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## THE 2010 UPDATE TO THE MODEL TAX CONVENTION

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CENTRE FOR TAX POLICY AND ADMINISTRATION

# THE 2010 UPDATE TO THE MODEL TAX CONVENTION

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## THE 2010 UPDATE TO THE MODEL TAX CONVENTION

[The changes to the existing text of the Model Tax Convention appear in ~~strike through~~ for deletions and ***bold italics*** for additions]

### A. INTRODUCTION

1. Replace paragraph 27 of the Introduction by the following:

27. The Model Convention seeks, wherever possible, to specify for each situation a single rule. On certain points, however, it was thought necessary to leave in the Convention a certain degree of flexibility, compatible with the efficient implementation of the Model Convention. Member countries therefore enjoy a certain latitude, for example, with regard to fixing the rate of tax at source on dividends and interest ***and***; the choice of method for eliminating double taxation ~~and, subject to certain conditions, the allocation of profits to a permanent establishment by apportionment of the total profits of the enterprise~~. Moreover, for some cases, alternative or additional provisions are mentioned in the Commentaries.

### B. ARTICLES

#### *Article 7*

2. Replace the existing Article 7 by the following new Article:

#### *Article 7*

#### **BUSINESS PROFITS**

***1. Profits of an enterprise of a Contracting State shall be taxable only in that State unless the enterprise carries on business in the other Contracting State through a permanent establishment situated therein. If the enterprise carries on business as aforesaid, the profits that are attributable to the permanent establishment in accordance with the provisions of paragraph 2 may be taxed in that other State.***

***2. For the purposes of this Article and Article [23 A] [23B], the profits that are attributable in each Contracting State to the permanent establishment referred to in paragraph 1 are the profits it might be expected to make, in particular in its dealings with other parts of the enterprise, if it were a separate and independent enterprise engaged in the same or similar activities under the same or similar conditions, taking into account the functions performed, assets used and risks assumed by the enterprise through the permanent establishment and through the other parts of the enterprise.***

3. *Where, in accordance with paragraph 2, a Contracting State adjusts the profits that are attributable to a permanent establishment of an enterprise of one of the Contracting States and taxes accordingly profits of the enterprise that have been charged to tax in the other State, the other State shall, to the extent necessary to eliminate double taxation on these profits, make an appropriate adjustment to the amount of the tax charged on those profits. In determining such adjustment, the competent authorities of the Contracting States shall if necessary consult each other.*

4. *Where profits include items of income which are dealt with separately in other Articles of this Convention, then the provisions of those Articles shall not be affected by the provisions of this Article.*

## C. COMMENTARY

### Article 1

3. Add the following new headings and paragraphs 6.8 to 6.34 to the Commentary on Article 1:

#### *Cross-border issues relating to collective investment vehicles*

6.8 *Most countries have dealt with the domestic tax issues arising from groups of small investors who pool their funds in collective investment vehicles (CIVs). In general, the goal of such systems is to provide for neutrality between direct investments and investments through a CIV. Whilst those systems generally succeed when the investors, the CIV and the investment are all located in the same country, complications frequently arise when one or more of those parties or the investments are located in different countries. These complications are discussed in the report by the Committee on Fiscal Affairs entitled *The Granting of Treaty Benefits with Respect to the Income of Collective Investment Vehicles*,<sup>1</sup> the main conclusions of which have been incorporated below. For purposes of the Report and for this discussion, the term “CIV” is limited to funds that are widely-held, hold a diversified portfolio of securities and are subject to investor-protection regulation in the country in which they are established.*

#### *Application of the Convention to CIVs*

6.9 *The primary question that arises in the cross-border context is whether a CIV should qualify for the benefits of the Convention in its own right. In order to do so under treaties that, like the Convention, do not include a specific provision dealing with CIVs, a CIV would have to qualify as a “person” that is a “resident” of a Contracting State and, as regards the application of Articles 10 and 11, that is the “beneficial owner” of the income that it receives.*

6.10 *The determination of whether a CIV should be treated as a “person” begins with the legal form of the CIV, which differs substantially from country to country and between the various types of vehicles. In many countries, most CIVs take the form of a company. In others, the CIV typically would be a trust. In still others, many CIVs are simple contractual arrangements or a form of joint ownership. In most cases, the CIV would be treated as a taxpayer or a “person” for purposes of the tax law of the State in which it is established; for example, in some countries where the CIV is commonly established in the form of a trust, either the trust itself, or the trustees acting collectively in their capacity as such, is treated as a*

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1. *Reproduced in Volume II of the loose-leaf version of the OECD Model Tax Convention at page R(24)-1.*

*taxpayer or a person for domestic tax law purposes. In view of the wide meaning to be given to the term “person”, the fact that the tax law of the country where such a CIV is established would treat it as a taxpayer would be indicative that the CIV is a “person” for treaty purposes. Contracting States wishing to expressly clarify that, in these circumstances, such CIVs are persons for the purposes of their conventions may agree bilaterally to modify the definition of “person” to include them.*

*6.11 Whether a CIV is a “resident” of a Contracting State depends not on its legal form (as long as it qualifies as a person) but on its tax treatment in the State in which it is established. Although a consistent goal of domestic CIV regimes is to ensure that there is only one level of tax, at either the CIV or the investor level, there are a number of different ways in which States achieve that goal. In some States, the holders of interests in the CIV are liable to tax on the income received by the CIV, rather than the CIV itself being liable to tax on such income. Such a fiscally transparent CIV would not be treated as a resident of the Contracting State in which it is established because it is not liable to tax therein.*

*6.12 By contrast, in other States, a CIV is in principle liable to tax but its income may be fully exempt, for instance, if the CIV fulfils certain criteria with regard to its purpose, activities or operation, which may include requirements as to minimum distributions, its sources of income and sometimes its sectors of operation. More frequently, CIVs are subject to tax but the base for taxation is reduced, in a variety of different ways, by reference to distributions paid to investors. Deductions for distributions will usually mean that no tax is in fact paid. Other States tax CIVs but at a special low tax rate. Finally, some States tax CIVs fully but with integration at the investor level to avoid double taxation of the income of the CIV. For those countries that adopt the view, reflected in paragraph 8.6 of the Commentary on Article 4, that a person may be liable to tax even if the State in which it is established does not impose tax, the CIV would be treated as a resident of the State in which it is established in all of these cases because the CIV is subject to comprehensive taxation in that State. Even in the case where the income of the CIV is taxed at a zero rate, or is exempt from tax, the requirements to be treated as a resident may be met if the requirements to qualify for such lower rate or exemption are sufficiently stringent.*

*6.13 Those countries that adopt the alternative view, reflected in paragraph 8.7 of the Commentary on Article 4, that an entity that is exempt from tax therefore is not liable to tax may not view some or all of the CIVs described in the preceding paragraph as residents of the States in which they are established. States taking the latter view, and those States negotiating with such States, are encouraged to address the issue in their bilateral negotiations.*

*6.14 Some countries have questioned whether a CIV, even if it is a “person” and a “resident”, can qualify as the beneficial owner of the income it receives. Because a “CIV” as defined in paragraph 6.8 above must be widely-held, hold a diversified portfolio of securities and be subject to investor-protection regulation in the country in which it is established, such a CIV, or its managers, often perform significant functions with respect to the investment and management of the assets of the CIV. Moreover, the position of an investor in a CIV differs substantially, as a legal and economic matter, from the position of an investor who owns the underlying assets, so that it would not be appropriate to treat the investor in such a CIV as the beneficial owner of the income received by the CIV. Accordingly, a vehicle that meets the definition of a widely-held CIV will also be treated as the beneficial owner of the dividends and interest that it receives, so long as the managers of the CIV have discretionary powers to manage the assets generating such income (unless an individual who is a resident of that State*

*who would have received the income in the same circumstances would not have been considered to be the beneficial owner thereof).*

*6.15 Because these principles are necessarily general, their application to a particular type of CIV might not be clear to the CIV, investors and intermediaries. Any uncertainty regarding treaty eligibility is especially problematic for a CIV, which must take into account amounts expected to be received, including any withholding tax benefits provided by treaty, when it calculates its net asset value (“NAV”). The NAV, which typically is calculated daily, is the basis for the prices used for subscriptions and redemptions. If the withholding tax benefits ultimately obtained by the CIV do not correspond to its original assumptions about the amount and timing of such withholding tax benefits, there will be a discrepancy between the real asset value and the NAV used by investors who have purchased, sold or redeemed their interests in the CIV in the interim.*

*6.16 In order to provide more certainty under existing treaties, tax authorities may want to reach a mutual agreement clarifying the treatment of some types of CIVs in their respective States. With respect to some types of CIVs, such a mutual agreement might simply confirm that the CIV satisfies the technical requirements discussed above and therefore is entitled to benefits in its own right. In other cases, the mutual agreement could provide a CIV an administratively feasible way to make claims with respect to treaty-eligible investors (see paragraphs 36 to 40 of the report *The Granting of Treaty Benefits with Respect to the Income of Collective Investment Vehicles* for a discussion of this issue). Of course, a mutual agreement could not cut back on benefits that otherwise would be available to the CIV under the terms of a treaty.*

#### *Policy issues raised by the current treatment of collective investment vehicles*

*6.17 The same considerations would suggest that treaty negotiators address expressly the treatment of CIVs. Thus, even if it appears that CIVs in each of the Contracting States would be entitled to benefits, it may be appropriate to confirm that position publicly (for example, through an exchange of notes) in order to provide certainty. It may also be appropriate to expressly provide for the treaty entitlement of CIVs by including, for example, a provision along the following lines:*

*[ ] Notwithstanding the other provisions of this Convention, a collective investment vehicle which is established in a Contracting State and which receives income arising in the other Contracting State shall be treated, for purposes of applying the Convention to such income, as an individual that is a resident of the Contracting State in which it is established and as the beneficial owner of the income it receives (provided that, if an individual who is a resident of the first-mentioned State had received the income in the same circumstances, such individual would have been considered to be the beneficial owner thereof). For purposes of this paragraph, the term “collective investment vehicle” means, in the case of [State A], a [ ] and, in the case of [State B], a [ ], as well as any other investment fund, arrangement or entity established in either Contracting State which the competent authorities of the Contracting States agree to regard as a collective investment vehicle for purposes of this paragraph.*

*6.18 However, in negotiating new treaties or amendments to existing treaties, the Contracting States would not be restricted to clarifying the results of the application of other treaty provisions to CIVs, but could vary those results to the extent necessary to achieve policy objectives. For example, in the context of a particular bilateral treaty, the technical analysis may result in CIVs located in one of the Contracting States qualifying for benefits, whilst CIVs*

*in the other Contracting State may not. This may make the treaty appear unbalanced, although whether it is so in fact will depend on the specific circumstances. If it is, then the Contracting States should attempt to reach an equitable solution. If the practical result in each of the Contracting States is that most CIVs do not in fact pay tax, then the Contracting States should attempt to overcome differences in legal form that might otherwise cause those in one State to qualify for benefits and those in the other to be denied benefits. On the other hand, the differences in legal form and tax treatment in the two Contracting States may mean that it is appropriate to treat CIVs in the two States differently. In comparing the taxation of CIVs in the two States, taxation in the source State and at the investor level should be considered, not just the taxation of the CIV itself. The goal is to achieve neutrality between a direct investment and an investment through a CIV in the international context, just as the goal of most domestic provisions addressing the treatment of CIVs is to achieve such neutrality in the wholly domestic context.*

*6.19 A Contracting State may also want to consider whether existing treaty provisions are sufficient to prevent CIVs from being used in a potentially abusive manner. It is possible that a CIV could satisfy all of the requirements to claim treaty benefits in its own right, even though its income is not subject to much, if any, tax in practice. In that case, the CIV could present the opportunity for residents of third countries to receive treaty benefits that would not have been available had they invested directly. Accordingly, it may be appropriate to restrict benefits that might otherwise be available to such a CIV, either through generally applicable anti-abuse or anti-treaty shopping rules (as discussed under “Improper use of the Convention” below) or through a specific provision dealing with CIVs.*

*6.20 In deciding whether such a provision is necessary, Contracting States will want to consider the economic characteristics, including the potential for treaty shopping, presented by the various types of CIVs that are prevalent in each of the Contracting States. For example, a CIV that is not subject to any taxation in the State in which it is established may present more of a danger of treaty shopping than one in which the CIV itself is subject to an entity-level tax or where distributions to non-resident investors are subject to withholding tax.*

*Possible provisions modifying the treatment of CIVs*

*6.21 Where the Contracting States have agreed that a specific provision dealing with CIVs is necessary to address the concerns described in paragraphs 6.18 through 6.20, they could include in the bilateral treaty the following provision:*

- a) Notwithstanding the other provisions of this Convention, a collective investment vehicle which is established in a Contracting State and which receives income arising in the other Contracting State shall be treated for purposes of applying the Convention to such income as an individual who is a resident of the Contracting State in which it is established and as the beneficial owner of the income it receives (provided that, if an individual who is a resident of the first-mentioned State had received the income in the same circumstances, such individual would have been considered to be the beneficial owner thereof), but only to the extent that the beneficial interests in the collective investment vehicle are owned by equivalent beneficiaries.*
- b) For purposes of this paragraph:
  - (i) the term “collective investment vehicle” means, in the case of [State A], a [ ] and, in the case of [State B], a [ ], as well as any other investment fund, arrangement or entity established in either Contracting State which the**



*competent authorities of the Contracting States agree to regard as a collective investment vehicle for purposes of this paragraph; and*

- (ii) *the term “equivalent beneficiary” means a resident of the Contracting State in which the CIV is established, and a resident of any other State with which the Contracting State in which the income arises has an income tax convention that provides for effective and comprehensive information exchange who would, if he received the particular item of income for which benefits are being claimed under this Convention, be entitled under that convention, or under the domestic law of the Contracting State in which the income arises, to a rate of tax with respect to that item of income that is at least as low as the rate claimed under this Convention by the CIV with respect to that item of income.*

*6.22 It is intended that the Contracting States would provide in subdivision (b)(i) specific cross-references to relevant tax or securities law provisions relating to CIVs. In deciding which treatment should apply with respect to particular CIVs, Contracting States should take into account the policy considerations discussed above. Negotiators may agree that economic differences in the treatment of CIVs in the two Contracting States, or even within the same Contracting State, justify differential treatment in the tax treaty. In that case, some combination of the provisions in this section might be included in the treaty.*

*6.23 The effect of allowing benefits to the CIV to the extent that it is owned by “equivalent beneficiaries” as defined in subdivision (b)(ii) is to ensure that investors who would have been entitled to benefits with respect to income derived from the source State had they received the income directly are not put in a worse position by investing through a CIV located in a third country. The approach thus serves the goals of neutrality as between direct investments and investments through a CIV. It also decreases the risk of double taxation as between the source State and the State of residence of the investor, to the extent that there is a tax treaty between them. It is beneficial for investors, particularly those from small countries, who will consequently enjoy a greater choice of investment vehicles. It also increases economies of scale, which are a primary economic benefit of investing through CIVs. Finally, adopting this approach substantially simplifies compliance procedures. In many cases, nearly all of a CIV’s investors will be “equivalent beneficiaries”, given the extent of bilateral treaty coverage and the fact that rates in those treaties are nearly always 10-15 percent on portfolio dividends.*

*6.24 At the same time, the provision prevents a CIV from being used by investors to achieve a better tax treaty position than they would have achieved by investing directly. This is achieved through the rate comparison in the definition of “equivalent beneficiary”. Accordingly, the appropriate comparison is between the rate claimed by the CIV and the rate that the investor could have claimed had it received the income directly. For example, assume that a CIV established in State B receives dividends from a company resident in State A. Sixty-five percent of the investors in the CIV are individual residents of State B; ten percent are pension funds established in State C and 25 percent are individual residents of State C. Under the A-B tax treaty, portfolio dividends are subject to a maximum tax rate at source of 10 percent. Under the A-C tax treaty, pension funds are exempt from taxation in the source country and other portfolio dividends are subject to tax at a maximum tax rate of 15 percent. Both the A-B and A-C treaties include effective and comprehensive information exchange provisions. On these facts, 75 percent of the investors in the CIV – the individual residents of State B and the pension funds established in State C – are equivalent beneficiaries.*

6.25 A source State may also be concerned about the potential deferral of taxation that could arise with respect to a CIV that is subject to no or low taxation and that may accumulate its income rather than distributing it on a current basis. Such States may be tempted to limit benefits to the CIV to the proportion of the CIV's investors who are currently taxable on their share of the income of the CIV. However, such an approach has proven difficult to apply to widely-held CIVs in practice. Those countries that are concerned about the possibility of such deferral may wish to negotiate provisions that extend benefits only to those CIVs that are required to distribute earnings currently. Other States may be less concerned about the potential for deferral, however. They may take the view that, even if the investor is not taxed currently on the income received by the CIV, it will be taxed eventually, either on the distribution, or on any capital gains if it sells its interest in the CIV before the CIV distributes the income. Those countries may wish to negotiate provisions that grant benefits to CIVs even if they are not obliged to distribute their income on a current basis. Moreover, in many countries, the tax rate with respect to investment income is not significantly higher than the treaty withholding rate on dividends, so there would be little if any residence-country tax deferral to be achieved by earning such income through an investment fund rather than directly. In addition, many countries have taken steps to ensure the current taxation of investment income earned by their residents through investment funds, regardless of whether the funds accumulate that income, further reducing the potential for such deferral. When considering the treatment of CIVs that are not required to distribute income currently, countries may want to consider whether these or other factors address the concerns described above so that the type of limits described herein might not in fact be necessary.

6.26 Some States believe that taking all treaty-eligible investors, including those in third States, into account would change the bilateral nature of tax treaties. These States may prefer to allow treaty benefits to a CIV only to the extent that the investors in the CIV are residents of the Contracting State in which the CIV is established. In that case, the provision would be drafted as follows:

- a) Notwithstanding the other provisions of this Convention, a collective investment vehicle which is established in a Contracting State and which receives income arising in the other Contracting State shall be treated for purposes of applying the Convention to such income as an individual who is a resident of the Contracting State in which it is established and as the beneficial owner of the income it receives (provided that, if an individual who is a resident of the first-mentioned State had received the income in the same circumstances, such individual would have been considered to be the beneficial owner thereof), but only to the extent that the beneficial interests in the collective investment vehicle are owned by residents of the Contracting State in which the collective investment vehicle is established.
- b) For purposes of this paragraph, the term "collective investment vehicle" means, in the case of [State A], a [ ] and, in the case of [State B], a [ ], as well as any other investment fund, arrangement or entity established in either Contracting State which the competent authorities of the Contracting States agree to regard as a collective investment vehicle for purposes of this paragraph.

6.27 Although the purely proportionate approach set out in paragraphs 6.21 and 6.26 protects against treaty shopping, it may also impose substantial administrative burdens as a CIV attempts to determine the treaty entitlement of every single investor. A Contracting State may decide that the fact that a substantial proportion of the CIV's investors are treaty-eligible is adequate protection against treaty shopping, and thus that it is appropriate to provide an

*ownership threshold above which benefits would be provided with respect to all income received by the CIV. Including such a threshold would also mitigate some of the procedural burdens that otherwise might arise. If desired, therefore, the following sentence could be added at the end of subparagraph a):*

*However, if at least [ ] percent of the beneficial interests in the collective investment vehicle are owned by [equivalent beneficiaries][residents of the Contracting State in which the collective investment vehicle is established], the collective investment vehicle shall be treated as an individual who is a resident of the Contracting State in which it is established and as the beneficial owner of all of the income it receives (provided that, if an individual who is a resident of the first-mentioned State had received the income in the same circumstances, such individual would have been considered to be the beneficial owner thereof).*

*6.28 In some cases, the Contracting States might wish to take a different approach from that put forward in paragraphs 6.17, 6.21 and 6.26 with respect to certain types of CIVs and to treat the CIV as making claims on behalf of the investors rather than in its own name. This might be true, for example, if a large percentage of the owners of interests in the CIV as a whole, or of a class of interests in the CIV, are pension funds that are exempt from tax in the source country under terms of the relevant treaty similar to those described in paragraph 69 of the Commentary on Article 18. To ensure that the investors would not lose the benefit of the preferential rates to which they would have been entitled had they invested directly, the Contracting States might agree to a provision along the following lines with respect to such CIVs (although likely adopting one of the approaches of paragraph 6.17, 6.21 or 6.26 with respect to other types of CIVs):*

- a) A collective investment vehicle described in subparagraph c) which is established in a Contracting State and which receives income arising in the other Contracting State shall not be treated as a resident of the Contracting State in which it is established, but may claim, on behalf of the owners of the beneficial interests in the collective investment vehicle, the tax reductions, exemptions or other benefits that would have been available under this Convention to such owners had they received such income directly.*
- b) A collective investment vehicle may not make a claim under subparagraph a) for benefits on behalf of any owner of the beneficial interests in such collective investment vehicle if the owner has itself made an individual claim for benefits with respect to income received by the collective investment vehicle.*
- c) This paragraph shall apply with respect to, in the case of [State A], a [ ] and, in the case of [State B], a [ ], as well as any other investment fund, arrangement or entity established in either Contracting State to which the competent authorities of the Contracting States agree to apply this paragraph.*

*This provision would, however, limit the CIV to making claims on behalf of residents of the same Contracting State in which the CIV is established. If, for the reasons described in paragraph 6.23, the Contracting States deemed it desirable to allow the CIV to make claims on behalf of treaty-eligible residents of third States, that could be accomplished by replacing the words “this Convention” with “any Convention to which the other Contracting State is a party” in subparagraph a). If, as anticipated, the Contracting States would agree that the treatment provided in this paragraph would apply only to specific types of CIVs, it would be necessary to ensure that the types of CIVs listed in subparagraph c) did not include any of the types of CIVs listed in a more general provision such as that in paragraph 6.17, 6.21 or 6.26 so that the treatment of a specific type of CIV would be fixed, rather than elective. Countries*

wishing to allow individual CIVs to elect their treatment, either with respect to the CIV as a whole or with respect to one or more classes of interests in the CIV, are free to modify the paragraph to do so.

6.29 Under either the approach in paragraphs 6.21 and 6.26 or in paragraph 6.28, it will be necessary for the CIV to make a determination regarding the proportion of holders of interests who would have been entitled to benefits had they invested directly. Because ownership of interests in CIVs changes regularly, and such interests frequently are held through intermediaries, the CIV and its managers often do not themselves know the names and treaty status of the beneficial owners of interests. It would be impractical for the CIV to collect such information from the relevant intermediaries on a daily basis. Accordingly, Contracting States should be willing to accept practical and reliable approaches that do not require such daily tracing.

6.30 For example, in many countries the CIV industry is largely domestic, with an overwhelming percentage of investors resident in the country in which the CIV is established. In some cases, tax rules discourage foreign investment by imposing a withholding tax on distributions, or securities laws may severely restrict offerings to non-residents. Governments should consider whether these or other circumstances provide adequate protection against investment by non-treaty-eligible residents of third countries. It may be appropriate, for example, to assume that a CIV is owned by residents of the State in which it is established if the CIV has limited distribution of its shares or units to the State in which the CIV is established or to other States that provide for similar benefits in their treaties with the source State.

6.31 In other cases, interests in the CIV are offered to investors in many countries. Although the identity of individual investors will change daily, the proportion of investors in the CIV that are treaty-entitled is likely to change relatively slowly. Accordingly, it would be a reasonable approach to require the CIV to collect from other intermediaries, on specified dates, information enabling the CIV to determine the proportion of investors that are treaty-entitled. This information could be required at the end of a calendar or fiscal year or, if market conditions suggest that turnover in ownership is high, it could be required more frequently, although no more often than the end of each calendar quarter. The CIV could then make a claim on the basis of an average of those amounts over an agreed-upon time period. In adopting such procedures, care would have to be taken in choosing the measurement dates to ensure that the CIV would have enough time to update the information that it provides to other payers so that the correct amount is withheld at the beginning of each relevant period.

6.32 An alternative approach would provide that a CIV that is publicly traded in the Contracting State in which it is established will be entitled to treaty benefits without regard to the residence of its investors. This provision has been justified on the basis that a publicly-traded CIV cannot be used effectively for treaty shopping because the shareholders or unitholders of such a CIV cannot individually exercise control over it. Such a provision could read:

- a) Notwithstanding the other provisions of this Convention, a collective investment vehicle which is established in a Contracting State and which receives income arising in the other Contracting State shall be treated for purposes of applying the Convention to such income as an individual who is a resident of the Contracting State in which it is established and as the beneficial owner of the income it receives (provided that, if an individual who is a resident of the first-mentioned State had received the income in the same circumstances, such individual would

*have been considered to be the beneficial owner thereof), if the principal class of shares or units in the collective investment vehicle is listed and regularly traded on a regulated stock exchange in that State.*

- b) *For purposes of this paragraph, the term “collective investment vehicle” means, in the case of [State A], a [ ] and, in the case of [State B], a [ ], as well as any other investment fund, arrangement or entity established in either Contracting State which the competent authorities of the Contracting States agree to regard as a collective investment vehicle for purposes of this paragraph.*

*6.33 Each of the provisions in paragraphs 6.17, 6.21, 6.26 and 6.32 treats the CIV as the resident and the beneficial owner of the income it receives for the purposes of the application of the Convention to such income, which has the simplicity of providing for one reduced rate of withholding with respect to each type of income. These provisions should not be construed, however, as restricting in any way the right of the State of source from taxing its own residents who are investors in the CIV. Clearly, these provisions are intended to deal with the source taxation of the CIV’s income and not the residence taxation of its investors (this conclusion is analogous to the one put forward in paragraph 6.1 above as regards partnerships). States that wish to confirm this point in the text of the provisions are free to amend the provisions accordingly, which could be done by adding the following sentence: “This provision shall not be construed as restricting in any way a Contracting State’s right to tax the residents of that State”.*

*6.34 Also, each of these provisions is intended only to provide that the specific characteristics of the CIV will not cause it to be treated as other than the beneficial owner of the income it receives. Therefore, a CIV will be treated as the beneficial owner of all of the income it receives. The provision is not intended, however, to put a CIV in a different or better position than other investors with respect to aspects of the beneficial ownership requirement that are unrelated to the CIV’s status as such. Accordingly, where an individual receiving an item of income in certain circumstances would not be considered as the beneficial owner of that income, a CIV receiving that income in the same circumstances could not be deemed to be the beneficial owner of the income. This result is confirmed by the parenthetical limiting the application of the provision to situations in which an individual in the same circumstances would have been treated as the beneficial owner of the income.*

4. Add the following new heading and paragraphs 6.35 to 6.39 immediately after new paragraph 6.34 of the Commentary on Article 1:

*Application of the Convention to States, their subdivisions and their wholly-owned entities*

*6.35 Paragraph 1 of Article 4 provides that the Contracting States themselves, their political subdivisions and their local authorities are included in the definition of a “resident of a Contracting State” and are therefore entitled to the benefits of the Convention (paragraph 8.4 of the Commentary on Article 4 explains that the inclusion of these words in 1995 confirmed the prior general understanding of most member States).*

*6.36 Issues may arise, however, in the case of entities set up and wholly-owned by a State or one of its political subdivisions or local authorities. Some of these entities may derive substantial income from other countries and it may therefore be important to determine whether tax treaties apply to them (this would be the case, for instance, of sovereign wealth funds: see paragraph 8.5 of the Commentary on Article 4). In many cases, these entities are totally exempt from tax and the question may arise as to whether they are entitled to the*

*benefits of the tax treaties concluded by the State in which they are set up. In order to clarify the issue, some States modify the definition of “resident of a Contracting State” in paragraph 1 of Article 4 and include in that definition a “statutory body”, an “agency or instrumentality” or a “legal person of public law” [personne morale de droit public] of a State, a political subdivision or local authority, which would therefore cover wholly-owned entities that are not considered to be a part of the State or its political subdivisions or local authorities.*

*6.37 In addition, many States include specific provisions in their bilateral conventions that grant an exemption to other States, and to some State-owned entities such as central banks, with respect to certain items of income such as interest (see paragraph 13.2 of the Commentary on Article 10 and paragraph 7.4 of the Commentary on Article 11). Treaty provisions that grant a tax exemption with respect to the income of pension funds (see paragraph 69 of the Commentary on Article 18) may similarly apply to pension funds that are wholly-owned by a State, depending on the wording of these provisions and the nature of the fund.*

*6.38 The application of the Convention to each Contracting State, its political subdivisions, and local authorities (and their statutory bodies, agencies or instrumentalities in the case of bilateral treaties that apply to such entities) should not be interpreted, however, as affecting in any way the possible application by each State of the customary international law principle of sovereign immunity. According to this principle, a sovereign State (including its agents, its property and activities) is, as a general rule, immune from the jurisdiction of the courts of another sovereign State. There is no international consensus, however, on the precise limits of the sovereign immunity principle. Most States, for example, would not recognise that the principle applies to business activities and many States do not recognise any application of this principle in tax matters. There are therefore considerable differences between States as regards the extent, if any, to which that principle applies to taxation. Even among States that would recognise its possible application in tax matters, some apply it only to the extent that it has been incorporated into domestic law and others apply it as customary international law but subject to important limitations. The Convention does not prejudice the issues of whether and to what extent the principle of sovereign immunity applies with respect to the persons covered under Article 1 and the taxes covered under Article 2 and each Contracting State is therefore free to apply its own interpretation of that principle as long as the resulting taxation, if any, is in conformity with the provisions of its bilateral tax conventions.*

*6.39 States often take account of various factors when considering whether and to what extent tax exemptions should be granted, through specific treaty or domestic law provisions or through the application of the sovereign immunity doctrine, with respect to the income derived by other States, their political subdivisions, local authorities, or their statutory bodies, agencies or instrumentalities. These factors would include, for example, whether that type of income would be exempt on a reciprocal basis, whether the income is derived from activities of a governmental nature as opposed to activities of a commercial nature, whether the assets and income of the recipient entity are used for public purposes, whether there is any possibility that these could inure to the benefit of a non-governmental person and whether the income is derived from a portfolio or from a direct investment.*

5. Replace paragraph 23 of the Commentary on Article 1 by the following:

23. The use of base companies may also be addressed through controlled foreign companies provisions. A significant number of Member and non-member countries have now adopted such legislation. Whilst the design of this type of legislation varies considerably among countries, a common feature of these rules, which are now internationally recognised as a legitimate

instrument to protect the domestic tax base, is that they result in a Contracting State taxing its residents on income attributable to their participation in certain foreign entities. It has sometimes been argued, based on a certain interpretation of provisions of the Convention such as paragraph 1 of Article 7 and paragraph 5 of Article 10, that this common feature of controlled foreign companies legislation conflicted with these provisions. For the reasons explained in paragraphs ~~1413~~ of the Commentary on Article 7 and 37 of the Commentary on Article 10, that interpretation does not accord with the text of the provisions. It also does not hold when these provisions are read in their context. Thus, whilst some countries have felt it useful to expressly clarify, in their conventions, that controlled foreign companies legislation did not conflict with the Convention, such clarification is not necessary. It is recognised that controlled foreign companies legislation structured in this way is not contrary to the provisions of the Convention.

6. Add the following new paragraph 27 to the Commentary on Article 1:

**27. *Chile considers that some of the solutions put forward in the report “The Application of the OECD Model Tax Convention to Partnerships” and incorporated in the Commentary can only be applied if expressly incorporated in a tax convention.***

7. Replace paragraph 27.4 of the Commentary on Article 1 by the following:

27.4 *Belgium* cannot share the views expressed in paragraph 23 of the Commentary. *Belgium* considers that the application of controlled foreign companies legislation is contrary to the provisions of paragraph 7 of Article 5, paragraph 1 of Article 7 and paragraph 5 of Article 10 of the Convention. This is especially the case where a Contracting State taxes one of its residents on income derived by a foreign entity by using a fiction attributing to that resident, in proportion to his participation in the capital of the foreign entity, the income derived by that entity. By doing so, that State increases the tax base of its resident by including in it income which has not been derived by that resident but by a foreign entity which is not taxable in that State in accordance with the Convention. That Contracting State thus disregards the legal personality of the foreign entity and therefore acts contrary to the Convention (see also paragraph ~~7466~~ of the Commentary on Article 7 and paragraph 68.1 of the Commentary on Article 10).

8. Delete the following paragraph 27.8 of the Commentary on Article 1:

~~27.8 — Whenever the prevailing hierarchy of tax conventions regarding internal law is not respected, *Portugal* will not adhere to the conclusions on the clarification of domestic anti-abuse rules incorporated in the Commentary on Article 1.~~

## **Article 2**

9. Replace paragraph 10 of the Commentary on Article 2 by the following:

10. *Canada, Chile* and the *United States* reserve their positions on that part of paragraph 1 which states that the Convention should apply to taxes of political subdivisions or local authorities.

## **Article 3**

10. Replace paragraph 15 of the Commentary on Article 3 by the following:

15. *Chile, Mexico and the United States* reserve the right to omit the phrase “operated by an enterprise that has its place of effective management in a Contracting State” from the definition of “international traffic” in subparagraph e) of paragraph 1.

#### **Article 4**

11. Add the following new paragraph 8.5 immediately after paragraph 8.4 of the Commentary on Article 4 (and renumber the existing paragraphs 8.5 to 8.7 as paragraphs 8.6 to 8.8):

**8.5** *This raises the issue of the application of paragraph 1 to sovereign wealth funds, which are special purpose investment funds or arrangements created by a State or a political subdivision for macroeconomic purposes. These funds hold, manage or administer assets to achieve financial objectives, and employ a set of investment strategies which include investing in foreign financial assets. They are commonly established out of balance of payments surpluses, official foreign currency operations, the proceeds of privatisations, fiscal surpluses or receipts resulting from commodity exports.<sup>1</sup> Whether a sovereign wealth fund qualifies as a “resident of a Contracting State” depends on the facts and circumstances of each case. For example, when a sovereign wealth fund is an integral part of the State, it will likely fall within the scope of the expression “[the] State and any political subdivision or local authority thereof” in Article 4. In other cases, paragraphs 8.6 and 8.7 below will be relevant. States may want to address the issue in the course of bilateral negotiations, particularly in relation to whether a sovereign wealth fund qualifies as a “person” and is “liable to tax” for purposes of the relevant tax treaty (see also paragraphs 6.35 to 6.39 of the Commentary on Article 1).*

#### **Article 5**

12. Add the following new paragraph 5.5 immediately after paragraph 5.4 of the Commentary on Article 5:

**5.5** *Clearly, a permanent establishment may only be considered to be situated in a Contracting State if the relevant place of business is situated in the territory of that State. The question of whether a satellite in geostationary orbit could constitute a permanent establishment for the satellite operator relates in part to how far the territory of a State extends into space. No member country would agree that the location of these satellites can be part of the territory of a Contracting State under the applicable rules of international law and could therefore be considered to be a permanent establishment situated therein. Also, the particular area over which a satellite’s signals may be received (the satellite’s “footprint”) cannot be considered to be at the disposal of the operator of the satellite so as to make that area a place of business of the satellite’s operator.*

13. Add the following new paragraph 9.1 immediately after paragraph 9 of the Commentary on Article 5:

**9.1** *Another example where an enterprise cannot be considered to carry on its business wholly or partly through a place of business is that of a telecommunications operator of a Contracting State who enters into a “roaming” agreement with a foreign operator in order to allow its users to connect to the foreign operator’s telecommunications network. Under such an agreement, a user who is outside the geographical coverage of that user’s home network*

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1. *This definition is drawn from: International Working Group of Sovereign Wealth Funds, Sovereign Wealth Funds – Generally Accepted Principles and Practices – “Santiago Principles”, October 2008, Annex 1.*



*can automatically make and receive voice calls, send and receive data or access other services through the use of the foreign network. The foreign network operator then bills the operator of that user's home network for that use. Under a typical roaming agreement, the home network operator merely transfers calls to the foreign operator's network and does not operate or have physical access to that network. For these reasons, any place where the foreign network is located cannot be considered to be at the disposal of the home network operator and cannot, therefore, constitute a permanent establishment of that operator.*

14. Replace paragraph 16 of the Commentary on Article 5 by the following:

16. The paragraph provides expressly that a building site or construction or installation project constitutes a permanent establishment only if it lasts more than twelve months. Any of those items which does not meet this condition does not of itself constitute a permanent establishment, even if there is within it an installation, for instance an office or a workshop within the meaning of paragraph 2, associated with the construction activity. Where, however, such an office or workshop is used for a number of construction projects and the activities performed therein go beyond those mentioned in paragraph 4, it will be considered a permanent establishment if the conditions of the Article are otherwise met even if none of the projects involve a building site or construction or installation project that lasts more than 12 months. In that case, the situation of the workshop or office will therefore be different from that of these sites or projects, none of which will constitute a permanent establishment, and it will be important to ensure that only the profits properly attributable to the functions performed **through that office or workshop, taking into account the assets used and the** ~~and~~ risks assumed through that office or workshop, are attributed to the permanent establishment. This could include profits attributable to functions performed ~~and risks assumed~~ in relation to the various construction sites but only to the extent that these functions ~~and risks~~ are properly attributable to the office.

15. Replace paragraph 26.1 of the Commentary on Article 5 by the following:

26.1 Another example is that of facilities such as cables or pipelines that cross the territory of a country. Apart from the fact that income derived by the owner or operator of such facilities from their use by other enterprises is covered by Article 6 where they constitute immovable property under paragraph 2 of Article 6, the question may arise as to whether paragraph 4 applies to them. Where these facilities are used to transport property belonging to other enterprises, subparagraph *a)*, which is restricted to delivery of goods or merchandise belonging to the enterprise that uses the facility, will not be applicable as concerns the owner or operator of these facilities. Subparagraph *e)* also will not be applicable as concerns that enterprise since the cable or pipeline is not used solely for the enterprise and its use is not of preparatory or auxiliary character given the nature of the business of that enterprise. The situation is different, however, where an enterprise owns and operates a cable or pipeline that crosses the territory of a country solely for purposes of transporting its own property and such transport is merely incidental to the business of that enterprise, as in the case of an enterprise that is in the business of refining oil and that owns and operates a pipeline that crosses the territory of a country solely to transport its own oil to its refinery located in another country. In such case, subparagraph *a)* would be applicable. ***An additional question is whether the cable or pipeline could also constitute a permanent establishment for the customer of the operator of the cable or pipeline, i.e. the enterprise whose data, power or property is transmitted or transported from one place to another. In such a case, the enterprise is merely obtaining transmission or transportation services provided by the operator of the cable or pipeline and does not have the cable or pipeline at its disposal. As a consequence, the cable or pipeline cannot be considered to be a permanent establishment of that enterprise.***

16. Delete the following footnote to the heading “Observations” in the Commentary on Article 5:

~~1. At the time of approval of paragraphs 42.11 to 42.13 above by the Committee, France, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland and the United States, which among others agree with the Committee’s conclusions set out in these paragraphs and do not share the views of some States expressed in paragraphs 42.14 to 42.17, have asked that their position on this issue be expressly stated in the OECD Model Tax Convention.~~

17. Replace paragraph 43 of the Commentary on Article 5 by the following:

43. ~~Italy does not adhere to the interpretation given in paragraph 12 above concerning the list of examples of paragraph 2. In its opinion, these examples can always be regarded as constituting a priori permanent establishments.~~ **Concerning paragraph 26.1, Germany reserves its position on whether and under which circumstances the acquisition of a right of disposal over the transport capacity of pipelines or the capacity of technical installations, lines and cables for the transmission of electrical power or communications (including the distribution of radio and television programs) owned by an unrelated third party could result in disposal over the pipeline, cable or line as a fixed place of business.**

18. Replace paragraph 45.6 of the Commentary on Article 5 by the following:

45.6 ~~Spain has expressed a number of reservations on the Report “Clarification of the permanent establishment definition in e-commerce”. Greece and Spain have some doubts concerning the opportunity of introducing paragraphs 42.1 to 42.10 of the Commentary in the Model at this time. Since the OECD continues the study of e-commerce taxation, these States will not necessarily take into consideration the aforementioned paragraphs until the OECD has come to a final conclusion. Chile and Greece do not adhere to all the interpretations in paragraphs 42.1 to 42.10.~~

19. Replace paragraphs 46 to 65 of the Commentary on Article 5 by the following:

#### **Paragraph 1**

46. *Australia* reserves the right to treat an enterprise as having a permanent establishment in a State if it carries on activities relating to natural resources or operates substantial equipment in that State with a certain degree of continuity, or a person — acting in that State on behalf of the enterprise — manufactures or processes in that State goods or merchandise belonging to the enterprise.

~~47~~<sup>52</sup>. Considering the special problems in applying the provisions of the Model Convention to offshore hydrocarbon exploration and exploitation and related activities, *Canada, Denmark, Ireland, Norway* and the *United Kingdom* reserve the right to insert in a special article provisions related to such activities.

**48. Chile reserves the right to deem an enterprise to have a permanent establishment in certain circumstances where services are provided.**

~~49~~<sup>60</sup>. The *Czech Republic* and the *Slovak Republic*, whilst agreeing with the “fixed place of business” requirement of paragraph 1, reserve the right to propose in bilateral negotiations specific provisions clarifying the application of this principle to arrangements for the performance of services over a substantial period of time.

50. *Greece* reserves the right to treat an enterprise as having a permanent establishment in Greece if the enterprise carries on planning, supervisory or consultancy activities in connection with a building

site or construction or installation project lasting more than six months, if scientific equipment or machinery is used in Greece for more than three months by the enterprise in the exploration or extraction of natural resources or if the enterprise carries out more than one separate project, each one lasting less than six months, in the same period of time (i.e. within a calendar year).

**5157.** *Greece* reserves the right to insert special provisions relating to offshore activities.

**5264.** *Mexico* reserves the right to tax individuals performing professional services or other activities of an independent character if they are present in Mexico for a period or periods exceeding in the aggregate 183 days in any twelve month period.

**5356.** *New Zealand* reserves the right to insert provisions that deem a permanent establishment to exist if, for more than six months, an enterprise conducts activities relating to the exploration or exploitation of natural resources or uses or leases substantial equipment.

**5455.** *Turkey* reserves the right to treat a person as having a permanent establishment in Turkey if the person performs professional services and other activities of independent character, including planning, supervisory or consultancy activities, with a certain degree of continuity either directly or through the employees of a separate enterprise.

### ***Paragraph 2***

**5563.** *Chile and Canada* reserves the right in subparagraph 2 f) to replace the words “of extraction” with the words “relating to the exploration for or the exploitation”.

**5651.** *Greece* reserves the right to include paragraph 2 of Article 5 as it was drafted in the 1963 Draft Convention.

### ***Paragraph 3***

**5747.** *Australia, Chile, Greece, Korea, New Zealand, Portugal and Turkey* reserve their positions on paragraph 3, and consider that any building site or construction or installation project which lasts more than six months should be regarded as a permanent establishment.

**58.** *Australia reserves the right to treat an enterprise as having a permanent establishment in a State if it carries on in that State supervisory or consultancy activities for more than 183 days in any twelve month period in connection with a building site or construction or installation project in that State.*

**5962.** *Korea* reserves its position so as to be able to tax an enterprise which carries on supervisory activities for more than six months in connection with a building site or construction or installation project lasting more than six months.

**6053.** *Slovenia*~~*Norway*~~ reserves the right to include connected supervisory or consultancy activities in paragraph 3 of the Article.

**6159.** *Mexico and the Slovak Republic* reserve the right to tax an enterprise that carries on supervisory activities for more than six months in connection with a building site or a construction, assembly, or installation project.

~~6258.~~ *Mexico and the Slovak Republic* reserve their position on paragraph 3 and consider that any building site or construction, assembly, or installation project that lasts more than six months should be regarded as a permanent establishment.

~~6361.~~ *Poland and Slovenia* reserves the right to replace “construction or installation project” with “construction, assembly, or installation project”.

~~6454.~~ *Portugal* reserves the right to treat an enterprise as having a permanent establishment in Portugal if the enterprise carries on an activity consisting of planning, supervising, consulting, any auxiliary work or any other activity in connection with a building site or construction or installation project lasting more than six months, if such activities or work also last more than six months.

~~49.~~ *Spain* reserves its position on paragraph 3 so as to be able to tax an enterprise having a permanent establishment in Spain, even if the site of the construction or installation project does not last for more than twelve months, where the activity of this enterprise in Spain presents a certain degree of permanency within the meaning of paragraphs 1 and 2. Spain also reserves its right to tax an enterprise as having a permanent establishment in Spain when such an enterprise carries on supervisory activities in Spain for more than 12 months in connection with a building site or construction or installation project also lasting more than 12 months.

~~6548.~~ The *United States* reserves the right to add “a drilling rig or ship used for the exploration of natural resources” to the activities covered by the ~~12~~*twelve* month threshold test in paragraph 3.

#### **Paragraph 4**

~~66.~~ *Chile* reserves the right to amend paragraph 4 by eliminating subparagraph f) and replacing subparagraph e) with the corresponding text of the 1963 Draft Model Tax Convention.

~~6765.~~ *Mexico* reserves the right to exclude subparagraph f) of paragraph 4 of the Article to consider that a permanent establishment could exist where a fixed place of business is maintained for any combination of activities mentioned in subparagraphs a) to e) of paragraph 4.

#### **Paragraph 6**

~~68.~~ *Slovenia* reserves the right to amend paragraph 6 to make clear that an agent whose activities are conducted wholly or almost wholly on behalf of a single enterprise will not be considered an agent of an independent status.

### **Article 7**

20. Replace the existing Commentary on Article 7, together with the sections on Reservations and Observations, by the following new Commentary, including the new sections on Reservations and Observations and the Annex:

#### **I. Preliminary remarks**

**1. This Article allocates taxing rights with respect to the business profits of an enterprise of a Contracting State to the extent that these profits are not subject to different rules under other Articles of the Convention. It incorporates the basic principle that unless an enterprise of a Contracting State has a permanent establishment situated in the other State, the business profits of that enterprise may not be taxed by that other State unless these profits fall into special**

*categories of income for which other Articles of the Convention give taxing rights to that other State.*

2. *Article 5, which includes the definition of the concept of permanent establishment, is therefore relevant to the determination of whether the business profits of an enterprise of a Contracting State may be taxed in the other State. That Article, however, does not itself allocate taxing rights: when an enterprise of a Contracting State carries on business in the other Contracting State through a permanent establishment situated therein, it is necessary to determine what, if any, are the profits that the other State may tax. Article 7 provides the answer to that question by determining that the other State may tax the profits that are attributable to the permanent establishment.*

3. *The principles underlying Article 7, and in particular paragraph 2 of the Article, have a long history. When the OECD first examined what criteria should be used in attributing profits to a permanent establishment, this question had previously been addressed in a large number of tax conventions and in various models developed by the League of Nations. The separate entity and arm's length principles, on which paragraph 2 is based, had already been incorporated in these conventions and models and the OECD considered that it was sufficient to restate these principles with some slight amendments and modifications for the main purpose of clarification.*

4. *Practical experience has shown, however, that there was considerable variation in the interpretation of these general principles and of other provisions of earlier versions of Article 7. This lack of a common interpretation created problems of double taxation and non-taxation. Over the years, the Committee on Fiscal Affairs spent considerable time and effort trying to ensure a more consistent interpretation and application of the rules of the Article. Minor changes to the wording of the Article and a number of changes to the Commentary were made when the 1977 Model Tax Convention was adopted. A report that addressed that question in the specific case of banks was published in 1984.<sup>1</sup> In 1987, noting that the determination of profits attributable to a permanent establishment could give rise to some uncertainty, the Committee undertook a review of the question which led to the adoption, in 1993, of the report entitled *Attribution of Income to Permanent Establishments*<sup>2</sup> and to subsequent changes to the Commentary.*

5. *Despite that work, the practices of OECD and non-OECD countries regarding the attribution of profits to permanent establishments and these countries' interpretation of Article 7 continued to vary considerably. The Committee acknowledged the need to provide more certainty to taxpayers: in its report *Transfer Pricing Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises and Tax Administrations*<sup>3</sup> (the "OECD Transfer Pricing Guidelines"), it indicated that further work would address the application of the arm's length principle to permanent establishments.*

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1. *"The Taxation of Multinational Banking Enterprises", in Transfer Pricing and Multinational Enterprises - Three Taxation Issues, OECD, Paris, 1984.*

2. *Attribution of Income to Permanent Establishments, Issues in International Taxation No. 5, OECD, Paris, 1994; reproduced in Volume II of the loose-leaf version of the OECD Model Tax Convention at page R(13)-1.*

3. *The original version of that report was approved by the Council of the OECD on 27 June 1995 and was updated a number of times since then. Published by the OECD as OECD Transfer Pricing Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises and Tax Administrations.*

*That work resulted, in 2008, in a report entitled Attribution of Profits to Permanent Establishments<sup>1</sup> (the “2008 Report”).*

*6. The approach developed in the 2008 Report was not constrained by either the original intent or by the historical practice and interpretation of Article 7. Instead, the focus was on formulating the most preferable approach to attributing profits to a permanent establishment under Article 7 given modern-day multinational operations and trade. When it approved the 2008 Report, the Committee considered that the guidance included therein represented a better approach to attributing profits to permanent establishments than had previously been available. It also recognised, however, that there were differences between some of the conclusions of the 2008 Report and the interpretation of Article 7 previously given in this Commentary.*

*7. In order to provide maximum certainty on how profits should be attributed to permanent establishments, the Committee therefore decided that the 2008 Report’s full conclusions should be reflected in a new version of Article 7, together with accompanying Commentary, to be used in the negotiation of future treaties and the amendment of existing treaties. In addition, in order to provide improved certainty for the interpretation of treaties that had already been concluded on the basis of the previous wording of Article 7, the Committee decided that a revised Commentary for that previous version of the Article should also be prepared, to take into account those aspects of the report that did not conflict with the Commentary as it read before the adoption of the 2008 Report.*

*8. The new version of the Article, which now appears in the Model Tax Convention, was adopted in 2010. At the same time, the Committee adopted a revised version of the 2008 Report in order to ensure that the conclusions of that report could be read harmoniously with the new wording and modified numbering of this new version of the Article. Whilst the conclusions and interpretations included in the revised report that was thus adopted in 2010<sup>2</sup> (hereinafter referred to as “the Report”) are identical to those of the 2008 Report, that revised version takes account of the drafting of the Article as it now reads (the Annex to this Commentary includes, for historical reference, the text of the previous wording of Article 7 and that revised Commentary, as they read before the adoption of the current version of the Article).*

*9. The current version of the Article therefore reflects the approach developed in the Report and must be interpreted in light of the guidance contained in it. The Report deals with the attribution of profits both to permanent establishments in general (Part I of the Report) and, in particular, to permanent establishments of businesses operating in the financial sector, where trading through a permanent establishment is widespread (Part II of the Report, which deals with permanent establishments of banks, Part III, which deals with permanent establishments of enterprises carrying on global trading and Part IV, which deals with permanent establishments of enterprises carrying on insurance activities).*

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*1. Available at <http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/20/36/41031455.pdf>.*

*2. Attribution of Profits to Permanent Establishments, OECD, Paris, 2010.*

## II. *Commentary on the provisions of the Article*

### *Paragraph 1*

10. *Paragraph 1 incorporates the rules for the allocation of taxing rights on the business profits of enterprises of each Contracting State. First, it states that unless an enterprise of a Contracting State has a permanent establishment situated in the other State, the business profits of that enterprise may not be taxed by that other State. Second, it provides that if such an enterprise carries on business in the other State through a permanent establishment situated therein, the profits that are attributable to the permanent establishment, as determined in accordance with paragraph 2, may be taxed by that other State. As explained below, however, paragraph 4 restricts the application of these rules by providing that Article 7 does not affect the application of other Articles of the Convention that provide special rules for certain categories of profits (e.g. those derived from the operation of ships and aircraft in international traffic) or for certain categories of income that may also constitute business profits (e.g. income derived by an enterprise in respect of personal activities of an entertainer or sportsman).*

11. *The first principle underlying paragraph 1, i.e. that the profits of an enterprise of one Contracting State shall not be taxed in the other State unless the enterprise carries on business in that other State through a permanent establishment situated therein, has a long history and reflects the international consensus that, as a general rule, until an enterprise of one State has a permanent establishment in another State, it should not properly be regarded as participating in the economic life of that other State to such an extent that the other State should have taxing rights on its profits.*

12. *The second principle, which is reflected in the second sentence of the paragraph, is that the right to tax of the State where the permanent establishment is situated does not extend to profits that the enterprise may derive from that State but that are not attributable to the permanent establishment. This is a question on which there have historically been differences of view, a few countries having some time ago pursued a principle of general “force of attraction” according to which income such as other business profits, dividends, interest and royalties arising from sources in their territory was fully taxable by them if the beneficiary had a permanent establishment therein even though such income was clearly not attributable to that permanent establishment. Whilst some bilateral tax conventions include a limited anti-avoidance rule based on a restricted force of attraction approach that only applies to business profits derived from activities similar to those carried on by a permanent establishment, the general force of attraction approach described above has now been rejected in international tax treaty practice. The principle that is now generally accepted in double taxation conventions is based on the view that in taxing the profits that a foreign enterprise derives from a particular country, the tax authorities of that country should look at the separate sources of profit that the enterprise derives from their country and should apply to each the permanent establishment test, subject to the possible application of other Articles of the Convention. This solution allows simpler and more efficient tax administration and compliance, and is more closely adapted to the way in which business is commonly carried on. The organisation of modern business is highly complex. There are a considerable number of companies each of which is engaged in a wide diversity of activities and is carrying on business extensively in many countries. A company may set up a permanent establishment in another country through which it carries on manufacturing activities whilst a different part of the same company sells different goods in that other country through independent agents. That company may have perfectly valid commercial reasons for doing so: these may be based, for example, on the historical pattern of its business or on commercial convenience. If the country in which the permanent establishment is situated wished*

*to go so far as to try to determine, and tax, the profit element of each of the transactions carried on through independent agents, with a view to aggregating that profit with the profits of the permanent establishment, that approach would interfere seriously with ordinary commercial activities and would be contrary to the aims of the Convention.*

13. *As indicated in the second sentence of paragraph 1, the profits that are attributable to the permanent establishment are determined in accordance with the provisions of paragraph 2, which provides the meaning of the phrase “profits that are attributable to the permanent establishment” found in paragraph 1. Since paragraph 1 grants taxing rights to the State in which the permanent establishment is situated only with respect to the profits that are attributable to that permanent establishment, the paragraph therefore prevents that State, subject to the application of other Articles of the Convention, from taxing the enterprise of the other Contracting State on profits that are not attributable to the permanent establishment.*

14. *The purpose of paragraph 1 is to limit the right of one Contracting State to tax the business profits of enterprises of the other Contracting State. The paragraph does not limit the right of a Contracting State to tax its own residents under controlled foreign companies provisions found in its domestic law even though such tax imposed on these residents may be computed by reference to the part of the profits of an enterprise that is resident of the other Contracting State that is attributable to these residents’ participation in that enterprise. Tax so levied by a State on its own residents does not reduce the profits of the enterprise of the other State and may not, therefore, be said to have been levied on such profits (see also paragraph 23 of the Commentary on Article 1 and paragraphs 37 to 39 of the Commentary on Article 10).*

#### **Paragraph 2**

15. *Paragraph 2 provides the basic rule for the determination of the profits that are attributable to a permanent establishment. According to the paragraph, these profits are the profits that the permanent establishment might be expected to make if it were a separate and independent enterprise engaged in the same or similar activities under the same or similar conditions, taking into account the functions performed, assets used and risks assumed through the permanent establishment and through other parts of the enterprise. In addition, the paragraph clarifies that this rule applies with respect to the dealings between the permanent establishment and the other parts of the enterprise.*

16. *The basic approach incorporated in the paragraph for the purposes of determining what are the profits that are attributable to the permanent establishment is therefore to require the determination of the profits under the fiction that the permanent establishment is a separate enterprise and that such an enterprise is independent from the rest of the enterprise of which it is a part as well as from any other person. The second part of that fiction corresponds to the arm’s length principle which is also applicable, under the provisions of Article 9, for the purpose of adjusting the profits of associated enterprises (see paragraph 1 of the Commentary on Article 9).*

17. *Paragraph 2 does not seek to allocate the overall profits of the whole enterprise to the permanent establishment and its other parts but, instead, requires that the profits attributable to a permanent establishment be determined as if it were a separate enterprise. Profits may therefore be attributed to a permanent establishment even though the enterprise as a whole has never made profits. Conversely, paragraph 2 may result in no profits being attributed to a permanent establishment even though the enterprise as a whole has made profits.*



18. Clearly, however, where an enterprise of a Contracting State has a permanent establishment in the other Contracting State, the first State has an interest in the directive of paragraph 2 being correctly applied by the State where the permanent establishment is located. Since that directive applies to both Contracting States, the State of the enterprise must, in accordance with either Article 23 A or 23 B, eliminate double taxation on the profits properly attributable to the permanent establishment (see paragraph 27 below). In other words, if the State where the permanent establishment is located attempts to tax profits that are not attributable to the permanent establishment under Article 7, this may result in double taxation of profits that should properly be taxed only in the State of the enterprise.

19. As indicated in paragraphs 8 and 9 above, Article 7, as currently worded, reflects the approach developed in the Report adopted by the Committee on Fiscal Affairs in 2010. The Report dealt primarily with the application of the separate and independent enterprise fiction that underlies paragraph 2 and the main purpose of the changes made to that paragraph following the adoption of the Report was to ensure that the determination of the profits attributable to a permanent establishment followed the approach put forward in that Report. The Report therefore provides a detailed guide as to how the profits attributable to a permanent establishment should be determined under the provisions of paragraph 2.

20. As explained in the Report, the attribution of profits to a permanent establishment under paragraph 2 will follow from the calculation of the profits (or losses) from all its activities, including transactions with independent enterprises, transactions with associated enterprises (with direct application of the OECD Transfer Pricing Guidelines) and dealings with other parts of the enterprise. This analysis involves two steps which are described below. The order of the listing of items within each of these two steps is not meant to be prescriptive, as the various items may be interrelated (e.g. risk is initially attributed to a permanent establishment as it performs the significant people functions relevant to the assumption of that risk but the recognition and characterisation of a subsequent dealing between the permanent establishment and another part of the enterprise that manages the risk may lead to a transfer of the risk and supporting capital to the other part of the enterprise).

21. Under the first step, a functional and factual analysis is undertaken which will lead to:

- the attribution to the permanent establishment, as appropriate, of the rights and obligations arising out of transactions between the enterprise of which the permanent establishment is a part and separate enterprises;
- the identification of significant people functions relevant to the attribution of economic ownership of assets, and the attribution of economic ownership of assets to the permanent establishment;
- the identification of significant people functions relevant to the assumption of risks, and the attribution of risks to the permanent establishment;
- the identification of other functions of the permanent establishment;
- the recognition and determination of the nature of those dealings between the permanent establishment and other parts of the same enterprise that can appropriately be recognised, having passed the threshold test referred to in paragraph 26; and
- the attribution of capital based on the assets and risks attributed to the permanent establishment.

22. *Under the second step, any transactions with associated enterprises attributed to the permanent establishment are priced in accordance with the guidance of the OECD Transfer Pricing Guidelines and these Guidelines are applied by analogy to dealings between the permanent establishment and the other parts of the enterprise of which it is a part. The process involves the pricing on an arm's length basis of these recognised dealings through:*

- *the determination of comparability between the dealings and uncontrolled transactions, established by applying the Guidelines' comparability factors directly (characteristics of property or services, economic circumstances and business strategies) or by analogy (functional analysis, contractual terms) in light of the particular factual circumstances of the permanent establishment; and*
- *the application by analogy of one of the Guidelines' methods to arrive at an arm's length compensation for the dealings between the permanent establishment and the other parts of the enterprise, taking into account the functions performed by and the assets and risks attributed to the permanent establishment and the other parts of the enterprise.*

23. *Each of these operations is discussed in greater detail in the Report, in particular as regards the attribution of profits to permanent establishments of businesses operating in the financial sector, where trading through a permanent establishment is widespread (see Part II of the Report, which deals with permanent establishments of banks; Part III, which deals with permanent establishments of enterprises carrying on global trading, and Part IV, which deals with permanent establishments of enterprises carrying on insurance activities).*

24. *Paragraph 2 refers specifically to the dealings between the permanent establishment and other parts of the enterprise of which the permanent establishment is a part in order to emphasise that the separate and independent enterprise fiction of the paragraph requires that these dealings be treated the same way as similar transactions taking place between independent enterprises. That specific reference to dealings between the permanent establishment and other parts of the enterprise does not, however, restrict the scope of the paragraph. Where a transaction that takes place between the enterprise and an associated enterprise affects directly the determination of the profits attributable to the permanent establishment (e.g. the acquisition by the permanent establishment from an associated enterprise of goods that will be sold through the permanent establishment), paragraph 2 also requires that, for the purpose of computing the profits attributable to the permanent establishment, the conditions of the transaction be adjusted, if necessary, to reflect the conditions of a similar transaction between independent enterprises. Assume, for instance, that the permanent establishment situated in State S of an enterprise of State R acquires property from an associated enterprise of State T. If the price provided for in the contract between the two associated enterprises exceeds what would have been agreed to between independent enterprises, paragraph 2 of Article 7 of the treaty between State R and State S will authorise State S to adjust the profits attributable to the permanent establishment to reflect what a separate and independent enterprise would have paid for that property. In such a case, State R will also be able to adjust the profits of the enterprise of State R under paragraph 1 of Article 9 of the treaty between State R and State T, which will trigger the application of the corresponding adjustment mechanism of paragraph 2 of Article 9 of that treaty.*

25. *Dealings between the permanent establishment and other parts of the enterprise of which it is a part have no legal consequences for the enterprise as a whole. This implies a need for greater scrutiny of these dealings than of transactions between two associated enterprises.*

*This also implies a greater scrutiny of documentation (in the inevitable absence, for example, of legally binding contracts) that might otherwise exist.*

26. *It is generally not intended that more burdensome documentation requirements be imposed in connection with such dealings than apply to transactions between associated enterprises. Moreover, as in the case of transfer pricing documentation referred to in the OECD Transfer Pricing Guidelines, the requirements should not be applied in such a way as to impose on taxpayers costs and burdens disproportionate to the circumstances. Nevertheless, considering the uniqueness of the nature of a dealing, countries would wish to require taxpayers to demonstrate clearly that it would be appropriate to recognise the dealing. Thus, for example, an accounting record and contemporaneous documentation showing a dealing that transfers economically significant risks, responsibilities and benefits would be a useful starting point for the purposes of attributing profits. Taxpayers are encouraged to prepare such documentation, as it may reduce substantially the potential for controversies regarding application of the approach. Tax administrations would give effect to such documentation, notwithstanding its lack of legal effect, to the extent that:*

- the documentation is consistent with the economic substance of the activities taking place within the enterprise as revealed by the functional and factual analysis;*
- the arrangements documented in relation to the dealing, viewed in their entirety, do not differ from those which would have been adopted by comparable independent enterprises behaving in a commercially rational manner, or if they do, the structure as presented in the taxpayer's documentation does not practically impede the tax administration from determining an appropriate transfer price; and*
- the dealing presented in the taxpayer's documentation does not violate the principles of the approach put forward in the Report by, for example, purporting to transfer risks in a way that segregates them from functions.*

27. *The opening words of paragraph 2 and the phrase "in each Contracting State" indicate that paragraph 2 applies not only for the purposes of determining the profits that the Contracting State in which the permanent establishment is situated may tax in accordance with the last sentence of paragraph 1 but also for the application of Articles 23 A and 23 B by the other Contracting State. Where an enterprise of one State carries on business through a permanent establishment situated in the other State, the first-mentioned State must either exempt the profits that are attributable to the permanent establishment (Article 23 A) or give a credit for the tax levied by the other State on these profits (Article 23 B). Under both these Articles, that State must therefore determine the profits attributable to the permanent establishment in order to provide relief from double taxation and is required to follow the provisions of paragraph 2 for that purpose.*

28. *The separate and independent enterprise fiction that is mandated by paragraph 2 is restricted to the determination of the profits that are attributable to a permanent establishment. It does not extend to create notional income for the enterprise which a Contracting State could tax as such under its domestic law by arguing that such income is covered by another Article of the Convention which, in accordance with paragraph 4 of Article 7, allows taxation of that income notwithstanding paragraph 1 of Article 7. Assume, for example, that the circumstances of a particular case justify considering that the economic ownership of a building used by the permanent establishment should be attributed to the head office (see paragraph 75 of Part I of the Report). In such a case, paragraph 2 could require the deduction of a notional rent in determining the profits of the permanent establishment. That fiction, however, could not be interpreted as creating income from immovable property for the purposes of Article 6. Indeed,*

*the fiction mandated by paragraph 2 does not change the nature of the income derived by the enterprise; it merely applies to determine the profits attributable to the permanent establishment for the purposes of Articles 7, 23 A and 23 B. Similarly, the fact that, under paragraph 2, a notional interest charge could be deducted in determining the profits attributable to a permanent establishment does not mean that any interest has been paid to the enterprise of which the permanent establishment is a part for the purposes of paragraphs 1 and 2 of Article 11. The separate and independent enterprise fiction does not extend to Article 11 and, for the purposes of that Article, one part of an enterprise cannot be considered to have made an interest payment to another part of the same enterprise. Clearly, however, if interest paid by an enterprise to a different person is paid on indebtedness incurred in connection with a permanent establishment of the enterprise and is borne by that permanent establishment, this real interest payment may, under paragraph 2 of Article 11, be taxed by the State in which the permanent establishment is located. Also, where a transfer of assets between a permanent establishment and the rest of the enterprise is treated as a dealing for the purposes of paragraph 2 of Article 7, Article 13 does not prevent States from taxing profits or gains from such a dealing as long as such taxation is in accordance with Article 7 (see paragraphs 4, 8 and 10 of the Commentary on Article 13).*

29. *Some States consider that, as a matter of policy, the separate and independent enterprise fiction that is mandated by paragraph 2 should not be restricted to the application of Articles 7, 23 A and 23 B but should also extend to the interpretation and application of other Articles of the Convention, so as to ensure that permanent establishments are, as far as possible, treated in the same way as subsidiaries. These States may therefore consider that notional charges for dealings which, pursuant to paragraph 2, are deducted in computing the profits of a permanent establishment should be treated, for the purposes of other Articles of the Convention, in the same way as payments that would be made by a subsidiary to its parent company. These States may therefore wish to include in their tax treaties provisions according to which charges for internal dealings should be recognised for the purposes of Articles 6 and 11 (it should be noted, however, that tax will be levied in accordance with such provisions only to the extent provided for under domestic law). Alternatively, these States may wish to provide that no internal dealings will be recognised in circumstances where an equivalent transaction between two separate enterprises would give rise to income covered by Article 6 or 11 (in that case, however, it will be important to ensure that an appropriate share of the expenses related to what would otherwise have been recognised as a dealing be attributed to the relevant part of the enterprise). States considering these alternatives should, however, take account of the fact that, due to special considerations applicable to internal interest charges between different parts of a financial enterprise (e.g. a bank), dealings resulting in such charges have long been recognised, even before the adoption of the present version of the Article.*

30. *Paragraph 2 determines the profits that are attributable to a permanent establishment for the purposes of the rule in paragraph 1 that allocates taxing rights on these profits. Once the profits that are attributable to a permanent establishment have been determined in accordance with paragraph 2 of Article 7, it is for the domestic law of each Contracting State to determine whether and how such profits should be taxed as long as there is conformity with the requirements of paragraph 2 and the other provisions of the Convention. Paragraph 2 does not deal with the issue of whether expenses are deductible when computing the taxable income of the enterprise in either Contracting State. The conditions for the deductibility of expenses are a matter to be determined by domestic law, subject to the provisions of the Convention and, in particular, paragraph 3 of Article 24 (see paragraphs 33 and 34 below).*

31. Thus, for example, whilst domestic law rules that would ignore the recognition of dealings that should be recognised for the purposes of determining the profits attributable to a permanent establishment under paragraph 2 or that would deny the deduction of expenses not incurred exclusively for the benefit of the permanent establishment would clearly be in violation of paragraph 2, rules that prevent the deduction of certain categories of expenses (e.g. entertainment expenses) or that provide when a particular expense should be deducted are not affected by paragraph 2. In making that distinction, however, some difficult questions may arise as in the case of domestic law restrictions based on when an expense or element of income is actually paid. Since, for instance, an internal dealing will not involve an actual transfer or payment between two different persons, the application of such domestic law restrictions should generally take into account the nature of the dealing and, therefore, treat the relevant transfer or payment as if it had been made between two different persons.

32. Variations between the domestic laws of the two States concerning matters such as depreciation rates, the timing of the recognition of income and restrictions on the deductibility of certain expenses will normally result in a different amount of taxable income in each State even though, for the purposes of the Convention, the amount of profits attributable to the permanent establishment will have been computed on the basis of paragraph 2 in both States (see also paragraphs 39-43 of the Commentary on Articles 23 A and 23 B). Thus, even though paragraph 2 applies equally to the Contracting State in which the permanent establishment is situated (for the purposes of paragraph 1) and to the other Contracting State (for the purposes of Articles 23 A or 23 B), it is likely that the amount of taxable income on which an enterprise of a Contracting State will be taxed in the State where the enterprise has a permanent establishment will, for a given taxable period, be different from the amount of taxable income with respect to which the first State will have to provide relief pursuant to Articles 23 A or 23 B. Also, to the extent that the difference results from domestic law variations concerning the types of expenses that are deductible, as opposed to timing differences in the recognition of these expenses, the difference will be permanent.

33. In taxing the profits attributable to a permanent establishment situated on its territory, a Contracting State will, however, have to take account of the provisions of paragraph 3 of Article 24. That paragraph requires, among other things, that expenses be deductible under the same conditions whether they are incurred for the purposes of a permanent establishment situated in a Contracting State or for the purposes of an enterprise of that State. As stated in paragraph 40 of the Commentary on Article 24:

*Permanent establishments must be accorded the same right as resident enterprises to deduct the trading expenses that are, in general, authorised by the taxation law to be deducted from taxable profits. Such deductions should be allowed without any restrictions other than those also imposed on resident enterprises.*

34. The requirement imposed by paragraph 3 of Article 24 is the same regardless of how expenses incurred by an enterprise for the benefit of a permanent establishment are taken into account for the purposes of paragraph 2 of Article 7. In some cases, it will not be appropriate to consider that a dealing has taken place between different parts of the enterprise. In such cases, expenses incurred by an enterprise for the purposes of the activities performed by the permanent establishment will be directly deducted in determining the profits of the permanent establishment (e.g. the salary of a local construction worker hired and paid locally to work exclusively on a construction site that constitutes a permanent establishment of a foreign enterprise). In other cases, expenses incurred by the enterprise will be attributed to functions performed by other parts of the enterprise wholly or partly for the benefit of the permanent establishment and an appropriate charge will be deducted in determining the profits

*attributable to the permanent establishment (e.g. overhead expenses related to administrative functions performed by the head office for the benefit of the permanent establishment). In both cases, paragraph 3 of Article 24 will require that, as regards the permanent establishment, the expenses be deductible under the same conditions as those applicable to an enterprise of that State. Thus, any expense incurred by the enterprise directly or indirectly for the benefit of the permanent establishment must not, for tax purposes, be treated less favourably than a similar expense incurred by an enterprise of that State. That rule will apply regardless of whether or not, for the purposes of paragraph 2 of this Article 7, the expense is directly attributed to the permanent establishment (first example) or is attributed to another part of the enterprise but reflected in a notional charge to the permanent establishment (second example).*

35. *Paragraph 3 of Article 5 sets forth a special rule for a fixed place of business that is a building site or a construction or installation project. Such a fixed place of business is a permanent establishment only if it lasts more than twelve months. Experience has shown that these types of permanent establishments can give rise to special problems in attributing income to them under Article 7.*

36. *These problems arise chiefly where goods are provided, or services performed, by the other parts of the enterprise or a related party in connection with the building site or construction or installation project. Whilst these problems can arise with any permanent establishment, they are particularly acute for building sites and construction or installation projects. In these circumstances, it is necessary to pay close attention to the general principle that income is attributable to a permanent establishment only when it results from activities carried on by the enterprise through that permanent establishment.*

37. *For example, where such goods are supplied by the other parts of the enterprise, the profits arising from that supply do not result from the activities carried on through the permanent establishment and are not attributable to it. Similarly, profits resulting from the provision of services (such as planning, designing, drawing blueprints, or rendering technical advice) by the parts of the enterprise operating outside the State where the permanent establishment is located do not result from the activities carried on through the permanent establishment and are not attributable to it.*

38. *Article 7, as it read before 2010, included the following paragraph 3:*

*In determining the profits of a permanent establishment, there shall be allowed as deductions expenses which are incurred for the purposes of the permanent establishment, including executive and general administrative expenses so incurred, whether in the State in which the permanent establishment is situated or elsewhere.*

*Whilst that paragraph was originally intended to clarify that paragraph 2 required expenses incurred directly or indirectly for the benefit of a permanent establishment to be taken into account in determining the profits of the permanent establishment even if these expenses had been incurred outside the State in which the permanent establishment was located, it had sometimes been read as limiting the deduction of expenses that indirectly benefited the permanent establishment to the actual amount of the expenses.*

39. *This was especially the case of general and administrative expenses, which were expressly mentioned in that paragraph. Under the previous version of paragraph 2, as interpreted in the Commentary, this was generally not a problem since a share of the general and administrative expenses of the enterprise could usually only be allocated to a permanent establishment on a cost-basis.*

40. As now worded, however, paragraph 2 requires the recognition and arm's length pricing of the dealings through which one part of the enterprise performs functions for the benefit of the permanent establishment (e.g. through the provision of assistance in day-to-day management). The deduction of an arm's length charge for these dealings, as opposed to a deduction limited to the amount of the expenses, is required by paragraph 2. The previous paragraph 3 has therefore been deleted to prevent it from being misconstrued as limiting the deduction to the amount of the expenses themselves. That deletion does not affect the requirement, under paragraph 2, that in determining the profits attributable to a permanent establishment, all relevant expenses of the enterprise, wherever incurred, be taken into account. Depending on the circumstances, this will be done through the deduction of all or part of the expenses or through the deduction of an arm's length charge in the case of a dealing between the permanent establishment and another part of the enterprise.

41. Article 7, as it read before 2010, also included a provision that allowed the attribution of profits to a permanent establishment to be done on the basis of an apportionment of the total profits of the enterprise to its various parts. That method, however, was only to be applied to the extent that its application had been customary in a Contracting State and that the result was in accordance with the principles of Article 7. For the Committee, methods other than an apportionment of total profits of an enterprise can be applied even in the most difficult cases. The Committee therefore decided to delete that provision because its application had become very exceptional and because of concerns that it was extremely difficult to ensure that the result of its application would be in accordance with the arm's length principle.

42. At the same time, the Committee also decided to eliminate another provision that was found in the previous version of the Article and according to which the profits to be attributed to the permanent establishment were to be "determined by the same method year by year unless there is good and sufficient reason to the contrary." That provision, which was intended to ensure continuous and consistent treatment, was appropriate as long as it was accepted that the profits attributable to a permanent establishment could be determined through direct or indirect methods or even on the basis of an apportionment of the total profits of the enterprise to its various parts. The new approach developed by the Committee, however, does not allow for the application of such fundamentally different methods and therefore avoids the need for such a provision.

43. A final provision that was deleted from the Article at the same time provided that "[n]o profits shall be attributed to a permanent establishment by reason of the mere purchase by that permanent establishment of goods or merchandise for the enterprise." Subparagraph 4 d) of Article 5 recognises that where an enterprise of a Contracting State maintains in the other State a fixed place of business exclusively for the purpose of purchasing goods for itself, its activity at that location should not be considered to have reached a level that justifies taxation in that other State. Where, however, subparagraph 4 d) is not applicable because other activities are carried on by the enterprise through that place of business, which therefore constitutes a permanent establishment, it is appropriate to attribute profits to all the functions performed at that location. Indeed, if the purchasing activities were performed by an independent enterprise, the purchaser would be remunerated on an arm's length basis for its services. Also, since a tax exemption restricted to purchasing activities undertaken for the enterprise would require that expenses incurred for the purposes of performing these activities be excluded in determining the profits of the permanent establishment, such an exemption would raise administrative problems. The Committee therefore considered that a provision according to which no profits should be attributed to a permanent establishment by reason of

*the mere purchase of goods or merchandise for the enterprise was not consistent with the arm's length principle and should not be included in the Article.*

### *Paragraph 3*

*44. The combination of Articles 7 (which restricts the taxing rights of the State in which the permanent establishment is situated) and 23 A and 23 B (which oblige the other State to provide relief from double taxation) ensures that there is no unrelieved double taxation of the profits that are properly attributable to the permanent establishment. This result may require that the two States resolve differences based on different interpretations of paragraph 2 and it is important that mechanisms be available to resolve all such differences to the extent necessary to eliminate double taxation.*

*45. As already indicated, the need for the two Contracting States to reach a common understanding as regards the application of paragraph 2 in order to eliminate risks of double taxation has led the Committee to develop detailed guidance on the interpretation of that paragraph. This guidance is reflected in the Report, which draws on the principles of the OECD Transfer Pricing Guidelines.*

*46. Risks of double taxation will usually be avoided because the taxpayer will determine the profits attributable to the permanent establishment in the same manner in each Contracting State and in accordance with paragraph 2 as interpreted by the Report, which will ensure the same result for the purposes of Articles 7 and 23 A or 23 B (see, however, paragraph 66). Insofar as each State agrees that the taxpayer has done so, it should refrain from adjusting the profits in order to reach a different result under paragraph 2. This is illustrated in the following example.*

*47. Example. A manufacturing plant located in State R of an enterprise of State R has transferred goods for sale to a permanent establishment of the enterprise situated in State S. For the purpose of determining the profits attributable to the permanent establishment under paragraph 2, the Report provides that a dealing must be recognised and a notional arm's length price must be determined for that dealing. The enterprise's documentation, which is consistent with the functional and factual analysis and which has been used by the taxpayer as the basis for the computation of its taxable income in each State, shows that a dealing in the nature of a sale of the goods by the plant in State R to the permanent establishment in State S has occurred and that a notional arm's length price of 100 has been used to determine the profits attributable to the permanent establishment. Both States agree that the recognition of the dealing and the price used by the taxpayer are in conformity with the principles of the Report and of the OECD Transfer Pricing Guidelines. In this case, both States should refrain from adjusting the profits on the basis that a different arm's length price should have been used; as long as there is agreement that the taxpayer has conformed with paragraph 2, the tax administrations of both States cannot substitute their judgment for that of the taxpayer as to what are the arm's length conditions. In this example, the fact that the same arm's length price has been used in both States and that both States will recognise that price for the purposes of the application of the Convention will ensure that any double taxation related to that dealing will be eliminated under Article 23 A or 23 B.*

*48. In the previous example, both States agreed that the recognition of the dealing and the price used by the taxpayer were in conformity with the principles of the Report and of the OECD Transfer Pricing Guidelines. The Contracting States, however, may not always reach such an agreement. In some cases, the Report and the OECD Transfer Pricing Guidelines may*



*allow different interpretations of paragraph 2 and, to the extent that double taxation would otherwise result from these different interpretations, it is essential to ensure that such double taxation is relieved. Paragraph 3 provides the mechanism that guarantees that outcome.*

*49. For example, as explained in paragraphs 105-171 of Part I of the Report, paragraph 2 permits different approaches for determining, on the basis of the attribution of “free” capital to a permanent establishment, the interest expense attributable to that permanent establishment. The Committee recognised that this could create problems, in particular for financial institutions. It concluded that in this and other cases where the two Contracting States have interpreted paragraph 2 differently and it is not possible to conclude that either interpretation is not in accordance with paragraph 2, it is important to ensure that any double taxation that would otherwise result from that difference will be eliminated.*

*50. Paragraph 3 will ensure that this result is achieved. It is important to note, however, that the cases where it will be necessary to have recourse to that paragraph are fairly limited.*

*51. First, as explained in paragraph 46 above, where the taxpayer has determined the profits attributable to the permanent establishment in the same manner in each Contracting State and both States agree that the taxpayer has done so in accordance with paragraph 2 as interpreted by the Report, no adjustments should be made to the profits in order to reach a different result under paragraph 2.*

*52. Second, paragraph 3 is not intended to limit in any way the remedies already available to ensure that each Contracting State conforms with its obligations under Articles 7 and 23 A or 23 B. For example, if the determination, by a Contracting State, of the profits attributable to a permanent establishment situated in that State is not in conformity with paragraph 2, the taxpayer will be able to use the available domestic legal remedies and the mutual agreement procedure provided for by Article 25 to address the fact that the taxpayer has not been taxed by that State in accordance with the Convention. Similarly, these remedies will also be available if the other State does not, for the purposes of Article 23 A or 23 B, determine the profits attributable to the permanent establishment in conformity with paragraph 2 and therefore does not comply with the provisions of this Article.*

*53. Where, however, the taxpayer has not determined the profits attributable to the permanent establishment in conformity with paragraph 2, each State is entitled to make an adjustment in order to ensure conformity with that paragraph. Where one State makes an adjustment in conformity with paragraph 2, that paragraph certainly permits the other State to make a reciprocal adjustment so as to avoid any double taxation through the combined application of paragraph 2 and of Article 23 A or 23 B (see paragraph 65 below). It may be, however, that the domestic law of that other State (e.g. the State where the permanent establishment is located) may not allow it to make such a change or that State may have no incentive to do it on its own if the effect is to reduce the amount of profits that was previously taxable in that State. It may also be that, as indicated above, the two Contracting States will adopt different interpretations of paragraph 2 and it is not possible to conclude that either interpretation is not in accordance with paragraph 2.*

*54. Such concerns are addressed by paragraph 3. The following example illustrates the application of that paragraph.*

*55. Example. A manufacturing plant located in State R of an enterprise of State R has transferred goods for sale to a permanent establishment of the enterprise situated in State S.*

*For the purpose of determining the profits attributable to the permanent establishment under paragraph 2, a dealing must be recognised and a notional arm's length price must be determined for that dealing. The enterprise's documentation, which is consistent with the functional and factual analysis and which has been used by the taxpayer as the basis for the computation of its taxable income in each State, shows that a dealing in the nature of a sale of the goods by the plant in State R to the permanent establishment in State S has occurred and that a notional price of 90 has been used to determine the profits attributable to the permanent establishment. State S accepts the amount used by the taxpayer but State R considers that the amount is below what is required by its domestic law and the arm's length principle of paragraph 2. It considers that the appropriate arm's length price that should have been used is 110 and adjusts the amount of tax payable in State R accordingly after reducing the amount of the exemption (Article 23 A) or the credit (Article 23 B) claimed by the taxpayer with respect to the profits attributable to the permanent establishment. In that situation, since the price of the same dealing will have been determined as 90 in State S and 110 in State R, profits of 20 may be subject to double taxation. Paragraph 3 will address that situation by requiring State S, to the extent that there is indeed double taxation and that the adjustment made by State R is in conformity with paragraph 2, to provide a corresponding adjustment to the tax payable in State S on the profits that are taxed in both States.*

56. *If State S, however, does not agree that the adjustment by State R was warranted by paragraph 2, it will not consider that it has to make the adjustment. In such a case, the issue of whether State S should make the adjustment under paragraph 3 (if the adjustment by State R is justified under paragraph 2) or whether State R should refrain from making the initial adjustment (if it is not justified under paragraph 2) will be solved under a mutual agreement procedure pursuant to paragraph 1 of Article 25 using, if necessary, the arbitration provision of paragraph 5 of Article 25 (since it involves the question of whether the actions of one or both of the Contracting States have resulted or will result for the taxpayer in taxation not in accordance with the Convention). Through that procedure, the two States will be able to agree on the same arm's length price, which may be one of the prices put forward by the taxpayer and the two States or a different one.*

57. *As shown by the example in paragraph 55, paragraph 3 addresses the concern that the Convention might not provide adequate protection against double taxation in some situations where the two Contracting States adopt different interpretations of paragraph 2 of Article 7 and each State could be considered to be taxing "in accordance with" the Convention. Paragraph 3 ensures that relief of double taxation will be provided in such a case, which is consistent with the overall objectives of the Convention.*

58. *Paragraph 3 shares the main features of paragraph 2 of Article 9. First, it applies to each State with respect to an adjustment made by the other State. It therefore applies reciprocally whether the initial adjustment has been made by the State where the permanent establishment is situated or by the other State. Also, it does not apply unless there is an adjustment by one of the States.*

59. *As is the case for paragraph 2 of Article 9, a corresponding adjustment is not automatically to be made under paragraph 3 simply because the profits attributed to the permanent establishment have been adjusted by one of the Contracting States. The corresponding adjustment is required only if the other State considers that the adjusted profits conform with paragraph 2. In other words, paragraph 3 may not be invoked and should not be applied where the profits attributable to the permanent establishment are adjusted to a level that is different from what they would have been if they had been correctly computed in*

*accordance with the principles of paragraph 2. Regardless of which State makes the initial adjustment, the other State is obliged to make an appropriate corresponding adjustment only if it considers that the adjusted profits correctly reflect what the profits would have been if the permanent establishment's dealings had been transactions at arm's length. The other State is therefore committed to make such a corresponding adjustment only if it considers that the initial adjustment is justified both in principle and as regards the amount.*

60. *Paragraph 3 does not specify the method by which a corresponding adjustment is to be made. Where the initial adjustment is made by the State in which the permanent establishment is situated, the adjustment provided for by paragraph 3 could be granted in the other State through the adjustment of the amount of income that must be exempted under Article 23 A or of the credit that must be granted under Article 23 B. Where the initial adjustment is made by that other State, the adjustment provided for by paragraph 3 could be made by the State in which the permanent establishment is situated by re-opening the assessment of the enterprise of the other State in order to reduce the taxable income by an appropriate amount.*

61. *The issue of so-called "secondary adjustments", which is discussed in paragraph 8 of the Commentary on Article 9, does not arise in the case of an adjustment under paragraph 3. As indicated in paragraph 28 above, the determination of the profits attributable to a permanent establishment is only relevant for the purposes of Articles 7 and 23 A and 23 B and does not affect the application of other Articles of the Convention.*

62. *Like paragraph 2 of Article 9, paragraph 3 leaves open the question whether there should be a period of time after the expiration of which a State would not be obliged to make an appropriate adjustment to the profits attributable to a permanent establishment following an upward revision of these profits in the other State. Some States consider that the commitment should be open-ended — in other words, that however many years the State making the initial adjustment has gone back, the enterprise should in equity be assured of an appropriate adjustment in the other State. Other States consider that an open-ended commitment of this sort is unreasonable as a matter of practical administration. This problem has not been dealt with in the text of either paragraph 2 of Article 9 or paragraph 3 but Contracting States are left free in bilateral conventions to include, if they wish, provisions dealing with the length of time during which a State should be obliged to make an appropriate adjustment (see on this point paragraphs 39, 40 and 41 of the Commentary on Article 25).*

63. *There may be cases where the initial adjustment made by one State will not immediately require a corresponding adjustment to the amount of tax charged on profits in the other State (e.g., where the initial adjustment by one State of the profits attributable to the permanent establishment will affect the determination of the amount of a loss attributable to the rest of the enterprise in the other State). The competent authorities may, in accordance with the second sentence of paragraph 3, determine the future impact that the initial adjustment will have on the tax that will be payable in the other State before that tax is actually levied; in fact, in order to avoid the problem described in the preceding paragraph, competent authorities may wish to use the mutual agreement procedure at the earliest opportunity in order to determine to what extent a corresponding adjustment may be required in the other State at a later stage.*

64. *If there is a dispute between the parties concerned over the amount and character of the appropriate adjustment, the mutual agreement procedure provided for under Article 25 should be implemented, as is the case for an adjustment under paragraph 2 of Article 9. Indeed, as shown in the example in paragraph 55 above, if one of the two Contracting States*

*adjusts the profits attributable to a permanent establishment without the other State granting a corresponding adjustment to the extent needed to avoid double taxation, the taxpayer will be able to use the mutual agreement procedure of paragraph 1 of Article 25, and if necessary the arbitration provision of paragraph 5 of Article 25, to require the competent authorities to agree that either the initial adjustment by one State or the failure by the other State to make a corresponding adjustment is not in accordance with the provisions of the Convention (the arbitration provision of paragraph 5 of Article 25 will play a critical role in cases where the competent authorities would otherwise be unable to agree as it will ensure that the issues that prevent an agreement are resolved through arbitration).*

65. *Paragraph 3 only applies to the extent necessary to eliminate the double taxation of profits that result from the adjustment. Assume, for instance, that the State where the permanent establishment is situated adjusts the profits that the taxpayer attributed to the permanent establishment to reflect the fact that the price of a dealing between the permanent establishment and the rest of the enterprise did not conform with the arm's length principle. Assume that the other State also agrees that the price used by the taxpayer was not at arm's length. In that case, the combined application of paragraph 2 and of Article 23 A or 23 B will require that other State to attribute to the permanent establishment, for the purposes of providing relief of double taxation, adjusted profits that would reflect an arm's length price. In such a case, paragraph 3 will only be relevant to the extent that States adopt different interpretations of what the correct arm's length price should be.*

66. *Paragraph 3 only applies with respect to differences in the determination of the profits attributed to a permanent establishment that result in the same part of the profits being attributed to different parts of the enterprise in conformity with the Article. As already explained (see paragraphs 30 and 31 above), Article 7 does not deal with the computation of taxable income but, instead, with the attribution of profits for the purpose of the allocation of taxing rights between the two Contracting States. The Article therefore only serves to allocate revenues and expenses for the purposes of allocating taxing rights and does not prejudice the issue of which revenues are taxable and which expenses are deductible, which is a matter of domestic law as long as there is conformity with paragraph 2. Where the profits attributed to the permanent establishment are the same in each State, the amount that will be included in the taxable income on which tax will be levied in each State for a given taxable period may be different given differences in domestic law rules, e.g. for the recognition of income and the deduction of expenses. Since these different domestic law rules only apply to the profits attributed to each State, they do not, by themselves, result in double taxation for the purposes of paragraph 3.*

67. *Also, paragraph 3 does not apply to affect the computation of the exemption or credit under Article 23 A or 23 B except for the purposes of providing what would otherwise be unavailable double taxation relief for the tax paid to the Contracting State in which the permanent establishment is situated on the profits that have been attributed to the permanent establishment in that State. This paragraph will therefore not apply where these profits have been fully exempted by the other State or where the tax paid in the first-mentioned State has been fully credited against the other State's tax under the domestic law of that other State and in accordance with Article 23 A or 23 B.*

68. *Some States may prefer that the cases covered by paragraph 3 be resolved through the mutual agreement procedure (a failure to do so triggering the application of the arbitration provision of paragraph 5 of Article 25) if a State does not unilaterally agree to make a corresponding adjustment, without any deference being given to the adjusting State's preferred*

*position as to the arm's length price or method. These States would therefore prefer a provision that would always give the possibility for a State to negotiate with the adjusting State over the arm's length price or method to be applied. States that share that view may prefer to use the following alternative version of paragraph 3:*

*Where, in accordance with paragraph 2, a Contracting State adjusts the profits that are attributable to a permanent establishment of an enterprise of one of the Contracting States and taxes accordingly profits of the enterprise that have been charged to tax in the other State, the other Contracting State shall, to the extent necessary to eliminate double taxation, make an appropriate adjustment if it agrees with the adjustment made by the first-mentioned State; if the other Contracting State does not so agree, the Contracting States shall eliminate any double taxation resulting therefrom by mutual agreement.*

69. *This alternative version is intended to ensure that the State being asked to give a corresponding adjustment would always be able to require that to be done through the mutual agreement procedure. This version differs significantly from paragraph 3 in that it does not create a legal obligation on that State to agree to give a corresponding adjustment, even where it considers the adjustment made by the other State to have been made in accordance with paragraph 2. The provision would always give the possibility for a State to negotiate with the other State over what is the most appropriate arm's length price or method. Where the State in question does not unilaterally agree to make the corresponding adjustment, this version of paragraph 3 would ensure that the taxpayer has the right to access the mutual agreement procedure to have the case resolved. Moreover, where the mutual agreement procedure is triggered in such a case, the provision imposes a reciprocal legal obligation on the Contracting States to eliminate the double taxation by mutual agreement even though it does not provide a substantive standard to govern which State has the obligation to compromise its position to achieve that mutual agreement. If the two Contracting States do not reach an agreement to eliminate the double taxation, they will both be in violation of their treaty obligation. The obligation to eliminate such cases of double taxation by mutual agreement is therefore stronger than the standard of paragraph 2 of Article 25, which merely requires the competent authorities to "endeavour" to resolve a case by mutual agreement.*

70. *If Contracting States agree bilaterally to replace paragraph 3 by the alternative above, the comments made in paragraphs 66 and 67 as regards paragraph 3 will also apply with respect to that provision.*

#### *Paragraph 4*

71. *Although it has not been found necessary in the Convention to define the term "profits", it should nevertheless be understood that the term when used in this Article and elsewhere in the Convention has a broad meaning including all income derived in carrying on an enterprise. Such a broad meaning corresponds to the use of the term made in the tax laws of most OECD Member countries.*

72. *Absent paragraph 4, this interpretation of the term "profits" could have given rise to some uncertainty as to the application of the Convention. If the profits of an enterprise include categories of income which are dealt with separately in other Articles of the Convention, e.g. dividends, the question would have arisen as to which Article should apply to these categories of income, e.g. in the case of dividends, this Article or Article 10.*

73. *To the extent that the application of this Article and of the relevant other Article would result in the same tax treatment, there is little practical significance to this question. Also, other*

*Articles of the Convention deal specifically with this question with respect to some types of income (e.g. paragraph 4 of Article 6, paragraph 4 of Articles 10 and 11, paragraph 3 of Article 12, paragraphs 1 and 2 of Article 17 and paragraph 2 of Article 21).*

74. *The question, however, could arise with respect to other types of income and it has therefore been decided to include a rule of interpretation that ensures that Articles applicable to specific categories of income will have priority over Article 7. It follows from this rule that Article 7 will be applicable to business profits which do not belong to categories of income covered by these other Articles, and, in addition, to income which under paragraph 4 of Articles 10 and 11, paragraph 3 of Article 12 and paragraph 2 of Article 21, fall within Article 7. This rule does not, however, govern the manner in which the income will be classified for the purposes of domestic law; thus, if a Contracting State may tax an item of income pursuant to other Articles of this Convention, that State may, for its own domestic tax purposes, characterise such income as it wishes (i.e. as business profits or as a specific category of income) provided that the tax treatment of that item of income is in accordance with the provisions of the Convention. It should also be noted that where an enterprise of a Contracting State derives income from immovable property through a permanent establishment situated in the other State, that other State may not tax that income if it is derived from immovable property situated in the first-mentioned State or in a third State (see paragraph 4 of the Commentary on Article 21 and paragraphs 9 and 10 of the Commentary on Articles 23 A and 23 B).*

75. *It is open to Contracting States to agree bilaterally upon special explanations or definitions concerning the term “profits” with a view to clarifying the distinction between this term and e.g. the concept of dividends. It may in particular be found appropriate to do so where in a convention under negotiation a deviation has been made from the definitions in the Articles on dividends, interest and royalties.*

76. *Finally, it should be noted that two categories of profits that were previously covered by other Articles of the Convention are now covered by Article 7. First, whilst the definition of “royalties” in paragraph 2 of Article 12 of the 1963 Draft Convention and 1977 Model Convention included payments “for the use of, or the right to use, industrial, commercial, or scientific equipment”, the reference to these payments was subsequently deleted from that definition in order to ensure that income from the leasing of industrial, commercial or scientific equipment, including the income from the leasing of containers, falls under the provisions of Article 7 or Article 8 (see paragraph 9 of the Commentary on that Article), as the case may be, rather than under those of Article 12, a result that the Committee on Fiscal Affairs considers appropriate given the nature of such income.*

77. *Second, before 2000, income from professional services and other activities of an independent character was dealt with under a separate Article, i.e. Article 14. The provisions of that Article were similar to those applicable to business profits but Article 14 used the concept of fixed base rather than that of permanent establishment since it had originally been thought that the latter concept should be reserved to commercial and industrial activities. However, it was not always clear which activities fell within Article 14 as opposed to Article 7. The elimination of Article 14 in 2000 reflected the fact that there were no intended differences between the concepts of permanent establishment, as used in Article 7, and fixed base, as used in Article 14, or between how profits were computed and tax was calculated according to which of Article 7 or 14 applied. The effect of the deletion of Article 14 is that income derived from professional services or other activities of an independent character is now dealt with under Article 7 as business profits. This was confirmed by the addition, in Article 3, of a definition of the term “business”*

*which expressly provides that this term includes professional services or other activities of an independent character.*

### Observations on the Commentary

7865. *Italy and Portugal* deem as essential to take into consideration that — irrespective of the meaning given to the fourth sentence of paragraph 778 — as far as the method for computing taxes is concerned, national systems are not affected by the new wording of the model, *i.e.* by the elimination of Article 14.

7966. *Belgium* cannot share the views expressed in paragraph 1413 of the Commentary. Belgium considers that the application of controlled foreign companies legislation is contrary to the provisions of paragraph 1 of Article 7. This is especially the case where a contracting State taxes one of its residents on income derived by a foreign entity by using a fiction attributing to that resident, in proportion to his participation in the capital of the foreign entity, the income derived by that entity. By doing so, that State increases the tax base of its resident by including in it income which has not been derived by that resident but by a foreign entity which is not taxable in that State in accordance with paragraph 1 of Article 7. That Contracting State thus disregards the legal personality of the foreign entity and acts contrary to paragraph 1 of Article 7.

8067. *Luxembourg* does not share the interpretation in paragraph 1413 which provides that paragraph 1 of Article 7 does not restrict a Contracting State's right to tax its own residents under controlled foreign companies provisions found in its domestic law as this interpretation challenges the fundamental principle contained in paragraph 1 of Article 7.

8168. With reference to paragraph 1413, *Ireland* notes its general observation in paragraph 27.5 of the Commentary on Article 1.

82. *Sweden* wishes to clarify that it does not consider that the different approaches for attributing “free” capital that are included in the Report on Attribution of Profits to Permanent Establishments will necessarily lead to a result in accordance with the arm's length principle. Consequently, Sweden would, when looking at the facts and circumstances of each case, in many cases not consider that the amount of interest deduction resulting from the application of these approaches conforms to the arm's length principle. When the different views on attributing “free” capital will lead to double taxation, the mutual agreement procedure provided for in Article 25 will have to be used.

83. With reference to paragraphs 27 and 65, the United States wishes to clarify how it will relieve double taxation arising due to the application of paragraph 2 of Article 7. Where a taxpayer can demonstrate to the competent authority of the United States that such double taxation has been left unrelieved after the application of mechanisms under the United States' domestic law such as the utilisation of foreign tax credit limitation created by other transactions, the United States will relieve such additional double taxation.

84. *Turkey* does not share the views expressed in paragraph 28 of the Commentary on Article 7.

69. — With regard to paragraph 45, *Greece* notes that the Greek internal law does not foresee any rules or methods for attributing “free” capital to permanent establishments. Concerning loans contracted by an enterprise that relate in whole or in part to the activities of the permanent establishment, Greece allows as deduction the part of the interest which corresponds to the

amount of a loan contracted by the head office and actually remitted to the permanent establishment.

70. — *Portugal* wishes to reserve its right not to follow the position expressed in paragraph 45 of the Commentary on Article 7 except whenever there are specific domestic provisions foreseeing certain levels of “free” capital for permanent establishments.

71. — With regard to paragraph 46, *Sweden* wishes to clarify that it does not consider that the different approaches for attributing “free” capital that the paragraph refers to as being “acceptable” will necessarily lead to a result in accordance with the arm’s length principle. Consequently, when looking at the facts and circumstances of each case in order to determine whether the amount of interest deduction resulting from the application of these approaches conforms to the arm’s length principle, Sweden in many cases would not consider that the other States’ approach conforms to the arm’s length principle. Sweden is of the opinion that double taxation will therefore often occur, requiring the use of the mutual agreement procedure.

72. — *Portugal* wishes to reserve its right not to follow the “symmetry” approach described in paragraph 48 of the Commentary on Article 7, insofar as the Portuguese internal law does not foresee any rules or methods for attributing “free” capital to permanent establishments. In eliminating double taxation according to Article 23, Portugal, as the home country, determines the amount of profits attributable to a permanent establishment according to the domestic law.

73. — *Germany, Japan* and the *United States*, whilst agreeing to the practical solution described in paragraph 48, wish to clarify how this agreement will be implemented. Neither Germany, nor Japan, nor the United States can automatically accept for all purposes all calculations by the State in which the permanent establishment is located. In cases involving Germany or Japan, the second condition described in paragraph 48 has to be satisfied through a mutual agreement procedure under Article 25. In the case of Japan and the United States, a taxpayer who seeks to obtain additional foreign tax credit limitation must do so through a mutual agreement procedure in which the taxpayer would have to prove to the Japanese or the United States competent authority, as the case may be, that double taxation of the permanent establishment profits which resulted from the conflicting domestic law choices of capital attribution methods has been left unrelieved after applying mechanisms under their respective domestic tax law such as utilisation of foreign tax credit limitation created by other transactions.

74. — With reference to paragraphs 6 and 7, *New Zealand* notes that it does not agree with the approach put forward on the attribution of profits to permanent establishments in general, as reflected in Part I of the Report *Attribution of Profits to Permanent Establishments*.

### Reservations on the Article

8575. *Australia* and *New Zealand* reserves the right to include a provision that will permit ~~their~~its domestic law to apply in relation to the taxation of profits from any form of insurance.

8676. *Australia* and *New Zealand* reserves the right to include a provision clarifying ~~their~~its right to tax a share of business profits to which a resident of the other Contracting State is beneficially entitled where those profits are derived by a trustee of a trust estate (other than certain unit trusts that are treated as companies for Australian and New Zealand tax purposes) from the carrying on of a business in Australia or New Zealand, as the case may be, through a permanent establishment.



**8777.** *Korea and Portugal* reserve the right to tax persons performing professional services or other activities of an independent character if they are present on their territory for a period or periods exceeding in the aggregate 183 days in any twelve month period, even if they do not have a permanent establishment (or a fixed base) available to them for the purpose of performing such services or activities.

**8878.** *Italy and Portugal* reserve the right to tax persons performing independent personal services under a separate article which corresponds to Article 14 as it stood before its elimination in 2000.

**8979.** The *United States* reserves the right to amend Article 7 to provide that, in applying paragraphs 1 and 2 of the Article, any income or gain attributable to a permanent establishment during its existence may be taxable by the Contracting State in which the permanent establishment exists even if the payments are deferred until after the permanent establishment has ceased to exist. The United States also wishes to note that it reserves the right to apply such a rule, as well, under Articles 11, 12, 13 and 21.

**9080.** *Turkey* reserves the right to subject income from the leasing of containers to a withholding tax at source in all cases. In case of the application of Articles 5 and 7 to such income, Turkey would like to apply the permanent establishment rule to the simple depot, depot-agency and operational branches cases.

**9184.** *Norway and the United States* reserve the right to treat income from the use, maintenance or rental of containers used in international traffic under Article 8 in the same manner as income from shipping and air transport.

**9282.** *Australia and Portugal* reserve the right to propose in bilateral negotiations a provision to the effect that, if the information available to the competent authority of a Contracting State is inadequate to determine the profits to be attributed to the permanent establishment of an enterprise, the competent authority may apply to that enterprise for that purpose the provisions of the taxation law of that State, subject to the qualification that such law will be applied, so far as the information available to the competent authority permits, in accordance with the principles of this Article.

**9383.** *Mexico* reserves the right to tax in the State where the permanent establishment is situated business profits derived from the sale of goods or merchandise carried out directly by its home office situated in the other Contracting State, provided that those goods and merchandise are of the same or similar kind as the ones sold through that permanent establishment. The Government of Mexico will apply this rule only as a safeguard against abuse and not as a general “force of attraction” principle; thus, the rule will not apply when the enterprise proves that the sales have been carried out for reasons other than obtaining a benefit under the Convention.

**94.** *The Czech Republic reserves the right to add to paragraph 3 a provision limiting the potential corresponding adjustments to bona fide cases.*

**95.** *New Zealand reserves the right to use the previous version of Article 7 taking into account its observation and reservations on that version (i.e. the version included in the Model Tax Convention immediately before the 2010 update of the Model Tax Convention) because it does not agree with the approach reflected in Part I of the 2010 Report on the Attribution of*

*Profits to Permanent Establishments. It does not, therefore, endorse the changes to the Commentary on the Article made through that update.*

*96. Chile, Greece, Mexico and Turkey reserve the right to use the previous version of Article 7, i.e. the version that was included in the Model Tax Convention immediately before the 2010 update of the Model Tax Convention. They do not, therefore, endorse the changes to the Commentary on the Article made through that update.*

*97. Portugal reserves its right to continue to adopt in its conventions the text of the Article as it read before 2010 until its domestic law is adapted in order to apply the new approach.*

*98. Slovenia reserves the right to specify that a potential adjustment will be made under paragraph 3 only if it is considered justified.*

#### ANNEX

#### PREVIOUS VERSION OF ARTICLE 7 AND ITS COMMENTARY

[The following is the text of Article 7 and its Commentary as it read before 22 July 2010. That previous version of the Article and Commentary is provided for historical reference as it will continue to be relevant for the application and interpretation of bilateral tax conventions that use the previous wording of the Article.]

#### Article 7

#### BUSINESS PROFITS

1. The profits of an enterprise of a Contracting State shall be taxable only in that State unless the enterprise carries on business in the other Contracting State through a permanent establishment situated therein. If the enterprise carries on business as aforesaid, the profits of the enterprise may be taxed in the other State but only so much of them as is attributable to that permanent establishment.
2. Subject to the provisions of paragraph 3, where an enterprise of a Contracting State carries on business in the other Contracting State through a permanent establishment situated therein, there shall in each Contracting State be attributed to that permanent establishment the profits which it might be expected to make if it were a distinct and separate enterprise engaged in the same or similar activities under the same or similar conditions and dealing wholly independently with the enterprise of which it is a permanent establishment.
3. In determining the profits of a permanent establishment, there shall be allowed as deductions expenses which are incurred for the purposes of the permanent establishment, including executive and general administrative expenses so incurred, whether in the State in which the permanent establishment is situated or elsewhere.
4. Insofar as it has been customary in a Contracting State to determine the profits to be attributed to a permanent establishment on the basis of an apportionment of the total profits of the enterprise to its various parts, nothing in paragraph 2 shall preclude that Contracting State from determining the profits to be taxed by such an apportionment as may be customary; the method of apportionment adopted shall, however, be such that the result shall be in accordance with the principles contained in this Article.
5. No profits shall be attributed to a permanent establishment by reason of the mere purchase by that permanent establishment of goods or merchandise for the enterprise.
6. For the purposes of the preceding paragraphs, the profits to be attributed to the permanent establishment shall be determined by the same method year by year unless there is good and sufficient reason to the contrary.
7. Where profits include items of income which are dealt with separately in other Articles of this Convention, then the provisions of those Articles shall not be affected by the provisions of this Article.

## COMMENTARY ON ARTICLE 7 CONCERNING THE TAXATION OF BUSINESS PROFITS

### I. Preliminary remarks

1. This Article is in many respects a continuation of, and a corollary to, Article 5 on the definition of the concept of permanent establishment. The permanent establishment criterion is commonly used in international double taxation conventions to determine whether a particular kind of income shall or shall not be taxed in the country from which it originates but the criterion does not of itself provide a complete solution to the problem of the double taxation of business profits; in order to prevent such double taxation it is necessary to supplement the definition of permanent establishment by adding to it an agreed set of rules by reference to which the profits attributable to the permanent establishment are to be calculated. To put the matter in a slightly different way, when an enterprise of a Contracting State carries on business in the other Contracting State the authorities of that second State have to ask themselves two questions before they levy tax on the profits of the enterprise: the first question is whether the enterprise has a permanent establishment in their country; if the answer is in the affirmative the second question is what, if any, are the profits on which that permanent establishment should pay tax. It is with the rules to be used in determining the answer to this second question that Article 7 is concerned. Rules for ascertaining the profits of an enterprise of a Contracting State which is trading with an enterprise of the other Contracting State when both enterprises are associated are dealt with in Article 9.

2. Articles 7 and 9 are not particularly detailed and were not strikingly novel when they were adopted by the OECD. The question of what criteria should be used in attributing profits to a permanent establishment, and of how to allocate profits from transactions between associated enterprises, has had to be dealt with in a large number of double taxation conventions and in various models developed by the League of Nations before the OECD first dealt with it and the solutions adopted have generally conformed to a standard pattern.

3. It is generally recognised that the essential principles on which this standard pattern is based are well founded, and, when the OECD first examined that question, it was thought sufficient to restate them with some slight amendments and modifications primarily aimed at producing greater clarity. The two Articles incorporate a number of directives. They do not, nor in the nature of things could they be expected to, lay down a series of precise rules for dealing with every kind of problem that may arise when an enterprise of one State makes profits in another. Modern commerce organises itself in an infinite variety of ways, and it would be quite impossible within the fairly narrow limits of an Article in a double taxation convention to specify an exhaustive set of rules for dealing with every kind of problem that may arise.

4. It must be acknowledged, however, that there has been considerable variation in the interpretation of the general directives of Article 7 and of the provisions of earlier conventions and models on which the wording of the Article is based. This lack of a common interpretation of Article 7 can lead to problems of double taxation and non-taxation. For that reason, it is important for tax authorities to agree on mutually consistent methods of dealing with these problems, using, where appropriate, the mutual agreement procedure provided for in Article 25.

5. Over the years, the Committee on Fiscal Affairs has therefore spent considerable time and effort trying to ensure a more consistent interpretation and application of the rules of the Article. Minor changes to the wording of the Article and a number of changes to the Commentary were made when the 1977 Model Tax Convention was adopted. A report that addressed that question in the specific case of banks was published in 1984.<sup>1</sup> In 1987, noting that the determination of profits attributable to a permanent establishment could give rise to some uncertainty, the Committee undertook a review of the question which led to the adoption, in 1993, of the report entitled *Attribution of Income to Permanent Establishments*<sup>2</sup> and to subsequent changes to the Commentary.

6. Despite that work, the practices of OECD and non-OECD countries regarding the attribution of profits to permanent establishments and these countries' interpretation of Article 7 continued to vary considerably. The Committee acknowledged the need to provide more certainty to taxpayers: in its report *Transfer Pricing Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises and Tax Administrations*, adopted in 1995, it indicated that further work would address the application of the arm's length principle to permanent establishments. That work resulted, in 2008, in a report entitled *Attribution of Profits to Permanent Establishments*. The approach developed in that report was not constrained by either the original intent or by the historical practice and interpretation of Article 7. Instead, the focus has been on

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1. "The Taxation of Multinational Banking Enterprises", in *Transfer Pricing and Multinational Enterprises - Three Taxation Issues*, OECD, Paris, 1984.

2. Reproduced in Volume II of the loose-leaf version of the OECD Model Tax Convention at page R(13)-1.

formulating the most preferable approach to attributing profits to a permanent establishment under Article 7 given modern-day multinational operations and trade.

7. The approach put forward in that Report deals with the attribution of profits both to permanent establishments in general (Part I of the Report) and, in particular, to permanent establishments of businesses operating in the financial sector, where trading through a permanent establishment is widespread (Part II of the Report, which deals with permanent establishments of banks, Part III, which deals with permanent establishments of enterprises carrying on global trading and Part IV, which deals with permanent establishments of enterprises carrying on insurance activities). The Committee considers that the guidance included in the Report represents a better approach to attributing profits to permanent establishments than has previously been available. It does recognise, however, that there are differences between some of the conclusions of the Report and the interpretation of the Article previously given in this Commentary. For that reason, this Commentary has been amended to incorporate a number of conclusions of the Report that did not conflict with the previous version of this Commentary, which prescribed specific approaches in some areas and left considerable leeway in others. The Report therefore represents internationally agreed principles and, to the extent that it does not conflict with this Commentary, provides guidelines for the application of the arm's length principle incorporated in the Article.

8. Before 2000, income from professional services and other activities of an independent character was dealt with under a separate Article, *i.e.* Article 14. The provisions of that Article were similar to those applicable to business profits but it used the concept of fixed base rather than that of permanent establishment since it had originally been thought that the latter concept should be reserved to commercial and industrial activities. However, it was not always clear which activities fell within Article 14 as opposed to Article 7. The elimination of Article 14 in 2000 reflected the fact that there were no intended differences between the concepts of permanent establishment, as used in Article 7, and fixed base, as used in Article 14, or between how profits were computed and tax was calculated according to which of Article 7 or 14 applied. The effect of the deletion of Article 14 is that income derived from professional services or other activities of an independent character is now dealt with under Article 7 as business profits. This was confirmed by the addition of a definition of the term "business" which expressly provides that this term includes professional services or other activities of an independent character.

## **II. Commentary on the provisions of the Article**

### ***Paragraph 1***

9. This paragraph is concerned with two questions. First, it restates the generally accepted principle of double taxation conventions that an enterprise of one State shall not be taxed in the other State unless it carries on business in that other State through a permanent establishment situated therein. It is hardly necessary to argue here the merits of this principle. It is perhaps sufficient to say that it has come to be accepted in international fiscal matters that until an enterprise of one State sets up a permanent establishment in another State it should not properly be regarded as participating in the economic life of that other State to such an extent that it comes within the jurisdiction of that other State's taxing rights.

10. The second principle, which is reflected in the second sentence of the paragraph, is that the right to tax of the State where the permanent establishment is situated does not extend to profits that the enterprise may derive from that State but that are not attributable to the permanent establishment. This is a question on which there have historically been differences of view, a few countries having some time ago pursued a principle of general "force of attraction" according to which income such as other business profits, dividends, interest and royalties arising from sources in their territory was fully taxable by them if the beneficiary had a permanent establishment therein even though such income was clearly not attributable to that permanent establishment. Whilst some bilateral tax conventions include a limited anti-avoidance rule based on a restricted force of attraction approach that only applies to business profits derived from activities similar to those carried on by a permanent establishment, the general force of attraction approach described above has now been rejected in international tax treaty practice. The principle that is now generally accepted in double taxation conventions is based on the view that in taxing the profits that a foreign enterprise derives from a particular country, the tax authorities of that country should look at the separate sources of profit that the enterprise derives from their country and should apply to each the permanent establishment test, subject to the possible application of other Articles of the Convention. This solution allows simpler and more efficient tax administration and compliance, and is more closely adapted to the way in which business is commonly carried on. The organisation of modern business is highly complex. There are a considerable number of companies each of which is engaged in a wide diversity of activities and is carrying on business extensively in many countries. A company may set up a permanent establishment in another country through which it carries on manufacturing activities whilst a different part of the same company sells different goods or manufactures in that other country through independent agents. That company may have perfectly valid commercial reasons for doing so: these may be based, for example, on the historical pattern of its business or on commercial convenience. If the country in which the permanent establishment is situated wished to go

so far as to try to determine, and tax, the profit element of each of the transactions carried on through independent agents, with a view to aggregating that profit with the profits of the permanent establishment, that approach would interfere seriously with ordinary commercial activities and would be contrary to the aims of the Convention.

11. When referring to the part of the profits of an enterprise that is attributable to a permanent establishment, the second sentence of paragraph 1 refers directly to paragraph 2, which provides the directive for determining what profits should be attributed to a permanent establishment. As paragraph 2 is part of the context in which the sentence must be read, that sentence should not be interpreted in a way that could contradict paragraph 2, *e.g.* by interpreting it as restricting the amount of profits that can be attributed to a permanent establishment to the amount of profits of the enterprise as a whole. Thus, whilst paragraph 1 provides that a Contracting State may only tax the profits of an enterprise of the other Contracting State to the extent that they are attributable to a permanent establishment situated in the first State, it is paragraph 2 that determines the meaning of the phrase “profits attributable to a permanent establishment”. In other words, the directive of paragraph 2 may result in profits being attributed to a permanent establishment even though the enterprise as a whole has never made profits; conversely, that directive may result in no profits being attributed to a permanent establishment even though the enterprise as a whole has made profits.

12. Clearly, however, the Contracting State of the enterprise has an interest in the directive of paragraph 2 being correctly applied by the State where the permanent establishment is located. Since that directive applies to both Contracting States, the State of the enterprise must, in accordance with Article 23, eliminate double taxation on the profits properly attributable to the permanent establishment. In other words, if the State where the permanent establishment is located attempts to tax profits that are not attributable to the permanent establishment under Article 7, this may result in double taxation of profits that should properly be taxed only in the State of the enterprise.

13. The purpose of paragraph 1 is to provide limits to the right of one Contracting State to tax the business profits of enterprises of the other Contracting State. The paragraph does not limit the right of a Contracting State to tax its own residents under controlled foreign companies provisions found in its domestic law even though such tax imposed on these residents may be computed by reference to the part of the profits of an enterprise that is resident of the other Contracting State that is attributable to these residents’ participation in that enterprise. Tax so levied by a State on its own residents does not reduce the profits of the enterprise of the other State and may not, therefore, be said to have been levied on such profits (see also paragraph 23 of the Commentary on Article 1 and paragraphs 37 to 39 of the Commentary on Article 10).

#### **Paragraph 2**

14. This paragraph contains the central directive on which the attribution of profits to a permanent establishment is intended to be based. The paragraph incorporates the view that the profits to be attributed to a permanent establishment are those which that permanent establishment would have made if, instead of dealing with the rest of the enterprise, it had been dealing with an entirely separate enterprise under conditions and at prices prevailing in the ordinary market. This corresponds to the “arm’s length principle” discussed in the Commentary on Article 9. Normally, the profits so determined would be the same profits that one would expect to be determined by the ordinary processes of good business accountancy.

15. The paragraph requires that this principle be applied in each Contracting State. Clearly, this does not mean that the amount on which the enterprise will be taxed in the source State will, for a given period of time, be exactly the same as the amount of income with respect to which the other State will have to provide relief pursuant to Articles 23 A or 23 B. Variations between the domestic laws of the two States concerning matters such as depreciation rates, the timing of the recognition of income and restrictions on the deductibility of certain expenses that are in accordance with paragraph 3 of this Article will normally result in a different amount of taxable income in each State.

16. In the great majority of cases, trading accounts of the permanent establishment — which are commonly available if only because a well-run business organisation is normally concerned to know what is the profitability of its various branches — will be used to ascertain the profit properly attributable to that establishment. Exceptionally there may be no separate accounts (*cf.* paragraphs 51 to 55 below). But where there are such accounts they will naturally form the starting point for any processes of adjustment in case adjustment is required to produce the amount of profits that are properly attributable to the permanent establishment under the directive contained in paragraph 2. It should perhaps be emphasized that this directive is no justification to construct hypothetical profit figures *in vacuo*; it is always necessary to start with the real facts of the situation as they appear from the business records of the permanent establishment and to adjust as may be shown to be necessary the profit figures which those facts produce. As noted in paragraph 19 below and as explained in paragraph 39 of Part I of the Report *Attribution of Profits to Permanent Establishments*, however, records and documentation must satisfy certain requirements in order to be considered to reflect the real facts of the situation.

17. In order to determine whether such an adjustment is required by paragraph 2, it will be necessary to determine the profits that would have been realized if the permanent establishment had been a separate and distinct enterprise engaged in the same or similar activities under the same or similar conditions and dealing wholly independently with the rest of the enterprise. Sections D-2 and D-3 of Part I of the Report *Attribution of Profits to Permanent Establishments* describe the two-step approach through which this should be done. This approach will allow the calculation of the profits attributable to all the activities carried on through the permanent establishment, including transactions with other independent enterprises, transactions with associated enterprises and dealings (e.g. the internal transfer of capital or property or the internal provision of services – see for instance paragraphs 31 and 32) with other parts of the enterprise (under the second step referred to above), in accordance with the directive of paragraph 2.

18. The first step of that approach requires the identification of the activities carried on through the permanent establishment. This should be done through a functional and factual analysis (the guidance found in the *Transfer Pricing Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises and Tax Administrations*<sup>1</sup> will be relevant for that purpose). Under that first step, the economically significant activities and responsibilities undertaken through the permanent establishment will be identified. This analysis should, to the extent relevant, consider the activities and responsibilities undertaken through the permanent establishment in the context of the activities and responsibilities undertaken by the enterprise as a whole, particularly those parts of the enterprise that engage in dealings with the permanent establishment. Under the second step of that approach, the remuneration of any such dealings will be determined by applying by analogy the principles developed for the application of the arm's length principle between associated enterprises (these principles are articulated in the *Transfer Pricing Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises and Tax Administrations*) by reference to the functions performed, assets used and risk assumed by the enterprise through the permanent establishment and through the rest of the enterprise.

19. A question that may arise is to what extent accounting records should be relied upon when they are based on agreements between the head office and its permanent establishments (or between the permanent establishments themselves). Clearly, such internal agreements cannot qualify as legally binding contracts. However, to the extent that the trading accounts of the head office and the permanent establishments are both prepared symmetrically on the basis of such agreements and that those agreements reflect the functions performed by the different parts of the enterprise, these trading accounts could be accepted by tax authorities. Accounts should not be regarded as prepared symmetrically, however, unless the values of transactions or the methods of attributing profits or expenses in the books of the permanent establishment corresponded exactly to the values or methods of attribution in the books of the head office in terms of the national currency or functional currency in which the enterprise recorded its transactions. Also, as explained in paragraph 16, records and documentation must satisfy certain requirements in order to be considered to reflect the real facts of the situation. For example, where trading accounts are based on internal agreements that reflect purely artificial arrangements instead of the real economic functions of the different parts of the enterprise, these agreements should simply be ignored and the accounts corrected accordingly. One such case would be where a permanent establishment involved in sales were, under such an internal agreement, given the role of principal (accepting all the risks and entitled to all the profits from the sales) when in fact the permanent establishment concerned was nothing more than an intermediary or agent (incurring limited risks and entitled to receive only a limited share of the resulting income) or, conversely, were given the role of intermediary or agent when in reality it was a principal.

20. It may therefore be concluded that accounting records and contemporaneous documentation that meet the above-mentioned requirements constitute a useful starting point for the purposes of attributing profits to a permanent establishment. Taxpayers are encouraged to prepare such documentation, as it may reduce substantially the potential for controversies. Section D-2 (vi) b) of Part I of the Report *Attribution of Profits to Permanent Establishments* discusses the conditions under which tax administrations would give effect to such documentation.

21. There may be a realisation of a taxable profit when an asset, whether or not trading stock, forming part of the business property of a permanent establishment situated within a State's territory is transferred to a permanent establishment or the head office of the same enterprise situated in another State. Article 7 allows the former State to tax profits deemed to arise in connection with such a transfer. Such profits may be determined as indicated below. In cases where such transfer takes place, whether or not it is a permanent one, the question arises as to when taxable profits are realised. In practice, where such property has a substantial market value and is likely to appear on the balance sheet of the importing permanent establishment or other part of the enterprise after the taxation year during that in which the transfer occurred, the realisation of the taxable profits will not, so far as the enterprise as a whole is concerned, necessarily take place in the taxation year of the transfer under consideration. However, the mere fact that the property

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1. The original version of that report was approved by the Council of the OECD on 27 June 1995. Published in a loose-leaf format as *Transfer Pricing Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises and Tax Administrations*, OECD, Paris, 1995.

leaves the purview of a tax jurisdiction may trigger the taxation of the accrued gains attributable to that property as the concept of realisation depends on each country's domestic law.

22. Where the countries in which the permanent establishments operate levy tax on the profits accruing from an internal transfer as soon as it is made, even when these profits are not actually realised until a subsequent commercial year, there will be inevitably a time lag between the moment when tax is paid abroad and the moment it can be taken into account in the country where the enterprise's head office is located. A serious problem is inherent in the time lag, especially when a permanent establishment transfers fixed assets or — in the event that it is wound up — its entire operating equipment stock, to some other part of the enterprise of which it forms part. In such cases, it is up to the head office country to seek, on a case by case basis, a bilateral solution with the outward country where there is serious risk of overtaxation.

23. Paragraph 3 of Article 5 sets forth a special rule for a fixed place of business that is a building site or a construction or installation project. Such a fixed place of business is a permanent establishment only if it lasts more than twelve months. Experience has shown that these types of permanent establishments can give rise to special problems in attributing income to them under Article 7.

24. These problems arise chiefly where goods are provided, or services performed, by the other parts of the enterprise or a related party in connection with the building site or construction or installation project. Whilst these problems can arise with any permanent establishment, they are particularly acute for building sites and construction or installation projects. In these circumstances, it is necessary to pay close attention to the general principle that income is attributable to a permanent establishment only when it results from activities carried on by the enterprise through that permanent establishment.

25. For example, where such goods are supplied by the other parts of the enterprise, the profits arising from that supply do not result from the activities carried on through the permanent establishment and are not attributable to it. Similarly, profits resulting from the provision of services (such as planning, designing, drawing blueprints, or rendering technical advice) by the parts of the enterprise operating outside the State where the permanent establishment is located do not result from the activities carried on through the permanent establishment and are not attributable to it.

26. Where, under paragraph 5 of Article 5, a permanent establishment of an enterprise of a Contracting State is deemed to exist in the other Contracting State by reason of the activities of a so-called dependent agent (see paragraph 32 of the Commentary on Article 5), the same principles used to attribute profits to other types of permanent establishment will apply to attribute profits to that deemed permanent establishment. As a first step, the activities that the dependent agent undertakes for the enterprise will be identified through a functional and factual analysis that will determine the functions undertaken by the dependent agent both on its own account and on behalf of the enterprise. The dependent agent and the enterprise on behalf of which it is acting constitute two separate potential taxpayers. On the one hand, the dependent agent will derive its own income or profits from the activities that it performs on its own account for the enterprise; if the agent is itself a resident of either Contracting State, the provisions of the Convention (including Article 9 if that agent is an enterprise associated to the enterprise on behalf of which it is acting) will be relevant to the taxation of such income or profits. On the other hand, the deemed permanent establishment of the enterprise will be attributed the assets and risks of the enterprise relating to the functions performed by the dependent agent on behalf of that enterprise (*i.e.* the activities that the dependent agent undertakes for that enterprise), together with sufficient capital to support those assets and risks. Profits will then be attributed to the deemed permanent establishment on the basis of those assets, risks and capital; these profits will be separate from, and will not include, the income or profits that are properly attributable to the dependent agent itself (see Section D-5 of Part I of the Report *Attribution of Profits to Permanent Establishments*).

### **Paragraph 3**

27. This paragraph clarifies, in relation to the expenses of a permanent establishment, the general directive laid down in paragraph 2. The paragraph specifically recognises that in calculating the profits of a permanent establishment allowance is to be made for expenses, wherever incurred, that were incurred for the purposes of the permanent establishment. Clearly in some cases it will be necessary to estimate or to calculate by conventional means the amount of expenses to be taken into account. In the case, for example, of general administrative expenses incurred at the head office of the enterprise, it may be appropriate to take into account a proportionate part based on the ratio that the permanent establishment's turnover (or perhaps gross profits) bears to that of the enterprise as a whole. Subject to this, it is considered that the amount of expenses to be taken into account as incurred for the purposes of the permanent establishment should be the actual amount so incurred. The deduction allowable to the permanent establishment for any of the expenses of the enterprise attributed to it does not depend upon the actual reimbursement of such expenses by the permanent establishment.

28. It has sometimes been suggested that the need to reconcile paragraphs 2 and 3 created practical difficulties as paragraph 2 required that prices between the permanent establishment and the head office be normally charged on an arm's length basis, giving to the transferring entity the type of profit which it might have been expected to make were it dealing with an independent enterprise, whilst the wording of paragraph 3 suggested that the deduction for expenses incurred for the purposes of permanent establishments should be the actual cost of those expenses, normally without adding any profit element.

29. In fact, whilst the application of paragraph 3 may raise some practical difficulties, especially in relation to the separate enterprise and arm's length principles underlying paragraph 2, there is no difference of principle between the two paragraphs. Paragraph 3 indicates that in determining the profits of a permanent establishment, certain expenses must be allowed as deductions whilst paragraph 2 provides that the profits determined in accordance with the rule contained in paragraph 3 relating to the deduction of expenses must be those that a separate and distinct enterprise engaged in the same or similar activities under the same or similar conditions would have made. Thus, whilst paragraph 3 provides a rule applicable for the determination of the profits of the permanent establishment, paragraph 2 requires that the profits so determined correspond to the profits that a separate and independent enterprise would have made.

30. Also, paragraph 3 only determines which expenses should be attributed to the permanent establishment for purposes of determining the profits attributable to that permanent establishment. It does not deal with the issue of whether those expenses, once attributed, are deductible when computing the taxable income of the permanent establishment since the conditions for the deductibility of expenses are a matter to be determined by domestic law, subject to the rules of Article 24 on Non-discrimination (in particular, paragraphs 3 and 4 of that Article).

31. In applying these principles to the practical determination of the profits of a permanent establishment, the question may arise as to whether a particular cost incurred by an enterprise can truly be considered as an expense incurred for the purposes of the permanent establishment, keeping in mind the separate and independent enterprise principles of paragraph 2. Whilst in general independent enterprises in their dealings with each other will seek to realise a profit and, when transferring property or providing services to each other, will charge such prices as the open market would bear, nevertheless, there are also circumstances where it cannot be considered that a particular property or service would have been obtainable from an independent enterprise or when independent enterprises may agree to share between them the costs of some activity which is pursued in common for their mutual benefit. In these particular circumstances, it may be appropriate to treat any relevant costs incurred by the enterprise as an expense incurred for the permanent establishment. The difficulty arises in making a distinction between these circumstances and the cases where a cost incurred by an enterprise should not be considered as an expense of the permanent establishment and the relevant property or service should be considered, on the basis of the separate and independent enterprises principle, to have been transferred between the head office and the permanent establishment at a price including an element of profit. The question must be whether the internal transfer of property and services, be it temporary or final, is of the same kind as those which the enterprise, in the normal course of its business, would have charged to a third party at an arm's length price, *i.e.* by normally including in the sale price an appropriate profit.

32. On the one hand, the answer to that question will be in the affirmative if the expense is initially incurred in performing a function the direct purpose of which is to make sales of a specific good or service and to realise a profit through a permanent establishment. On the other hand, the answer will be in the negative if, on the basis of the facts and circumstances of the specific case, it appears that the expense is initially incurred in performing a function the essential purpose of which is to rationalise the overall costs of the enterprise or to increase in a general way its sales.<sup>1</sup>

33. Where goods are supplied for resale whether in a finished state or as raw materials or semi-finished goods, it will normally be appropriate for the provisions of paragraph 2 to apply and for the supplying part of the enterprise to be allocated a profit, measured by reference to arm's length principles. But there may be exceptions even here. One example might be where goods are not supplied for resale but for temporary use in the trade so that it may be appropriate for the parts of the enterprise which share the use of the material to bear only their share of the cost of such material *e.g.* in the case of machinery, the depreciation costs that relate to its use by each of these parts. It should of course be remembered that the mere purchase of goods does not constitute a permanent establishment (subparagraph 4 *d*) of Article 5) so that no question of attribution of profit arises in such circumstances.

34. In the case of intangible rights, the rules concerning the relations between enterprises of the same group (*e.g.* payment of royalties or cost sharing arrangements) cannot be applied in respect of the relations between parts of the same enterprise. Indeed, it may be extremely difficult to allocate "ownership" of the intangible right solely to one part

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1. Internal transfers of financial assets, which are primarily relevant for banks and other financial institutions, raise specific issues which have been dealt with in Parts II and III of the Report *Attribution of Profits to Permanent Establishments*.



of the enterprise and to argue that this part of the enterprise should receive royalties from the other parts as if it were an independent enterprise. Since there is only one legal entity it is not possible to allocate legal ownership to any particular part of the enterprise and in practical terms it will often be difficult to allocate the costs of creation exclusively to one part of the enterprise. It may therefore be preferable for the costs of creation of intangible rights to be regarded as attributable to all parts of the enterprise which will make use of them and as incurred on behalf of the various parts of the enterprise to which they are relevant accordingly. In such circumstances it would be appropriate to allocate between the various parts of the enterprise the actual costs of the creation or acquisition of such intangible rights, as well as the costs subsequently incurred with respect to these intangible rights, without any mark-up for profit or royalty. In so doing, tax authorities must be aware of the fact that the possible adverse consequences deriving from any research and development activity (*e.g.* the responsibility related to the products and damages to the environment) shall also be allocated to the various parts of the enterprise, therefore giving rise, where appropriate, to a compensatory charge.

35. The area of services is the one in which difficulties may arise in determining whether in a particular case a service should be charged between the various parts of a single enterprise at its actual cost or at that cost plus a mark-up to represent a profit to the part of the enterprise providing the service. The trade of the enterprise, or part of it, may consist of the provision of such services and there may be a standard charge for their provision. In such a case it will usually be appropriate to charge a service at the same rate as is charged to the outside customer.

36. Where the main activity of a permanent establishment is to provide specific services to the enterprise to which it belongs and where these services provide a real advantage to the enterprise and their costs represent a significant part of the expenses of the enterprise, the host country may require that a profit margin be included in the amount of the costs. As far as possible, the host country should then try to avoid schematic solutions and rely on the value of these services in the given circumstances of each case.

37. However, more commonly the provision of services is merely part of the general management activity of the company taken as a whole as where, for example, the enterprise conducts a common system of training and employees of each part of the enterprise benefit from it. In such a case it would usually be appropriate to treat the cost of providing the service as being part of the general administrative expenses of the enterprise as a whole which should be allocated on an actual cost basis to the various parts of the enterprise to the extent that the costs are incurred for the purposes of that part of the enterprise, without any mark-up to represent profit to another part of the enterprise.

38. The treatment of services performed in the course of the general management of an enterprise raises the question whether any part of the total profits of an enterprise should be deemed to arise from the exercise of good management. Consider the case of a company that has its head office in one country but carries on all its business through a permanent establishment situated in another country. In the extreme case it might well be that only the directors' meetings were held at the head office and that all other activities of the company apart from purely formal legal activities, were carried on in the permanent establishment. In such a case there is something to be said for the view that at least part of the profits of the whole enterprise arose from the skilful management and business acumen of the directors and that part of the profits of the enterprise ought, therefore, to be attributed to the country in which the head office was situated. If the company had been managed by a managing agency, then that agency would doubtless have charged a fee for its services and the fee might well have been a simple percentage participation in the profits of the enterprise. But whatever the theoretical merits of such a course, practical considerations weigh heavily against it. In the kind of case quoted the expenses of management would, of course, be set against the profits of the permanent establishment in accordance with the provisions of paragraph 3, but when the matter is looked at as a whole, it is thought that it would not be right to go further by deducting and taking into account some notional figure for "profits of management". In cases identical to the extreme case mentioned above, no account should therefore be taken in determining taxable profits of the permanent establishment of any notional figure such as profits of management.

39. It may be, of course, that countries where it has been customary to allocate some proportion of the total profits of an enterprise to the head office of the enterprise to represent the profits of good management will wish to continue to make such an allocation. Nothing in the Article is designed to prevent this. Nevertheless it follows from what is said in paragraph 38 above that a country in which a permanent establishment is situated is in no way required to deduct when calculating the profits attributable to that permanent establishment an amount intended to represent a proportionate part of the profits of management attributable to the head office.

40. It might well be that if the country in which the head office of an enterprise is situated allocates to the head office some percentage of the profits of the enterprise only in respect of good management, whilst the country in which the permanent establishment is situated does not, the resulting total of the amounts charged to tax in the two countries would be greater than it should be. In any such case the country in which the head office of the enterprise is situated should take the initiative in arranging for such adjustments to be made in computing the taxation liability in that country as may be necessary to ensure that any double taxation is eliminated.

41. The treatment of interest charges raises particular issues. First, there might be amounts which, under the name of interest, are charged by a head office to its permanent establishment with respect to internal “loans” by the former to the latter. Except for financial enterprises such as banks, it is generally agreed that such internal “interest” need not be recognised. This is because:

- From the legal standpoint, the transfer of capital against payment of interest and an undertaking to repay in full at the due date is really a formal act incompatible with the true legal nature of a permanent establishment.
- From the economic standpoint, internal debts and receivables may prove to be non-existent, since if an enterprise is solely or predominantly equity-funded it ought not to be allowed to deduct interest charges that it has manifestly not had to pay. Whilst, admittedly, symmetrical charges and returns will not distort the enterprise’s overall profits, partial results may well be arbitrarily changed.

42. For these reasons, the ban on deductions for internal debts and receivables should continue to apply generally, subject to the special situation of banks, as mentioned below.

43. A different issue, however, is that of the deduction of interest on debts actually incurred by the enterprise. Such debts may relate in whole or in part to the activities of the permanent establishment; indeed, loans contracted by an enterprise will serve either the head office, the permanent establishment or both. The question that arises in relation to these debts is how to determine the part of the interest that should be deducted in computing the profits attributable to the permanent establishment.

44. The approach suggested in this Commentary before 1994, namely the direct and indirect apportionment of actual debt charges, did not prove to be a practical solution, notably since it was unlikely to be applied in a uniform manner. Also, it is well known that the indirect apportionment of total interest payment charges, or of the part of interest that remains after certain direct allocations, comes up against practical difficulties. It is also well known that direct apportionment of total interest expense may not accurately reflect the cost of financing the permanent establishment because the taxpayer may be able to control where loans are booked and adjustments may need to be made to reflect economic reality, in particular the fact that an independent enterprise would normally be expected to have a certain level of “free” capital.

45. Consequently, the majority of Member countries consider that it would be preferable to look for a practicable solution that would take into account a capital structure appropriate to both the organization and the functions performed. This appropriate capital structure will take account of the fact that in order to carry out its activities, the permanent establishment requires a certain amount of funding made up of “free” capital and interest-bearing debt. The objective is therefore to attribute an arm’s length amount of interest to the permanent establishment after attributing an appropriate amount of “free” capital in order to support the functions, assets and risks of the permanent establishment. Under the arm’s length principle a permanent establishment should have sufficient capital to support the functions it undertakes, the assets it economically owns and the risks it assumes. In the financial sector regulations stipulate minimum levels of regulatory capital to provide a cushion in the event that some of the risks inherent in the business crystallise into financial loss. Capital provides a similar cushion against crystallisation of risk in non-financial sectors.

46. As explained in Section D-2 (v) b) of Part I of the Report *Attribution of Profits to Permanent Establishments*, there are different acceptable approaches for attributing “free” capital that are capable of giving an arm’s length result. Each approach has its own strengths and weaknesses, which become more or less material depending on the facts and circumstances of particular cases. Different methods adopt different starting points for determining the amount of “free” capital attributable to a permanent establishment, which either put more emphasis on the actual structure of the enterprise of which the permanent establishment is a part or alternatively, on the capital structures of comparable independent enterprises. The key to attributing “free” capital is to recognise:

- the existence of strengths and weaknesses in any approach and when these are likely to be present;
- that there is no single arm’s length amount of “free” capital, but a range of potential capital attributions within which it is possible to find an amount of “free” capital that can meet the basic principle set out above.

47. It is recognised, however, that the existence of different acceptable approaches for attributing “free” capital to a permanent establishment which are capable of giving an arm’s length result can give rise to problems of double taxation. The main concern, which is especially acute for financial institutions, is that if the domestic law rules of the State where the permanent establishment is located and of the State of the enterprise require different acceptable approaches for attributing an arm’s length amount of free capital to the permanent establishment, the amount of profits calculated by the State of the permanent establishment may be higher than the amount of profits calculated by the State of the enterprise for purposes of relief of double taxation.

48. Given the importance of that issue, the Committee has looked for a practical solution. OECD member countries have therefore agreed to accept, for the purposes of determining the amount of interest deduction that will be used in computing double taxation relief, the attribution of capital derived from the application of the approach used by the State in which the permanent establishment is located if the following two conditions are met: first, if the difference in capital attribution between that State and the State of the enterprise results from conflicting domestic law choices of capital attribution methods, and second, if there is agreement that the State in which the permanent establishment is located has used an authorised approach to the attribution of capital and there is also agreement that that approach produces a result consistent with the arm's length principle in the particular case. OECD member countries consider that they are able to achieve that result either under their domestic law, through the interpretation of Articles 7 and 23 or under the mutual agreement procedure of Article 25 and, in particular, the possibility offered by that Article to resolve any issues concerning the application or interpretation of their tax treaties.

49. As already mentioned, special considerations apply to internal interest charges on advances between different parts of a financial enterprise (*e.g.* a bank), in view of the fact that making and receiving advances is closely related to the ordinary business of such enterprises. This problem, as well as other problems relating to the application of Article 7 to the permanent establishments of banks and enterprises carrying on global trading, is discussed in Parts II and III of the Report *Attribution of Profits to Permanent Establishments*.

50. The determination of the investment assets attributable to a permanent establishment through which insurance activities are carried on also raises particular issues, which are discussed in Part IV of the Report.

51. It is usually found that there are, or there can be constructed, adequate accounts for each part or section of an enterprise so that profits and expenses, adjusted as may be necessary, can be allocated to a particular part of the enterprise with a considerable degree of precision. This method of allocation is, it is thought, to be preferred in general wherever it is reasonably practicable to adopt it. There are, however, circumstances in which this may not be the case and paragraphs 2 and 3 are in no way intended to imply that other methods cannot properly be adopted where appropriate in order to arrive at the profits of a permanent establishment on a "separate enterprise" footing. It may well be, for example, that profits of insurance enterprises can most conveniently be ascertained by special methods of computation, *e.g.* by applying appropriate co-efficients to gross premiums received from policy holders in the country concerned. Again, in the case of a relatively small enterprise operating on both sides of the border between two countries, there may be no proper accounts for the permanent establishment nor means of constructing them. There may, too, be other cases where the affairs of the permanent establishment are so closely bound up with those of the head office that it would be impossible to disentangle them on any strict basis of branch accounts. Where it has been customary in such cases to estimate the arm's length profit of a permanent establishment by reference to suitable criteria, it may well be reasonable that that method should continue to be followed, notwithstanding that the estimate thus made may not achieve as high a degree of accurate measurement of the profit as adequate accounts. Even where such a course has not been customary, it may, exceptionally, be necessary for practical reasons to estimate the arm's length profits based on other methods.

#### **Paragraph 4**

52. It has in some cases been the practice to determine the profits to be attributed to a permanent establishment not on the basis of separate accounts or by making an estimate of arm's length profit, but simply by apportioning the total profits of the enterprise by reference to various formulae. Such a method differs from those envisaged in paragraph 2, since it contemplates not an attribution of profits on a separate enterprise footing, but an apportionment of total profits; and indeed it might produce a result in figures which would differ from that which would be arrived at by a computation based on separate accounts. Paragraph 4 makes it clear that such a method may continue to be employed by a Contracting State if it has been customary in that State to adopt it, even though the figure arrived at may at times differ to some extent from that which would be obtained from separate accounts, provided that the result can fairly be said to be in accordance with the principles contained in the Article. It is emphasized, however, that in general the profits to be attributed to a permanent establishment should be determined by reference to the establishment's accounts if these reflect the real facts. It is considered that a method of allocation which is based on apportioning total profits is generally not as appropriate as a method which has regard only to the activities of the permanent establishment and should be used only where, exceptionally, it has as a matter of history been customary in the past and is accepted in the country concerned both by the taxation authorities and taxpayers generally there as being satisfactory. It is understood that paragraph 4 may be deleted where neither State uses such a method. Where, however, Contracting States wish to be able to use a method which has not been customary in the past the paragraph should be amended during the bilateral negotiations to make this clear.

53. It would not, it is thought, be appropriate within the framework of this Commentary to attempt to discuss in length the many various methods involving apportionment of total profits that have been adopted in particular fields for allocating profits. These methods have been well documented in treatises on international taxation. It may, however,

not be out of place to summarise briefly some of the main types and to lay down some very general directives for their use.

54. The essential character of a method involving apportionment of total profits is that a proportionate part of the profits of the whole enterprise is allocated to a part thereof, all parts of the enterprise being assumed to have contributed on the basis of the criterion or criteria adopted to the profitability of the whole. The difference between one such method and another arises for the most part from the varying criteria used to determine what is the correct proportion of the total profits. It is fair to say that the criteria commonly used can be grouped into three main categories, namely those which are based on the receipts of the enterprise, its expenses or its capital structure. The first category covers allocation methods based on turnover or on commission, the second on wages and the third on the proportion of the total working capital of the enterprise allocated to each branch or part. It is not, of course, possible to say in vacuo that any of these methods is intrinsically more accurate than the others; the appropriateness of any particular method will depend on the circumstances to which it is applied. In some enterprises, such as those providing services or producing proprietary articles with a high profit margin, net profits will depend very much on turnover. For insurance enterprises it may be appropriate to make an apportionment of total profits by reference to premiums received from policy holders in each of the countries concerned. In the case of an enterprise manufacturing goods with a high cost raw material or labour content, profits may be found to be related more closely to expenses. In the case of banking and financial concerns the proportion of total working capital may be the most relevant criterion. It is considered that the general aim of any method involving apportionment of total profits ought to be to produce figures of taxable profit that approximate as closely as possible to the figures that would have been produced on a separate accounts basis, and that it would not be desirable to attempt in this connection to lay down any specific directive other than that it should be the responsibility of the taxation authority, in consultation with the authorities of other countries concerned, to use the method which in the light of all the known facts seems most likely to produce that result.

55. The use of any method which allocates to a part of an enterprise a proportion of the total profits of the whole does, of course, raise the question of the method to be used in computing the total profits of the enterprise. This may well be a matter which will be treated differently under the laws of different countries. This is not a problem which it would seem practicable to attempt to resolve by laying down any rigid rule. It is scarcely to be expected that it would be accepted that the profits to be apportioned should be the profits as they are computed under the laws of one particular country; each country concerned would have to be given the right to compute the profits according to the provisions of its own laws.

#### **Paragraph 5**

56. In paragraph 4 of Article 5 there are listed a number of examples of activities which, even though carried on at a fixed place of business, are deemed not to be included in the term "permanent establishment". In considering rules for the allocation of profits to a permanent establishment the most important of these examples is the activity mentioned in paragraph 5 of this Article, *i.e.* the purchasing office.

57. Paragraph 5 is not, of course, concerned with the organisation established solely for purchasing; such an organisation is not a permanent establishment and the profits allocation provisions of this Article would not therefore come into play. The paragraph is concerned with a permanent establishment which, although carrying on other business, also carries on purchasing for its head office. In such a case the paragraph provides that the profits of the permanent establishment shall not be increased by adding to them a notional figure for profits from purchasing. It follows, of course, that any expenses that arise from the purchasing activities will also be excluded in calculating the taxable profits of the permanent establishment.

#### **Paragraph 6**

58. This paragraph is intended to lay down clearly that a method of allocation once used should not be changed merely because in a particular year some other method produces more favourable results. One of the purposes of a double taxation convention is to give an enterprise of a Contracting State some degree of certainty about the tax treatment that will be accorded to its permanent establishment in the other Contracting State as well as to the part of it in its home State which is dealing with the permanent establishment; for this reason, paragraph 6 gives an assurance of continuous and consistent tax treatment.

#### **Paragraph 7**

59. Although it has not been found necessary in the Convention to define the term "profits", it should nevertheless be understood that the term when used in this Article and elsewhere in the Convention has a broad

meaning including all income derived in carrying on an enterprise. Such a broad meaning corresponds to the use of the term made in the tax laws of most OECD member countries.

60. This interpretation of the term “profits”, however, may give rise to some uncertainty as to the application of the Convention. If the profits of an enterprise include categories of income which are treated separately in other Articles of the Convention, *e.g.* dividends, it may be asked whether the taxation of those profits is governed by the special Article on dividends, etc., or by the provisions of this Article.

61. To the extent that an application of this Article and the special Article concerned would result in the same tax treatment, there is little practical significance to this question. Further, it should be noted that some of the special Articles contain specific provisions giving priority to a specific Article (cf. paragraph 4 of Article 6, paragraph 4 of Articles 10 and 11, paragraph 3 of Article 12, and paragraph 2 of Article 21).

62. It has seemed desirable, however, to lay down a rule of interpretation in order to clarify the field of application of this Article in relation to the other Articles dealing with a specific category of income. In conformity with the practice generally adhered to in existing bilateral conventions, paragraph 7 gives first preference to the special Articles on dividends, interest, etc. It follows from the rule that this Article will be applicable to business profits which do not belong to categories of income covered by the special Articles, and, in addition, to dividends, interest, etc. which under paragraph 4 of Articles 10 and 11, paragraph 3 of Article 12 and paragraph 2 of Article 21, fall within this Article (cf. paragraphs 12 to 18 of the Commentary on Article 12 which discuss the principles governing whether, in the particular case of computer software, payments should be classified as business profits within Article 7 or as a capital gain within Article 13 on the one hand or as royalties within Article 12 on the other). It is understood that the items of income covered by the special Articles may, subject to the provisions of the Convention, be taxed either separately, or as business profits, in conformity with the tax laws of the Contracting States.

63. It is open to Contracting States to agree bilaterally upon special explanations or definitions concerning the term “profits” with a view to clarifying the distinction between this term and *e.g.* the concept of dividends. It may in particular be found appropriate to do so where in a convention under negotiation a deviation has been made from the definitions in the special Articles on dividends, interest and royalties. It may also be deemed desirable if the Contracting States wish to place on notice, that, in agreement with the domestic tax laws of one or both of the States, the term “profits” includes special classes of receipts such as income from the alienation or the letting of a business or of movable property used in a business. In this connection it may have to be considered whether it would be useful to include also additional rules for the allocation of such special profits.

64. It should also be noted that, whilst the definition of “royalties” in paragraph 2 of Article 12 of the 1963 Draft Convention and 1977 Model Convention included payments “for the use of, or the right to use, industrial, commercial, or scientific equipment”, the reference to these payments was subsequently deleted from that definition in order to ensure that income from the leasing of industrial, commercial or scientific equipment, including the income from the leasing of containers, falls under the provisions of Article 7 rather than those of Article 12, a result that the Committee on Fiscal Affairs considers to be appropriate given the nature of such income.

#### **Observations on the Commentary**

65. *Italy* and *Portugal* deem as essential to take into consideration that — irrespective of the meaning given to the fourth sentence of paragraph 8 — as far as the method for computing taxes is concerned, national systems are not affected by the new wording of the model, *i.e.* by the elimination of Article 14.

66. *Belgium* cannot share the views expressed in paragraph 13 of the Commentary. Belgium considers that the application of controlled foreign companies legislation is contrary to the provisions of paragraph 1 of Article 7. This is especially the case where a contracting State taxes one of its residents on income derived by a foreign entity by using a fiction attributing to that resident, in proportion to his participation in the capital of the foreign entity, the income derived by that entity. By doing so, that State increases the tax base of its resident by including in it income which has not been derived by that resident but by a foreign entity which is not taxable in that State in accordance with paragraph 1 of Article 7. That Contracting State thus disregards the legal personality of the foreign entity and acts contrary to paragraph 1 of Article 7.

67. *Luxembourg* does not share the interpretation in paragraph 13 which provides that paragraph 1 of Article 7 does not restrict a Contracting State’s right to tax its own residents under controlled foreign companies provisions found in its domestic law as this interpretation challenges the fundamental principle contained in paragraph 1 of Article 7.

68. With reference to paragraph 13, *Ireland* notes its general observation in paragraph 27.5 of the Commentary on Article 1.

69. With regard to paragraph 45, *Greece* notes that the Greek internal law does not foresee any rules or methods for attributing “free” capital to permanent establishments. Concerning loans contracted by an enterprise that relate in whole or in part to the activities of the permanent establishment, Greece allows as deduction the part of the interest which corresponds to the amount of a loan contracted by the head office and actually remitted to the permanent establishment.

70. *Portugal* wishes to reserve its right not to follow the position expressed in paragraph 45 of the Commentary on Article 7 except whenever there are specific domestic provisions foreseeing certain levels of “free” capital for permanent establishments.

71. With regard to paragraph 46, *Sweden* wishes to clarify that it does not consider that the different approaches for attributing “free” capital that the paragraph refers to as being “acceptable” will necessarily lead to a result in accordance with the arm’s length principle. Consequently, when looking at the facts and circumstances of each case in order to determine whether the amount of interest deduction resulting from the application of these approaches conforms to the arm’s length principle, Sweden in many cases would not consider that the other States’ approach conforms to the arm’s length principle. Sweden is of the opinion that double taxation will therefore often occur, requiring the use of the mutual agreement procedure.

72. *Portugal* wishes to reserve its right not to follow the “symmetry” approach described in paragraph 48 of the Commentary on Article 7, insofar as the Portuguese internal law does not foresee any rules or methods for attributing “free” capital to permanent establishments. In eliminating double taxation according to Article 23, Portugal, as the home country, determines the amount of profits attributable to a permanent establishment according to the domestic law.

73. *Germany, Japan* and the *United States*, whilst agreeing to the practical solution described in paragraph 48, wish to clarify how this agreement will be implemented. Neither Germany, nor Japan, nor the United States can automatically accept for all purposes all calculations by the State in which the permanent establishment is located. In cases involving Germany or Japan, the second condition described in paragraph 48 has to be satisfied through a mutual agreement procedure under Article 25. In the case of Japan and the United States, a taxpayer who seeks to obtain additional foreign tax credit limitation must do so through a mutual agreement procedure in which the taxpayer would have to prove to the Japanese or the United States competent authority, as the case may be, that double taxation of the permanent establishment profits which resulted from the conflicting domestic law choices of capital attribution methods has been left unrelieved after applying mechanisms under their respective domestic tax law such as utilisation of foreign tax credit limitation created by other transactions.

74. With reference to paragraphs 6 and 7, *New Zealand* notes that it does not agree with the approach put forward on the attribution of profits to permanent establishments in general, as reflected in Part I of the Report *Attribution of Profits to Permanent Establishments*.

#### **Reservations on the Article**

75. *Australia, Chile<sup>1</sup>* and *New Zealand* reserve the right to include a provision that will permit their domestic law to apply in relation to the taxation of profits from any form of insurance.

76. *Australia* and *New Zealand* reserve the right to include a provision clarifying their right to tax a share of business profits to which a resident of the other Contracting State is beneficially entitled where those profits are derived by a trustee of a trust estate (other than certain unit trusts that are treated as companies for Australian and New Zealand tax purposes) from the carrying on of a business in Australia or New Zealand, as the case may be, through a permanent establishment.

77. *Korea* and *Portugal* reserve the right to tax persons performing professional services or other activities of an independent character if they are present on their territory for a period or periods exceeding in the aggregate 183 days in any twelve month period, even if they do not have a permanent establishment (or a fixed base) available to them for the purpose of performing such services or activities.

78. *Chile,<sup>1</sup> Italy* and *Portugal* reserve the right to tax persons performing independent personal services under a separate article which corresponds to Article 14 as it stood before its elimination in 2000.

79. The *United States* reserves the right to amend Article 7 to provide that, in applying paragraphs 1 and 2 of the Article, any income or gain attributable to a permanent establishment during its existence may be taxable by the Contracting State in which the permanent establishment exists even if the payments are deferred until after the permanent establishment has ceased to exist. The United States also wishes to note that it reserves the right to apply such a rule, as well, under Articles 11, 12, 13 and 21.

80. *Turkey* reserves the right to subject income from the leasing of containers to a withholding tax at source in all cases. In case of the application of Articles 5 and 7 to such income, Turkey would like to apply the permanent establishment rule to the simple depot, depot-agency and operational branch cases.

81. *Norway* and the *United States* reserve the right to treat income from the use, maintenance or rental of containers used in international traffic under Article 8 in the same manner as income from shipping and air transport.

82. *Australia* and *Portugal* reserve the right to propose in bilateral negotiations a provision to the effect that, if the information available to the competent authority of a Contracting State is inadequate to determine the profits to be attributed to the permanent establishment of an enterprise, the competent authority may apply to that enterprise for that purpose the provisions of the taxation law of that State, subject to the qualification that such law will be applied, so far as the information available to the competent authority permits, in accordance with the principles of this Article.

83. *Mexico* reserves the right to tax in the State where the permanent establishment is situated business profits derived from the sale of goods or merchandise carried out directly by its home office situated in the other Contracting State, provided that those goods and merchandise are of the same or similar kind as the ones sold through that permanent establishment. The Government of Mexico will apply this rule only as a safeguard against abuse and not as a general “force of attraction” principle; thus, the rule will not apply when the enterprise proves that the sales have been carried out for reasons other than obtaining a benefit under the Convention.

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1. *Chile was added to this reservation when it joined the OECD in 2010.*

## Article 8

21. Replace paragraph 20 of the Commentary on Article 8 by the following:

20. Nor does any difficulty arise in applying the provisions of paragraphs 1 and 2 if the enterprise has in another State a permanent establishment which is not exclusively engaged in shipping, inland waterways transport or air transport. If its goods are carried in its own ships to a permanent establishment belonging to it in a foreign country, it is right to say that none of the profit obtained by the enterprise through acting as its own carrier can properly be ~~attributed to~~ **taxed in the State where the permanent establishment is situated**. The same must be true even if the permanent establishment maintains installations for operating the ships or aircraft (*e.g.* consignment wharves) or incurs other costs in connection with the carriage of the enterprise’s goods (*e.g.* staff costs). In this case, ~~the permanent establishment’s expenditure in respect of the operation of the ships, boats or aircraft should be attributed not to the permanent establishment but to the enterprise itself, since none of the profit obtained through the carrying benefits the permanent establishment.~~ ***even though certain functions related to the operation of ships and aircraft in international traffic may be performed by the permanent establishment, the profits attributable to these functions are taxable exclusively in the State where the place of effective management of the enterprise is situated. Any expenses, or part thereof, incurred in performing such functions must be deducted in computing that part of the profit that is not taxable in the State where the permanent establishment is located and will not, therefore, reduce the part of the profits attributable to the permanent establishment which may be taxed in that State pursuant to Article 7.***

22. Replace paragraph 21 of the Commentary on Article 8 by the following:

21. Where ships or aircraft are operated in international traffic, the application of the Article to the profits arising from such operation will not be affected by the fact that the ships or aircraft are operated by a permanent establishment which is not the place of effective management of the whole enterprise; ***thus, even if such profits could be attributed to the permanent establishment under Article 7, they will only be taxable in the State in which the place of effective management of the enterprise is situated (a result that is confirmed by paragraph 4 of Article 7).*** ~~(for example, ships or aircraft put into service by the permanent establishment or figuring on the balance sheet of the permanent establishment).~~

23. Replace paragraph 38 of the Commentary on Article 8 by the following:

38. *Australia reserves the right to tax profits from the carriage of passengers or cargo taken on board at one place in Australia for discharge in Australia. ~~Australia also reserves the right to tax profits from other coastal and continental shelf activities.~~*

24. Add the following new paragraph 43 to the Commentary on Article 8:

***43. Chile and Slovenia reserve the right not to extend the scope of the Article to cover inland waterways transportation in bilateral conventions and to make corresponding modifications to paragraph 3 of Articles 13, 15 and 22.***

#### **Article 9**

25. Delete the following paragraph 14 of the Commentary on Article 9:

~~14. *Germany does not agree with the use of the term “arm’s length profits” in paragraph 2 above.*~~

26. Add the following new paragraph 19 to the Commentary on Article 9:

***19. Slovenia reserves the right to specify in paragraph 2 that a correlative adjustment will be made only if it considers that the primary adjustment is justified.***

#### **Article 10**

27. Add the following new paragraph 13.2 immediately after paragraph 13.1 of the Commentary on Article 10:

***13.2 Similarly, some States refrain from levying tax on dividends paid to other States and some of their wholly-owned entities, at least to the extent that such dividends are derived from activities of a governmental nature. Some States are able to grant such an exemption under their interpretation of the sovereign immunity principle (see paragraphs 6.38 and 6.39 of the Commentary on Article 1); others may do it pursuant to provisions of their domestic law. States wishing to do so may confirm or clarify, in their bilateral conventions, the scope of these exemptions or grant such an exemption in cases where it would not otherwise be available. This may be done by adding to the Article an additional paragraph drafted along the following lines:***

***Notwithstanding the provisions of paragraph 2, dividends referred to in paragraph 1 shall be taxable only in the Contracting State of which the recipient is a resident if the beneficial owner of the dividends is that State or a political subdivision or local authority thereof.***



28. Replace paragraph 32 of the Commentary on Article 10 by the following:

32. It has been suggested that the paragraph could give rise to abuses through the transfer of shares to permanent establishments set up solely for that purpose in countries that offer preferential treatment to dividend income. Apart from the fact that such abusive transactions might trigger the application of domestic anti-abuse rules, it must be recognised that a particular location can only constitute a permanent establishment if a business is carried on therein and, ~~also as explained below~~, that the requirement that a shareholding be “effectively connected” to such a location ~~requires that the shareholding be genuinely connected to that business~~ **requires more than merely recording the shareholding in the books of the permanent establishment for accounting purposes.**

**32.1 A holding in respect of which dividends are paid will be effectively connected with a permanent establishment, and will therefore form part of its business assets, if the “economic” ownership of the holding is allocated to that permanent establishment under the principles developed in the Committee’s report entitled Attribution of Profits to Permanent Establishments<sup>1</sup> (see in particular paragraphs 72-97 of Part I of the report) for the purposes of the application of paragraph 2 of Article 7. In the context of that paragraph, the “economic” ownership of a holding means the equivalent of ownership for income tax purposes by a separate enterprise, with the attendant benefits and burdens (e.g. the right to the dividends attributable to the ownership of the holding and the potential exposure to gains or losses from the appreciation or depreciation of the holding).**

**32.2 In the case of the permanent establishment of an enterprise carrying on insurance activities, the determination of whether a holding is effectively connected with the permanent establishment shall be made by giving due regard to the guidance set forth in Part IV of the Committee’s report with respect to whether the income on or gain from that holding is taken into account in determining the permanent establishment’s yield on the amount of investment assets attributed to it (see in particular paragraphs 165-170 of Part IV). That guidance being general in nature, tax authorities should consider applying a flexible and pragmatic approach which would take into account an enterprise’s reasonable and consistent application of that guidance for purposes of identifying the specific assets that are effectively connected with the permanent establishment.**

29. Replace paragraph 59 of the Commentary on Article 10 by the following:

59. Comments above relating to dividends paid to individuals are generally applicable to dividends paid to companies which hold less than 25 per cent of the capital of the company paying the dividends. ~~Moreover, the Committee on Fiscal Affairs has not covered in the Commentary the special problem of dividends paid to collective investment institutions (investment companies or investment funds)~~ **The treatment of dividends paid to collective investment vehicles raises particular issues which are addressed in paragraphs 6.8 to 6.34 of the Commentary on Article 1.**

30. Delete the following paragraph 69 of the Commentary on Article 10:

~~69. New Zealand reserves the right to tax, at a rate of 15 per cent, dividends paid by a company that is a resident of New Zealand.~~

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31. Delete the following paragraph 73 of the Commentary on Article 10:

~~73. — *Italy reserves its position concerning the percentage envisaged for the holding (25 per cent) and can only agree to a rate of tax of 5 per cent for a direct holding of more than 50 per cent.*~~

32. Add the following new paragraph 74 to the Commentary on Article 10:

**74. *In view of its particular taxation system, Chile retains its freedom of action with regard to the provisions in the Convention relating to the rate and form of distribution of profits by companies.***

33. Delete the following paragraph 76 of the Commentary on Article 10:

~~76. — *Spain reserves its position on the rate of tax of 5 per cent and the determination of the minimum percentage for the holding.*~~

34. Replace paragraph 81 of the Commentary on Article 10 by the following:

81. ~~*Canada, and Germany and Spain*~~ reserve the right to amplify the definition of dividends in paragraph 3 so as to cover certain interest payments which are treated as distributions under their domestic law.

35. Replace paragraph 81.2 of the Commentary on Article 10 by the following:

81.2 ***Chile and Luxembourg*** reserves the right to expand the definition of dividends in paragraph 3 in order to cover certain payments which are treated as distributions of dividends under ~~its~~***their*** domestic law.

36. Delete paragraph 82 and the preceding heading of the Commentary on Article 10:

~~*Paragraph 4*~~

~~82. — *Italy reserves the right to subject dividends to the taxes imposed by its law whenever the recipient thereof has a permanent establishment in Italy, even if the holding on which the dividends are paid is not effectively connected with such permanent establishment.*~~

## ***Article 11***

37. Replace paragraph 7.4 of the Commentary on Article 11 by the following:

7.4 Some States refrain from levying tax on income derived by other States ***and some of their wholly-owned entities (e.g. a central bank established as a separate entity)***, at least to the extent that such income is derived from activities of a governmental nature. ***Some States are able to grant such an exemption under their interpretation of the sovereign immunity principle (see paragraphs 6.38 and 6.39 of the Commentary on Article 1); others may do it pursuant to provisions of their domestic law.*** In their bilateral conventions, many States wish to confirm or clarify the scope of these~~at~~ exemptions with respect to interest ***or to grant such an exemption in cases where it would not otherwise be available.*** States wishing to do so may therefore agree to include the following category of interest in a paragraph providing for exemption of certain interest from taxation in the State of source:

a) is that State or the central bank, a political subdivision or local authority thereof;

38. Replace paragraph 25 of the Commentary on Article 11 by the following:

25. It has been suggested that the paragraph could give rise to abuses through the transfer of loans to permanent establishments set up solely for that purpose in countries that offer preferential treatment to interest income. Apart from the fact that such abusive transactions might trigger the application of domestic anti-abuse rules, it must be recognised that a particular location can only constitute a permanent establishment if a business is carried on therein and, ~~also as explained below~~, that the requirement that a debt-claim be “effectively connected” to such a location ~~requires that the debt-claim be genuinely connected to that business~~ *requires more than merely recording the debt-claims in the books of the permanent establishment for accounting purposes.*

*25.1 A debt-claim in respect of which interest is paid will be effectively connected with a permanent establishment, and will therefore form part of its business assets, if the “economic” ownership of the debt-claim is allocated to that permanent establishment under the principles developed in the Committee’s report entitled Attribution of Profits to Permanent Establishments<sup>1</sup> (see in particular paragraphs 72-97 of Part I of the report) for the purposes of the application of paragraph 2 of Article 7. In the context of that paragraph, the “economic” ownership of a debt-claim means the equivalent of ownership for income tax purposes by a separate enterprise, with the attendant benefits and burdens (e.g. the right to the interest attributable to the ownership of the debt-claim and the potential exposure to gains or losses from the appreciation or depreciation of the debt-claim).*

*25.2 In the case of the permanent establishment of an enterprise carrying on insurance activities, the determination of whether a debt-claim is effectively connected with the permanent establishment shall be made by giving due regard to the guidance set forth in Part IV of the Committee’s report with respect to whether the income on or gain from that debt-claim is taken into account in determining the permanent establishment’s yield on the amount of investment assets attributed to it (see in particular paragraphs 165-170 of Part IV). That guidance being general in nature, tax authorities should consider applying a flexible and pragmatic approach which would take into account an enterprise’s reasonable and consistent application of that guidance for purposes of identifying the specific assets that are effectively connected with the permanent establishment.*

39. Replace paragraph 38 of the Commentary on Article 11 by the following:

38. *Chile, Hungary, Mexico, Portugal, the Slovak Republic and Turkey* reserve their positions on the rate provided in paragraph 2.

40. Replace paragraph 43 of the Commentary on Article 11 by the following:

43. *Canada, Chile and Norway* reserve the right to delete the reference to debt-claims carrying the right to participate in the debtor’s profits.

41. Delete paragraph 45 and the preceding heading of the Commentary on Article 11:

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*Paragraph 4*

~~45. Italy reserves the right to subject interest to the taxes imposed by its law whenever the recipient thereof has a permanent establishment in Italy, even if the indebtedness in respect of which the interest is paid is not effectively connected with such permanent establishment.~~

**Article 12**

42. Add the following new paragraphs 9.1 to 9.3 immediately after paragraph 9 of the Commentary on Article 12:

*9.1 Satellite operators and their customers (including broadcasting and telecommunication enterprises) frequently enter into “transponder leasing” agreements under which the satellite operator allows the customer to utilise the capacity of a satellite transponder to transmit over large geographical areas. Payments made by customers under typical “transponder leasing” agreements are made for the use of the transponder transmitting capacity and will not constitute royalties under the definition of paragraph 2: these payments are not made in consideration for the use of, or right to use, property, or for information, that is referred to in the definition (they cannot be viewed, for instance, as payments for information or for the use of, or right to use, a secret process since the satellite technology is not transferred to the customer). As regards treaties that include the leasing of industrial, commercial or scientific (ICS) equipment in the definition of royalties, the characterisation of the payment will depend to a large extent on the relevant contractual arrangements. Whilst the relevant contracts often refer to the “lease” of a transponder, in most cases the customer does not acquire the physical possession of the transponder but simply its transmission capacity: the satellite is operated by the lessor and the lessee has no access to the transponder that has been assigned to it. In such cases, the payments made by the customers would therefore be in the nature of payments for services, to which Article 7 applies, rather than payments for the use, or right to use, ICS equipment. A different, but much less frequent, transaction would be where the owner of the satellite leases it to another party so that the latter may operate it and either use it for its own purposes or offer its data transmission capacity to third parties. In such a case, the payment made by the satellite operator to the satellite owner could well be considered as a payment for the leasing of industrial, commercial or scientific equipment. Similar considerations apply to payments made to lease or purchase the capacity of cables for the transmission of electrical power or communications (e.g. through a contract granting an indefeasible right of use of such capacity) or pipelines (e.g. for the transportation of gas or oil).*

*9.2 Also, payments made by a telecommunications network operator to another network operator under a typical “roaming” agreement (see paragraph 9.1 of the Commentary on Article 5) will not constitute royalties under the definition of paragraph 2 since these payments are not made in consideration for the use of, or right to use, property, or for information, referred to in the definition (they cannot be viewed, for instance, as payments for the use of, or right to use, a secret process since no secret technology is used or transferred to the operator). This conclusion holds true even in the case of treaties that include the leasing of industrial, commercial or scientific (ICS) equipment in the definition of royalties since the operator that pays a charge under a roaming agreement is not paying for the use, or the right to use, the visited network, to which it does not have physical access, but rather for the telecommunications services provided by the foreign network operator.*

*9.3 Payments for the use of, or the right to use, some or all of part of the radio frequency spectrum (e.g. pursuant to a so-called “spectrum license” that allows the holder to transmit*

*media content over designated frequency ranges of the electromagnetic spectrum) do not constitute payments for the use of, or the right to use, property, or for information, that is referred in the definition of royalties in paragraph 2. This conclusion holds true even in the case of treaties that include the leasing of industrial, commercial or scientific (ICS) equipment in the definition of royalties since the payment is not for the use, or the right to use, any equipment.*

43. Replace paragraph 21 of the Commentary on Article 12 by the following:

21. It has been suggested that the paragraph could give rise to abuses through the transfer of rights or property to permanent establishments set up solely for that purpose in countries that offer preferential treatment to royalty income. Apart from the fact that such abusive transactions might trigger the application of domestic anti-abuse rules, it must be recognised that a particular location can only constitute a permanent establishment if a business is carried on therein and, ~~also~~ *as explained below*, that the requirement that a right or property be “effectively connected” to such a location ~~requires that the debt claim be genuinely connected to that business~~ *requires more than merely recording the right or property in the books of the permanent establishment for accounting purposes.*

*21.1 A right or property in respect of which royalties are paid will be effectively connected with a permanent establishment, and will therefore form part of its business assets, if the “economic” ownership of that right or property is allocated to that permanent establishment under the principles developed in the Committee’s report entitled Attribution of Profits to Permanent Establishments<sup>1</sup> (see in particular paragraphs 72-97 of Part I of the report) for the purposes of the application of paragraph 2 of Article 7. In the context of that paragraph, the “economic” ownership of a right or property means the equivalent of ownership for income tax purposes by a separate enterprise, with the attendant benefits and burdens (e.g. the right to the royalties attributable to the ownership of the right or property, the right to any available depreciation and the potential exposure to gains or losses from the appreciation or depreciation of that right or property).*

*21.2 In the case of the permanent establishment of an enterprise carrying on insurance activities, the determination of whether a right or property is effectively connected with the permanent establishment shall be made by giving due regard to the guidance set forth in Part IV of the Committee’s report with respect to whether the income on or gain from that right or property is taken into account in determining the permanent establishment’s yield on the amount of investment assets attributed to it (see in particular paragraphs 165-170 of Part IV). That guidance being general in nature, tax authorities should consider applying a flexible and pragmatic approach which would take into account an enterprise’s reasonable and consistent application of that guidance for purposes of identifying the specific assets that are effectively connected with the permanent establishment.*

44. Add the following new paragraphs 32 and 32.1 to the Commentary on Article 12:

*32. Concerning paragraph 9.1, Germany reserves its position on whether and under which circumstances payments made for the acquisition of the right of disposal over the transport capacity of pipelines or the capacity of technical installations, lines or cables for the transmission of electrical power or communications (including the distribution of radio and*

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*television programs) could be regarded as payments made for the leasing of industrial, commercial or scientific equipment.*

**32.1** *Greece reserves the right to include the payments referred to in paragraphs 9.1, 9.2 and 9.3 in the definition of royalties.*

45. Replace paragraph 36 of the Commentary on Article 12 by the following:

36. *Australia, ~~Chile~~~~Japan~~, Korea, Mexico, New Zealand, Poland, Portugal, the Slovak Republic, ~~Slovenia~~~~Spain~~ and Turkey reserve the right to tax royalties at source.*

46. Replace paragraph 40 of the Commentary on Article 12 by the following:

40. *Canada, **Chile**, the Czech Republic, Hungary, Korea and the Slovak Republic reserve the right to add the words “for the use of, or the right to use, industrial, commercial or scientific equipment” to paragraph 2.*

47. Replace paragraph 44 of the Commentary on Article 12 by the following:

44. *~~Portugal and Spain~~ reserves the right to tax at source as royalties income arising from technical assistance in connection with the use of, or right to use, rights or information of the type referred to in paragraph 2 of the Article.*

48. Delete the following paragraph 47 and preceding heading of the Commentary on Article 12:

~~*Paragraph 3*~~

~~47. *Italy reserves the right to subject royalties and profits from the alienation of rights or property giving rise to royalties to the taxes imposed by its law whenever the recipient thereof has a permanent establishment in Italy, even if the rights or property in respect of which the royalties are paid is not effectively connected with such permanent establishment.*~~

49. Add the heading “*Other reservations*” immediately before paragraph 48 of the Commentary on Article 12.

50. Replace paragraph 48 of the Commentary on Article 12 by the following:

48. *Australia, Belgium, Canada, **Chile**, the Czech Republic, France, Mexico, ~~and~~ the Slovak Republic **and Slovenia** reserve the right, in order to fill what they consider as a gap in the Article, to propose a provision defining the source of royalties by analogy with the provisions of paragraph 5 of Article 11, which deals with the same problem in the case of interest.*

### **Article 13**

51. Add the following new paragraphs 27.1 and 27.2 to the Commentary on Article 13:

**27.1** *For the purposes of the paragraph, property will form part of the business property of a permanent establishment if the “economic” ownership of the property is allocated to that permanent establishment under the principles developed in the Committee’s report entitled Attribution of Profits to Permanent Establishments<sup>1</sup> (see in particular paragraphs 72-97 of*

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1. *Attribution of Profits to Permanent Establishments, OECD, Paris, 2010.*

*Part I of the report) for the purposes of the application of paragraph 2 of Article 7. In the context of that paragraph, the “economic” ownership of property means the equivalent of ownership for income tax purposes by a separate enterprise, with the attendant benefits and burdens (e.g. the right to any income attributable to the ownership of that property, the right to any available depreciation and the potential exposure to gains or losses from the appreciation or depreciation of that property). The mere fact that the property has been recorded, for accounting purposes, on a balance sheet prepared for the permanent establishment will therefore not be sufficient to conclude that it is effectively connected with that permanent establishment.*

*27.2 In the case of the permanent establishment of an enterprise carrying on insurance activities, the determination of whether property will form part of the business property of the permanent establishment shall be made by giving due regard to the guidance set forth in Part IV of the Committee’s report with respect to whether the income on or gain from that property is taken into account in determining the permanent establishment’s yield on the amount of investment assets attributed to it (see in particular paragraphs 165-170 of Part IV). That guidance being general in nature, tax authorities should consider applying a flexible and pragmatic approach which would take into account an enterprise’s reasonable and consistent application of that guidance for purposes of identifying the specific assets that form part of the business property of the permanent establishment.*

52. Add the following new paragraph 33 to the Commentary on Article 13:

*33. Spain reserves its right to tax gains from the alienation of shares or other rights where the ownership of such shares or rights entitles, directly or indirectly, to the enjoyment of immovable property situated in Spain.*

53. Delete paragraph 37 of the Commentary on Article 13:

~~37. — Italy reserves the right to subject capital gains from Italian sources to the taxes imposed by its law whenever the alienator has a permanent establishment in Italy, even if the property or assets alienated did not form part of the business property employed in such permanent establishment.~~

54. Replace paragraph 39 of the Commentary on Article 13 by the following:

~~39. Chile and Sweden~~ wants to reserve the right to tax gains from the alienation of shares or other corporate rights in ~~their Swedish~~ companies.

55. Replace paragraph 42 of the Commentary on Article 13 by the following:

~~42. Japan wishes to retain the right to tax gains from the alienation of shares or other corporate rights which are part of a substantial participation in a Japanese company.~~ *reserves the right to tax gains from the alienation of a Japanese financial institution’s shares if these shares were previously acquired by the alienator from the Government of Japan which had itself previously acquired the shares as part of the bail-out of the financial institution due to its insolvency.*

56. Replace paragraph 45 of the Commentary on Article 13 by the following:

~~45. Korea and Spain~~ reserves the right to tax gains from the alienation of shares or other rights forming part of a substantial participation in a company which is a resident.

57. Replace paragraph 51 of the Commentary on Article 13 by the following:

51. *Belgium, Luxembourg, and the Netherlands and Switzerland* reserve the right not to include paragraph 4 in their conventions.

#### **Article 15**

58. Replace paragraph 1 of the Commentary on Article 15 by the following:

1. Paragraph 1 establishes the general rule as to the taxation of income from employment (other than pensions), namely, that such income is taxable in the State where the employment is actually exercised. ***The issue of whether or not services are provided in the exercise of an employment may sometimes give rise to difficulties which are discussed in paragraphs 8.1 ff.*** Employment is exercised in the place where the employee is physically present when performing the activities for which the employment income is paid. One consequence of this would be that a resident of a Contracting State who derived remuneration, in respect of an employment, from sources in the other State could not be taxed in that other State in respect of that remuneration merely because the results of this work were exploited in that other State.

59. Replace paragraph 7 of the Commentary on Article 15 by the following:

7. Under the third condition, if the employer has a permanent establishment in the State in which the employment is exercised, the exemption is given on condition that the remuneration is not borne by that permanent establishment. The phrase “borne by” must be interpreted in the light of the underlying purpose of subparagraph *c*) of the Article, which is to ensure that the exception provided for in paragraph 2 does not apply to remuneration that could give rise to a deduction, having regard to the principles of Article 7 and the nature of the remuneration, in computing the profits of a permanent establishment situated in the State in which the employment is exercised.

**7.1** ~~In this regard, it must be noted that~~ The fact that the employer has, or has not, actually claimed a deduction for the remuneration in computing the profits attributable to the permanent establishment is not necessarily conclusive since the proper test is whether any deduction otherwise available ***with respect to*** ~~for~~ that remuneration ***should be taken into account in determining the profits attributable to the permanent establishment*** ~~would be allocated to the permanent establishment.~~ That test would be met, for instance, even if no amount were actually deducted as a result of the permanent establishment being exempt from tax in the source country or of the employer simply deciding not to claim a deduction to which he was entitled. The test would also be met where the remuneration is not deductible merely because of its nature (*e.g.* where the State takes the view that the issuing of shares pursuant to an employee stock-option does not give rise to a deduction) rather than because it should not be allocated to the permanent establishment.

**7.2** *For the purpose of determining the profits attributable to a permanent establishment pursuant to paragraph 2 of Article 7, the remuneration paid to an employee of an enterprise of a Contracting State for employment services rendered in the other State for the benefit of a permanent establishment of the enterprise situated in that other State may, given the circumstances, either give rise to a direct deduction or give rise to the deduction of a notional charge, e.g. for services rendered to the permanent establishment by another part of the enterprise. In the latter case, since the notional charge required by the legal fiction of the separate and independent enterprise that is applicable under paragraph 2 of Article 7 is merely*



*a mechanism provided for by that paragraph for the sole purpose of determining the profits attributable to the permanent establishment, this fiction does not affect the determination of whether or not the remuneration is borne by the permanent establishment.*

60. Replace existing paragraph 8 of the Commentary on Article 15 by the following new paragraphs:

~~8. Paragraph 2 has given rise to numerous cases of abuse through adoption of the practice known as “international hiring out of labour”. In this system, a local employer wishing to employ foreign labour for one or more periods of less than 183 days recruits through an intermediary established abroad who purports to be the employer and hires the labour out to the employer. The worker thus fulfils *prima facie* the three conditions laid down by paragraph 2 and may claim exemption from taxation in the country where he is temporarily working. To prevent such abuse, in situations of this type, the term “employer” should be interpreted in the context of paragraph 2. In this respect, it should be noted that the term “employer” is not defined in the Convention but it is understood that the employer is the person having rights on the work produced and bearing the relative responsibility and risks. In cases of international hiring out of labour, these functions are to a large extent exercised by the user. In this context, substance should prevail over form, i.e. each case should be examined to see whether the functions of employer were exercised mainly by the intermediary or by the user. It is therefore up to the Contracting States to agree on the situations in which the intermediary does not fulfil the conditions required for him to be considered as the employer within the meaning of paragraph 2. In settling this question, the competent authorities may refer not only to the above mentioned indications but to a number of circumstances enabling them to establish that the real employer is the user of the labour (and not the foreign intermediary):~~

- ~~— the hirer does not bear the responsibility or risk for the results produced by the employee’s work;~~
- ~~— the authority to instruct the worker lies with the user;~~
- ~~— the work is performed at a place which is under the control and responsibility of the user;~~
- ~~— the remuneration to the hirer is calculated on the basis of the time utilised, or there is in other ways a connection between this remuneration and wages received by the employee;~~
- ~~— tools and materials are essentially put at the employee’s disposal by the user;~~
- ~~— the number and qualifications of the employees are not solely determined by the hirer.~~

*8. There is a direct relationship between the principles underlying the exception of paragraph 2 and Article 7. Article 7 is based on the principle that an enterprise of a Contracting State should not be subjected to tax in the other State unless its business presence in that other State has reached a level sufficient to constitute a permanent establishment. The exception of paragraph 2 of Article 15 extends that principle to the taxation of the employees of such an enterprise where the activities of these employees are carried on in the other State for a relatively short period. Subparagraphs b) and c) make it clear that the exception is not intended to apply where the employment services are rendered to an enterprise the profits of which are subjected to tax in a State either because it is carried on by a resident of that State or because it has a permanent establishment therein to which the services are attributable.*

*8.1 It may be difficult, in certain cases, to determine whether the services rendered in a State by an individual resident of another State, and provided to an enterprise of the first State (or that has a permanent establishment in that State), constitute employment services, to which Article 15 applies, or services rendered by a separate enterprise, to which Article 7 applies or, more generally, whether the exception applies. While the Commentary previously dealt with*

*cases where arrangements were structured for the main purpose of obtaining the benefits of the exception of paragraph 2 of Article 15, it was found that similar issues could arise in many other cases that did not involve tax-motivated transactions and the Commentary was amended to provide a more comprehensive discussion of these questions.*

*8.2 In some States, a formal contractual relationship would not be questioned for tax purposes unless there were some evidence of manipulation and these States, as a matter of domestic law, would consider that employment services are only rendered where there is a formal employment relationship.*

*8.3 If States where this is the case are concerned that such approach could result in granting the benefits of the exception provided for in paragraph 2 in unintended situations (e.g. in so-called “hiring-out of labour” cases), they are free to adopt bilaterally a provision drafted along the following lines:*

*Paragraph 2 of this Article shall not apply to remuneration derived by a resident of a Contracting State in respect of an employment exercised in the other Contracting State and paid by, or on behalf of, an employer who is not a resident of that other State if:*

- a) the recipient renders services in the course of that employment to a person other than the employer and that person, directly or indirectly, supervises, directs or controls the manner in which those services are performed; and*
- b) those services constitute an integral part of the business activities carried on by that person.*

*8.4 In many States, however, various legislative or jurisprudential rules and criteria (e.g. substance over form rules) have been developed for the purpose of distinguishing cases where services rendered by an individual to an enterprise should be considered to be rendered in an employment relationship (contract of service) from cases where such services should be considered to be rendered under a contract for the provision of services between two separate enterprises (contract for services). That distinction keeps its importance when applying the provisions of Article 15, in particular those of subparagraphs 2 b) and c). Subject to the limit described in paragraph 8.11 and unless the context of a particular convention requires otherwise, it is a matter of domestic law of the State of source to determine whether services rendered by an individual in that State are provided in an employment relationship and that determination will govern how that State applies the convention.*

*8.5 In some cases, services rendered by an individual to an enterprise may be considered to be employment services for purposes of domestic tax law even though these services are provided under a formal contract for services between, on the one hand, the enterprise that acquires the services, and, on the other hand, either the individual himself or another enterprise by which the individual is formally employed or with which the individual has concluded another formal contract for services.*

*8.6 In such cases, the relevant domestic law may ignore the way in which the services are characterized in the formal contracts. It may prefer to focus primarily on the nature of the services rendered by the individual and their integration into the business carried on by the enterprise that acquires the services to conclude that there is an employment relationship between the individual and that enterprise.*

*8.7 Since the concept of employment to which Article 15 refers is to be determined according to the domestic law of the State that applies the convention (subject to the limit*

*described in paragraph 8.11 and unless the context of a particular convention requires otherwise), it follows that a State which considers such services to be employment services will apply Article 15 accordingly. It will, therefore, logically conclude that the enterprise to which the services are rendered is in an employment relationship with the individual so as to constitute his employer for purposes of subparagraph 2 b) and c). That conclusion is consistent with the object and purpose of paragraph 2 of Article 15 since, in that case, the employment services may be said to be rendered to a resident of the State where the services are performed.*

*8.8 As mentioned in paragraph 8.2, even where the domestic law of the State that applies the Convention does not offer the possibility of questioning a formal contractual relationship and therefore does not allow the State to consider that services rendered to a local enterprise by an individual who is formally employed by a non-resident are rendered in an employment relationship (contract of service) with that local enterprise, it is possible for that State to deny the application of the exception of paragraph 2 in abusive cases.*

*8.9 The various approaches that are available to States that want to deal with such abusive cases are discussed in the section Improper use of the Convention in the Commentary on Article 1. As explained in paragraph 9.4 of that Commentary, it is agreed that States do not have to grant the benefits of a tax convention where arrangements that constitute an abuse of the Convention have been entered into. As noted in paragraphs 9.5 of that Commentary, however, it should not be lightly assumed that this is the case (see also paragraph 22.2 of that Commentary).*

*8.10 The approach described in the previous paragraphs therefore allows the State in which the activities are exercised to reject the application of paragraph 2 in abusive cases and in cases where, under that State's domestic law concept of employment, services rendered to a local enterprise by an individual who is formally employed by a non-resident are rendered in an employment relationship (contract of service) with that local enterprise. This approach ensures that relief of double taxation will be provided in the State of residence of the individual even if that State does not, under its own domestic law, consider that there is an employment relationship between the individual and the enterprise to which the services are provided. Indeed, as long as the State of residence acknowledges that the concept of employment in the domestic tax law of the State of source or the existence of arrangements that constitute an abuse of the Convention allows that State to tax the employment income of an individual in accordance with the Convention, it must grant relief for double taxation pursuant to the obligations incorporated in Articles 23A and 23B (see paragraphs 32.1 to 32.7 of the Commentary on these articles). The mutual agreement procedure provided by paragraph 1 of Article 25 will be available to address cases where the State of residence does not agree that the other State has correctly applied the approach described above and, therefore, does not consider that the other State has taxed the relevant income in accordance with the Convention.*

*8.11 The conclusion that, under domestic law, a formal contractual relationship should be disregarded must, however, be arrived at on the basis of objective criteria. For instance, a State could not argue that services are deemed, under its domestic law, to constitute employment services where, under the relevant facts and circumstances, it clearly appears that these services are rendered under a contract for the provision of services concluded between two separate enterprises. The relief provided under paragraph 2 of Article 15 would be rendered meaningless if States were allowed to deem services to constitute employment services in cases where there is clearly no employment relationship or to deny the quality of employer to an enterprise carried on by a non-resident where it is clear that that enterprise provides services, through its own personnel, to an enterprise carried on by a resident. Conversely, where*

*services rendered by an individual may properly be regarded by a State as rendered in an employment relationship rather than as under a contract for services concluded between two enterprises, that State should logically also consider that the individual is not carrying on the business of the enterprise that constitutes that individual's formal employer; this could be relevant, for example, for purposes of determining whether that enterprise has a permanent establishment at the place where the individual performs his activities.*

*8.12 It will not always be clear, however, whether services rendered by an individual may properly be regarded by a State as rendered in an employment relationship rather than as under a contract for services concluded between two enterprises. Any disagreement between States as to whether this is the case should be solved having regard to the following principles and examples (using, where appropriate, the mutual agreement procedure).*

*8.13 The nature of the services rendered by the individual will be an important factor since it is logical to assume that an employee provides services which are an integral part of the business activities carried on by his employer. It will therefore be important to determine whether the services rendered by the individual constitute an integral part of the business of the enterprise to which these services are provided. For that purpose, a key consideration will be which enterprise bears the responsibility or risk for the results produced by the individual's work. Clearly, however, this analysis will only be relevant if the services of an individual are rendered directly to an enterprise. Where, for example, an individual provides services to a contract manufacturer or to an enterprise to which business is outsourced, the services of that individual are not rendered to enterprises that will obtain the products or services in question.*

*8.14 Where a comparison of the nature of the services rendered by the individual with the business activities carried on by his formal employer and by the enterprise to which the services are provided points to an employment relationship that is different from the formal contractual relationship, the following additional factors may be relevant to determine whether this is really the case:*

- who has the authority to instruct the individual regarding the manner in which the work has to be performed;*
- who controls and has responsibility for the place at which the work is performed;*
- the remuneration of the individual is directly charged by the formal employer to the enterprise to which the services are provided (see paragraph 8.15 below);*
- who puts the tools and materials necessary for the work at the individual's disposal;*
- who determines the number and qualifications of the individuals performing the work;*
- who has the right to select the individual who will perform the work and to terminate the contractual arrangements entered into with that individual for that purpose;*
- who has the right to impose disciplinary sanctions related to the work of that individual;*
- who determines the holidays and work schedule of that individual.*

*8.15 Where an individual who is formally an employee of one enterprise provides services to another enterprise, the financial arrangements made between the two enterprises will clearly be relevant, although not necessarily conclusive, for the purposes of determining whether the remuneration of the individual is directly charged by the formal employer to the enterprise to which the services are provided. For instance, if the fees charged by the enterprise that*

*formally employs the individual represent the remuneration, employment benefits and other employment costs of that individual for the services that he provided to the other enterprise, with no profit element or with a profit element that is computed as a percentage of that remuneration, benefits and other employment costs, this would be indicative that the remuneration of the individual is directly charged by the formal employer to the enterprise to which the services are provided. That should not be considered to be the case, however, if the fee charged for the services bears no relationship to the remuneration of the individual or if that remuneration is only one of many factors taken into account in the fee charged for what is really a contract for services (e.g. where a consulting firm charges a client on the basis of an hourly fee for the time spent by one of its employee to perform a particular contract and that fee takes account of the various costs of the enterprise), provided that this is in conformity with the arm's length principle if the two enterprises are associated. It is important to note, however, that the question of whether the remuneration of the individual is directly charged by the formal employer to the enterprise to which the services are provided is only one of the subsidiary factors that are relevant in determining whether services rendered by that individual may properly be regarded by a State as rendered in an employment relationship rather than as under a contract for services concluded between two enterprises.*

**8.16** *Example 1: Aco, a company resident of State A, concludes a contract with Bco, a company resident of State B, for the provision of training services. Aco is specialised in training people in the use of various computer software and Bco wishes to train its personnel to use recently acquired software. X, an employee of Aco who is a resident of State A, is sent to Bco's offices in State B to provide training courses as part of the contract.*

**8.17** *In that case, State B could not argue that X is in an employment relationship with Bco or that Aco is not the employer of X for purposes of the convention between States A and B. X is formally an employee of Aco whose own services, when viewed in light of the factors in paragraphs 8.13 and 8.14, form an integral part of the business activities of Aco. The services that he renders to Bco are rendered on behalf of Aco under the contract concluded between the two enterprises. Thus, provided that X is not present in State B for more than 183 days during any relevant 12 month period and that Aco does not have in State B a permanent establishment which bears the cost of X's remuneration, the exception of paragraph 2 of Article 15 will apply to X's remuneration.*

**8.18** *Example 2: Cco, a company resident of State C, is the parent company of a group of companies that includes Dco, a company resident of State D. Cco has developed a new world-wide marketing strategy for the products of the group. In order to ensure that the strategy is well understood and followed by Dco, which sells the group's products, Cco sends X, one of its employees who has worked on the development of the strategy, to work in Dco's headquarters for 4 months in order to advise Dco with respect to its marketing and to ensure that Dco's communications department understands and complies with the worldwide marketing strategy.*

**8.19** *In that case, Cco's business includes the management of the world-wide marketing activities of the group and X's own services are an integral part of that business activity. While it could be argued that an employee could have been easily hired by Dco to perform the function of advising the company with respect to its marketing, it is clear that such function is frequently performed by a consultant, especially where specialised knowledge is required for a relatively short period of time. Also, the function of monitoring the compliance with the group's worldwide marketing strategy belongs to the business of Cco rather than to that of Dco. The exception of paragraph 2 of Article 15 should therefore apply provided that the other conditions for that exception are satisfied.*

**8.20 Example 3:** A multinational owns and operates hotels worldwide through a number of subsidiaries. Eco, one of these subsidiaries, is a resident of State E where it owns and operates a hotel. X is an employee of Eco who works in this hotel. Fco, another subsidiary of the group, owns and operates a hotel in State F where there is a shortage of employees with foreign language skills. For that reason, X is sent to work for 5 months at the reception desk of Fco's hotel. Fco pays the travel expenses of X, who remains formally employed and paid by Eco, and pays Eco a management fee based on X's remuneration, social contributions and other employment benefits for the relevant period.

**8.21** In that case, working at the reception desk of the hotel in State F, when examined in light of the factors in paragraphs 8.13 and 8.14, may be viewed as forming an integral part of Fco's business of operating that hotel rather than of Eco's business. Under the approach described above, if, under the domestic law of State F, the services of X are considered to have been rendered to Fco in an employment relationship, State F could then logically consider that Fco is the employer of X and the exception of paragraph 2 of Article 15 would not apply.

**8.22 Example 4:** Gco is a company resident of State G. It carries on the business of filling temporary business needs for highly specialised personnel. Hco is a company resident of State H which provides engineering services on building sites. In order to complete one of its contracts in State H, Hco needs an engineer for a period of 5 months. It contacts Gco for that purpose. Gco recruits X, an engineer resident of State X, and hires him under a 5 month employment contract. Under a separate contract between Gco and Hco, Gco agrees to provide the services of X to Hco during that period. Under these contracts, Gco will pay X's remuneration, social contributions, travel expenses and other employment benefits and charges.

**8.23** In that case, X provides engineering services while Gco is in the business of filling short-term business needs. By their nature the services rendered by X are not an integral part of the business activities of his formal employer. These services are, however, an integral part of the business activities of Hco, an engineering firm. In light of the factors in paragraphs 8.13 and 8.14, State H could therefore consider that, under the approach described above, the exception of paragraph 2 of Article 15 would not apply with respect to the remuneration for the services of the engineer that will be rendered in that State.

**8.24 Example 5:** Ico is a company resident of State I specialised in providing engineering services. Ico employs a number of engineers on a full time basis. Jco, a smaller engineering firm resident of State J, needs the temporary services of an engineer to complete a contract on a construction site in State J. Ico agrees with Jco that one of Ico's engineers, who is a resident of State I momentarily not assigned to any contract concluded by Ico, will work for 4 months on Jco's contract under the direct supervision and control of one of Jco's senior engineers. Jco will pay Ico an amount equal to the remuneration, social contributions, travel expenses and other employment benefits of that engineer for the relevant period, together with a 5 percent commission. Jco also agrees to indemnify Ico for any eventual claims related to the engineer's work during that period of time.

**8.25** In that case, even if Ico is in the business of providing engineering services, it is clear that the work performed by the engineer on the construction site in State J is performed on behalf of Jco rather than Ico. The direct supervision and control exercised by Jco over the work of the engineer, the fact that Jco takes over the responsibility for that work and that it bears the cost of the remuneration of the engineer for the relevant period are factors that could support the conclusion that the engineer is in an employment relationship with Jco. Under the

*approach described above, State J could therefore consider that the exception of paragraph 2 of Article 15 would not apply with respect to the remuneration for the services of the engineer that will be rendered in that State.*

*8.26 Example 6: Kco, a company resident of State K, and Lco, a company resident of State L, are part of the same multinational group of companies. A large part of the activities of that group are structured along function lines, which requires employees of different companies of the group to work together under the supervision of managers who are located in different States and employed by other companies of the group. X is a resident of State K employed by Kco; she is a senior manager in charge of supervising human resources functions within the multinational group. Since X is employed by Kco, Kco acts as a cost centre for the human resource costs of the group; periodically, these costs are charged out to each of the companies of the group on the basis of a formula that takes account of various factors such as the number of employees of each company. X is required to travel frequently to other States where other companies of the group have their offices. During the last year, X spent 3 months in State L in order to deal with human resources issues at Lco.*

*8.27 In that case, the work performed by X is part of the activities that Kco performs for its multinational group. These activities, like other activities such as corporate communication, strategy, finance and tax, treasury, information management and legal support, are often centralised within a large group of companies. The work that X performs is thus an integral part of the business of Kco. The exception of paragraph 2 of Article 15 should therefore apply to the remuneration derived by X for her work in State L provided that the other conditions for that exception are satisfied.*

*8.28 Where, in accordance with the above principles and examples, a State properly considers that the services rendered on its territory by an individual have been rendered in an employment relationship rather than under a contract for services concluded between two enterprises, there will be a risk that the enterprises would be required to withhold tax at source in two jurisdictions on the remuneration of that individual even though double taxation should ultimately be avoided (see paragraph 8.10 above). This compliance difficulty may be partly reduced by tax administrations making sure that their domestic rules and practices applicable to employment are clear and well understood by employers and are easily accessible. Also, the problem can be alleviated if the State of residence allows enterprises to quickly adjust the amount of tax to be withheld to take account of any relief for double taxation that will likely be available to the employee.*

61. Replace paragraph 13 of the Commentary on Article 15 by the following:

*13. ~~Switzerland is of the opinion that the comments in paragraph 8 above should only apply to situations of international hiring out of labour in case of abusive arrangements.~~ France considers that paragraph 8.13 should not be interpreted as being sufficient in itself to question a formal contractual relationship. If, with respect to paragraph 8.13, the services rendered by an individual constitute an integral part of the business of the enterprise to which these services are provided, the situation should then be analysed in accordance with the provisions of paragraph 8.14.*

62. Add the following new paragraph 14 to the Commentary on Article 15:

**14. Slovenia reserves the right to add an article which addresses the situation of teachers, professors and researchers, subject to various conditions and to make a corresponding modification to paragraph 1 of Article 15.**

#### **Article 17**

63. Add the following new paragraph 15 to the Commentary on Article 17:

**15. Concerning paragraphs 8 and 9, Germany, considering paragraph 18 of the Commentary on Article 12, takes the view that payments made as remuneration for live broadcasting rights of an event are income of the performing or appearing sportspersons or artistes under paragraph 1 of Article 17. This income may be taxed in accordance with paragraph 2 of Article 17 in the case of payments made to any other third party in the context of an economic exploitation of the live broadcasting rights.**

#### **Article 21**

64. Add new paragraphs 5.1 and 5.2 and replace paragraph 6 of the Commentary on Article 21 as follows:

**5.1 For the purposes of the paragraph, a right or property in respect of which income is paid will be effectively connected with a permanent establishment if the “economic” ownership of that right or property is allocated to that permanent establishment under the principles developed in the Committee’s report entitled Attribution of Profits to Permanent Establishments<sup>1</sup> (see in particular paragraphs 72-97 of Part I of the report) for the purposes of the application of paragraph 2 of Article 7. In the context of that paragraph, the “economic” ownership of a right or property means the equivalent of ownership for income tax purposes by a separate enterprise, with the attendant benefits and burdens (e.g. the right to the income attributable to the ownership of the right or property, the right to any available depreciation and the potential exposure to gains or losses from the appreciation or depreciation of that right or property).**

**5.2 In the case of the permanent establishment of an enterprise carrying on insurance activities, the determination of whether a right or property is effectively connected with the permanent establishment shall be made by giving due regard to the guidance set forth in Part IV of the Committee’s report with respect to whether the income on or gain from that right or property is taken into account in determining the permanent establishment’s yield on the amount of investment assets attributed to it (see in particular paragraphs 165-170 of Part IV). That guidance being general in nature, tax authorities should consider applying a flexible and pragmatic approach which would take into account an enterprise’s reasonable and consistent application of that guidance for purposes of identifying the specific assets that are effectively connected with the permanent establishment.**

6. Some States which apply the exemption method (Article 23 A) may have reason to suspect that the treatment accorded in paragraph 2 may provide an inducement to an enterprise of a Contracting State to attach assets such as shares, bonds or patents, to a permanent establishment situated in the other Contracting State in order to obtain more favourable tax treatment there. To counteract such arrangements which they consider would represent abuse, some States might take the view that the transaction is artificial and, for this reason, would

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1. *Attribution of Profits to Permanent Establishments, OECD, Paris, 2010.*



regard the assets as not effectively connected with the permanent establishment. Some other States may strengthen their position by adding in paragraph 2 a condition providing that the paragraph shall not apply to cases where the arrangements were primarily made for the purpose of taking advantage of this provision. **Also, the requirement that a right or property be “effectively connected” with such a location requires more than merely recording the right or property in the books of the permanent establishment for accounting purposes.**

65. Replace paragraph 13 of the Commentary on Article 21 by the following:

13. *Australia, Canada, **Chile**, Mexico, New Zealand, Portugal and the Slovak Republic* reserve their positions on this Article and would wish to maintain the right to tax income arising from sources in their own country.

#### **Article 22**

66. Add the following new paragraphs 3.1 and 3.2 to the Commentary on Article 22:

**3.1** *For the purposes of paragraph 2, property will form part of the business property of a permanent establishment if the “economic” ownership of the property is allocated to that permanent establishment under the principles developed in the Committee’s report entitled *Attribution of Profits to Permanent Establishments*<sup>1</sup> (see in particular paragraphs 72-97 of Part I of the report) for the purposes of the application of paragraph 2 of Article 7. In the context of that paragraph, the “economic” ownership of property means the equivalent of ownership for income tax purposes by a separate enterprise, with the attendant benefits and burdens (e.g. the right to any income attributable to the ownership of that property, the right to any available depreciation and the potential exposure to gains or losses from the appreciation or depreciation of that property). The mere fact that the property has been recorded, for accounting purposes, on a balance sheet prepared for the permanent establishment will therefore not be sufficient to conclude that it is effectively connected with that permanent establishment.*

**3.2** *In the case of the permanent establishment of an enterprise carrying on insurance activities, the determination of whether property will form part of the business property of the permanent establishment shall be made by giving due regard to the guidance set forth in Part IV of the Committee’s report with respect to whether the income on or gain from that property is taken into account in determining the permanent establishment’s yield on the amount of investment assets attributed to it (see in particular paragraphs 165-170 of Part IV). That guidance being general in nature, tax authorities should consider applying a flexible and pragmatic approach which would take into account an enterprise’s reasonable and consistent application of that guidance for purposes of identifying the specific assets that form part of the business property of the permanent establishment.*

#### **Articles 23 A and 23 B**

67. Replace paragraph 38 of the Commentary on Articles 23 A and 23 B by the following:

38. Article 23 A contains the principle that the State of residence has to give exemption, but does not give detailed rules on how the exemption has to be implemented. This is consistent with the general pattern of the Convention. Articles 6 to 22 also lay down rules attributing the right to

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1. *Attribution of Profits to Permanent Establishments, OECD, Paris, 2010.*

tax in respect of the various types of income or capital without dealing, as a rule, with the determination of taxable income or capital, deductions, rate of tax, etc. (*cf.*, however, ~~paragraph 3 of Article 7 and~~ Article 24). Experience has shown that many problems may arise. This is especially true with respect to Article 23 A. Some of them are dealt with in the following paragraphs. In the absence of a specific provision in the Convention, the domestic laws of each Contracting State are applicable. Some conventions contain an express reference to the domestic laws but of course this would not help where the exemption method is not used in the domestic laws. In such cases, Contracting States which face this problem should establish rules for the application of Article 23 A, if necessary, after having consulted with the competent authority of the other Contracting State (paragraph 3 of Article 25).

#### **Article 24**

68. Replace paragraph 14 of the Commentary on Article 24 by the following:

14. Furthermore, paragraph 1 has been deliberately framed in a negative form. By providing that the nationals of a Contracting State may not be subjected in the other Contracting State to any taxation or any requirement connected therewith which is other or more burdensome than the taxation and connected requirements to which nationals of the other Contracting State in the same circumstances are or may be subjected, this paragraph has the same mandatory force as if it enjoined the Contracting States to accord the same treatment to their respective nationals. But since the principal object of this clause is to forbid discrimination in one State against the nationals of the other, there is nothing to prevent the first State from granting to persons of foreign nationality, for special reasons of its own, or in order to comply with a special stipulation in a double taxation convention, such as, notably, the requirement that profits of permanent establishments are to be taxed ~~on the basis of separate accounts~~ **in accordance with Article 7**, certain concessions or facilities which are not available to its own nationals. As it is worded, paragraph 1 would not prohibit this.

69. Replace paragraph 34 of the Commentary on Article 24 by the following:

34. It appears necessary first to make it clear that the wording of the first sentence of paragraph 3 must be interpreted in the sense that it does not constitute discrimination to tax non-resident persons differently, for practical reasons, from resident persons, as long as this does not result in more burdensome taxation for the former than for the latter. In the negative form in which the provision concerned has been framed, it is the result alone which counts, it being permissible to adapt the mode of taxation to the particular circumstances in which the taxation is levied. ***For example, paragraph 3 does not prevent the application of specific mechanisms that apply only for the purposes of determining the profits that are attributable to a permanent establishment. The paragraph must be read in the context of the Convention and, in particular, of paragraph 2 of Article 7 which provides that the profits attributable to the permanent establishment are those that a separate and independent enterprise engaged in the same or similar activities under the same or similar conditions would have been expected to make. Clearly, rules or administrative practices that seek to determine the profits that are attributable to a permanent establishment on the basis required by paragraph 2 of Article 7 cannot be considered to violate paragraph 3, which is based on the same principle since it requires that the taxation on the permanent establishment be not less favourable than that levied on a domestic enterprise carrying on similar activities.***

70. Replace subparagraphs 40 a) and c) of the Commentary on Article 24 by the following

40. With regard to the basis of assessment of tax, the principle of equal treatment normally has the following implications:

- a) Permanent establishments must be accorded the same right as resident enterprises to deduct the trading expenses that are, in general, authorised by the taxation law to be deducted from taxable profits ~~in addition to the right to attribute to the permanent establishment a proportion of the overheads of the head office of the enterprise~~. Such deductions should be allowed without any restrictions other than those also imposed on resident enterprises (*see also paragraphs 33 and 34 of the Commentary on Article 7*).

[...]

- c) Permanent establishments should also have the option that is available in most countries to resident enterprises of carrying forward or backward a loss brought out at the close of an accounting period within a certain period of time (*e.g.* 5 years). It is hardly necessary to specify that in the case of permanent establishments it is the loss on their own business activities, ~~as shown in the separate accounts for these activities~~, which will qualify for such carry-forward.

71. Replace paragraph 58 of the Commentary on Article 24 by the following:

58. However, even if the profits of the whole enterprise to which the permanent establishment belongs are taken into account when applying either a progressive scale of rates or a minimum rate, this should not conflict with the principle of the ~~distinct and separate~~ **and independent** enterprise, according to which the profits of the permanent establishment must be determined under paragraph 2 of Article 7. The minimum amount of the tax levied in the State where the permanent establishment is situated is, therefore, the amount which would be due if it were a ~~distinct and separate~~ **and independent** enterprise, without reference to the profits of the whole enterprise to which it belongs. The State where the permanent establishment is situated is, therefore, justified in applying the progressive scale applicable to resident enterprises solely to the profits of the permanent establishment, leaving aside the profits of the whole enterprise when the latter are less than those of the permanent establishment. This State may likewise tax the profits of the permanent establishment at a minimum rate, provided that the same rate applies also to resident enterprises, even if taking into account the profits of the whole enterprise to which it belongs would result in a lower amount of tax, or no tax at all.

72. Replace paragraph 62 of the Commentary on Article 24 by the following:

62. When permanent establishments receive dividends, interest, or royalties such income, by virtue of paragraph 4 of Articles 10 and 11 and paragraph 3 of Article 12, respectively, comes under the provisions of Article 7 and consequently — subject to the observations made in paragraph 53 above as regards dividends received on holdings of permanent establishment — falls to be included in the taxable profits of such permanent establishments (cf. paragraph ~~7462~~ of the Commentary on Article 7).

73. Replace paragraph 89 of the Commentary on Article 24 by the following:

89. **Chile and** ~~the~~ United Kingdom reserves ~~its~~ **their** position on the second sentence of paragraph 1.

74. Replace paragraph 90 of the Commentary on Article 24 by the following:

90. **Chile and** Switzerland reserves the right not to insert paragraph 2 in ~~its~~ **their** conventions.

75. Add the following new heading and paragraph 90.1 to the Commentary on Article 24:

**Paragraph 3**

**90.1** *In view of its particular taxation system, Chile retains its freedom of action with regard to the provisions in the Convention relating to the rate and form of distribution of profits by permanent establishments.*

76. Replace paragraph 92 of the Commentary on Article 24 by the following:

92. *Chile, Greece, Ireland, ~~Luxembourg~~ and the United Kingdom* reserve the right to restrict the application of the Article to the taxes covered by the Convention.

**Article 25**

77. Replace the first bullet of paragraph 9 of the Commentary on Article 25 as follows:

9. In practice, the procedure applies to cases — by far the most numerous — where the measure in question leads to double taxation which it is the specific purpose of the Convention to avoid. Among the most common cases, mention must be made of the following:

— ~~the questions relating to attribution to a permanent establishment of a proportion of the executive and general administrative expenses incurred by the enterprise, under paragraph 3 of Article 7~~ *questions relating to the attribution of profits to a permanent establishment under paragraph 2 of Article 7;*

[...]

78. Replace paragraph 98 of the Commentary on Article 25 by the following:

98. *Chile, Greece, Italy, Mexico, Poland, Portugal, the Slovak Republic, ~~Spain~~ and Switzerland* reserve their positions on the second sentence of paragraph 2. These countries consider that the implementation of reliefs and refunds following a mutual agreement ought to remain linked to time-limits prescribed by their domestic laws.

79. Replace paragraph 14 of the Sample Mutual Agreement on Arbitration which appears in the Annex to the Commentary on Article 25 by the following:

**14. Applicable Legal Principles**

The arbitrators shall decide the issues submitted to arbitration in accordance with the applicable provisions of the treaty and, subject to these provisions, of those of the domestic laws of the Contracting States. Issues of treaty interpretation will be decided by the arbitrators in the light of the principles of interpretation incorporated in Articles 31 to 33~~34~~ of the *Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties*, having regard to the Commentaries of the *OECD Model Tax Convention* as periodically amended, as explained in paragraphs 28 to 36.1 of the Introduction to the *OECD Model Tax Convention*. Issues related to the application of the arm's length principle should similarly be decided having regard to the *OECD Transfer Pricing Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises and Tax Administrations*. The arbitrators will also consider any other sources which the competent authorities may expressly identify in the Terms of Reference.

80. Replace paragraph 33 of the explanations on the Sample Mutual Agreement on Arbitration which appears in the Annex to the Commentary on Article 25 by the following:

33. An examination of the issues on which competent authorities have had difficulties reaching an agreement shows that these are typically matters of treaty interpretation or of applying the arm's length principle underlying Article 9 and paragraph 2 of Article 7. As provided in paragraph 14 of the sample agreement, matters of treaty interpretation should be decided by the arbitrators in the light of the principles of interpretation incorporated in Articles 31 to 33~~34~~ of the *Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties*, having regard to the Commentary of the *OECD Model Tax Convention* as periodically amended, as explained in paragraphs 28 to 36.1 of the Introduction of the *Model Tax Convention*. Issues related to the application of the arm's length principle should similarly be decided in the light of the *OECD Transfer Pricing Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises and Tax Administrations*. Since Article 32 of the *Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties* permits a wide access to supplementary means of interpretation, arbitrators will, in practice, have considerable latitude in determining relevant sources for the interpretation of treaty provisions.

## Article 26

81. Replace subparagraph 7 c) of the Commentary on Article 26 by the following:

7. Application of the Convention

...

c) Similarly, information may be needed with a view to the proper allocation of taxable profits between associated *enterprises* ~~companies~~ in different States or *the proper determination of the profits attributable to a permanent establishment situated in one State of an enterprise of the other State* ~~the adjustment of the profits shown in the accounts of a permanent establishment in one State and in the accounts of the head office in the other State~~ (Articles 7, 9, 23 A and 23 B).

82. Delete the following paragraph 20 of the Commentary on Article 26:

~~20. — Japan wishes to indicate that with respect to paragraph 11 above, it would be difficult for Japan, in view of its strict domestic laws and administrative practice as to the procedure to make public the information obtained under the domestic laws, to provide information requested unless a requesting State has comparable domestic laws and administrative practice as to this procedure.~~

83. Delete the following paragraphs 23 to 26 and the heading preceding paragraph 23 of the Commentary on Article 26:

### **Reservations on the Article**

~~23. — Austria reserves the right not to include paragraph 5 in its conventions. However, Austria is authorised to exchange information held by a bank or other financial institution where such information is requested within the framework of a criminal investigation which is carried on in the requesting State concerning the commitment of tax fraud.~~

~~24. — Switzerland reserves its position on paragraphs 1 and 5. It will propose to limit the scope of this Article to information necessary for carrying out the provisions of the Convention. This reservation shall not apply in cases involving acts of fraud subject to imprisonment according to the laws of both Contracting States.~~

~~25. — Luxembourg reserves the right not to include paragraph 5 in its conventions.~~

26. ~~Belgium reserves the right not to include paragraph 5 in its conventions. Where paragraph 5 is included in one of its conventions, the exchange of information held by a bank or other financial institution is restricted to the exchange on request of information concerning both a specific taxpayer and a specific financial institution.~~

## D. POSITIONS OF NON-MEMBER ECONOMIES

### *Title and Introduction*

84. Replace the title of the section on Positions of non-member economies by the following:

### **NON-OECD MEMBER COUNTRIES' ECONOMIES' POSITIONS ON THE OECD MODEL TAX CONVENTION**

85. Replace paragraphs 1, 2, 3, 4 and 5 of the Introduction to the section on Positions of non-member economies by the following:

1. When, in 1991, the Committee on Fiscal Affairs adopted the concept of an ambulatory Model Tax Convention, it also decided that because the influence of the Model Tax Convention had extended far beyond the OECD Member countries, the ongoing process through which the Model Tax Convention would be updated should be opened up to benefit from the input of non-**OECD economies**~~Member countries~~.

2. Pursuant to that decision, the Committee on Fiscal Affairs decided, in 1996, to organise annual meetings that would allow experts of Member countries and some non-**OECD economies**~~Member countries~~ to discuss issues related to the negotiation, application and interpretation of tax conventions. Recognising that non-**OECD economies**~~Member countries~~ could only be expected to associate themselves to the development of the Model Tax Convention if they could retain their freedom to disagree with its contents, the Committee also decided that these countries should, like Member countries, have the possibility to identify the areas where they are unable to agree with the text of an Article or with an interpretation given in the Commentary.

3. This has led to the inclusion in the Model Tax Convention of this section, which sets out the positions of a number of non-**OECD economies**~~Member countries~~ on the Articles of the Model and the Commentary thereon. It is intended that this document will be periodically updated, like the rest of the Model Tax Convention, to reflect changes in the views of participating **economies**~~countries~~.

4. This section reflects the following **non-OECD economies'**~~countries'~~ positions on the Model Tax Convention:

Albania	Argentina	Armenia	Belarus
Brazil	Bulgaria	<del>Chile</del> Croatia	Democratic Republic of the Congo
Estonia	Gabon	<b>Hong Kong, China</b>	India
<b>Indonesia</b>	Israel	Ivory Coast	Kazakhstan
Latvia	Lithuania	Malaysia	Morocco
People's Republic of China	Philippines	Romania	Russia
Serbia	<del>Slovenia</del>	South Africa	Thailand
Tunisia	Ukraine	<b>United Arab Emirates</b>	Vietnam

5. Whilst these **economies**~~countries~~ generally agree with the text of the Articles of the Model Tax Convention and with the interpretations put forward in the Commentary, there are for each **economy**~~country~~ some areas of disagreement. For each Article of the Model Tax Convention, the

positions that are presented in this ~~section~~ document indicate where a country disagrees with the text of the Article and where it disagrees with an interpretation given in the Commentary in relation to the Article.<sup>1</sup> As is the case with the observations and reservations of Member countries, no reference is made to cases where ~~an economy~~ a country would like to supplement the text of an Article with provisions that do not conflict with the Article, especially if these provisions are offered as alternatives in the Commentary, or would like to put forward an interpretation that does not conflict with the Commentary.

[Footnote to paragraph 5]

1. ~~Indonesia and~~ The People's Republic of China wishes to clarify expressly that in the course of negotiations with other countries, they will not be bound by their stated positions included in this section as they appear in this document.

### **Positions on Article 1**

86. Delete the following paragraph 4 of the Positions on Article 1 and its Commentary:

~~4. — Chile considers that some of the solutions put forward in the report “The Application of the OECD Model Tax Convention to Partnerships” and incorporated in the Commentary should only be applicable when especially included in tax conventions. For instance, the different treatment and legal form between States makes the solution of the treatment of partners of partnerships that are fiscally transparent very difficult to administer and should be specifically dealt with by treaty partners.~~

### **Positions on Article 2**

87. Replace paragraph 3 of the Positions on Article 2 and its Commentary by the following:

3. Since ~~they have~~ it has no tax on capital, Brazil ~~and~~ **Indonesia** reserves its ~~the~~ right not to include any reference to such tax in paragraph 1.

88. Delete the following paragraph 5.1 of the Positions on Article 2 and its Commentary:

~~5.1 — Chile reserves its position on that part of paragraph 1 which states that the Convention should apply to taxes of political subdivisions or local authorities.~~

### **Positions on Article 3**

89. Replace paragraph 10 of the Positions on Article 3 and its Commentary by the following:

10. ~~Chile-Hong Kong, China~~ reserves the right to omit the phrase “operated by an enterprise that has its place of effective management in a Contracting State” from the definition of “international traffic” in subparagraph e) of paragraph 1.

90. Delete the following paragraph 11 and the heading that precedes that paragraph in the Positions on Article 3 and its Commentary:

#### **Position on the Commentary**

~~11. — With respect to paragraph 11, Chile is of the view that the Commentary to the OECD Model Convention is an important reference for the Chilean Tax authority when interpreting~~

Chilean treaties with equal or similar wording to the Model. When interpreting a particular treaty, however, the view held by the Tax authority is that only that edition of the Commentary which was applicable at the time of the treaty's completion can be used as guidance. A newer Commentary that is merely clarifying what had been the correctly understood meaning should in this context be distinguished from wording that attempts to alter the previous meaning of the Commentary.

91. Add the following new paragraphs 2, 4.1, 7 and 11 to the Positions on Article 3 and its Commentary:

2. *Israel reserves the right to include a trust within the definition of a “person”.*

4.1 *Brazil reserves the right not to include the definitions of “enterprise” and “business” in paragraph 1 of Article 3 because it reserves the right to include an article concerning the taxation of independent personal services.*

7. *Thailand reserves the right to include in the definition of “person” any entity treated as a taxable unit under the taxation laws in force in either Contracting State.*

11. *Hong Kong, China reserves its position with respect to the definition of “national” in subparagraph (g) of paragraph 1, because Hong Kong, China is not a sovereign state. Where the term “national” appears in Articles 4, 19, 24 and 25, Hong Kong, China reserves the right to use alternative provisions based on the concepts of “right of abode” and “incorporated or constituted in”.*

#### *Positions on Article 4*

92. Replace paragraphs 1, 5 and 7 of the Positions on Article 4 and its Commentary by the following:

1. *Armenia, Albania, Belarus, Estonia, **Indonesia**, Latvia, Lithuania, Russia, Thailand, Ukraine and Vietnam reserve the right to include the place of incorporation or a similar criterion (registration for Belarus and Vietnam) in paragraph 1.*

5. *Armenia, ~~Belarus~~, Bulgaria, Russia, Thailand and Vietnam reserve the right to use the place of incorporation (registration for ~~Belarus and Vietnam~~) as the test for paragraph 3.*

7. *Israel reserves the right to include a separate provision regarding a trust that is a resident of both Contracting States. ~~Belarus reserves the right to replace paragraph 3 (if the other Contracting State does not agree to the use of the place of registration in this paragraph) by a provision that will refer to the mutual agreement procedure for the determination of the country of residence in the case of a dual resident person other than an individual.~~*

93. Delete the following paragraphs 4.2 and 6 and the heading preceding paragraph 4.2 of the Positions on Article 4 and its Commentary:

#### *Paragraph 2*

4.2 ~~*Israel reserves the right to reorder the hierarchy of the residence tie breaker tests for individuals by placing centre of vital interests before the permanent home available criteria.*~~

6. ~~*The People's Republic of China reserves its position on the provisions in this and other articles of the Convention which refer directly or indirectly to the place of effective management.*~~



Instead of the term “place of effective management”, the People's Republic of China wishes to use in its conventions the term “head office”.

94. Add the following new paragraphs 2, 2.1 and 9.3 to the Positions on Article 4 and its Commentary:

**2. The United Arab Emirates reserves the right to adopt its own definition of residence in its bilateral conventions and not necessarily follow Article 4.**

**2.1 Hong Kong, China reserves the right to modify the definition of “resident” in its bilateral agreements because it is not a sovereign state and it taxes on a territorial basis.**

**9.3 Indonesia is of the opinion that in considering the dual residence of an individual, economic relations shall have priority over personal relations.**

#### **Positions on Article 5**

95. Replace paragraphs 2, 3, 4, 8, 9, 9.1, 11.1, 13, 14, 14.1, 14.4, 14.5, 14.7, 15, 17, 17.1, 18, 19 and 25 of the Positions on Article 5 and its Commentary by the following:

2. In paragraph 2, in addition to “the extraction of” natural resources, *Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Gabon, Ivory Coast, Morocco, the Philippines, Russia, Thailand, and Tunisia and the United Arab Emirates* reserve the right to refer to the “exploration for” such resources.

3. *India and Indonesia* reserves the right to add to paragraph 2 additional subparagraphs that would cover a sales outlet and a farm, plantation or other place where agricultural, forestry, plantation or related activities are carried on.

4. *India, Indonesia, Thailand and Vietnam* reserve the right to add to paragraph 2 an additional subparagraph that would cover a warehouse in relation to a person supplying storage facilities for others.

8. *Armenia, Brazil, Chile, Thailand and Vietnam* reserve their position on paragraph 3 as they consider that any building site or construction, assembly or installation project which lasts more than six months should be regarded as a permanent establishment.

9. *Albania, the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Latvia and Lithuania and Hong Kong, China* reserve their position on paragraph 3 and consider that any building site, construction, assembly or installation project or a supervisory or consultancy activity connected therewith constitutes a permanent establishment if such site, project or activity lasts for a period of more than six months.

9.1 *Serbia and Slovenia* reserves the right to treat any building site, construction, assembly or installation project or a supervisory or consultancy activity connected therewith as constituting a permanent establishment only if such site, project or activity lasts for a period of more than twelve months.

11.1 *India and Indonesia* reserves the right to replace “construction or installation project” with “construction, installation or assembly project or supervisory activities in connection therewith” and reserves ~~its~~ **their** right to negotiate the period of time for which they ~~se~~ should last to be regarded as a permanent establishment.

13. *Gabon, India, **Indonesia**, Ivory Coast, Morocco, and Tunisia* reserve the right to treat an enterprise as having a permanent establishment if the enterprise furnishes services, including consultancy services, through employees or other personnel engaged by the enterprise for such purpose but only where such activities continue for the same project or a connected project for a period or periods aggregating more than a period to be negotiated.

14. *Albania, Armenia, Lithuania, Serbia, South Africa, Thailand, ~~and Vietnam~~ and **Hong Kong, China*** reserve the right to treat an enterprise as having a permanent establishment if the enterprise furnishes services, including consultancy services, through employees or other personnel engaged by the enterprise for such purpose, but only where activities of that nature continue (for the same or a connected project (other than in the case of Armenia)), within the country for a period or periods aggregating more than six months within any 12-month period.

14.1 ~~*Chile, The Democratic Republic of the Congo, Gabon, Ivory Coast, Latvia, Morocco, South Africa and Tunisia*~~ reserve the right to deem any person performing professional services or other activities of an independent character to have a permanent establishment if that person is present in the State for a period or periods exceeding in the aggregate 183 days in any twelve month period.

14.4 *Bulgaria and **Indonesia*** reserves the right to insert a provision that deems a permanent establishment to exist if, for more than a negotiated period, an installation, drilling rig or ship is used for the exploration of natural resources.

14.5 ***Indonesia, the United Arab Emirates and Vietnam*** reserves the right to tax income derived from activities relating to exploration and exploitation of natural resources.

14.7 *Israel reserves the right to insert a provision according to which an installation, drilling rig or ship used for activities connected with the exploration of natural resources shall be treated as constituting a permanent establishment in a Contracting State if those activities last in aggregate more than 365 days in that State in any two-year period*~~*Chile reserves the right to treat a person as having a permanent establishment if the person performs professional services and other activities of independent character, including planning, supervisory or consultancy activities, with a certain degree of continuity.*~~

15. *Albania, Argentina, Armenia, Gabon, India, **Indonesia**, Ivory Coast, Malaysia, Morocco, Russia, Thailand, Tunisia, Ukraine and Vietnam* reserve their position on paragraph 4 as they consider that the term “delivery” should be deleted from subparagraphs a) and b).

17. *Albania, Armenia, Gabon, India, **Indonesia**, Ivory Coast, ~~Malaysia, Morocco, Russia, Thailand, Tunisia, Ukraine and Vietnam~~* reserve the right to treat an enterprise as having a permanent establishment if a person acting on behalf of the enterprise habitually maintains a stock of goods or merchandise in a Contracting State from which the person regularly delivers goods or merchandise ~~(in the case of Malaysia fills orders)~~ on behalf of the enterprise.

17.1 *India, **Malaysia and Thailand*** reserves the right to treat an enterprise of a Contracting State as having a permanent establishment in the other Contracting State if a person habitually secures orders in the other Contracting State wholly or almost wholly for the enterprise.

18. *Albania, Gabon, Estonia, Ivory Coast, Lithuania, Morocco, Serbia, ~~Slovenia, Thailand, Tunisia~~ and Vietnam* reserve the right to make clear that an agent whose activities are conducted

wholly or almost wholly on behalf of a single enterprise will not be considered an agent of an independent status.

19. *Gabon, India, Indonesia, Ivory Coast, Morocco, Russia, Thailand, Tunisia and Vietnam* reserve the right to provide that an insurance enterprise of a Contracting State shall, except with respect to re-insurance (other than in the case of India), be deemed to have a permanent establishment in the other Contracting State if it collects premiums in the territory of that other state or insures risks situated therein through a person other than an agent of an independent status to whom paragraph 6 applies.

25. *India and Malaysia* does not agree with the interpretation given in paragraph 5.3 (first part of the paragraph) and 5.4 (first part of the paragraph); they are of the view that these examples could also be regarded as constituting permanent establishments.

96. Delete the following paragraphs 16.1, 18.1 and 23.1 of the Positions on Article 5 and its Commentary:

~~16.1—Chile reserves the right to amend paragraph 4 by eliminating subparagraph f) and replacing subparagraph e) with the corresponding text of the 1963 Draft Model Tax Convention.~~

~~18.1—Chile believes that the arm's length principle should also be considered in determining whether or not an agent is of an independent status for purposes of paragraph 6 of the Article and wishes to add such wording to its conventions to clarify that this is how the paragraph should be interpreted.~~

~~23.1—Chile will not necessarily take into consideration paragraphs 42.1 to 42.10 until further study of e-commerce taxation has taken place.~~

97. Add the following new paragraphs 2.1, 17.2, 43, 44 and 45 to the Positions on Article 5 and its Commentary:

**2.1** *Indonesia reserves the right to add to paragraph 2 the exploration and exploitation of natural resources and a drilling rig or working ship used for exploration and exploitation of natural resources.*

**17.2** *Indonesia reserves the right to treat an enterprise as having a permanent establishment if a person acting on behalf of the enterprise, other than an independent agent, manufactures or processes for the enterprise goods or merchandise belonging to the enterprise.*

**43.** *India does not agree with the interpretation in paragraph 5.5 of the Commentary on Article 5 according to which a satellite's footprint in the space of a source country cannot be treated as a permanent establishment. India is of the view that in such a case, the source state not only contributes its customer base but also provides infrastructure for reception of the satellite telecast or telecommunication process. India is also of the view that a satellite's footprint falls both in the international and national space. The footprint has a fixed location, has a value and can be used for commercial purposes. Accordingly, it can be treated as a fixed place of business in the space in the jurisdiction of a source country.*

**44.** *India does not agree with the interpretation in paragraph 9.1 of the Commentary on Article 5 as it considers that a roaming call is a composite process which requires a composite use of various pieces of equipment located in the source and residence countries and the*

*distinction proposed in paragraph 9.1 was neither intended by the wording of Article 5 nor logical.*

**45. India does not agree with the interpretation in the last two sentences of paragraph 26.1 of the Commentary on Article 5 according to which even undersea cables and pipelines lying in the territorial jurisdiction of a source country cannot be considered as permanent establishment of an enterprise.**

#### **Positions on Article 6**

98. Replace paragraphs 1, 2.2 and 4 of the Positions on Article 6 and its Commentary by the following:

1. *India and Indonesia* wishes to address the issue of *the* inclusion of the words “including income from agriculture or forestry” through bilateral negotiations.

2.2 *Estonia* reserves the right to include in the definition of the term “immovable property” any right of claim in respect of immovable property *because such right of claim may not be included in its domestic law’s meaning of the term.*

4. ~~*Estonia, Latvia*~~ and *Lithuania* reserve the right to include in paragraph 3 a reference to income from the alienation of immovable property.

#### **Positions on Article 7**

99. Replace and renumber paragraph 1 of the Positions on Article 7 and its Commentary by the following:

1.2 *Argentina* and ~~*IndonesiaChile*~~ reserve the right to include a special provision in the Convention that will permit them to apply their domestic law in relation to the taxation of the profits of an insurance and re-insurance enterprise.

100. Replace paragraphs 2.1, 4.2, 5, 7, 8 and 12 of the Positions on Article 7 and its Commentary by the following:

2.1 *Albania, Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Croatia, Gabon, IndiaIndonesia, Ivory Coast, Malaysia, Morocco, the People’s Republic of China, Russia, Serbia, Thailand, Tunisia* and *Vietnam* reserve the right to maintain in their conventions a specific article dealing with the taxation of “independent personal services”. Accordingly, reservation is also made with respect to all the corresponding modifications in the Articles and the Commentaries, which have been modified as a result of the elimination of Article 14.

4.2 *The United Arab Emirates reserves the right to include a special provision in its conventions that will permit its domestic law to apply to all activities that are related to the exploration, extraction or exploitation of natural resources, including petroleum activities as well as rendering services in connection with these activities, when these activities are carried out on its territory.* ~~*Chile and India* reserve the right to amend Article 7 to provide that, in applying paragraphs 1 and 2 of the Article, any income or gain attributable to a permanent establishment during its existence may be taxable by the Contracting State in which the permanent establishment exists even if the payments are deferred until after the permanent establishment has ceased to exist. Furthermore, India also reserves the right to apply such a rule under Articles 11, 12, 13 and 21.~~

5. ~~With respect to paragraph 3, Argentina reserves the right to provide that a Contracting State shall not be obliged to allow the deduction of expenses incurred abroad which are not reasonably attributable to the activity carried on by the permanent establishment, taking into account the general principles contained in its domestic legislation concerning executive and administrative expenses for assistance services.~~

7. ~~Armenia, India, Lithuania and SerbiaSlovenia reserve the right to add to paragraph 3 a clarification that expenses to be allowed as deductions by a Contracting State shall include only expenses that are deductible under the domestic laws of that State.~~

8. ~~Serbia reserves the right to specify that a potential adjustment will be made only if it is considered justifiedUkraine and Vietnam reserve the right to add to paragraph 3 a clarification to the effect that the paragraph refers to actual expenses incurred by the enterprise (other than interest in the case of a banking enterprise).~~

12. ~~Argentina, Brazil, Indonesia, Latvia, Malaysia, Romania, Serbia, South Africa, Thailand and Hong Kong, China will interpret Article 7 as it read before the 2010 Update in line with the relevant Commentary as it stood prior to that updateIndia does not agree with the interpretation given in paragraph 25.~~

101. Delete the following paragraphs 6, 7.1, 9, 10, 11 and 13, and the headings preceding paragraphs 3, 5, 9, 10 and 11 of the Positions on Article 7 and its Commentary:

*Paragraphs 1 and 2*

*Paragraph 3*

6. ~~Brazil reserves its position on the words “whether in the State in which the permanent establishment is situated or elsewhere” found in paragraph 3.~~

7.1 ~~Latvia and Estonia reserve the right to add to paragraph 3 a clarification that expenses to be allowed as deductions by a Contracting State shall include only expenses that would be deductible if the permanent establishment were a separate enterprise of that Contracting State.~~

*Paragraph 4*

9. ~~Brazil reserves the right not to adopt paragraph 4.~~

*Paragraph 5*

10. ~~Vietnam reserves the right not to adopt paragraph 5.~~

*Paragraph 6*

11. ~~Brazil reserves the right not to adopt paragraph 6.~~

13. ~~As regards paragraphs 41-50 of the Commentary on Article 7, Chile does not adhere to the specific methods provided as the rules on the amount of profit attributable to a permanent establishment; these must be established in and follow domestic law (including foreign exchange legislation).~~

102. Add the following new paragraphs 1, 1.1, 1.3 and 3.1 to the Positions on Article 7 and its Commentary:

**1. Argentina, Brazil, Indonesia, Latvia, Malaysia, Romania, Serbia, South Africa, Thailand and Hong Kong, China reserve the right to use the previous version of Article 7, i.e. the version that was included in the Model Tax Convention immediately before the 2010 Update, subject to their positions on that previous version (see annex below).**

**1.1 India reserves the right to use the previous version of Article 7, i.e. the version that was included in the Model Tax Convention immediately before the 2010 update, subject to its positions on that previous version (see annex below). It does not agree with the approach to the attribution of profits to permanent establishments in general that is reflected in the revised Article, in its Commentary and in the consequential changes to the Commentary on other Articles (i.e. paragraph 21 of the Commentary on Article 8, paragraphs 32.1 and 32.2 of the Commentary on Article 10, paragraphs 25.1 and 25.2 of the Commentary on Article 11, paragraphs 21.1 and 21.2 of the Commentary on Article 12, paragraphs 27.1 and 27.2 of the Commentary on Article 13, paragraph 7.2 of the Commentary on Article 15, paragraphs 5.1 and 5.2 of the Commentary on Article 21, paragraphs 3.1 and 3.2 of the Commentary on Article 22 and subparagraph 40 a) of the Commentary on Article 24).**

**1.3 Whilst the People's Republic of China understands and respects the separate and independent enterprise principle underlying the new version of Article 7, due to its tax administration capacity it reserves the right to adopt the previous version of the Article and, in some cases, to resort to simpler methods for calculating the profits attributable to a permanent establishment.**

**3.1 Indonesia reserves the right to tax in the State where the permanent establishment is situated business profits derived from the sale of goods or merchandise which are the same as or of a similar kind to the ones sold through that permanent establishment or from other business activities carried on in that State of the same or similar kind as those carried on through that permanent establishment.**

103. Add the following Annex immediately after paragraph 12 of the Positions on Article 7 and its Commentary:

#### ANNEX

#### POSITIONS ON THE PREVIOUS VERSION OF ARTICLE 7 AND ITS COMMENTARY

[The following is the text of the non-OECD economies' positions on Article 7 and its Commentary as it read before 22 July 2010. That previous version of the positions on Article 7 and its Commentary is provided for historical reference as it will continue to be relevant for the application and interpretation of bilateral tax conventions that use the previous version of the Article]

##### Positions on the Article

1. *Argentina and Chile* reserve the right to include a special provision in the Convention that will permit them to apply their domestic law in relation to the taxation of the profits of an insurance and re-insurance enterprise.

2. *Malaysia, Thailand and Ukraine* reserve the right to add a provision to the effect that, if the information available to the competent authority of a Contracting State is inadequate to determine the profits to be attributed to the permanent establishment of an enterprise, the competent authority may apply to that enterprise the provisions of the taxation law of that State, subject to the qualification that such law will be applied, so far as the information available to the competent authority permits, in accordance with the principles of this Article.

2.1 *Albania, Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Croatia, Gabon, India, Ivory Coast, Malaysia, Morocco, the People's Republic of China, Russia, Serbia, Tunisia and Vietnam* reserve the right to maintain in their conventions a specific article dealing with the taxation of "independent personal services". Accordingly, reservation is also made with respect to all the corresponding modifications in the Articles and the Commentaries, which have been modified as a result of the elimination of Article 14.

2.2 *Bulgaria* reserves the right to propose in bilateral negotiations the replacement, in this Article, of the term "profits" with the term "business profits", provided that it is defined in Article 3.

2.3 *Tunisia* reserves the right to propose in bilateral negotiations to add a criterion for the taxation in the Source State of the independent personal services, under the former Article 14, based on the amount (to be established through bilateral negotiations) of the remuneration paid.

#### *Paragraphs 1 and 2*

3. *Argentina, Morocco and Thailand* reserve the right to tax in the State where the permanent establishment is situated business profits derived from the sale of goods or merchandise which are the same as or of a similar kind to the ones sold through a permanent establishment situated in that State or from other business activities carried on in that State of the same or similar kind as those effected through that permanent establishment. They will apply this rule only as a safeguard against abuse and not as a general "force of attraction principle". Thus, the rule will not apply when the enterprise proves that the sales or activities have been carried out for reasons other than obtaining a benefit under the Convention.

4. *Albania and Vietnam* reserve the right to tax in the State where the permanent establishment is situated business profits derived from the sale of goods or merchandise which are the same as or of a similar kind to the ones sold through a permanent establishment situated in that State or from other business activities carried on in that State of the same or similar kind as those effected through that permanent establishment.

4.1 *Morocco and the Philippines* reserve the right to adopt a length of stay and fixed base criteria in determining whether an individual rendering personal services is taxable.

4.2 *Chile and India* reserve the right to amend Article 7 to provide that, in applying paragraphs 1 and 2 of the Article, any income or gain attributable to a permanent establishment during its existence may be taxable by the Contracting State in which the permanent establishment exists even if the payments are deferred until after the permanent establishment has ceased to exist. Furthermore, *India* also reserves the right to apply such a rule under Articles 11, 12, 13 and 21.

#### *Paragraph 3*

5. With respect to paragraph 3, *Argentina* reserves the right to provide that a Contracting State shall not be obliged to allow the deduction of expenses incurred abroad which are not reasonably attributable to the activity carried on by the permanent establishment, taking into account the general principles contained in domestic legislation concerning executive and administrative expenses for assistance services.

6. *Brazil* reserves its position on the words "whether in the State in which the permanent establishment is situated or elsewhere" found in paragraph 3.

7. *Armenia, India, Lithuania and Slovenia* reserve the right to add to paragraph 3 a clarification that expenses to be allowed as deductions by a Contracting State shall include only expenses that are deductible under the domestic laws of that State.

7.1 *Latvia and Estonia* reserve the right to add to paragraph 3 a clarification that expenses to be allowed as deductions by a Contracting State shall include only expenses that would be deductible if the permanent establishment were a separate enterprise of that Contracting State.

8. *Ukraine and Vietnam* reserve the right to add to paragraph 3 a clarification to the effect that the paragraph refers to actual expenses incurred by the enterprise (other than interest in the case of a banking enterprise).

#### *Paragraph 4*

9. *Brazil* reserves the right not to adopt paragraph 4.

*Paragraph 5*

10. *Vietnam* reserves the right not to adopt paragraph 5.

*Paragraph 6*

11. *Brazil* reserves the right not to adopt paragraph 6.

**Positions on the Commentary**

12. *India* does not agree with the interpretation given in paragraph 25.

13. As regards paragraphs 41-50 of the Commentary on Article 7, *Chile* does not adhere to the specific methods provided as the rules on the amount of profit attributable to a permanent establishment; these must be established in and follow domestic law (including foreign exchange legislation).

***Positions on Article 8***

104. Replace paragraphs 6 and 7 of the Positions on Article 8 and its Commentary by the following:

6. *Bulgaria, Latvia, South Africa and Ukraine* reserve the right to include a provision that will ensure that profits from the leasing of ships or aircraft on a bare boat basis and, in the case of *Bulgaria, Latvia* and *Ukraine*, from the leasing of containers, will be treated in the same way as income covered by paragraph 1 when such profits are incidental to international transportation.

7. *Albania, Argentina, Brazil, ~~Chile~~, Estonia, Gabon, India, Latvia, Malaysia, Morocco, the People's Republic of China, ~~Slovenia~~ and South Africa and Hong Kong, China* reserve the right not to extend the scope of the Article to cover inland waterways transportation in bilateral conventions and are free to make corresponding modifications to paragraph 3 of Articles 13, 15 and 22.

105. Add the following new paragraphs 2.1 and 6.6 to the Positions on Article 8 and its Commentary:

***2.1 Indonesia reserves the right to allow the State of source to tax profits from the operation of ships in international traffic provided that the shipping activities arising from such operation in that State are more than casual and subject to certain limits.***

***6.6 The United Arab Emirates reserves the right to include in its bilateral conventions a provision to confirm that income from selling tickets on behalf of other enterprises, income derived from selling technical services to third parties, income from bank deposits and other investments, such as bonds, shares and other debentures, are covered by Article 8 provided that this income is incidental to the operation of air transport enterprises operating in international traffic.***

***Positions on Article 9***

106. Replace paragraph 3 of the Positions on Article 9 and its Commentary by the following:

3. *Malaysia, and Serbia and ~~Slovenia~~* reserve the right to specify in paragraph 2 that a correlative adjustment will be made if the adjustment is considered to be justified.

107. Add the following new paragraph 5 to the Positions on Article 9 and its Commentary:



5. *Israel reserves its right to insert a provision according to which any appropriate adjustment to the amount of the tax charged therein on those profits shall be implemented notwithstanding any time limits or other procedural limitations in the domestic law of the Contracting States, except such limitations as apply to claims made in pursuance of such an agreement.*

#### *Positions on Article 10*

108. Replace paragraphs 4, 10.3, 13 and 14 of the Positions on Article 10 and its Commentary by the following:

4. *Israel reserves its position on the rates provided for in paragraph 2, especially with respect to dividends which are distributed out of the profits of an “approved enterprise” according to its law for the encouragement of investment.*

10.3 *Israel reserves the right to exclude payments made by a Real Estate Investment Trust which is a resident of Israel from the definition of dividends in paragraph 3 and to tax those payments according to its domestic law*~~*Chile reserves the right to amplify the definition of dividends in paragraph 3 so as to cover all income subjected to the taxation treatment of distributions.*~~

13. *Thailand reserves the right to levy tax on distributions by non-resident companies of profits arising within its territory a profit remittance tax on a permanent establishment at the same rate as is provided for in subparagraph 2 a).*

14. *Indonesia reserves the right to apply a branch profits tax, but that branch profits tax shall not affect the provisions contained in any production sharing contracts relating to oil and gas and contracts of works for other mining sectors.*~~*In view of its particular taxation system, Chile retains its freedom of action with regard to the provisions in the Convention relating to the rate and form of distribution of profits by permanent establishments.*~~

109. Delete the following paragraphs 2 and 9.1 of the Positions on Article 10 and its Commentary:

2. ~~*In view of its particular taxation system, Chile retains its freedom of action with regard to the provisions in the Convention relating to the rate and form of distribution of profits by companies.*~~

9.1 ~~*Slovenia reserves the right to omit “jouissance” shares, “jouissance” rights, and mining shares as its their legislation does not provide for such concepts.*~~

#### *Positions on Article 11*

110. Replace paragraphs 2 and 7 of the Positions on Article 11 and its Commentary by the following:

2. *Argentina, Brazil, ~~Chile~~, India, Israel, Ivory Coast, the Philippines, Romania, Thailand and Ukraine reserve their positions on the rate provided for in paragraph 2.*

7. *Brazil and Thailand reserves the right to consider as interest any other income assimilated to income from money lent by the tax law of the Contracting State in which the income arises.*

111. Delete the following paragraph 7.2 of the Positions on Article 11 and its Commentary:

~~7.2 Chile reserves the right to delete the reference to debt claims carrying the right to participate in the debtor's profits.~~

### *Positions on Article 12*

112. Replace paragraphs 3, 8, 11, 12 and 12.2 of the Positions on Article 12 and its Commentary by the following:

3. *Albania, Argentina, Armenia, Belarus, Brazil, Bulgaria, ~~Chile~~, Croatia, the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Gabon, **Indonesia**, ~~Israel~~, Ivory Coast, Kazakhstan, Latvia, Lithuania, Malaysia, Morocco, the People's Republic of China, the Philippines, Romania, Russia, Serbia, ~~Slovenia~~, South Africa, Thailand, Tunisia, Ukraine, ~~and Vietnam~~ **and Hong Kong, China** reserve the right to tax royalties at source.*

8. *Albania, Armenia, Belarus, Brazil, Bulgaria, ~~Chile~~, India, **Indonesia**, Kazakhstan, Latvia, Lithuania, Malaysia, the People's Republic of China, the Philippines, Romania, Russia, Serbia, **Thailand** and Vietnam reserve the right to include in the definition of royalties payments for the use of, or the right to use, industrial, commercial or scientific equipment. Bulgaria intends to propose in bilateral negotiations **the** source taxation of royalties on industrial, commercial or scientific equipment at a lower rate than the rate applied to the rest of the royalty payments.*

11. *Albania, Malaysia, ~~Serbia~~ ~~Russia~~ and Vietnam reserve the right to deal with fees for technical services in a separate Article similar to Article 12.*

12. *Albania, Argentina, Armenia, Belarus, Brazil, Bulgaria, ~~Chile~~, Croatia, Estonia, Gabon, **Indonesia**, Ivory Coast, Kazakhstan, Latvia, Lithuania, Malaysia, Morocco, the People's Republic of China, the Philippines, Romania, Serbia, ~~Slovenia~~, South Africa, Thailand, Tunisia, Ukraine, ~~and Vietnam~~ **and Hong Kong, China** reserve the right, in order to fill what they consider as a gap in the Article, to add a provision defining the source of royalties by analogy with the provisions of paragraph 5 of Article 11, which deals with the same issue in the case of interest.*

12.2 The *Democratic Republic of the Congo* **and Malaysia** reserves ~~its~~ **their** position on the treatment of software.

113. Delete the following paragraph 2 of the Positions on Article 12 and its Commentary:

~~2. *Romania reserves the right to include an additional article dealing with commissions. This article has the same structure as Article 11 on interest.*~~

114. Add the following new paragraphs 20 to 22 to the Positions on Article 12 and its Commentary:

**20. *India does not agree with the interpretation in paragraph 9.1 of the Commentary on Article 12 according to which a payment for transponder leasing will not constitute royalty. This notion is contrary to the Indian position that income from transponder leasing constitutes an equipment royalty taxable both under India's domestic law and its treaties with many countries. It is also contrary to India's position that a payment for the use of a transponder is a payment for the use of a process resulting in a royalty under Article 12. India also does not agree with the conclusion included in the paragraph concerning undersea cables and pipelines as it considers that undersea cables and pipelines are industrial, commercial or scientific equipment and that payments made for their use constitute equipment royalties.***

21. *India does not agree with the interpretation in paragraph 9.2 of the Commentary on Article 12. It considers that a roaming call constitutes the use of a process. Accordingly, the payment made for the use of that process constitutes a royalty for the purposes of Article 12. It is also the position of India that a payment for a roaming call constitutes a royalty since it is a payment for the use of industrial, commercial or scientific equipment.*

22. *India does not agree with the interpretation in paragraph 9.3 of the Commentary on Article 12. It considers that a payment for spectrum license constitutes a royalty taxable both under India's domestic law and its treaties with many countries.*

#### **Positions on Article 13**

115. Replace paragraphs 4 and 5 of the Positions on Article 13 and its Commentary by the following:

4. *Estonia, ~~Latvia~~ and Lithuania reserve the right to limit the application of paragraph 3 to enterprises operating ships and aircraft in international traffic.*

5. *~~Chile~~, India and Vietnam reserve the right to tax gains from the alienation of shares or rights in a company that is a resident of their respective country.*

116. Add the following new paragraph 11 to the Positions on Article 13 and its Commentary:

11. *Israel reserves its right to insert a provision according to which where a person, who was a resident of a Contracting State, has become a resident of the other Contracting State, this Article shall not prevent the first-mentioned State from taxing under its domestic law the capital gains on the property of that person at the time of change of residence. In the case of the alienation of property dealt with in paragraphs 1, 2, 3 and 4 made after the change of residence, double taxation will be eliminated by the first-mentioned Contracting State. In the case of the alienation of property dealt with in paragraph 5 made after the change of residence, double taxation will be eliminated by the other Contracting State.*

#### **Positions on Article 15**

117. Add the following new paragraph 5.1 to the Positions on Article 15 and its Commentary:

5.1 *The United Arab Emirates reserves the right to modify paragraph 3 to provide that remuneration derived in respect of an employment exercised in connection with an aircraft operated in international traffic (including the crew of the aircraft and ground staff) shall be taxed exclusively in the country of residence of the operator of that aircraft.*

#### **Positions on Article 16**

118. Replace paragraphs 1 and 4 of the Positions on Article 16 and its Commentary by the following:

1. *Albania, Bulgaria, the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Estonia, **Indonesia**, Latvia, Lithuania, ~~and Serbia and Slovenia~~ reserve the right to tax under this Article any remuneration of a member of a board of directors or any other similar organ of a resident company.*

4. ***Indonesia**, Malaysia and Vietnam reserve the right to extend the Article to cover the remuneration of top-level managerial officials.*

119. Delete the following paragraph 2 of the Positions on Article 16 and its Commentary:

~~2. Thailand reserves the right to extend the Article to cover the remuneration of senior employees.~~

#### ***Positions on Article 17***

120. Replace paragraph 2 of the Positions on Article 17 and its Commentary by the following:

2. ***India and Thailand*** reserves the right to exclude from the application of paragraphs 1 and 2 the income from activities performed in a Contracting State by entertainers or sportspersons if the activities are substantially supported by public funds and to provide for residence based taxation of such income.

#### ***Positions on Article 20***

121. Replace paragraphs 6 and 9 of the Positions on Article 20 and its Commentary by the following:

6. ***Brazil, Bulgaria, India, Ivory Coast, Morocco, the People's Republic of China, the Philippines, Romania, Serbia, Slovenia, Thailand, Tunisia and Vietnam*** reserve the right to add an article which addresses the situation of teachers, professors and researchers, subject to various conditions and are free to make a corresponding modification to paragraph 1 of Article 15.

9. ***India and Hong Kong, China*** reserves the right to exclude “business apprentice” from this Article.

122. Delete the following paragraph 3 of the Positions on Article 20 and its Commentary:

~~3. Romania reserves the right to limit to a period of 7 years (the maximum period of studies in Romania) the exemption provided for in the Article.~~

#### ***Positions on Article 21***

123. Replace paragraph 1 of the Positions on Article 21 and its Commentary by the following:

1. ***Albania, Argentina, Belarus, Brazil, Bulgaria, Chile, Gabon, India, Indonesia, Ivory Coast, Malaysia, Morocco, Russia, Serbia, Slovenia, South Africa, Thailand and Vietnam*** reserve their positions on this Article as they wish to maintain the right to tax income arising from sources in their own country.

#### ***Positions on Article 22***

124. Replace paragraph 2 of the Positions on Article 22 and its Commentary by the following:

2. ***Brazil, Bulgaria, Indonesia, Malaysia, the People's Republic of China, Thailand and Vietnam*** reserve their positions on the Article if and when they impose taxes on capital.

#### ***Positions on Article 24***

125. Replace paragraphs 2, 2.2, 4, 10, 11 and 12 of the Positions on Article 24 and its Commentary by the following:

2. ***Brazil, Chile, Romania, Russia, Thailand and Vietnam*** reserve their position on the second sentence of paragraph 1.

2.2 *Indonesia, Malaysia and Tunisia* reserve the right to restrict the scope of the Article to residents of the Contracting States.

4. *Albania, Bulgaria, ~~Chile~~, Estonia, India, Malaysia, the Philippines, Russia, Serbia and Vietnam* reserve the right not to insert paragraph 2 in their conventions.

10. *Albania, Brazil, Bulgaria, ~~Chile~~, Malaysia, the Philippines, Romania, Serbia, Thailand, Tunisia, Ukraine and Vietnam* reserve the right to restrict the scope of the Article to the taxes covered by the Convention.

11. *India and Malaysia* reserves ~~its~~ **their** position on the interpretation set out in paragraph 44.

12. *India* reserves the right to add a paragraph to clarify that this provision can neither be construed as preventing a Contracting State from charging the profits of a permanent establishment which a company of the other Contracting State has in the first mentioned State at a rate of tax which is higher than that imposed on the profits of a similar company of the first mentioned Contracting State, nor as being in conflict with the provisions of paragraph 3 of Article 7 (*as it read before the 2010 update to the Model Tax Convention*).

#### *Positions on Article 25*

126. Replace paragraph 2 of the Positions on Article 25 and its Commentary by the following:

2. *Brazil, ~~Chile~~, the Philippines and Thailand* reserve their positions on the second sentence of paragraph 2. These countries consider that the implementation of reliefs~~ses~~ and refunds following a mutual agreement ought to remain linked to time-limits prescribed by their domestic laws.

#### *Positions on Article 26*

127. Delete the following paragraphs 1, 2.2, 2.3, 2.4 and 4 of the Positions on Article 26 and its Commentary:

~~1. — *Brazil* reserves the right not to include the word “public” in the last sentence of paragraph 2 in its conventions.~~

~~2.2 — *Malaysia and Thailand* reserve the right not to include paragraph 4 in their conventions.~~

~~2.3 — *Brazil, Malaysia, Romania, Serbia and Thailand* reserve the right not to include paragraph 5 in their conventions.~~

~~2.4 — *Chile* can generally supply information held by banks and other financial institutions but reserves the right not to supply certain information for civil tax purposes, such as information regarding transfer of funds, transactions carried out on checking accounts and account balances, which are confidential under Chilean law.~~

~~4. — *Malaysia* wishes to indicate that with respect to paragraph 11 of the Commentary, it would be difficult for it, in view of its strict domestic laws and administrative practice as to the procedure to make public certain information obtained under the domestic laws, to provide information requested.~~

128. Add the following new paragraph 3 to the Positions on Article 26 and its Commentary:

3. *As regards paragraph 10.3 of the Commentary, Hong Kong, China wishes to clarify its position on the exchange of information that existed prior to the entry into force of the bilateral agreement. In view of its domestic law requirements, Hong Kong, China will only exchange information relating to taxable periods after the agreement came into operation.*

*Positions on Article 28*

129. Add the following new section on the Positions on Article 28 and its Commentary:

**POSITIONS ON ARTICLE 28  
(MEMBERS OF DIPLOMATIC MISSIONS AND CONSULAR POSTS)  
AND ITS COMMENTARY**

1. *Considering that Hong Kong, China is not a sovereign state but a special administrative region of the People's Republic of China, Hong Kong, China reserves the right to replace "diplomatic missions" by "government missions" in this Article.*

*Positions on Article 29*

130. Replace paragraph 1 of the Positions on Article 29 and its Commentary by the following:

1. *Indonesia, the People's Republic of China and Thailand reserve their position on this Article.*