Party Cooperation in a Results Perspective

Country Study: Ukraine
## Acronyms

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Acronym</th>
<th>Description</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>CIS</td>
<td>Centre Party International Foundation/ Centerpartiets Internationella Stiftels</td>
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<tr>
<td>DA</td>
<td>Democratic Alliance</td>
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<tr>
<td>ELDR</td>
<td>European Liberal Democrats</td>
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<td>EPP</td>
<td>European People’s Party</td>
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<td>IRI</td>
<td>International Republican Institute</td>
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<td>JHS</td>
<td>Jarl Hjalmarson Foundation/ Jarl Hjalmarson Stiftelsen</td>
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<tr>
<td>KAS</td>
<td>Konrad Adenauer Stiftung</td>
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<tr>
<td>KIC</td>
<td>Christian Democratic International Center/ Kristdemokratiskt Internationellt Center</td>
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<tr>
<td>LFA</td>
<td>Logical Framework Approach</td>
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<td>NDI</td>
<td>National Democratic Institute</td>
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<tr>
<td>OA</td>
<td>Social Democratic party district of Oskarshamn/ Oskarshamns Arbetarekommun</td>
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<tr>
<td>OU</td>
<td>People’s Union Our Ukraine</td>
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<tr>
<td>PAO</td>
<td>Swedish Party Affiliated Organisation</td>
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<tr>
<td>PES</td>
<td>Party of European Socialists</td>
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<tr>
<td>PNP</td>
<td>Party for Public Rule/ Partija Narodnij Porjadok</td>
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<tr>
<td>Palme Centre</td>
<td>Olof Palme International Center</td>
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<tr>
<td>SDPU</td>
<td>Social-Democratic Party of Ukraine</td>
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<tr>
<td>SEK</td>
<td>Swedish Crowns</td>
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<tr>
<td>Sida</td>
<td>Swedish International Development Cooperation Agency</td>
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<tr>
<td>Silc</td>
<td>Swedish International Liberal Center</td>
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<tr>
<td>SPU</td>
<td>Socialist Party of Ukraine</td>
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<tr>
<td>VP</td>
<td>Social Democratic Party District of Värmland</td>
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<tr>
<td>YEPP</td>
<td>Youth of the European People’s Party</td>
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## Appendix 2: The Party System of Ukraine

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1 Introduction

This report presents the findings of the country study on Ukraine, undertaken as an input to the evaluation of democracy support through Swedish party affiliated organisations (PAOs). The report is one of three country studies linked to the evaluation. The overall findings, conclusions and recommendations of the evaluation are presented in the main report.

The Swedish PAOs have been engaged in cooperation with Ukraine since the mid or late 1990s. In the period 2007/08 there was cooperation between the following organisations:1

- Center Party International Foundation (CIS) – People’s Union Our Ukraine (OU), Lviv
- Jarl Hjalmarson Foundation (JHS) – (OU)
- Christian Democratic International Center (KIC) – Democratic Alliance (DA)
- Palme Center (Olof Palme International Center) – Socialist Party of Ukraine (SPU)2
- Swedish International Liberal Center (Silc) – Party for Public Rule (PNP)

The study was undertaken from 30 August to 13 September 2009. The Team visited Kiev, Lviv, Kharkiv and Donetsk, and met with representatives of partner organisations and participants of the different activities. The Team also met with independent think-tanks, NGO representatives, international party foundations, the Swedish Embassy and others. A list of persons met is found in Appendix 1.

Each project is assessed with respect to effectiveness and relevance.3 The assessment of effectiveness is made against the specific objectives of each project, as described in project documents and interviews. The assessment of relevance draws on an analysis of the party system attached in Appendix 2. The report also presents observations made regarding side effects and sustainability, as well as lessons and other observations of interest. A summary of the main findings is presented in Chapter two. Findings in respect to the specific projects are presented in Chapters three to seven.

The evaluation team (the Team) consisted of Lennart Peck (team leader), Eva-Marie Kjellström, Dr. Taras Kuzio and Peter Sjöberg. We would like to thank everyone who has contributed to the study in various ways!

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1 Green Forum was engaged in cooperation with Ukraine between 1996 and 2005. One of its current regional projects also covers Ukraine, but this project has not been included in this evaluation.
2 The evaluation has looked at the projects at the central level, the cooperation between the Social Democratic Party District of Värmland and SPU Kiev as well as the between the Social Democratic party branch of Oskarshamn and SPU and SDPU, Kharkiv.
3 Effectiveness: the extent to which the development intervention’s objectives were achieved, or are expected to be achieved, taking into account their relative importance.
Relevance: The extent to which the objectives of a development intervention are consistent with beneficiaries’ requirements, country needs, global priorities and partners’ and donor’s policies.
Source: Glossary of Key Terms in Evaluation and Results Based management, Sida in cooperation with OECD/DAC, 2007.
2 Main Findings

2.1 The Context
Ukraine has been independent for less than 20 years and its party system is still young. The country has passed over semi-authoritarianism to a considerable degree of party pluralism but a number of weaknesses in the party system remain. Many parties are oligarchic and highly corrupt, serving as business platforms for certain groups or persons rather than as channels for citizen interests. Ideology plays a limited role and it is not uncommon that parties and politicians change factions in parliament. Party membership and internal democracy tend to be limited or nonexistent in most parties. Other problems include politicians’ lack of accountability to citizens and the distance between voters and politicians. The citizens’ have very low trust in parties and politicians. There is considerable party fragmentation; at the time of this evaluation, there were 167 registered parties, of which many only exist on paper. Parties also face problems of fragmentation internally.

2.2 Strategies and Approaches
The Swedish cooperation with Ukraine has been in the form of support to individual parties.4 This is based on the conviction that, by strengthening these parties, the party system as a whole and democracy will be strengthened.

Two parties, OU and SPU, have been supported on the grounds that they are established parties and considered by the PAOs to have a place in the Ukrainian party system. Two other organisations have been supported as alternatives to the established parties: PNP, registered as late as in March 2009 with support of Silc, and DA, an NGO that in the future may develop into a political party.

The Swedish PAOs have largely chosen their partner organisations on ideological grounds. For example, Silc’s support of PNP is based on the conviction that Ukraine needs a social-liberal party, while DA is supported because it shares the Christian democratic values of KIC. OU and SPU belong to the same European party groups as their Swedish counterparts, i.e. the European People’s Party (EPP) and Party of European Socialists (PES). And CIS, itself belonging to the European Liberal Democrats (ELDR), has described OU as a party with an (in Swedish terms) centrist ideology.

The cooperation can, with a few exceptions, be labelled as ‘capacity building’. At the centre of most projects is the transfer of Swedish knowledge and experiences in party building. Some projects aim at increasing the knowledge about, and contacts with, the European Union (EU) and NATO. Support has also been given to locally implemented capacity building in the form of training and seminars. There has in many cases been a mix of the above.

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4 To be more specific, three parties and one political youth organisation possibly transforming into a party in the future. As a group, they will here be referred to as ‘parties’.
In most projects, focus has been on strengthening the ‘base’ of parties, through training of members, strengthening of local branches etc.

In all projects, youth have been an important, or even primary, target group.

With respect to gender equality, the PAOs have stressed gender balance among project participants and usually succeeded rather well. Otherwise, the Team has observed few activities or measures addressing the issue of women’s participation in politics explicitly (the CIS-O-U gender seminar in Lviv, and gender being raised as one topic among others in PNP seminars are two exceptions).

2.3 Activities and Output

The activities have primarily consisted of:

- Competence building in Ukraine (with and without Swedish participation).
- Thematic seminars in Ukraine (with and without Swedish participation).
- Study visits and training in Sweden.
- Study visits to Brussels.
- International conferences.

Output during 2007-2008 can be summarized as follows:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>JHS-OU</th>
<th>One three-day conference in Europe for 10 participants held in Sweden.</th>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Five three-day study visits to Brussels (EU+NATO) for a total of 77 persons.</td>
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<td></td>
<td>One three-day study visit to Sweden focusing on local government, for 24 persons.</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Two one-day seminars in Ukraine on corruption with approximately 25 participants in each.</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Three three-day study visits to Sweden on the theme ‘campaign management’ for a total of 50 persons from Our Ukraine’s youth wing.</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Participation of eight persons in JHS’ summer school on ‘Principles of a Free Society’; four days.</td>
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<thead>
<tr>
<th>CIS-OU</th>
<th>A joint planning exercise based on the Logical Framework Approach (LFA) with 40 participants in Ukraine.</th>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>A two-day seminar for 42 persons on energy and the environment and coalition building.</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>A two-day seminar for 43 persons on local government.</td>
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<td></td>
<td>A two-day seminar for 25 persons on communication and media.</td>
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<td></td>
<td>A two-day seminar for 31 persons on gender equality.</td>
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<td></td>
<td>A two-day seminar for 20 persons on local government and environmental protection.</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>A seven day study visit to Sweden for 17 persons from OU’s youth wing.</td>
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<tr>
<th>KIC- DA</th>
<th>Twelve three-day seminars in Ukraine for 120 participants 18-25 years old on modern political ideologies, the Christian democratic movement - its formation and development, and Christian democracy – the Ukrainian dimension.</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Two international conferences in Kiev.</td>
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PARTY COOPERATION IN A RESULTS PERSPECTIVE

MAIN FINDINGS

### Silc- PNP

Contribution to establishment of 17 local branches.
Twenty-five seminars in Ukraine on topics related to liberal ideology and gender equality in politics for 590 participants (325 women and 265 men).
Twenty seminars in Ukraine on party organisation building and team work for 350 participants (180 women and 170 men).
Twenty-two issues of a monthly party bulletin were published and distributed in 25 000 copies (in all, 550 000 copies).
PNP participated in six international events on elections and activism (three in Moldavia, one in Russia, one in Stockholm, one in Kiev).
PNP arranged two events, inviting other Silc partner organisations to ‘Liberalism today and tomorrow’ and ‘Elections in Ukraine’.

### Palme Center-SPU

Financing of 24 issues of the magazine *Socialist Globus* (800-1500 copies of each issue).
Co-financing of two regional energy conferences in Ukraine, each with approximately 27 and 20 participants.

(References)

1. A four-day visit for three persons to Brussels.
2. Presentation of the On-line Academy to an unknown number of SPU members.

(References)

3. Meetings with the trade unions and the party organisations to plan for coming events, in order to bring the counterparts together.
4. Visit to the federal trade union school to discuss social and political development and to show the film ‘Lilja Forever’, which deals with trafficking.
5. A seminar for the representatives of two parties and two trade unions discussing the role of the trade union and parties in a democratic market economy (seminars continued in 2009).
6. One training of trainers (ToT) course, held for representatives from the same organisations as those mentioned above.

From the information obtained by the Team, activities have mostly, but not always, been implemented as foreseen. In some cases, there has not been a plan of activities against which the actual implementation could be compared.\(^5\)

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\(^5\) For example, in the case of CIS-OU, topics were defined during the initial LFA exercise and the planning was conducted on a rolling basis. JHS states that activities were defined along the course of work in dialogue with OU. However, DA and PNP had a plan of activities that was also implemented.
2.4 Effectiveness

The overall objective of the JHS-OU cooperation was to develop OU organisationally at the central, regional and local levels, as well as to build a solid ideological basis. A considerable number of people have participated in study visits to/training events in Brussels and Sweden. The participants met by the Team were generally enthusiastic about these events, stating that they had given them new insights, perspectives and sometimes contacts. However, all of them had difficulties explaining how they would be able to use the information in party work. Positive impacts appear to have been limited to the individual level. The crucial question, not answerable in this type of study, is how new insights, knowledge and perspectives from the rather short events may possibly influence their actions in the future and how this may possibly benefit OU.

The picture is similar for CIS’ cooperation with OU Lviv, aimed at strengthening OU in Lviv by increasing political competence through a number of thematic seminars. Again, while there are indications that the participants appreciated and learned from the seminars, there are no signs of the party having been strengthened. Absent links between the events and processes taking place within the party, as well as lack of follow-up activities may at least in part explain this.

The objective of the cooperation of both JHS and CIS was to contribute to a stronger OU. In the last two-year period, the party has instead been weakened due to factors totally beyond the control of the Swedish cooperation. The fact that many OU members have left the party, including participants of the different events, has most likely reduced the impact of the Swedish cooperation.

The Palme Center-SPU cooperation has consisted of several sub-projects, all aimed at strengthening the party organisationally and ideologically. The objective of the energy seminars, to elaborate an energy policy, was unfulfilled due to failure of the seminar participants to arrive at any conclusions and a lack of interest from the party leadership. The purpose of the magazine *Socialist Globe* was (according to the application to Sida) to disseminate findings of the energy seminars. Instead, it became a channel to present European news on social democracy and left-wing parties and to promote a critical debate (i.e. internal democracy) within SPU. Cooperation with the local SPU branch in Kharkiv has, after several years, resulted in an emerging collaboration between SPU, SDPU and labour unions. However, the cooperation with SPU Kiev has failed in its objectives and the Team questions the value of sending three persons from the SPU youth branch to Brussels (instead of the originally planned activities) and presenting the Palme Center’s ‘Online Academy’ in other parts of Ukraine.

For the Silc-PNP cooperation, the overall objective has been to contribute to the establishment of a well-functioning social-liberal party in Ukraine. Partly thanks to the support of Silc, PNP has now become registered. However, it is still very unsure whether PNP will ever be able to enter parliament and, if so, what role it will play in Ukrainian politics. The party is still quite unknown even in its home base, Donetsk,
and a liberal party from eastern Ukraine is bound to be met by suspicion in the rest of the country.6

The official objective of the KIC-DA project was to contribute to a new generation of politicians in Ukraine. However, the principle objective of KIC has been to assist DA to transform into a party. The immediate outcome of activities in 2007/08 consisted of 120 young people becoming more ideologically aware and trained to be politically active, yet trained as civil activists rather than as party politicians. In addition, DA was strengthened as an organisation as most of the participants either were members of DA or joined DA following participation. How many of these persons will one day engage in party politics – for a possible future ‘DA Party’ or other party – is an open question. It is possible that DA, now building up its local branches, will later try to transform into a party and aim for the parliamentary elections scheduled 2012. However, it is still uncertain whether DA has the ambition and capacity to do so and what role it would play if it were to become a political party.

All in all it can be concluded that the extent of fulfilment of project objectives in the short and medium term (outcome) has been very mixed. The prospects for fulfilment of overall project objectives are highly uncertain.

2.5 Relevance
As a ‘case’, Ukraine clearly illustrates the crucial role of parties in a democracy. Its party system is still young and unstable, and the problems discussed in Appendix 2 (description of the party system) severely limit the citizens’ influence on how the country is governed. Nevertheless, there has been significant progress since independence in 1991, and the party system has also been described as ‘dynamic’ and ‘developing’. It is a country where there are parties to cooperate with that are still in considerable need of improvement. It is also a country with ambitions to integrate with the European Union (which is not controversial inside Ukraine, unlike NATO membership) and European political parties. Such integration is at the heart of Swedish bilateral cooperation with Ukraine, and supporting democracy and human rights is one of the pillars in Sweden’s cooperation strategy. In this perspective, the relevance of party cooperation with Ukraine is high.

When it comes to consistency between project objectives and the beneficiaries’ requirements, the Team notes that the Ukrainian side has usually had a strong influence on project design. For example, in the cases of KIC-DA, Palme Center-SPU (Central and Kharkiv) and Silc-PNP, the project proposals were elaborated by the Ukrainian side and approved by the Swedish PAOs after a dialogue and only smaller adjustments. In the case of CIS-OU, the content of the cooperation was defined during an LFA workshop. In the case of JHS-OU, the activities largely formed part of a standard package offered by JHS but they were decided upon in discussion with OU. In one case, the Social Democratic Party District of Värmland – SPU Kyiv, the project appears to have been largely Swedish driven. In most cases, however, the project objectives are found to have been consistent with the demand of the partner organisations.

6 The Liberal Party was established in Donetsk in 1991 and discredited itself and ‘liberalism’ because of its close ties to corruption during the transition to a market economy. Its leader, Yevhen Shcherban, a Member of Parliament, was assassinated at the Donetsk airport in 1996.
That the projects are in line with the demand of five organisations (selected by the PAOs and with support of few Ukrainian voters) does not necessarily imply that they are the most relevant in terms of addressing the concerns of citizens and the problems of the Ukrainian party system. This leads to the question of how the projects correspond to country needs.

A problem highlighted in the description of the party system is the lack of ideology and policies of parties. Many of the projects dealt with ideology and policy issues (DA training, JHS summer school, seminars in Lviv, the SPU magazine Socialist Globus, etc.), indicating a high relevance in this respect. However, as noted in the previous section, there are signs that this ideological training of individuals not always made the parties more ideological and policy oriented.

There was also seen to be a need of a generation shift in Ukrainian politics, and of the new generation in Ukrainian politics having greater respect for democratic principles and being less corrupt than earlier generations. In this perspective, the strong focus on young politicians in all projects has been highly relevant.

A fundamental problem of the Ukrainian party system, on the centre-left as well as on the centre-right, is its extreme fragmentation. This is something that has not been addressed by the Swedish cooperation. Instead, the PAOs have chosen to identify and work with their own counterparts. Given that the cooperation is largely about transferring Swedish experiences, and that coalition building is an important feature of Swedish politics, there have been surprisingly few efforts to try to bring parties with similar ideologies together.

The Swedish PAOs cooperates with one party (OU) that received 14 percent in the last parliamentary election but is currently estimated to have only 2-4 percent of the voter support, one party that was unable to enter parliament (SPU) and whose leader only received 1 percent of the votes in the 2010 presidential election, one recently registered party with still quite dim prospects of becoming influential, and one NGO that in the future could possibly transform into a party. The selection of partners is understandable from the point of the view that it is difficult to find parties in Ukraine that share the values of the Swedish PAOs and that are trustworthy in the promotion of democracy. However, a risk of not working together with any of the major political forces in the country is that the Swedish cooperation will make little difference. The Swedish approach could be compared to that of the U.S. party foundation National Democratic Institute (NDI), which works exclusively with parliamentary parties, or the German party foundation Konrad Adenauer Stiftung (KAS), which works with several centre-right parties.

Another observed problem was the lack of accountability of politicians to citizens and the distance between voters and politicians. The public trust in Ukrainian political parties is low as is the public trust in state institutions across the board - the president, parliament, government, judiciary and local councils. The low levels of trust is a result of voters feeling estranged from their political system as a result of the elite remaining above and beyond the law and only taking an interest in them during elections. Ukraine’s electoral democracy can only evolve into a functioning democracy if

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7 The only factor that comes close to this is the Palme Center working with both the SPU and the SDPU in Kharkiv to build a centre-left alliance.
this cycle of mistrust is broken and better interaction between voters-parties-leaders is introduced. None of the party-party cooperations worked explicitly on these political culture issues.

Two of the parties, SPU and Our Ukraine, have had serious and increasing internal problems in terms of leadership and organisation at the national level. The activities did not address these problems other than very indirectly by training individuals on various topics.

To a considerable extent, the cooperation is based on the assumption that more information, knowledge or competence can contribute to solving the problems of the parties. However, problems such as corruption, lack of internal democracy and party infighting are not primarily problems related to lack of information. Leading politicians are often benefiting from things being the way they are.

Much of the cooperation has been centred around the transfer of Swedish experiences. In general terms, the previous isolation of Ukraine makes it relevant to broaden perspectives and expose politicians to the experiences of other countries. However, this does not mean that all Swedish experiences are relevant. For example, Swedish experiences of collaboration with labour unions are only partly relevant as the Ukrainian context is completely different. Another example is corruption, i.e. Sweden’s relatively low levels of corruption give limited room for providing relevant expertise on fighting the type of corruption existing in Ukraine. The Swedish experiences related to environmental problems and communication and campaigning presented in Lviv were only partly relevant for the local situation, according to persons interviewed. The PAOs have apparently not always been sensitive enough to Ukrainian conditions in their transfer of experiences and/or paid sufficient attention to translating Swedish experiences to the Ukrainian context. In some areas, for example EU integration and corruption, other countries more similar to Ukraine probably have more relevant experiences to share.

Finally, a strengthening of the Ukrainian party system will require changes outside of the parties themselves, such as reform of the judiciary, constitutional reform and a stronger civil society. These are areas in which the Swedish PAOs can make limited contributions. Hence, the party-to-party cooperation is best seen as one of many components in the strengthening of the Ukrainian party system.

2.6 Side Effects

Supporting some Ukrainian parties but not others implies that the PAOs may influence the power relations between the Ukrainian parties. This can be seen as a positive achievement given that it also contributes to a better functioning party system and democracy; otherwise it is a side effect (considering the fact that the objective of the PAO cooperation is to promote democracy, not a specific ideology or party).
Some participants met by the Team stated that they expect to be able to use the knowledge gained during project activities in their professional life and as citizens. Participants who moved from a specific party to another may or may not have taken their experiences to the new party.

Interviewees have also pointed at other positive side effects, such as participants having become more environmentally aware (Lviv), the labour union having become strengthened (Kharkiv) and various results of the local protest actions of DA.

The PAOs have, during interviews in Sweden, stated that the cooperation is valuable for the Swedish parties as it can add new perspectives and mobilise members. The PAO cooperation also facilitates the international networking of Swedish parties.

2.7 Sustainability

Sustainability refers to continuation of benefits from a development intervention after assistance has been completed. As noted earlier, any long-term impact of the Swedish support is highly uncertain. Furthermore, the fact that Ukrainian parties are themselves unstable and not always sustainable is problematic. The country is in a phase where new parties will continue to emerge and older ones will disappear. Politicians often go from one party to another. In this situation, the sustainability again rests on individuals and on whether they are able and willing to make use of what they have learned. Probably, activities directed to young people, making them more politically competent, have the greatest chances of giving long-term benefits, not necessarily by strengthening a particular party but by contributing to the critical mass of persons that stronger parties eventually can build on and include as members and activists. Looked from this perspective, the projects could be seen as very long term.

2.8 Observations and Lessons

What factors have contributed to, and what factors have counteracted, the observed results?

Looking first at how projects have been presented in applications to Sida, the logical chain between activities and overall objective is not always clear. Projects are sometimes based on unrealistic assumptions, such as that the participants of different events are always able and want to use and share their knowledge. In some cases, the objectives set have been overambitious.

Some of the observations made indicate that it may take more than single events, such as seminars, to achieve actual change. However, engaging in processes would require more engagement from the Swedish PAOs. Greater capacity and a closer presence would also be needed if the PAOs, instead of working with single parties, would broaden their partnerships and work on, for example, coalition building.

Some projects have also faced implementation problems. In some cases it has been due to capacity constraints and party turbulence on the Ukrainian side. Both SPU and OU have had internal organisational problems, fragmentation and a high turnover of people. The 2007 pre-term elections and the three years of political crisis (2007-2009) that both preceded and followed them also reduced the capacity of parties to engage in international cooperation. However, there have in some instances also been
capacity constraints, lack of project management capacity and insufficient quality control, on the Swedish side. In at least one case, the strong reliance on very few individuals for project management proved to make the project vulnerable.

As in all international cooperation, it is important to know the local context well. The PAOs’ understanding of Ukraine appears to have varied considerably. The PAOs have generally had good communication with their partners, but in order to know, understand and evaluate what is going on in the country, it is important to have multiple sources of information. The evaluation also shows that the relevance of a project may change over time and that there is a need to be aware of changing conditions.\(^{10}\)

The Team also notes a limited capacity to monitor projects and that no post-project evaluation has been carried out.\(^{11}\) The absence of clear objectives and indicators makes it difficult for the PAOs and their partners to follow up progress and results.

One effect of this is that reports to Sida in some cases have included incorrect, incomplete and/or misleading information.

Another observation is that the project applications and reports to Sida have been written in Swedish. This implies that the Ukrainian parties have not been in a position to read the key guiding document spelling out exactly which uses funds have finally been approved for. Nor have they been able to read what has been reported to Sida. This creates a transparency and accountability problem. In 2009, however, KIC began preparing its documents in English.

The Team notes that there has been no coordination or regular exchange of experiences between the PAOs with respect to their work in Ukraine. As all PAOs are to work towards the same objective – to strengthen the Ukrainian party system and democracy – and they all have different perspectives, it seems that much could be gained from an exchange of information. There also appears to be an unused potential to collaborate more with other party foundations working in Ukraine, such as KAS, NDI and IRI.

All in all, the Swedish cooperation with Ukraine seems to be guided by the interests and priorities of the PAOs and the organisations that they have selected for cooperation, rather than by any comprehensive analysis of the problems of the Ukrainian party system. This observation reflects how the entire system of the PAO cooperation is set up.

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\(^{10}\) Attention should be paid to new political forces, particularly in the centre and the centre right. Arseniy Yatseniuk and Serhiy Tihipko came 4th and 3rd in the 2010 elections with a combined vote of 20 percent, compared to Yushchenko’s 5%.

\(^{11}\) The only evaluation undertaken during 2007/8 was one of the cooperation with Democratic Alliance. However, it looked at processes rather than results.
3 CIS-Our Ukraine-Lviv

3.1 Background
The Centre Party International Foundation (CIS) began working in Ukraine in 2000, starting with limited support to the league of Ukrainian women voters. The cooperation with People’s Union-Our Ukraine party12 (hereafter OU) was initiated in 2003 and included seminars on democratisation in the Kherson and Kahkovka districts. These activities continued in 2004 and 2005. An important dimension of this project was rural development. In 2006, CIS co-financed the women’s conference ‘Win With Women’. In 2007/2008, CIS cooperated with OU in Lviv. This cooperation was initiated following contacts between a Swedish person with links to CIS, who at the time was teaching at the University of Lviv and a representative of OU, who at that time worked as an advisor to the regional Governor. For the period 2009/10, CIS is engaged in a new project aimed to bring together politically interested young people from eastern and western Ukraine.

3.2 Project Design
According to the application to Sida, the overall objective of the OU project was to strengthen democratic forces in Ukraine, to be understood as the orange revolution movement. Stressing the importance of working at the local level, CIS chose party members from six local branches around Lviv as its primary target group.

The project objective was to contribute to increased political competence within OU, with a focus on youth, students and women in the city of Lviv and the surrounding region. The sub-objectives were a) to arrange a series of seminars for existing and new members, b) to contribute to the participation of women and youth in party activities at the local and regional levels, c) to strengthen party activists’ understanding of the political process and to raise competence within selected policy areas, and d) to contribute to strengthening of OU’s party structure and organisation in the city of Lviv and the region.

Planning of the activities was done in the form of a ‘Logical Framework Approach’13 (LFA) workshop in June 2007 with approximately 40 participants. The workshop participants met by the Team described the exercise as a new and positive experience, useful for designing a project. The purpose of the LFA workshop was to identify key problems to address in the project and to decide activities to be included. Key topics that were identified were the environment and energy, gender equality and communication/media.

The Swedish project manager put forward proposals to clarify the key interests and competences of the Centre Party members, but did not, according to persons inter-

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12 People’s Union-Our Ukraine Party is closely associated with President Viktor Yushchenko who is its Honorary Chairman. The party was one of nine in the Our Ukraine bloc that entered parliament in the September 2007 pre-term elections.
13 A method for project planning and follow-up that includes identifying problems and establishing objectives and indicators in a logical fashion.
viewed, impose anything on the Ukrainian partners. Hence, the content of the project was largely determined by the partner organisation.

The project budget for the Lviv cooperation amounted to SEK 1 002 000 for the two-year period 2007/2008.

3.3 Activities and Output

Based on the results of the LFA workshop, the project activities began with a two-day seminar on the environment in December 2007 (much delayed due to political unrest in the country). The participants in this event included 42 persons, mainly from the OU youth organisation. The purpose of the seminar was to present foreign experiences of how to limit dependence on external sources of energy. Other environmental issues, such as recycling, were also discussed. Presentations were made by Swedish as well as Ukrainian experts.

In December 2007, CIS organised a two-day conference for 43 politicians from the Lviv region. The original purpose of the conference was to disseminate information from the earlier seminar on the environment. However, some persons met by the Team stated that the conference had dealt exclusively with local government issues. Another planned topic was, according to the report prepared by CIS, Sweden’s experience of power-sharing in a coalition government and how this could be used to overcome the political crisis in Ukraine. However, no participants at the meeting were from Sweden.

In March 2008, a two-day seminar on media strategies was organized for 25 persons. The target groups for the seminar were activists from OU and its youth organisation. The seminar’s resources included local experts and two representatives of the Swedish Centre Party, as well as a Swedish entrepreneur living in Kiev. Sweden’s experiences of how to organise election campaigns, communicate with the media and deliver political messages were presented at the seminar.

Another event taking place in March 2008 was a gender seminar organised by women in leading positions in OU. The purpose of the event was to create a basic awareness of gender issues and to discuss oppression of women. It was organised by the women’s section of OU in collaboration with ‘Women’s Perspectives’, a local NGO. The ambition was to have a gender-balanced audience. Out of the 26 participants (31 with arrangers) there were 15 women (mainly local deputies) and 11 men from OU. Very few of the participants were senior level party representatives. In addition to ‘Women’s Perspectives’, four representatives of the Centre Party attended and shared Swedish experiences on gender and the Centre Party’s strategy to promote gender equality.

The district of Turka (in the Lviv region) is negatively affected by deforestation, which has serious consequences for local citizens. To address this issue, a seminar was organised in November 2008 to find solutions to the problem at the political level. The seminar targeted local decisions makers, and both Swedish and local experts were involved. Discussed topics included forestry, legislative measures and private ownership of land. The 20 participants were mainly deputies in the district council.
The final activity organised together with CIS was a seven-day study visit to Stockholm for 17 members of the OU youth organisations for them to participate in an exchange of experiences and cultural differences with regard to democracy. Initially, this visit was aimed at politicians on a higher level in OU, but CIS decided to modify the arrangement, due to dissatisfaction with the response for the project from the OU leadership. The study trip was designed as a ‘summer school’ and the participants attended a series of seminars on how Sweden is governed, current tendencies in world politics, environment and climate, and how young people can gain influence. The seminars were arranged in the Swedish Parliament and engaged Centre Party Members of Parliament and political advisors to the Centre Party.

3.4 Effectiveness

The immediate outcome of this project was that participants in the different events, to varying degrees, gained new knowledge in relation to the different topics that were presented. Some participants said the events gave them inspiration and encouraged them or changed their attitudes.

Comments made in relation to the environment seminar included that it was interesting to learn how Sweden can function without domestic gas sources, to learn about ways of saving energy (i.e. changing the type of light bulbs used, etc.) and to learn about Swedish recycling factories and other green issues. According to ‘Women’s Perspectives’ as well as some OU participants, the gender seminar contributed to giving the participants a valuable ‘eye-opener’ regarding the question of gender. The Team was told that it was the first time there had been such a discussion within the party. The press secretary of the Youth Union gave some examples of things he had learned during the media seminars, such as how to present a message to the press and how to achieve a good timing of different media activities. To this extent, there was a contribution towards the project objectives of strengthening OU’s political competence.

However, it is impossible to say whether this knowledge has been transferred to the party and, if so, how. Some of the participants were already OU politicians while others may one day become OU politicians. How their decisions and actions have been, or might be, influenced by participating in a two-day seminar is, however, very unclear.

There were no direct links between the seminars and processes taking place within the OU party. Even though project activities were identified through a process of collaboration with OU politicians, there was limited active involvement of the party leadership in the implementation of the project. For example, a number of proposals for how to work with gender issues came up during the gender seminar, but there were no signs of any follow-up by the party. Also, the fact that the project touched briefly on such a large number of issues without giving post-event continuity to any of them gives the Team reason to believe that the institutional impact was in fact limited.
OU as well as the Our Ukraine bloc have been declining since 2006 and have lost many supporters. Even though Lviv is a stronghold of OU\textsuperscript{14}, many participants have left or are likely to leave the party and/or party politics. The Team met some of them.

In sum, and referring to the project sub-objectives: a) a series of seminars for existing and new members have been arranged; b) there have been some contributions to the participation of women and youth in party activities at the local and regional levels to the extent that these groups have been well represented in the CIS seminars and, additionally, one seminar focused specifically on gender; c) some contributions have been made to increase the participants’ understanding of the political process and to raise competence within selected policy areas; yet d) the contributions to strengthening of the OU’s party structure and organisation in the city of Lviv city and region appear to have been minimal.

3.5 Relevance

CIS has had some difficulties identifying ideological counterparts in Ukraine. OU is best described as a moderate centre-right party with nationalist features, and it belongs to the EPP. The Swedish Centre Party, itself a member of ELDR, supports OU on the ground that it is a party with a “centrist ideology”,\textsuperscript{15} and more importantly, a pro-democratic force.

The purpose of the project was to support ‘democratic forces’ against non-democratic ones (considered to be the Party of the Regions and its allies). OU is indeed more democratic than many other parties, even though it also has severe internal problems. However, over the last two years, OU has lost much influence and it trails in opinion polls at 2-3 percent. What was once the ‘orange’ movement has fragmented into a large number of centre-right parties and embryo parties. In retrospect, the relevance of choosing OU as a partner organisation for the purpose of strengthening the democratic forces may be questioned.

The decision by CIS to initiate cooperation with OU in Lviv was based on a policy of working from the ‘bottom-up’ and a belief in the need to strengthen participation and knowledge at the regional and local levels. The intention was to make OU more responsive to Ukrainian citizens and to strengthen local branches. Given the problems of OU at the central level, working locally makes sense. However, the relevance of working with a party at the local level also depends on the general development of the party. Furthermore, western Ukraine is where OU is the strongest. It would possibly have been more relevant to support OU in other parts of the country.\textsuperscript{16}

Otherwise, the project objective to increase participation and knowledge in political and democratic processes in order to address the party’s weaknesses in ideology, structure and organisation were relevant, considering the situation in Ukraine and in OU.

\textsuperscript{14} In the 2007 pre-term elections, the Our Ukraine bloc only placed first in the Trans-Carpathian region whereas in the previous years’ March elections, the bloc placed first in Lviv, Ivano-Frankivsk, Ternopil and Trans-Carpathia.

\textsuperscript{15} In Swedish terms. In Ukraine, parties labelled traditionally as ‘centrist’ are those linked to big business and oligarchs, such as the Party of Regions.

\textsuperscript{16} The team also had an opportune occasion to discuss with Donetsk OU leaders the tremendous problems they faced (financial, low membership, local obstruction from the authorities, corruption, etc) in eastern Ukraine.
Defining the project activities through an LFA workshop was appreciated by participants, which suggested that these activities were a high priority for the partner organisation, or at least among the participants in the workshop. This did not, however, necessarily mean that there was a true commitment from the senior levels of the party. It is also unclear whether the topics singled out by the participants at this workshop were the most crucial questions that OU needed to address as an organisation.

The workshop in Turka was described by the persons responsible locally, as well as by the CIS project manager, as a successful event in several respects. It is questionable to the Team, however, whether it was also strategic to strengthen OU as a party and a pro-democratic force.

Another question is the applicability of the Swedish experiences to the context of Ukraine. Although the participants no doubt found it interesting and inspiring to learn about Sweden, they questioned to what extent the experiences presented were applicable to the Ukrainian context. Several of the participants stressed the big differences that exist between Ukraine and Sweden.

3.6 Sustainability

CIS has been present in Ukraine for several years, but there has not been much continuity. The cooperation with OU in the Lviv region only lasted over the last project application period 2007/08. Due to the complexities in Ukrainian politics and the difficulties in identifying well-functioning and likeminded parties, these shifts in activities can to some extent be understandable. However, it is difficult to see how lasting improvements can be obtained without more continuity. There has been no regular contact between CIS and its partner organisations of the cooperation that took place some years back.

The Team considers the probability of medium and long-term benefits of the project activities in Lviv rather low. Even though the coordinators and participants expressed satisfaction with the activities undertaken, there were no signs of changes at the organisational and party system levels. To achieve such changes, it would probably be necessary to work more systematically over a longer period of time.

This case illustrates how dependent the sustainability of the cooperation is on the sustainability of the party. CIS finds it likely that the cooperation would have continued had OU not fallen into pieces.

As noted above, some of the participants are no longer within OU. This does not necessarily mean that the resources were wasted as these individuals could possibly make use of the acquired skills in another political setting. However, it does mean that the long-term benefits to OU are diminished.

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17 In a comment to the draft report, CIS mentions that the LFA seminar was opened by the Governor and Chairman of OU for Lviv region, Petro Oliynyk. In a letter he later thanked the leader of the Swedish Centre Party Maud Olofsson. This, states CIS, could be seen as a sign of commitment, even though the highest party leadership was not in a position to follow the project in detail.

18 CIS comments that it has sometimes seen that even small, short term interventions can get substantial repercussions. This may well be the case. However, in respect to the Lviv project a standing comment from persons met was that that the single events had been insufficient to make much of a change.
3.7 Side Effects
As indicated above, it may well be that the persons participating in the seminars personally benefited from them, becoming somewhat more gender aware, environmentally conscious, etc.

In the Turka, the party representatives claim that a solution to the deforestation problem was actually identified as a result of the seminar.

The Centre Party reports that this type of cooperation is valuable for the party in Sweden, as it contributes to international perspectives and generates party member engagement.

3.8 Observations and Lessons
The rather limited effectiveness of the project was largely due to its design. That the project came into being in the first place was primarily a result of a coincidence. The project was not based on any comprehensive analysis of the political situation. Even though the initial LFA workshop served to identify key topics, the way in which these topics were dealt with was not effective. There was a lack of continuity and linkage of the seminars to regular party activities and processes. Most persons that the Team met with pointed to the need to work more intensively with the issues (or some issues) over a longer period of time.

There were also certain problems of implementation due to organisational problems within OU and the general political turbulence in Ukraine. At one point, the implementation was affected by a conflict between CIS and the Ukrainian project manager, as well as by the Swedish project manager falling ill.

The fact that CIS had a project manager living in Lviv implied a closer Swedish presence and closer follow-up than in most other PAO projects. However, as recognised by CIS, there was too strong a reliance on this one individual.

Apart from CIS, JHS is cooperating with OU but mainly at the central level in Kiev. Given that both CIS and JHS cooperate with the same party and for the same purpose (to strengthen OU organisationally), it is surprising that there has been no regular exchange of information between the two Swedish organisations regarding the party’s challenges, needs and development. Unaware of each other, JHS arranged an anti-corruption seminar and CIS a gender seminar on the same day, despite the fact that both seminars largely aimed at the same target group.
4 JHS - Our Ukraine

4.1 Background

JHS’ cooperation with Ukraine dates back to the mid 1990s. Its partners initially included Rukh, the Reform and Order party and other actors to become part of the orange movement.\footnote{\textit{Rukh} (Ukrainian Popular Movement for Restructuring) was the main anti-communist centre-right political party until the 2002 elections. Formed in 1989, it was led by the former political prisoner Vyacheslav Chornovil, who died in a car accident in 1999. Currently, it is led by the former Foreign Minister Borys Tarasiuk. Rukh was the first Ukrainian party to establish links to the EPP, and its youth wing is one of two Ukrainian youth organisations (the other is Democratic Alliance) that belong to the EPP-youth. Rukh joined the 2002, 2006 and 2007 Our Ukraine bloc. \textit{The Reform and Order Party} brought together many intellectuals from Rukh and has always been led by many times Finance Minister Viktor Pynzenyk. In the late 1990s, Reform and Order was close to Viktor Yushchenko and pushed him to stand in the 1999 elections, but he refused. In 2002, Reform and Order joined the newly created Our Ukraine bloc, but in 2006 and 2007 belonged to the Yulia Tymoshenko bloc. \textit{The Our Ukraine bloc} was created as a bloc of centre-right parties in late 2001 after Yushchenko was removed as Prime Minister in April 2001. In the 2002 elections, the bloc included 10 parties and won with 24 percent of the vote. In the 2006 elections, the Our Ukraine bloc included 8 parties and came third with 14 percent of the vote. Reform and Order broke with Yushchenko in 2005 and entered parliament in the 2006 and 2007 elections in the Tymoshenko bloc. \textit{Rukh} entered the 2006 and 2007 parliaments as part of the Our Ukraine bloc. \textit{The People’s Union-Our Ukraine Party} was established as Yushchenko’s presidential party in 2005 after he was elected president. It was envisaged that the other parties in the Our Ukraine bloc would merge with Peoples Union-Our Ukraine. In the 2006 and 2007 elections, the Peoples Union-Our Ukraine party was part of the Our Ukraine bloc.} Activities included seminars and visits to Sweden, but the agenda was also to bring together the different democratic centre-right forces. Co-sponsoring organisations included the Konrad Adenauer Stiftung (KAS), the International Republican Institute (IRI) and the Westminster Foundation/Conservatives. Since 2005, JHS has cooperated with the party People’s Union Our Ukraine (OU), established in 2005 to unite the orange parties in the Our Ukraine bloc around President Yushchenko.

In its application to Sida for 2007/08, JHS noted that the Ukrainian political parties generally lack an ideological ground and that a charismatic leader tends to be more important than the political programme, leading to problems of legitimacy and of the wrong people entering politics for the wrong reasons. JHS also pointed at the weak organisational structures of parties, not least at the local and regional levels. JHS therefore pointed at the need to support the parties at all levels in order to develop internal structures and policy platforms. Young people, having been excluded from the old power structures, were said to be a strategic resource.

In discussions with representatives in 2006, JHS identified the following principal needs of the newly formed party:

- Shift focus from strong leaders to political content.
- Building support for (förankra) the political activities outside the big cities.
- Developing sustainable party structures and taking advantage of the talents of women and youth.
- Developing policies in order to strengthen the party organisation and the democratic legitimacy.
4.2 Project Design

The overall objective of the project (2007/08) was to assist OU in developing organi-
sationally at the central, regional and local levels, as well as in building a solid ideo-
logical basis. There were two sub-projects: Democratic Governance (demokratiska rättsstaten) and Youth and Younger Politicians.

The first sub-project was to focus on democratic governance as a prerequisite for Ukraine becoming an EU member. JHS was to strive to strengthen OU’s conviction of the value of democracy, market economy, rule of law, human rights, tolerance etc. An important component was to help OU develop its work against corruption and violations of individuals’ rights and freedoms. The expected results listed in JHS’ application were that the trained party representatives should be able to discuss and analyse,

- Policy issues regarding democracy, market economy, rule of law, human rights and tolerance.
- Media, strategy, voter contact and campaign strategy from an organisational perspec-
tive.
- The party’s own EU policy.
- EU’s relation to Ukraine as well as the importance of EU as a driving force for reform.

The second sub-project was to strengthen the participation of youth in politics through training and thereby contribute to political renewal and a generation shift. The participants were also to be given a network of contacts in Sweden and the EU. This network was to continue after the project as a source of inspiration and consultation for the participant’s continued political work. The expected results were that the trained young party representatives should

- Be able to use basic concepts of political theory and to account for their own political opinion.
- Have capacity to design communication, campaigns and their own profiles as candidates.
- Be oriented with respect to organisation, networking, internal training and support systems.
- Have access to a network of young politicians in Sweden and the rest of the EU.

The indicators to be used for follow-up (for the two sub-projects) were the following:

- Evaluations from the participants of the different activities, used to see if the established targets in terms of knowledge and skills had been reached.
- OU, at both the central and local levels, establishing a political programme based on democratic principles.
- Better understanding of how the EU functions (measured through evaluations in connection with training activities).
• The number of youth participating in training events.
• The number of participants in established contact networks for young politicians.
• The number of young people running for, and reaching, leading positions at the central, regional and local level where OU is increasing.

The immediate target groups were party members and OU politicians at the central, regional and local levels as well as young party members. At the institutional level, the beneficiary of the project was OU.

No written plan of activities was established at the outset. Instead, activities were agreed upon between JHS and OU during the course of the work.

The project budget for 2007-2008 was SEK 2.4 million, out of which SEK 1.4 million was for the Democratic Governance component and SEK 1 million for the Youth component.

4.3 Activities and Output

The following activities were implemented via the budget for 2007/08.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Activity</th>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Place</th>
<th>No. Participants</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Male/Female</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Democratic Governance Component</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Conference on Europe</td>
<td>1-3 June, 2007</td>
<td>Muskö</td>
<td>10 (5/5)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Conference on Europe 2 (Ukraine-EU-NATO relations)</td>
<td>27-29 February, 2008</td>
<td>Brussels</td>
<td>11 (7/4)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Seminar on Corruption</td>
<td>29 March, 2008</td>
<td>Lviv</td>
<td>Approximately 25</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Seminar on Corruption</td>
<td>30 March, 2008</td>
<td>Kiev</td>
<td>Approximately 25</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Conference on Europe 3 (Ukraine-EU-NATO relations)</td>
<td>26-28 May, 2008</td>
<td>Brussels</td>
<td>15 (8/7)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Conference on Europe 4 (Ukraine-EU-NATO relations)</td>
<td>8-10 September, 2008</td>
<td>Brussels</td>
<td>14 (10/4)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Academy for Local Decision Makers</td>
<td>10-13 November, 2008</td>
<td>Sollentuna, Sweden</td>
<td>24 (15/9)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Conference on Europe 5 (Ukraine-EU-NATO relations)</td>
<td>8-10 December, 2008</td>
<td>Brussels</td>
<td>17 (9/8)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Conference on Europe 6 (Ukraine-EU-NATO relations)</td>
<td>3-5 March 2009</td>
<td>Brussels</td>
<td>20 (10/10)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
All Conferences on Europe, except the first which took place in Sweden, consisted of a trip to Brussels with visits to the European Parliament, the European People’s Party (EPP), the NATO Headquarters, the European Commission and the Mission of Ukraine to the EU.

The one-day anti-corruption seminars included presentations by Swedish and Ukrainian speakers, and discussion.

The Academy for Local Decision Makers consisted of a two-and-a-half-day visit to Sweden covering topics such as local government (visiting the municipality of Sollentuna), campaigning, parliamentarism and establishment of coalitions.

The Conferences referred to as Campaign Management consisted of a visit to Sweden, during which the participants saw the Swedish Parliament, organisations such as MUF, Timbro and the Swedish Confederation of Conservative and Liberal Students (FMSF). Sessions on campaigning were held as well.

The Summer School on the Principals for a Free Society is a regular JHS activity for young people from different countries. Departing from a book reflecting certain ideological positions20, participants are introduced to, and discuss, themes such as democracy, private property, free enterprise, globalisation, rule of law, human rights, freedom and equality.

According to the questionnaires filled out by participants after the various events (in which participants rate different sessions from ‘very good’, ‘good’, ‘not very good’ and ‘poor’), participants were generally very satisfied (marking mainly ‘very good’ and ‘good’).

As there were no activities planned from the outset, there is nothing to compare the actual implementation against.

### 4.4 Effectiveness

As shown above, the Democratic Governance component, gave 77 persons the possibility to visit Brussels and an additional ten to attend a conference on Europe in Sweden. The Brussels participants met by the Team stressed the visit to NATO but

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showed limited interest in the EU component of the visit. This can be explained by the fact that OU and OU youth have been running information campaigns to increase Ukrainian public support for a NATO membership. ‘Having seen NATO with your own eyes, it is easier to agitate for it’, as one participant put it. In Kharkiv, the Brussels visit led to a debate on NATO with students. Several participants, however, were disappointed that they had not received more practical tools for their NATO campaign. This seems to indicate that the purpose of the visit was not quite clear to the participants. There was little indication that the participants understood how Eastern European countries had joined NATO as a stepping stone to a more fundamentally important (in terms of reforms required) EU membership.\footnote{This could be for two reasons. Firstly, only NATO of the two organisations has an open door on membership (at NATO’s April 2008 Bucharest summit, a resolution talked of Ukraine becoming a future member. The EU has never stated that Ukraine would become a future member). Secondly, OU and President Yushchenko see NATO membership as providing Ukraine with security against what is seen as a resurgent Russia.} Judging from the interviews, the fundamental question of strengthening democratic governance in Ukraine as a means of entering the EU had not been discussed at all.

Even if the three-day visit to Brussels gave the participants some new knowledge about EU, the expected results (that participants would be in a position to discuss and analyse, independently, OU’s own EU policy, EU’s relation to Ukraine and the importance of EU as a motor for reform) appear clearly overambitious and would have required a more comprehensive approach with some follow-up in Ukraine.

The Team also met with a few persons who had participated in the Academy for local decision makers. They generally described it as ‘valuable’ and ‘interesting’, and as having given them ‘new outlooks’. However, the question of how useful the study visits were, and of how the knowledge was implemented in Ukraine afterwards, proved difficult to answer for all of them.

The Team could not identify any outcome of the one-day corruption seminar and strongly questions the effectiveness of this event. Although corruption is admittedly a great problem in Ukraine, a short seminar has no impact on it unless it coupled with some follow-up, which it was not. A representative from OU asked the Team rhetorically if it believed that 20 such seminars would have made a difference. Many participants may in fact be benefiting from the current situation and, as put by one OU member, it is difficult to influence people at the top by merely talking to them.

Finally, the Team notes that there were very few, if any, activities to train OU representatives to discuss and analyse policy issues regarding democracy, market economy, rule of law, human rights and tolerance, as foreseen in the project application. It therefore questions fulfilment of this objective.

Turning to the youth component, the Team met with some of the persons who had participated in the summer school. They were all very enthusiastic about it, saying that they had gained better understanding of politics and stressing the value of meeting young people from other countries. Although some of them still keep in touch via Facebook, no formalised networks have been established.

The few persons met with who had participated in the youth conference on campaign management in Sweden were also appreciative, saying that it had reinforced their self-confidence, that it was inspiring and that it gave them a new view of their own
country. The many things they had noted included how the Swedish parties use party symbols and that Swedish parties are active even between elections.

It is impossible to tell how the young people who offered to participate in a three-day summer school or study visit to Sweden will make use of their experience in their future political life. Again, the expected results listed in the project applications (see bullet points above) appear clearly overambitious; it cannot be expected e.g. that a person after a short study visit to Sweden has the capacity to design both campaigns and their own profiles as candidates. However, it is not impossible that ‘seeds’ were sown during these events that for some participants will one day prove important.

The overall project objective was to develop OU organisationally at the central, regional and local levels, as well as to build a solid ideological basis. A reason for concern in this respect is that there have been no mechanisms in place to absorb the knowledge acquired by the participants in the different events. There has not been any systematic follow-up or use of any of the project activities. Any benefits therefore seem to have been gained mainly at the individual level and the impact will totally depend on whether and, if so, how the participants choose to use their new outlooks etc.

Another reason for concern is that many OU members have left the party, some for new centre-right NGOs and parties, such as Front for Change (led by Arseniy Yatseniuk), the Civic Initiative (Anatoliy Grytsenko) and the United Centre (Viktor Baloga). To what extent this has been the case for participants in the project is not known, but an indication could be that out of the ten people participating in the first conference on Europe in 2007, a maximum of four persons were still linked to the party in September 2009.

While the project objective was to strengthen OU, the party has become considerably weaker since 2006, and many observers question the very survival of the party. This development was due to factors totally beyond the control of the Swedish cooperation.

4.5 Relevance

The overall project objective, to develop OU organisationally and ideologically, was clearly relevant considering the situation of the party. So were the two components: democratic governance and youth, seen in a national perspective.

However, the Team cannot see that the activities have been the most relevant to achieve the overall objective. In the Democratic Governance component, there was a strong emphasis on getting to know EU and NATO as institutions but not on the question of democratic governance in Ukraine. Although the issue of a future NATO membership may be important for OU, it does not relate to democratic governance

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22 Loss of members, internal organisational and leadership problems, acute financial problems, declining support from voters (recent opinion polls put the party at 2-3 percent, source: Razumkov Center for Political and Economic Studies), the existing support being confined to western Ukraine, desertion by the majority of the parties in the 2007 Our Ukraine who no longer support Yushchenko and increasing competition from other parties within the centre-right ‘niche’. The Executive Director of OU confirms that the party is closely tied to Yushchenko’s destiny. The declining support for Yushchenko has led to a declining support for the party.
but is rather a security issue.\textsuperscript{23} Furthermore, while there has been a great deal of training of individuals, it has not concerned organisational strengthening to a significant extent.

However, there has been a strong emphasis on youth, not only in the youth project but also in the Democratic Governance project in which many young people participated.

Apart from the two corruption seminars, all events have taken place in Brussels or Sweden. In view of Ukraine’s previous international isolation, there is indeed a need to expose party members and politicians to the experiences of other countries, particularly within the EU. When commented upon by the participants, the Swedish experience is said to be interesting and valuable. However, the huge differences between the countries are also noted (e.g. Sweden’s low level of corruption). Experiences from countries that have gone through a transition process and that have joined the EU more recently are likely to be more relevant (e.g. slow reformers with equally problematic communist inheritances such as Romania, Bulgaria etc.). Furthermore, there are many sources of information available in Kiev (e.g. the NATO information office and EU Commission) that could have been utilised more effectively.

Activities are reported to have been elaborated jointly by JHS and OU. However, to our understanding, the activities are largely part of a package of standard modules offered by JHS. Most activities are implemented by JHS and not OU. Compared to the cooperation of other PAOs, this is the most Swedish-driven one.

Being a member of EPP, OU is a natural partner for JHS. However, a principal problem of the Ukrainian centre-right is its growing fragmentation and the inability of parties to cooperate for the greater national interest and their own fortunes.\textsuperscript{24} This problem is not addressed by the project and there is a risk that the strategy of supporting a single party that currently has limited voter support reinforces fragmentation. Given JHS’ earlier efforts to unite the centre-right, it would seem natural that it made the similar efforts today.\textsuperscript{25}

\section*{4.6 Side Effects}
As indicated above, the Team does not believe that the cooperation has substantially altered OU’s development. Nevertheless, to strengthen one particular party among many still implies an influence on the power relations between parties in the country.

As mentioned above, a substantial number of trained persons are likely to have left OU and/ or politics. They carry with them the knowledge and experiences gained through the project, as citizens or possibly within other parties. However, this was not the purpose of the project.

\textsuperscript{23} NATO membership for Ukraine is a question of increasing public support; in terms of basic democratic governance and long-term cooperation with NATO, Ukraine already qualifies for a Membership Action Plan as entering NATO is far easier than entering the EU.

\textsuperscript{24} The Our Ukraine bloc included nine parties in the 2007 elections. Today the number of parties and NGO-embryonic parties within the OU parliamentary faction has grown to 14.

\textsuperscript{25} KAS has recently shifted policy from supporting individual parties to trying to promote collaboration between parties.
4.7 **Sustainability**

The lack of mechanisms to link training to party activities, policy making etc. makes sustainability totally dependent on how the trained persons use their acquired knowledge in the future. Such use is highly uncertain. The future of OU as a political project is also highly unsure and many persons met questioned whether the party will even exist in a few years time. This illustrates how dependent the sustainability of Swedish cooperation is on national political events.

On the positive side, many persons trained are still young, and their participation in JHS events may, in a very long-term perspective, prove to be valuable. This we simply do not know.

4.8 **Observations and Lessons**

All in all, the Team observes some positive outcomes, mainly at the individual level, but questions the fulfilment of the overall objective to develop OU organisationally. Reasons for this are mainly to be found in the design of the project and its activities. Firstly, the selection of activities and topics has not always strategically contributed to the project objectives. Secondly, training events/seminars/conferences have not been linked to activities and processes within the party but have rather taken place as separate events.

Most likely, the achievement of project results has also been affected by the internal problems of OU. Participants in different events have left the party, and frequent changes in leadership would make any project for organisational strengthening difficult.

During discussions with participants, the idea of Permanent Working Groups on issues such as corruption came up as an alternative to the one-off seminars. The Permanent Working Groups could e.g. meet once a month with different speakers and draw on local resources in Kiev (the EU Commission, the NATO Information Office, Embassies, and other international organisations, such as IRI, Ukrainian think tanks etc.).

There was evidently no preparation by the participants before their visits to Brussels and Sweden. Such a preparation could probably have made the visits far more effective, as would some type of follow-up. In discussions with participants, it was suggested that pre-visit briefings could be organised in Kiev by the EU Commission, the NATO Information Office and Ukrainian think tank specialists. These could be followed by post-visit evaluations and discussions.

Some participants felt a need for more reflection on what they were told in seminars and that there was too little discussion. Some would have liked to see more detailed handbooks on the fundamentals they had learnt that they could bring back to Ukraine.

Since 2006 when the project was planned, both the political landscape of Ukraine and OU’s position in it have changed dramatically. More exactly, there have been political instabilities, constitutional changes and two elections. What was a relevant approach in 2006 is not necessarily so today. This shows the need to be flexible and adjust the cooperation to actual developments.
Turning to the issue of management, JHS prepares applications to Sida and writes all reports in Swedish. Activities are said to have been planned in dialogue with OU, and JHS argues that increased formalisation is not required due to its close relations with OU. However, OU is not in a position to ever read the application to Sida, which is the principal document spelling out what the project is to achieve and how. The same goes for the reports. This is a problem of transparency. The somewhat unclear division of roles between JHS and OU also creates a problem of accountability. It is positive that JHS and OU have close and good relations, but it is also important to know who is accountable for what.

JHS’ project application listed some performance indicators that are not very useful the way in which they were expressed. The list included the number of youth participating in training events, but it was not clear how many were originally supposed to participate in training, or even in what training and for how long. Another indicator is the number of young people running for, and reaching, leading positions. Whether this in fact happens obviously depends on a number of factors unrelated to the project. Regarding the indicator that OU establishes a political programme based on democratic principles, JHS has correctly reported that OU was in the process of establishing such a programme. However, it was done for the upcoming congress in October 2009 and without any linkage to the Swedish cooperation.

Apart from JHS, also CIS has cooperated with OU (at the local level in Lviv). Given that both CIS and JHS cooperate with the same party and for the same purpose (to strengthen OU organisationally), it is surprising that there has been no regular exchange of information between them. As a result of this lack of information exchange, the anti-corruption seminar organised by JHS and the gender seminar organised by CIS were held on the same day, despite the fact that the two events shared the same target groups.
5 KIC – Democratic Alliance

5.1 Background

Democratic Alliance (DA) was founded in 1995 as the youth organisation of the Ukrainian Christian Democratic Party. It soon separated from the party to become an independent political youth organisation with a Christian democratic ideology. A large number of Ukrainian parties label themselves as ‘Christian Democratic’, yet none of them truly represent this ideology, according to KIC or DA. This is why KIC has chosen to work with an NGO outside of the party-political sphere.

In 2001, DA contributed to the formation of the student coalition Our Ukraine, which played an important role in the Orange Revolution. Over the years, DA has established ‘partnerships’ with political parties, although it has no fixed ties with any of them.

There have also been discussions about turning DA itself into a party. Such ambitions have not yet been stated officially, possibly for tactical reasons. The board members met neither conformed nor denied it but stated that DA would then first have to prepare itself well. Representatives of the branches in Kharkiv and Donetsk stated that there were no such plans and argued that DA can address political problems more forcefully from outside the party system. However, KIC clearly looks upon DA as a future political party.

DA wants to be a platform for training of young people and contribute to a new generation of politicians in Ukraine, and its mission is said to be ‘to prepare, on the basis of Christian democracy, new, responsible, patriotically-oriented, civil-political elite of the country, by means of creating conditions for development, improvement and realisation of youth to the benefit of Ukrainian people’. DA runs a number of programmes to encourage young people to participate in the political process, e.g. School of Young Journalists, School of Young Leaders and Interconfessional Dialogue. The project supported by KIC is School of Politicians – Let’s Go Together! DA has 1500 members out of which 300-400 are quite active.

Cooperation between Democratic Alliance and the Swedish Christian Democratic Youth Organisation (KDU) was initiated in the mid 1990s following contacts through Youth of European People’s Party (YEPP). This cooperation included a variety of activities to support DA. Until 2006, the cooperation was administered by KDU and financed through Forum Syd. Forum Syd then denied KDU continued financing of the project because DA was too political. From 2007, the contractual responsibility has been taken over by KIC and the project is to be a three-party cooperation among

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26 Until 2007 called Christian Democratic Youth of Ukraine.
27 According to the Board of DA after a recent revision of its list of members.
KDU, KIC and DA. The ties between KIC/KDU and DA have grown close over the years.

In 2005, KIC/KDU supported a project for training of politicians. The project Let’s Go Together was implemented in 2007/08 and was continued, with some modifications but with the same main focus, into 2009/10. The collaboration between KIC/KDU and DA has also included some DA representatives visiting summer school in Sweden, LFA training etc.

In addition to the support from the Swedish organisation, Democratic Alliance receives financing from e.g. Konrad Adenauer Stiftung (KAS), Hanns Seidel Stiftung and the Robert Shuman Institute.

5.2 Project design

According to the project application for 2007/08, the overarching goal of the School of Politicians – Let’s Go Together was to contribute to a more stable and ideology-based political system, and thereby increase the possibilities for a democratic future of Ukraine. The project objective was to increase the ideological awareness among young people and contribute to political stability. Three sub-objectives with the following indicators were established:

1. A successful recruitment process to identify the future political leaders in Ukraine.
   - Indicator: A strong commitment among the participants during the implementation phase.
   - Indicator: The participants will get influential positions within political parties.

2. To contribute with knowledge about different ideologies through seminars in various regions of Ukraine.
   - Indicator: The participants take on political activities with ideological awareness within a strong democratic organisational structure.

3. To increase the number of active young people in political youth organisations.
   - Indicator: An increased number of members of Democratic Alliance.
   - Indicator: An increased number of politically active young people within Ukrainian youth associations.

Overall, the project builds on the assumption that by training young and politically interested persons and increasing their ideological awareness, they will contribute to a more stable and ideology-based party system.

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The project objectives and indicators are somewhat different in KIC’s final reporting to Sida. In the final report, the project objective was expressed as ‘improved ideological awareness among young people and enhance their participation in politics’. The first sub-objective was expressed as ‘increased knowledge and understanding about how to improve a party or organisation structure, indicators being i) number of participants, ii) number of seminar hours and iii) knowledge about party structure and organisation. The second sub-objective was unchanged from the application but the indicators were instead i) number of participants, ii) number of seminar hours, iii) knowledge of fundamental ideological aspects and iv) grade of political activity based on an ideological awareness. It is not known by the Team when the project was reformulated. The current evaluation’s assessment of effectiveness is based on the original objectives.
The immediate target group was youth and students (aged 18-25) from universities in the regions covered by the project. In total 120 persons from four regions in Ukraine were to take part in the project. There was to be an equal participation between men and women. The reasons for targeting students were that they were considered receptive while at the same time old enough to critically scrutinise different ideologies. In addition, they were considered potential members of political youth organisations.

The programme was designed as a series of seminars; six two-day seminars per year in 2007 and 2008, of which each participant was to attend three. In addition, each year a joint conference was to be arranged with the aim of providing an opportunity for an exchange of experiences, follow-up and evaluation.

The project was elaborated jointly by DA and KIC. The idea mainly came from the Ukrainian side while KIC gave methodological support and functioned as a dialogue partner.

An objective of KIC not expressed in the project application but explicitly stated in interviews has been to support DA to transform into a political party. This gives a very special meaning to the above mentioned objectives. The aim has not been to train young people to become politicians in any party or to increase the membership of young people in any youth organisation but to create a platform of young politicians that can serve as a base for the future party DA.

The project budget for 2007/08 amounted to 845 000 SEK. This figure was evenly distributed over the two years.

5.3 Activities and Output

The project was implemented as planned with a total of 12 three-day seminars in four different regions in Ukraine. During 2007, six seminars were conducted (in Lviv, Donetsk and Yalta). In the autumn of 2007, a final conference was arranged in Kiev. During 2008, six seminars were arranged (in Cherkasy and Lugansk), again with a final conference in Kiev. Groups of participants were to be gender balanced.

DA used the internet, social networks, posters and presentations to announce the seminars. Potential participants went through an extensive application process that included several phases. The selection criteria included a desire to bring about a change in the country, readiness to improve personally, moral values and ability to collect signatures from 50 persons recommending them.

Major topics covered during the seminars were modern political ideologies; the Christian-democratic movement, its formation and development; and Christian democracy - the Ukrainian dimension. The seminars were divided into three blocks. The first dealt with ideology, political parties and civil society. The second was more practical, and the last block was mainly intended to give the participants skills to write articles and engage in debate. After each seminar, different public manifestations were carried out to draw attention to problems in society and put pressure on political decision makers.
The seminars were organised by DA. Training was mainly carried out by DA people, in combination with invited lecturers from Ukraine, for example to speak about different ideologies. Persons from KDU participated in some training sessions, but their input was not something the interviewed Ukrainian participants stressed. Board members stated that the Swedish participation in seminars was valuable mainly as a source of inspiration – giving a ‘vision’ – and as proof of international backing.

DA was also responsible for project management. The role of KIC / KDU was that of a financier, dialogue partner in planning and occasional contributor at the training events. The communication between KIC and DA is good and decisions have been taken in mutual understanding between them.

5.4 Effectiveness

Output (seminars etc.) was produced as foreseen and the past participants interviewed gave the DA training high marks. They appreciated the structure and content of the training course. The practical skills acquired and the emphasis on values and ideology were useful, they said. The training encouraged and inspired them, and gave them practical tools to engage in political activities. Several participants stressed that the course made them realise that they could actually do something about problems: protest, write articles etc. As one participant put it, ‘I did things that I had never done before’.

Relating achievements to the sub-objectives and indicators listed earlier, it cannot yet be determined how successful the project has been at achieving the ‘identify the future political leaders in Ukraine’ sub-goal (Sub-goal 1). There was certainly a thorough selection process and far more applications than places to fill, increasing the chances of a good selection. The participants met by the Team clearly showed a strong commitment and the various implemented civic actions indicate that there was a strong commitment among other participants as well. The future will tell whether the participants will be appointed influential positions within political parties, but so far participants have mainly engaged themselves as political activists of DA, for the time being a political youth organisation. Furthermore, training was not primarily focused on political party work but on advocacy and civil activism. Among the participants met, some were interested in going into politics while others were not.

The project contributed ‘knowledge about different ideologies through seminars in various regions of Ukraine’ (Sub-goal 2). Focus was on Christian democracy. The indicator for this sub-goal was that participants take on political activities with ideological awareness within a strong democratic organisational structure. Such activities were undertaken as part of the project and many participants have continued as DA members.

Sub-goal 3, i.e. ‘To increase the number of active young people in political youth organisations’ was partly achieved. The project gave DA some 60 new members. Half of the 120 participants were already DA members and, therefore, the main result was largely that DA members became better trained and more active. Some of the participants participated in the creation of new DA branches. The project did not increase
the number of young people in other political youth organisations, however, but this was not an ambition of DA and KIC.29

Returning to the project objective (‘To increase the ideological awareness among young people and contribute to political stability’), there has certainly been a contribution to ideological awareness, and in addition to this, a readiness to act. However, the number of persons (120) has still been relatively limited and it would not be realistic to expect it to have any noticeable effect on political stability in Ukraine. The revised project objective (see earlier footnote) also talked about enhancing the participation of young people in politics. Such participation has clearly been enhanced, however, but so far not in party politics.

The overarching project goal (‘To contribute to a more stable and ideology-based political system, and thereby increase the possibilities for a democratic future of Ukraine’) is of course even more remote. While training certainly is a contribution, it is clearly not sufficient.

The above, does not properly reflect KIC’s actual objective behind the support: to assist DA to turn into a political party, challenging the existing ones. The Team can see that the cooperation has strengthened DA organisationally both through activist training and increased visibility in connection with the different civic actions30. If DA continues to build up its base, to establish branches and to use its experiences to define a political agenda, it could possibly become a new political party and aim for the 2012 parliamentary elections. As pointed out by KIC, there is an increasing mistrust towards the established parties, which implies an opening for new parties. Whether DA chooses this path, and has the potential to succeed, is still an open question. So is what role DA would have if it were to enter party politics.

5.5 Relevance

As mentioned above, the project has been developed by DA and fits in well with its other activities. It is clearly consistent with the priorities of DA.

The description of the party system of Ukraine (Appendix 2) points at the ideological deficit of Ukrainian politics. In this perspective, to support an ideology-based organisation such as DA and promote an ideological awareness among youth is highly relevant. The focus on young people is also relevant. Not only is there a need for a generational shift within the established parties, there is also a need to make sure that the young people going into politics are better than the old ones.

The relevance of supporting DA depends on how the organisation is looked upon: as a political civil society organisation (as it operates today and is viewed by many, including members) or as a future political party (as stressed by KIC).

Civil society is important to channel citizen concerns, put pressure on politicians, hold politicians accountable etc. This work is needed and DA seems to be doing it quite effectively. For DA, working politically and being a politician does not, according to its Board members, necessarily imply engaging in a political party. However, it

29 KIC’s report to Sida states that ‘The realisation of the project negatively affected the interests of other political youth organisations in Ukraine since many participants chose to join DA after different activities’.

30 To a certain extent forming an agenda, by identifying problems in society. However, the problems addressed by the different actions were principally local government problems, not national issues.
is difficult to see how DA currently strengthens the party system, other than very indirectly.

Another way to see the DA cooperation would be as a support to a future political party. There is clearly a need for better functioning political parties in Ukraine. Meanwhile, considering the extreme fragmentation of the Ukrainian party system, it is questionable whether the solution lies in starting yet another party. DA argues that working through established parties is not a way forward.31 Other persons met, engaged in party cooperation in Ukraine, argue that it necessary to work with the parties that exist. In this particular case the Team understands that KIC’s support has largely been based on a conviction the Ukrainian party system would benefit from also including a Christian Democratic party with values similar to those of the Swedish one. This may, or may not, be so.

5.6 Side Effects

The protest actions etc. that were part of the training have had effects of different magnitude. Examples include a protest action in Odessa to counteract corruption, and campaigns against the rubbish situation in Donetsk.

Some of the former participants met stated that what they learned in the project would be of benefit for them professionally as well as personally.

As mentioned above, the project has also strengthened DA organisationally. The DA leaders stressed the importance of the long-lasting and reliable support from KIC.

According to KIC, the cooperation has also benefited KDU by broadening international perspectives and motivating its members.

5.7 Sustainability

The likeliness that the benefits of the project will be long term depends on several factors. Many project participants have been very active after having completed the programme, as members of DA and in the established networks. However, only few participants have moved into politics, which was one of the aims with the project. The uncertainties regarding whether DA will transform into a political party were also discussed above. While this transformation is possible, another possible scenario is that DA continues as the NGO it is today, which would not necessarily be a bad thing.

Even thought there has been a gender balance in the project, there is a tendency for women in Ukraine to leave political activity after getting married. One important sustainability issue is therefore how to address traditional gender roles so that female participants are not ‘lost’.

A factor having contributed to the sustainability of DA has been the continuity of its cooperation with KIC.

DA is largely dependent on funding from international party foundations, such as KIC. This international funding helps DA maintain its independence, which is

31 Still a few former DA leaders have actually joined established political parties.
important in Ukraine. At the same time, it has created a dependency on donors. DA is not financially dependent on KIC alone but would not be able to run the School of Young Politicians at the current scale without KIC.

5.8 Observations and Lessons

The assessment of this project, largely depends on what ground the assessment is made.

Seen as a project to raise political awareness among young people and making them more politically active, the Team considers it rather successful. However, the question is what impact the project has had on the party system or, more fundamentally, how DA as a political youth NGO (which it still is) may contribute to a better functioning party system without being a part of it itself.

If the project instead is seen as one to establish a new party, it is clear that this objective has not yet been achieved, and it is an open question whether it will be achieved in the future. Almost 15 years of cooperation with Sweden has, however, been important to build up DA as an organisation and increased its possibilities to transform into a party.

The project highlights the strategic question of whether to try to improve the established parties or to establish new parties challenging the old ones. Established parties can indeed be difficult to change from within, as stated by DA. On the other hand, creating yet another party may contribute to even greater party fragmentation.

There is a considerable discrepancy between the objectives expressed in the Sida application and those directly expressed by KIC, i.e. the ambition to assist DA in becoming a party. This objective was not clear to some of the persons that had undergone training either.

Otherwise, the project application for 2007/08 shows a clear ambition to apply the LFA methodology although there were inconsistencies among sub-goals, indicators and overarching goals. The report to Sida did not quite follow the application. There were, however, considerable improvements in the project application for 2009/10.

Everything indicates that the project has been well managed and professionally implemented. The Team was impressed by the DA representatives met. Other persons met by the Team also spoke favourably about DA and the persons attached to the organisation. The personal capacity of those working within DA is likely to have been one success factor in this project.

Another one is likely to have been the good relations between DA and KIC, a result of many years of continuous cooperation. The DA Board stressed the importance of cooperation having been systematic and long term. The cooperation is based on trust, mutual understanding and a shared view of what is needed in the Ukrainian political system. The personal contacts between KIC and DA have been good, and DA describes KIC as an organisation ‘taking a genuine interest’. At the same time, there has been a strong local ownership of project activities.
According to reports and interviews in Sweden, the division of work between KIC and KD U has not always functioned ideally; there has been a lack of engagement and continuity on the KD U side. The Team has not looked into this issue.
6  Palme Center – Socialist Party of Ukraine

6.1  General

Swedish Social Democrats have been engaged in East European countries since the fall of the Berlin Wall. The Socialist Party of Ukraine (SPU) has been supported by the Palme Center since 2003. SPU was established in October 1991 as a centre-left party and has been a member of Socialist International since 2003. The party has traditionally obtained its votes in rural and small towns in central Ukraine.

SPU obtained 6-8 percent of the votes in the parliamentary elections held 1994-2006. Following the 2004 Orange Revolution, SPU included its representatives in two orange governments in 2005-2006 and campaigned in the 2006 elections to join an orange coalition. However, the refusal of Our Ukraine to cede the position of parliamentary speaker to SPU leader Oleksandr Moroz led to defection of SPU from the coalition, permitting the Party of Regions to create a governing coalition with the Communist and Socialist Parties. This step proved to be a fatal blow to the party's popularity, and in the 2007 pre-term elections, the SPU failed to enter parliament, with many of their voters going to the Yulia Tymoshenko and Volodymyr Lytvyn blocs. Most of the Western donor organisations that had supported SPU decided to withdraw their assistance with the exception of the Palme Center, which argued that supporting SPU was now more important than ever. Today, the party's support is 1-2 percent. In the 2010 presidential election, SPU leader Moroz's received only one percent of the votes. Moroz refusal to entertain the idea of leadership change has led to a split within the party. According to the former leader of the national youth wing of SPU, the majority of the youth members have little optimism about SPU’s future as long as the leadership does not change. This opinion was shared by other persons met as well as by the Team.

The Palme Center both manages its own project and functions as an umbrella organisation for other Swedish organisations affiliated with the social democratic movement. This evaluation has covered three of the projects in Ukraine:

- SPU at the central level (project number 65 113), managed by the Palme Center.
- SPU Kiev (project number 65 281), managed by the Social Democratic Party District of Värmland (VP).
- SPU Kharkiv (project number 65 048), managed by the Social Democratic Party branch of Oskarshamn (OA).

Additional (but not evaluated) projects that included the SPU in 2007 and 2008 were:

- SPU Donetsk (project number 65 805), managed by the Social Democratic Party district of Blekinge.
- SPU Crimea (project number 65 191), managed by VP and LO-union Arvika-Eda.
• Wider Europe (project number 65 223), managed by the Palme Center, targeting SPU and other co-parties in Eastern Europe.

• CEE Network (project number 65 257), managed by the women’s wing of the Social Democratic Party in collaboration with CEE Gender Network for Gender Issues, targeting socialistic women’s organisations in Eastern Europe and the Balkan countries.

According to PC’s project application to Sida for 2007/2008, the overall problem of Ukrainian political parties is the lack of ideological foundation in combination with a very strong personal focus on the leaders. This has led to unclear political alternatives for voters and a disconnection between party leaders and voters. As a result, political parties are incapable of formulating political platforms that are aligned with the interest of citizens. It is also difficult for parties to mobilise party members in campaign work.

The overarching objective of the cooperation with SPU was for the party to become more inclusive and to develop ties between the party and citizens supporting the ideology. This was to be undertaken in two ways: by supporting the party strategically in formulating a clear and consistent programme and by supporting the party in training of party members. With consideration to the underrepresentation of women in the party, there is a requirement that women should participate in all project activities.

6.2 Palme Center - SPU Central Level

6.2.1 Project Design

The principal problem addressed by this project was the lack of substantial political debate due to conflicts among party members in senior positions. The objective was therefore to assist SPU in finding an ideological foundation, whereby a number of core issues would be analysed and discussed in order to find common political standpoints. The areas to be addressed through a series of seminars were migration and energy.

According to the application, the direct target group was activists at all levels in the party. The group should also be gender balanced. An indirect target group was other parties from countries in the Black Sea region.

The primary activity was to conduct of a series of six seminars, starting with the energy issue, arranged by SPU and in collaboration with other ideologically like-minded parties in the Black Sea region. The energy crisis in 2006 triggered the need to bring up energy issues at the political level. The expected outcome was that the SPU would develop a clear standpoint based on well-defined arguments and a comprehensive ideological analysis. Another expected outcome was that the different socialist parties in the regions would reach a common standpoint and make a joint declaration on the energy issue.

In August 2007, an additional application from SPU was submitted to the Palme Center for support to a party newsletter called Socialist Globus, presented as a tool to disseminate information from the planned energy conferences. Instead of arranging
six seminars, SPU applied for two seminars, and the remaining budget would finance the newsletter. The request was approved and the Palme Center transferred the funds in June 2008. The initial idea to arrange seminars on the migration issue was thus never realised. The newsletter was later motivated by the Palme Center as a forum to debate political issues thereby reaching out to a larger target group in the country. The editor of Socialist Globus was the former international secretary of SPU who left the party board in 2008. Non-professional journalists from the SPU youth wing joined the editorial office to work on a freelance basis, as an attempt to encourage ordinary party members also to have the courage to write their own articles or letters to air their views in the newsletter.

The total project budget for 2007 and 2008 was SEK 500 000, of which 250 000 was disbursed each year.

6.2.2 Activities and Output

The activities and output in 2007/08 consisted of two energy seminars (instead of six) and the publication of Socialist Globus.

The first energy conference was held in September 2007, shortly before the parliamentary elections later that month. The conference was attended by 25 participants, including from Georgia (2 persons), Moldavia (2), Russia (1) and Belarus (1). The majority of the participants were youth and half of them were female activists. The expectation among the SPU youth organisation that arranged and attended the conference was that the energy declaration would be possible to use as part of SPU’s election platform as the party did not have a clear position on the energy issue. International participation was motivated by the fact that the neighbouring countries faced similar problems of dependency on Russian gas. The media attention was substantial; four newspapers and two TV channels reported on the conference.

The second energy seminar was held in October 2008 and was attended by 22 persons. Fewer were from neighbouring countries this time and there were no academics. The political situation was completely different compared to one year earlier since SPU had lost the previous year’s elections. There was no support from the party leadership and there was no media coverage.

Twenty-four issues (of which 6 were published in 2009) of Socialist Globus were produced and distributed free of charge on a monthly basis to SPU branches and members all over the country, as well as to some persons outside SPU. The number of printed copies of each issue varied between 800 and 1500. The newsletter mainly contained articles on European social democracy. It also included articles and letters submitted by readers, and published results of polls of readers’ opinions about the party and its leadership. Some articles and letters were critical of the SPU leadership, resulting in them becoming increasingly hostile towards the newsletter. The articles dealt with foreign affairs, democracy, gender, political life and foreign youth organisations, issues that are not very common in other SPU party papers. The Socialist Globus also published 3-4 articles on the energy conference.

The Swedish input to this project has been restricted to financial support required for the seminars and the newsletter. There was no transfer of Swedish experiences.
6.2.3 Effectiveness

The energy issue proved too complicated to solve and no energy policy was developed for SPU. The persons interviewed by the Team concluded that the only outcome of the two conferences was that some people began discussing energy questions and became more environmentally aware. The issue was eventually overtaken by the January 2009 gas crisis. The project objective was thus not achieved.

The newsletter most likely contributed to broadening of the Ukrainian perspectives of social democracy and promoted dialogue, reaching not only urban areas but also rural and more isolated areas. Some participants in international events were given a forum to write about their experiences. Unlike in the official party newspapers, viewpoints other than those of the party leadership were presented, encouraging a hitherto lacking internal and open debate.

However, the circulation of the newsletter was quite limited, implying that relatively few persons were reached. Furthermore, are no indications that Socialist Globus has had any effect on the party so far. The party leadership has distanced itself from the newsletter, which may in fact be an indication of its importance.

Even though the original purpose of Socialist Globus remains somewhat unclear, and the content of it was controversial, the Team concludes that it did contribute to the overall objective of making SPU more inclusive.

6.2.4 Relevance

Research shows that some 10-15 percent of the Ukrainian population sympathises with social democratic ideology. SPU as a party is in a deep crisis and the socialist movement is deeply divided. In this perspective, the cooperation to strengthen SPU has been relevant.

However, SPU is also a party with a severe leadership crisis and problems of weak internal democracy. The strategy of the Palme Center has been to work both at the central and local levels. SPU’s internal problems have seriously affected the cooperation and it may be questioned whether there have actually been any conditions for cooperation at the central level. In practice, the partner became the youth wing of SPU and the institute that the former SPU international secretary is now heading (Institute for Democracy and Social Progress). The international secretary of SPU was not aware of the cooperation with the Palme Center at the time of the evaluation. There has also been a split within the youth organisation itself with respect to loyalty to different party leaders, which has complicated the relationship between the Palme Center and SPU.

The energy issue is an important national issue and, considering the frustration the youth wing felt over the lack of a party policy on the issue, it is understandable that the organisation wanted to address this question. Still, it is very doubtful whether the youth organisation was a suitable partner to handle this issue, considering its complexity and political sensitivity and the strong international interests involved.

On the other hand, the support to the newsletter with the orientation it obtained was relevant in order to infuse new ideas, promote ideological discussions and open up a forum for ordinary party members to discuss party issues and politics.
6.2.5 Sustainability
Regarding the environment seminars there was no impact in the first place and, hence, no sustainability.

The long-term benefits of Socialist Globus are also highly doubtful. The party has not shown responsiveness and the newsletter was completely dependent on the financing of the Palme Center. There have been some discussions between the journalists and the project coordinator regarding a possible web-based version to avoid printing costs, but this would restrict access for older generation SPU members, who very seldom use the internet. The project coordinator has therefore hesitated, claiming that many current subscribers lack internet access (i.e. in rural areas).

6.2.6 Observations and Lessons
As noted above, the project has been seriously affected by the leadership crisis and internal organisational problems of SPU. Working through the youth wing may have been the only alternative at the time, but as a result there has been no ideological strengthening of the party. By the end of 2008, the cooperation was limited to persons who had left SPU. This may be for good reason, but there is a need to clarify with whom the Palme Center should actually work to strengthen social democracy in Ukraine.

A lesson from the energy conference is that projects need to have realistic objectives. An alternative to the conferences could have been to introduce and deepen the knowledge on a step-by-step basis and to bring the mother party onboard in the process.

6.3 Social Democratic Party District of Värmland - SPU Kiev

6.3.1 Background
In 2004, some local social democratic branches in Sweden were invited by the Palme Center to participate in a fact-finding trip to Ukraine. The purpose of the trip was to initiate cooperation with SPU at the local level. VP began a project with SPU Crimea in 2006 in cooperation with the trade union from Arvika and Eda located in Värmland, Sweden. The same year, the Palme Center asked VP to initiate cooperation with SPU Kiev.

6.3.2 Project Design
The principal problem to be addressed by the project was, according to PC’s application to Sida, citizens’ widespread distrust in politics and politicians, as well as a weak civil society. To be credible in politics, politicians must be accountable and able to formulate trustworthy programmes. People’s trust in trade unions has also been very low, and the challenge for the unions is therefore to rebuild confidence in union methods as a tool for economic and political change.
The project objective was to:

- Support the party in its organisational development and work for democratic reforms.
- Strengthen cooperation between the party and the trade union.
- Increase the political participation of women in politics and union work.

Indicators were:

- An increased number of party members.
- Improved organisational structure and internal democracy in the party.
- Steps taken to cooperate with the trade union.
- An increased number of women elected to decision-making posts within the party, and/or more women becoming more active in the party.

According to the application, the direct target group in 2007 was to be persons in leading position within SPU Kiev. Later, the target group was to be extended to include other party members of SPU Kiev.

Together with the SPU Kiev leadership, VP was to plan future activities, in addition to the activities already identified, related to organisational development and political leadership:

- Training on the Palme Center’s internet-based course Online Academy.
- A leadership course held in Sweden.

The intention was also to broaden the direct target group during 2008. The purpose of this was to include more party members in the training on organisation building and gender issues. The ambition was that the level of female representation at the different activities would be at least 50 percent, and that the youth representation in the party would increase.

The inclusion of the trade union in the project was based on the Swedish model. The trade union can influence politics through its close affiliation with the party, while the party receives votes from trade union members by pursuing policies that are in line with the member interests. However, the trade union was not mentioned as a target group in the project application.

When the cooperation with SPU Kiev began, the trade union federation declared that it was not interested in any collaboration with the SPU, since it already collaborated with another party.

In 2008, the project plans changed. VP and the Ukrainian project coordinators at the time found it important for SPU to learn more about the EU and to increase its network with European parties, organisations and institutions. A request for a study trip to Brussels for SPU members was submitted to and approved by the Palme Center.
The yearly budget for 2007 and 2008 was SEK 100,000. The disbursements were SEK 100,000 in 2007 and SEK 146,948 in 2008.

6.3.3 Activities and Output

According to Palme Center reports to Sida, the following activities were implemented:

- A course for Kiev electoral leaders (2007).
- A short presentation of the Online Academy (2007).
- In connection with the Palme Days event in Stockholm, a visit to Karlstad by representatives from Kiev to learn more about the international work of Swedish Social Democrats (2007).
- Three persons from the party board went on the study trip to Brussels (2008).
- Five training courses were conducted on Online Academy in Kiev and Odessa (2008). VP wrote in its report to the Palme Center that the number of participants in the training was difficult to estimate, but estimated the number to approximately 200. The mix of ages and gender was also estimated as being of the right balance.

According to the information given by representatives from SPU Kiev City, there was only one meeting in 2007. In the 2 1/2 hours it lasted, the Swedish representatives informed about the history of the Swedish Social Democratic Party and about the Swedish public sector and election campaigns. The meeting was said to be mutually appreciated as both sides found that they shared the same social democratic values. Some meetings in the Kiev districts were held thereafter to spread the information. However, according to the persons met, there was no further outcome. The project managers of VP have informed the Team that they spent five days meeting and training campaign workers for the upcoming 2007 election. The interviewed persons from SPU Kiev were unaware of this.

The current SPU Kiev leadership had never heard of Online Academy and informed the Team that if such courses had been conducted for SPU Kiev City or the city’s 10 districts, they would have known. In fact, they were totally unaware of any cooperation with Sweden. However, the Ukrainian Project Coordinator (who started administering the SPU Kiev project in May 2008) informed the Team that she had attended a meeting in the same year together with VP in a village called Kotlsubinske located in the Kiev region. The meeting was held in a local café and lasted for approximately three hours. Between 30 and 35 SPU members attended, of which 5-7 were representatives from the local youth organisation and a majority were of pension age. Since there was no technical equipment available, Online Academy was presented orally and some CDs were distributed. In addition, a general information meeting was held in the Chernihiv region, according to SPU representatives there.

32 In SPU in Kiev City, there are also 10 districts included.
Another presentation of Online Academy was given to 37 persons in Odessa. This event was, according to persons interviewed, not an actual training session, but rather a meeting to disperse information about the programme as a web tool. A person attending this session informed the Team that the participants in Odessa were not very interested since most of them were relatively old and hence rarely had access to or used this kind of technology. The respondent emphasised that it would be more efficient if a pool of local persons were trained instead of training being undertaken by the Swedish counterpart. VP, on the other hand, informed the Team that they, in addition to the Online Training in Odessa, had trained five youth to continue the training of SPU members.

The next activity was the four-day study trip to Brussels for three persons. The participants were selected on unclear grounds, i.e. two members of the national youth wing of SPU (the International Secretary and a board member) and a youth wing member went, and none of them held a formal position in SPU. The purpose of the study trip was to learn about the EU and to establish international and European contacts. As part of the trip, the participants visited the European Parliament and the Swedish delegation and met with a Swedish parliamentarian (Inger Segerström) responsible for gender issues. The participants also met with the European Community Organisation of Socialist Youth (ECOSY) and the Party of European Socialists (PES).

The participants interviewed by the Team described the visit as interesting and as having increased their knowledge about the EU. They said it helped them put Ukraine in a different perspective, and upon their return they wrote an article in the Socialist Globus newsletter.

However, according to the Ukrainian participants, the visit did not result in any cooperation. They described the reception at PES as quite cold, probably reflecting the tense relations between the European socialists and SPU, due to the way the SPU leadership has acted. The contacts with PES resulted in provision of advice only. However, a meeting of PES parties was arranged in Ukraine in September 2009, and VP claims that this was largely a result of their visit to Brussels. The PES representatives attending this meeting were also invited to a seminar financed by VP and implemented by the former international secretary of the SPU youth branch. The theme of the seminar was 'What is social democracy?'

No project activities have specifically addressed the issue of women’s participation in politics.

6.3.4 Effectiveness

None of the original project objectives have been achieved or are expected to be achieved. There has been no cooperation at all with the SPU Kiev branch, apart from the meeting conducted in 2007. The activities have instead mainly involved three individuals in the SPU’s youth organisation. Of the three individuals, one left the party in 2009.

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33 A training session on Online Academy was supposed to be held in a parallel project (SPU Crimea) as well. However, the Team was informed that this was not an actual training session but rather a meeting where CDs of the Online Academy were distributed to the participants.
6.3.5 Relevance
The original overall objectives of the project were highly relevant in view of the situation of SPU. However, the undertaken activities did not lead to the fulfilment of these objectives. The three SPU representatives’ visit to Brussels did not strategically contribute to reaching the project objectives.

PC’s choice, in view of the problems at the central level, to work at the local level was understandable. However, the SPU in Kiev has also been very turbulent, changing its leadership four times over four years, making cooperation practically unviable.

The idea of promoting collaboration with trade unions stems from the long history of collaboration between Swedish trade unions and the Social Democratic Party. However, there seems to have been no consideration of the very different Ukrainian situation, in which trade unions of the type known in Western Europe are virtually non-existent.

6.3.6 Side effects
There was an unforeseen target group, namely SPU members in Odessa.

6.3.7 Observations and Lessons
This project failed for a number of reasons. The general disorder began with an inadequate planning process. A more thorough investigation of potential target groups, as well as their interest and needs, should have been undertaken. The turbulence within SPU Kiev was another crucial factor. The project highlights the importance of assessing the very feasibility of engaging in cooperation.

There are substantial differences between VP’s application to the Palme Center and the Palme Center’s application to Sida. VP states that it has not seen the application to Sida, which is a reason for concern. The Ukrainian project coordinator had not had access to any of these documents and was unaware of the project objectives.

There have also been serious flaws in its implementation. The implemented activities have been erratic, appear to have been poorly implemented and have not contributed strategically to the project objectives.

The reports from VP have not given a good basis for reporting to Sida. The reports to Sida have been partly misleading and incorrect. VP has not seen them.

One factor that has affected the project is the frequent change of party leaders in SPU Kiev, making it difficult to work with this branch. However, during these circumstances, the project should have been stopped.

In its latest report to the Palme Center, VP sees a ‘big possibility of copying the Swedish model’. Although some Swedish experiences may be valuable, the Team questions this approach. Greater sensitivity to, and knowledge about, the local situation is needed.

The Team’s findings indicate that VP has lacked the project management capacity necessary to conduct an adequate problem analysis and to plan, follow-up and report on the project.
The findings indicate weaknesses in the Palme Center’s quality assurance of projects. They also indicate a need for the Palme Center to support its implementing organisation with respect to project management.

VP has pointed at the problems caused by the long time span from application for funds to disbursement.

Although not part of the assessed period, in September 2009 a seminar was held in Kiev on the theme ‘What is social democracy?’. The seminar was attended by six Ukrainian parties who label themselves as social-democratic. This cross-party approach is interesting, considering the fragmentation among left-wing parties. However, from what the Team understands, there was no institutional linkage between SPU and this event.

6.4 Social Democratic Party Branch of Oskarshamn - Socialist Party of Ukraine, Kharkiv

6.4.1 Background

This cooperation originates from two different projects, of which one has been financed by the Palme Center through the PAO cooperation since 2004, managed by the Social Democratic Party branch of Oskarshamn (OA), and directed to SPU and the Social Democratic Party of Ukraine (SDPU) in Kharkiv. The other project, which has been financed as part of Sida’s NGO support, has dealt with trade unions and has been managed by the international secretary of the Swedish trade union IF Metall. It was initiated in 2002 with the partners being two local trade unions in Kharkiv; namely Automobile and Agricultural Machine Building Workers Union and Ukrtelecom. Although this report will to a certain extent touch on the trade union project but its main focus is on the cooperation that started in 2007 between, on the Swedish side, OA and, on the Ukrainian side, SPU, SDPU and the trade unions.

The initiative to begin party to party cooperation was taken after OA was invited by the Palme Center to participate in a fact-finding mission to Ukraine, at a time when the Swedish Social Democratic Party had decided to increase cooperation with Ukraine.

OA was already cooperating with Belarus and expected that the experiences from this project could facilitate the proposed project in Ukraine. A trilateral cooperation was initiated in 2004, involving the two social democratic parties in Kharkiv (SPU and SDPU), their counterpart BSDP in Belarus and OA. OA in turn involved the social democratic women’s and youth branches in the city of Kalmar in the project. Due to the political situation in Belarus, the project was split into two separate ones in 2005. According to OA, SDPU had an ambition to initiate cooperation with the local trade unions, and there were sporadic contacts between OA and trade unions in 2005.

However, in 2007 the Palme Center decided to change SDPU’s status from a cooperating partner at the national level to being involved in the project through ‘talks’ at the local level. According to the Palme Center, the decision was motivated on the grounds that SDPU was a small party at the national level.
The party cooperation in Ukraine in its present form (with the cooperation with trade unions) began when representatives from OA and the Swedish trade unions met and noted that they were both interested in Ukraine and both had well-established networks in their respective fields. This became the basis for continued discussions.

6.4.2 Project Design

The project objective was to strengthen SPU in terms of organisation and capacity. The project was also aimed at enhancing knowledge in specific areas, such as party-union collaboration, women’s role and possibilities for engaging politically, different modes of training (such as the study circle methodology), organisational issues and technical issues in relation to elections.

The principal problem for the project to address was citizens’ distrust in politicians and trade unions. As a result of Soviet rule, no Ukrainian trade unions have represented the workers in relation to working conditions, livelihood and politics. There has also been a great deal of distrust between politicians and trade unions. Politicians have looked upon trade unions as the government’s extended arm, since many trade union leaders have been appointed by the state or a state-controlled company. The trade unions have distrusted politicians in the country for the same reasons as ordinary citizens. Politicians have not represented voters and have often been corrupt and above the law. The cooperation was to give mutual benefits to the parties and the trade union. The parties would provide a channel for trade unions to influence political decision-making, while the parties would receive support and votes from the trade union and its members by representing them on trade union issues. The Ukrainian stakeholders requested Swedish experiences in order to learn how political parties and trade unions function in Sweden and how they collaborate.

The primary target group was persons with leading positions in SPU in Kharkiv, as well as party members, with a special focus on women and youth. The trade union representatives have, after 2007, also become a primary target group in the project, in order to promote cooperation between the parties and the trade unions, and to find common grounds and problem areas to work with.

In 2008, the teachers and students at the Federation of Trade Unions school (‘gymnasium’) in Kharkiv were added to the target group, with the aim of reaching the young generation before it enters the labour market to discuss social and political issues, as well as HIV/AIDS and trafficking.

The central organisation of SPU was an indirect target group.

The activities planned for 2007/08 to reach the objectives were:

- Study visits (number not mentioned) to Sweden and Ukraine to plan for different trainings to be conducted in 2007/08, starting by exchange experiences and, for the Ukrainian side to learn from the Swedish socio-democratic model how trade unions and political parties are functioning, and collaborate.

34 The SDPU local branch has also been a target group although the party was not mentioned in the application and the reports for 2007 and 2008.
• To establish a broader network between the Swedish and Ukrainian party structures to facilitate dialogue and correspondence in-between the study visits.

Issues were considered for inclusion in the planned trainings were party and trade union cooperation, the ‘study circle’ methods during training, and women’s and youth’s roles and possibilities to work politically. OA’s revised project application for 2007/08 (dated in July 2007) includes health issues related to HIV/AIDS and trafficking, active support of youth exchange and promotion of engagement and information in the Swedish province of Kalmar about the Ukrainian development.

The expected outcome of the activities consisted of:

• An increased number of party members.

• A better organisational structure, including improved internal democracy.

• Steps taken to initiate cooperation between political parties and trade unions.

The total budget was SEK 225 000 and the actual expenditures totalled SEK 185 841. It was not until the end of 2007 that the project was launched more comprehensively. Savings were mainly due to cancelled activities with SDPU, cancelled visits to Ukraine, a lower number of participants making study visits than originally foreseen, as well as a planned visit to Sweden being financed by the Sida NGO support during 2007/08.

The links between activities, project objectives and the overall objective of the party support are not very clear and there was no discussion in the project application about any underlying assumptions.

6.4.3 Activities and Output

In 2007 and 2008, the activities and output consisted of:

• A study visit by the trade union in Kharkiv to Sweden and LO-distriktet Sydost (not financed via the PAO budget but as part of Sida’s NGO support). It was during this study visit that the different counterparts decided to initiate collaboration.

• Meetings with the trade unions’ (Automobile and Agricultural Machine Building Workers Union and Ukrtelecom) and party organisations’ (SPU and SDPU) regional representatives with the aim of planning for upcoming events intended to unite them.

• The project coordinators from OA and SEKO, including one representative from LO-distriktet Sydost, visiting the federal trade union school twice to discuss social and political development and to show the film ‘Lilja Forever’, which deals with trafficking.

• A seminar for 20 staff from the Automobile and Agricultural Machine Building Workers Union and Ukrtelecom to discuss future cooperation.

• A seminar for 25 participants from the two trade unions and two party organisations (as above) to discuss the role of trade unions and parties in a democratic market economy.
• A training of trainers course, held for 20 representatives from the same four organisations.

The purpose of the training of trainers was to enable Ukrainian trainers to conduct their own seminars or meetings to create awareness among party and trade union members of the importance of trade union and party collaboration, for a united labour movement with common ideological positions.

Two trips to Ukraine were not conducted as planned. One was the delegation trip to Ukraine related to the termination of separate cooperation with SDPU. The other trip was cancelled due to another project obligation with Belarus.

6.4.4 Effectiveness

The Team finds that the expected outcomes have been fulfilled in part.

In terms of an increased number of party members, the Team received information that the collaboration with the trade unions and increased media attention had contributed to the parties gaining some new members. However, the number of new members is unknown. It should be recalled that during the project period, SPU had a disastrous membership development due to its leadership. However, in a longer-term perspective, the parties' collaboration with trade unions could well be important to attract new members.

The second expected outcome, a better organisational structure and improved internal democracy, has not been achieved. No activities for this purpose were undertaken.

There has, however, been progress in relation to the third outcome, i.e. steps taken to initiate cooperation between political parties and trade unions. During 2007 and 2008, such cooperation was promoted through seminars and meetings, resulting in a breakthrough in February 2009 when an agreement to bring collaboration was signed between the different partners. A permanent steering group responsible for the collaboration was elected, and suggestions on common topics to cooperate on were put forward. The cooperation between trade unions and social-democratic parties is reported to have spread to regions outside the city of Kharkiv. There have been joint street actions (protests), TV and radio appearances, newspaper articles, and speeches by trade union leaders at local SPU congresses. Collaboration between parties and the unions has thus been established.

There are also indications that there has been some progress towards achievement of the project objective. The cooperation between SPU and the trade unions has to a certain extent strengthened SPU organisationally through the contact with the trade unions and media exposure. Knowledge about party-union cooperation has increased, and to a certain extent also knowledge about women’s roles and possibilities to engage in politics. Participation of youth has also been promoted to the extent that OA has required its partner organisations to invite women and youth to all meetings and seminars. It was reported that the participation of men and women in training is now
equal, but this has not been possible to confirm. However, the number of women and youth with higher positions is still low in both parties. Impact in relation to all of the above-mentioned activities should be seen in relation to the rather few activities that have taken place.

According to OA, when the Swedish-Ukrainian cooperation began, SPU in Kharkiv did not have any structured women’s organisation and had very few youth attending the meetings. Today, working with women and youth has become a ‘natural part of SPU’s approach’, OA states. The women’s organisation ‘Ukrainian Roses’ in SDPU on the other hand was involved from the very beginning of the cooperation in 2005. Many of SDPU’s party members and local leaders are young and there has been ongoing work to establish local branches, youth camps, international contacts (which has resulted in membership in the International Union of Socialist Youth), and to support and invest in female politicians.

However, the number of women and youth with higher positions is still low in both parties. Impact in relation to all of the above-mentioned activities should be seen in relation to the rather few activities that have taken place.

6.4.5 Relevance

Considering the problems of the socialist parties at the national level, working with SPU and SDPU at the local level in Kharkiv makes sense. In Kharkiv, the divides between the parties are not that deep. Additionally, the SPU and SDPU have a long experience of engagement in local politics and have international exposure, being the only two Ukrainian parties in Socialist International. However, the local branches of SPU also inevitably suffer from the problems at the central level as the party has lost both credibility and members.

The overall project objectives, in terms of strengthening the parties as organisations and promoting political participation of women, are highly relevant. Also, the objective of promoting collaboration between the parties and the unions is relevant, if seen as a means of strengthening the links between the party and its constituencies. It also has the potential of bringing mutual benefits to both sides.

The ambition to involve women and youth is relevant, considering their current underrepresentation in Ukrainian politics.

To establish contact with school of the trade union federation is seen as a good initiative to encourage youth to take more active part in trade union work and eventually run for leading positions. However, the cooperation needs to be more intensified in order to support female and youth trade union members so that they can become more influential in the trade union.

According to the respondents, the Swedish input and experiences have been very relevant. It is from the Swedish party-trade union model that the partner organisations received new ideas as to how they could organise themselves.

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35 A female activist from an NGO advocating for women's rights brought up an additional issue related to gender. She has observed that men still dominate in the larger seminars while women are just listeners. In the seminar that the Team attended in September 2009, 9 out of 23 participants were women. Out of the 8 speakers and presenters at the seminar, only 1 was a woman, which confirms the respondent’s observations. Facilitation skills, training in group dynamics and how to work with gender issues in the facilitation of the seminars could support women to be more active at different events.

36 Most youth the Team met with found that they were more social democratic in their ideology than older members, who tended to be more socialist.
6.4.6 Side effects

A key feature of this project is that it has not only served to strengthen the party system but also the trade unions. According to representatives from the trade union, the number of trade union members has increased as a result of the project. After a trade union activist held a meeting in one of the factories, approximately 300 workers decided to join (an unconfirmed figure). Furthermore, the cooperation has made trade unions understand that they do not need to establish new parties but can work with existing ones. The interviewed party leaders found the cooperation beneficial as the parties had received new members after joint activities (the Team did not receive any supporting documents to verify the number of new members). Furthermore, the union representatives told the Team that the cooperation had led to empowerment and political consciousness – they now understand that change is reliant on their actions and not on a ‘good Tsar’ (i.e. change coming from above rather than from below).

The parties and trade unions reported that they became more effective in using the media for their purposes. For instance, the cooperation had received attention in local media (newspaper and radio). SPU in Kharkiv had organised a political day, explaining the Swedish model and cooperation between parties and trade unions. All in all, there was a good public response.

Working with two local parties, i.e. SPU and SDPU, has been an important component of the project since the beginning of the cooperation. It is one of the very few cases where PAO has in some, albeit limited, way dealt with the problem of party fragmentation and coalition building.

6.4.7 Sustainability

The collaboration between the parties and the unions has just begun. If it progresses, there are good prospects for long-term benefits.

With respect to how the project was designed, the training of Ukrainian trainers and sharing of the costs for the seminars and courses held between Sweden and the Ukraine (e.g. rental of seminar halls, transport costs and materials) all contribute to sustainability.

6.4.8 Observations and Lessons

The positive results with respect to party-union collaboration were enabled by several factors. First of all, there have been labour unions to work with, something that is not obvious in Ukraine. Secondly, there were originally two projects, which began with the labour unions and the parties working separately and then became a successful merge. Moreover, the personal capacities of some persons engaged in the cooperation appear to have played an important role.

Another success factor appears to have been the way in which the seminars (initiated in 2008 and continued in 2009) were conducted. The interactive ‘study circle’ method, which is common in the Swedish labour movement, was appreciated by the participants interviewed by the Team. The seminars were very structured and result oriented, and participants could see that they were moving forward from one seminar to another by using the SWOT analysis at each seminar (the Team witnessed a SWOT
analysis made by three Ukrainian groups in Kharkiv at a Swedish seminar). The method engaged the participants in discussions and forced them to present solutions to different problems. There was also continuity in the series of seminars, with tasks they had to complete between the seminars.

The participatory approach, in which Swedish and Ukrainian counterparts collaborate in the project design and its content, has many advantages. The topics become relevant for the stakeholders and they feel responsible for the outcome of the project. Local ownership is very often the key for successful projects. At the same time, it requires that the Swedish counterpart is in close and frequent contact with the stakeholders, and that a good monitoring system is in place, which is not the case today.

The Team notes that a number of planned activities were not implemented and that several objectives were not fulfilled. This was largely due to capacity constraints of OA but was also a question of prioritisation. There was a de facto drift of objectives from those related to organisational development and internal democracy to the party-union cooperation. It was logical to seize the opportunity to work with the unions, as there was a parallel project with the union. However, the need for organisation building and internal democracy remains the same and was not addressed by the project other than indirectly.

6.5 General Observations Regarding Palme Center’s Cooperation in Ukraine

Considering that an estimated 10-15 percent of the Ukrainian population have political sympathies that lie close to social democracy, and considering the current crisis of SPU, the Team considers cooperation with this party to be highly relevant. The overall objective of the cooperation, i.e. for SPU to become a more inclusive party and to develop ties between the party and citizens supporting the ideology, is also considered relevant.

Today, SPU is considerably weaker than when OPC initiated its cooperation some years back. It is not inclusive and ties to citizens supporting the ideology are weaker than ever. The cooperation has evidently had limited impact on the overall negative development of the party.

One obvious reason for this is the fact that project have been rather small.

The Team also notes that the effectiveness has varied considerably among the different sub-projects studied. Some progress was observed in the trade union cooperation in Kharkiv, and the newsletter Socialist Globus is believed to have contributed somewhat to the internal debate within SPU. However, the objectives of the cooperation with SPU Kiev and of the energy conference were not fulfilled.

The varying degree of effectiveness of the projects seen may be explained by the very crisis of SPU and the current split between the party leadership and party sympathisers. In this situation, the Palme Center chose to work mainly at the local level and to continue working with persons who have distanced themselves from the party leadership. The international Secretary of SPU was not aware of the Palme Center’s projects at the time of the visit to Ukraine. While the strategy of the Palme Center may have been the only feasible one, it has led to local interventions lacking linkage to the cen-
tral level. In fact, it was not even very clear with whom the Palme Center was actually working in 2009.

Even though the Team considers the objectives of the cooperation relevant, the very feasibility of the cooperation may be called into question.

Another factor behind the results seen is insufficient capacity of the Swedish party districts to plan, manage and follow-up on projects. Furthermore, the Palme Center has not managed to assure quality and give the party districts sufficient support.

While the different sub-projects were intended to complement each other, the Team notes that there has hardly been any linkage between them. To a certain extent, this can be explained by the absence of a functioning counterpart at the central level. However, neither has there been any systematic exchange of information between the Swedish party districts, even though they work with the same party, within similar areas and for the same purpose.

The Team also notes that the project applications of the two party districts to the Palme Center differ quite substantially from the applications presented by the Palme Center to Sida. The party districts have not seen the latter, nor the reports submitted by the Palme Center to Sida. This is problematic from accountability and transparency perspectives.
7 Silc – Party for Public Rule

7.1 Background
The cooperation between Silc and PNP (Partija Narodnij Porjadok) originates from an earlier cooperation that Silc with the NGO youth organisation Euroleader since 2002 (financed through Forum Syd). The party and the NGO are located in Donetsk in Eastern Ukraine.

The initiative to launch PNP as a party was taken in 2004 by Euroleader and locally elected politicians unaffiliated with any political party. For this purpose, they established the PNP organisation committee. The process of registering PNP as a national party began in 2005 with the ambition to participate in the 2006 national elections. Silc began cooperation with PNP in 2005.

In March 2009, after four court cases, the party was finally registered by the Ministry of Justice. The delay of registering the party was, according to Silc and PNP, due to the Ministry of Justice questioning the number of party supporters. An additional possible reason was, according to Silc, that the application did not fulfil the requirement according to the registration law. From 2005 and onwards, Silc has given PNP financial assistance for the process of registration, training, domestic and international seminars, and recruitment with a view to strengthen the party.

7.2 Project Design
According to the project application for 2007/2008, a big problem in Ukraine is that people are dissatisfied with the prevailing political situation and that people are generally unwilling to participate in the democratic processes and politics. Especially young people have refrained from engaging politically and from voting. Silc therefore believes it is important to support democratic forces that may constitute political alternatives for the Ukrainian citizens and voters.

According to Silc, there are no social-liberal parties in the country today. By supporting the process of registering PNP as a national party, there would be a social-liberal political alternative for persons with such sympathies, potentially attracting young people and promoting equal opportunities for both women and men to participate in politics. The party’s influence would strengthen Ukraine’s democracy and observance of human rights.

The primary target group of the project consisted of PNP and its members. The secondary target group has been the Ukrainian citizens in general, with an emphasis on younger people interested in politics.

In order to contribute to a well-functioning party system and strengthened democracy, the overall objective of this project was to contribute to encourage increased

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37 This committee has the same function as a local party organisation and could candidate in the local council election. However, to be registered as a party, the organisation needs to have support from 2/3 of the regions in Ukraine.
political participation in Ukraine and to strengthen the presence of liberal parties in the country, especially in the Eastern parts, which are dominated by oligarchic parties and where democratic and liberal ideologies have had problems reaching out to voters.

The project objectives have been a) to increase the legitimacy of PNP in the Donetsk area; b) to increase participation and representation of women at higher levels of the party; c) to increase and improve the party’s communication with the citizens and the party members; d) to strengthen the political platform and the election strategy for the election in 2011; e) to strengthen PNP’s networks with European and international organisations such as ELDR and the Liberal International; f) to establish a network for Ukrainian political reformists called Eurodeputies; and g) to prepare the registration of PNP at the national level for the elections in 2011.

Sub-objectives and expected results were:

- Establishment 17 local party branches in the Donetsk region.
- Implementation of 25 seminars on topics related to liberal ideology and gender equality/women’s participation in party building.
- Implementation of 20 training sessions to party members about team work.
- Design and distribution of a monthly party newspaper in 25 000.
- Participation of PNP in the events of ELDR, the Liberal International and other liberal organisations at least once per year.
- Invitation of other Silc partner organisations to at least two events per year.

PNP was to develop a plan and a process for the political work and the training of party members. The aim of the training programme was to improve the party members’ understanding of political work and about different European liberal party programmes, gender equality and team building. The trainings were also intended to equip the participants with necessary knowledge and techniques to be able to run in elections.

Indicators were:

- The number of persons becoming new members of PNP.
- The number of times PNP is mentioned in articles and media.
- The number of women becoming new party members and reaching higher positions in the party.
- To conduct a study to investigate how well-known the party is in the community.
- The number of activities and number of participants in each activity (separated into old and new members).
- To develop the content of the seminars and trainings based on the evaluations made by participants after each seminar or training.
The number of international participants attending PNP activities and the number of times PNP attends international events.

The total yearly budget for 2007 and 2008 was SEK 927 000, yet the disbursements were lower (SEK 883 195). Some trips to Ukraine planned by Silc were cancelled in 2007 and 2008. There was a reallocation of funds to pay for PNP’s participation in international events.

7.3 Activities and Output
PNP and Silc have reported that all the above-listed sub-objectives were implemented with the planned number of participants:

• 17 local branches were established.
• 25 seminars on topics related to liberal ideology and gender equality in politics were conducted for 590 participants (325 women and 265 men).
• 20 seminars on party organisation building and team work were conducted for 350 participants (180 women and 170 men).
• 22 issues of a monthly party bulletin were published and 25 000 copies were distributed (in all 550 000 copies).
• PNP participated in six international events on elections and activism (three in Moldavia, one in Russia, one in Stockholm, one in Kiev).
• PNP arranged two events, to which other Silc partner organisations were invited (Liberalism Today and Tomorrow and Elections in Ukraine).

All planned activities and output foreseen have thus, according to reports, lists of participants and interviews with PNP, been completed. Silc has monitored and followed up on the project on a regular basis via telephone and e-mail, and on a quarterly basis by sending people from Sweden to attend some of the project activities, where they took the opportunity to talk with as many participants as possible.

7.4 Effectiveness
The registration of PNP in 2009 as a party was a major achievement. According to PNP, this would not have happened without the assistance from Silc. The project objective of preparing the registration of the party at the national level (g) has thus been achieved.

According to Silc's report, project objective (a), i.e. increased legitimacy of PNP, has been achieved, as a result of the establishment of 17 local branches in the Donetsk region. The number of party members has also increased, from 6423 in 2007 to 11 897 in 2009 according to PNP records. The organised seminars, on human rights, gender, liberal ideology and private property, have proven to be good recruiting grounds for new members.

What constitutes an indicator of ‘legitimacy’ may be subject to discussion. Silc emphasises the importance of party members being active. The team has not been able to evaluate the level of activity among the registered members. It may,
however, be recalled that it is very common among Ukraine’s (currently) 167 parties to gather signatures of persons who are not politically committed and then establish branches that thus exist only on paper.

The objective of increased female participation and representation at the higher levels of the party (b) has been partly fulfilled. There was a gender balance in the seminars and meetings during 2007 and 2008 (51 percent women and 49 percent men), but according to Silc’s own report, PNP needs to continue its efforts to increase female representation in higher political posts.

The project objective to improve the party’s communication with citizens and party members (c) has partly been achieved. This has to a certain extent been achieved through the newsletter. However, the Team visited two politically independent centres and think tanks (the Razumkow Ukrainian Centre for Economic and Political Studies in Kiev and the Centre for Political Studies in Donetsk),38 which monitor political developments and parties in Ukraine. At the time of the meeting, neither of them had heard of PNP. It is especially surprising that the local political centre in Donetsk, which has monitored the Donetsk region for the last 16 years, had never heard of PNP or its organisational committee. The Team concludes that PNP is still unknown to most people in the area.

The interviewed party members did not mention any progress in terms of elaboration of the election strategy. The project objective to strengthen the political platform and the election strategy for the election in 2012 (d) is still to be fulfilled.

PNP has both arranged and been invited to international networking events, and has establishing a domestic network called Eurodeputies. There has thus been some achievement in relation to project objectives (e), i.e. to intensify the network with European and international organisations such as ELDR and the Liberal International, and (f), i.e. to establish a network for Ukrainian political reformists called Eurodeputies. However, based on reports and interviews, it is highly questionable what those events resulted in.

The Team concludes that the planned activities have been carried out and fulfilled at the output level, and that some of the outcomes have been partly achieved. There has also been some progress towards the overall objective to contribute to increased political participation in Ukraine and to strengthen the presence of liberal parties in the country through the registration of PNP at the national level. However, although the party has been registered, the presence of PNP as a liberal party at the national and local levels is still very limited. The next parliamentary elections will show to what extent PNP has been successful in establishing itself as a nationwide liberal party and as a political alternative.

7.5 Relevance

The project objectives are relevant in order to increase the participation and representation of youth and especially young women in politics. The network established with other liberal organisations has been useful in broadening the party members’ perspectives of party work and liberal ideology.

38 www.uceps.com.ua and http://cps.at.ua/index/0-2
Silc and PNP have mainly drawn on local resources for training, which is likely to have made the training and seminar content better adapted to the national context. On the other hand, the added value that Silc has brought in as a Swedish liberal party foundation has been limited to lectures in the seminars on e.g. election campaigning, methodology and themes that PNP has asked for.

Most efforts have, however, been directed to support PNP in preparing for registration (such as collection of signatures of supporters). This has been at the expense of capacity building activities of the organisation and activities to elaborate an election platform, according to the interview with Silc.

The project builds on the idea that something important would be missing in the Ukrainian party system without a social-liberal party and that PNP can become a better functioning party than the existing ones. However, it may be questioned whether Ukraine is helped by the establishment of an additional party in an already highly fragmented party system. Also, there is no guarantee that this party will be better functioning than existing ones or be in a position to rehabilitate liberal ideas and values following their discrediting by the Liberal Party.

### 7.6 Side Effects
As mentioned, the Ukrainian party system suffers from fragmentation. There is a risk that starting yet another party will increase this fragmentation.

As a result of Silc’s activities in Ukraine, there has been some increased interest in Ukraine within the Swedish Liberal Party.

### 7.7 Sustainability
The main, and very open, question in relation to sustainability is whether PNP will survive as a political party. The experience of Silc is that it is difficult for parties to survive unless they receive representation in the parliament. Some parties manage to survive by obtaining representation in local councils while failing to enter parliament, as they may be influential and popular only at the local level. To enter parliament, PNP would have to join one of the major political blocs, or it could merge with a larger party. 39

Silc is the only donor organisation that gives technical and financial support to PNP. PNP, and Silc estimates that the Swedish support covers between 20 and 30 percent of PNP’s total budget. PNP also has private sponsors. Silc has no intention of phasing out its support to PNP in the near future, but is hoping that other donors and private persons will show an interest in the party and begin supporting it financially. The introduction of PNP in the international liberal networks, where party support foundations from other countries also participate, is an additional way to make possible the broadening of PNP’s funding base, according to Silc.

### 7.8 Observations and Lessons
Interviewed young women and men talked about strengthened self esteem, better abilities to pursue political issues and increased knowledge about party work as a

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39 There have been contacts between PNP and Our Ukraine-Donetsk.
result of the various seminars and trainings. The seminars have developed the participants on an individual level, and according to the party leader, those who attended international events ‘changed their awareness and became more active in the liberal party’. However, the link between this individual capacity development and development of the party’s capacity is not clear or obvious.

There has been a strong local project ownership and decentralised management. This requires well-developed monitoring systems, and as perceived by the Team, there is room for improvement.

While the registration of the party in 2009 was a major achievement, the overall objective of the project is still far from fulfilled. Establishing a new national political party is obviously a tremendous task with many risks involved. Furthermore, it is still uncertain whether, and if so how, such a party will strengthen the Ukrainian party system.

Silc is a relatively small organisation with limited resources, as commented on by PNP, having big ambitions. It appears that broadened support, both nationally and internationally, will be crucial for PNP’s ability to reach its goals.
Appendix 1: List of Persons Met

IN UKRAINE

People's Union - Our Ukraine

Kiev

Stepan Barna
President, Youth Union Our Ukraine

Roman Bezsmertnyi
Head of Central Executive Committee of OU

Elina Foinska
Participant, JHS Summer School

Mychailo Gorovoy
Participant, Conference on Europe

Yiliya Hladkova
Former International Secretary

Larysa Hynchuk
Former Project Manager

Tanya Karchenko
Organiser of party activities

Igor Kazmichuk
Participant, Conference on Europe

O Kravtsenyuk
Participant, JHS Summer School

Yuriy Mindyuk
International Secretary, Youth Union

Olga Miroshnychenko
Participant, Conference on Europe

Viktorija Mykha
Former International Secretary, Youth Union

Khrystyna Nadraga
Participant, JHS Summer School

Mariya Naumenko
Party functionary

Oleg Pavlyshyn
Head, Dept. for education and methods support

Maksym Volobumr
Participant, Campaign training

Petro Yaroshynsky
Participant, Conference on Europe

Nadia Yershov
Participant, JHS Summer School

Lviv

Yiiriy Dikanev
Founder and former head of Youth Union, Lviv

Andriy Dybravsky
Participant, Turka seminar

Bohdan Horbovyy
Former Project Manager

Roman Ivanovych Yasinsky
Deputy of Lviv city council; organiser of seminars

Andriana Khvorostyak
Project participant

Rostyslav Koval
Press secretary, participant in seminars

Ivan Kuts
Participant, Turka seminar

Oksana Krystyniak
Head of Executive Committee, Lviv City

Emiliya Podlyashetska
Member of Lviv Regional Council
Kseniya Rozhak  Executive Committee of OU Lviv, and organiser of project activities
Natalya Tsenova  Participant, gender seminar
Emiliya Volodymyrivna  Organiser/participant of gender seminar
Oksana Yamschykova  Participant
Oksana Yevstahiivna  Organiser/participant of gender seminar

Dnepropetrovsk
Andriy Fishchuk  Head of regional branch Youth Union
Sergey Medvid  Our Ukraine Youth Union
Nebrat Vladlen  Our Ukraine YenaKiyvo youth

Kharkiv
Lilia Avdyeeva  Local council Kharkiv city/participant governance
Yaroslav Markevych  Our Ukraine Youth Union
Svitlana Semko  Our Ukraine Youth Union, International relations

Socialist Party of Ukraine

Kiev
Bohdan Ferens  Project participant
Tetiana Kachanovska  SPU Kiev Branch
Viktor Khomenko  SPU Dniprovsky region of Kiev
Irina Kovalenko  Contributor Socialist Globus
Olena Lukaniuk  Project Coordinator, former International Secretary of Youth Wing
Lyndmila Protasenko  Contributor Socialist Globus
Rastislav (-)  Secretary, ideological issues, SPU Kiev branch
Yevhen Shchawb  SPU Dniprovsky branch
Vitaliy Yakovych Shybo  Former International Secretary of SPU, Editor of Socialist Globus
Kateryna Vezieleiva  Project participant, Coordinator (Krim), SPU Youth Wing
Dennis Voloshyn  International Secretary of SPU
Yuriy Zubko  First Secretary of SPU Kiev branch

Kharkiv
Oleksandr Dubynskyi  Second secretary SPU Kharkiv Regional branch
Vasyl Goncharenko  Second secretary SPU Kharkiv City
Tatiana Kiliapkova  Participant (NGO women’s right)
Viktor Alexic Mikukov  Participant (NGO defence of children of the war)
PARTY COOPERATION IN A RESULTS PERSPECTIVE

APPENDIX 1: LIST OF PERSONS MET

Donetsk
Ksienia Tiuterva
Head of SPU Youth Wing

Crimea
Oleksandr Chernetsky (by phone)
Head of the Socialist Youth Union, Crimea

Social Democratic Party of Ukraine
Oleksandr Antonov
Party leader SDPU

Party for Public Rule
Andriy Drevsky
Chairperson PNP
Natalia Golovchenko
Member PNP
Natalia Lazarik
Euroleader/ PNP
Sergey Maltser
Euroleader/ PNP
Volodymyr Shyhus
Euroleader/ PNP
Juliya Skiperskih
Head of Board of Euroleader/ PNP

Democratic Alliance

Kiev
Victor Andrusiv
Vice Chairman of the Board
Vasyl Gatsko
Chairman of the Board
Kateryna Gozbluyk
Project participant
Julia Horodyska
Project participant
Oleksandr Iarema
Former leader of DA
Anatolii Korol
Secretary of the Board
Olena Kyzlyuk
Project participant
Olia Muliarchuk
Project participant
Marina Pavlenchik
Project participant
Maksym Studilko
Project participant
Vladyslav Syniagovskiy
Former leader of DA

Lugansk
Andrey Petrov
Head
Lyudmila Petrukhan
Former leader Board Member

Donetsk
Zoya Buinicka
Head
Alyona Matveychuk
Board Member
Yevgen Semenikhin
Board Member
Kharkiv

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Position</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Viktoria Cherevko</td>
<td>Head</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ielyzaveta Salitska</td>
<td>Board Member</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Natalya Serpukhova</td>
<td>Board Member</td>
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<tr>
<td>Iryna Shevalchuk</td>
<td>Board Member</td>
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Green Party

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<th>Position</th>
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<tr>
<td>Serhiy Kurykin</td>
<td>Deputy Head</td>
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Labour Unions (Kharkiv):

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Name</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Viktor Antonov</td>
<td>Automobile and Agricultural Machine Worker union</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Anatolyi Kaiduun</td>
<td>Post and Telecom workers union Ukrtelecom</td>
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Swedish Embassy/ Sida

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<thead>
<tr>
<th>Name</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Mirja Peterson</td>
<td>Country Director</td>
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<tr>
<td>Olga Sandakova</td>
<td>Programme Officer Development Cooperation Section</td>
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Other in Ukraine

<table>
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<tr>
<th>Name</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Marta Chumalo</td>
<td>West-Ukrainan center “Women’s perspectives”</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gabriel Gatehouse</td>
<td>BBC Correspondent in Ukraine</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Leonid Kozhara</td>
<td>Member of Parliament, Party of Regions</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nico Lange</td>
<td>Director, Konrad Adenauer Foundation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Oleg Matsekh</td>
<td>Hromadsky (Citizens) Forum/ Speaker Corruption seminar</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Oleksiy Melnyk</td>
<td>Senior Fellow, Razumkov Centre for Economic and Political Studies, Kiev</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Scott Person</td>
<td>Senior Political Party and Parliamentary Programme Officer, National Democratic Institute</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Åke Peterson</td>
<td>Representative of the Secretary General, Council of Europe</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Oleg Rybachuk</td>
<td>Head of the board of Foundation Suspilnist</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sergiy Shtukarin</td>
<td>Executive Director, Center for Political Studies, Donetsk</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Eugene Tarasov</td>
<td>Sociologist, Center for Political Studies, Donetsk</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bodhan Vitvitsky</td>
<td>MCC Resident Legal Advisor, Millennium Corporation project of law and corruption, Centre for Political Studies</td>
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IN SWEDEN

CIS
Lennart Karlsson  Senior Programme Officer
Lars Nordgren  Programme Officer for Ukraine
Siv Ramsell Westberg  Secretary General

GF
Eva Göes  Chairman of the Board

JHS
Jens Ahl  Deputy Director
Eva Gustavsson  Managing Director
Evelina Lorenzon  Senior Project Manager
Bertil Persson  Board Member

KIC
Maria Folkegård  Secretary General
Adina Trunk  Programme Officer

Palme Center and Social Democratic party
Christina Bergman  Programme Manager for Western Balkans
Gert Björnvall  Project Coordinator, Social Democratic Party, District of Värmland
Olle Burell  Head of Operations
Eric Clifford  EU-Secretary, Social Democratic Party District of Värmland
Emma Frost  SSU Kalmar
Mats Griph  Ombudsman LO-districtet Sydost
Roger Johansson  SEKO Växjö
Johan Moström  Deputy Head of Operations
Tormod Nesset (by phone)  Project Coordinator, Social Democratic Party, Oskarshamn Branch
Liselotte Olsson  Programme Officer Ukraine
Martin Sandgren  Deputy International Secretary, Social Democratic Party

Silc
Gunilla Davidsson  Secretary General (former)
Amanda Löökvist  Programme Officer
Appendix 2: The Party System of Ukraine

**General Overview**

Political party development in the former USSR (outside the three Baltic States) is very different to that found in Eastern Europe. The political landscape in Eastern Europe quickly transformed into a spectrum of parties similar to that found in Western European democracies. Parties in the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS), on the other hand, are often top-down creations that maintain shallow structures, lack real roots in society, and are run and funded by elites from the regime or business community. They also share features such as a lack of programmatic differences among one another and little interaction between parties and voters except during elections, and leaders are often leader-centric and unaccountable for their actions. In addition, political parties are highly fluid and unstable.

Ukraine is the only country in the CIS with some degree of party pluralism. Ukraine’s reformed semi-parliamentary constitution coupled with a full proportional election law, both introduced in 2006, aimed to induce the development of parliamentary political parties. In 2004, when the election law was changed from a mixed majoritarian-proportional to a proportional system, it was argued that proportionalism would encourage the growth of ideologically-driven parties. But, at the same time, opinion polls showed that parties commanded little public trust in society as a whole.

No political party has voter support throughout Ukraine, although the Tymoshenko bloc obtained some support in Eastern and Southern Ukraine in the 2007 elections, making it the only political force to win votes throughout Ukraine. Centre-right and centre-left parties are more popular in Western and Central Ukraine, while centrist and far-left parties dominate in Southern and Eastern Ukraine and the Crimean autonomous republic.40

Ukraine’s current party system emerged in the March 1998 parliamentary elections and developed in subsequent elections. Prior to 1998, parties existed on the right (Ukrainian Popular Movement [Rukh]) and left (Communist Party and Socialist Party), but there was a large void in the centre. Former senior members of the Communist Party, which had existed until August 1991, established ideologically amorphous centrist parties with regional strongholds tied to local business interests in the emerging market economy (i.e. Kiev, Dnipropetrovsk and Donetsk). Ukraine’s left (Communists, Socialists), centre (Party of Regions) and right (Our Ukraine, Yulia Tymoshenko bloc) division of party politics continues to be the main framework of Ukrainian party politics to the present day.

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40 This division of party support was reflected in the 2004 elections when Yushchenko, supported by the centre-right and moderate centre-left, won the majority of the vote in Western, Central and Northern Ukraine while his rival Yanukovych won a majority of the vote in Eastern and Southern Ukraine and the Crimea. In the 2006 and 2007 elections, the Party of Regions won pluralities in Eastern and Southern Ukraine and the Tymoshenko bloc won majorities in Western and Central Ukraine, while Our Ukraine dominated Galicia and Transcarpathia.
During the Kuchma presidency, the pro-regime centrist parties were pressured to unite into a single election bloc in the March 2002 elections (For a United Ukraine). The five parties included the Party of Regions. Opposing them were the right (Our Ukraine, Tymoshenko bloc) and the Socialists. These three political forces became the main political base for Yushchenko’s election in 2004, mobilising millions of protestors in the Orange Revolution. The Communists adopted a more cautiously anti-regime stance with many of their voters defecting to the Party of Regions (both parties have the same two regional strongholds of the Donbas and Crimea).

Looking at the political forces one by one, the left emerged quickly after the collapse of the USSR with the Socialist Party establishing itself in October 1991 and the Communist Party re-registering itself in 1993 following a two year ban. The Socialist Party has suffered three splits with offshoots leaving to establish other left-wing parties, such as the extreme left Progressive Socialist Party.

The Social Democratic united Party entered politics in the 1998 elections but has been rejected by the Socialist International due to not being a bona fide centre-left party. Its close association with oligarchs and Viktor Medvedchuk, the president’s chief of staff in 2002-2004, is coupled with personal relations with Russia’s leaders. Medvedchuk's daughter's godparents are Prime Minister Vladimir Putin and President Dmitry Medvedev's wife, Svetlana.

The centre-right also quickly emerged in the late 1980s and early 1990s. The Ukrainian Popular Movement (Rukh) led the democratic movement in the late Soviet era and continued to remain Ukraine’s second largest opposition force in the 1990s (the first being the Communist Party). A large number of smaller centre-right (national democratic) parties emerged in this period and they, together with Rukh, received the majority of their support in Western Ukraine.

The centre right parties were united by Yushchenko in 2002 when he established the Our Ukraine bloc. Expectations that Our Ukraine would become a strong presidential party after Yushchenko was elected failed to materialise. Our Ukraine suffered from being too big as a bloc, uniting leaders of virtual parties. By 2008, Yushchenko had quarrelled with most of these leaders and they re-aligned with Tymoshenko. In autumn 2008, Yushchenko’s drive to hold pre-term elections was seen as a threat by many Our Ukraine deputies as they feared Our Ukraine would not be elected. A majority therefore voted to join Tymoshenko’s orange coalition as the prime minister and her eponymous bloc had opposed Yushchenko’s call for pre-term elections.

Centrist parties only emerged in the late 1990s and formed the bedrock of support for President Kuchma during his second term in office. Centrist parties were established in Ukrainian parlance as ‘roofs’ to accommodate and defend business and regional interests. Many of the senior Communist Party members had gone into business after the USSR collapsed, and in the course of the 1990s, they returned to politics with accumulated capital.

Centrist parties fought the 1998 elections individually or in blocs. The parties were either newly created or were older parties that had been taken over. The former included the People’s Democratic Party, the Labour Party and the Agrarian Party. The latter included the Green Party and the Social Democratic united Party. The
Party of Regions was established in 2001 through a merger of five small parties. In the post-Kuchma era, the majority of centrist parties have become marginalised. The big exception is the Party of Regions, which was the only centrist party to have a monopolistic base of support in Donetsk and extensive private resources.

In September 2009, Ukraine had approximately 170 political parties registered with the Ministry of Justice, yet most of them were small and insignificant. Eight political forces were elected to parliament in 1998 and six in 2002. Five political forces were represented within the parliaments elected in March 2006 and September 2007.

The following are the principal parties and blocs:

**Party of Regions (Partiya Rehioniv):** The Party of Regions grew out of its Donetsk base where it established itself as the political home of Ukraine's most powerful regional, economic and financial clan. In the 2002 elections, it joined four other parties aligned to then President Leonid Kuchma to establish the For a United Ukraine bloc. The Party of Regions entered the 2006 and 2007 elections independently, coming in first with 32 and 34 percent of the vote respectively. It took advantage of the split in the Orange alliance after the 2006 elections and, following the defection of the Socialist Party, established the Anti-Crisis coalition with the Socialist and Communist parties. Party of Regions leader Viktor Yanukovych became prime minister. Following the September 2007 pre-term parliamentary elections and the reformation of an orange coalition, it went into opposition. The Party of Regions receives the majority of its votes in Eastern and Southern Ukraine among the Russophone population, and its two main bases of support are Donetsk and the Crimea. It has a weak programmatic base as it is a party that unites different interest groups that include former communist supporters, trade unionists, pragmatic oligarchs and big businessmen, Kuchma era officials, and individuals loyal to party leader Yanukovych. The party is divided into at least three wings: an anti-orange wing led by party leader Yanukovych, which includes ex-communist party voters, a pragmatic business wing led by oligarch Renat Akhmetov, Borys Kolesnikov and Andriy Kluyev, as well as the gas lobby linked to the RosUkrEnergo (RUE) gas intermediary.

**Yulia Tymoshenko Bloc (Blok Yuliy Tymoshenko):** The Tymoshenko bloc was established by Yulia Tymoshenko in 2000-2001 as a radical anti-presidential political force based on the Fatherland Party that she established in 1999. The Tymoshenko bloc participated in the 2002 elections as the National Salvation Forum and came third with seven percent of the vote. The Tymoshenko bloc and Fatherland Party bring together moderate social democrats (such as Tymoshenko) with liberal centrists and moderate centre-rights. Fatherland debated joining Socialist International but eventually joined the centre-right European Peoples Party (EPP) in the European Parliament. Tymoshenko agreed not to stand in the 2004 presidential elections in return for the position of prime minister if Yushchenko was elected. During the subsequent Orange Revolution, Tymoshenko played an important role in mobilising voters. The subsequent Tymoshenko government lasted eight months in 2005 after it was removed by Yushchenko in September of that year. The Tymoshenko bloc came second in the March 2006 parliamentary elections with 22 percent of the vote and, according to a pre-election agreement made with Our Ukraine, had the right to nominate the prime minister in an orange government. However, the subsequent collapse in negotiations...
between orange political forces allowed the Party of Regions to form a coalition with the Socialist Party and the Communist Party. The bloc won 31 percent of the vote in the 2007 elections and Yushchenko returned as prime minister in December 2007. The orange coalition collapsed in September 2008 and then re-formed four months later with the addition of the Volodymyr Lytvyn bloc. In June 2009, Tymoshenko announced her intention to stand as a candidate in the January 2010 presidential elections.

Our Ukraine-Peoples Self Defence Bloc (Blok Nashi Ukrainy-Narodna Samohranma): The Our Ukraine bloc was created in 2001 as a moderate liberal and centre-right opposition force that built on Yushchenko’s popularity as prime minister in 2000-2001. In the Kuchma era, Our Ukraine was never as radical in opposition as the Tymoshenko bloc and Socialist Party. In the 2002 elections, the bloc included 10 parties and came first with 24 percent of the vote. Our Ukraine played a central role in the Orange Revolution in 2004.

The Peoples Union-Our Ukraine Party was established as Yushchenko’s presidential party in 2005 after he was elected president. It was envisaged that the other parties in the Our Ukraine bloc would merge with Peoples Union-Our Ukraine. In the 2006 and 2007 elections, the Peoples Union-Our Ukraine party was one of the parties inside the Our Ukraine bloc.

A weak election campaign led to a poor result in the 2006 elections when Our Ukraine-People’s Self Defence Bloc obtained only 14 percent of the vote, down ten percent from its 2002 support. In the 2007 elections, Our Ukraine brought together nine political parties that again obtained 14 percent but won fewer regions (oblasts).

The bloc has been divided by internal fractions, with several prominent party members leaving in February 2008 to join presidential chief of staff Viktor Baloga’s new United Centre party. Throughout 2008, there was also a high level of tension between President Yushchenko and Prime Minister Tymoshenko. By the last year of Yushchenko’s first term as president (2009), the centre-right had imploded as a political force and the president had lost control over his presidential party. People’s Union-Our Ukraine, one of nine parties in the bloc, is led by Vera Ulianchenko, the president’s chief of staff who replaced Baloga.

Volodymyr Lytvyn bloc (Narodnyi Blok Lytvyna): The Volodymyr Lytvyn bloc is headed by the enigmatic Volodymyr Lytvyn. In the 2006 parliamentary elections, it received 2.44 percent of the vote and failed to enter parliament. In the 2007 elections, the bloc (composed of the People’s Party and the former pro-Kuchma Labour Party) won 4 percent and 20 seats. Initially, the bloc remained outside the government as a relatively neutral member of the opposition but, after Lytvyn was offered the position of parliamentary speaker, it joined a revived Orange coalition in December 2008.

Communist Party (Komunistychna Partiia Ukrainy): The Communist Party of Ukraine has been in terminal decline since its leader Piotr Symonenko was defeated in the 1999 elections. Declared illegal in 1991-1993 after it had been accused of supporting the hard-line Moscow putsch of August 1991, it was re-registered in October 1993. The party brings together the hard-line core of the former Soviet Ukrainian Communist Party, which at its peak in 1985 had 3.5 million members. Only 5 percent (120 000)
re-joined the Communist Party in 1993. The party’s support declined from 20 percent in the 2002 elections to five percent in 2007. Two factors account for the decline of the Communist Party. Firstly, the average age of Communist Party members is over 60 in a country where life expectancy is low. Secondly, many Communist voters defected to the Party of Regions and other smaller leftist parties.

The slow stagnation of the Soviet Union in the 1970s and 1980s impacted the Communist Party. Members remained within the party for career and personal reasons but no longer believed in communist ideology. This transplanted into a weak sense of support for the value of political parties, a lack of tradition (or forgotten traditions) of multi-party politics. The ideological amorphousness of Soviet era Communist Party members, and their cynicism and corruption also transplanted into the newly emerging multi-party system.

Socialist Party (Sotsialistychna Partiya Ukrainy): The Socialist Party of Ukraine is a left-wing centre-left party that is a member of the Socialist International and has traditionally obtained its votes in rural and small town Central Ukraine. Ukraine is unusual in having a centre-left party in Eurasia, a tradition more common in Eastern Europe. One factor behind this could be Ukraine’s strong historical tradition of Socialist Parties in Western and Eastern Ukraine and the historical linkage in peasant societies, such as Ukraine and Ireland, of socio-economic and nationality factors.

The Socialist Party obtained between six and eight percent of the vote in the 1994, 1998, 2002 and 2006 parliamentary elections, and its leader, Oleksandr Moroz, came third in the 1994, 1999 and 2004 presidential elections. The Socialists played a central role together with the Tymoshenko bloc in anti-regime protests from 2000 to 2004. Following the 2004 Orange Revolution, the Socialist Party included their representatives in two orange governments in 2005-2006 and campaigned in the 2006 elections to join an orange coalition after them. However, the refusal of Our Ukraine to cede Moroz the position of parliamentary speaker led to their defection, permitting the Party of Regions to create a governing coalition with the Communist and Socialist Parties. This step proved to be a fatal blow to the party's popularity, and in the 2007 elections, the Socialists failed with many of their voters having defected to the Tymoshenko and Lytvyn blocs. The party has less than one percent support. Socialist Party leader Moroz’s refusal to entertain the idea of leadership change led to a second split in spring 2009.
Results of the September 2007 Parliamentary Election

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Party</th>
<th>Percent of votes</th>
<th>Seats</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Party of Regions</td>
<td>34.4</td>
<td>175</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Yulia Tymoshenko Bloc</td>
<td>30.7</td>
<td>156</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>All Ukrainian Union ‘Fatherland’</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ukrainian Social Democratic Party</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Reforms and Order Party</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Our Ukraine – People’s Self-Defence Bloc</td>
<td>14.2</td>
<td>72</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>People’s Union ‘Our Ukraine’</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Forward Ukraine!</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>People’s Movement of Ukraine</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Ukrainian People’s Party</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Ukrainian Republican Party Assembly</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Christian Democratic Union</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>European Party of Ukraine</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Citizen’s Party ‘PORA’</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Congress of Ukrainian Nationalists</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Motherland Defenders Party</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Communist Party of Ukraine</td>
<td>5.4</td>
<td>27</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lytvyn Bloc</td>
<td>4.0</td>
<td>20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>People’s Party</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Labour Party of Ukraine</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other</td>
<td>11.3</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>450</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

At the time of the completion of this evaluation, the candidate of Party of the Region had been elected president and Prime Minister Tymoshenko had lost a vote of confidence in the Ukrainian parliament. Comparing the election results of 2010 with presidential elections held five years earlier, we can conclude that all the mainstream political forces lost a portion of their voters. However, the left suffered the greatest defeat. In the 1999 and 2004 elections, Communist Party leader Piotr Symonenko and Socialist Party leader Oleksandr Moroz both received a sufficiently high number of votes to place them among the top five candidates. In the 2010 elections, Symonenko came sixth while Moroz did not even enter the top ten out of eighteen candidates, after coming third in 2004. The top five candidates in the 2010 elections were either centrists (Yanukovych, Sergei Tihipko) or national democrats (Tymoshenko, Arseniy Yatseniuk, Viktor Yushchenko). Past president Viktor Yushchenko came in fifth place with five percent of the votes. The Our Ukraine block in parliament has continued to fragment into ever more groups.

**The parties as organisations**

*Participation and internal democracy:* Members, membership fees and participation are not central to Ukrainian political parties. Most parties have inflated membership figures, particularly centrist parties created from the top down. Most parties receive funding from businessmen and/or through corrupt ties to the state. Internal democracy is in most parties weak or inexistent. Party congresses are rubber stamp affairs with little discussion. There is no established mechanism in place to link voters, members and
leaders. This is a result of the fact that Ukrainian political parties tend to be considered to be the belonging of individuals, with membership influence not being a prioritised issue. Voters tend to vote for leaders, rather than platforms, a factor that gives a lot of power to party leaders who treat their parties as personal vehicles.

**Internal unity.** Party leader characteristics are important to consider when analysing internal affairs. Internal unity exists if there is a strong and charismatic leader who is the key to the electoral success of the political force. Unity also exists where an inherited Soviet Communist Party culture has provided more disciplined leadership and members (such as the Communist Party and the Party of Regions). Where there is no charismatic leader or Soviet culture of discipline and hierarchy, we find disunity and party fracturing (such as Our Ukraine).

**Independence.** Parties are independent to a degree, although corruption is a major problem in Ukrainian politics. For example, the RosUkrEnergo gas intermediary took over the Party of Regions in 2007-2008, shifting aside the Donetsk oligarchs who had established the party. Big business interests are represented in each of the parliamentary parties, including the Communist Party, and these have an influence through the financial and media resources they provide access to. Political party independence will only be possible if business and politics are separated.

**Ideology and party programmes.** Party platforms are poorly developed and have little relevance to parties except during elections. Parties and presidents are not held to account for what they included in their election programmes and what they implemented in power. As discussed above, codifying political parties in Ukraine (and the former USSR in general) is difficult as most are not driven by programmes. Ukrainian voters are not programme-driven in their vote choice but by their geographic location and personalities (i.e. charisma of leaders or leaders exhibiting certain qualities, such as Viktor Yushchenko’s claims of being an ‘honest politician’ in the 2004 elections). The left are by far the easiest to codify. The Communists represent the hard-line core of the pre-1991 Communist Party and their policies reflect this. The Socialists occupy a niche on the centre-left as a left-wing social democratic party (i.e. more ‘Old’ than ‘New’ Labour in the British case). The right espouse a mix of moderate centre-right platforms on market economics, a strong emphasis on integration of national minorities and defence of the Ukrainian language, and integration into Europe (i.e. seeking NATO and EU membership). Right-wing election blocs, such as Yushchenko’s Our Ukraine, have also included nationalist-populist parties with more radical agendas on what they consider to be important issues (i.e. language, national history, Russia, NATO, etc.).

The most difficult to codify are centrist parties. From 1998-2004 under President Leonid Kuchma, many centrist parties competed with each other while collectively supporting the president. Ideological platforms were not key to centrist parties as they were built from the top down by regional and business elites with access to state resources. Following regime change (i.e. the move from the semi-authoritarian Kuchma to the democratic Yushchenko era in 2005), most central parties lost their privileged access to state resources and became marginalised. The one exception was 41 One of the few means through which Ukrainian voters can influence politicians between elections is through opinion polls. These can show, for example, public dissatisfaction in policies by withdrawing their support of them in polls.
the Party of Regions, which emerged as the dominant centrist party after 2005 and winning the 2006 and 2007 elections. The Party of Regions had a strong advantage over other centrists: its total monopoly over economic and political life in the two oblasts of Donetsk and Luhansk (collectively known as the Donbas). In the absence of state resources, the Party of Regions has been able to draw on extensive private resources from Ukraine’s wealthiest oligarchs.42

**Capacity to communicate and campaign:** Western-style campaigning is rare in Ukraine. Most campaigning is undertaken in large outdoor and indoor rallies. Television is also used as a platform to get messages across. Another factor is the charisma of leaders. A party leader who excels in election campaigns usually relies on energy, ability to connect with voters and great speech making.

A problem faced in party development is the need for media, financial and other types of resources, particularly during election campaigns. This encourages businessmen to provide funding in a non-transparent manner in exchange for seats in parliament where they can obtain immunity from prosecution and the ability to lobby contracts and receive access to state finances. Business and politics have yet to be separated.

**Equal opportunities for advancement within the party, irrespective of sex, age, race, religion etc.** Ukrainian political parties have not provided opportunities for equal advancement, and women remain underrepresented. Tymoshenko is an exception in Ukrainian politics of a woman reaching the pinnacles of power. There are no restrictions or practices blocking individuals on the basis of race or religion. Young people have not been brought into Ukrainian politics to the degree envisaged following the Orange Revolution. Furthermore, it has been found that young people entering politics today are not necessarily less corrupt than the former generation of politicians, but sometimes even more. Hence, there is not only a need for a new generation of politicians but also of this generation showing a different conduct.

**Financial transparency:** This is non-existent. Ukraine still has a large informal economy with untaxed ‘slosh fund’ cash available in large quantities. A large number of parliamentary deputies (it is impossible to say how many factions practice this) receive cash allocations over and above their official salaries. Ukrainian politicians do not live within their official salaries. The Ukrainian media often point out how expensive politicians’ clothes, jewellery, watches, cars, homes and holidays are and how these luxuries could not be afforded with official salaries only. There is no accountability of how much funding parties receive from business donors; businessmen often wish to keep this quiet as it is taken from shadow economy funds. Another reason for wanting to keep the funding non-transparent is that some businessmen place their eggs in many baskets, funding more than one political force. In election campaigns, political parties always spend far more than the officially permitted maximum.

**Non-corruption:** Corruption is a major factor in Ukrainian politics, economics and society. There was no progress in battling corruption during the Yushchenko presidency. This is in marked contrast to Georgia, which has radically overcome many aspects of its corruption. Ukraine placed at the bottom of the newly independent states in the

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42 An example being Renat Akhmetov, whose wealth was estimated in 2008, prior to the onset of the global financial crisis, to over $31 billion, making him the wealthiest businessman in Eurasia and Europe.
2009 Corruption Perceptions Index produced by Transparency International. Overcoming corruption requires governments in place for many years to implement medium-term strategies: Ukraine has had four governments under the Yushchenko presidency. Overcoming corruption also requires political will at the senior level.

Political forces that rule out making deals with oligarchs find it difficult to receive publicity and popularity among voters. A case in point is former Defence Minister Anatoliy Grytsenko, who established Civic Position and will stand as a candidate in the presidential elections. Grytsenko’s popularity has not grown beyond one percent even though he is an honest and active civic activist.

**Respect for democracy and human rights** Orange parties (Our Ukraine, Tymoshenko bloc, Socialist Party) have greater respect for democracy and human rights. The Party of Regions record in the 2004 elections was very poor, and its control of the media in its home base of Donetsk does not show a commitment to a pluralistic media environment. Senior Party of Regions officials, including leader Yanukovych, continue to believe that the second round results in 2004 were fair and that Yanukovych was unduly elected president of Ukraine. They have never accepted their accountability for massive election fraud in 2004 and have not accepted the legitimacy of the Supreme Court ruling on 1 December 2004 that annulled the election of Yanukovych because of evidence of election fraud.

**International contacts and integration in international party structures** The extent to which parties have international contacts and are integrated in international party structures varies. The Fatherland Party and Our Ukraine are members of the European People’s Party (EPP) political group in the European Parliament. Of these two, the Fatherland Party is the most active through the very energetic Deputy Prime Minister Heorhiy Nemyria. Relations deteriorated between the EPP and Our Ukraine in 2008-2009 because President Yushchenko did not favourably receive criticism directed at him by the EPP. The Socialist Party is a consultative member of the socialist international while its relations with the European Socialist Party (ESP) have been frosty in recent years. The Party of Regions does not have strong ties to any western parties and has never attempted to join a political group in the European Parliament.

**Parties in the citizenry**

**Levels of polarization** Since the orange revolution, polarisation between parties has been based on power struggles between leaders more than on ideological differences. There are many parties in the centre-right and the centre-left and relatively few extremist parties.

Ukraine’s regional diversity prevents the monopolisation of power by any political force. A US academic described Ukraine as a country with ‘pluralism by default’. Are Ukrainian political parties and politicians democratic because of the emergence of a democracy since the Orange Revolution? Or are they forced to compromise (because of pluralism by default) and work together because no political force will ever win a plurality of votes? Both factors are at work but the latter is more influential.

**Fragmentation** The number of registered political parties in Ukraine reflects a high degree of fragmentation. It is particularly a problem for the centre-right. The eastern
Ukrainian political culture is more disciplined and hierarchical. Former pro-Kuchma centrist parties merged with the strongest centrist party after Yushchenko’s elections, i.e. the Party of Regions. The Our Ukraine blocs united nine parties that promised to merge after the 2007 elections into a united presidential party, but they reneged on their promise. Instead, the number of political forces increased from nine to fourteen after the 2007 election. Maintaining the existence of parties is often seen by leaders as preferable as it brings them benefits: they can use the parties to trade for places in elections on Our Ukraine’s list and parties can lead to leadership in parliamentary committees, provision of office space, and visits abroad to conferences and training.

Fragmentation also comes about due to the lack of a mechanism to replace leaders who see parties as their own private property. Leaders do not resign of their own accord if they have been unsuccessful in elections. For example, Oleksandr Moroz never resigned after the failure of the Socialists to enter parliament in 2007. Failing to replace the party leader often leads to groups breaking away and launching new political parties.

Vocatility. Changes in electoral support between elections is high because of a weakly developed culture of compromise, the existence of personality conflicts (i.e. Yushchenko vs. Tymoshenko), and the fracturing of blocs into more virtual parties.

The extent to which parties have ties to well-defined constituencies. Parties receive votes in their traditional regional strongholds: orange in western and central Ukraine and the Party of Regions in eastern and southern Ukraine. A voter’s regional location in Ukraine will provide a good indicator of who they will vote for. Voters who support Ukraine’s membership of NATO and the EU will vote for orange parties. Those who seek good relations with Russia will support the Party of Regions. The Party of Regions’ Yanukovych’s election campaign has used issues that have divided the country, such as NATO and elevating Russian to a second state language.

Public debate on substantial issues. This is limited in scope due to the weakness of party programmes and the fact that politicians tend to look upon them as documents that are prepared only for election campaign purposes and not to consult or guide policies after the elections. Public debate remains limited on foreign policy issues, which are still seen as the preserve of the elite.

Relations between parties and civil society organisations. This relationship exists among orange parties, as seen during the Orange Revolution when large numbers of youth NGOs and civil society groups mobilised protests. Civil society is more weakly established in eastern Ukraine and the Party of Regions has not developed a strong working relationship with civil society NGOs.

Citizens’ confidence in the political parties. Citizens’ trust in parties is extremely low. A similar low level of public trust is found in Ukraine’s parliament. Ukrainians see politicians as entering politics only in pursuit of personal enrichment rather than as public service and to serve the common interest of the country. The cynicism and corruption of politicians result in the public not reciprocating trust. This impacts parties since it leads to very few Ukrainians joining them.

43 According to Razumkov Centre: ‘Fully trust’ is only 1.9 percent. ‘Fully trust’ and ‘mainly trust’ is 16.8 percent.
Parties in government

The extent to which party representatives have capacity to work well in parliament as well as in government: This depends on the individuals, and a generalisation of the 450 deputies cannot be made. Many of them have been in parliament for many years and work very well in committees. However, problems include the manner in which parties block the working of parliament frequently by taking over the speaker’s chair; the quality of legislation and to what extent it reflects lobbying of business interests; the weak connection to voters, who do not know who they are voting for as they do not elect individuals; the view of voters that the deputies are corrupt, leading to weak public trust in parliament; and the inability to work together.

The extent to which political parties dominate in the representative organs: Deputies have all been elected on party lists, not as individuals. However, the lack of ideological bases of parties means that deputies regularly switch allegiances. Plus, there is no party discipline. For example, 37 (bare minimum) of Our Ukraine deputies voted to join the Tymoshenko coalition. The other half of Our Ukraine refuse to join and therefore refuse to follow the majority decision. This requires stronger legislation to force deputies to resign if they leave factions.

The extent to which parties operate as unitary actors in representative organs: Parties do not operate as unitary actors in parliament or local government; instead, they operate through election blocs. Within parliament, three out of five political groups are election blocs (Tymoshenko bloc, Our Ukraine, Lytvyn bloc). Our Ukraine is the most divided of these. During the 2007 elections, Our Ukraine campaigned on the pledge given to President Yushchenko that the nine parties would merge into one presidential party after the elections. This pledge to voters was never upheld. Two years after the elections, there were fourteen (not nine) political parties and embryo parties within the Our Ukraine parliamentary faction.

The centre-right has continued to splinter into an ever greater number of virtual political parties, making it impossible for Our Ukraine to pursue a united agenda. The faction has broken down into two groups, one leaning towards Tymoshenko and the orange coalition (a bare majority of 40 out of 72 deputies voted to re-join it in December 2008) while the remainder are divided into two pro-presidential groups (For Ukraine! and United Centre) that dislike each other and refuse to cooperate. These two groups have refused to heed the majority vote to re-join the orange coalition and categorically refuse to vote for government legislation. The distrust between Our Ukraine and the Tymoshenko government intensified in spring 2009 in response to negotiations between the Tymoshenko bloc and Party of Regions over a coalition of national unity.

The Tymoshenko bloc acts as a unified actor in most votes. Nevertheless, the bloc was divided over the desirability of creating a coalition of national unity with the Party of Regions and at least a third of the bloc’s deputies opposed such a step. The bloc has a more difficult problem linked to its personalisation with the Yulia Tymoshenko. The Tymoshenko bloc has similar problems to Our Ukraine in that as a political force, and therefore as a parliamentary faction, it brings together an eclectic group of people. (This is even more so the case with the Party of Regions.) The Tymoshenko bloc includes long-time national democrats who defected from Our
Ukraine and were active in anti-presidential protests in 2000-2004. It also includes businessmen who seek immunity and in return provide the bloc with financial and media resources. Finally, the bloc incorporates former supporters of President Kuchma from the marginalised Social Democratic united Party.

The Lytvyn bloc is largely a one-man show and devoid of any ideological programme. The Agrarian Party (now the People's Party) had the potential to become a rural political force in the same manner as the peasant parties in Eastern Europe but stagnated after Lytvyn became its leader. The bloc wins most of its votes in rural and small town regions of Central Ukraine and has taken some of the Socialist Party vote.

Party of the Region has been quite united in parliament although it is an amalgam of different interest groups. This is a consequence of the fact that it has become the party of Eastern-Southern Ukraine that stands united against the orange forces and in fear of businessmen/oligarchs losing their assets or going to jail. They also have inherited Soviet style communist discipline from the political culture of the region and from taking over many Communist voters.

The extent to which there is also a party linkage to the executive: Attempts at the formation of parties of power (i.e. presidential parties) have failed in Ukraine. In Eurasia, such parties only succeed in authoritarian regimes such as Russia, Azerbaijan and most Central Asian states. In the Kuchma era (1994-2004), two failed attempts were made to create parties of power: the People's Democratic Party (NDP) after the 1998 elections and the For a United Ukraine bloc after the 2002 elections. President Yushchenko sought to transform People's Union-Our Ukraine (one of the many parties in the Our Ukraine bloc) into a party of power, but this also failed. Our Ukraine received 14 percent of the vote in both the 2006 and 2007 elections, ten percent less than it received in 2002. A sign of a typical Eurasian party of power is that it receives over 50 percent of the vote because it has privileged access to state resources. Our Ukraine obviously did not have such access to state resources in Ukraine.

Political access to the executive nevertheless exists but at the informal and non-transparent level through corruption and lobbying. The presidential secretariat and the National Security and Defence Council are over-staffed with their total of 800 staff members (the equivalent two structures in the US have 1,600 personnel in a six times larger population and a far larger GDP than Ukraine), and these officials are routinely corrupt.

Factors determining party behaviour and performance

Respect of fundamental human rights: Ukraine has ratified several of the most central human right conventions, e.g. the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights and International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights. Still, Ukraine faces severe challenges in terms of high corruption levels contributing to unequal access to social services, health care and education. The health situation suffers from serious weaknesses and Ukraine faces one of the highest HIV/AIDS prevalence rates in Europe. Another concern is flaws in the legal framework and in assurance of justice as a central component in a rule-governed society. While citizens do enjoy freedom of association, complicated registration processes may be used as an instru-
ment to hamper this right. Traditional gender roles are deeply rooted and domestic violence is widespread in Ukraine.

Active and free media: Ukraine had a pluralistic and free media environment since 2005. During Kuchma's second term, the media environment deteriorated. For example, journalists were murdered (i.e. Georgi Gongadze) or physically attacked and censorship was introduced through instructions sent from the presidential secretariat. These twin problems no longer exist in Ukraine.

Ukraine's media remain timid in the questions they pose to politicians, especially on the television. The media also have a weak investigative journalist culture. While editorial control and intervention by business owners of newspapers is rare, television, as in some Western countries, is far more problematic. Three leading television channels are controlled by oligarch Viktor Pinchuk and Ukraine's most popular channel (Inter) is controlled by Dmytro Firtash, co-owner of RosUkrEnergo. Firtash is very anti-Tymoshenko because her government has removed RosUkrEnergo from the 2009 gas contract. Inter attacks the government daily and provides free air time to Arseniy Yatseniuk, a competitor to Tymoshenko for the orange vote. Some Ukrainian commentators do not believe that Inter's broadcast style can be considered compatible with free media. In the Party of Regions twin strongholds of Donetsk and Crimea, there is little media plurality.

An adequate party legislation: Ukraine's law on political parties, which was updated and came into force in April 2001, does not stipulate any minimum requirement of members for a party to be registered. When submitting registration documents, parties have to collect 10 000 signatures from eligible voters, which is not difficult. To prevent the rise of regional and secessionist parties, these signatures have to be collected in two-thirds of Ukraine's regions, the cities of Kiev and Sevastopol (which have all-Ukrainian republican status) and the Crimea. The aim of the law is to create parties that supposedly have an all-Ukrainian status.

Election system: Ukraine's unicameral parliament, known as the Supreme Council (Verkhovna Rada), is the sole legislative authority and is responsible for initiating legislation, ratifying international agreements, and approving and implementing the budget. The election law, on the basis of which the first parliament of an independent Ukraine was elected, was adopted on 18 November 1993 and allowed for the election of 450 single seat constituencies. In order to encourage a party-based system of parliament, in 1997 a new electoral law was adopted. Of the 450 parliamentary seats, 225 were to be elected on the basis of proportional representation (with a four percent threshold) while the remaining 225 were to be elected in first-past-the-post (majoritarian) districts. This mixed system was used in the 1998 and 2002 elections.

The law was subsequently changed in 2004 to a fully proportional system with a lower, three percent threshold. The full proportional system was used for the first time in the 2006 elections. The 2004 amendments to the election law increased parliaments life span from four to five years. Based on the 2006 constitution, after the elections, a parliamentary majority (with a minimum of 226 seats) submits a prime minister and government list that is put to a vote in parliament. The president submits the candidates for foreign and defence ministers for parliamentary approval.
Rule of law and a functioning judiciary: Ukraine's rule of law is problematic and the judiciary and prosecutors office are highly corrupt. Court outcomes can be purchased. No senior members of the ruling elite have ever been criminally charged and the elites continue to think of themselves as above the law. Politicians are not made accountable for their words and actions by the threat of prosecutions or by exposure in the media. High level abuse of office and corruption exposed in the media are not acted upon by the prosecutor's office.

International cooperation

International cooperation (other than with Sweden) has primarily been with the International Republican Institute (IRI), National Democratic Institute (NDI, affiliated with the National Endowment for Democracy), the Westminster Foundation for Democracy and the German foundations Konrad Adenauer Stiftung (KAS) and Friedrich Ebert Stiftung (FES). There has also been cooperation at a more limited scale with other countries.

National Democratic Institute (NDI): NDI has worked in Ukraine since 1992, carrying out programmes in political party development, parliamentary strengthening, safeguarding elections, civil society development, and governance. The Institute's political party assistance has focused on coalition building, organisational strengthening, platform development, and voter outreach, while its civic assistance has focused on nonpartisan election monitoring activities and issue advocacy campaigns. NDI has also worked with the Parliament of Ukraine, the Cabinet of Ministers, and the Presidential Secretariat to build the technical capabilities of legislators and civil servants. NDI works with parties across the political spectrum. NDI shares international best practices with political parties on strengthening regional and national organisations, developing their platforms and internal structures, identifying and addressing the concerns of their constituents, and broadening bases of support.

International Republican Institute (IRI) works rather similar to NDI, i.e. with all political parties. It also supports young political leadership schools in Eastern and Southern Ukraine and Crimea and works in conjunction with the East Ukraine Democracy Development Foundation and the Zhytomyr Oblast Center of Youth Initiatives.

Westminster Foundation for Democracy (WFD): WFD has not worked with the political parties in Ukraine since the Orange Revolution. The major UK parties feel that there are currently no Ukrainian parties that they can work with on a party-to-party basis, mainly due to the lack of clear political orientations and policy platforms. The Conservatives have worked with Our Ukraine in the past, but that has stopped since the Orange Revolution, as has a short-lived cooperation between the Labour Party and the SPU.

KAS has recently changed their approach moving from fraternal support to working with the centre right parties as a group, striving to bring them together. Like KAS, FES has an office in Kiev but it does not cooperate with any particular programme.

There has been some bilateral cooperation with for example Poland and the Netherlands, but recently on a very limited scale.