Evaluation of Norwegian Development Cooperation
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The evaluation work in Norad seeks to document to what extent Norwegian development cooperation is relevant, effective and achieves the intended results. The goal is both to learn by collecting lessons, and to hold the aid administration accountable. The Evaluation Department is managed under a specific directive that establishes principles of neutrality and independence, and that authorises the department itself to initiate evaluation of all types of development cooperation. The actual evaluation work is conducted by external specialists.

In 2012, we commissioned nine evaluations and studies, and we contributed to ten studies conducted by the evaluation offices at The World Bank and the UN Development Programme. The topics are wide-ranging, from the Government’s Climate and Forest Initiative to the programme “Oil for Development”, from agriculture and food security to health, and from the rights of the disabled to aid in Afghanistan.

We also turn the spotlight towards our own department. Our evaluations are to show the results, both positive and negative, and in this way contribute to improved aid. But what are the results of the evaluations? Are they used? A study concludes that we who evaluate – and other sections within aid administration – are doing some things well. But our evaluations can improve, they should be used to a greater extent, and aid administration can learn more from them. Incidentally, one of the recommendations is to continue to use this annual report to make our experiences available to a wider audience.

A similar study conducted 20 years ago concluded that it is easier to learn and adjust one’s course where fairly concrete, specific tasks are concerned, often of a technical nature, and harder where more abstract, higher objectives as well as political, social and cultural issues are concerned. It also said that the culture of learning was strongest further “down” in the hierarchy, with technical experts, and weakest at the “top”, where more general plans and priorities are the concern. On that level, evaluations likely contributed to affected parties acknowledging weaknesses, but such acknowledgements rarely led to changes in the more general approach to aid.

This is likely to still be the case. Even so, we will attempt to draw out some general findings and lessons which are seen in several of last year’s evaluations. Even though they are related to specific interventions, we believe they point to something that is relevant to aid administration almost regardless of level and sector. They are not necessarily the most important findings in each evaluation; these are given in the main section of the report. However, they are observations we think are relevant to most people working in aid, even if they are not especially interested in that particular evaluation, since the lessons concern challenges appearing in many studies and evaluations.

The first experience we would like to highlight, relates to the significance of thorough analyses. This is based particularly on evaluations of aid to Afghanistan, and the request for solid groundwork
and up-to-date analyses along the way are especially relevant for conflict areas, which are the targets of much Norwegian aid. The other lesson is that we must utilise what works well – we must expand the good interventions. Experiences from successful projects should be used better and shared with other aid parties. The third lesson makes it relevant to ask whether “capacity building” is becoming a white elephant in aid. Many resources are spent on courses and seminars, but do they deliver the results and the learning effects we expect? The fourth lesson puts the attention on us. Many factors decide whether an evaluation turns out well. One thing is for certain: evaluations need to be communicated better. A step in the right direction would be shorter reports with good summaries, fewer abbreviations and less jargon, making it more accessible for non-experts.

In our annual report for 2011, we said that none of the evaluations could sufficiently document what we call development results and effects, i.e. to what degree aid contributed to achieving the long term goals for the target group or at community level. We explained this by a lack of data and weak reporting routines for those interventions we chose to evaluate. This does not necessarily mean that goal achievement was low, but it is difficult to document effects, especially considering the strict requirements to method and documentation which apply to evaluations.

Generally, 2012 shows the same trend. Even though several reports show results within specific sectors or in a country, we still see that it is often difficult to document long term effects. This may be because in many cases, projects were not planned with evaluation in mind. How can you facilitate evaluations when starting an aid project? How can the Evaluation Department ask better questions and obtain better answers? We have initiated a study which looks at these questions, and we hope to be able to share some useful findings in next year’s report.

The results of all evaluations are communicated to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and others in the aid administration, along with the Evaluation Department’s recommendations for follow-up. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs prepares follow-up plans for each report (see the overview at the end). In addition, evaluations are communicated to anyone who is interested through open seminars and websites, as well as to the Norwegian Parliament, the Office of the Auditor General and the media.

Tale Kvalvaag
Director
Evaluation Department
Lessons from 2012
Lessons from 2012

1 The significance of thorough analyses of countries in conflict

Aid to countries in conflict is particularly challenging. All aid should be based on analyses of the conditions in the country in question, but when starting up in a country in conflict, the situation is generally complex and donors are under pressure to deliver results quickly.

In 2012, OECD’s Development Assistance Committee (DAC) published guidelines for evaluating support to peacebuilding in fragile states in conflict\(^1\), as a result of work the Evaluation Department had taken part in. The guidelines build on international research which acknowledges that there are few recipes for how to combat conflict and create lasting peace. But a few points have been agreed upon, and all aid to countries in conflict should be considered according to these. It is important to study the history, culture, economy and power structure of the area, as well as the drivers of conflict, and to consider carefully what could contribute to lessening the conflict and what could make it more intense, or create new conflicts. Are we qualified at this in the Norwegian aid administration? Are we able to plot the course of developments and detect when situations are starting to deteriorate?

Both Norway’s and The World Bank’s aid to Afghanistan was evaluated in 2012, and we summarise positive and negative evaluation findings later. The evaluation office of the UN Development Programme (UNDP) also presented an evaluation of their work in countries in conflict generally, not just in Afghanistan. What do these evaluations say about aid to countries in conflict?

One of their conclusions was that it was impossible to follow the development of aid interventions in Afghanistan closely enough. This was both due to safety considerations that made it difficult to travel outside the capital, and insufficient resources to keep up with developments where it would otherwise have been possible. This means that there may be good results we heard too little about, but also harmful effects. Resources may have ended up in the wrong hands and contributed to local conflicts. They may have been allocated in ways seen to be unfair, or may have weakened local power structures in favour of new ones. The evaluations concluded that in some areas, aid efforts weakened local authorities in favour of new players who receive plenty of aid. There is a risk that activities will come to an end when aid is reduced and the local community has to get by on their own resources.

Evaluation of the Norwegian aid concludes that Norway had conducted a good analysis of the circumstances in Afghanistan. This understanding should, however, have been followed up better and there were no plans for risk prevention. Questions have also been asked whether Norway sufficiently took into account the development in the country and the experiences that were in fact gained along the way. The report refers to recent research which points out that international aid as such primarily supported social and financial development, rather than honing in on the underlying political causes of the conflict.

The World Bank claims that the most successful interventions in Afghanistan were planned by staff who had experience and knowledge of the sectors in question and who took the sustainability of interventions into account from the very beginning. Evaluation of UNDP concluded that the UN is often poorly prepared when conflict erupts, partly

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\(^1\) Evaluating Peacebuilding Activities in Settings of Conflict and Fragility. Improving learning for results. DAC Guidelines and Reference Series. OECD 2012
because efforts are spread across too many countries.

Would it have been possible to prepare more thoroughly where Afghanistan was concerned? And should the aid have been restructured along the way? Based on our observations, we cannot answer these questions, but it appears donors did not sufficiently take into account the underlying causes of the conflict, and that we know too little about local effects of greater aid efforts. These are lessons to remember when working with other countries in conflict.

2 Good results obligate. Expand the good interventions

Working towards better aid obligates us to do more of what yields good results. The evaluation of Norwegian organisations’ work in East Africa, which we wrote about in last year’s report, pointed out a paradox: several successful interventions were concluded without considering expanding or repeating them in other locations.

This year’s evaluation of Norwegian support for agriculture and food security calls attention to the same issue. It gives positive assessments of Norwegian support of so-called conservation agriculture, where less tillage of the land reduces erosion and improves yield. This is referred to as a flagship of Norwegian agricultural aid. The report highlights conditions felt to be vital for success: involving farmers and others who are affected and organising projects as far as possible according to their preferences. The evaluation also highlights something that sounds obvious, but which is often forgotten: go for inexpensive interventions that give individual farmers a high return.

The evaluation stresses, however, that with a few honourable exceptions, there is not enough emphasis on expanding good interventions in these cases either. Norway could do more to make use of experiences and share them with other aid stakeholders in this area.

Evaluation of the support to NGOs under Norway’s Climate and Forest Initiative resulted in similar findings. One of the goals of this programme was precisely to gain experience in developing local, national and international efforts for forest conservation. Many of the interventions had contributed to national planning of forest conservation or resulted in valuable experiences in local projects. However, Norad and others in Norway did little to systematise and share this knowledge.

If aid organisations are not interested enough in what is successful and what is not, what could be the reasons behind this? It has been claimed that the number of registered international NGOs has increased tenfold in the period 1990-2012, and that the number now lies at 60,000. A number of new governmental and intergovernmental aid initiatives have also been established. Are all these really good enough to survive? Given that aid is partly driven by whatever is offered, and characterised by little competition, it is possible that even aid organisations that do not deliver good aid, are allowed to continue. Maybe there is an element of auto-pilot in annual allocations, meaning that those who received money last year, are given the same amount or maybe more this year. The signal to recipients of aid may then be that it is better to continue as before. The East Africa evaluation recom-

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This figure was given by Nancy Birdsall, president of the think tank Center for Global Development, during Norad’s 2012 conference. There are different ways of counting, but numbers have no doubt increased substantially.
mended less emphasis on historical support levels and the recipients’ financial contributions and more on documented results following allocation of funds.

3 Do not let “capacity building” become the new white elephant

When Western aid bureaucrats planned how African countries would build industry with gifts from the north, it sometimes led to factories that did not make any profit and which fell into disrepair because there were no spare parts. These were often called white elephants and became a symbol of expensive, useless aid. Aid organisations learned from these mistakes, but could there be new white elephants which have taken the place of the old ones? This is an important question. There is a demand that government activities reach their goals at reasonable costs at home. There is no less need to pay attention to publicly financed activities when the money is spent in a country far away.

In many Norwegian aid efforts, “hard” input factors, such as infrastructure, have been replaced by “soft” inputs such as capacity building, and “white elephants” may be less visible. A lot of aid funds go to capacity building nowadays, often through training, courses and seminars. It may seem as though strategies are built on the assumption that if employees have some more knowledge, and preferably slightly different attitudes, the institution will work better. Anyone who has been part of organisational processes, knows that institutional change is complex and not necessarily achieved by sending employees to seminars.

Has capacity building been given too much emphasis? Is it effective? Our own evaluations and other studies show that capacity building can be both necessary and effective. The evaluation of the Oil for Development programme illustrates how Norway has contributed to development within petroleum management through different types of capacity building. But capacity building interventions, not least courses and seminars, also take up valuable working time for staff. Often, capacity building strategies are mainly geared towards enabling institutions to manage aid funds better, whether it is a question of having the capacity to implement specific interventions or to handle donors’ requirements when it comes to applications, measuring results and reporting. This can lead to aid being measured as more effective, but it may not be evaluated and reported what such capacity building does to the institution’s ability to attend to those of their core activities which are not financed by aid.

We do not have general answers, but in 2012 we looked at some aspects of capacity building. To make participants prioritise courses and seminars, many aid organisations have allocated plenty of funds to compensate for travelling and attending meetings. A study of such allowances highlighted the danger of an exaggerated volume of travelling and seminars taking time away from the work itself. The study also found a risk of abuse and even corruption.

Donors with the highest per diem rates attract participants most easily. Getting donors to agree to a set of rules is probably no easier here than in other areas. But donors and the country itself have a responsibility to consider both the need for training and possible unfortunate consequences. Costly programmes with disproportionate capacity development components must not become an easy way to run an aid organisation.

We see something similar in attempts at capacity building in individuals. Muhammad Yunus has
claimed that much training of “resource-poor” people is worth little. Firstly, is it right to call those who survive in the slums and on the street thanks to knowledge, skills, and a network of helpers and protectors “resource-poor”? Secondly, how can others know what they need, when they do not know the people or the conditions they live in? Yunus believes much such training is allowed to continue because concrete results cannot be demanded from those offering it. And when they offer a free meal, poor participants will always take part in courses and seminars.

4 Evaluations need to be communicated better
Evaluations can be useful in different ways. Sometimes they contribute to changing ongoing activities, at other times they influence strategies and plans for new activities. Sometimes their usefulness is more indirect, when they introduce new thoughts and ideas or contribute new knowledge to a debate or process which is already going on. They also contribute to increasing the general knowledge base which makes professionals, leaders, politicians and others able to make better decisions.

Sometimes evaluations which attract little interest within aid administration, perhaps because they do not relate to ongoing decision-making or political processes, attract interest in the public sphere. In this way, they can contribute to a more informed aid debate, which in turn may have an effect on aid policy and management. Other reports may be of great significance for an aid intervention, even though they are only read by a few professionals and appear uninteresting to others. We have to admit, however, that it also seems some evaluations are put in a drawer with no visible effect.

In the next section of this annual report, we will summarise three studies of how evaluations are used: among the largest non-governmental aid organisations in Norway, in Norwegian public aid administration, and in the World Bank. Some of the conclusions concur, while others show that the three aid systems can learn from each other.

Among the Norwegian NGOs, it appears the most concrete function of the evaluations is to influence decisions regarding organisation, or specific projects. A study of the evaluations from Norad’s Evaluation Department finds that use increases when affected parties are involved from an early stage. A questionnaire survey clearly showed that the employees in the aid administration see insufficient time, not very relevant evaluation topics and management prioritising other tasks, as the main barriers to use of evaluations – but they also highlight several weaknesses in the evaluation reports themselves.

The study of whether our own evaluations are used in aid administration showed that evaluations are met with interest, but that follow-up varies greatly. This is partly our responsibility. The study advised making reports and information about the evaluations more readily available. Currently, they contain too much in-house jargon, abbreviations and academic language. Also, there should be short, clear summaries without too much technical information. In addition, we are encouraged to use social media, film clips and other “new” information channels. We agree with this advice, and will do our utmost to follow it up.

3 He says this in his book “Banker to the Poor” (1998), chapter 29.
Reports from the Evaluation Department
Evaluation of Norwegian support for promotion of the rights of persons with disabilities

Background
Norway has supported work for the rights of persons with disabilities in several countries for many years. In 2002, guidelines were developed for integration of the rights of the disabled in other aid work, i.e. aid work not specifically for persons with disabilities. It has been important for Norway to shift the focus from health services and welfare, to social rights.

Purpose
Documenting and evaluating results of the support of work for the rights of people with disabilities in the period 2000-2010, focusing specifically on Malawi, Nepal, Palestine, Uganda and Afghanistan. This includes implementation of the guidelines from 2002 for integration of such work in other aid work. One goal was to get advice on revising the guidelines.

Findings
- Allocations of aid specifically for promoting the rights of the disabled totalled NOK 1.4 billion for the period. In addition, the report found that considerations for persons with disabilities integrated in other aid were at approximately NOK 1.6 billion in the same period; less than one per cent of the total aid during the period.
- The 2002 Guidelines for integration of the rights of the disabled into general aid activities are not well-known. Norway has only to a small degree promoted disability as a human rights issue, despite indications in a decision by the Norwegian Parliament (Stortinget) and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs.
- Few development agencies take a rights-based approach, which focuses on defining and strengthening rights holders and holders of responsibility (authorities). Services and immediate needs are often prioritised above work for lasting change.
- There are still several positive results of the support. The rights of persons with disabilities have become more visible in society. Organisations for the disabled are now in a better position to influence authorities and the situation of the disabled.
- Individuals with reduced mobility have been given the most attention, while those with developmental impairment and hearing impairment have received least attention.

Recommendations
- Include disability as a human rights issue in aid.
- Support both interventions that specifically support the disabled, and which include the disabled in other aid projects. Support for “service deliveries” (health, education, welfare) should be combined with emphasising rights.
- Keep building on experiences from work with landmine victims, e.g. by including the disabled in humanitarian projects.
- Ensure that work for women and equality also includes the disabled.
- Require more information about the disabled in plans and reports.
- Support the authorities in meeting international commitments.
- Support research on the rights of persons with disabilities.
- Support the Atlas Alliance and its partners as advocates for the rights of persons with disabilities.
Study of compensation for travelling and meetings

Background
Seminars can be useful and provide relevant training for government employees and locals. But too many seminars can also be detrimental to one’s day-to-day work. The study builds on material collected from Tanzania, Malawi and Ethiopia.

Purpose
Collect information about any negative effects of extensive seminar activities, focusing on understanding the role of donors and national authorities.

Findings
- The scope of seminars and courses has increased significantly over the past 20 years. Expenses for seminars for planning and training often represent a large portion of a development programme’s total expenses.
- Aid-financed seminar activities can easily lead to abuse of funds. This could for instance take place through stating that seminars last longer than they do, or adjusting the number of participants upwards. Sometimes people only take part in a seminar for a short time, and then they register for another seminar at the same time, and receive further compensation.
- Because there is money to be made by arranging and participating in seminars, development programmes may be planned with unnecessary and exaggerated amounts of resources for training and planning seminars. In this way, government employees can be distracted from carrying out existing plans, and focus instead on training, planning, and opportunistic use of seminars.
- Compensations can mean a significant increase in the total income of a government employee, perhaps multiply it for some, increased competition for positions that afford such opportunities, and an unfortunate culture in the organisation. Situations could develop where loyalty and support are rewarded with seminar participation.
- Donors are often generous with money for seminars without having a common practice or rules for the level of payment. Often there’s competition, and the most generous donors attract the most relevant participants.
- Authorities’ own systems for disbursements are complex and difficult to understand, too, which further increases the risk of abuse.

Recommendations
- Establish common regulations for seminar activities among donors and authorities.
- Only cover participants’ actual costs.
- Require better reasons for and documentation of the usefulness of seminars.
- Conduct more training and planning during normal working hours, with less need for travelling, seminars and extra payment.
Evaluation of Norwegian aid to Afghanistan

Background
Bilateral (country to country) aid from Norway to Afghanistan in the period 2001-2011 totalled NOK 5.4 billion. More than half of this went to international organisations, with the World Bank’s multi-donor trust fund ARTF as the biggest recipient. A quarter went to Norwegian NGOs. The rest was shared between other international and Norwegian recipients, including the Norwegian Ministry of Local Government and Regional Development, the Ministry of Justice and the Norwegian Police Directorate.

Purpose
To document and evaluate implementation and results of Norwegian aid to Afghanistan, including its relevance, goal achievement, and to some degree; cost-effectiveness and sustainability.

Findings
- Afghan priorities have been high on the Norwegian agenda. These have, however, to a large degree been defined by the international community, which may have undermined Afghan ownership of the development efforts.
- Norway’s choice of partners and gradual increase of support has been in line with its political priorities, but there is a question of whether Norway paid enough attention to the changing context in the country and experiences gained along the way.
- Norway’s development and humanitarian aid has been a part of Norwegian foreign policy. The evaluation questions whether one undertook sufficient analysis of the country’s conflicts and power structures to develop good conflict-sensitive plans and programmes.
- Norway has maintained a division between development aid and humanitarian efforts on the one hand, and military efforts on the other hand. Norway has shown respect for humanitarian and non-governmental organisations’ independence and impartiality.
- Immediate results at the output level can be documented regarding national assembly elections, training of teachers and new schooling opportunities for millions of children, capacity building in the police and prison service, rural development, payment of salaries to government employees, establishment of community development councils which facilitated transfer of assistance to villages for improvement of roads, local water supply and opportunities for women to engage in paid work.
- There is limited documentation of long term effects of development assistance. Some exceptions however include improvements in pedagogical competence of school teachers, improved access to midwife services and some transfer of authority from village elders to the elected village councils.
- NGOs have had a prominent role. The support they receive may however have weakened the legitimacy of Afghan provincial administrations that does not have comparable resources and implementation capacity.
- Cost-effectiveness could not be evaluated because of weak follow-up and documentation. This applied to interventions outside Kabul in particular.
- Norway has generally kept an arms-length distance from multilateral organisations.
implementation of interventions in Afghanistan. Norway has relied on the organisations’ own follow-up and inspection routines. The multilaterals have in turn transferred the responsibility for follow-up to national authorities, who have lacked the capacity to carry out such work. The result has been a weak system, with regard to both control and learning.

- Sustainability has not been a priority, although this has been given more attention in connection with reduction of military efforts.

**Recommendations**
- There is an urgent need to establish efficient routines for follow-up and evaluation of aid.
- The World Bank’s work on country strategy and result framework for Afghanistan should be finalised.
- Strengthening district and province administration should be a higher priority.
- NGO’s choice of projects and programmes should to a greater degree build on knowledge of local conditions and conflicts.
Evaluation of the World Bank’s multi-donor trust fund for result-based financing of health services

Background
The multi-donor trust fund receives support both from Norway and the United Kingdom. The fund’s main goal is to contribute to reaching the UN’s Millennium Development Goal of reducing mother and child mortality through result-based aid – aid where money is not given before the intended results have been achieved. The fund is testing various models and has the following main objectives:
• Support planning, implementation and follow-up of financing mechanisms (pilots) at country level, as well as associated impact evaluations.
• To find out more about what it takes to succeed in this work and share this knowledge.
• Develop competence and build good financial mechanisms in the countries.
• Contribute to increased financial support for the health sector.

Findings
• The activities are relevant and the fund has contributed to increasing interest for result-based financing as a form of aid within the World Bank, among donors and in the 45 countries in which the fund has supported activities to date.
• The fund still lacks a result framework and indicators to measure the results of the four main objectives. Therefore it is difficult to assess progress.
• The pilot mechanisms receiving support only cover a somewhat limited selection of financing models. The number of models should be increased to enable the fund to test various models adequately.
• Little has been done to collect, document and analyse information from the ongoing pilot projects. This hampers the work of developing knowledge of good result-based financing mechanisms. This may improve, however, when the results of the pilot projects and impact evaluations are ready.
• Development of expertise in result-based financing mechanisms in the countries seems to take place somewhat randomly, mostly in connection with start-up of a pilot project.
• It is too early to say whether the activities currently being tested are worth developing and it is therefore difficult to say whether these activities are sustainable. In order to reach the goal of more money for healthcare, examples of successful pilot projects are urgently needed.
• Administration of the fund is satisfactory, but must be strengthened as activities increase.

Recommendations
• Develop result frameworks and indicators to be able to measure results.
• Improve the result and financial reporting to donors and pilot project countries.
• Survey the current portfolio in order to better assess which interventions should be supported.
• Strengthen the fund administration in line with growing activities.
• Invest more in building local expertise on result-based financing mechanisms.
• Intensify the work of determining whether and, if so how, successful pilot projects should receive further support.
Evaluation of the Climate and Forest Initiative’s support to civil society

**Background**
The Climate and Forest Initiative was launched by the Government in December 2007 to support Reducing Emissions from Deforestation and Forest Degradation in Developing Countries (REDD), pledging up to NOK three billion per year. The initiative is subject to continuous evaluation (real time evaluation) which was started in 2010, and which has a different thematic focus and choice of countries each year.

**Purpose**
Document experiences from the Norad-managed support scheme for civil society organisations, with emphasis on 1) advocacy and support for policy development and 2) local field projects. The evaluation covered the period 2009-2012, when 40 organisations received a total of NOK 650 million for local, national and international projects. In 2012 this included studies with particular emphasis on Indonesia, Peru, Cameroon and DR Congo.

**Findings**
Regarding advocacy and support for national policy development:

- The support has promoted valuable capacity building of the civil society at local and national levels.
- Projects with emphasis on governance have promoted REDD and in many cases also promoted sustainable forestry in general.
- Support for policy development was in many cases well-coordinated with national REDD processes.
- Support for work on security mechanisms – especially in connection with the rights of indigenous peoples and others who live off the forest – has contributed to the work of preparing national plans in several countries.
- Several projects have supported work on legislative amendments.
- Some supported research projects contribute or are expected to contribute to international advances in knowledge.

Regarding local field projects:
- Local projects have contributed to the development of local communities and strengthening of local land rights, which is important for local communities to get involved in REDD.
- Local capacity building, establishment of cooperation and development of local pilot projects have taken longer than expected.
- With a prevailing uncertainty of future REDD financing; many international civil society organisations are planning their field projects so that they are not dependent on such financing.
- There is a risk that local projects will foster unrealistic expectations towards REDD in the local population.
- The project portfolio’s contribution to promoting biological diversity and equality is limited.

Other findings:
- With a few exceptions, the projects are in line with one or more of the Climate and Forest Initiative’s objectives, even though they are not always developed with this in mind.
- In some cases, descriptive reports give a skewed picture of projects’ effectiveness and results. This especially applies to bigger programmes that
Some recipients of funds felt that the Civil Society Department in Norad did not follow up and support the work well enough.

Transfer of knowledge often works well within organisations, but more poorly outside the organisation and between countries. This means that involved parties and the general public learn less from ongoing experiences than they could have done.

**Recommendations**

- Strengthen the administration with more forestry and climate experts.
- Manage the portfolio so it continues to be in line with the objective of the initiative.
- Ensure a good balance in the project portfolio between 1) support for advocacy and national policy development and 2) field projects.
- Require that project applications document clear objectives, plans to cooperate with other players and one’s own knowledge and experience.
- Require better reports from recipients of support, e.g. complete reports even though Norway only finances part of a programme, to ensure learning and necessary adjustments along the way.
- Offer training in reporting and result monitoring to recipients of support who need this.
- Communicate lessons learnt and new knowledge better to Norwegian players and the public.
- Have phasing-out plans in order to give recipients and locals realistic expectations.
Evaluation of the Oil for Development programme

Background
The Oil for Development (OfD) programme is founded on three pillars; resource management, revenue management, and the environment. The goal of the programme is to help countries use their petroleum wealth to achieve a lasting reduction of poverty with the least possible effect on the natural environment. Norwegian support has increased from NOK 43 million in 2005 to approx. NOK 340 million in 2012, resulting in a total support of NOK 1.5 billion in the evaluated period 2005-2012. Approximately 58 per cent went to resource management, 20 per cent to the environment and 12 per cent to the revenue management pillar. About 70 per cent went through the public sector, mostly as cooperation between Norwegian institutions and their counterparts in the recipient countries.

Purpose
To evaluate the results of the OfD programme and to outline recommendations for programming of future assistance. The evaluation included field studies in East Timor, Ghana, Mozambique, Uganda and Bolivia and short visits to Ecuador and Nicaragua.

Findings
- The programme has contributed to laying the foundation for better handling of petroleum resources in the cooperation countries, especially through support for development and implementation of general plans for sector legislation including allotment and monitoring of concessions.
- The programme has helped give Norway a visible role in many countries.
- The most important results were achieved within resource management. There are fewer results within the revenue management pillar although in East Timor the programme was instrumental in establishing the country’s oil fund. Support to the environment pillar came late into the OfD programme and has also suffered due to weak local capacity and political will.
- Support for training has not been very successful in establishing local training programmes which can address the shortage of trained personnel in these countries. The sustainability of some of the results attained is also uncertain, because much of the support has gone to training of individuals who can easily find work elsewhere and leave the institutions.
- The functional divisions into resource, environmental and financial management pillars do not always coincide with how these areas are organised in partner countries. In some cases, this has made it more difficult to get started on tasks such as risk management, good governance, anti-corruption and gender equality.
- Norwegian public institutions have over time gained experience from institutional cooperation, and their counterparts in recipient countries are generally satisfied with this cooperation. However some of the institutions have lacked knowledge about e.g. local culture, good governance, corruption and gender equality issues. In some cases, such knowledge may be more important than the technical know-how of the Norwegian institutions.
The programme did not place enough emphasis on challenges related to governance issues.

Generally, the work has focused on involvement of public institutions, and participation from non-government actors has been limited.

The significance of OfD is greater than ever. The petroleum sector is becoming increasingly significant all over the world. The danger of private companies and corrupt elites capturing oil revenues in poor countries is still very real.

The programme could increase its capacity if it made itself less dependent on Norwegian experts and institutions.

**Recommendations**

A separate allocation in the state budget allocation should be considered in order to ease long term planning in the programme. The programme should:

- Maintain its goals of poverty reduction and of financially, environmentally and socially responsible management of petroleum resources and be extended in accordance with the demand from the recipient countries.
- Include good governance as a cross-cutting issue in the most important country programmes, with support for actors working for better governance in the petroleum area.
- Place greater emphasis on partner countries’ commercial interests and financial management, including the assessment, collection and reporting of petroleum revenues.
- Place greater emphasis on environmental management, safety issues and preparedness for handling emergencies.
- Open up for cooperation with regional and other knowledge centres on need basis (as Norwegian institutions have limited capacity).
- Delegate more management responsibility to Norwegian embassies or other partners.
- Consider making the OfD board an advisory body.
- Let the OfD secretariat concentrate on issues related to strategy, supervision and reporting of the programme.
A study of the evaluation work in Norwegian NGOs

Background
Norwegian organisations represent a fifth of bilateral aid. Evaluation of their activities must to a large degree build on how they themselves track implementation and results. The study specifically examined the evaluation work of the Norwegian Refugee Council, the Norwegian Red Cross, Norwegian Church Aid, Norwegian People’s Aid, Save the Children Norway and DIGNI.

Purpose
Provide an overview of and assessment of the evaluation work in Norwegian organisations, with emphasis on professional quality, information and learning.

Findings
- The monitoring and evaluation function generally works well, with a good evaluation culture and many competent, committed staff members in the organisations.
- The work is organised and carried out slightly differently in the organisations, but the similarities are more striking than the differences.
- In the last five years, work in all the organisations has become more formalised, but no more centralised.
- The quality of the evaluation reports is satisfactory, but more comprehensive evaluations and in some cases a more critical assessment of evaluation methods and limitations would be desirable.
- Evaluation does not have a clear foundation in the overall policy documents and budgeting in several of the organisations.
- Governing bodies often show little interest in considering the evaluation reports.
- Evaluation reports should be used more in cooperation between the organisations and Norad.

Recommendations
- Clearer guidelines for the evaluation work in the organisations’ governing documents.
- Develop systems for engaging governing bodies and management in considering evaluation. Governing bodies should follow evaluation work more closely.
- Root the evaluation processes better in the organisation, e.g. by having reference groups with clear mandates.
- The organisations should have annual or multi-annual budgets for evaluation and link evaluation activities to systems for cost control.
- Clarify responsibility for quality control.
- Consider interventions for how to learn more from evaluations.
A study of the use of evaluations in Norwegian aid administration

Background
The study builds on interviews, analyses of documents, reviews of previous evaluations and a questionnaire survey conducted by the Evaluation Department in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Norad and in the foreign missions working with international development.

Objective
Find out to what degree evaluations carried out by Norad’s Evaluation Department are used in decision-making processes and for learning in Norwegian aid administration, with a view to making improvements.

Findings
The Evaluation Department has managed to generate interest for the evaluations, through e.g.:
• Consulting widely during the development of the evaluation programme.
• Presenting the evaluations at open seminars.
• Having the evaluations discussed on other websites about development and research.

Follow-up of the evaluations varies considerably, however, and factors that sometimes impede learning and utilisation are:
• The evaluations come at the wrong time.
• The evaluations cover areas considered less important by the management.
• The management does not have time to study the evaluations.
• The recommendations are not specific or practical enough.
• The reports suffer from too much jargon, abbreviations and academic language.
• The selection of consultants may seem too narrow.

Recommendations
For the Evaluation Department:
• Work to get more companies competing for the evaluation assignments.
• Lay down guidelines which ensure that the recommendations become clearer, fact-based, realistic and measurable.
• Ensure that all reports have clear, short summaries.
• Prepare short and not too technical briefs for all reports.
• Offer relevant departments and foreign missions targeted evaluation briefings.

• Consider dissemination of information through networks outside Norad, social media, podcast, videos, and other channels of communication.
• Work to make the reports easier to read.
• Make efforts to keep stakeholders more engaged while the evaluations are carried out.
• Consider reporting on the status for follow-up of the recommendations every other year.

To the Ministry of Foreign Affairs:
• Making timely production of follow-up plans and actions an explicit element in managers’ performance metrics.
• Conduct annual reviews of compliance with requirements for follow-up of recommendations and send these reports to Parliament.
• Publish examples of good use of evaluations in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Norad, to promote use of the evaluations.
• Consider holding regular meetings between the Evaluation Department and the management of the Ministry regarding use and follow-up of evaluations.
Questionnaire survey: Use of evaluations in Norwegian aid administration

Background
An electronic Questionnaire survey was sent to 640 employees at embassies and delegations, in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Norad. The response rate was 41 per cent.

Purpose
Learn more about to what degree the Evaluation Department’s evaluations are known in Norwegian aid administration, and identify which factors impede or contribute to evaluations being used, determine how they are used, and how employees in the administration seek to obtain and share knowledge. The survey provided information for the study of the use of evaluations (Report 8/2012).

Key findings
• Not enough time is cited as a barrier to the use of evaluations (90 per cent of respondents), followed by low quality in reports (47 per cent).
• High relevance and easily available information about the evaluations are cited by 47 per cent as important for use, followed by 45 per cent who emphasise how important it is for motivation that management is interested in use of evaluations.
• Informal conversations with colleagues and friends are cited as the most important source of information about evaluations, followed by the evaluation reports themselves, policy studies and research, participation in sector or donor groups (in the countries), and direct contact with relevant researchers, evaluators or other professionals. Few view the intranet as an important source.
• Of those who had recently been affected by an evaluation, three of five stated that the evaluation contributed to internal discussion about the programme. Fewer reported that the evaluations led to improvements in specific programmes.

Figure 1: Word cloud of 155 replies to the question: What would help you to make greater use of evaluation knowledge in your work?
Evaluation of Norway’s agricultural support to food security

Background
Agricultural support was at close to NOK 3 billion in the seven year period 2005-11 and made up around two per cent of Norwegian aid. The evaluation concentrated on 25 of the largest programmes receiving support from Norway, with specific studies of 15 programmes in Malawi, Tanzania and Zambia.

Purpose
To find out to what degree Norwegian agricultural support has contributed to food security, with a view to gaining advice on future organisation of this aid.

Findings
Food security:
- Positive effects are likely, but seldom proven due to a lack of data. Existing documentation says most about food production, least about nutrition.
- Efforts in many countries have promoted the goal of food security, especially food availability, and have generally been better adapted to national plans and been more effective than regional and global programmes.
- Many programmes which focused on small farmers and combating poverty have worked well even though food security was not expressed as a goal.
- Support for research and innovation, e.g. in connection with climate-adjusted crops, has promoted long term food security.
- In line with the agriculture action plan from 2004, significant support went to the private sector.
- Weak coordination between Norwegian administration bodies (the Ministry, the embassies, Norad and the Peace Corps), e.g. within conservation agriculture, made the support less effective.
- There was little emphasis on nutrition (food utilisation), the right to food, women’s rights and participation.
- Livelihood activities in several NGO programmes promoted food accessibility.
- Several programmes focusing on sustainable use of natural resources promoted food stability.

“Follow the money” studies of three large programmes showed that they were well-organised, with good systems for accounting, control and reporting. In the CAP conservation agriculture programme in Zambia, the number of farmers cultivating in an environmentally friendly way was lower than reported (one interested party questioned the evaluators’ calculations). In the NAS-FAM programme in Malawi, there was not enough money to buy the food that had been produced, which lowered profits and makes the programme dependent on donors for longer than planned. The rice cultivation project Mngetsa in Tanzania (supported by Norfund) is taking longer than planned to reach production goals, which increases the need for investment and the commercial risk.

Some other findings:
- Weak planning and insufficient start data often lessen the opportunity to evaluate results.
- Many interventions appear to spread information effectively, but there is little knowledge of what this achieves.
- Commercial programmes had clear plans to end the aid, but
most other programmes had no such plans. This led to the biggest problems in infrastructure programmes and programmes which subsidised farm inputs.

- With a few exceptions, there was not enough emphasis on expansion of good programmes.
- An important question is whether aid displaces countries’ own financing of agriculture, or whether it on the contrary leads to greater national efforts. An evaluation in Malawi, Tanzania and Zambia gives a mixed picture where no conclusion may be drawn.

**Recommendations**

- The Ministry of Foreign Affairs and embassies should ensure better coordination of Norwegian agricultural aid.
- Lay down guidelines for women and equality, rights and nutrition in agricultural aid.
- Systematise lessons from conservation agriculture better.
- Require start-up information and result frameworks that make projects easier to evaluate.
- Require more information on financial and economic sustainability, plans for expansion, and for terminating aid.
Other Evaluation Reports
The UN Development Programme: Support to countries in conflict

**Background**
The evaluation investigates whether UNDP’s activities and programmes contribute to the stability necessary for countries to reach their development goals. The evaluation looks specifically at the countries where both UNDP and a UN peacekeeping mission are present.

The evaluation primarily builds on studies in Burundi, Ivory Coast, DR Congo, Haiti, Lebanon, Liberia, Somalia, South Sudan and East Timor. Assessments have also been conducted for Afghanistan, Iraq, the Central African Republic, Chad, Guatemala, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Nepal, Palestine, Sierra Leone and Uganda.

**Purpose**
Obtain knowledge about UNDP’s contribution to stability and development in countries in conflict, especially countries where international peace operations are present.

**Findings**
In countries in conflict:
- The work requires a political agreement and a certain stability in the country.
- Activities related to law and order, legal aid for women, bridge-building between traditional and formal legal systems, infrastructure, non-violent conflict resolution, employment generation and culture have contributed to mitigate conflicts.

The UN Development Programme:
- Is perceived as an experienced and impartial provider of election support.
- Has strengthened women’s legal position and opportunities for political participation.
- Has had little success with support for disarming, demobilisation and re-integration of former soldiers.

General findings regarding UNDP:
- In one way or another, the organisation is present in all countries in conflict – and might be trying to cover too much.
- Does not have procedures for use of conflict analyses and is often unprepared when conflict breaks out.
- Allocates 14 per cent of its funds to supporting local authorities in countries in conflict, likely too little, given these have an important role in peacebuilding.
- Does not have good procedures for recruitment and supplies.

Findings regarding UNDP in integrated peace operations:
- The work for increased political participation in elections has sometimes compromised the peace process.
- Close contact between different parts of the UN system may assist in handling incompatible goals in integrated peace operations.
- Has been criticised for bad management of the cluster for early recovery.
- The Integrated Mission Planning Process was useful to determine division of work, but is often absent in countries where peacekeeping operations are closing down.
- The organisation is criticised for favouring its own projects in the management of multi-donor trust funds.
- The organisation is criticised for favouring its own projects in the management of multi-donor trust funds.
Recommendations

General recommendations to UNDP:

- There is a need for new guidelines for project development in countries in crisis. These should concern the quality and use of conflict analysis, goals for gender equality interventions, evaluation and monitoring, strategies for aid, and different forms of programme implementation.

- It is recommended to establish a crisis team which can convene rapidly when required.

- The UNDP is recommended to expand training and incentives given to employees. Employees’ experiences from conflict situations and the male/female ratio should be emphasised.

Recommendations to UNDP in integrated peace operations:

- Conflict analyses should be given more weight in the planning of integrated operations.

- Should systematise knowledge and experiences from multi-donor trust funds.

- Must prioritise better which projects will be part of the first phase of early recovery.

- Should have clearer guidelines for division of work within the UN when integrated operations are being phased out.
The UN Development Programme: Efforts in Liberia

**Background**
The UNDP Evaluation Department conducts evaluations of the results of the organisation’s work – Assessments of Development Results. In Liberia, which had suffered many years of war and conflict, the group focused on supporting peace and state building.

**Purpose**
To document the results of UNDP’s support of peace work and state building in Liberia in the period 2004-2011, with a view to gaining insights for the further work.

**Findings**
Many conditions which often hinder peace and development are also present in Liberia, e.g. that

- Many laws directly or indirectly discriminate against tribes or ethnic and religious groups.
- Land is unfairly distributed.
- Corruption and breach of human rights are rife.
- The education level in public administration is low. It is difficult to recruit Liberians with a high education, which makes e.g. the work of decentralisation difficult.
- UNDP has contributed to establishing separate commissions to work on some of these problems. Their work is however often hindered by privileged groups who fend for their own interests.

The country office has not had routines for following and evaluating the results of their efforts. Further, the evaluation finds that the organisation

- has spread its efforts across too many areas.
- has organised the work too much as projects.
- has not paid enough attention to other UN organisations and other players’ work, resulting in fragmented and unsustainable projects in local communities.
- has not drawn enough on the organisation’s experiences from other countries in conflict.
- has had ineffective, cumbersome purchasing procedures.

A general conclusion is that UNDP in cooperation with the UN peace-keeping mission in the country has tried to prevent conflicts in areas prioritised by the authorities, but the results are as yet unavailable.

**Recommendations**
Among the recommendations for UNDP’s efforts were:

- Increased geographic and thematic focus in programmes;
- Better coordination between programmes, and
- A more long-term and overall focus.

The success of UNDPs work in Liberia is dependent on structural causes of conflict being removed.
The UN Development Programme: Efforts in DR Congo

**Background**
The evaluation investigates whether UNDP’s contribution to recovery and development in the Democratic Republic of Congo in the period 2003-2011 has been useful, in light of the major challenges still facing the country.

**Purpose**
To document the results of UNDP’s support of rebuilding and developing the Democratic Republic of Congo 2003-2011 and make recommendations related to future work.

**Findings**
The greatest sources of conflict in the country are poverty, the battle for natural resources, conflicts over land, lawlessness and impunity.

UNDP has generally managed donor trust funds well. The organisation has contributed to the recovery since 2003 by
- Support registration of over 25 million voters and the subsequent referendum, presidential election and elections for parliament and local government.
- Support the country’s Office of the Auditor General.
- Support the authorities’ coordination of aid.
- Support training of police and legal protection for victims of sexual abuse, etc.

On the other hand:
- The organisation is cumbersome and slow at disbursements.
- There is not enough result measurement and evaluation, perhaps because employees in the country who could have done these things have not been given the opportunity to work independently on them.
- There was a lack of thorough assessments of the public administration’s need for support for competence raising and training. Instead, there were too much emphasis on training individuals and too little on institutional framework conditions. One example is training of police and judges, which suffered because these were preoccupied earning other income as they were not paid their salaries.
- The fact that UNDP itself does much of the work through its own projects, appears to be in conflict with the goal of strengthening the authorities’ ownership and competence.

The evaluation calls for the vigour and energy that were present in the country office in the beginning of the recovery period, and recommends efforts be concentrated on fewer areas.

Unrest in the country and less money from donors made it necessary to reduce work for poverty reduction and good governance from 2010.
The UN Development Programme: Efforts in Nepal

Background
UNDP’s work in Nepal has consisted in peace building, reconstruction, support for the transitional government, economic growth and employment, energy and the environment, and disaster and crisis handling. The period 2002-2011 was a period of great change in the country. The 240-year-old monarchy was abolished and the parliament was reintroduced.

Purpose
To document the results of UNDP’s support for Nepal in the period 2002-2011 and make recommendations for future work.

Findings
On the positive side, the evaluation finds that the organisation
• Carefully followed the country’s conflicts, peacebuilding, political development and work on a new constitution.
• Was perceived to be a neutral supporter of the authorities, and was present in isolated communities.
• Achieved good results in several programmes, a case in point being their work for gender equality and social inclusion.
• Strengthened their administration of procurements, payments, etc.

However, the evaluation also finds that
• It is uncertain whether the results will last, due to e.g. low interest and few resources on the part of the authorities.
• Training within public administration has placed too much emphasis on individuals and not enough on institutional framework conditions.

Recommendation
The evaluation recommends the organisation to coordinate its work better with other programmes and concentrate on fewer areas.
The World Bank:
Impact Evaluations – are they relevant and what do they lead to?

The World Bank and the International Finance Corporation (IFC) conduct a number of impact evaluations. Impact evaluations can often provide answers to specific questions: What is the effect of an intervention on a target group, compared with a situation without the initiative? The situation without the intervention – the counterfactual situation - cannot be measured, but impact evaluations use statistical methods to establish a credible counterfactual basis for comparison.

The main focus of Impact Evaluation is on one question: What is the impact (or causal effect) of an intervention on the beneficiary, compared to the counterfactual situation which would have prevailed had the intervention been absent? Since the counterfactual is not observable, impact evaluations rely on statistical methods to create a credible counterfactual scenario.

Purpose
The main objective is to assess the relevance and quality of the World Bank and International Finance Corporation (IFC)’s Impact Evaluations and their influence on operational, institutional, and knowledge priorities. The evaluation does not measure the impact of IE, as the construction of a counterfactual situation to measure such an impact was beyond the scope of this evaluation.

Findings
- The World Bank Group is the largest producer of Impact Evaluations among all development institutions. IEs increasingly depend on donor support through trust funds.
- The World Bank Group’s portfolio of IEs is largely aligned with project objectives and sector strategies. However, some sectors (social protection, education) have received more attention than others (such as energy, transport and environment).
- With some exceptions, there are at present no formal and standardized mechanisms at the World Bank to ensure quality control of IEs. In addition, staff capacity to implement and supervise IE is inadequate in many units of the World Bank, and even more so at IFC.
- The use of World Bank IEs to provide evidence of program impact or to inform operational decisions is modest. There is a potential for more systematic use of IEs in the World Bank Group.

Recommendations
- Develop a strategic approach to guide IE selection across sectors and regions.
- Explore options for consolidation of external funding of IEs.
- Strengthen the utilization of IE in operations of the World Bank and IFC, and enhance their quality by consistently applying good practice standards, including peer-reviews of the Impact Evaluations.
The World Bank: Support for youth employment

Background

Youth employment issues are a major concern for many countries, because they have negative effects on the welfare of young people and may also adversely affect economic performance and social stability. The World Bank, including the International Finance Corporation (IFC) which works more directly with the private sector, supports work of promoting employment of youth.

Purpose

The main objective of the evaluation was to map and assess the effectiveness of World Bank Group support to countries tackling youth employment issues. The main purpose was to understand the contribution of interventions supported by the World Bank Group and identify lessons for future efforts in this area.

Findings

- Evaluating the World Bank’s and IFC’s assistance to youth employment is challenging because employment outcomes are the result of actions across many sectors.
- Most World Bank projects include interventions in skills development and school-to-work transition. More than half of the projects include interventions to foster job creation and work opportunities for youth. IFC has taken a broad approach to job creation, it has supported youth through investment and advisory services in education and 10 youth employment projects.
- Programs that combine smoothing the transition from school to work with work-based skills development appear to be most effective for youth employment and earnings in countries with a formal sector.
- In rural low-income areas, where most youth are active in agriculture and non-farm employment or self-employment, it is essential for youth employment to stimulate the market environment for growth of farms and rural agribusinesses.

Recommendations

- Support governments by collecting labour market data by age groups, and monitor and evaluate age-specific employment and earning outcomes for Bank Group supported interventions designed to address youth employment issues.
- At the country level, address youth employment issues comprehensively from the demand and supply side, and design interventions targeted to low-income youth. Examples for the private sector could include closing the gap between skills demanded by the private sector and those acquired through the educational system.
Background
The World Bank Group’s strategy in Liberia (2003-2011) initially focused on two areas: (i) restoring the functionality of the state; and (ii) rebuilding infrastructure. In addition, the World Bank Group designated three priorities as cross-cutting themes: capacity building, gender equality, and environmental sustainability, with the aim of reflecting these priorities in all interventions.

Purpose
The main objective has been to assess the outcomes of World Bank Group support to Liberia from its post-war re-engagement in 2003 through 2011.

Findings
• There has been substantial progress in the rebuilding of public institutions. Important results have been achieved in restoring public finances and reforming the civil service.
• The World Bank Group has helped improve the conditions of roads, ports, power supply, and water and sanitation.
• With some exceptions, results have been weak with regard to integration of cross-cutting themes across interventions.
• Cancelation of Liberia’s debt burden, which was attained in 2010, was a crucial step in boosting the country’s development efforts.

Recommendations
• There is a need to systematically enhance the quality of governance across the value chain for the country’s natural resources.
• There is a need to create job opportunities, especially among youth who also need skills development.
Background
Following a short initial phase to develop essential governance institutions, the World Bank Group’s assistance to Afghanistan 2002-11 has had three strategic objectives: (a) building the capacity of the state and its accountability to its citizens; (b) promoting growth of the rural economy and improving rural livelihoods; and (c) supporting growth in the formal private sector.

Purpose
The main objective has been to review the relevance and effectiveness of the World Bank Group’s strategy and the effectiveness of its assistance program.

Findings
- Despite the deterioration in security since 2006, the Bank Group has established and sustained a large program of support for the country.
- Impressive results have been achieved in public financial management, public health, telecommunications and community development.
- Substantial outputs have also been achieved in primary education, rural roads, irrigation, and microfinance. However, progress has been limited in civil service reform, agriculture, urban development and private sector development.
- Given the lack of viable district/provincial institutions, the investment in community organizations at the village level may not be sustainable. With a reduced international presence in 2014, the sustainability of development gains remains a major risk, particularly because of capacity constraints on the civilian side.

Recommendations
- Help the government to develop a comprehensive, long-term human resources strategy for the civilian sectors and assist in the development of local government institutions.
- Assist in transforming the National Solidarity Program into a more sustainable financial and institutional model to consolidate its gains.
- Scale up the support from the International Finance Corporation (IFC) and Multilateral Investment Guarantee Agency (MIGA) to the private sector.
Background
Evaluation of the World Bank Group’s 2002 Forest Strategy that established three main objectives: protecting vital local and global forest environmental services and values, harnessing the potential of forests to reduce poverty, and integrating forests into sustainable economic development.

Purpose
The main objective has been to assess in what manner and how effectively the World Bank Group has supported member countries and the private sector in managing their forest resources for sustainable development, and what we can learn from this engagement.

Findings
- Protected areas are more effective in reducing deforestation when they are designed and managed by the people who live in and around the forest and depend on it for resources.
- Poverty can be exacerbated by limiting or restricting local communities’ access to forests through the creation or expansion of a park or a protected area, if due consideration is not paid to livelihoods.
- When implemented effectively, Participatory Forest Management has delivered livelihood-enhancing benefits as well as positive environmental outcomes. However, its potential is often hampered by the failure to transfer true authority to communities and by regulations which often discriminate against small producers.
- The monitoring and reporting systems for the operations of the World Bank forest sector cannot verify whether its operations are supporting forest management in an environmentally and socially sustainable way.
- The World Bank Group’s forest interventions have contributed substantially to environmental outcomes, but poverty reduction, for the most part, has not been adequately addressed.

Recommendations
The World Bank Group’s effectiveness in supporting sustainable forest management can be enhanced by
- building more meaningful community participation into the design and management of protected areas,
- helping to level the playing field for community-based forest enterprises
- reviewing the current approach to industrial timber concession reforms in tropical moist forests
- targeting IFC and MIGA investments toward firms that can have a catalytic effect on generating greater demand for and supply of sustainable forest products.
The World Bank: Adapting to climate change

**Background**
Evaluation of the World Bank Group’s engagement with interventions dealing with adaptation to climate change. Adaptation interventions reduce vulnerability and exposure to the risks associated with climate change, climate variability and extreme climate events.

**Purpose**
The main objective has been to answer the following three questions:
- What can be learned from past and ongoing efforts to deal with climate change?
- Under what circumstances is it most important to incorporate climate change risks into the design and appraisal of long-term investment projects, and to what extent, and how is this being done?
- What are the lessons from efforts explicitly aimed at adaptation to climate change at the national and regional levels, and how has the Bank Group performed against climate adaptation goals?

**Findings**
- The Bank has developed financial products such as standby loans and insurance pools for disaster risk management. However, the interventions are not adequate to fully manage risks of catastrophic losses.
- Long-term, inflexible infrastructure projects are often subject to climate risk, but the Bank Group lacks procedures for identifying and mitigating these risks.
- Anticipatory adaptation efforts—pay now to avoid damage later—are inherently less appealing to individuals and countries because of their uncertain benefits, and the priority put on current needs.
- The Bank Group lacks a comprehensive, outcome-oriented results framework for guiding and tracking its adaptation efforts.

**Recommendations**
- Develop guidelines for incorporating climate risk management into project and program design, appraisal, and implementation.
- Develop and pilot local and national-level indicators to better assess the costs, benefits, sustainability, and impact of interventions.
- Support countries to improve hydro-meteorological services and encourage the use and sharing of hydro-meteorological information within and between countries.
- Promote attention to precautionary principles for adaptation to long-term climate change.
Follow-up of Evaluations
# Follow-up of Evaluations

Below is an overview of follow-up of previews evaluations. This overview only shows which procedures were carried out, not actual follow-up. All documents are available on request.

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<td>Synthesis Study - Support to Legislatures</td>
<td>2010/2</td>
<td>Memo note not required</td>
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<td>Norwegian Business-related Assistance</td>
<td>2010/3 (Case studies 2010/4,5,6)</td>
<td>23.09.2010</td>
<td>15.03.2011</td>
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<td>Norwegian Development Cooperation with the Western Balkans</td>
<td>2010/7</td>
<td>04.11.2010</td>
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<td>Evaluability Study of Partnership Initiatives- Norwegian support to Achieve Millennium Development Goals 4 and 5</td>
<td>2010/9</td>
<td>24.02.2011</td>
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<td>Adopted action plans</td>
<td>Follow-up report</td>
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<td>Conflict Prevention and Peace building Activities in Southern Sudan</td>
<td>Joint</td>
<td>03.03.2011</td>
<td>22.06.2011</td>
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<td>Democracy Support through the United Nations</td>
<td>2010/10</td>
<td>08.07.2011</td>
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<td>Paris Declaration on Aid Effectiveness</td>
<td>Joint</td>
<td>Report did not include Norwegian aid specifically. Memo note not developed.</td>
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<td>Results of Development Cooperation through Norwegian NGO’s in East Africa</td>
<td>2011/1</td>
<td>25.04.2012</td>
<td>13.03.2013</td>
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<td>Research on Norwegian Development Assistance</td>
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<td>Strategy for Norway’s Culture and Sports Cooperation with Countries in the South</td>
<td>2011/3</td>
<td>27.01.2012</td>
<td>06.06.2012</td>
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<td>Contextual Choices in Fighting Corruption - Study</td>
<td>2011/4 Study</td>
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<td>Norwegian peace efforts in Sri Lanka</td>
<td>2011/5</td>
<td>08.02.2012</td>
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<td>Support to Anti-corruption Efforts</td>
<td>2011/6</td>
<td>15.02.2012</td>
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<td>Synthesis Study: Norway’s Trade Related Assistance through Multilateral Organizations</td>
<td>2011/8</td>
<td>08.03.2012</td>
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<td>Activity-Based Financial Flows in the UN system</td>
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<td>Hunting for Per Diem</td>
<td>2012/2</td>
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<td>Lessons learnt from support to Civil Society Organisations</td>
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<td>Norway’s Oil for Development Programme</td>
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<td>Monitoring and Evaluation in six Civil Society Organisations - Study</td>
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<td>Use of Evaluations in the Norwegian Development Cooperation System</td>
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<td>Evaluation of Norway’s Bilateral Agricultural Support to Food Security</td>
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