

OWNERSHIP STRUCTURE IN LISTED EQUITY CAPITAL MARKETS - OBSERVATIONS & ISSUES

ECGI ANNUAL MEMBERS' MEETING
3 MAY 2018

Greg Medcraft
Director
Directorate for Financial and Enterprise Affairs





Ownership structure in listed equity capital markets

- 1. Context of common ownership What we know at company level
- 2. Implications for corporate governance
- 3. Implications for competition



Dominance of institutional investors

Concentration of ownership



Concentration of ownership by institutional investors



Indicative of strong family and holding company groups

Institutional dominance in main developed markets

Average ownership by investor category, 100 largest listed companies, end-2016


		Indicative	of state-contro	ol .	
	Private corporations and holding companies	Governments	Institutional investors	Others	
Brazil	29.3	11.8 ///	25.0	33.9	
Canada	8.0	2.7 //	47.6	41.7	
China	13.1	41.8	8.2	36.9	
France	21.9	7.8 / /	29.4	40.9	
Germany	22.0	5.2	28.9	43.9	
Hong Kong (China)	21.3	25.2	13.1	40.4	
India	31.0	20.1	19.3	29.6	
Indonesia	44.5	15.5	7.5	32.5	
ltaly	19.9	7.8	23.0	49.3	Significant concentration
Japan	20.1	5.9	26.6	47.4	of institutional investors
Korea	26.1	13.2	15.4	45.3	or management investors
Malaysia	30.1	33.0	11.3	25.6	
Mexico	16.3	0.7	19.0	64	
Poland	20.6	9.4	32.1	37.9//	
Russia	33.3	24.0	9.0	33//	
Singapore	29.8	10.1	13.2	46.9	
South Africa	22.6	11.5	30.4	35.5	
Spain	20.0	3.5	24.9	51.6	
Switzerland	12.4	8.9	27.8	50.9	Ha from 200/ in 1000
Thailand	26.2	10.2	12.0	51.6	Up from 30% in 1980
Turkey	3 47.8	9.4	11.3	31.5	
United Kingdom	4.5	6.0	66.4	23.1	
United States	2.3	1.3	72.9	23.5	
Average	22.7	12.4	25.0	39.9	

Source: FactSet, Thomson Reuters, OECD calculations.



Ownership concentration at listed company level

Combined holdings of the 3 largest shareholders, 100 largest listed companies, end-2016






1. Context

Concentration of ownership in the hands of institutional investors

Combined holdings of the largest institutional investors at company level, 100 largest companies, end-2016





2. Impacts on corporate governance

Active exercise of corporate governance is in the hands of institutional investors.

Initiatives to lift voting don't mean better engagement – risk of 'box-ticking'.

Need for truly informed shareholder engagement

Similar concerns for passive investment funds



3. Implications for competition

Risk to competition? <u>It depends</u>.

- 1. The extent of common ownership links.
- 2. The level of market concentration.
- 3. The approach of firm managers in considering shareholder interests.
- 4. Technology spillovers.



3. Implications for competition

Tools for regulators

Competition authorities shouldn't ignore the research – or the risks.

- 1. Market studies include common ownership
- 2. Mergers watch for industry-wide ownership concentration.
- 3. Collaborate with researchers to better explore the evidence



- 1. Competition authorities need to better understand common ownership and risks
- 2. Institutional investors should also be aware of the risks.
- 3. Need for continued dialogue between competition researchers and the investment community.