Start-ups, killer acquisitions and merger control

11 June 2020 Paris

Questions over the competitive effects of the acquisition of start-ups or ‘nascent’ firms, by dominant incumbents have become a key part of the debate on how the effective merger control regimes have been in protecting competition during a period of increasing profits.

One of the most discussed theories of harm in such mergers has been the risk of ‘Killer Acquisitions’ in which firms acquire nascent competitors only to discontinue the target’s innovation projects, thereby pre-empting the emergence of future competition.

In June 2020, the OECD will explore questions such as:

How to ensure these mergers can be investigated?
How agencies can identify the relevant counterfactual in such cases?
What tools can be used to assess competitive effects?
Which types of efficiency might result from these acquisitions?
What, if any, broader policy reforms might be required to help improve decision-making in these cases?

All related documentation is available on this page.

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INVITED SPEAKERS

Amelia Fletcher Bio
Professor of Competition Policy, Centre for Competition Policy (CCP) and Norwich Business School, University of East Anglia