in VfM Chain	Observations
<b>Economy</b> Are we minimizing programme input costs in different programme areas?	Insufficient data to draw conclusions on economy. TOR available for one consultant; fees provided are reasonable and services rendered deemed satisfactory by the Task Manager
<b>Efficiency</b> Are we over/under-spending on overall costs of delivering the programme?	As above. However: (a) delays in procurement may have resulted in losing the best consultants for the tasks required; (b) one consultant resigned due to Arab Spring developments in Tunis during 2011; (c) fees paid by the AfDB for consultants are broadly aligned to what is paid by other IFIs and multilateral agencies.

Caveats: TOR for other consultants, estimates of days per deliverable, and CVs of consultants were unavailable.

## 2.2. Cost-efficiency

Cost-efficiency	Observations
<b>Ratio of costs</b> Ratio of administrative costs to total costs	$\alpha$ ratio cannot be calculated given insufficient data
<b>Unit costs against international benchmarks</b> Unit cost (total cost per document)	GBP11,972.80/document (Peter Talbot); GBP19,192.50/document (Norman Flynn); and GBP44,194.00/system revamp (Olaseni Muraino) *(This is a blunt assessment that does not look at the scale or complexity of the tasks undertaken)
Comparative unit costs	N/A

Caveats: As in Section 2.1.

## 2.3. Cost-effectiveness

Cost-effectiveness	Observations
<b>Cost per measure of outcome</b>	Insufficient data available. During the course of the project (2010-2014), the AfDB has awarded USD8,511,470,237 in contracts.*
<b>Cost-effectiveness drivers</b>	Cost-effectiveness is determined by Bank roll-out of Financial Management policy and guidelines.

\* Data accessed from <http://www.afdb.org/documents/document/listing-of-awarded-contracts-as-at-16-january-2014-20098/>

Caveats: Readiness reviews were not accessible to the evaluator. It is not possible to assess percentage of Bank projects and programmes running with new FM arrangements with available data.

## 3. CONCLUSIONS

The TCA funded Financial Management Reforms project was for the preparation of six documents (policy, guidance, manuals) and revision of one. Over the course of

implementation, there were some adjustments to the envisaged deliverables. The project itself fits within a broader strategy for procurement reform – and a broader set of related TCA-funded activities. The project is outlined in a results framework and there are several progress and financial reports that explain project implementation and challenges. There is, however, insufficient available data to complete a VfM assessment. Nonetheless, the following conclusions are drawn:

- The project is a key component of broader procurement reforms. It is relatively well-articulated and consistent with the overall procurement reform strategy.
- Procurement is an area that fundamentally affects overall Bank performance and its ability to deliver on its mandate. TCA targeting of procurement as a sector for support was and is appropriate.
- Although it is not possible to complete a VfM assessment, it seems intuitively clear that the development of financial management policy/guidance documents makes good investment-sense, considering the size of Bank annual contracting.

## **ANNEX 10: LIST OF INTERVIEWEES**

### **African Development Bank**

Cecile Ambert  
Principal Strategy Officer  
Private Sector and Microfinance  
Department

Dr Balgis Osman-Elasha  
Principal Climate Change Officer ORQR

Rees Mwasambili  
Senior Water and Sanitation Engineer  
OWAS

Florian Theus  
Private Sector Development Officer  
North Africa Regional Department –  
ORNA

Cecil Nartey  
PECOD

Isaac Lobe Ndoumbe  
Director, Governance Department

Chioma Onukogu  
Former TCA Manager  
FRMB

Tanja Faller  
Senior Energy Economist  
ONEC

Etienne Nkoa  
Chief Financial Management Specialist  
Fiduciary Services Division – Policy  
(ORPF.0)

Kalayu Gebre-Selassie  
Principal Governance Expert  
Governance, Economic and Financial  
Reforms Department

Moctar Hassane  
Chief Regional Procurement Coordinator  
CMFO / ORPF1

### **Department for International Development**

Duncan Hart,  
Policy Adviser  
International Financial Institutions Dept

Zoe Hensby  
Private Sector Adviser  
Middle East and North Africa Dept

Allan Scarrott  
Programme Officer  
Africa Regional Dept

Geraldine Murphy  
Senior Private Sector Adviser  
Africa Regional Department

Paula Barrett  
Policy Officer  
International Financial Institutions Dept

Cath Duric  
Arab Partnership Policy Officer  
Middle East and North Africa Dept

Gareth Martin  
Climate Change Adviser  
Africa Regional Dept

Richard Teuten  
Head, International Financial Institutions  
Dept

Drew Tetlow,  
Governance Adviser  
Africa Regional Dept

Tanweena Chowdhury  
Governance Adviser  
Conflict Humanitarian and Security Dept  
(formerly Africa Regional Dept)

Sarah Cooper  
Chief Governance Officer  
Governance Department

Vinay Sharma  
Director  
Procurement and Fiduciary Services  
Department

Frederik Teufel  
Fragile States Department

Aymen Ali  
Transport Department (OITC)

Richard Schiere  
Chief Results Officer  
Quality Assurance and Results  
Department

Cam Do  
Governance, Economics and Financial  
Reforms Department

Desire Vencatachellum  
Director, FRMB

Shingo Kikuchi  
TCA Manager  
FRMB

## ANNEX 11: TCA RESULTS FRAMEWORK

PROJECT NAME									
AfDB-DFID Technical Cooperation Arrangement									
IMPACT	Impact Indicator 1		Baseline	Milestone 1 (2011)	Milestone 2 (2012)	Milestone 3 (2013)	Target (2015)		
Poverty Reduction in Africa.	Percentage of people living on less than \$1.25 purchasing power parity (2005 PPP) per day	Planned	57.9% (1999)	52.3% (2005)	47.5% (2008)	none	42% (2015)		
		Achieved							
			Source						
			Statistical Annex: Millennium Development Goals, Targets and Indicators						
OUTCOME	Outcome Indicator 1		Baseline	Milestone 1 (2011)	Milestone 2 (2012)	Milestone 3 (2013)	Target (2014)	Assumptions	
AfDB is a more effective, results orientated and responsive development institution.	% of AfDB partners and donors rating the AfDB's overall internal effectiveness as 'very effective'	Planned	24 (2009)	none	27	none	35	AfDB leadership committed to continue improving organisational performance and resources appropriately.  African governments committed and able to finance and drive development in their countries.  Other development agencies and the	
		Achieved							
			Source						
		Multilateral Organisation Performance Assessment Network (MOPAN), Organisational Effectiveness Performance Assessment - African Development Bank. N.B. Baseline, milestones and the target are based on an average of the rating of the perception of overall internal or organisational effectiveness of AfDB as judged by Clients, Donors in country and Donors at HQ. <a href="http://www.mopanonline.org/">http://www.mopanonline.org/</a>							
	AfDB partners' and donors' ratings of the AfDB's corporate focus on results	Planned	Adequate (2009)	none	Strong	none	Strong		
		Achieved							
			Source						

			MOPAN N.B. Successive MOPAN assessments provide scores based on different scales (e.g. 1-5 or 1-6) which means the raw scores cannot be compared. Baseline, milestones and the target are therefore based on the category that MOPAN assigned on the basis of the score achieved each year. <a href="http://www.mopanonline.org/">http://www.mopanonline.org/</a>					private sector provide resources needed for broad-based development.	
	<b>Outcome Indicator 3</b>		<b>Baseline</b>	<b>Milestone 1 (2011)</b>	<b>Milestone 2 (2012)</b>	<b>Milestone 3 (2013)</b>	<b>Target (2014)</b>	Economic and political stability.	
	% of AfDB country strategies approved with explicit baseline data, monitoring indicators, and clearly defined outcomes to be reached	<b>Planned</b>	19% have baseline data, 66% have incomplete baseline data, and 15% have no baseline data (2008)	69%	72%	75%	78%	No major continent-wide environmental disasters.	
		<b>Achieved</b>							
		<b>Source</b>							
		COMPAS Multilateral Development Banks' Common Performance Assessment System Report (annual reports) <a href="http://www.mfdr.org/COMPAS/index.html">http://www.mfdr.org/COMPAS/index.html</a>							
<b>INPUTS (£)</b>	<b>DFID (£)</b>		<b>Govt (£)</b>	<b>Other (£)</b>	<b>Total (£)</b>		<b>DFID SHARE (%)</b>		
	13000000		0	0	13000000		100%		
<b>INPUTS (HR)</b>	<b>DFID (FTEs)</b>								
	0.55								
<b>OUTPUT 1</b>	<b>Output Indicator 1.1</b>		<b>Baseline</b>	<b>Milestone 1 (2011)</b>	<b>Milestone 2 (2012)</b>	<b>Milestone 3 (2013)</b>	<b>Target (2014)</b>	<b>Assumption</b>	
Enhanced capacity of AfDB to deliver high	The value of national infrastructure investment approvals (millions of Units of Account or UA where the	<b>Planned</b>	1345 (2007)	2564	2750	2900	3150	AfDB and its partners' capacity to implement projects keep pace with	
		<b>Achieved</b>							
		<b>Source</b>							

quality and high priority infrastructure investment	value of 1 UA is approximately equivalent to US\$1.50)	Infrastructure Department Business Plan Reports						project approvals.  AfDB pays due attention to results on implementation of projects.  Strong corporate systems ensure disbursement delays subsequent to first disbursement are avoided.
	<b>Output Indicator 1.2</b>		<b>Baseline</b>	<b>Milestone 1 (2011)</b>	<b>Milestone 2 (2012)</b>	<b>Milestone 3 (2013)</b>	<b>Target (2014)</b>	
	Regional infrastructure investment approvals (UA millions)	<b>Planned</b>	141 (2007)	364	500	525	550	
		<b>Achieved</b>						
	<b>Source</b>							
		Infrastructure Department Business Plan Reports						
<b>IMPACT WEIGHTING</b>	<b>Output Indicator 1.3</b>		<b>Baseline</b>	<b>Milestone 1 (2011)</b>	<b>Milestone 2 (2012)</b>	<b>Milestone 3 (2013)</b>	<b>Target (2014)</b>	
25%	Time lapse between approval and 1st disbursement (months) for infrastructure projects	<b>Planned</b>	19.5 (2007)	15.5	14.5	13.5	12	
		<b>Achieved</b>						
		<b>Source</b>						
		Infrastructure Department Business Plan Reports, interviews with AfDB staff						<b>RISK RATING</b> medium
<b>INPUTS (£)</b>	<b>DFID (£)</b>		<b>Govt (£)</b>	<b>Other (£)</b>	<b>Total (£)</b>		<b>DFID SHARE (%)</b>	
	1500000		0	0	1500000		100	
<b>INPUTS (HR)</b>	<b>DFID (FTEs)</b>							
<b>OUTPUT 2</b>	<b>Output Indicator 2.1</b>		<b>Baseline</b>	<b>Milestone 1 (2011)</b>	<b>Milestone 2 (2012)</b>	<b>Milestone 3 (2013)</b>	<b>Target (2014)</b>	<b>Assumptions</b>
Improved AfDB capacity to define and pursue its governance agenda effectively	AfDB partners' and donors' ratings of AfDB strategic focus on good governance	<b>Planned</b>	adequate (2009)	none	adequate	none	strong	OSGE manages component effectively.
		<b>Achieved</b>						
		<b>Source</b>						
	MOPAN N.B. Successive MOPAN assessments provide scores based on different scales (e.g. 1-5 or 1-6) which means the raw scores cannot be compared. Baseline, milestones and the target are therefore based on the category that MOPAN assigned on the basis of the score achieved each year. <a href="http://www.mopanonline.org/">http://www.mopanonline.org/</a>							
	<b>Output Indicator 2.2</b>		<b>Baseline</b>	<b>Milestone 1 (2011)</b>	<b>Milestone 2 (2012)</b>	<b>Milestone 3 (2013)</b>	<b>Target (2014)</b>	

	Progress in effectively implementing AfDB strategy to support good economic governance	<b>Planned</b>	no strategy (2009)	AfDB is implementing Governance Strategic Directions (GCD) and Action Plan (2008-2012)	positive GSD mid-term review	GSD II approved	GSD II being implemented effectively	AfDB uses core budget to fund rollout of products after catalytic DFID funding ends.
		<b>Achieved</b>						OSGE work continues to have buy-in and to secure approvals from higher up in the Bank.
		<b>Source</b>						
		Governance Strategic Directions and Action Plan ( <i>Nb – baseline and target is a composite value judgement derived from a range of different indicators reflecting the effectiveness of the AfDB's GSD and Action Plan, review and follow up strategy and action plan</i> )						
<b>IMPACT WEIGHTING</b>		<b>RISK RATING</b>						
	20%	medium						
<b>INPUTS (£)</b>	<b>DFID (£)</b>		<b>Govt (£)</b>	<b>Other (£)</b>	<b>Total (£)</b>		<b>DFID SHARE (%)</b>	
	1500000		0	0	1500000		100	
<b>INPUTS (HR)</b>	<b>DFID (FTEs)</b>							
<b>OUTPUT 3</b>	<b>Output Indicator 3.1</b>		<b>Baseline</b>	<b>Milestone 1 (2011)</b>	<b>Milestone 2 (2012)</b>	<b>Milestone 3 (2013)</b>	<b>Target (2014)</b>	<b>Assumptions</b>
enhanced capability to support climate change adaptation and exploitation of low carbon growth opportunities	% of new projects classified as climate sensitive which become climate proofed	<b>Planned</b>	0% (2009)	none	none	none	100%	Insufficient senior management and operational department prioritisation of CRMA.
		<b>Achieved</b>						
		<b>Source</b>						
		Corporate reporting ( <i>AfDB Climate Risk Analysis Framework operational in 2010</i> )						
	<b>Output Indicator 3.2</b>		<b>Baseline</b>	<b>Milestone 1 (2011)</b>	<b>Milestone 2 (2012)</b>	<b>Milestone 3 (2013)</b>	<b>Target (2014)</b>	AfDB projected increase in staff capacity does not happen.
	% energy investment that is clean energy	<b>Planned</b>	not known (2009)	none	increased by 40%	none	increased by 60%	

								RMC willingness to explore renewable options.
		<b>Achieved</b>						<b>RISK RATING</b>
		<b>Source</b>						medium
		African Development Bank corporate reporting, interviews with bank staff						
<b>IMPACT WEIGHTING</b>								
20%								
<b>INPUTS (£)</b>	<b>DFID (£)</b>		<b>Govt (£)</b>	<b>Other (£)</b>	<b>Total (£)</b>		<b>DFID SHARE (%)</b>	
	1820000		0	0	1820000		100	
<b>INPUTS (HR)</b>	<b>DFID (FTEs)</b>							
<b>OUTPUT 4</b>	<b>Output Indicator 4.1</b>		<b>Baseline</b>	<b>Milestone 1 (2011)</b>	<b>Milestone 2 (2012)</b>	<b>Milestone 3 (2013)</b>	<b>Target (2014)</b>	<b>Assumptions</b>
Improved AfDB human resources and procurement capacity	Perceptions of the AfDB's donors and partners of its effectiveness in managing human resources	<b>Planned</b>	inadequate (2009)	none	adequate	none	adequate	HR: Staff respond positively to revised incentives and rewards for improved performance; Growth of the organisation is managed effectively; Remuneration and benefits remain sufficiently attractive for high-calibre existing/prospective
		<b>Achieved</b>						
	<b>Source</b>							
	MOPAN N.B. Successive MOPAN assessments provide scores based on different scales (e.g. 1-5 or 1-6) which means the raw scores cannot be compared. Baseline, milestones and the target are therefore based on the category that MOPAN assigned on the basis of the score achieved each year. <a href="http://www.mopanonline.org/">http://www.mopanonline.org/</a>							
	<b>Output Indicator 4.2</b>		<b>Baseline</b>	<b>Milestone 1 (2011)</b>	<b>Milestone 2 (2012)</b>	<b>Milestone 3 (2013)</b>	<b>Target (2014)</b>	
Gender Balance Index (percentage of professional staff that are female)		<b>Planned</b>	23% (2007)	none	30%	none	35%	
		<b>Achieved</b>						

		<b>Source</b>					employees
		AfDB Annual Report KPI					
	<b>Output Indicator 4.3</b>		<b>Baseline</b>	<b>Milestone 1 (2011)</b>	<b>Milestone 2 (2012)</b>	<b>Milestone 3 (2013)</b>	<b>Target (2014)</b>
	Time elapsed from approval to first disbursement (months)	<b>Planned</b>	13 (2009)	none	13	11	11
		<b>Achieved</b>					
							Procurement: Other parts of the AfDB produce sufficiently clear and rigorous terms of reference; Sanctions for non-compliance are clear, proportionate and are enforced; Appropriate levels of delegated authority to country offices; Effective internal communication and training re revised procurement procedures
<b>IMPACT WEIGHTING</b>		<b>Source</b>					<b>RISK RATING</b>
10%		Annual Development Effectiveness Review, African Development Bank					medium
<b>INPUTS (£)</b>	<b>DFID (£)</b>		<b>Govt (£)</b>	<b>Other (£)</b>	<b>Total (£)</b>		<b>DFID SHARE (%)</b>
	1500000		0	0	1500000		100
<b>INPUTS (HR)</b>	<b>DFID (FTEs)</b>						

<b>Output 5</b>	<b>Output Indicator 5.1</b>		<b>Baseline</b>	<b>Milestone 1 (2011)</b>	<b>Milestone 2 (2012)</b>	<b>Milestone 3 (2013)</b>	<b>Target (2014)</b>	<b>Assumptions</b>
infrastructure, social sector	Share of public and private operations having private	<b>Planned</b>	<10% (2010)	none	<10%	none	70.00%	No crisis event with high economic

and governance operations contribute to development of dynamic competitive private sectors	sector development (PSD) impact	<b>Achieved</b>						impact increasing governments' expenditure towards social safety nets and delaying private investment	
		<b>Source</b>							<b>RISK RATING</b>
		Readiness reviews, ADOA reports for NSO and regional operations							medium
<b>IMPACT WEIGHTING</b>									
25%									
<b>INPUTS (£)</b>	<b>DFID (£)</b>		<b>Govt (£)</b>	<b>Other (£)</b>	<b>Total (£)</b>	<b>DFID SHARE (%)</b>			
	2000000		0	0	2000000	100			
<b>INPUTS (HR)</b>	<b>DFID (FTEs)</b>								