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2015 - 2019
OECD COMPETITION TRENDS 2021, VOLUME I
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Graphic design by Poeli Bojorquez.
Foreword

Starting in 2018, the OECD, under the guidance of the Bureau of the Competition Committee, has launched an initiative to develop a database of general statistics relating to competition agencies, including data on enforcement and information on advocacy initiatives. The database currently covers the period 2015-2019 and will be collected on an annual basis in the future.

OECD Competition Trends presents unique insights into global competition trends based on analysis of data from more than 50 OECD and non-OECD jurisdictions. First launched in 2020, this second edition is presented in two volumes. Volume I provides an update on the competition enforcement trends between 2015 and 2019 for the competition authorities of the 56 jurisdictions in the OECD CompStats database.

This is complemented by “Volume II: Global Merger Control” which provides an overview of trends in global merger control. It describes a selection of the different choices made by jurisdictions when designing legal regimes, global merger control activity, and trends in merger control enforcement.

This publication supports informed policymaking and contributes to improving competition law and policy around the world by providing multi-year data on a large number of economic and legal indicators. The OECD Competition Committee, which includes representatives of the world’s major competition authorities, is the premier source of policy analysis and advice to governments on how best to harness market forces in the interests of greater global economic efficiency and prosperity. For almost 60 years the OECD and its Competition Committee have taken a leading role in shaping the framework for international co-operation among competition agencies. The resulting recommendations, best practices and policy roundtables serve both as models and inspiration for national initiatives and as tools for sharing global best practices on competition law and policy.

This work benefits from the support of the OECD Secretariat, in particular the Competition Division, and from the organisation’s whole-of-government approach, taking advantage of expertise in other OECD committees and experience in international co-operation. As the role and scope of competition law and policy continue to evolve, the tools of competition authorities must constantly develop and incorporate lessons learned from others. This publication contributes to helping policy makers and competition enforcers to stay up to date with the different ways in which competition law and policy is applied throughout the world.

Data in OECD Competition Trends 2021 is mainly presented on an aggregate level, combining the data of a certain number of individual jurisdictions. The aggregate-level data includes an analysis (i) for all participating jurisdictions (“All jurisdictions”), (ii) comparing OECD and non-OECD jurisdictions, and (iii) per geographical region (Americas, Asia-Pacific, Europe and Other (i.e. countries that do not qualify for the first three regions, but for whom not enough countries in their region participate to remain anonymous)).

The publication was prepared under the supervision of Antonio Capobianco, Acting Head of Division; by Wouter Meester, project leader; Carlotta Moiso; Menna Mahmoud; Niyati Asthana; and Pedro Caro de Sousa; all of the OECD Competition Division. Cristina Volpin, Federica Maiorano, Isolde Lueckenhausen, James Mancini, Paulo Burnier, Ruben Maximiano and Sabine Zigelski, all of the OECD Competition Division, provided comments and suggestions on earlier drafts.

We want to thank the individual competition authorities in the participating jurisdictions who generously provided the information on which much of this publication is based.
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1. Key figures

Figure 1 Coverage of the OECD CompStats Database, 2019

- OECD: 37*
  - Europe: 31
  - Americas: 11
- Non-OECD: 19
- Other: 7

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Figure 2 Key facts about the OECD CompStats Database

- % of World Population: 48%
- % of World GDP: 68%
- Years of Data: 5

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Figure 3 Evolution of competition law and merger regimes, 1910-2019

- Number of jurisdictions

Note: Data based on the 56 jurisdictions in the CompStats database
Source: OECD CompStats Database.

* Includes the 36 OECD countries and the European Union. Colombia, although having become a member in 2020, has been treated as non-member, as the data pertained to the years before Colombia’s accession.
Figure 4 General overview of competition resources and enforcement activity, 2019

**COMPETITION BUDGET (EUR)**

Total 1.155 Billion  
Average 23.57 Million  
Median 10.19 Million

**COMPETITION STAFF**

Total 10 768  
Average 207  
Median 100

**TOTAL DECISIONS**

Abuse of dominance 212  
Cartel decisions 449  
Mergers 8 636

Note: Data based on the 52 jurisdictions in the CompStats database for which complete data has been received. Budget data includes 49 jurisdictions that provided budget data for solely competition activities for all five years. OECD vs non-OECD logos show the average annual growth rate from 2015 to 2019. Budget number is in 2019 EUR. 

Source: OECD CompStats Database.
2. Resources

2.1 Competition budgets

**Figure 5 Total budget, 2015-2019**

**Figure 6 Average budget per agency, 2015-2019**

**Figure 7 Average competition budget per EUR 1 million GDP, 2015-2019**

**Figure 8 Average budget per competition staff member per agency, 2015-2019**

Note (for all graphs): Data based on the 49 jurisdictions in the CompStats database that provided budget data for solely competition activities for all five years. Budget figures are in 2015 EUR (non-euro currencies are converted using 2015 official exchange rates on 31 December 2015) to eliminate currency fluctuations distorting budget changes. Competition staff are staff working only on competition (excluding administrative staff or staff involved in other functions of the authority, such as consumer protection, public procurement, sector regulation).

Source: OECD CompStats Database.
2.2 Competition staff

Figure 9 Total number of competition staff, 2015-2019

Figure 10 Average number of competition staff per agency, 2015-2019

Figure 11 Competition staff per 1 million inhabitants, 2019

8% increase in competition staff between 2015-2019

* Two jurisdictions in the group “Other” are responsible for the high values because of regional offices.

Note (for all graphs): Data based on the 52 jurisdictions in the CompStats database that provided data for five years. Total number of staff working only on competition (excluding administrative staff or staff involved in other functions of the authority, such as consumer protection, public procurement, and sector regulation).

Source: OECD CompStats Database.
3. Competition enforcement activities

3.1 Enforcement and detection activities

Figure 12 Change in enforcement activity by jurisdiction, 2015-2019

Figure 13 Change in detection activity and ex-officio investigations by jurisdiction, 2015-2019

Note (for all graphs): Data based on the 50 jurisdictions in the CompStats database that provided data for five years. Each ‘wedge of three/four rectangles represents the development of the respective indicators in one of the jurisdictions. The development was calculated by using the average annual growth rate (AAGR) by jurisdiction. (“increase” indicates an AAGR-increase of 5% or more, “stable” indicates an AAGR-change between -5% and 5%, “decrease” indicates a AAGR-decrease of 5% or more, “low activity” indicates insufficient activity to calculate a meaningful change, and “No data/N.A.” indicates that no data is available or that this indicator is not applicable for the particular jurisdiction.).

Source: OECD CompStats Database
Two jurisdictions in the group “Other” and one jurisdiction in the Asia-Pacific region are responsible for the high values in 2018.

Note (for all graphs): Data based on the 50 jurisdictions in the CompStats database that provided data for five years.

Source: OECD CompStats Database.
3. Competition enforcement activities (continued)

3.2 Cartels

Decisions

Figure 18 Total number of cartel decisions, 2015-2019

Figure 19 Average number of cartel decisions per agency, 2015-2019

Leniency

Figure 20 Total number of leniency applications, 2015-2019

Figure 21 Average number of leniency applications per agency, 2015-2019

* In 2018, one jurisdiction is mainly responsible for the spike in the number of cartel decisions in Asia-Pacific in 2018. Note (for all graphs): Data based on the 50 jurisdictions in the CompStats database that provided data for five years. Source: OECD CompStats Database.
Settlements

Figure 22 Total of cartel decisions and the percentage of cases with settlements, 2015-2019

Note: Data based on the 50 jurisdictions in the CompStats database that provided data for five years. Source: OECD CompStats Database.
3. Competition enforcement activities (continued)

3.3 Abuse of dominance

Decisions

Figure 23 Total number of abuse of dominance decisions, 2015-2019

Figure 24 Average number of abuse of dominance decisions per agency, 2015-2019

Note (for all graphs): Data based on the 50 jurisdictions in the CompStats database that provided data for five years.
Source: OECD CompStats Database.
Figure 25  Total number of abuse of dominance decisions by jurisdiction, 2015-2019

67% share of top 5 jurisdictions in total abuse of dominance cases

Note: Data based on the 50 jurisdictions in the CompStats database that provided data for five years. Each number represents one jurisdiction. Source: OECD CompStats Database.
### 3.3 Abuse of dominance

**Investigations**

Figure 26: **Total number of investigations launched for alleged abuse of dominant position, 2015-2019**

- **All jurisdictions**
- **Non-OECD**
- **OECD**
- **Americas**
- **Asia-Pacific**
- **Europe**
- **Other**

**Commitment procedures**

Figure 27: **Total number of commitment procedures, negotiated or consensual procedures used in abuse of dominance cases, 2015-2019**

Note: Data based on the 50 jurisdictions in the CompStats database that provided data for five years.

Source: OECD CompStats Database.
3.4 Mergers

Merger decisions and notifications

Figure 28 Number of merger decisions and notifications, 2015-2019

Note: Data based on the 48 jurisdictions in the CompStats Database that have a merger regime and for which data is available for all years and is comparable. Decisions include cases in which the waiting period had expired.

Source: OECD CompStats Database.

15% increase in merger notifications between 2015-2019
3. Competition enforcement activities (continued)

3.4 Mergers

Merger clearances

Figure 29 Types of merger decisions, 2019

Phase I clearances without remedy 95.7%
Phase I clearances with remedy 0.7%
Phase II clearances without remedy 2.2%
Phase II clearances with remedy 1.0%
Other 4.3%
Prohibitions 0.4%

Figure 30 Types of merger decisions, 2015-2019

Prohibitions and withdrawals

Figure 31 Number of prohibition decisions and withdrawn merger notifications, 2015-2019

Phase I clearances with remedy
Phase I clearances without remedy
Phase II clearances without remedy
Phase II clearances with remedy
Prohibitions

Note: The figures slightly overestimate the number of blocked or withdrawn transactions as they include prohibitions decisions and withdrawals of the same transaction by different agencies.

95% share of mergers cleared without remedy in Phase I

Note (for all graphs): Data based on the 48 jurisdictions in the CompStats Database that have a merger regime and for which data is available for all years and is comparable.
Phase I clearances without remedy, Phase I clearances with remedy, and Phase II prohibitions include Single Phase decisions.
Phase I and Phase II clearances include cases of expiration of waiting period.
Source: OECD CompStats Database.
Note (for all graphs): Data based on the 48 jurisdictions in the CompStats Database that have a merger regime and for which data is available for all years and is comparable. Source: OECD CompStats Database.
4. Fines

4.1 Total fines

Figure 35 Total of fines imposed (abuse of dominance and cartel cases), 2015-2019

Figure 36 Total of fines imposed by type of infringement, by year, 2015-2019

9.3 bn total fines imposed in 2019

Note (for all graphs): Data based on the 50 jurisdictions in the CompStats database that provided data for five years. Fines are in 2015 EUR (non-euro currencies are converted using 2015 official exchange rates on 31 December 2015) to eliminate currency fluctuations distorting fines changes. Source: OECD CompStats Database.
Note: Data based on the 47 jurisdictions in the CompStats database that provided budget for solely competition activities and fines data for five years. Budget and fines figures are in 2015 EUR (non-euro currencies are converted using 2015 official exchange rates (on 31 December 2015) to eliminate currency fluctuations distorting budget and fines changes. One jurisdiction in the “Other” group was responsible for the spike of fines in 2018 and 2019.

Source: OECD CompStats Database.
4. Fines (continued)

4.2 Fines imposed for cartel cases

*In 2017, two jurisdiction in Americas were responsible for the spike of cartel fines. One jurisdiction in the “Other” group was responsible for the spike in 2018.

Note (for all graphs): Data based on the 50 jurisdictions in the CompStats database that provided data for five years. Fines are in 2015 EUR (non-euro currencies are converted using 2015 official exchange rates on 31 December 2015) to eliminate currency fluctuations distorting fines changes.

Source: OECD CompStats Database.

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Figure 38 Total of cartel fines imposed, 2015-2019

Figure 39 Average cartel fines imposed, 2015-2019
Note (for all graphs): Data based on the 50 jurisdictions in the CompStats database that provided data for five years. Fines are in 2015 EUR (non-euro currencies are converted using 2015 official exchange rates on 31 December 2015) to eliminate currency fluctuations distorting fines changes.

Source: OECD CompStats Database.
4.3 Fines imposed for abuse of dominance cases

* One jurisdiction in Europe was responsible for the spike of abuse of dominance fines in 2018.

* One jurisdiction in Europe and one jurisdiction in Asia-Pacific were responsible for the spike of abuse of dominance fines in 2018.

Note (for all graphs): Data based on the 50 jurisdictions in the CompStats database that provided data for five years. Fines figures are in 2015 EUR (non-euro currencies are converted using 2015 official exchange rates) (on 31 December 2015) to eliminate currency fluctuations distorting fines changes. Source: OECD CompStats Database.
Figure 44  *Average fines imposed per abuse of dominance decision, 2015-2019*  

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Average fine per abuse of dominance decision</th>
<th>5-year average</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2015</td>
<td>3.9 million</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2016</td>
<td>7.0 million</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2017</td>
<td>26.3 million</td>
<td>26.3 million</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2018</td>
<td>26.3 million</td>
<td>26.3 million</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2019</td>
<td>29.8 million</td>
<td>26.3 million</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: Data based on the 50 jurisdictions in the CompStats database that provided data for five years. Fines figures are in 2015 EUR (non-euro currencies are converted using 2015 official exchange rates) on 31 December 2015 to eliminate currency fluctuations distorting fines changes.  
Source: OECD CompStats Database.
Annex A. Source of data: CompStats

Starting in 2018, the OECD, under the guidance of the Bureau of the Competition Committee, has launched an initiative to develop a database of general statistics relating to competition agencies, including data on enforcement and information on advocacy initiatives.

Some statistics related to competition authorities' activities are already publicly available. However, this information is often dispersed, lacks consistency across time and jurisdictions, and is currently not used systematically to identify overall trends from which to draw policy lessons. This initiative fills this gap.

The OECD collects data annually from:

1. competition authorities in OECD countries;
2. authorities in non-OECD jurisdictions that are Participants or Associates in the OECD Competition Committee; and
3. agencies in jurisdictions that are neither OECD countries nor a participant or associate in the OECD Competition Committee but have expressed interest in joining the database.

The currency of the data in CompStats is Euros.

Jurisdictions

Currently, the CompStats database covers data from competition agencies in 56 jurisdictions, of which 37 jurisdictions are OECD countries (including the European Commission); 15 jurisdictions are participants in the OECD Competition Committee; 2 jurisdictions are associates to the OECD Competition Committee; and 1 jurisdiction is neither an OECD country nor an associate or participant in the OECD Competition Committee. Colombia, although having become a member in 2020, has been treated as a non-member, as the data in this report pertains to the years before Colombia’s accession.

Americas
Argentina, Brazil, Canada*, Chile*, Colombia¹, Costa Rica, Ecuador, El Salvador, Mexico*, Peru, United States*

Asia-Pacific
Australia*, Chinese Taipei, India, Indonesia, Japan*, Korea*, New Zealand*

Europe

Other
Egypt, Israel*, Kazakhstan, Russian Federation, South Africa, Turkey*, Ukraine.

* Jurisdictions with an asterisk (*) have been considered an OECD-member for the data analysis.

Period

The database currently covers the period 2015-2019.

¹ Colombia, although having become a member in 2020, has been treated a non-member, as the date pertained to the years before Colombia’s accession.

² The Commission of the European Union (EU) takes part in the work of the OECD, in accordance with the Supplementary Protocol to the Convention on the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development.
Data

The following areas are currently covered in OECD CompStats database.

1. **General information**
   - Budget
   - Number of staff
   - Number of competition staff

2. **Cartels and other anticompetitive agreements**
   - Number of decisions
   - Number of decisions on vertical agreements
   - Number of cases with settlements or plea bargain
   - Number of cases with negotiated/consensual procedure for settling cases
   - Number of leniency applications
   - Number of ex-officio investigations launched
   - Number of cases that used a dawn raid
   - Total amount of fines imposed
   - Number of companies fined
   - Number of cases with fines on individual
   - Number of cases with imprisonment of individual

3. **Abuse of dominance/unilateral conduct**
   - Number of decisions
   - Number of cases with negotiated/consensual procedure for settling cases
   - Number of investigations launched
   - Number of cases that used a dawn raid
   - Total amount of fines imposed
   - Number of companies fined

4. **Mergers and acquisitions**
   - Number of notifications
   - Number of Phase One (or single phase) clearances
   - Number of Phase One (or single phase) clearances with remedies
   - Number of Phase Two clearances (after an in-depth investigation)
   - Number of Phase Two clearances with remedies
   - Number of Phase Two prohibitions (or trials)
   - Number of withdrawn notifications by merging parties in Phase Two

5. **Advocacy**
   - Number of market studies
   - Number of formal advocacy opinions issued to governments, regulators, legislators
   - Number of advocacy events organised

6. **Additional variables collected by the OECD Secretariat**
   In order to enrich the database and allow for better and in-depth analysis, the Secretariat has added the following variables to the database:
   - Gross domestic product (GDP, current prices, purchasing power parity) data was extracted from the World Bank development indicators database. GDP data was extracted from the International Monetary Fund (GDP, current prices, purchasing power parity).
   - Population data was extracted from the United Nations World Population Prospects 2019
   - Year of enactment of first competition law
   - Year of establishment of competition authority
   - Year of adoption of merger control
# Annex B. Competition Authorities in the CompStats Database

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<th>COMPETITION AUTHORITY</th>
</tr>
</thead>
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<td>Argentina</td>
<td>Comisión Nacional de Defensa de la Competencia / National Commission for the Defence of Competition</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Australia</td>
<td>Australian Competition and Consumer Commission</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Austria</td>
<td>Bundeswettbewerbsbehörde / Austrian Federal Competition Authority (AFCA)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Belgium</td>
<td>Belgische Mededingingsautoriteit / Autorité belge de la Concurrence / Belgian Competition Authority</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Brazil</td>
<td>Conselho Administrativo de Defesa Econômica / Administrative Council for Economic Defence</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bulgaria</td>
<td>Commission on Protection of Competition</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Canada</td>
<td>The Competition Bureau</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chile</td>
<td>Fiscalía Nacional Económica / National Economic Prosecutor / The Tribunal de Defensa de la Libre Competencia / The Chilean Competition Tribunal</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Colombia</td>
<td>Superintendencia de Industria y Comercio / Superintendency of Industry and Commerce</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Costa Rica</td>
<td>Comisión para Promover la Competencia / Commission for the Promotion of Competition / Superintendencia de Telecomunicaciones / Superintendence of Telecommunications</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Croatia</td>
<td>Agencija za zaštitu tržišnog natjecanja / Croatian Competition Agency</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Czech Republic</td>
<td>Úřad pro ochranu hospodářské soutěže / Office for the Protection of Competition</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Denmark</td>
<td>Konkurrence- og Forbrugerstyrelsen / Danish Competition and Consumer Authority</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ecuador</td>
<td>Superintendencia de Control del Poder de Mercado / Superintendency for Control of Market Power</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Egypt</td>
<td>Egyptian Competition Authority</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>El Salvador</td>
<td>Superintendencia de competencia / Superintendency of Competition</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Estonia</td>
<td>Konkurentsiamet / Estonian Competition Authority</td>
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<tr>
<td>European</td>
<td>European Commission Directorate-General for Competition</td>
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<td>Finland</td>
<td>Kilpailu- ja kuluttajavirasto / Finnish Competition and Consumer Authority</td>
</tr>
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<td>France</td>
<td>Autorité de la concurrence / French Competition Authority</td>
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<td>Germany</td>
<td>Bundeskartellamt / Federal Cartel Office</td>
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<td>Greece</td>
<td>Ελληνική Επιτροπή Ανταγωνισμού / Hellenic Competition Commission</td>
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<tr>
<td>Hungary</td>
<td>Gazdasági Versenyhivatal / Office of Economic Competition</td>
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<tr>
<td>Iceland</td>
<td>Samkeppnisefirlitöð / Icelandic Competition Authority</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>India</td>
<td>Competition Commission of India</td>
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<td>Indonesia</td>
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<td>COMPETITION AUTHORITY</td>
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<td>Autoriteit Consument en Markt Authority for Consumers and Markets</td>
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<td>Commerce Commission</td>
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<td>Norway</td>
<td>Konkurrantsetilsynet Norwegian Competition Authority</td>
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<td>Instituto Nacional de Defensa de la Competencia y de la Protección de la Propiedad Intelectual National Institute for the Defence of Free Competition and the Protection of Intellectual Property</td>
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<td>Portugal</td>
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<td>Comisión Nacional de los Mercados y la Competencia National Commission on Markets and Competition</td>
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<td>Konkurrensverket Swedish Competition Commission</td>
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<td>Антимонопольний комітет України Antimonopoly Committee</td>
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<td>United Kingdom</td>
<td>Competition and Markets Authority</td>
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<tr>
<td>United States</td>
<td>Department of Justice Antitrust Division / Federal Trade Commission Bureau of Competition</td>
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Annex C. Methodology

This annex includes the methodological approach to ensure consistency, completeness, transparency, comparability and accuracy.

The “Global competition enforcement update” covers data of 52 jurisdictions that provided complete quality data for all five years (four jurisdictions provided incomplete information and were excluded).

For some jurisdictions, a competition authority’s mandate extends beyond competition activities to consumer protection, public procurement or other functions. This can have an impact on the authority’s allocated budget. To ensure consistency and comparability, the OECD only takes into account the budget figures of those competition authorities reporting their budget exclusively for competition law and policy activities for the five years (excluding, for instance, consumer protection). 49 jurisdictions in the CompStats database provided budget data for solely competition activities for all five years.

Financial figures (budgets and fines) of competition authorities are converted in euros to allow for comparison and aggregation. For charts of financial figures over time, the official exchange rates from 2015 were used (published on 31 December 2015), to avoid fluctuations over time because of currency appreciations or devaluations. For charts that show solely data from 2019, the official exchange rates from 2019 were used (published on 31 December 2019).

For the sunburst charts (Figure 12 and Figure 13), each ‘wedge’ of two/three/four rectangles represents the development in one jurisdiction. The development of the respective indicators of the was calculated by using the average annual growth rate (AAGR) by jurisdiction (“increase” indicates an AAGR-increase of 5% or more, “stable” indicates an AAGR-change between -5% and 5%, “decrease” indicates a AAGR-decrease of 5% or more, “low activity” indicates insufficient activity to calculate a meaningful change, and “No data/N.A.” indicates that no data is available or that this indicator is not applicable for the particular jurisdiction.).