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The evidence debate

In 2004, two Americans started something they called The Evaluation Gap Initiative. They felt there was a gap in our knowledge of development, due to a great shortage of solid evaluations of the impact of development measures. We lacked evidence for our knowledge. Two years later a working group at their initiative published a report: When Will We Ever Learn? Will we – do we want to – learn? The report was highly critical of traditional aid evaluations, and the aid organisations were urged to make a much better effort to document the impact of their work. The report created a stir, and much lively debate followed.

A great evidence debate has continued for a long time in international research and evaluation circles. One of the topics of debate is the use of quantitative versus qualitative methods of evaluation, and specifically the use of randomisation – random selection – in evaluation. While the discussion ranges across different disciplines, there is also a transatlantic dimension to it. The American evaluation tradition has been more devoted to quantitative methods than what has been the case in Europe.

The European Evaluation Society – which the newly established Norwegian Evaluation Society has recently joined – refutes the view that the best or even the only method of evaluating impact is by controlled use of random selection. The Society advocates using a number of methods. Randomisation may be used in certain cases, e.g. where there is a simple connection between a measure and its expected outcome. But this method is rarely useful in complex situations where the outcome is a result of many factors. Most of the time this will be the case for development cooperation, and quite often for the rest of the world as well.

We endorse this view. However, it is not difficult to agree that we must get better at measuring the grassroots results of our development policy and the use of our development funds. That is why we have placed greater emphasis on just these aspects in our evaluations in recent years. In this report we are also able to present more specific results than before. We believe this is not just because we have become better at asking questions, but also because the results achieved are better.

This does not mean we are good enough, either in evaluating or in achieving results. That is why we have joined the new programme which has been launched to follow up the initiative from Nancy Birdsall and Ruth Levine, The International Initiative for Impact Evaluation, 3ie, together with 20 other donor organisations, foundations and NGOs. The British government and the Gates Foundation have secured considerable funds for this programme. 3ie functions as a kind of research council which distributes support for impact evaluations to applicants in the South and North. There has been a great response, not least from institutions, governments and organisations in the South. 3ie also provides expert advice if the initial applications are not up to standard.

For donor representatives in developing countries, this must be a good opportunity to join forces with the national authorities and other players in order to find out of what works and what doesn’t – answers that may not be obtained through ordinary reviews.

Such methods will not be able to answer all our questions. It is impossible to present the result of every part of Norwegian aid. More often than not, Norway is one of many actors in international aid, and our contributions go into to a major programme or through multilateral organisations. We can then rarely say that an outcome is the result of Norwegian support, but we can say that we have contributed to the result. It is even more difficult to determine the long-term impact of Norwegian money and Norwegian development policy, as there are so many factors at play.

We are continuously working with evaluation staff in other countries to improve our methods. And we vary our methods. In evaluating the Norwegian peace-making efforts in Sri Lanka we take a very different approach from when we look at the long-term effects of Norwegian agricultural aid in Madagascar. We do not always come up with equally precise answers. We firmly believe, however, that by adapting our methods we can find meaningful answers regarding the impact of most aspects of Norwegian development policy.

Asbjørn Eidhammer
Director of Evaluation
Lessons learned in 2009

We are better at documenting our results, but have a long way to go

A series of reports in 2009 are able to document concrete results for poor people, better than in earlier evaluations. There has been clear progress in the number of children going to school in Nepal, from 86 percent of the children in 2003 to 92 percent in 2008; an increase which is actually higher when bearing in mind that the number of children has grown. In difficult Northern Uganda, Norwegian NGOs have provided education and shelter for internal refugees, provided income through the breeding of cattle and goats, caused improved awareness of children’s rights and offered energy-saving stoves that reduce the workload and risk for women and children. Norwegian peace efforts in Haiti helped reduce tension at a critical point of time for the country, and Norwegian People’s Aid has by and large reached their objectives with regard to removal of landmines. Norwegian support for local business and industry development has helped create 1500 new jobs in Sri Lanka.

However, there is still a long way to go for Norwegian aid agencies to become sufficiently able to document their results, whether these are good or not. There are several reports to indicate this. Norwegian organisations are not good enough at describing their goal achievement, to quote the report on Northern Uganda. The Norwegian effort in Haiti lacks a system to follow-up and ensure viability of the activities, which goes to show that we need a system for learning and knowledge sharing in our peace promotion efforts. Other reports from 2009 and earlier reveal the same. We do not oversee our emergency aid well enough, is what the report on the state of international humanitarian aid says.
A weakness pointed out in several reports is that our long-term work to build up capacity and ensure sustainability is inadequate. Although local organisations have been strengthened in Northern Uganda, Norwegian organisations have not done enough to build up long-term competence. Norwegian support for further education and research in developing countries has helped improve their capacity considerably, but to the benefit of private individuals rather than institutions. In some instances the United Nations’ organisation for Education, Science and Culture, UNESCO, chose to use international expertise when there were local people who were qualified to do the job, and the local connection was weak.

This lack of long-term perspective is by no means a particularly Norwegian trait. The study of long-term effects of the support given in the wake of the tsunami shows that providing services was given higher priority than capacity building. The report on the state of international humanitarian aid points out that local authorities are not included in the work as much as they should be, and the World Bank’s evaluation of the use of poverty analyses shows that these studies had no effect on the countries’ capacity for analysis. The World Bank’s evaluation of efforts for the public sector in 2008 also found few results of any importance with regard to institutional changes.

The report presented in February 2010 on support to parliaments points out that this type of work often has been too much ad hoc. This conclusion corresponds with similar evaluations from earlier years in the petroleum sector, hydropower and fisheries, which show that long term engagement produces results.

This lack of long-term perspective is by no means a particularly Norwegian trait.
A common denominator in several of the evaluations and studies in this year’s report is that the assessments of aid provided via the UN organisations made for discouraging reading. A couple of these reports were from comparative studies, comparing the UN as a channel to other channels for aid; a comparison not often made. A study of fourteen assessments of the work performed by multi-lateral organisations on environmental issues ranked the UN at the bottom, behind the multilateral development banks and international NGOs. Among others the report questions the added value of the United Nations’ environment programme, UNEP, in international environment aid. In the evaluation of aid to protect cultural heritage in developing countries, UNESCO is criticised for being inefficient, and for not using local institutions. The consultants query the fact that the majority of Norwegian support in this field is channelled through UNESCO, and feel that Norway ought to strengthen its bilateral work in this area.

UN organisations struggle to deliver aid efficiently

On the bright side – although at another level – it seems that the improved organisation of the UN emergency aid in a central fund and cluster approach is more successful.

Complaints of inefficiency in the UN are not exactly news. Nor are a few such studies sufficient to draw broader conclusions about using the UN to channel Norwegian aid. However, these reports serve to document the state of affairs.

The UN organisations are especially criticised for their bureaucracy and inefficiency. The country-specific study of the UNDP’s development programme in Uganda is a good illustration. The evaluation team found that the UNDP was not efficient in the implementation of its programmes after the conflict in Uganda, especially with regard to rapid and adapted response. The organisation had no strategy for capacity building, and the long-term results are modest. Other studies of UNDP’s performance in individual countries confirm this picture, at least to a certain degree. For instance, UNDP is also heavily criticised for its inefficiency and lax administrative routines in Afghanistan.
The administration of international humanitarian aid has seen some progress, especially with regard to the working methods in the system, such as coordination mechanisms, funding schemes and tools to analyse and assess the needs. However, the system continues to have basic weaknesses, for example when it comes to leadership and the will and ability to get directly involved with the groups that receive the aid. This emerges from the State of the Humanitarian System Report, which was published by the Active Learning Network for Accountability and Performance in Humanitarian Action (ALNAP) and which is based on a large number of evaluations and research reports.

The donors have become better at prioritising, and aid arrives more timely than before. There has also been a development in new ways of giving aid, such as giving cash and using the local markets more. Experience shows that well-functioning markets and knowledge are more important than infrastructure when it comes to rebuilding communities in the wake of a disaster, as the assessment of aid after the tsunami found.

Increased work on preparedness, both through the established schemes and the UN Control Emergency Response Fund (CERF), has contributed to making the system more efficient. The UN’s cluster approach has also helped. The administrative costs for these schemes are high, but justifiable, according to the report.

Too little is still done for local and national capacity building. The system is still predominantly ‘top-down’, with the inherent risk of undermining local capacity, rather than reinforcing it.

It is also positive that the evaluations of long-term effects of the work following the tsunami show considerable success in achieving linkage between emergency aid, rehabilitation and development aid in the tsunami efforts. The report also points out actions taken to reduce the risk of new natural disasters causing the same amount of damage.
Do the evaluation reports get used?

Each year we provide information concerning the follow-up of the evaluation reports, as determined by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. A schematic overview of such follow-up is found on page 40 of this report. The overview shows that follow-up actions are decided on, so to speak, all evaluation reports, but that the time requirements are often not adhered to.

For the first time we have also prepared a systematic overview of how the evaluation reports are being used. We have reviewed all the evaluation reports for 2005 and 2006 in order to show the use of the reports, what measures have been implemented to follow up the recommendations, and their impact on the implementation of development policies and aid in the respective areas.

As will be seen, all the reports have influenced policies and practice, although some more than others. The Norwegian scholarship programme for students from developing countries was altered quite radically after an evaluation in 2005. The evaluation of the Norwegian strategy for women, which showed that the integration strategy had failed to a great extent, was an important premise when a new action plan for women and equal opportunity was drawn up for the new red-green government. With this plan, earmarked funds and targets for this purpose returned to development policy. A new cooperation agreement with the UN environmental agency UNEP was based on the evaluation of cooperation between Norway and this organisation. The evaluation strongly recommended establishing better performance management in UNEP, but it took a long time to put this into place. The evaluation report for Fredskorpset FK was mainly positive, but led to some adjustments in the way FK operates. However, recommendations to strengthen monitoring in the South were not followed up, as a later review remarked.

Two programmes were closed down following an evaluation: The “Women can do it” programme in the Western Balkans was terminated due to disagreement on the follow-up, and the collaboration between the ministries of education in Norway and Zambia ended since it turned out to have limited results and was not prioritised from the Zambian side.

A number of reports were published in 2006 stemming from two comprehensive evaluations commissioned jointly by donor countries. One of these evaluations concerned budget support as an aid form, while the other looked at international aid after the tsunami in Southeast Asia after Christmas 2004. The tsunami evaluation report contained a series of general findings concerning policy and practice in the humanitarian field, and the main report functioned as input into the further debate and policy formation in this field. Lessons learnt and recommendations from this evaluation can for example be seen in a strategy for humanitarian aid and two government white papers on this subject. The budget support evaluation was used more directly to inform policy formation and budget allocation for the next few years.

The overview shows that the reports are being used, and therefore seem to have been relevant and useful. Reports that are part of an aid management process or directly address a political need are of course more likely to be used. Some reports will provide more general lessons learnt and feed into the overall development debate. Others will have a more direct control purpose. Their use and usefulness will therefore always vary. Also, all recommendations in a report are not necessarily appropriate and correct. It is therefore up to the decision-makers to decide what consequences to draw from an evaluation report, and this is as it should be.

You will find a more thorough review of the use of these evaluation reports on page 35 in this report.
# Summary of evaluations

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The education sector in Nepal has received support from international partners for several decades, and has been a separate sector programme since 2001. The evaluation was led by our Evaluation Department and conducted on behalf of the education authorities and the donors. The education programme has in the 2004-2009 period cost approx. USD 800 million. About 70 per cent of this has been financed by the Nepalese authorities and about 30 per cent by the donors. The biggest donors are the World Bank, the Asia Bank, Great Britain, Denmark and Norway. Norway has provided about NOK 40 million a year.

Purpose
To provide the Ministry of Education, the donors and other stakeholders with information which would be used to design a new phase of the programme.

Findings
> The number of children attending school increased by 19 per cent from 2003 to 2008. The proportion of children who attend school has increased from 84 to 92 per cent during the period (the target was 96 per cent). The proportion of girls has increased from 83 to 98 girls per 100 boys during the same period.
> The proportion of low-caste and pariah children who attend school has also risen sharply. Scholarships for girls and children from marginalised groups have been important in making more children from marginalised groups attend school.
> However, certain groups of children are still overrepresented among the eight per cent who do not attend school (due to poverty, caste, ethnicity, disabilities, language, geography or gender).
> Children dropping out of school are still a major problem. It is difficult to show a positive development in the quality of education.
> The local school management committees have been assigned more tasks and have been revitalised.
> The report states that it is harder to assess the quality of the education, but the documentation seems to indicate a very uneven quality. Some studies demonstrate progress in certain parts of the country, while other documentation would indicate that the progress in the distribution of schools has not been followed up with a corresponding improvement in educational quality.
> Recruitment of new teachers has not kept up with the strong growth in student numbers, and the number of students per teacher has risen.
> Many new classrooms have been built, and water supply and sanitary conditions have been improved in many places.

The recommendations in the evaluation
> A greater emphasis on educational quality, not least by strengthening the education of teachers and making it more practical; by having more child-friendly and gendersensitive education, and by developing quality standards and management systems.
> Clearer guidelines (at present there is a conflict between the principles of free education on the one hand and cost-sharing on the other in order to prioritise needy groups on the other).
> Better follow-up of political wishes, for instance plans to achieve a multilingual education.

Follow-up
The report was presented and discussed at a meeting in Nepal in March 2009, where the authorities, donor representatives and the media were present. The findings of the evaluation and its recommendations have been used when drawing up the new five-year education programme (2009-2013).

The evaluation was presented to a Norwegian audience at a seminar in May 2009. Norway signed a new five-year agreement with Nepal regarding support in the field of education in November 2009.
Evaluation of
The joint donor office in the Southern Sudanese capital Juba was established by Canada, Denmark, The Netherlands, Norway, Great Britain and Sweden following the signing of the peace agreement between Sudan and Southern Sudan in 2005.

Purpose
To assess how the donor office has contributed to the Southern Sudanese authorities’ capacity to promote peace building, poverty reduction and achievement of the millennium goals in Southern Sudan. In addition, the evaluation has assessed whether cooperation through a joint donor office is a good model for working in a situation characterised by vulnerability and conflict.

Findings
The original mandate for the donor office was highly relevant to achieving greater aid efficiency, given the limited receiving capacity in Southern Sudan.

In practice, the Joint Donor Office has not lived up to the donor countries’ expectations, partly because the prerequisites for the joint initiative were never fulfilled:
> It had been expected that emergency aid to Southern Sudan would be reduced and replaced by long-term assistance, but this did not happen. The joint office was also meant to represent the donors vis-à-vis the Multi-Donor Trust Fund for Southern Sudan (headed by the World Bank), which was to manage most of the aid. However, nearly half of the aid bypassed this fund and was instead handled by the donors individually. The Joint Donor Office was only given charge of two smaller funds.
> The donor countries were unable to draw up a joint operational strategy for the office. Bilateral, and sometimes informal, communication between the office and the donors hampered the development of joint guidelines. The distribution of roles and responsibilities between the Office Board and its Advisory Group was also unclear, and the latter had a more active role than planned.
> The donor countries underestimated the relationship between politics and development in Southern Sudan, and the conflict and vulnerability of the region made the work of the Office more difficult.
> Rigid employment procedures, where the donor countries recruited the professional staff themselves, meant that the Joint Donor Office did not have sufficient staffing.

The Office’s role vis-à-vis the World Bank-led Multi-Donor Trust Fund, and its support to the authorities in Southern Sudan has been good:
> The Office has been a strong participant in the control committee for the Donor Fund.
> The Office has provided good support to the Government of Southern Sudan in designing the development strategy for the region and has helped strengthen the authorities’ capacity in budget planning. The Office is also commendable for its technical assistance to the health sector and good government.
> The Office has played a considerable role in promoting dialogue between the donors and the authorities, and the Office has adapted well to conditions in the region.

In conclusion, the Joint Donor Office in Southern Sudan so far has not emerge as a good working model for donor harmonisation.

The recommendations in the evaluation
> It must be ensured that the donor countries’ efforts in Southern Sudan are based on a comprehensive understanding of the political and economic factors that affect development in Southern Sudan.
> The donor countries must make it clear what specific political goals and development goals they want to achieve through the Joint Donor Office. They should prepare political and development-oriented indicators to follow up the activity in a better way.
> Management structure of the Office must be improved. The Board should focus on designing the strategy and determine priorities and frameworks for the activities of the Office.
> The Donor Office should be given more technical and financial resources.
Evaluation of Norwegian NGOs in Northern Uganda (2003-2007)

The work of Norwegian NGOs in Northern Uganda (2003-2007)

Evaluation of The Rattsø Commission was appointed by the Norwegian government in 2005 to look at the role of Norwegian NGOs in development cooperation. The evaluation is the second assessment to follow up the Commission’s recommendations to evaluate the results of the work carried out by Norwegian NGOs in more detail.

The evaluation assignment was awarded after a tender competition among Ugandan institutions and companies. The evaluation includes the six Norwegian NGOs Save the Children, Norwegian Red Cross, CARE Norway, Caritas Norway, the Norwegian Refugee Council and Medicins sans Frontiers.

Purpose To evaluate the results of Norwegian NGOs’ work in Northern Uganda, a region which is emerging from a conflict and humanitarian crisis situation.

Findings The main conclusion is that the Norwegian organisations have helped improve the lives of the poor in the short and medium term, particularly thanks to the humanitarian assistance provided in the period from 2003 to 2005. The team pointed specifically to the following results as important for the poor:

> increased schooling, also among girls, in local communities in the north in general and in Karamoja in particular,
> shelter for internally displaced people,
> improved income through support for livestock; agricultural supplies (seed, tools, training in better planting techniques),
> increased awareness of the rights of children,
> strengthening existing hospitals and health services,
> energy-saving stoves that reduce the work load and the risks for women and children.

Local organisations have been strengthened through the cooperation, but the Norwegian NGOs have not done enough to build long-term competence in their local cooperation partners. Due to a lack of local capacity, the evaluation team feels it has been necessary to channel funds through Norwegian organisations.

Late disbursements from the Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Norad have in some cases delayed implementation of activities. The quality of the Norwegian NGOs’ reporting varies, particularly with regard to whether the planned development goals have been reached or not.

The report points out several key dilemmas in the transition from emergency relief to long-term assistance in Uganda. Two of them are:

1. The need for a rapid response and a high degree of coordination in a humanitarian crisis often causes funds to be channelled to overseas organisations rather than directly to local partner organisations and authorities. This may cause weak sustainability and weak local ownership.

2. When the humanitarian crisis passes and people return to where they originally lived, they will often feel left to themselves. The security situation is still volatile, and the evaluation team is concerned that a lack of involvement from the central authorities and donors may delay the recovery process.

The recommendations in the evaluation

> The Norwegian organisations should strengthen their efforts in long-term capacity building and improve their reporting routines (their result-based reporting in particular).
> Norway can and should encourage other donors and organisations to support development in Northern Uganda.
> For rehabilitation and more long-term development work, resources should to a greater extent be channelled to local organisations and authorities.
> In the transition period, support should be concentrated on food security and financial security (sustainable agriculture, income-generating measures and savings), plus construction and rehabilitation of infrastructure within health services and education.
Evaluation of Norwegian support for the protection of cultural heritage during the period 2000-2008, material as well as immaterial. Our total support in this field for the period amounted to NOK 275 million, distributed between 60 projects. The evaluation covered country-specific studies in Ethiopia, Malawi and Nepal. Special attention was paid to aid given through UNESCO, the United Nations’ Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organisation.

Support for culture and cultural heritage is now based on Strategy for Norway’s cultural and sports cooperation with countries in the South (Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 2005).

Purpose
To assess the Norwegian support and present recommendations for the future organisation of our aid in this field.

Findings
Many of the goals for the projects assessed were reached, but the local connection was often weak.

> In Ethiopia, historical heritage, current use, awareness and pride create a good foundation for positive contributions to local development. The Norwegian work in restoring King Fasiledes’ bath in Gonder had good local connections and was particularly successful. Problems in the local administration have, however, delayed both this and other projects. UNESCO projects are criticised for using international professionals instead of local resources.

> In Malawi, the evaluation focused mainly on Norway’s collaboration programme with the authorities. The goals were too wide-ranging, and there was little connection between goals and the actual activities. The Norwegian aid has helped develop the cultural sector, the key cultural institution the KuNgoni Centre of Culture & Arts, and many rehabilitation projects. However, the activity did not achieve much in terms of the overall goal of promoting a national identity.

> In Nepal, the Norwegian support was part of a UNESCO programme which comprises several countries. The projects supported immaterial cultural heritage and were considered highly relevant. The conflict in Nepal may have made the work especially difficult, but the team nevertheless emphasises the Nepalese criticism of UNESCO for inefficiency, weak local ownership and little cooperation with local institutions.

General lessons learned
> Material and immaterial cultural heritage may be important components in economic innovation and local development.

> Broad partnerships and different kinds of knowledge and expertise as well as local understanding, participation and ownership are prerequisites for a successful project.

> The research and education sector are important for competence building and development projects in the cultural heritage sector.

The recommendations in the evaluation
> Survey the partner countries’ need for cultural infrastructure and definitions of success criteria in a better way.

> Invest more in institution building and follow this up through more direct bilateral contact with the cultural authorities in selected countries. Organise the Norwegian resources better, make the cooperation less dependent on specific individuals and draw more Norwegian experts into the work.

> Consider whether UNESCO’s big network projects are relevant and cost-effective, and promote the goals set for the Norwegian strategy.

> Consider whether UNESCO should continue to be the main channel for Norwegian aid in the cultural heritage field.
Evaluation of Norwegian Support to Peacebuilding in Haiti (1998-2008)

Prepared by: Le Groupe-conseil baastel, Belgium

Contents
   Prepared by: Le Groupe-conseil baastel, Belgium  

Evaluation of
Norway has supported the peace work in Haiti since 1998. Most of the Norwegian support has been channelled through Norwegian Church Aid and this organisation’s network, but the UN system has had a greater role after 2006. A considerable investment has been made from the Norwegian side to support political dialogue. Haiti is a particularly vulnerable country, politically and socially as well as in terms of security. In Haiti, Norway is a fairly small donor.¹

Purpose
To assess whether Norwegian support for peace building has helped to gains achieved are likely to be sustained.

Findings
> The report’s main conclusion is that Norway’s efforts to support political dialogue in Haiti – when Haitian policies were in at stalemate from 1998 to 2005 - helped reduce tensions in the country.  
> The Norwegian-supported initiative for dialogue between Haiti and the Dominican Republic was considered relevant, but without corresponding results.  
> Major parts of the Norwegian support are assessed as relevant, although the efforts have mainly been focused on short-term results.  
> Norwegian-supported measures after 2006 helped improve people’s lives at grassroots level, not least in some parts of Port-au-Prince where people have lived with insecurity and violence for decades.  
> Norway has managed its aid differently from other donors, coming in with fresh and independent eyes. Norway was willing to take risks, e.g. by giving the partners a high degree of freedom. International as well as national organisations in Haiti regard this as positive.  
> Norwegian aid suffered from a lack of systems for monitoring and following up.

The recommendations in the evaluation
Concerning Norwegian support for Haiti:
> A strategic approach to long-term support for Haiti is needed, with emphasis on continuity, local ownership and sustainability.  
> Well-documented practices and principles in the Norwegian approach should be retained.  
> The deterioration in the relationship between the Dominican Republic and Haiti requires a conflict analysis. More research may contribute to a better understanding of the situation and to identify targeted measures.  
> The Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Norwegian Church Aid must review the events leading up the closure of ISPOS (a training institute which received significant Norwegian assistance) and share the findings and conclusions of that review.

Concerning the Ministry of Foreign Affairs
> Strengthen the systems for planning, following up results and evaluating results.  
> Establish systems for risk and conflict analysis, plus a framework for conflict prevention and peacebuilding.  
> Establish systems for institutional learning and knowledge sharing.  
> A review of the work of Norwegian Church Aid should include an evaluation of the results of the cooperation in Haiti so far, of the organisation as a partner and the close relationship between this organisation and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Norad.

Norwegian-supported measures after 2006 helped improve people’s lives

¹. Our support for Haiti was in the order of NOK 250 million for the period 1998-2008.
Evaluation of the mine action activities of Norwegian People’s Aid from 1999 until the present (field work in Sudan, Ethiopia and Jordan). The report is focusing on the work of landmine surveys, operational mine clearance, cooperation with and capacity building in national authorities and local personnel, plus development of new landmine clearance methods and techniques.

Norwegian People’s Aid is an important cooperation partner for the Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs in its work of following up the international agreement prohibiting anti-personnel landmines, the Mine Ban Treaty. Since this convention came into effect in 1999, the NPA has received more than NOK 700 million from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs for its humanitarian landmine activities.

Purpose
To document results of the Norwegian aid to humanitarian mine clearance activities through Norwegian People’s Aid, as well as outline lessons learnt that can be used in further planning and implementation of aid in this field.

Findings
The report concludes that Norwegian People’s Aid is one of the leading organisations in mine action activities, stating that the strength of the NPA is that they are one of the few organisations that combine different types of activities in the mine clearance work – from operational activities to advocacy – and that these activities complement each other and help enhance the results which the NPA contributes to in national mine clearing operations. The report says that the close cooperation with the Ministry of Foreign Affairs has been important in giving the Norwegian People’s Aid its leading role in the international mine action community.

With regard to landmine surveys, the evaluation team finds that Norwegian People’s Aid has played an important role in developing new methods for obtaining and systematising information on alleged, known or possible minefields, and this makes it possible to use the available resources more efficiently.

The report also states that Norwegian People’s Aid has to a great extent reached the goals they have set for their operational mine clearance work, but advises the organisation to improve its documentation of these results. As for cooperation with and capacity building in national authorities and local personnel, the report finds that the organisation has achieved or is about to achieve the goals they have set.

The report also mentions areas where there is room for improvement. The team questions the sustainability of some of the activities and points out that a clarification of certain organisational and administrative issues would improve the chances of fully realising the potential in the organisation.

Recommendations
The report mentions in particular that socio-economic aspects and competence could be better integrated in the various mine action activities, and that Norwegian People’s Aid would benefit from coordinating its humanitarian mine action activities with its more long-term development activities. The report also recommends better documentation and systematisation of the results that have been achieved, and that the organisation should develop an overall plan for capacity building which takes into account the need for sustainable competence and capacity in countries from which Norwegian People’s Aid is about to withdraw.
Evaluation of
NUFU, mainly for the period from 2002, and of NOMA from 2006, the year when this programme started. On average, NOK 66 million was allocated to NUFU projects for each of the years from 2002 to 2006, and the plan is to spend NOK 344 million for the entire 2007-2012 period. For NOMA projects, total allocations amounted to NOK 187 million for 2007 and 2008.

Purpose
The main purpose was to assess the two programmes in relation to the objectives, document the quality of the work that has been done and provide useful learning for the affected parties. It has also been important to give advice on how to improve results through a closer cooperation in the two programmes.

Findings
> The overall conclusion is that the two programmes have contributed significantly to capacity building in the South.
> Support has mainly focused on building competence and capacity in individuals, and there is now a need to use more of an overall institutional approach in our cooperation.
> The good outcomes so far have a significant extent been due to the positive attitudes and zeal of individual people, particularly at the cooperating academic institutions in Norway. Norwegian university reforms in recent years, with new demands for efficiency, make it more difficult for university staff to continue their individual efforts in the two programmes.
> Complex management systems and funding systems for the programmes constitute one of the main problems. On the Norwegian side there is frustration concerning the structure of the cooperation, while the partners in the South are happier. There is a considerable potential for simplifying and improving the administrative systems.
> Contacts between countries in the South under the programmes have promoted cooperation as well as friendship; they have also helped promote an increased understanding of shared problems at universities in the South and how such problems may be solved. It is not clear, however, to what extent such contacts have helped improve the academic quality of the programmes.
> The established partnerships between academic institutions in the North and South have rarely arisen due to initiatives from the South, and cooperation continues to be dominated by the desires and preferences in the North.
> Gender equality has a high priority in both programmes, but so far mostly in the sense of increasing the number of female students. Integration of more women continues to be difficult, due to social and cultural factors. Some attempts are being made to do more than just increase the proportion of women, particularly by integrating a gender perspective in curricula and research.
Recommendations

The evaluation team has one main recommendation:

> A very high priority should be given to simplifying the organisational structure and harmonising the work methods of institutions that do capacity building in research and higher education in a North-South context. This may be done by identifying what objectives each institution should pursue and how these objectives may be reached.

A number of recommendations concerning disciplines and programmes have been presented, and the recommendations can be summarised as follows:

> Establish a joint understanding of key concepts and objectives for the programmes and design indicators for use in strategies, in measuring results and in evaluations.

> Ensure support at the highest political level for simplifying the complex administration of the two programmes, or possibly merging them. It is important to achieve synergy effects by having the different activities support each other.

> Reinforce schemes for identifying and paying attention to special, context-related needs for studies and research rather than promoting standard solutions, and ensuring a better balance between partners from the South and from Norway when it comes to influence and decisions.

Important individual recommendations are:

> Establish a more efficient system for monitoring and evaluation in order to improve learning in the programme organisations and ensure better feedback from partners in the South. The reporting formats used should reflect the results achieved more clearly, by using relevant indicators.

> Strengthen the arrangements for developing mutual cooperation between Southern institutions as well as between Southern institutions and institutions in the North. A strategy should be prepared for achieving added value through such types of cooperation.

> Improve the Southern institutions’ influence on decisions made in Norway by having more (than the current two) representatives from the South on the NOMA Programme Board, and by having Southern representatives on the NUFU Programme Board for the first time.

> Document relevance when new projects are proposed, e.g. in relation to university priorities, strategies and development plans in the South.
Tsunami aid evaluated four years later

Evaluation of
The international support after the tsunami in 2004 in Indonesia, Sri Lanka and the Maldives. Follows up the evaluation conducted in 2005-06. The evaluation was led by Sida (Sweden), and focuses on five key development issues: the state and civil society, poverty and living conditions, social fabric and community development, risk reduction and capacity development.

Purpose
To evaluate the international response following the tsunami, focusing on to what extent the aid had helped make the local communities stronger and more able to handle future risk.

Findings
> One of the main conclusions in the evaluation was that even though the tsunami was a major disaster, it only represented a temporary setback in development compared to issues that have existed for a long time. With improved long-term planning and analysis, the development might have been disturbed even less. Assumptions that one would be unable to link emergency aid, rehabilitation and development measures in the tsunami response in a good manner were refuted.

> The state and civil society: the state assumed a leading role in each of the three countries. The tsunami brought opportunities for new forms of participation, but civil society has not been strengthened as much as the state. Rehabilitation efforts opened up the Aceh province in Indonesia to the international community, bringing with it a spirit of cooperation which is still there.

> Poverty, livelihoods and economic recovery: There has been a moderate reduction in poverty in Aceh after the tsunami. Local authorities have been willing to discuss tailored-made modalities with the affected local communities. However, in Aceh, as well as in Sri Lanka and the Maldives, both the donors and the state have failed to sufficiently understand that the economy of the most vulnerable groups depend more on functioning markets and knowledge than on infrastructure.

> Social fabric and community development: In Indonesia, most of those who have been asked say that their quality of life, economically as well as socially, is better now than before the tsunami. In Sri Lanka most people feel that they are not fully rehabilitated at a personal level. In both countries the perception is that the status and role of women have been strengthened. However, it appears that the sense of fear and trauma remains in all three countries, not least in the Maldives. The distribution of aid has been a main reason for conflict in the affected areas. The elites have attempted to use the aid for their own benefit, especially in the period immediately following the tsunami. But there are also examples where the aid, through the building of homes for the poor, has had a socially levelling effect.

The economic rehabilitation might have progressed even further if there had been a better understanding that economic rehabilitation is more than just replacing equipment or property, so that one had focused more on training instead.
Risk reduction: A strong aspect of the response following the tsunami has been measures to reduce the damage caused by natural disasters. Sri Lanka has established new legislation and new institutions, while Indonesia is well on its way. The Maldives have come the shortest. The buffer zones that have been set up on Sri Lanka are particularly important, and tsunami warning systems have been established throughout the region. Despite weaknesses in the work, the vulnerability of the poorest groups has been considerably reduced.

Capacity building: Aid has been focused more on delivering services than on building capacity. Considerable attention has been devoted to national capacity development, while much local capacity has not been used. One of the main challenges in the further work is the development of capacity in the local community.

Aid in the transitional phase between emergency aid and development functions best when the state has a strong local presence and is able to coordinate the work. Thorough analyses of the context where the support will be given, long-term plans, a well co-ordinated field presence, an integrated approach and good partnerships are important in achieving good results.

Recommendations in the evaluation

> Strengthen the state’s efficiency at the local level in order to ensure good connections between emergency aid, rehabilitation and long-term development
> Conduct more long-term analyses
> Target the efforts more towards restoring people’s living conditions
> Have a more integrated area approach
> Develop a less strict and more comprehensive model for, and understanding of, risk reduction, where the connection between emergency relief, rehabilitation and development is made stronger
> Invest more in capacity development.

...even though the tsunami was a major disaster, it only represented a temporary setback in development compared to issues that have existed for a long time.
Improving Effectiveness and Outcomes for the Poor in Health, Nutrition, and Population.

Evaluation of
The impact of World Bank support in the area of health, nutrition and population from 1997 to mid-2008. The support totalled more than USD 17 billion. The evaluation was performed by the World Bank’s independent evaluation group, supported by Norad’s Evaluation Department.

Purpose
To gain knowledge for future work, with assessments of the effectiveness of the support, to what extent it reaches the poor, and whether follow-up and continuous evaluation have been adequate. The evaluation includes the Bank’s experience in controlling infectious diseases, health reform and sector-wide approaches. It also investigates to what extent programmes in other sectors contribute to results in health, nutrition and population.

Findings
> The Bank is now financing a smaller proportion of the global aid for health, nutrition and population than it did ten years ago, but the support provided by the Bank is still considerable: USD 17 billion in country-level support in the course of the evaluation period. This is in addition to the World Bank’s policy advice, analysis work and involvement in global partnerships, and USD 873 million in private health-related and pharmaceutical investments made by the International Finance Corporation (IFC).

> Overall, about two thirds of the Bank’s support in these areas have yielded satisfactory results, often under difficult conditions and underpinned by solid analysis. This applies to a lesser extent in Africa, however, where only one quarter of the Bank’s projects can show satisfactory results.

> There is a marked improvement in the results from IFC’s investments in private health services (mainly hospitals), but IFC has only succeeded to a limited extent in diversifying its health portfolio.

> Only one half of the support had particular focus on the poor.

> The World Bank’s support for reducing fertility rates and malnutrition among the poor has decreased dramatically in the last ten years. There are also fewer discussions of health, nutrition and population issues in poverty analyses.

> There is a large, but little exploited potential for improving results in these areas by means of measures outside the health sector.

Recommendations
> Results can be improved by making the projects less complex, strengthening the risk assessment and compensating measures, conducting more open institutional analysis and do more evaluation so that decisions can be made on an improved factual basis.

> The project must have goals that explicitly apply to the poor, and results among the poor must be followed up. IFC investments in health services have largely benefited people with medium or high income. IFC must support more activities that are commercially viable while also benefiting more poor people.

> The Bank must increase its support for measures to reduce fertility rates and malnutrition among the poor and ensure that health, nutrition and population issues are included in poverty analyses.

> Including health, nutrition and population objectives in the Bank’s projects in other sectors, such as water and sanitary systems, will increase the probability of reaching goals in the health sector.
Independent Evaluation Group, World Bank, 2010

The World Bank’s analyses of the social effects of reforms

Evaluation of
The World Bank’s Poverty and Social Impact Analysis, PSIA, which was introduced by the Bank in 2002 analyse how policy reforms affect the welfare of poor and vulnerable groups. Until 2007 the Bank carried out 156 PSIA analyses in 75 countries and 14 sectors. This evaluation covers the World Bank’s PSIA analyses up to 2007. The evaluation was performed by the World Bank’s independent evaluation group, and supported by Norad’s Evaluation Department.

Purpose
To assess what effect PSIA analyses have had on countries’ policies and the Bank’s activity, as well as to assess what contribution the analyses have made the countries’ capacity for policy analysis.

Main findings
Evalueringen har vist at:
＞ PSIA analyses have had a moderate effect on country policies and the Bank’s operations, and on average little or no effect on the countries capacity for policy analysis, even though there are some examples of success.
＞ The World Bank’s use of PSIA has quite correctly been based on the need for national ownership to policy reforms and has seen it as important to understand institutional and political issues that hamper development. The analyses have also assessed how the effects of policy measures are distributed among population groups.
＞ The Bank has made use of the results to improve its guidelines for future work.
＞ The implementations of PSIA have had significant limitations. There have been tensions between the different PSIA objectives. These include:
- A discrepancy between the need to provide timely information for the country’s and the Bank’s policy decisions and the need to build the country’s analytical capacity.
- The connection between operational goals and the desired effect is often inadequately defined and this makes it harder to develop a good strategy for achieving the desired effects.
- The Bank’s employees and managers have had limited ownership of PSIA, which has often been inadequately integrated in aid programmes in the country.
- There has been weak quality assurance, monitoring and evaluation of the general effect of PSIA.

Recommendations
＞ The Bank employees should be given clearer guidelines about the nature of PSIA and when these analyses should be used.
＞ The connection between impact objectives, operational objectives and activities should be made clearer for each PSIA
＞ One should integrate PSIA better in the Bank’s aid programmes by moving the decision-making and funding authority for PSIA to the Bank’s regional management, and by demanding that all earmarked financing for PSIA must be accompanied by a significant contribution from the Bank’s country offices.
＞ Quality assurance must be improved by the regional management by carrying out systematic reviews of PSIA both during planning and completion, to ensure that the proposed work is in line with operational objectives and desired effects.

www.worldbank.org
Evaluation of
The United Nations’ Development Programme’s (UNDP’s) contribution to results under the country-level programme in Uganda in the period from 2001 to 2009. The assessment was conducted by the UNDP’s independent Evaluation Office.

The assessment looks at support for a broad range of issues: poverty reduction, sustainable environment, democratic government, crisis prevention and post-conflict reconstruction.

Purpose
To generate lessons for future country-level programmes, particularly the country-level programme for Uganda 2010-2014. Contribute to the organisation’s achievement of results and general accountability.

Findings
> The quality of the results varies greatly, and it is doubtful whether UNDP has contributed to development results in Uganda (the Parliament, the Inspector General of Government, the Directorate of Ethics and Integrity and the Uganda Human Rights Commission).
> Considerable efforts have been made in several development areas that have been given a high priority by the authorities, and these efforts are perceived as relevant.
> Several objectives of the introduced measures were met, e.g. related to cooperation with key institutions in the further democratic development in Uganda (the Parliament, the Inspector General of Government, the Directorate of Ethics and Integrity and the Uganda Human Rights Commission).
> More could have been achieved in the governance area if the work had been better embedded in the national state structures and in UNDP’s own objectives to contribute to long-term capacity building.
> UNDP was not effective as an early recovery cluster lead was slow and inefficient in the first phase of the rehabilitation work in Northern Uganda.
> UNDP missed opportunities for playing a more proactive role in the complex post-conflict environment. Weak cooperation with the authorities and other agencies undermined the transition work from rehabilitation to a more long-term development.
> The organisation did not engage sufficiently in the policy discussions with regard to the return of displaced groups to their home areas in Northern Uganda.
> UNDP could have positioned itself better among the donors in Uganda.
> Capacity development was a stated priority for UNDP, but there was no strategy with clear objectives and indicators. The nature of the work had not been made clear enough, and remain at the individual level.
> Cooperation with civil society was inadequate.
> The work to integrate cross-cutting issues such as HIV/AIDS and gender equality and building the government capacity to do the same, has also been insufficient.
> Support for reporting on the millennium goals has been poorly adapted to the government’s mechanisms.
> There were few synergy effects between the organisation’s different programmes.

Recommendations in the assessment
> Strengthen government reporting on the millennium development goals, not least by including an analysis of gender-related differences at disaggregated levels.
> Strengthen the gender equality dimension, including through strategic partnership with other organisations.
> Integrate the environment and climate change adaptation as a cross-cutting issue, particularly in programmes for poverty reduction and disaster management.
> Develop a more strategic approach to capacity building and support for the authorities’ efforts in Northern Uganda.
> Reduce the number of intervention. Instead UNDP should focus on fewer interventions, over a longer period of time.
> Strengthen country and field offices with regard to personnel, resources and relevant expertise, and focus particularly on following up results.
## Summary of studies

| Study 1/2009 | Global Aid Architecture and the Health Millennium Development Goals |
| Study 2/2009 | Evaluations of multilateral organisations’ environment-related aid |
| Study 3/2009 | Norwegian business-related assistance to Sri Lanka |
| Study 4/2009 | Baseline study for evaluation of the Norwegian Environmental Action Plan |
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EVALUATION OF NORWEGIAN DEVELOPMENT COOPERATION 2009

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Danish Institute for International Studies 2009
Study of
On request from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the Prime Minister's Office, the Evaluation Department in Norad has commissioned a survey of aid through various channels and organisations working towards the millennium goals for health. These goals are to reduce the mortality rate of children under five years (goal 4); improve maternal health (goal 5); and combat HIV/AIDS, malaria and other diseases (goal 6).

This study is mainly based on 29 recently conducted assessments of health-related aid, plus five brief studies at the country level (Ethiopia, India, Nigeria, Pakistan and Tanzania).

Purpose
The purpose was to come up with suggested measures that would make our work in this area more cost-effective.

Findings
Some main points:
> Pledged official aid for health and population issues has increased from NOK 6 billion in 2001 to NOK 15.5 billion in 2007.
> Well-financed global partnerships like the Global Fund to fight AIDS, Tuberculosis and Malaria and the international vaccine fund GAVI Alliance create results, but it is expensive to maintain these results. The Global Fund has set up many parallel systems, and this has led to inefficient implementation at the national level.
> The health sector programmes, the Non Governmental Organisations (NGOs), GAVI and the Global Fund are able to demonstrate that they have made the funds reach the district and field level.
> The fragmented architecture means that fundamental questions such as priorities and strategies are not discussed.

> Countries think in terms of service delivery levels. It makes sense for a ministry of health to focus on tasks. The current global focus on disease programmes “versus” systems has shifted our attention from the crucial question: what are the minimum tasks we expect to be carried out at each level of the health system - in the local community, in clinics and in hospitals?

Recommendations
Some key recommendations:
> Unrealistic funding plans and needs must not be allowed to dominate analyses and debates. The emphasis must be on realistic financing, prioritisation and sustainability.
> The current fragmented thinking concerning health must be restructured around levels. What minimum tasks must be performed and expected at each level?
> The Global Fund should extend its mandate to cover all measures that can promote the millennium goals for health.
> Norway should be careful so that the work of streamlining health system investments through the World Bank, The Global Fund, GAVI and WHO does not become a platform for inappropriate resource mobilisation before the best way of supporting the health systems has been identified. It has not been proven that the Global Fund and GAVI are appropriate for financing health system support.
> Norway and other bilateral partners must have a stronger presence at the national level. Norway should speak with one voice and consolidate Norwegian input in international forums at the operational as well as the political level.
Evaluation of
Multilateral organisations with key roles in the Norwegian Environmental Action Plan in development cooperation. These organisations received a little over NOK 1.5 billion in support for this area in the three-year period 2005-07.

Purpose
The main purpose was to identify documented results from the environmental efforts of various UN agencies and the World Bank and their ability to implement such measures. One also wanted an assessment of whether our support has given Norway a greater influence and contributed to greater efficiency in the environment-related aid. Another objective was to assess strong and weak sides of the different organisations, including which organisations would be best able to implement the objectives of the Norwegian Environmental Action Plan.

Findings
The study bases its assessment on 16 recent evaluation reports and expert articles. Most of the reports had been prepared for other purposes than that of describing the results of Norwegian environment-related aid.

As for what benefit Norway derives from channelling the funds through each of the organisations, the study concluded that:

> The multilateral development banks and The Global Environmental Facility (GEF) make up the best channel, followed by the international NGOs and finally, the UN system.
> It is primarily the World Bank and the Global Environmental Facility (GEF) that can document results in relation to the Norwegian action plan. Measures financed through the Bank work best when they are directed to key areas in the Bank’s activity.
> Aid through GEF to the development banks, the UN development programme (UNDP) and the UN environmental programme (UNEP) is often successful. GEF projects have high transaction costs and their processes are time-consuming, but they can point to global results.
> Core support for the UN organisations for food and agriculture, (FAO), UNDP and the International Institute for Environment and Development (IIED), provides little or no added value for Norway in the environmental area. Further environment-related grants to these organisations should depend on them becoming more efficient.
> GEF projects have been effective in UNDP. FAO can point to relevant results for individual projects at the national level, but the organisation is often inefficient and inflexible and it has high administration costs. IIED is spread over too many areas, but the organisation is achieving results in certain niche areas.
> It is difficult to document any added value of channelling funds through UNEP. UNEP currently has a wide range of goals that must be described as relevant, but it puts more emphasis on the use of resources than on performance management. The same may be said for the United Nations’ settlements programme (UN-HABITAT), which generally has high costs and is inefficient.
> The International Union for the Conservation of Nature, IUCN, has been unique in bringing together different milieus on the global level, and it can document results that are interesting in relation to the Norwegian Action Plan. However, its utility value for Norway has decreased in the last few years.
> The Commission for Sustainable Development (CSD) has few documented results to refer to. It therefore gives Norway little added value - perhaps rather more of a cost - to continue supporting CSD and the global UN conferences.

These assessments agree to a great extent with a study that was conducted about the same time by the Swedish aid authorities (SIDA).
The study recommendations

> Norway should to a greater extent make use of the various multilateral organisations’ advantages when it comes to expertise.
> For the environment-related aid through the World Bank and the development banks, it is important to develop new global programmes in areas where Norway has superior competence and the Bank can make use of its role as a global player.
> Norway should continue to support GEF, but contribute to restructuring and greater efficiency.
> The support via FAO and UNDP should be followed up actively in areas where these organisations have comparative advantages.
> Norwegian support for UNEP, the UN settlement programme UN-HABITAT and IIED should be restricted to areas where they have strong expertise compared with other multilateral agencies. The IUCN’s activity should to a greater extent be supported over other budgets than the aid budget.

The multilateral development banks and The Global Environmental Facility (GEF) make up the best channel, followed by the international NGOs and finally, the UN system.
Evaluation of Norwegian business-related assistance to Sri Lanka, which has amounted to approx. NOK 25 million a year for the past few years, or 10-15 per cent of Norwegian aid to Sri Lanka.

Purpose
This report is part of a major evaluation of Norwegian business-related assistance. Its main purpose is to document and assess previous implementation and results. In addition, the evaluation was to analyze the opportunities for improving our assistance in former as well as new partner countries, plus provide advice on future policies and guidelines.

Findings
The measures have been of many kinds, they have been implemented through many different channels and have not been well coordinated. A significant proportion has had the objective of encouraging Norwegian companies to invest in, and begin cooperation with, partners in Sri Lanka.
> Business-related assistance to Sri Lanka has contributed to activity which would probably not have been implemented without the Norwegian assistance, and it has on the whole been useful. One exception might be Norwegian initiatives in micro finance, where there are many players. The initiatives have been implemented fairly well, but reporting on results has been weak. Cost-efficiency has varied, but has generally been acceptable, except for support to a chamber of commerce that has shown little result in recent years.
> Norwegian aid through Norad has probably contributed directly to the establishment of 1500 jobs, most of them for women. Aid has represented a significant proportion of Norwegian investments in Sri Lanka. These investments have totalled NOK 30-40 million a year after year 2000. A major part of the increase in exports from Sri Lanka to Norway, currently amounting to about NOK 160 million per year, is due to Norwegian business-related aid.

> These results are slight seen in relation to the Sri Lankan economy. Norwegian investments and exports to Norway account for less than one per cent of foreign investments and exports from the country, respectively. The Norad programme has been small (approx. NOK 8 million per year), and has had an acceptable cost efficiency. The measures have largely proved viable, although conditions in the country are demanding and the Norwegian enterprises involved are small and medium-sized (SME).
> The Match-Making programme has been an effective initiative that has mobilised 330 Norwegian small and medium-sized companies. Most of the supported companies have survived, but there is weak reporting of results and weak quality assurance concerning health, safety and the environment. Norad’s loan schemes (which were terminated in 2000) have helped increase exports and transfer of knowledge in the agricultural sector and boat building and led to increased exports. Costs per job created has been low, as has profitability.
> The evaluation points out some elements in Norad’s measures that give cause for concern. The most important one is the risk that the programme might be seen as support for moving hazardous industrial activities out of Norway. In addition, some organisations may become too dependent on Norwegian support, and there has been insufficient coordination between the Norwegian NGOs involved.

Recommendations
The recommendations will only be presented once the other sub-studies (in Bangladesh, South Africa and Uganda) have been conducted and analysed.
Purpose
The 2006 Norwegian Action Plan for environment-related aid requires the outcomes of measures to be evaluated after the end of the plan period, i.e. after 2015. The main purpose of this study is to contribute to a better fact base for the later evaluation by documenting what the situation was like at the beginning.

The study acquired data and indicators for assessing changes in environmental and living conditions in three countries, Malawi, Tanzania and Indonesian Papua, and covers different types of environments (rain forest, intensive farming areas and areas where climate adaptation will be important in years to come).

The subsidiary goals included:
> To assess the relevance of existing data and national reporting systems concerning the environment and living conditions
> To supplement existing data on the environment and living conditions in some areas where Norwegian environment-related aid is significant
> To clarify interpretation problems and other factors that are likely to affect implementation of the Norwegian environment-related measures.

Findings
> The baseline report provides extensive information on environmental and living conditions in some localities where there are environmental initiatives supported by Norway, and it also shows briefly to what extent the environment has been a cross-cutting topic in Norwegian aid to Malawi and Tanzania.
> A depletion of natural resources is occurring in some areas of Malawi and Tanzania and partly also in Papua.
> Many families have too little farming land. Ninety per cent of the African families studied are concerned that their food security is low. The food grown by the family is only sufficient for six months of the year or less. The households are increasingly dependent on extra income from casual work or from forest areas in the vicinity.
> Deforestation is a problem caused by illegal logging, clearing of new farming areas, collection of firewood and production of charcoal. Erosion is an increasing problem.
> The studied households in Tanzania and Malawi have little livestock and do not have access to bulls for ploughing or other heavy tasks. The soil is worked with hoes, and the produce is carried on people’s heads or backs.
> Without livestock there is little fertiliser available, and crops are small. Eighty to 100 per cent of the households have no access to agricultural supplies and no agricultural guidance.
> Ninety per cent of households in the local study in Tanzania stated that their water was not safe to drink, nor was there sufficient water for irrigation. Half of households in Malawi did not have safe drinking water. This will contribute greatly to disease and affect living conditions in a number of ways, and it also contributes to the high mortality rate.
> The purpose of the Norwegian environmental measures in the African study areas is to improve management of the natural resources and contribute to reduced deforestation. These measures affect big population groups and comprise guidance at the village level as well as strengthening the government agencies in charge of nature conservation and agriculture. One of the measures in Tanzania aims to reduce energy needs and deforestation through more efficient stoves that reduce the consumption of firewood or charcoal.

Recommendations
> The results of the Norwegian Environmental Action Plan can only be assessed when the follow-up studies and final evaluation have been performed. The study shows, however, that poverty leads to a vicious circle of non-sustainable use of natural resources, depletion of resources and increased poverty.
> This situation is exacerbated by the high population growth in the three countries. Considerable investments and social changes are necessary to maintain the environment and the standard of living. It will be important to involve and train the local population to work together in managing the natural resources.
Protected areas have significantly lower deforestation than comparable non-protected areas. This holds true even after controlling for other factors that may affect deforestation, e.g. slope, rainfall and road proximity. Areas that allow some degree of sustainable use by local people are at least equally effective in deforestation reduction as strict protected areas. Indigenous areas have the highest protective impact in Latin America. The indigenous group of protected areas does not occur in Africa and Asia.
Evaluation of ALNAP (Active Learning Network for Accountability and Performance in Humanitarian Action) commissioned this study of the international system for humanitarian aid. Our Evaluation Department is a member of ALNAP and is currently represented on the board.

The study assesses international aid in the wake of major disasters in recent years, and is based on dedicated surveys (e.g. interviews with more than 200 aid organisations) as well as a great number of previous surveys and evaluations of humanitarian work. The plan is to repeat the study with two or three year intervals.

Purpose:
The purpose was to develop a framework for the analysis of aid in the humanitarian area, conduct an initial analysis and draw conclusions for use in the further international work in the humanitarian area.

Findings:
> The number of people working with humanitarian aid globally has risen by six per cent per year over the last decade, currently amounting to around 210,000. In 2008, approximately USD 6.6 billion was distributed from the donors to international emergency aid efforts, three times as much as at the beginning of the decade.
> One of the main conclusions is that there has been a positive development in most areas, e.g. with regard to coordination, financing mechanisms and assessment tools. Accountability to the target groups is still weak.
> Even with more money, more personnel and better coverage than before, there is still some way to go before the needs are met (approx. 85 per cent coverage in 2007 and 2008 compared to the registered needs).
> The increased allocations are distributed more fairly between sectors and emergency aid situations than before, due to new joint funding schemes.
> Insecurity for aid personnel is an increasing concern.
> The quality and use of needs assessments have increased. Prioritisation has improved, not least due to an impressive development of new methods. Greater use of cash transfers and an emphasis on improving living conditions and promoting market development has also contributed to increased relevance. However, many aid workers feel the work is suffering because the affected groups are not being sufficiently involved in analyses and programme development.
> More often than before, aid arrives at the right time. Preparedness through established standby schemes and new mechanisms such as the UN Central Emergency Response Fund (CERF) have contributed to this. Better cooperation within the UN has helped improve coordination, although this has led to greater administrative costs.
Coordination is still suffering under weak overall management and coordination, and the position of the UN humanitarian coordinator should be strengthened. An enhanced role for regional organisations and increased use of consortia with NGOs have had a positive effect. However, many evaluations still point to weaknesses in follow-up, monitoring and analysis of conditions in the disaster areas.

Too little is still invested in local and national capacity building, and the international aid apparatus will often overrule at the risk of undermining local capacity. There are positive exceptions, however, and there seems to be an increased awareness of these issues. Establishing complaint mechanisms and being transparent about aid programmes are becoming more common.

Scant attention is still paid to cost-effectiveness and the risk of corruption. The demand to reduce administration costs may lead to too little being invested in key competence which is needed to become more effective. There is, however, agreement that the advantages of coordination are greater than the costs.

Protection in the humanitarian system is given more attention, and new policies and guidelines have been developed. There is still confusion as to what protection means and who is responsible. Insufficient understanding of the legislation, use of inexperienced personnel, protection work of a low quality and breaches of confidentiality are matters that have been criticised.

The number of people working with humanitarian aid globally has risen by six per cent per year over the last decade, currently amounting to around 210,000.
Evaluation
In 2001, the Development Committee in the Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD/DAC) recommended its members to make their aid less dependent on their own goods and services (untying). The reason given for this was that it would give the recipient countries more influence, stimulate their government administration and business sector and provide more aid for the money. The study is part of a joint evaluation of the implementation of the Paris Declaration on aid effectiveness. The study is based on studies of Norway and four other donor countries.

Purpose
The purpose of the evaluation was to assess the progress of the untying process and determine to what extent untying had affected the aid efficiency. The evaluation should also include advise on further measures in this area.

Findings
> Many requirements for purchasing goods and services in the donor country had been removed
> Further untying has taken place. The proportion of untied aid to the least developed countries has risen from less than half to more than 80 per cent
> Both the 2001 recommendation and the Paris declaration on aid effectiveness (2005) have contributed to this progress
> Food aid and most technical assistance were exempt for the recommendation, and the untying has made less progress in these areas
> The receiving countries emphasise that untying is particularly important for local government, business and industry
> The study confirms that untying promotes local job creation and industry, but points out that some local markets are so weak that this delays real untying
> Co-financing promotes untying, ownership and adaptation to local government to a greater extent than other forms of aid
> However, project aid is still a dominating form of aid, often leading to informal ties. Purchasing expert assistance from the donor country is often explained with time pressure or weak local capacity
> The World Bank has made greater progress than the DAC members in untying
> Norway is praised for extensive untying. The report points out, however, that increased emphasis on areas of Norwegian competence (petroleum, the environment), entails a risk that more of the aid will once again be tied to Norwegian expertise.

Recommendations
> DAC should do more untying, also with regard to technical assistance and food aid, and produce better reports on developments
> Further untying should be accompanied by measures to strengthen local competitiveness
> Technical expertise and project management expertise should also increasingly be purchased locally or in the region
> In donor countries where untying is hampered by general procurement regulations, exemption should be sought for development aid funds
> Reporting on untying should be included in the members’ annual reports to DAC and in the DAC peer reviews.
How the 2005 and 2006 evaluations were put to use

Our Evaluations Department has reviewed the follow-up of the evaluations reports that were presented in 2005 and 2006 in order to identify what measures have been implemented and which, if any, changes have been made to policies following the presentation of the reports.

2005/1 Norad’s fellowship programme

The evaluation pointed out the need for increased development relevance in the fellowship programme through the choice of subject of study as well as the actual physical location of these. The objective should be to enhance competence building and learning capacity in the developing countries. The programme should be based on demand to a larger extent, and the studies should to a far greater degree be designed in the partner countries. The report indicated that improved cost efficiency could be achieved through better harmonization of the activities with the student quota scheme administered by the (now) Ministry of Education and Research. The number of user countries, sectors and courses should be strictly curtailed. It would be necessary to initiate measures to improve management and framework, to enhance development of institutions and to prioritize a development of joint degrees. An extensive critical review should be performed after three to four years with external participation.

The scholarship programme was substantially amended in line with the recommendations in the evaluation. The Norwegian Master programme NOMA (as it is called now), provides support for Master Degree programmes that have been set up and developed in the South in collaboration with Norwegian institutions. The studies are mainly conducted at universities and university colleges in the South and not in Norway as they were before. The numbers of user countries have in principle been restricted to nine Norwegian partner countries, although other developing countries may be included. In practice there has been a reduction in the number of user countries, but not by as much as recommended in the report. Employers in the South have been brought into the work of selecting students to a greater extent, as the intention is for these to have a job to come back to once they have completed their studies. Employers have also been brought more into the cooperation on the subject of the studies in fields such as oil and energy, whereas the results are much more modest in subjects such as gender equality, good governance, peace and conflict resolution. The critical review took place in 2009 in the form of an external evaluation of NOMA. This evaluation shows that there is a lot more to be done to make the programme more geared towards demand. The evaluation team also points out that developments take place so rapidly that there is a need for substantial changes both with regard to some of the weak points that were highlighted in 2005 and with regard to matters that have been identified at a later point of time.
2005/2  
The ‘Women can do it’ programme in the Western Balkans

This programme was a collaboration project between Norwegian People’s Aid (NPA) and the Women’s Union of the Norwegian Labour Party, offering organisational and political training for women who were active participants in public life in the Western Balkans. The objective was to enhance their position in society. The evaluation concluded that the programme had functioned well to a large degree, but that it was too dependent on external financial support. It was therefore recommended that a strategy for financial sustainability be developed.

The hearing revealed strong disagreement with regard to the recommendations that the Norwegian parties should begin to withdraw from the cooperation and to develop an exit strategy in order to ensure the long-term viability of the programme.

Based on the recommendations in the evaluation, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs asked for a phase-out plan which emphasised making the local partners of the programme more viable. According to the NPA this phase-out plan was somewhat delayed due to lack of capacity in the organisation. In the same period, the NPA made a decision to phase out all their activities in the Western Balkans by 2012, and in this connection the ‘Women can do it’ programme was discontinued after the Ministry of Foreign Affairs gave their last contribution to the programme in 2008. The Norwegian People’s Aid still conducted a survey of the sustainability of the local partner organisations in 2008. The survey found that out of 13 local partners in 2008, more than half received between 40 - 100% of their budget costs from the NPA. As part of the strategy to improve the viability of these organisations, the NPA, as late as in 2009, provided support for a seminar where the participants learnt to apply for support from various financial schemes in the EU. The Norwegian People’s Aid is also planning to use some of the local network organisations from the Western Balkans for similar programmes in other nations, such as Belarus and Russia.

2005/3 was a synthesis report, not an evaluation

2005/4  
Norway’s framework agreement with the United Nations’ environmental programme UNEP

The purpose of the evaluation was to identify successes and challenges in the then framework agreement between Norway and UNEP and assess key strategic alternatives in designing the upcoming programme agreement.

The Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the Ministry of the Environment and UNEP prepared a response to the evaluation report containing an assessment of the evaluation and responses to the recommendations. For instance, the Evaluation Dept. recommended that the report should be used as a foundation for a new framework agreement with UNEP that the Ministry of Foreign Affairs should keep tabs on the work of establishing an improved system from quality assurance and reporting in UNEP, and ensure that new performance reports from the organisation are reviewed. Furthermore, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs should strive to achieve improved harmonisation between the Norwegian trust fund and those of other nations.

The recommendations from the evaluation report provided the foundation for a new framework agreement between Norway and UNEP and a programme agreement for 2006/07.

After almost four years, the UNEP has presented a strategy and an evaluation plan for improved performance reporting. It is likely that the Norwegian evaluation contributed to putting the issue on the agenda. It has not been documented that reviews have been made of the UNEP performance reports or that the Norwegian side has strived to achieve a harmonisation of the various donor countries’ trust funds.
The purpose of the evaluation was two-fold. Firstly, to provide knowledge on key issues in regard to the implementation of the strategy, and specifically to give an assessment of available capacity, tools and training. Secondly, the evaluation was intended as a contribution to enhanced knowledge on how Norway can promote gender equality in bilateral development cooperation.

The evaluation concluded that the issue of women and gender equality held a fairly prominent position on the policy level in the Norwegian development partnerships, but that the challenge consisted of putting goals into practice. On this basis, the consultants recommended that the support for women and equal rights should be operationalised in Norwegian development collaborations. The report also recommended that equal rights should be highlighted much more in the dialogue with partner countries and that the institutional capacity in this area needed to be strengthened. In addition, the evaluation pointed out that reporting on this issue was weak and needed to be improved.

The evaluation’s criticism of the lack of an operational action plan was addressed in the preparation of Action plan for women’s rights and gender equality in the development cooperation (2007-2009) which was presented in the beginning of 2007. The action plan aimed to counteract the weaknesses identified by the evaluation through an increased focus on targeted efforts, enhanced institutional competence and capacity on the issue of women and equal rights in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs as well as in Norad and the foreign missions, along with a demand for improved reporting on the work for women and equal rights.

The action plan was reviewed in 2009, assessing to what extent one had succeeded in correcting the weaknesses pointed out by the evaluation. The review showed that women and gender equality still rank high on the political agenda in Norway, but that it is difficult to show to what degree equal rights have been emphasised in the dialogue with partner countries. With regard to reinforcing the capacity and competence in this field, the review shows that improvements had been made in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Norad, but that the capacity in the foreign missions was still weak. Training in the field has not yet found its right form, according to the review, and reporting in this area still needs to be improved.

The evaluation had two objectives. It was intended to provide knowledge about inter-ministerial collaboration as a model for development work, and especially assess the collaboration between the Norwegian Ministry of Education and Research and the ministries of education in Zambia and Nepal.

The evaluation found that the potential of this particular collaboration model (a twinning between ministries) had not been properly exploited, even though it was considered useful to those who took part in it and had resulted in an organisational reinforcement of the capacity at some levels of the administration in the partner countries. The collaboration was considered as more positive for Nepal than for Zambia. The report contained a series of recommendations, both in general and for the two countries in particular, such as the need to clarify roles, responsibilities, financing, and priorities by Zambia and Nepal. If the collaboration were to be continued in the two countries it would have to be coordinated with the harmonisation agenda, with a clear prerequisite being that the collaboration was wanted and prioritised by the partner country.

The evaluation follow-up complied with the two tracks that had been laid down; one general and one relating to the specific countries. Based on the Ministry of Foreign Affairs’ follow-up plan, a working group was appointed by Norad. In February 2009, this group presented its survey of lessons learned and a memorandum on the collaboration between
institutions; i.e. Norwegian ministries and directorates and partner countries in the South. Various models for such collaborations were discussed. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs submitted its response to the memorandum, but has not drawn any conclusions relating to policy. These documents are, however, used as a basis when developing new collaboration agreements, for example in Bangladesh.

The Ministry of Foreign Affairs asked the embassies in Zambia and Nepal, in cooperation with Norad, to use the report’s assessments and recommendations in their reporting on the follow-up of the collaboration between the institutions. The collaboration in Zambia was discontinued in 2008 in agreement with the Zambian authorities. In Nepal, where the authorities were really interested in continuing the cooperation between institutions, this work has carried on within the framework of a sector programme for education which Norway contributes to. A final review of the collaboration between institutions will be made in 2010, and the question of continuing the collaboration will be determined at that time.

### 2006/2 Evaluation of Fredskorpset (FK)

The objective was to evaluate to what degree the activities run by FK complied with the paramount objectives for development collaboration, to assess performance and goal achievement with regard to learning, and to provide recommendations for the activities of FK in the future. The report concluded that FK is a fairly efficient tool for achieving the paramount goals and objectives for Norwegian collaboration with developing countries, and that FK has found its own niche in this cooperation. The exchange scheme is beneficial for the individual participants, whereas the usefulness for the institutions they represent is found to be less. An exchange between countries in the South is the most efficient. A strategy for FK’s communication work was requested.

The evaluation was used for the work of producing a strategic plan for FK for the period 2006 – 2011. FK gave a relatively detailed presentation of their follow-up of the evaluation to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. It was not necessary to make any amendments of the statutes. In 2007, a review of the communication work was performed, and they wanted to put more resources into south-south collaboration efforts. Some other adjustments were also possible within the current statutes.

An external review of FK was performed by Nordic Consulting Group in 2009, to assess the follow-up of the evaluation in 2006. The review shows that several of the recommendations had been implemented. A couple of recommendations to strengthen monitoring and structures in the South had not been adhered to, and the review report states that this has a negative impact on the efficiency of the activities. In brief, this report finds FK to be a successful undertaking, which has produced many future leaders and change agents and which has many good results in different areas. However, due to its weak monitoring, it was hard to document these outcomes sufficiently well.
2006 

Multiple donor evaluation of budget support

Many donor countries took part in this evaluation, which constitutes the first comprehensive attempt at systematising experience and results of budgetary support across the board, comprising seven countries in total. The evaluation found that budgetary support can be an efficient, appropriate and sustainable way to underpin national strategies to combat poverty. Budgetary support can positively affect several aspects, such as donor harmonisation, adaptation to the countries’ own systems, cost efficiency in public consumption and support for national processes of reform. However, the report also showed that the risk factors inherent in budgetary support may be significant, not least with regard to political circumstances.

Norwegian policy on budgetary support has to a large extent been based on this report. An external presentation seminar, as well as several meetings in the development aid administrations were held, helping to disseminate information on the results and recommendations in the report. Both the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the relevant department in Norad found the evaluation very useful. It represented important positive input by providing Norad with a more robust, professional foundation for reviews and other professional advisory activities on the subject of budgetary support by Norad. Key recommendations were incorporated into the revised Norwegian guidelines for budgetary support in 2007. This policy was also reflected in the annual national budget and in Storting Report No. 13 on Norwegian development aid policies in the altered scope of 2009.

2006 

Multiple donor evaluation of international aid after the tsunami

This evaluation was an extensive project with many participating aid agencies. The report focused on the immediate response to the disaster, and the work performed in the course of the following eleven months.

The evaluation found that the pure emergency relief work was most efficient, whereas efforts to rehabilitate and reconstruct were less successful. This work did not sufficiently include the local population and local competence. The major deficiencies in coordination were also pinpointed. An important recommendation was that the focus for humanitarian aid ought to be shifted from supply of services to empowering the local communities to manage emergency aid and rehabilitation themselves, in accordance with their own priorities.

The evaluation report served as a contribution to the continuous debate on how humanitarian aid can be improved and better coordinated, with both government bodies and NGOs taking part. Much of the follow-up from the evaluation report has happened through international processes in which Norway takes part. However, the evaluation of the tsunami efforts also formed part of our own processes, and has resulted in changes to the way Norway handles humanitarian aid.

In 2007, a Storting report was presented on Norwegian policies for prevention of humanitarian disasters, and a humanitarian strategy was presented in the autumn of 2008, followed by a Storting report on Norwegian humanitarian policies. In line with these policies the first annual report (of 2008) on Norwegian humanitarian policy was presented by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. The evaluation has probably been a contributory factor to the changes to the concrete work in the Norwegian administration which have been laid down in these documents. There is now a much stronger focus on prevention. And the principle of proximity shall be used as a basis for prevention and rehabilitation. There is a much greater emphasis on women’s rights and gender equality in connection with humanitarian crises. The environment and climate are central issues. The importance of local ownership and participation must be highlighted. In addition, agreements are now being entered into for contributions over several years to important partners in the field, which is also in line with the recommendations of the evaluation report.
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