

# WHAT DO WE KNOW ABOUT MULTILATERAL AID?

## The 54 billion dollar question

*“Multilateral aid has a vital role to play in responding to global challenges such as food security, climate change, and conflict. We have shaped a complex multilateral system with structures to suit diverse objectives and subject to a kaleidoscope of vested interests. As the major funders of the multilateral system, we have a collective responsibility to ensure its effectiveness for the benefit of our partner countries.”*

- J. Brian Atwood, DAC Chair

### Summary

The share of aid delivered by multilateral organisations has grown steadily over the past 20 years. In 2011\*, it reached almost USD 55 billion, equivalent to **40% of gross official development assistance (ODA)** from OECD Development Assistance Committee (DAC) member countries. This total includes USD 38 billion provided to multilaterals to fund core activities (see box), as well as some USD 17 billion in non-core funding channelled through and implemented by the multilateral system.

In 2010, twenty-one **non-DAC members** also reported their aid to the DAC and among them, the **share of multilateral aid was 22% of total financing for development**. Other important contributors to the multilateral system include the emerging economies, for example Brazil, China, India and South Africa; none of these countries, however, report their development assistance to the DAC.

As donors invest more in multilateral co-operation, **the multilateral system is becoming increasingly complex**. Today, it comprises over 210 major organisations and funds as well as numerous smaller trust funds. In turn, these organisations and funds have an ever increasing number of operations in developing countries, resulting in increasingly fragmented funding and activities. For recipient countries, the transaction costs and administrative burden associated with this proliferation are significant.

As multilateral aid grows in importance, it is **coming under increased scrutiny**. Donors are asking for clear evidence of the effectiveness of multilateral organisations in addressing today’s development challenges.

In 2008 the OECD/DAC began to publish **annual reports on multilateral aid**, providing a snapshot of this funding and analysing DAC members’ related strategies and policies. This paper summarizes the major data and trends presented in the multilateral aid reports to date. It comes at a moment when the international community is working to reduce the proliferation of aid channels so as to increase effectiveness, drawing guiding principles from good practice.

### Core or non-core?


**Core** = un-earmarked contributions to multilateral organisations, known as multilateral ODA

**Non-core** = contributions to multilateral organisations earmarked for a specific purpose, sector, region or country, which includes contributions to trust funds and joint programming, also referred to as “multi-bi” aid.

\*2011 data in this paper is for aggregate statistics only and is provisional; disaggregated statistics, which include non-core/earmarked data, are from 2010. The aggregate 2010 data on multilateral aid can be found on p. 4.

## How much multilateral aid do DAC donors provide?

Gross ODA provided by DAC member countries, 2001-2011, in constant 2010 prices



Source: *DAC Aggregate Statistics*, OECD, Paris, 2012

## WHY MULTILATERAL AID?

The multilateral system generally has been seen as offering an appropriate vehicle for tackling global issues because of its political legitimacy. The multilaterals also have a broader technical base than individual bilateral donors. Finally, using the multilateral system allows for economies of scale.

Nonetheless, governments are increasingly under pressure from legislative bodies and civil society to scrutinise and even limit multilateral aid. The reasons are many. Decisions on what, where, and how this finance is actually delivered often escape the control of national policy makers, thereby appearing to be too far removed from governments' accountability and oversight processes.

Concerns over accountability and control, however, are often offset by the efficiency gains achieved through joint efforts. For example by pooling resources, donors share the aid burden, are able to leverage a range of experience at the sector and country levels, and can extend their geographical reach by providing aid to countries where they do not have a bilateral co-operation programme. Channelling funds through multilateral agencies also enables donors to concentrate funding that targets key global priorities.

The 2011 DAC Report on Multilateral Aid looks at the factors that contribute to confidence in multilateral aid. It concludes that the more closely the preferences of a government are aligned with those of the multilateral agency, the more likely the government is to fund the multilateral agency and the less likely it is to be concerned with the risks of loss of influence over the funds.

Reasons to engage with multilateral agencies	Priorities for engaging with multilateral agencies
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Economies of scale</li> <li>• Governance based on global development principles and standards</li> <li>• Political neutrality and legitimacy</li> <li>• Abundant capital and knowledge resources</li> <li>• Advisory services and technical assistance</li> <li>• Low transaction costs</li> <li>• Contribution to global public goods</li> <li>• Global presence</li> <li>• Effectiveness and efficiency</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• The MDGs – especially poverty reduction</li> <li>• Fragile states</li> <li>• Humanitarian crises</li> <li>• Health – especially HIV/AIDS</li> <li>• Food security</li> <li>• Climate change/environment</li> <li>• Gender equality</li> <li>• Education</li> <li>• Human rights</li> </ul>

Based on: 2008 DAC Report on Multilateral Aid


## MULTILATERAL AID: FACTS AND TRENDS

**40% of ODA flows through the multilateral system.** Donors today rely heavily on the multilateral system. In 2010, of the USD 136.7 billion of gross ODA provided by DAC member countries (excluding debt relief), 28% was spent to fund core mandates of multilateral agencies. An additional 12% of total gross ODA, though counted as bilateral, was channelled through and implemented by multilateral agencies (referred to as “non-core” or “multi-bi” aid – see box).

Together, the total amount allocated to or through the multilateral system in 2010 (core and non-core) was USD 54.3 billion, or 40% of gross ODA, compared to USD 51.2 billion in 2009.

### Multilateral, bilateral, and multi-bi aid

(Gross ODA disbursements 2010, excluding debt relief and contributions from EU Institutions, in constant 2010 prices)



2010 Total ODA (excl. debt relief) = 136.7 bn


Source: Creditor Reporting System Database and DAC Aggregate Statistics, OECD, Paris, 2012

**A significant part of many aid budgets.** From 2008 to 2010, the countries that disbursed the highest share of multilateral aid relative to their total gross ODA were Italy (74%), Austria and Greece (55% each, including contributions to the EU). Australia, Portugal and the United States allocated the smallest share of their ODA on multilateral aid – only 12% in the case of the United States<sup>2</sup>. EU members provided on average 19% of their total gross ODA to EU institutions, with the overall shares ranging from a high of around 44% (Greece, Italy) to a low of 8-9% (Sweden, Luxembourg and the Netherlands).

<sup>2</sup> See Table “How Much Multilateral Aid?” on p. 11

## What share of a donor's aid went to and through multilateral organisations in 2010?

Multilateral ODA and non-core contributions to the multilateral system as % of gross ODA disbursements, excluding debt relief and contributions to EU Institutions, 2010 (in constant 2010 prices)



Source: Creditor Reporting System Database and DAC Aggregate Statistics, OECD, Paris, 2012

**Non-core multilateral aid on the rise.** In 2006, donors began reporting to the OECD on their non-core funding to multilateral agencies. In 2009, the DAC Reports on Multilateral Aid began to examine this non-core funding through the multilateral system, reporting a steady increase (from 8% of total ODA in 2007 to 12% in 2010). Examples of non-core funding include funds allocated to the Central Emergency Response Fund (CERF) of the United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA), to emergency- and relief-specific programmes of the World Food Programme (WFP), to the World Health Organization's (WHO) Polio Eradication Fund, and to the World Bank's Afghanistan Reconstruction Trust Fund, as well as to well over 1,000 other trust funds of the multilateral development banks, many of which are single-donor trust funds.

**Multilateral aid is concentrated in five main clusters.** Over past years, there has been very little change in the way DAC members allocate multilateral aid. Member countries have provided most of their multilateral aid (81% from 2006-2010) to five clusters of multilaterals: the European Development Fund, financed by extra-budgetary contributions of the EU member states and the budget of the European Union (EDF-plus-EU, 36%), the World Bank's International Development Association (IDA, 22%), United Nations Funds and Programmes (9%), the African and Asian Development Banks (5% and 3% respectively), and the Global Fund for AIDS, Tuberculosis and Malaria (7%). The remaining 200+ multilateral organisations, funds or trust funds – many of which have research or policy functions or are norms-based or standard-setting organisations – together receive less than 20% of total multilateral aid.


**Pros and cons of non-core contributions to multilateral agencies.** Non-core, or multi-bi, funding is seen to have advantages and disadvantages, depending on the perspective from which it is viewed. The 2011 Multilateral Aid Report explored these perspectives, as summarised in the table below:

From the perspective of:	Advantages of non-core funding	Disadvantages of non-core funding
<b>Developing countries</b>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• can lead to more representative governance;</li> <li>• results in better harmonisation compared to bilateral initiatives;</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• could lead to less representative governance;</li> <li>• might blur lines of accountability;</li> </ul>
<b>Multilateral organisations</b>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• preferable to numerous parallel bilateral initiatives when there are multiple donors;</li> <li>• preferable to the creation of new organisations or initiatives for specific, critical, time-bound purposes;</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• may weaken established governance mechanism by bypassing board decisions;</li> <li>• Increases transaction costs (including reporting), especially for single-donor trust funds;</li> <li>• may conflict with the organisation’s core policies or strategy;</li> <li>• may lead to the “bilateralisation” of multilateral aid;</li> </ul>
<b>Bilateral donors</b>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• can be focused on specific sectors, regions or countries (e.g. fragile states) where the bilateral donor may lack expertise or has no presence;</li> <li>• can make contributions more visible as funds “keep their identity” by not being pooled;</li> <li>• can bypass cumbersome board decisions;</li> <li>• can serve as “pilot” for stand-alone funds.</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• core contributions may subsidise administrative costs of non-core funds.</li> </ul>


Based on: 2011 DAC Report on Multilateral Aid

**Has multilateral aid now reached its peak?** Over the past two decades, multilateral ODA has risen by 64% in real terms – from USD 23 billion in 1991 to USD 38 billion in 2011 (at 2010 prices and exchange rates). In comparison, over the same period gross ODA (excluding debt relief) increased by 52%. Although fiscal austerity in OECD countries has placed pressure on overall aid levels in recent years (total ODA dropped by 2.7% in 2011, the first decrease since 1997<sup>3</sup>), the multilateral component of ODA continues to rise. This growth, however, appears to be slowing down: compared to 9% growth in 2008, multilateral ODA grew by only 1% in 2011. The graphs below show the shares of total multilateral core and non-core ODA disbursed by DAC member countries in 2010.

**DAC Multilateral ODA**  
in 2010 USD disbursements  
Total = USD 37.6 billion



**DAC non-core (multi-bi) ODA**  
in 2010 USD disbursements  
Total = USD 16.7 billion



Source: Creditor Reporting System Database and DAC Aggregate Statistics, OECD, Paris, 2012

3 .Disregarding years of exceptional debt relief.

According to the *2012-2015 Survey on Donors' Forward Spending Plans*, nine out of the 16 donors that reported their funding plans through 2013 plan to increase their multilateral ODA in real terms by 2013 (against 2010) and seven expect to decrease.<sup>4</sup> This indicates a change in from 2011, when 12 of these same DAC donors had programmed to regularly increase their multilateral aid.

**An opportunity to broaden the multilateral funding base.** Many traditional sources of multilateral funding are drying up, prompting multilateral agencies to focus on diversifying their funding base and mobilise resources from middle-income countries and private foundations, as well as through innovative financing. The United Nations reports that 17% of its contributions for development in 2010 came from non-governmental organisations, public-private partnerships and other multilateral organisations (including global funds).<sup>5</sup> Non-DAC countries provided 4.2% of total resources for the 16th replenishment of the International Development Association (IDA16), the concessional arm of the World Bank that provides credits and grants to the world's poorest countries. This was an increase from the IDA15 replenishment three years earlier.


## NON-DAC PROVIDERS OF MULTILATERAL DEVELOPMENT ASSISTANCE

Twenty-one non-DAC members reported their 2010 aid flows to the DAC.<sup>6</sup> Of these countries, the eleven EU members that are not part of the DAC allocated 69% of their total ODA to multilateral agencies; the overall average share of multilateral aid for non-DAC members was 22%. Saudi Arabia reported 17% (USD 609 million) of its total aid as multilateral and the United Arab Emirates reported 7% (USD 32 million). The Russian Federation is the most recent addition to the non-DAC countries reporting their aid to the OECD; it provided 36% (USD 170 million) of its total aid to multilaterals.

Other important contributors to the multilateral system include emerging economies such as Brazil, India, South Africa and China (none of these countries report their development assistance to the DAC). The *2011 DAC Report on Multilateral Aid* highlighted Brazil's use of multilateral agencies to provide aid to neighbouring countries and circumvent domestic laws against providing bilateral aid. In contrast, both India and China have large bilateral programmes and it is very likely that the share of aid they channel through multilateral organisations would be below the DAC average (28%). The *2012 DAC Report on Multilateral Aid* reported China's contributions to major multilateral agencies using information gathered from those agencies' annual statements. In the absence of data from some of the emerging donors, however, it is difficult to ascertain whether the strong political support they provide to the United Nations, for example, translates into higher financial commitments.

### How much multilateral aid do non-DAC members provide?

*Gross ODA disbursements by non-DAC donors, 2010, excluding debt relief, in constant 2010 prices*



Source: *DAC Aggregate Statistics*, OECD, Paris, 2012

4. Nine donors provided estimates through 2015; of these, four predicted a real decrease of 11% and five a real increase of 16%.

5. United Nations (2012), *Analysis of funding of operational activities for development of the UN system for the year 2010*.

6. See Table "How Much Multilateral Aid?" on p. 11

Increases in multilateral contributions by the emerging economies are inextricably linked to the ongoing reform of the international financial institutions, which is being undertaken to take into account the increasing weight of emerging economies.

## EVALUATING THE EFFECTIVENESS OF MULTILATERAL ORGANISATIONS

In the current context of tight budgets, governments and their legislative bodies are scrutinising multilateral aid allocations more closely than ever before. Over and above the regular evaluations undertaken by multilateral organisations' own evaluation groups and departments, a number of important bilateral and joint assessments of multilateral agencies have been undertaken over the past years. These include Australia's Multilateral Assessment (2012), Sweden's Organisational Assessments (2011), the Dutch Scorecards of Multilateral Organisations (2011), the United Kingdom's Multilateral Aid Review (2011), and annual reports by the multi-stakeholder Multilateral Organisation Performance Assessment Network (MOPAN).

Most of these assessments apply similar criteria: organisational effectiveness, development results, and the relevance of the organisation to the donor's preferences. Two broad questions appear to drive these various assessments: (1) What is the direct return on investment, or "value for money"? and/or (2) What is the ability and capacity of the organisation to deliver its mandate? In bilateral assessments, preferences are often introduced in the methodology based the donor's own thematic or geographical priorities and these can influence the conclusions drawn from the assessments.

In its 2011 and 2012 reports, the OECD argues that donors should enhance existing joint assessments rather than promoting new bilateral assessments. In this way, they can ensure that organisations are assessed against collective objectives, enabling their recommendations to carry more weight in the broader governance context of the institution under review and inciting greater reform. In line with existing aid effectiveness commitments, these assessments would also place stronger emphasis on the evidence provided by developing countries or other "end-users" of the multilateral system.

### MOPAN and the common approach

The Multilateral Organisation Performance Assessment Network (MOPAN, founded in 2002, is comprised of 16 members who share a common interest in assessing the effectiveness of the major multilateral organisations they fund. By generating relevant and credible information, the network helps its members offer domestic accountability and supports dialogue with multilateral organisations and their clients. MOPAN members carry out joint assessments, share information, and draw on each other's experience in monitoring and evaluation.

In 2009 MOPAN adopted a "common approach" methodology, which focuses on organizational effectiveness and is built around four management dimensions: strategic, operational, relationship and knowledge management. In 2012, MOPAN introduced criteria to measure development results, as well as relevance to stakeholders. MOPAN has recently included global funds and humanitarian organisations (2011) in its annual assessments.

## HOW FRAGMENTED IS MULTILATERAL AID?

The OECD qualifies a donor's aid relation with a specific partner country as "significant" when (1) the volume of the donor's aid to that country is among the top 90% of the aid the country receives, and/or (2) the donor's share of aid to the partner country is higher than the donor's share of global aid. A donor's concentration/fragmentation ratio is determined by the number of "significant" to "non-significant" aid relations it maintains.

The 2012 DAC Report on Multilateral Aid concludes that the average multilateral donor's aid is more concentrated

than that of the average DAC member country (the multilateral concentration ratio is 65%, compared to 54% for DAC countries). Still, close to two out of every five relationships between a multilateral donor and a developing country are not significant. Fragmented bilateral funding channelled through multilateral agencies further heightens multilateral fragmentation; for this reason, bilateral donors should carefully consider their motivation and rationale in channelling financially “non-significant” levels of non-core funding through multilateral agencies.

## HOW DO DAC COUNTRIES DECIDE MULTILATERAL AID ALLOCATIONS?

*Decentralised decision-making models prevail.* Another key aspect of multilateral funding explored in the *2011 DAC Report on Multilateral Aid* is the way in which DAC member countries decide their multilateral aid allocations. A survey conducted in late 2010 asked DAC members to identify which ministries, departments or agencies were involved in making allocations to the 29 funds and organisations that receive over 90% of all multilateral aid. Only nine members – Australia, Belgium, Denmark, Finland, the Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Sweden, and the UK – had a “centralised” decision-making model by which a single government body decides on allocations. For the majority of DAC members, by contrast, coordination within government is complex; 14 of them follow a “decentralised model”, with at least two government bodies deciding allocations. (The EU, though not surveyed, would also fall into this last category.) Means of co-ordination among ministries or agencies range from formal inter-ministerial bodies that meet regularly, to *ad hoc* consultations among government officials. These decentralised contexts for decisions on allocations to multilateral organisations can result in unclear and even incoherent funding decisions.

*Striking the balance between bilateral and multilateral aid.* Survey results indicate that just under one-half (11 out of 23) of member countries explicitly discuss the balance between bilateral and multilateral aid allocations within their government at least every three to five years. Where structured opportunities for discussion are lacking, citizens learn only incidentally of the rationale for choosing one or another channel for aid delivery. In the current environment of budget constraints, clearly setting out and publicising the national case for multilateralism is increasingly important to enable the general public, legislators, and civil society to understand what they are getting in exchange for less direct control.

## GUIDING PRINCIPLES FOR MULTILATERAL AID

At the Fourth High-Level Forum in Busan in 2011, countries and organisations agreed to “improve the coherence of our policies on multilateral institutions, global funds and programmes.” They set out to “reduce the proliferation of these channels and [...], by the end of 2012, agree on principles and guidelines to guide our joint efforts”<sup>7</sup>. To do so, they pledged to “make effective use of existing multilateral channels, focusing on those that are performing well [...]”<sup>8</sup>. These commitments follow a decade of efforts facilitated by the UN, the OECD/DAC, the health sector and others to identify good practice in funding, assessing, and delivering multilateral co-operation. The 2012 DAC Report on Multilateral Aid reviews some of this good practice and distinguishes between four levels of relations between bilateral and multilateral agencies:


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7 . Busan Partnership for Effective Development Co-operation (2011), Paragraph 25(b).

8 . Ibid.



#### Four levels of relationships between bilateral and multilateral agencies



Source: 2012 Report on Multilateral Aid, Paris, OECD, 2012

The report distils the good practice into seven guiding principles, framed with wording taken from the Busan Partnership for Effective Development Co-operation (para. 25b):

*“In line with the commitment set out in the Busan Partnership for Effective Development Co-operation (paragraph 25), [DAC members] welcome the diversity of development co-operation actors, and agree to work to reduce the proliferation of multilateral channels by using existing channels and frameworks for programme design, delivery and assessments, drawing on the following principles:*

- (1) **Use existing channels as the default**, adjusting them where necessary, and address any legal and administrative barriers that may prevent their use.
- (2) Use the international community's appetite for new initiatives to **innovate and reform the existing multilateral system**, allowing for donor visibility.
- (3) **Regularly review the number** of multilateral organisations, funds and programmes with the aim of reducing their number through consolidation without decreasing the overall volume of resources.
- (4) **Provide core or un-earmarked contributions** to multilateral organisations, where relevant and possible.
- (5) **Ensure that new multilateral programmes and channels are multi-donor arrangements; are time-bound, and should contain provisions for a mid-term review; and do not impose excessive reporting requirements** if the creation of multilateral programmes and channels is unavoidable.
- (6) **Support country-level harmonisation** among all providers of development co-operation, including through representation on governing boards of multilateral organisations, funds and programmes.
- (7) **Monitor trends and progress** to curb the proliferation of channels at the global level; inform monitoring in partner countries.”

Source: 2012 Report on Multilateral Aid, Paris, OECD, 2012

## DAC Multilateral Reports at a Glance

Each *DAC Report on Multilateral Aid* provides a snapshot of multilateral aid and its trends, analyses the total use (core and non-core) of the multilateral system, and provides a profile of each DAC donor's multilateral contributions and policy. In addition, every report highlights a few specific topics.

2008	The first <i>DAC Report on Multilateral Aid</i> asked why DAC members provide multilateral aid and examined the multilateral strategies of DAC donors. It also explored initiatives to monitor how <b>effective</b> multilateral organisations are, finding that multilaterals had made slightly faster progress in living up to the Paris Declaration than bilaterals. It also highlighted <b>reforms</b> in the multilateral system.
2010	The second <i>DAC Report on Multilateral Aid</i> took a closer look at core and <b>non-core funding of UNDP and World Bank</b> trust funds. It explored multilateral <b>climate change</b> funding from a development perspective and asked how multilateral aid was responding to the <b>financial and economic crisis</b> . It looked at DAC members' multilateral strategies and their approaches to assessing multilateral agencies.
2011	The third <i>DAC Report on Multilateral Aid</i> delved into why and how governments invest in multilateral aid channels. It put forward <b>eight principles for good multilateral donorship</b> .
2012	The fourth <i>DAC Report on Multilateral Aid</i> provided an overview of country programmable aid and its fragmentation, analysed different approaches adopted by donors in <b>assessing multilateral organisations</b> , and proposed ideas for <b>guiding principles and guidelines to limit the proliferation of multilateral channels</b> .

# How much multilateral aid?

ODA, gross disbursements excluding debt relief, 2010

Donor	Bilateral ODA	of which, channelled through multilateral agencies (non-core)	Multilateral ODA (in USD m)	Total use of the multilateral system	Core multilateral ODA as % of gross ODA	Multilateral ODA and non-core as % of total ODA	Core as % of total use of the multilateral system
	(A)	(B)	(C)	(B+C)	(C/(A+C))	(B+C)/(A+C)	(C/(B+C))
Australia	3,234	813	585	1,397	15%	37%	42%
Austria	462	99	597	697	56%	66%	86%
Belgium	1,543	234	953	1,187	38%	48%	80%
Canada	3,912	1,367	1,282	2,650	25%	51%	48%
Denmark	2,139	241	790	1,032	27%	35%	77%
Finland	839	250	494	744	37%	56%	66%
France	7,446	39	5,220	5,259	41%	42%	99%
Germany	9,220	480	4,950	5,430	35%	38%	91%
Greece	212	6	296	302	58%	59%	98%
Ireland	585	103	310	413	35%	46%	75%
Italy	694	92	2,237	2,329	76%	79%	96%
Japan	14,954	1,251	3,684	4,935	20%	26%	75%
Korea	931	45	273	318	23%	26%	86%
Luxembourg	262	98	141	239	35%	59%	59%
Netherlands	4,453	719	1,516	2,235	25%	37%	68%
New Zealand	271	31	71	102	21%	30%	70%
Norway	3,544	1,035	1,019	2,053	22%	45%	50%
Portugal	428	51	253	304	37%	45%	83%
Spain	3,933	1,349	1,951	3,300	33%	56%	59%
Sweden	2,923	736	1,618	2,355	36%	52%	69%
Switzerland	1,698	292	588	879	26%	38%	67%
United Kingdom	8,200	2,961	5,037	7,997	38%	60%	63%
United States	27,199	4,383	3,775	8,157	12%	26%	46%
<b>Total DAC donors</b>	<b>99,083</b>	<b>16,677</b>	<b>37,638</b>	<b>54,316</b>	<b>28%</b>	<b>40%</b>	<b>69%</b>

Multilateral ODA as % gross ODA excluding debt relief (2008-2010)

Donor	Multilateral as % gross ODA	Multilateral as % gross ODA, excl. contributions to EU institutions
Australia	14%	14%
Austria	55%	35%
Belgium	40%	22%
Canada	26%	26%
Denmark	31%	24%
Finland	39%	27%
France	42%	25%
Germany	37%	20%
Greece	55%	19%
Ireland	32%	20%
Italy	74%	48%
Japan	20%	20%
Korea	27%	27%
Luxembourg	35%	28%
Netherlands	25%	17%
New Zealand	23%	23%
Norway	23%	23%
Portugal	40%	15%
Spain	31%	18%
Sweden	34%	29%
Switzerland	26%	26%
United Kingdom	36%	24%
United States	12%	12%
<b>Total DAC donors</b>	<b>28%</b>	<b>26%</b>

Gross ODA reported by non-DAC donors excluding debt relief, 2010

Donor	Bilateral ODA	Multilateral ODA (in USD m)	Multilateral ODA as a share of gross ODA (%)	Total ODA, excl. debt relief (in USD m)
Cyprus*	30	21	41	51
Czech Republic	79	148	65	228
Estonia	5	14	74	19
Hungary	28	86	75	114
Latvia	2	14	90	16
Lithuania	16	20	55	37
Malta	8	5	39	14
Poland	102	282	73	384
Romania	27	88	77	114
Slovak Republic	20	54	73	74
Slovenia	22	36	62	59
<b>EU 11 total</b>	<b>340</b>	<b>768</b>	<b>69</b>	<b>1,108</b>
Chinese Taipei	326	55	14	381
Iceland	21	8	28	29
Israel**	128	17	12	145
Liechtenstein	22	5	18	27
Russia	302	170	36	472
Thailand	31	14	31	45
Turkey	920	47	5	967
<b>Kuwait, Saudi, UAE)</b>	<b>2,400</b>	<b>1,357</b>	<b>31</b>	<b>4,378</b>
Kuwait (KFAED)	617	-	-	617
Saudi Arabia	2,884	609	17	3,494
UAE	539	32	6	571
<b>Total non-DAC</b>	<b>6,440</b>	<b>1,999</b>	<b>22</b>	<b>9,060</b>

Sources: Creditor Reporting System and DAC Aggregate Statistics (2012), OECD, Paris.

\* Footnote by the European Union Member States of the OECD and the European Commission: The Republic of Cyprus is recognised by all members of the United Nations with the exception of Turkey. The information in this document relates to the area under the effective control of the Government of the Republic of Cyprus'

\* Footnote by Turkey: The information in this document under the heading "Cyprus" relates to the southern part of the Island. There is no single authority representing both Turkish and Greek Cypriot people on the Island. Turkey recognises the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus (TRNC). Until a lasting and equitable solution is found within the context of the United Nations, Turkey shall preserve its position concerning the "Cyprus" issue.'

\*\* Malta started reporting to the DAC in 2009 and Romania started reporting to the DAC in 2008. Therefore, the data above includes just one or two years of reporting.

\*\*\* The statistical data for Israel are supplied by and under the responsibility of the relevant Israeli authorities. The use of such data by the OECD is without prejudice to the status of the Golan Heights, East Jerusalem and Israeli settlements in the West Bank under the terms of international law.

\*\*\*\* Korea acceded to the DAC on 25 November 2009.

For more information, please visit <http://www.oecd.org/dac/aid-architecture/multilateralaid.htm>

Email: [dac.contact@oecd.org](mailto:dac.contact@oecd.org)