

**The International Response to Conflict and Genocide:
Lessons from the Rwanda Experience**

Study 1

**Historical Perspective:
Some Explanatory Factors**

by

Tor Sellström
Lennart Wohlgemuth
The Nordic Africa Institute
Uppsala, Sweden

with contributions by

Patrick Dupont
Karin Andersson Schiebe

Joint Evaluation of Emergency Assistance to Rwanda

Contents

Preface	5
Introduction and Summary	9
Chapter 1: Country Brief	14
The physical setting	14
Demographic and social features	16
The land question	18
The position of women	18
The economy	19
Chapter 2: Pre-Colonial Period	21
Patron/client relationships	23
Ethnicity in pre-colonial Rwanda	24
Chapter 3: Colonial Period and Independence	26
The colonial era	26
Transition to independence	28
The events of 1959–62: reversal and confrontation	29
The Second Republic	32
Chapter 4: Towards Crisis in Rwanda 1990-1994	35
General outline: main actors/main factors	35
Evolution of the conflict	41
Chapter 5: April 1994 and its Aftermath	50
The genocide	50
Churches	53
The civil war	53
The role of the international community	53
The refugees	55
Rwanda after the war	56
The internal political situation	58

Annex 1: Rwanda in the Region	59
The Banyarwanda	59
Rwanda and regional organizations	60
Rwanda and Burundi in crisis: comparative and regional perspective	62
The national dialogue in Burundi: a way towards conflict resolution?	63
Annex 2: Arming Rwanda	67
Rwanda government	67
Rwandese Patriotic Front	69
International peacekeeping	70
Appendix 1: Tables: Economic Indicators	71
Appendix 2: Chronology	74
Appendix 3: Annotated Bibliography	81
Pre-colonial period	81
Colonial period/independence	81
1990–1994	82
April 1994 and after	82
Bibliography	82
Appendix 4: Interviews and Meetings	89
Appendix 5: List of Abbreviations	90

Preface

Within a period of three months in 1994, an estimated five to eight hundred thousand people were killed as a result of civil war and genocide in Rwanda. Large numbers were physically and psychologically afflicted for life through maiming, rape and other trauma; over two million fled to neighbouring countries and maybe half as many became internally displaced within Rwanda. This human suffering was and is incomprehensible. The agony and legacy of the violence create continuing suffering, economic loss and tension both inside Rwanda and in the Great Lakes Region.

For several years preceding the massive violence of 1994, the international community contributed to efforts to find a peaceful solution to escalating conflict and provided substantial assistance to alleviate the human suffering. During the nine months of the emergency in 1994, April to December, international assistance for emergency relief to Rwandese refugees and displaced persons is estimated to have cost in the order of US\$1.4 billion, of which about one-third was spent in Rwanda and two-thirds in asylum countries. This accounted for over 20% of all official emergency assistance, which in turn has accounted for an increasing share, reaching over 10% in 1994, of overall international aid.

This growth reflects the worldwide proliferation in recent years of so-called complex emergencies. These tend to have multiple causes, but are essentially political in nature and entail violent conflict. They typically include a breakdown of legitimate institutions and governance, widespread suffering and massive population displacements, and they often involve and require a range of responses from the international community, including intense diplomacy and conflict resolution efforts, UN policing actions, and the provision of multilateral and bilateral humanitarian assistance by official and private agencies. A complex emergency tends to be very dynamic, characterized by rapid changes that are difficult to predict. Thus complex issues are raised regarding the timing, nature and scale of response. The Rwanda complex emergency shares all these characteristics and more.

Although some evaluations of international assistance for complex emergencies have been carried out, experience from the planning and execution of large-scale aid for relief, rehabilitation and reconstruction has not been extensively documented and assessed. Recognizing both the magnitude of the Rwanda emergency and the implications of complex disasters for constricted aid budgets, the Danish Ministry of Foreign Affairs, through its development cooperation wing, Danida, proposed a *Joint Evaluation of Emergency Assistance to Rwanda*.

This initiative resulted in the launching of an unprecedented multinational, multi-donor evaluation effort, with the formation of a Steering Committee at a consultative meeting of international agencies and NGOs held in Copenhagen in November 1994. This Committee¹ is composed of representatives from 19 OECD-member bilateral donor agencies, plus the European Union and the Develop-

1 Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada, Denmark, Finland, Germany, Ireland, Italy, Japan, Luxembourg, Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, United Kingdom, United States of America, Commission of the EU, OECD/DAC, IOM, UN/DHA, UNDP, UNHCHR, UNHCR, UNICEF, WFP, WHO, IBRD, ICRC, IFRC, ICVA, Doctors of the World, INTERACTION, Steering Committee for Humanitarian Response, VOICE. Several other countries supported the evaluation, but did not participate actively. France suspended its participation in the Steering Committee in December 1995. The cost of the evaluation has been met by voluntary contributions from members of the Steering Committee.

ment Assistance Committee (DAC) of the OECD; nine multilateral agencies and UN units; the two components of the International Red Cross and Red Crescent Movement (ICRC and IFRC); and five international NGO organizations

Objective of the Evaluation²

The main objective of the evaluation is to draw lessons from the Rwanda experience relevant for future complex emergencies as well as for current operations in Rwanda and the region, such as early warning and conflict management, preparation for and provision of emergency assistance, and the transition from relief to rehabilitation and development.

In view of the diversity of the issues to be evaluated, four separate evaluation studies were contracted to institutions and individuals with requisite qualifications in the fields of (i) emergency assistance planning and management; (ii) repatriation and rehabilitation of refugees; (iii) history and political economy of Rwanda and the surrounding region; (iv) institution and capacity building in development; (v) conflict and political analysis; and/or (vi) socio-cultural and gender aspects. Institutions and individuals were also selected for their proven ability to perform high-quality, analytical and objective evaluative research.

The institutions and principal individuals responsible for the four reports are listed below. Space precludes listing all team members for each study, which ranged from four persons for Study I to 21 for Study III; in all, 52 consultants and researchers participated. Complete identification of the study teams may be found in each study report. Several of the studies commissioned sub-studies that are also identified in the respective study report.

Study I: Historical Perspective: Some Explanatory Factors

The Nordic Africa Institute (Uppsala, Sweden)
Tor Sellström and Lennart Wohlgemuth.

Study II: Early Warning and Conflict Management

Chr. Michelsen Institute (Bergen, Norway)
York University (Toronto, Canada)
Howard Adelman and Astri Suhrke.

Study III: Humanitarian Aid and Effects

Overseas Development Institute (London, United Kingdom)
John Borton, Emery Brusset and Alistair Hallam.

Study IV: Rebuilding Post-Genocide Rwanda

Center for Development Information and Evaluation,
US Agency for International Development; Development Alternatives, Inc.;
Refugee Policy Group (Washington, DC, USA)
Krishna Kumar and David Tardif-Douglin.

Evaluation oversight was performed by the Steering Committee (which held four meetings between December 1994 and December 1995), and by a Management Group, comprised of one lead bilateral agency for each study: Study I: Claes Benedich, Sida, Sweden; Study II: Jarle Hårstad, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Norway; Study III: Johnny Morris, ODA, United Kingdom; and Study IV: Krishna Kumar, USAID/CDIE, USA; and Niels Dabelstein, Danida, Denmark, as chair. The evaluation teams were responsible to the Management Group and the Steering Committee for guidance regarding

2 See Appendix I of the Synthesis Report for the full Terms of Reference.

such issues as terms of reference and operational matters, including time frames and budget constraints, and they were obliged to give full and fair consideration to substantive comments from both groups. The responsibility for the content of final reports is solely that of the teams.

The approach taken to this evaluation has reflected two concerns:

- to try, through involving experienced outsiders, to examine as objectively and critically as possible an experience about which it is impossible for any person with humane values not to be deeply affected;
- to engage leading Africans in a critical review of the analysis, findings and recommendations while they were still in draft.

For this last reason, a panel of distinguished experts from Africa has provided a critique of the report through participation in two panel discussions with the authors of the reports and selected resource persons. The panel comprised: Reverend José Chipenda, General Secretary, All-Africa Conference of Churches, Kenya; Dr. Adama Djeng, President, International Commission of Jurists, Switzerland; Professor Joseph Ki-zerbo, Member of Parliament, Republic of Burkina Faso; and Dr. Salim A. Salim, Secretary General, Organization of African Unity, Ethiopia. Also, Mr. Gideon Kayinamura, Ambassador of Rwanda to the UK; Ms. Julie Ngiriye, Ambassador of Burundi to Denmark; and Ms. Victoria Mwakasege, Counsellor, Embassy of Tanzania, Stockholm, made significant contributions through their participation in the December 1995 Steering Committee Meeting.

While the Steering Committee is particularly grateful to these African participants for contributing their wisdom and keen insights at one stage of the evaluation process, it is also acutely aware of the fact that African researchers and institutions were not, with the exception of selected sub-studies, involved in its execution. However, the Steering Committee is committed to disseminate the evaluation widely among African leaders and organizations and anxious that they participate fully in discussions about the evaluation's recommendations.

The following resource persons have commented on drafts at various stages and/or participated in panels or workshops: Mary B. Anderson, Consultant, USA; Hanne Christensen, Independent Bureau for Humanitarian Issues, France; John Eriksson, Consultant, USA; Professor André Guichaoua, Université des Sciences at Technologies de Lille, France; Sven Hamrell, Dag Hammarskjöld Foundation, Sweden; Larry Minear, Humanitarianism and War Project, Brown University, USA; Professor Rodolfo Stavenhagen, Colegio de México, México; and Stein Villumstad, Norwegian Church Aid, Norway.

The Synthesis Report was prepared by John Eriksson, with contributions from the authors of the four study reports and assistance from Hanne Christensen and Stein Villumstad in the preparation of findings and recommendations.

This evaluation was initiated on the premise that in spite of the complexity and chaos that characterize Rwanda's experience, it would be possible to identify applicable lessons to be learned by the international community in attempting to respond to future complex emergencies and in its continuing attempt to help Rwanda rebuild its society. The international teams who have produced this evaluation believe they have identified such lessons. It will be up to the governmental and non-governmental leaders of the international community for whom this evaluation has been prepared to apply the lessons.

Niels Dabelstein

Chairman of the Steering Committee for
Joint Evaluation of Emergency Assistance to Rwanda

Introduction and Summary

The purpose of this study is to present a historical background to developments in Rwanda that culminated in the genocide* that began in April 1994. The subject is dealt with in chronological order. The two chapters “Rwanda in the region” and “Arming Rwanda”, although not less important, fall outside the chronology and are therefore presented as separate annexes.

There is an abundance of books, research reports and studies on different aspects of the history and recent developments in Rwanda (see the annotated bibliography in Appendix 3). This study relies on available written materials supplemented by interviews with established scholars (Rwandese as well as foreign). We wish to thank them all for letting us draw upon their knowledge, in particular Professors Filip Reyntjens, David Newbury and Gérard Prunier, who have commented on our drafts.

Our review of documentation on the historical evolution of Rwandese society has not led us to any easy answers or to pinpoint one or two ultimate reasons for the tragic events. On the contrary, it has rather led us to conclude that recent events result from a cumulation of events of the past, with one factor forming a building block for the next, and all actors and factors interrelating and interacting.

However, we wish to use this summary to highlight a few specific developments in Rwanda’s history that we think have been of decisive importance, and need to be understood in order better to comprehend what led to the tragedy in 1994 and what is going on in Rwanda today. We think that they are all important and hesitate to stress one more than the other. The scholarly debate on Rwanda has often been “reductionist”, trying to establish whether one or the other factor has been more important – a debate that has helped to clarify the different standpoints, but has led to little conclusive result.

The aspects we wish to stress are:

- 1) The build-up of indigenous social and political structures towards the end of the pre-colonial period, in particular under the reign of the Tutsi king Rwabugiri during the second half of the 19th century. Rwabugiri’s administration (1860–1895) imposed a harsh regime on the formerly semi-autonomous Tutsi and Hutu lineages, confiscating their lands and breaking their political power. Rwabugiri amplified feudal labour systems, in particular the *uburetwa*, i.e. labour in return for access to land, a system that was restricted to Hutu peasant farmers while exempting Tutsi. He also manipulated social categories, and introduced an “ethnic” differentiation between Tutsi and Hutu based on historical social positions. Polarization and politicization of ethnicity thus began before the advent of European colonialism.

* *The term “genocide” is legally defined in the International Genocide Convention of 1948 as acts committed with the intention to destroy, wholly or in part, a national ethnic, racial or religious group, as such. This definition is precise and operational and is rather qualitative than quantitative. Politically, the tendency has been to avoid the use of the term as much as possible as it obligates states to intervene to protect those threatened by massacre. This is discussed in detail in Study II.*

- 2) The German and Belgian colonial (trusteeship) policy of indirect rule, favouring the strengthening of Tutsi hegemony and resulting in a political and administrative monopoly in the hands of the aristocratic Tutsi overlords of the *Nyiginya* clan from the 1920s. Under the influence of the so-called hamitic thesis, this policy culminated in 1933 with the introduction of compulsory identity cards, reinforcing and accelerating the late pre-colonial process towards a separation of Tutsi and Hutu (and Twa). From then on, all Rwandese had to relate to “their” respective ethnic group, which in turn determined avenues and fortunes in society. Under European colonialism, a policy of “ethnogenesis” was actively pursued, i.e. a politically-motivated creation of ethnic identities based on socially-constituted categories of the pre-colonial past. The minority Tutsi became the haves and the majority Hutu the have-nots.
- 3) The abrupt change by Belgium only some 25 years later, when – under the influence of the general decolonization process in Africa, the build-up towards political independence in the Congo (Zaire) and in a belated attempt to redress past injustices – the colonial administration (and the Catholic church) shifted support from the minority Tutsi to the majority Hutu. This eased the way for the so-called peasant, or Hutu, revolution of 1959–61, through which Rwanda underwent a profound transition from a Tutsi-dominated monarchy to a Hutu-led independent republic in less than three years. The replacement of one political elite by another introduced a new dimension of political and social instability and a potential for future ethnic violence. The events of 1959–61 also forced tens of thousands of Tutsi into exile in neighbouring countries, from where groups of refugees began to carry out armed incursions into Rwanda, sowing the seeds of the country’s ethnically-defined refugee problem.
- 4) Largely due to extreme population pressure, in addition to complex agricultural production systems and competition for land between crop-farmers and cattle-owners, the Rwandese society developed over the centuries into a remarkably organized state, with a high degree of authoritarian social control from the centre. This was not only the case with the core Tutsi-dominated pre-colonial feudal kingdom (i.e. excluding the northern and south-western areas of present Rwanda) – in which a vertical chain of command through layers of chiefs regulated the economy and the life of peasants through various social contracts – but also during the German and Belgian administrations, through which a policy of indirect rule continued, and strengthened, the control from above.

What is important in the context of this study is, first, that the highly organized and centralized Rwandese state formation over the years constrained the scope for the emergence of non-governmental organizations and independent interest groups. Political parties did appear on the scene towards the end of the 1950s, but on the whole the development of an independent NGO-based civil society has been largely dwarfed by the state. Thus, along with the oppression and exploitation of Rwandese women farmers – carrying most of the agricultural work and being physically drained through constant pregnancies – there are, for example, in male-dominated Rwanda only a few rural women’s associations to voice their interests.

Secondly – and most importantly – the political culture of centralized social control has facilitated policies aiming at mobilization or manipulation of the Rwandese rural people, for peaceful as well as violent purposes. Subjugated receivers of instructions from above and without means to disobey, the peasant population has largely joined campaigns launched by the government, whether the essentially constructive *umuganda* labour regime from the mid-70s or the later fatally destructive *interahamwe* militias.

- 5) Increasing intra-Hutu tensions – mainly between groups from the northern Gisenyi and Ruhengeri regions and those from the rest of the country – developed during the First and Second Republics (1962–1990) and came to form an important factor underlying the cleavage between Hutu in the 1990s. In addition to competition over political spoils, at the core of this division is the historical fact that the northern Hutu were independent until the first decade of the 20th Century, when they were militarily defeated by combined German and Tutsi-led southern Rwandese troops. To this day, the northerners form a distinctive Hutu sub-culture in which


awareness of a pre-Tutsi past is more pronounced than in other parts of Rwanda. President Habyarimana's informal council – or *akazu*; constituted around his wife and brothers-in-law – represented this independent Hutu tradition, deeply suspicious of any reconciliatory gestures towards the exiled Tutsi community and, therefore, also essentially hostile to the Hutu political groups favouring a dialogue with the Tutsi-led Rwandese Patriotic Front (RPF). The slow and often flawed democratization process in 1990–94 was to a great extent due to this intra-Hutu division. The *akazu* was also behind the genocide from April 1994, preparing the tragic events through instructions to presidentially-appointed *bourgemestres* (mayors), building up the *inter-ahamwe* militias and mobilizing the Burundian Hutu refugees pouring into southern Rwanda after the assassination of the Burundian Hutu president Ndadaye in October 1993.

- 6) The economic slump starting in the late 1980s and the effects of the actions subsequently taken by the government in consultation with the international donor community, i.e. the structural adjustment programme of 1990–1992. The economic deterioration, largely due to a sharp decline of world market prices for coffee – Rwanda's prime export earner – as well as to unfavourable weather and economic policies such as increased protectionism, price controls and other regulations, affected the whole society. In US dollar terms, GDP per capita fell by some 40 percent over the four years 1989–1993. The slump hit the Rwandese peasantry particularly hard. Combined with the effects of the civil war from October 1990, continued demographic pressure on available resources and decreasing agricultural yields, the economic crisis introduced yet another element of stress and instability into the Rwandese political and social fabric. The international community, including the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund, overlooked these potentially explosive political consequences when designing and imposing their economic conditions for support to Rwanda's economic recovery.
- 7) The refugee crisis, starting in 1959 and developing into a constant political and social problem throughout the history of independent Rwanda. Tens of thousands of Tutsi, in several waves from the Hutu revolution onwards, were forced into exile in neighbouring countries. Largely due to the intransigence of the Rwandese Hutu-led governments towards their demands to return, and to the unwelcoming policies of some of the host countries, the exiled Tutsi communities became over the years increasingly militant. In turn, this led to the creation of the Rwandese Patriotic Front (RPF), the military attack on Rwanda in October 1990 and the ensuing civil war.
- 8) Of crucial importance in this context is the two-generations-old unsolved issue of impunity for genocidal crimes in Rwanda. The International Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, adopted by the United Nations General Assembly in 1948, confirmed by the International Court of Justice in 1951 and ratified by Rwanda in 1975, stipulates that persons committing genocide shall be punished, "whether they are constitutionally responsible rulers, public officials or private individuals". In addition to the crime of genocide as such, punishable acts according to the convention are conspiracy to commit genocide, direct and public incitement to commit genocide, attempt to commit genocide and complicity in genocide. In Rwanda, those who over the years have been responsible for ethnic mass killings have not, however, been brought to justice. For the psychological health of the people, and the political health of the country, the crimes must be addressed. If a culture of impunity is allowed to continue, the spiral of violence seems almost bound to be repeated in the future.
- 9) Linked to the problem of impunity is the legacy of fear that exists in the Rwandese social fabric as a result of repeated mass killings since 1959, and which has its origins in the process of ethnogenesis and division between privileged Tutsi and under-privileged Hutu during the colonial period. With creation of the ethnicity issue followed a social construct of Tutsi superiority and Hutu inferiority, contempt and mistrust, which ultimately permeated the entire society and developed into a culture of fear. It largely contributed to the outburst of violence at the time of Rwanda's independence, when the tables were turned and the fear among the majority Hutu

gave way to a fear among the minority Tutsi. Since then, it has been repeatedly exploited for purposes of political manipulation.

- 10) Developments in Rwanda are, finally, closely related to developments in the Great Lakes region, comprising Rwanda, eastern Zaire, Uganda, north-western Tanzania and Burundi. This is the historical region of the *banyarwanda*, i.e. the people who speak the language of Rwanda, *kinyarwanda*, and who throughout modern history share a common heritage. It was violated by European powers, who at the turn of the century divided the region and the people into Belgian, British and German colonial dominions, with far-reaching consequences for later, including the most recent, events. Thus, regional political, economic, social and cultural dynamics – taking the form of, among other things, cross-border flows of refugees, weapons, ideas and fears – must be borne in mind when considering solutions to Rwanda's problems, as well as the problems of – above all – Burundi and Zaire. If not, the ghastly events in Rwanda in 1994 could easily draw the entire region into similar, or still greater, human tragedies.

All these factors, sometimes fuelled and sometimes constrained by interventions from the international community, led to the manipulation of ethnicity in the 1990s, which in turn led to the genocide from 6 April 1994. We hope that this study of the history of Rwanda will help the reader to be aware that the causes of polarized ethnicity are not easily defined. On the one hand, we do not wish to draw the conclusion that such ethnicity only stems from differences based on ancestry, culture or social position. As shown below, the complexity of the pre-colonial society was such that differences could just as well be explained by lineage, clan, occupation, class etc. On the other hand, neither can we draw the conclusion that the contemporary antagonistic cleavages along ethnic lines can be attributed solely to specific events during the colonial period, nor in the period thereafter. There are no simple answers. The truth is that the present can be explained only as a product of a long and conflict-ridden process, where many factors contribute to the total picture.



The Great Lakes Region

Source: Vassall-Adams, 1994.


Chapter 1

Country Brief

The physical setting

With just over 26,000 square kilometres, Rwanda is one of the smallest countries in Africa, comparable in size to its southern neighbour, Burundi, and to its former colonial power, Belgium. Situated immediately south of the Equator, it borders on Zaire, Uganda, Tanzania and Burundi. Often called “the Land of a Thousand Hills” or “the Switzerland of Africa”, Rwanda is dominated by mountain ranges and highland plateaus of the great watershed between the Nile and the Zaire river basins (Congo-Nile Divide). The populous central part – from Ruhengeri in the north to Butare in the south – lies between 1,500 and 2,000 metres above sea-level. West of the central plateau, the Congo-Nile Divide reaches altitudes above 2,500 metres, with the highest parts in the north-western volcanic Virunga chain. Here, the Karasimbi peak reaches 4,507 metres. Lake Kivu – which separates Rwanda from Zaire – lies 1,460 metres above sea-level and is the highest lake in Africa. East of the central plateau, i.e. from the capital, Kigali, to the border with Tanzania, the land gradually gets lower, but is still within the 1,000–1,500 metre range and with a number of higher areas.

Administrative division



Source: Scheffer, 1986.


Although Rwanda is just below the Equator, the high altitudes moderate the climate. The average annual temperature in Kigali is 19 degrees Celsius, with only small variations between rainy and dry seasons. Rwanda enjoys rich rainfall from October to June, followed by a short dry season in July to September. The average monthly rainfall on the central plateau is 85 millimetres, which supports a wide range of crops grown on every available patch of land. The moderated tropical climate supports two, and sometimes three, agricultural seasons a year, which gives parts of the country a potential for agricultural production unparalleled by most African countries.

Rwanda is a land-locked country, which for its economy depends on a costly and vulnerable transit trade to the Indian Ocean through Tanzania or Uganda and Kenya, or to the Atlantic through Zaire. The distance from Kigali to the Indian Ocean is approximately 1,500 kilometres and to the Atlantic coast some 2,000 kilometres.

Not less than 10 percent of Rwanda's area has been protected as national parks or forest reserves, considerably more than in most other African countries. The best-known of the parks are Virunga on the border with Zaire in the north-west and Akagera on the eastern border with Tanzania. The Virunga park – made famous through the film, *Gorillas in the Mist* – is home to the last mountain gorillas, while the savannas of Akagera sustain a wildlife as varied as that of the better-known game parks in Kenya and Tanzania.

For administrative purposes, Rwanda is divided into 10 *préfectures* (regions), each headed by a *préfet* (prefect) appointed by the President of the Republic. The *préfectures* are divided into 143 *communes*, governed by a *bourgemestre* (mayor). The mayors are also appointed by the President.

Population density



Source: Walter, 1993.

Demographic and social features

According to the 1991 census, in August of that year Rwanda had a total population of 7.15 million, with an annual increase of 3.1%. This translates into a very high population density. In fact, with 271 people per square kilometre, it was the highest in mainland Africa; if lakes, national parks and forest reserves are excluded, it was far higher. Thus, the actual area of arable agricultural land (some 17,600 square kilometres out of the total of 26,300) had to support an average of 406 people per square kilometre over the whole country. The most densely-populated area was Ruhondo in the Ruhengeri *préfecture*, with some 820 people per square kilometre of usable land. At the other end of the scale was Rusomo (Kibungo), with 62 people to the same unit (République Rwandaise, 1993:II).

The reasons behind Rwanda's historically high population density are many. Both land and climate are generous. In addition, the mountainous area has been protective. The natural fortress formed by the highlands served as a shield against hostile intruders, such as the nineteenth century Swahili slave traders from the Indian Ocean coast. Coupled with effective military structures, the Rwandese society was thus one of the very few in Africa that were saved from the ravages of the Arab and European slave trades. As a result, the population was not reduced by this trade but actually increased as other people sought refuge in the country (Waller, 1993; Prunier 1995). In addition, the strong influence of the Catholic church against population control measures, as well as the traditional position of women, are important explanatory factors for the high population growth.

Rwanda is a country of peasant farmers, or rather large-scale gardeners. The crucial question of land will be presented below. Already here, however, it should be stated that many observers link the tragedy that unfolded in 1994 to high population pressure and increasing competition for means of survival. Thus, in the words of Prunier (1995):

the decision to kill was of course made by politicians, for political reasons. But at least part of the reason why it was carried out so thoroughly by the ordinary rank-and-file peasants (...) was the feeling that there were too many people on too little land, and that with a few less there would be more for the survivors... (Prunier, 1995).

According to the 1991 census, 90.4% (or some 6.5 million) of the resident population in Rwanda was Hutu, 8.2% (0.6 million) Tutsi and 0.4% (approximately 30,000) Twa. In general, though with some exceptions, commentators are in agreement that these figures reflect the reality. They also correspond to the results obtained when extrapolating from earlier census and migration data. The historical relationship between Hutu and Tutsi is discussed below. Here it should be noted that the marginalized minority of pygmoid Twa actually consists of two groups: those making a living from pottery and those who live by hunting and gathering. The latter group – also known as *Impunyu* – numbers less than 5,000 people and is concentrated in the Ruhengeri and Gisenyi *préfectures*. They are often exploited and looked down upon by their fellow Rwandese.

In 1991, there were some 1.5 million households with an average of 4.7 members in Rwanda. The dominance of agriculture – and traditional life – is underlined by the fact that not less than 94.6% of the population lived in the countryside, while almost two-thirds of the urban population were concentrated to Kigali. Rwanda is thus a rural country, where most of the people live and farm on hills (*collines* in French or *musozi* in *kinyarwanda*), which form the basis of the society. This has determined a very precise and peculiar form of human settlement. The Rwandese peasant – Hutu or Tutsi – is part of a *rugo*, which broadly translates into enclosure, compound or household. (In a polygamous household, each wife occupies her own *rugo*). Every hill consists of several *ingo* (plural for *rugo*), where Hutu and Tutsi traditionally live side by side on the same slopes, "for better or for worse; for intermarriage or for massacre" (Prunier, 1995).

The 1991 census showed that 48% of the population was below the age of 15 and that the average life expectancy was 53.1 years. At the same time – i.e. before the massacres and the demographic

upheavals of 1994/95 – more than 20% of the sexually active adults in the urban areas were infected with the HIV virus (The Economist Intelligence Unit, 1995). Women get infected at younger ages and in greater numbers than men. It is estimated that between 100,000 and 200,000 Rwandese in their prime age will die from AIDS by the year 2,000.

A large section of the rural population suffers from endemic diseases such as bilharzia, diarrhoea, dysentery and respiratory infections. Water-related diseases are the main causes of death among children. According to World Bank estimates, the infant mortality rate fell from 142 per 1,000 in 1970 to 117 in 1992. In 1992, 1.5 million Rwandese were without access to health services; 2.6 million were without potable water, and 3.2 million without sanitation (The Economist Intelligence Unit, 1995).

The official language of administration is French, but people communicate in the common national vernacular *kinyarwanda* and, as a *lingua franca* for traders, Swahili (while returnees from Uganda and Tanzania also speak English). According to the 1991 census, 44% of the population could not read or write, with a higher illiteracy rate among women (50%) than among men (37%). The World Bank estimates that 71% of primary age Rwandese attended school in 1991, compared with 68% in 1970. However, only 8% benefitted from secondary and less than 1% from tertiary education.

The Catholic church has played a major role in Rwanda's history. In a sense, it would be more appropriate to characterize the colonization of Rwanda as a venture by the French Catholic "White Fathers" than by the German Empire. They arrived in 1899, and had within a few years set up a number of missions around the country. During the colonial period, the Catholic church worked hand-in-hand with the German and Belgian authorities, and after Independence there has been a remarkably high degree of political intertwining between the Church and the state.

The founding fathers of modern Hutu nationalism – among them the future President, Grégoire Kayibanda – all formed part of the small elite of so-called *évolués* educated at Catholic schools and seminars. In the mid-1970s, the Roman Catholic Archbishop of Kigali, Vincent Nsengiyumwa, became a member of the Central Committee of the ruling MNRD party, official confessor to President Habyarimana's wife and close to the *akazu* inner circle of Hutu nationalists.

The wide spread of Christianity in Rwanda should be seen against this background. According to the 1991 census, not less than 90% of the population was Christian, out of which 63% Catholic, 19% Protestant and some 8% Adventist. The Muslim faith has a certain following in Kigali and in other urban centres, but is of marginal importance on a national scale, representing just over 1% of the population.

Employment data, finally, are sketchy, since only about 4% of Rwanda's population live wholly within the cash economy. World Bank statistics for 1985 suggest that 93% of the labour force worked in the agricultural sector (well above the average for sub-Saharan Africa), 3% in industry and 4% in the service sector. In the beginning of the 1990s, the biggest employer in the formal sector was the government, with about 7,000 employees in the central and some 43,000 in the local administration, not including personnel in the armed forces.

The overwhelming majority of peasant farmers are self-employed, and neither the government nor the small industrial sector can absorb the annual physical increase of the working population. Thus, the agricultural sector has had to support the rapid demographic growth, which, however, in many regions has outstripped the rise in agricultural yields. Few rural households therefore survived on farming alone. In 1990, the government estimated that 81% also earned money from informal activities such as brick-making, carpentry and sewing. In addition, almost everyone was active in the parallel or "black" economy, if only from time to time. This included cross-border trade and barter, or smuggling, with neighbouring countries (The Economist Intelligence Unit, 1995).

The land question

Already in 1984, 57% of rural households in Rwanda farmed less than one hectare of land and 25% had less than half a hectare, from which they had to feed an average family of five people. With the growth of the population, the inheritance laws – dividing a family's rights to use land among all the remaining sons – ensured that the size of the holdings would continue to fall and be increasingly fragmented into small plots, scattered over wider areas. Thus, in the beginning of the 1990s, the average Rwandese household farmed at least five plots of land, each with its specific characteristics of fertility, accessibility and form of tenancy.

On the diverse plots, the household must produce a constant supply of food throughout the year. This involves highly sophisticated decisions. Preferably, the crops should be of more than one type so that, for example, carbohydrate-rich crops such as potatoes can complement protein-rich crops such as beans. In addition, the farmer must also take into account the degree to which the different crops require fertile soils or can tolerate poorer soils etc. Thus, a study (quoted by Waller, 1993) showed that in order to preserve soil fertility, in 1993 farmers in one area in southern Rwanda grew 14 different crops in almost 50 rotations.

Under increasing population pressure, such a complex system is difficult to maintain, and during the 1980s more and more families could no longer afford to let their plots rest and recover through periods of fallow. The result was reduced soil fertility and short-term survival strategies, such as farming on the steepest slopes, even though the peasants knew that such practices were not sustainable. In the beginning of the 1990s, half of Rwanda's farming was done on slopes of more than 10% inclination, where rainfall often washed away both the soil and the crops. In turn, for an increasing part of the peasantry this translated into malnutrition and deeper poverty. According to a report by the Ministry of Agriculture, in 1984 the agricultural population of Rwanda numbered some 5.5 million. On average each person consumed 49 grammes of protein per day (which should be compared with the internationally recommended minimum of 59 grammes). By 1989, the agricultural population had risen to 6.5 million, but the average daily intake of protein was now down to 36 grammes per person (Waller, 1993).

The position of women

As in other African countries, the legal position of women in Rwanda is ambiguous. The 1991 constitution stipulates that all citizens are equal, while at the same time accepting the validity of traditional law in areas where there is no written code. This includes the important question of inheritance. The main problem is that the law does not consider the woman legally "competent" and only recognizes the man as the head of the household. A woman can acquire land for usufruct by settlement from her parents, or by inheritance if she has no brothers, but upon marriage it becomes the husband's property and if the marriage ends in divorce she cannot claim it. If her husband dies, the wife inherits nothing. In effect, a woman can own *nothing* legally, neither house, tools, livestock, nor crops. This lack of legal status causes particular problems in rural households headed by single women (22% of the total in 1984). In the modern sector of the economy, a woman's legal incapacity means that she cannot open a bank account without the permission of the husband, or – if unmarried – a male relative. Combined with her inability to own assets, this makes it almost impossible for her to obtain any loans.

In the area of government and administration, there were no women ministers until the coalition government of 1992. Nor were there any women *préfets* or *bourgemestres*; 97% of all economically active women are farmers, responsible for feeding their families and running almost all aspects of the household, including farming activities such as sowing, weeding and harvesting, in addition to fetching wood and water. In the beginning of the 1990s women did 54% of all agricultural work and had on average 20% less free time than men. In spite of this, 38% of rural women had never had any contact with a government agricultural extension agent (Waller, 1993).

Of late, Rwandese women have become increasingly conscious of the injustice of their position in society. Thus, associations of women working together in the rural areas grew in strength throughout the 1980s. Within these associations women have acquired a *de facto* legal status through which they can gain access to land and credit. In times of political turmoil and upheavals – such as in 1994 – under the traditional, male-dominated and conservative political culture, women in general, however, have not exercised a moderating influence.

The economy

Except for under-exploited hydroelectric sites, Rwanda has very limited natural resources and the economy has almost exclusively been built around the two cash crops, coffee and tea. The manufacturing sector, however, has grown in importance since Independence, rising from virtually nothing to around 16% of the gross domestic product (GDP) in 1992. Before the 1994 upheavals – which badly hit the industrial infrastructure, management and workforce – the most important sub-sectors comprised the production of beverages and food, detergents, textiles and agricultural tools, such as hoes and machetes.

According to World Bank figures, Rwanda's GDP grew in real terms by an impressive annual average of 4.7% in the period 1970-1979, but slowed down to a 2.2% in 1980-88. In 1989, GDP fell significantly due to a sharp fall in coffee earnings. The decline continued in 1991, 1992 and 1993, and was for obvious reasons particularly devastating in 1994. GDP per capita was estimated at US\$200 in 1993, compared with US\$330 in 1989, i.e. a decrease of about 40% in only four years (The Economist Intelligence Unit, 1995).

Coffee is by far Rwanda's most important cash crop. The variety grown is predominantly *arabica* and is classed with "other milds" on the world market. It was first introduced into the country by the Belgian administration in the 1920s. The Belgians planted coffee extensively and decreed that taxes be paid in cash rather than in kind, to further force its cultivation. The colonial authorities later made coffee cultivation compulsory in many areas, a law that exists virtually unamended until today (The Economist Intelligence Unit, 1995). From its introduction, coffee production expanded until by 1986 exports – peaking at more than 42,000 tonnes – accounted for 82% of Rwanda's total export earnings. However, following the collapse of international coffee prices in 1989 and the war from October 1990, this share has constantly fallen. It stood at 51% in 1992 and should be considerably lower after the tragedy of 1994, which left coffee bushes damaged, untended and diseased all over the country. It has been estimated that it will take at least three years for them to recover.

All the coffee producers in Rwanda are smallholders, who are obliged to grow some coffee on their plots. (In Rwanda, the land belongs to the state. Individual farmers have the right only to use the land, not to own it, and the State can reclaim land for its own use, without compensation for the losses (Waller, 1993).) In 1989, there were almost 700,000 coffee farmers – or about 60% of all smallholders in the country – each growing an average of 150 bushes. During most of the 1980s, the government assured them a guaranteed price of 125 Rwanda francs (RWF) per kilo, which until 1987 meant that the price paid to the producers was less than the strong world price and, consequently, that the government made huge profits from the coffee trade. However, the world price began to fall and in 1989 Rwanda, like other small coffee-producing countries, was severely hit by the collapse of the International Coffee Agreement, which in turn led to a fall of the price on the London market to half its 1980 level. Against this background, the Rwandese government cut the price to the producers to 115 RWF per kilo and – within the 1990 Structural Adjustment Programme with the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund (IMF) – devalued the national currency by as much as 40%. An additional devaluation of 15% was made in June 1992.

While the restructuring was inevitable, from the point of view of the Rwandese peasant farmer it made coffee cultivation even less attractive than before. In one year – from 1989 to 1990 – the

average farmer actually responded to the crisis by increasing production considerably, only to earn about 20% less. As the coffee bushes yielded a crop of substantially less value per hectare in local currency than, for example, bananas or beans, many Rwandese peasants were desperate to rip up their coffee plants in favour of other crops (Waller, 1993).

In addition to coffee, tea has developed into a significant foreign exchange earner, rising from 9% of export receipts in 1986 to 30% in 1992. Unlike coffee, tea is primarily grown on big estates, of which all except one are government-owned. Between them, the plantations cover 1% of Rwanda's cultivated area. In some places, such as Nkuli (Ruhengeri), tea estates have been introduced in areas previously settled by peasant farmers. The annual harvests during the period 1988–1992 fluctuated around 13,000 tonnes. However, the cultivation of tea, like that of coffee, was badly hit by the war from October 1990.

Taken as a whole, the 1980s saw a dramatic decline in Rwanda's economic fortunes and at the end of the decade the economy worsened in every key area, such as GDP growth, balance of payments, terms of trade and indebtedness (tables 1–8 in Appendix 1). The stagnating GDP has been commented upon above. The balance of payments also deteriorated from 1985, and in 1989 the value of imported goods was 3.5 times higher than the value of goods exported. This was largely a consequence of the decline in Rwanda's terms of trade, or international purchasing power, which fell by 47% between 1980 and 1987. Very few countries experienced such drastic declines over the same period. Finally, the ensuing external debt – which in 1980 stood at US\$189 million – rose virtually constantly throughout the 1980s and had in 1992 jumped to US\$873 million (Waller, 1993; Vassall-Adams, 1994; and The Economist Intelligence Unit, 1995).

The 1990 and 1992 structural adjustment programmes coincided with the war that started with the invasion by the Rwandese Patriotic Front in October 1990. It is, thus, difficult to assess its macro-economic impact. In addition to the hardships experienced by the coffee-growing peasants, there is, however, ample evidence that the introduction of higher fees for health and education, among other things, added to the already heavy burdens of Rwanda's poor (Vassall-Adams, 1994; Marysse, 1993 and 1994).

The war had a devastating effect on Rwanda's economy. First, it displaced hundreds of thousands of peasant farmers in northern Rwanda, with a dramatic impact on both coffee and food production. Second, it cut off the road to the Kenyan port of Mombasa, Rwanda's main overland route to the outside world. Third, it destroyed the country's fledgling tourist industry, which had become the third largest earner of foreign exchange. Finally, it prompted the government to enlarge its armed forces dramatically, thereby reducing national resources available for other purposes (Vassall-Adams, 1994).

Chapter 2

Pre-Colonial Period

This presentation, based on documentation by historians on the development of pre-colonial Rwanda, points in different directions. On the one hand, it indicates an “ethnic” diversity based partly on occupational status, partly on a patron/client relationship, but also on Hutu/Tutsi ancestry. On the other hand, it is said that until written descriptions by the first European travellers, people identified themselves according to clan rather than to ethnic affiliation, and that the description of so-called ethnic groups was laid down by those travellers. As in many other areas in Africa, in the absence of written source material, archaeological remains etc., reliable historical data from before the mid-19th century are scarce.

Most historians agree that the first inhabitants of Rwanda were hunter-gatherers and forest-dwellers, whose modern-day descendents are the Twa, today's small minority who have inhabited the country from as early as 2,000 B.C. Besides hunting, they practised pottery and basketwork. Around 1,000 A.D., a migration of farmers, Hutu, began to displace them. This migration was part of the so-called Bantu expansion, which, in the case of Rwanda, can be followed from the savannahs of present Cameroon to the Great Lakes area. They cleared the forests and cultivated the dark and rich volcanic soils (Vansina, 1962 and de Heusch, 1966).

The immigrant Bantu-speaking agriculturalists grew sorghum, kept livestock and bees, hunted and developed village industries. They wore goatskins and bark cloth, and organized themselves into lineages and clans under the leadership of heads or chiefs, respectively (d'Hertefeldt, 1962). Hutu co-existed with Twa, and bartered skins and meat in exchange for salt and iron goods.

By the 15th century, many Hutu were organized into “statelets”. Each of them was controlled by a dominant clan and composed of several different lineages under a ruling lineage (which over time became dynastic) headed by a *mwami* (chief or king), who was a land chief as well as a ritual leader in charge of rain-making (Vansina, 1962). There is evidence that some lineages had already acquired cattle at that time and that several states had emerged before the immigration of Tutsi (principally the *Nyiginya* clan). According to Kagame (1972), at this time seven major clans had pre-*Nyiginya* status.

Present-day Rwanda, seen as a geopolitical entity of many statelets, emerged, according to different historians, some time between the 11th and 15th century, largely through the pastoralist immigration and settlement of Tutsi. From about the 15th century, the number of pastoralists increased sharply in the existing states.

Tutsi seem to have been part of a larger pastoralist migration southward into the Great Lakes region (Bauman, 1948; d'Hertefeldt, 1962). Whether the immigration into Rwanda was gradual or sudden has been contested. However, over time the Tutsi settlement was achieved through both conquest and peaceful assimilation (Lemarchand, 1970; d'Hertefeldt, 1962; Kagame, 1972; Vansina, 1962; Ogot, 1984; and Reyntjens, 1985).

Two different phases of interaction between Hutu and Tutsi have been distinguished. The Tutsi immigration into Hutu areas is described as beginning with a gradual and peaceful infiltration. Cattle

products were exchanged for agricultural products, forming the basis of social interaction. Peaceful co-existence, however, was usually followed by Tutsi conquests, resulting in the establishment of direct Tutsi military rule and administration (Lemarchand, 1966; Vansina, 1962). This phase was followed by a process directed towards the control of the factors of production, involving gradual restriction of access to land, cattle and labour (C. Newbury, 1974; d'Hertefeldt, 1962; and Vidal, 1969).

Thus, over a period of 400 years, a number of independent Hutu political units were reduced to administrative entities, and Hutu transformed into what was to be described as an "ethnic" category (Lema, 1993). One, often repeated, assertion is that about 20 generations ago, one Tutsi clan, the *Nyiginya*, achieved political dominance in eastern Rwanda. Over several centuries, they came to form the core of a state that expanded westwards to cover most of the modern-day territory (D. Newbury, 1987). The history of the periphery differs, therefore, from that of the centre. Rwanda is, consequently, a country of strong regional variations. In particular, the northern areas or present-day Gisenyi and Ruhengeri *préfectures*, as well as parts of the south-west, lay outside the Rwandese core state.

In the process, Tutsi were assimilated by Hutu. They took over the language spoken by Hutu (*kinyarwanda*) and incorporated Hutu traditions and cults. Moreover, they shared the same hills – there was no segregation of people – and they intermarried and bore the same names (Lemarchand, 1970; Rennie, 1972; Oliver, 1977 and Reyntjens, 1985).

In large part, during the pre-colonial period or before the 19th century, Tutsi, Hutu and Twa roughly corresponded to occupational categories. Cattle-herders, soldiers and administrators were mostly Tutsi, while Hutu were farmers. Twa were marginalized and often mistreated by the others. Hutu and Tutsi were less sharply distinct, and individuals could and did move between the categories as their fortunes rose or fell. Though there is no doubt that the early *Nyiginya* Tutsi were dominant, a range of institutions mediated social relations, notably the clan system, which spanned the entire Rwandese society. Nineteen clans encompassed members of all three groups. Some argue that up to about the middle of the 19th century these clan identities in fact overrode the Tutsi-Hutu-Twa categorization (d'Hertefeldt, 1971; D. Newbury, 1980; C. Newbury, 1978).

The first European travellers who reached central Rwanda noted a socio-economic and "ethnic" stratification between Tutsi, Hutu and Twa. Tutsi were described as distinct in terms of origin, economic activities, social status and physical appearance, although sharing the language, religion and settlement with Hutu (von Götzen, 1895; Kandt, 1921). This description of Rwandese "ethnic groups" – partly based on indigenous mythology – was upheld and diffused by outsiders, colonial agents, ethnographers, anthropologists, historians etc. and came to represent the generalized Western view of the Rwandese people. It seems, however, that the people themselves identified each other rather according to clan affiliation. In a number of studies, David Newbury has shown that while the terms "Hutu" and "Tutsi" existed in pre-colonial times, they did not have the same significance as in the recent era, and the meaning of an "ethnic" identity varied from place to place and over time. There was no single universal definition of ethnic identity, valid for all regions at one time (D. Newbury, 1979, 1980; C. Newbury, 1988).

The amalgamation of the statelets into a united Rwanda was a process spread over several hundred years. The core *Nyiginya* state in eastern Rwanda slowly expanded by conquest and by giving protection, in return receiving tribute. Not until the second part of the 19th century under *mwami* Kigeri Rwabugiri was Rwanda united as one country. Under Rwabugiri, the *mwami* was the source and symbol of all authority in the politically-centralized state. Some smaller states, however, stayed autonomous until 1910–20. This was, for example, the case of the northern region near Ruhengeri, which was only incorporated into the Rwandese monarchy under German colonial rule. It took several military expeditions by the German *Schutztruppe*, assisted by Tutsi from central Rwanda between 1910 and 1912, before the northern Hutu – also known as Kiga – were defeated, leaving

considerable bitterness towards both the Tutsi and the southern Hutu, called *Banyanduga*, who came with them (Dorsey, 1994; Waller, 1993). Thus, to this day, the northerners form a distinctive sub-culture, in which contacts with Tutsi have been less frequent and the awareness of a pre-Tutsi past more pronounced than in other parts of Rwanda (Lemarchand, 1970 and 1995).

The reign of Rwabugiri, or Kigeri IV, lasted from 1860 to 1895, i.e. just before the arrival of European colonialism, and marks an important watershed in the history of Rwanda. Rwabugiri broke through traditional restraints and increased the prerogatives of the throne. He is considered the last of the great reformers and is also referred to as the great warrior king. His domestic policies reflected two complementary goals, namely centralization of power and extension of the central political structures to peripheral areas of the kingdom. In foreign policy, he led a series of military campaigns against the smaller Hutu statelets in both western and eastern Rwanda, eventually incorporating them under his crown. The northern and south-western parts, however, remained largely autonomous. To undermine the hereditary power held by old Tutsi families, Rwabugiri dismissed incumbent officials and appointed men who were directly dependent on him, notably in regions that previously had been relatively independent, thereby increasing the material resources available to the monarchy (Dorsey, 1994).

What is of importance is that the state-building efforts during the reign of Rwabugiri heightened awareness of “ethnic” differences in Rwanda. As C. Newbury explains,

with the arrival of central authorities, lines of distinction were altered and sharpened, as the categories of Hutu and Tutsi assumed new hierarchical overtones associated with proximity to the central court – proximity to power. Later, when the political arena widened and the intensity of political activity increased, these classifications became increasingly stratified and rigidified. More than simply conveying the connotation of cultural difference from Tutsi, Hutu identity came to be associated with and eventually defined by inferior status (C. Newbury, 1988).

Patron/client relationships

What appears to have kept the people together is the institution of the *ubuhake* – a highly personalized relationship between two individuals of unequal social status (Maquet, 1954). This patron/client relationship involved reciprocal bonds of loyalty and exchange of goods and services. It provided a place, a status, within an hierarchical system. The patron was mostly Tutsi, but the client could be Hutu or Tutsi of inferior social status. One person could be a client as well as a patron. Even Tutsi patrons of Hutu could be clients of yet another Tutsi. Theoretically, the only person ultimately not a client of this system was the *mwami* himself. Thus, most Tutsi were clients and some Hutu patrons. At the top, however, there were always Tutsi and at the bottom always Hutu and/or Twa. This institutionalized relationship was reinforced under colonial rule and lasted until it was brought to an end in the 1950s (Saucier, 1974; C. Newbury, 1988).

The *ubuhake* system and social order were predominant in central Rwanda, where Tutsi had their strongest influence. In the regions dominated by Hutu in the northern and south-western areas, different systems, mostly based on land-lease contracts or donation of agricultural products, were developed; the patrons were often Hutu, and in the north exclusively so (d’Hertefeldt, 1962; Vansina, 1962). However, the dominance of cattle as a form of disposable wealth meant that the Tutsi cattle chiefs were able to dominate central Rwanda. Mobilizing an army required capital, which came only in the form of livestock, and Tutsi controlled the cattle. In these parts, Hutu was almost synonymous with client.

The *ubuhake* (and other forms of patron/client relationship such as the *uburetwa*) did have some important effects, viz. 1) it institutionalized the economic differences between the mainly cultivating Hutu and the cattle-breeding Tutsi; 2) it was an instrument of control, and turned Hutu into socio-economic and political clients and Tutsi into patrons; and 3) it led to a process of “ethnic” amalga-

mation, particularly among Hutu. The result was an “ethnic” Hutu-Tutsi dichotomy, following the socio-economic and political process engendered by Tutsi extension and occupation (Lema, 1993).

However, a number of historians question the assumption that the patron/client relationship was an important cornerstone of the traditional Hutu-Tutsi social formation as the Rwandese clans were both multi-class and multi-“ethnic”. Hutu and Tutsi, they point out, shared membership in all the 19 main clans of Rwanda (Vidal, 1985; d’Hertefeldt, 1971; C. Newbury 1978; D. Newbury, 1980). In particular, Hutu did not feel as one people or identify themselves as such. In this view, the system rather resulted in an economic differentiation and stratification between various occupations.

Ethnicity in pre-colonial Rwanda

As head of the late 19th century Rwandese state, the *mwami* owned all land and cattle. He ruled despotically, but had a political board of great chiefs and a permanent council of *abiru* (ritual specialists) who advised him about the divine obligations connected to his office (Vansina, 1962). According to the 500 years of *mwami* chronology, all *bami* (plural of *mwami*) were Tutsi (Kagame, 1957; Vansina, 1962). None of them was married to a Hutu woman, an important fact as the queen mother played a crucial role in the traditional society. Also, the great chiefs all appear to have been Tutsi (Lema, 1993), while the ritual specialists of the *abiru* seem to have been Hutu and based themselves on old Hutu rituals (de Lacger, 1939; Vansina, 1962).

The *mwami* was the supreme court/judge in traditional Rwandese society. Lower courts were the administrative court and the military court. The first dealt with land tenure disputes and was led by the land chief, the second dealt with disputes concerning cattle and was led by the army chief. The *mwami* and all army chiefs were Tutsi, and so almost without exception were the cattle chiefs (Vanhove, 1941). As regards the army, although it had a multi-“ethnic” composition, it was clearly stratified in the way that all higher military offices were held by Tutsi, followed by Hutu and, finally, Twa in the lowest ranks. There was, thus, no power-sharing over the army’s activities: the army command, like most other institutions of the state, was mono- or uni-ethnic Tutsi (Lema, 1993; Adekanye, 1995).

By the end of the 19th century, many areas of the Rwandese kingdom had developed a complex and highly-organized administrative structure encompassing provinces, districts, hills and neighbourhoods (Vansina, 1962). The provinces were normally administered by high chiefs or army commanders, who always were Tutsi. The districts were administered by two chiefs appointed by the *mwami* – one cattle chief in charge of cattle taxes and one land chief responsible for agricultural levies (Pagès, 1933; de Lacger, 1939; Kagame, 1952 and Maquet, 1961). Tutsi were normally appointed as cattle chiefs and Hutu as land chiefs (Kagame, 1957 and 1975). The districts were divided into hills, administered by chiefs responsible for handing over the levies to the two district chiefs. Rwanda did not and still does not have villages in the sense of concentrated homesteads (C. Newbury, 1978). The hill was the basic administrative unit and had normally not one, but three chiefs, namely:

- the “chief of the pastures” (always a Tutsi), in charge of delimiting grazing rights;
- the “chief of the land” (almost always a Hutu), in charge of agricultural matters and land taxes; and
- the “chief of the men” (usually a Tutsi), who was a tax collector and a kind of census agent for the *abagaba*, the *mwami*’s army recruiters (Kagame, 1975).

The three functions were often intertwined: the same person could hold all three, but on different hills. Or he could hold only one or two. (The peasants played on inter-chief rivalries, a fundamental feature of peasant survival, which was destroyed by the reforms of Governor Voisin from the late 1920s, when each hill was to be administered by only one chief) (Prunier, 1995).

It follows that the Rwandese state formation developed into a Tutsi-dominated structure, built to

consolidate political power. Hutu participated only in the middle and lower levels of the administration. They were receivers of orders and norms, not norm-makers. Consequently, there was only very limited scope for “ethnic” integration in the upper echelons of the state apparatus (Lema, 1993).

Chapter 3

Colonial Period and Independence

The colonial era

When, in 1916, Belgium occupied Ruanda-Urundi as a result of the World War I East African campaign against Germany, the two kingdoms of Rwanda and Burundi had only been marginally administered from Berlin (via Dar-es-Salaam) since 1899. In 1914 there were just six German civil servants in Burundi and five in Rwanda, i.e. a total of eleven officials for a territory twice the size of Belgium. Having discovered that the existing *mwami* kingdoms already functioned as fully-fledged nations before the arrival of the Europeans and also, undoubtedly, because of a shortage of colonial personnel, the Germans decided from the very beginning to favour a policy of indirect rule. The occupation came about through protectorate “treaties” negotiated between the Germans and the *mwami* (Reyntjens, 1994). This meant that full use was to be made of the existing political system, which was much stronger and more centralized in Rwanda than in Burundi (Louis, 1963).

Belgium continued this policy: A decree of 6 April, 1917 stated that “under the authority of the Resident Commissioner the Sultans (*bami*) exercise their political and judicial powers to the extent that these are in accord with indigenous customs and the instructions of the Royal Commissioner” (Rumiya, 1992).

After World War I, the League of Nations mandated Belgium to administer Rwanda and in 1946 the country became a Belgian trust territory under the United Nations. During 40 years of Belgian administration, as under most colonial dispensations, we observe the disintegration, distortion or bastardization of indigenous social and political structures and their consequences. For example, while the indigenous pre-colonial patron/client relationship was flexible and contained an important element of reciprocity, the Belgian colonizers actually rigidified the system and did away with mutual obligations. By “reinforcing” a Rwandese institution, the colonizers in this way introduced forced labour and strengthened the socio-economic divisions between Tutsi and Hutu. The same abuse of other pre-colonial institutions could be quoted. Balandier has described this phenomenon in terms of the following features: the falling into abeyance of traditional political entities, the overall deterioration as a result of depoliticization, the breakdown of traditional systems of power control, the incompatibility of the two systems of power and authority and, finally, the abuse of power (Balandier, 1978). What is of interest here is the extent to which such developments affected ethnic inter-relations in Rwanda.

Among the European civil servants and missionaries operating in the Great Lakes region at the turn of the century, the so-called Hamitic thesis became generalized. According to this thesis, “everything of value in Africa had been introduced by the Hamites, supposedly a branch of the Caucasian race” (Sanders, 1969). When the well-known British explorer John Speke arrived in the Buganda kingdom (in present-day Uganda) with its sophisticated political organization, he attributed this civilization to an indigenous race of nomadic pastoralists related to the (Ethiopian) Galla “Hamites”. For Europeans, the attractiveness of this hypothesis lay in the fact that it allowed for linking physical characteristics with mental capacity: the “Hamites” were supposed to be born leaders and, in principle, had the right to a history and a future almost as noble as that of their European “cousins” (Linden, 1977). In Rwanda, the “Hamites” were Tutsi: “they resemble the negro only in the colour of their skin” (Jamoulle, 1927): “before becoming black these people were tanned” (de Lacger,

1961); “his stature resembles more closely that of a white person rather than that of a negro – in fact, it would not be an exaggeration to state that he is a European who happens to have a black skin...” (Gahama, 1983). This racist thesis was expressed in innumerable ways, but, in short, Tutsi were considered to be related to Europeans and, therefore, the Europeans could easily work with them. It, thus, also served the colonial policy of divide-and-rule (Adekanye, 1995).

By the end of the 1920s, the Hamitic hypothesis was to be utilized with far-reaching consequences for ethnic relations in Rwanda. Within the framework of an administrative reform process (culminating in the *Programme Voisin* of 1926–1931), especially a regrouping and enlarging of chiefdoms (out of around 200 chiefs only 40 remained in the new system), it was decided to give preferential treatment to Tutsi when recruiting indigenous political authorities. It would seem that the particular position taken on the matter by Monsignor Leon-Paul Classe, the Vicar Apostolic to Rwanda, was of considerable influence. In a letter dated 21 September 1927, he wrote to Georges Mortehean, the Belgian Resident Commissioner:

If we want to be practical and look after the real interest of the country we shall find a remarkable element of progress with the Mututsi youth [...] Ask the Bahutu whether they prefer to be given orders by uncouth persons or by nobles and the answer will be clear: they will prefer the Batutsi, and quite rightly so. Born chiefs, the latter have a knack of giving orders. [...] Here lies the secret of how they managed to settle in this country and hold it in their grip (de Lacger, 1961).

Faced with what he sees as “hesitations and foot-dragging of the colonial administration regarding the traditional hegemony of the well-born Batutsi”, Monsignor Classe – in 1930 – issues a stern warning:

the greatest harm the government could possibly inflict on itself and on the country would be to do away with the Mututsi caste. Such a revolution would lead the country straight into anarchy and towards a viciously anti-European communism. Far from achieving progress, this will annihilate any action taken by the government for the latter would be deprived of auxiliaries who are born capable of comprehension and obedience. [...] As a rule, we cannot possibly have chiefs who'd be better, more intelligent, more active, more capable of understanding the idea of progress and even more likely to be accepted by the population, than the Batutsi (Classe, 1930).

The Vicar Apostolic's message was seen as a strong plea in favour of – at least in principle – a Tutsi monopoly. His intervention put an end to the “hesitations and foot-dragging” of the administration. The Hutu chiefs and deputy-chiefs were removed and replaced by Tutsi. Furthermore, a policy favouring protection and strengthening of the Tutsi hegemony was vigorously pursued. Therefore, and given that traditionally Hutu, and even Twa, exercised certain political power, albeit at lower levels, the “Tutsification” of the 1930s resulted in a monopoly of political and administrative power in the hands of Tutsi. With the abolition of the three-fold hierarchy of the chiefs (army chief, cattle chief and land chief), this policy accentuated the ethnic divisions (Reyntjens, 1985). It was also reinforced by the introduction of identity cards in 1933. Every Rwandese was henceforth (on the basis of quite arbitrary criteria) registered as Tutsi, Hutu or Twa (Reyntjens, 1985).

Finally, the possibilities of most Hutu were further limited by the discrimination introduced in the Catholic schools, which represented the dominant educational system throughout the colonial period. Tutsi who had resisted conversion became increasingly enrolled in the Catholic mission schools. To accommodate and further encourage this process, the Church adjusted its educational policies and openly favoured Tutsi and discriminated against Hutu. With some exceptions, Hutu received only the education required for working in the mines and in industry (C. Newbury, 1988).

In summary, the monopolization of power in the hands of Tutsi constituted a crucial and undisputed factor in firmly establishing (“structuring”) the ethnic cleavage. This colonial intervention caused the groups to become distinct political categories. In a certain sense, we have here an instance of

ethnogenesis (Roosens, 1989), which in the case of Rwanda would inevitably lead to a reaction on the part of Hutu that they had been excluded from power. Tutsi discourse has drawn inordinate conclusions from the alleged ethnogenesis by claiming that, before the arrival of the Europeans, the people of Rwanda (and Burundi) were quite homogeneous and that, through their policy of divide-and-rule, the colonial authorities deliberately introduced ethnic cleavages. Yet the ethnic groups existed before colonialism. Colonial policies were merely grafted onto a foundation that already contained a potential for conflict (Reyntjens, 1994).

From the mid-1950s, political demands in Rwanda were formulated in ethnic terms. The opposing theses were expressed, rather stereotypically, in three main documents: on the one hand, the *Bahutu Manifesto* of March 24, 1957 and, on the other, two letters by the great Tutsi chiefs (“*Abagaragu b’ibwami bakuru*”) (Nkundabagenzi, 1961). Putting the ethnic problem in a social context, the Bahutu Manifesto demanded Hutu emancipation as well as democratization. Starting from the colonial thesis that Tutsi were outsiders/foreigners and claiming that Hutu (in majority) were true Rwandese nationals, and thus the rightful rulers of Rwanda, the manifesto was a significant statement for both the social revolution from 1959 and the deepening ethnic cleavage. This important document, originally published as “Notes on the Social Aspect of the Racial Native Problem in Rwanda” and aiming to influence a United Nations Trusteeship mission to the territory, was drafted by nine Hutu intellectuals. Among the signatories was the future president, Grégoire Kayibanda. It attacked the whole concept of Belgian administration and maintained that the basic problem of Rwanda was a conflict between Hutu and Hamitic – i.e. foreign – Tutsi (Dorsey, 1994; Prunier, 1995). The two letters written by the conservative great chiefs (and which did not necessarily express the point of view of the whole Tutsi political elite) rejected Hutu participation “because our kings conquered the land of the Bahutu, killed their ‘little’ kings and thus subjugated the Bahutu; how, then, can they now pretend to be our brothers?” (Reyntjens, 1994).

When political parties were set up in the late 1950s, political structures had already been established along the ethnic cleavage: *Parmehutu* (*Parti du mouvement de l’émancipation des Bahutu*) and APROSOMA (*Association pour la promotion sociale des masses*) were essentially Hutu, whereas UNAR (*Union nationale rwandaise*) and RADER (*Rassemblement démocratique rwandais*) were essentially Tutsi. At the parliamentary elections of September 1961, the cleavage was confirmed: the Hutu parties obtained about 83% of the vote, corresponding roughly to the proportion of Hutu among the population. In other words, a demographic majority came to be matched by a political majority. From 1965 onwards, following the elimination of the opposition (partly by physical, partly by political means), Rwanda was a *de facto* single party state; and in essence (Hutu) mono-ethnic (Reyntjens, 1985).

From the time of *mwami* Rwabugiri until the monarchy was abolished in 1961, the kingdom of Rwanda was a highly organized and stratified state. This was reinforced by communal reforms during the colonial period. The latest major communal reform took place in 1960, once again confirming the very organized structure of the Rwandese state. The country was divided into 10 *préfectures*, each divided into a number of *communes*. These, which numbered 143 in total, formed the basis for development. The *communes* were each divided into 4–5 *secteurs* and these into “cells” (10 “cells” per secteur). Taking after the Tanzanian model, the final organizational unit was the 10-household cell comprising some 80 people. Few African countries were so well organized and also used the structures set up so extensively as Rwanda (Reyntjens, 1985).

Transition to independence

The revolution of 1959–1961, with the support of the Belgian administration (Harroy, 1984; Logiest, 1988), led to the abolition of the monarchy and to the removal of all political and administrative Tutsi structures on which, for decades, Belgium had based its policy of indirect rule. The peasants’ (or Hutu) revolt was largely provoked by the intransigence of a conservative political and administrative elite, which flatly refused any democratization, demanded not only by an emerging

Hutu elite, but also by a Tutsi counter-elite, far more progressive than the one in power (Reyntjens, 1994). Though, initially, the number of victims was rather small, the attempts on the part of the Tutsi-led traditional power-elite to maintain authoritarian rule led to violent clashes. The Belgians supported the revolt. The abolition of the monarchy and the rise of a Hutu elite became definitive in September 1961 when, at a referendum, 80% of the electorate voted in favour of a republic. At the same time, the results of the parliamentary elections showed a correspondingly clear victory for the Hutu-dominated parties.

The events of 1959–62: reversal and confrontation

Most observers agree that the revolutionary transition from the Tutsi-dominated monarchy to the Hutu-led republic, which took place between November 1959 and September 1961, culminating in the proclamation of Independence on 1 July, 1962, constitutes a crucial period for the understanding of the subsequent ethnic division of the country (Reyntjens, 1985; Lema, 1993; C. Newbury, 1988). During this brief period – initiated by the 1959 *jacquérie* or so-called peasant revolt – the historical tables were turned. Under pressure from the democratic winds of change over Africa, the Belgian authorities shifted their support from the Tutsi aristocracy to the majority Hutu, withdrew their backing of the *mwami*, abandoned the policy of indirect rule and hastily brought Rwanda (and Burundi) to national independence. This process, as noted by Linden (1995), marked the beginning of a cycle of turbulent clashes for power, where “capture of the Rwandan state from political opponents has been a violent zero-sum game in which the winner takes all”. The struggle for state power in an arena abandoned both by the colonial power and its former ally, the traditional monarchy, explains why the ethnic exacerbations came to the fore. While Tutsi, through their dominant position in colonial society, already saw themselves as a group, it was now felt necessary by the emerging Hutu political elite to appeal to a common “Hutu-ness” of the underprivileged to challenge the indigenous leadership successfully, compete for the vacant state and redress historical injustices.

Towards the end of the 1950s, the Belgian authorities suddenly started to pay marked attention to the situation of the Hutu peasant majority. A similar, radical change of mind occurred within the Catholic church, as exemplified by the pastoral letter issued by Monsignor André Perraudin in the late 1950s, in which he adopted a pro-Hutu attitude by stating that the social discrimination faced by the Hutu was no longer consistent with a sound organization of Rwandese society (Reyntjens, 1994).

On 1 November, 1959, ethnic violence broke out as a result of a leader of the *Parmehutu* party being molested by Tutsi youth. The ensuing riots led to a widespread Hutu uprising, during which hundreds of Tutsi were killed. The Belgian government responded by sending troops to the country. Contrary to contemporary expectations, however, the Belgian military did not attempt to crush the Hutu revolt, but adopted a *de facto* pro-Hutu policy through the installation of a military-led administration and the appointment of more than 300 Hutu chiefs and sub-chiefs to replace those Tutsi incumbents who had been deposed, killed or had fled during the initial stages of the uprising. (C. Newbury, 1988; Prunier, 1995). Soon thereafter – in May 1960 – the Belgian authorities confirmed the new policy through the setting up of an indigenous military territorial guard of 650 men, based on ethnic proportionality, with 85% Hutu and 15% Tutsi.

As stated above, the tables were turned. This was further confirmed in the local elections held in June–July 1960, which left the Tutsi-dominated political parties with merely 16% of the votes and, thus, resulted in an overwhelming Hutu victory. Following the elections, no less than 211 out of 229 *bourgemestres* were Hutu (C. Newbury, 1988). In this situation, and against a background of continued ethnic clashes, *mwami* Kigeri V opted to leave Rwanda on 29 June, 1960, officially to attend the independence celebrations in the Congo. He was, however, never to return.

Belgium’s policy in Rwanda encountered severe criticism in the General Assembly of the United Nations. From December 1960 to June 1962, it called on different occasions for reconciliation with

both the *mwami* and imprisoned Tutsi representatives, also urged Belgium to keep Rwanda and Burundi together, but to no avail. Instead, the Belgian authorities proceeded to strengthen the process towards Rwandese independence through the granting of internal autonomy under a temporary government led by the founder of *Parmehutu*, Grégoire Kayibanda, a Hutu leader from the Gitarama region in central Rwanda. Throughout this period the ethnic confrontation between Hutu and Tutsi not only continued, but escalated, with mainly Tutsi killed, expelled or exiled.

The transition from Tutsi to Hutu political domination was sealed through the parliamentary elections of 25 September 1961, which resulted in a crushing victory for the Hutu-led parties. *Parmehutu* obtained no less than 78% of the votes, gaining 35 seats out of 44, while UNAR (the Tutsi-dominated party) received 17% and seven seats. A simultaneous referendum led to an equally massive rejection of the monarchy in favour of a republican system of government. Following the elections, Grégoire Kayibanda was elected President by the new parliament on 26 October, 1961, appointing a government that initially was composed of members of *Parmehutu*, UNAR and APROSOMA. Eight months later, on 1 July 1962, Rwanda and Burundi finally gained formal independence as two sovereign states, a fact the General Assembly of the United Nations reluctantly had to endorse.

During the ensuing three decades, the Hutu *jacquérie* of 1959 and the events leading to independence in 1962 came to constitute crucial points of reference in the political life of Rwanda, positively or negatively, depending on the fears or hopes of those involved.

Why, then, did these political developments take the form of a violent Tutsi-Hutu confrontation? In the words of C. Newbury,

the salient fact was that virtually all those who controlled the state (before 1959) – the chiefs and the sub-chiefs – were Tutsi, and here is where the ethnic factor becomes important [...] An appeal to Hutu solidarity became, for Hutu leaders, the most effective rallying point for revolutionary activity. Although Hutu could and apparently did distinguish among Tutsi of different types and attitudes, the fact that the chiefs and other African agents of the state were seen as exploiters, and that virtually all of these were Tutsi, made an appeal to ethnic solidarity potent where an appeal to “all poor people” may have been less so. Because colonial policies had repeatedly pressed upon Hutu their inferior, excluded status, even poor Tutsi did not experience quite the same forms of discrimination as did those classified as Hutu (C. Newbury, 1988).

Three major consequences of this crucial turning-point determined, and still continue to determine, political developments in Rwanda.

1. *Exile of a huge number of Tutsi.* The exact number of refugees has been the topic of many debates and has also been used for propaganda purposes. This was especially so during the crisis in October 1990, which followed the RPF (Rwandese Patriotic Front) incursion from Uganda. In fact, Tutsi refugees left Rwanda during a number of successive crises, most notably in 1959–1961, 1963–1964 and 1973. The total number in the early 1990s amounted to some 600,000, including descendants of the original refugees (Guichaoua, 1992). This figure is contested by many. Prunier establishes, however, that this is the best estimate available (Prunier, 1995). The figure is impressive, corresponding to about 9% of the total estimated population inside the country, or half the Tutsi population. They constituted an element of structural insecurity, especially since the communities of Tutsi refugees never accepted exile as a *fait accompli* – on the contrary, they always claimed “Rwanda-hood” or “Rwanda-ness” and their right to return. Even before independence, groups of refugees began to make armed incursions in an attempt to regain their former positions. They were easy to carry out given the fact that the majority of refugees resided in the four neighbouring countries. These activities by groups of Tutsi refugees, the so-called *inyenzi* (cockroaches), only came to an end in 1967 (Reyntjens, 1994).

The official attitude of the Rwandese governments with respect to this problem changed considerably over the years. Already in 1960, the provisional government had expressed its concern by setting up a State Secretariat for Refugees. During the First Republic (1962–1973), the refugees were invited, on many occasions, to return to the country. This goal was never achieved. For one thing, Tutsi refugees never believed in the sincerity of the government's change in attitude; for another, the *inyenzi* were making regular incursions. At the end of 1963 and at the beginning of 1964, new waves of refugees left Rwanda.

During the Second Republic – from 1973 onwards – this state of affairs changed somewhat (but, of course, did not disappear) as a result of a policy of ethnic pacification. However, a new hindrance was put forward by the regime, arguing that the country was overpopulated and unable to reintegrate a large number of refugees. Mass repatriation was therefore ruled out. This position was endorsed by a declaration of the Central Committee of the ruling MRND (*Mouvement Révolutionnaire National pour le Développement*) dated 26 July 1986. The return of individual refugees was further linked to certain conditions amenable to a variety of interpretations: For example, it was anticipated that a possible candidate for repatriation should “demonstrate that, upon return to the country, he will be able to provide for himself” (Ndagijimana, 1990). This position, which seemed to become the “definitive” stance, caused the refugees to hold, for the first time, an international conference in Washington in August 1988. The position of the government was rejected and the full right to return was reaffirmed. At this point, perhaps without being fully realized, an imminent confrontation was in the making. The crisis of October 1990 was, therefore, essentially a crisis of refugees, with roots in the events of 1959–62, reinforced by subsequent political developments within Rwanda and in the neighbouring states, particularly Uganda.

2. *Virtual exclusion from public life of all Tutsi.* This exclusion came about in two ways: 1) the Tutsi parties suffered the same fate as the other opposition parties (see below) and 2) Tutsi citizens became the victims of all sorts of abuses. In fact, the revolt of November 1959 was only the beginning of a series of violent actions against Tutsi. While the events of 1959 were responsible for hundreds of deaths, the toll gradually increased during successive crises. The first political victims were Tutsi chiefs and sub-chiefs. Of the 43 Tutsi chiefs and 549 sub-chiefs in office in early November 1959, 21 and 314 respectively were eliminated through murder, expulsion or exile. They were replaced by “temporary” Hutu authorities that, six months after the revolt, occupied about half the posts. During the municipal elections of June–July 1960, the Tutsi parties obtained 289 municipal councillors out of a total of 3,125, i.e. a mere 9%. It should be noted, however, that UNAR had called for a boycott of these elections, which might have affected the outcome in favour of Hutu parties.

Elimination by physical means continued, especially during periods of political tension, such as before and during the municipal elections of 1960 and the parliamentary elections of September 1961. Still, the final blow was dealt at the end of 1963. An attack in Bugesera by *inyenzi* led to a great deal of violence. In the *préfecture* of Gikongoro alone, it was estimated that between 5,000 to 8,000 Tutsi were killed; that is, about 10–20% of the total Tutsi population of the *préfecture*. The majority of the Tutsi leadership that remained inside the country was eliminated: 15 of its most important leaders were immediately executed without any kind of trial. This was the end of the two Tutsi parties, UNAR and RADER, and at the same time it brought to an end any Tutsi participation in public life. Crises with lesser impact would still continue to affect the minority ethnic group. The last time this occurred until 1990 was in the beginning of 1973, constituting a prelude to the coup of 5 July, 1973 (Reyntjens, 1994).

3. *Concentration of power and growing authoritarianism.* As in many other African countries, after an initial period of multi-partyism, Rwanda became a *de facto* single-party state. The elimination of the opposition was achieved through a combination of various techniques such as intimidation, arrest, physical violence and, sometimes, by negotiation. The actual policy of *Parmehutu* aimed at extinction of other parties, both Hutu and Tutsi. Already during a speech delivered on the occasion

of the first anniversary of independence, President Grégoire Kayibanda indicated his preference for “a majority party – an ‘overwhelming’ majority – with some minor opposition on the side”. Thus, he asserted that “a proliferation of political parties would distract the population, render the progress of the country rather incoherent and lead to harmful stagnation of the nation” (*Chronique de politique étrangère*, 1963).

The outcome was that in 1965 the MDR-*Parmehutu* was the only party to propose candidates for the parliamentary and presidential elections. Without being fully constitutionalized as such, it nevertheless called itself “National Party”. Having eliminated the opposition, the concentration of power within the party increased. Especially from 1968 onwards, numerous conflicts or divisions within the government forced the regime to withdraw more and more within itself. In 1972, the usurpation of power by a small group of politicians from Gitamara, President Grégoire Kayibanda’s home region in central Rwanda, was completed (Reyntjens, 1985).

The Second Republic

Faced with expressions of discontent, especially on the part of politicians and military from the north, Grégoire Kayibanda’s government eventually tried to resort to “ethnic” tactics. In 1973, violence – initially of an ethnic nature – erupted in schools, in the administration and in business enterprises. Psychologically, these developments were certainly influenced (and facilitated) by the bloody events of 1972 in Burundi, where Hutu were the victims of genocidal killings (UN Human Rights Commission, 1972). It remains to be emphasized, though, that the impulse aimed at expelling Tutsi found its origin within the centre of power, which tried to detract attention from other issues (Reyntjens, 1985). However, the politicians from Gitarama lost sight of the dynamism such a policy could provoke in a situation where complete control became rather precarious. Thus, the population began to attack the rich (and not only Tutsi); Hutu of the north began to chase those of the central region; politicians of the north shifted their attention from the schools – where everything started – to the ministries and the enterprises where they felt underrated or ostracized. As certain politicians from the north, especially the National Defense Minister, Major General Juvénal Habyarimana, felt in danger of being physically eliminated, he finally decided on army intervention; an army in which, historically, the north had always been dominant. Grégoire Kayibanda’s regime was overthrown by a coup on 5 July 1973, which took place without any violence and was received largely with satisfaction by the population (Reyntjens, 1994). This marked the beginning of the Second Republic under President Habyarimana.

After a judicial proceeding held in utmost secrecy, a court martial of June 1974 passed death sentences on former President Grégoire Kayibanda and seven other eminent personalities from his regime. Others were sentenced to long terms of imprisonment.

Even though clemency was granted in some cases, this only had symbolic significance. In fact, during the 1970s scores of dignitaries of the First Republic perished in the infamous “special section” of the Ruhengeri prison, whereas Grégoire Kayibanda, who was under house arrest in Kavumu, died in 1976, having been denied the medical care he needed. After the “moral revolution” of 1973, the militants of the “social revolution” of 1959 had disappeared – some through political, others through physical means. Nevertheless, the regime of the Second Republic laid claim to the revolutionary legitimacy of the previous regime: “Anxious to preserve the achievements of the Social Revolution of 1959, the MRND intends to mobilize all the people of Rwanda under the banner of peace and national harmony by restoring a climate of confidence among the sons and daughters of the Nation” (MRND, 1985). Still, the break with the First Republic was considerable.

In many respects, the Second Republic contrasted sharply with the First. To begin with, we witness a period of distinct modernization, manifesting itself in an opening towards the outside world, in urban growth, in investment, and also in business. Whereas the regime of the First Republic was turned inwards, that of the Second Republic adhered to a policy of opening up the country. One

notes a sudden increase in the number of diplomatic posts of Rwanda abroad and of other countries in Kigali. President Habyarimana travels frequently and entertains a lot. Kigali hosts the sixth Franco-African Conference in 1979. Rwanda is co-founder of the *Communauté Économique des Pays des Grands Lacs* (CEPGL) in 1976 and of the *Organisation pour l'aménagement et le développement de la rivière Akagera* (OBK) in 1977. Heavy investments in infrastructure, such as the road network and telecommunications, are made. Kigali, with its mere 15,000 inhabitants in 1965, grows into a town of some 250,000 in the beginning of the 1990s and many small centres are gradually urbanized, facilitated by expansion of the electricity grid. The increased mobility related to investment, communication and training, however, is not always conducive to the ambition of social control, the maintenance of order and "morality", and the fight against a rural exodus (Reyntjens, 1994).

Also, as regards business dealings, the particular "first republican" austerity gives way to a somewhat different ethic. For example, all civil servants are without any restrictions allowed to get involved in private business. Also allowed are: ownership of rented houses, the purchase of rented vehicles, and interests in both mixed economy enterprises and commercial enterprises (Presidential Instruction No. 556101, 11 June 1975). This phenomenon was less prominent in Rwanda than elsewhere, but the fact that Rwanda after all was not that different led to a change of the particular image many had of the country up to the mid-1980s.

The myth of an "egalitarian republic" had evaporated: a quaternary bourgeoisie (military, administrative, business and technocratic) embezzles for its own benefit an important part of the national income (Bezzy, 1990).

Gradually, the link between town and countryside (which had always constituted an important element of equilibrium and cohesion) begins to crumble. One of the persons interviewed by Hanssens puts it as follows:

While the actual leaders are still "peasants" at heart the children of the cadres or office holders take to an urban model and when they are in power they will have lost all contact with reality. Hence the Zaïrisation of Rwanda with an elite that is bound to neglect social infrastructures in order to boost its own well-being (Hanssens, 1989).

A process towards a break between an urban minority and a rural majority was well under way during the 1980s. Newbury observes that the economic change of the 1980s resulted not only in a widening gap between rich and poor, but also in an affirmation of class interests on the part of those in power (C. Newbury, 1991).

Finally, it should be observed that access to power and knowledge came to very few regional groups in the country, notably in the northern *préfectures* of Gisenyi and Ruhengeri. This concentration took place over a number of years and narrowed down to these two *préfectures* in the late 1980s. This is seen to happen on all levels, but we shall limit ourselves to three illustrations. In the mid-1980s, the *préfecture* of Gisenyi alone arrogated to itself nearly one-third of the 85 most important posts in the republic, as well as near-total leadership of the army and security services. According to a survey dating back to the early 1990s, 33 public institutions out of a total of 68 were under the directorship of people coming from Gisenyi (19 posts) and Ruhengeri (14 posts). During the period 1979–1986 the "disparity indices" regarding grants to study abroad read 1.83 in favour of Gisenyi and 1.44 for Ruhengeri (the worst off *préfecture* being Kibungo in the East, with an index of 0.67). By 1990, ethnic conflict had been overtaken or even transcended by regional conflict and – within the dominant region – by small scale antagonisms (for example, the *préfectures* of Gisenyi and Ruhengeri were at loggerheads in the north while in Gisenyi itself Bushiru, Habyarimana's home area, competed with Bugoyi) (Reyntjens, 1994).

In spite of all the difficulties during the Second Republic, a number of positive developments took

place. Measured simply in terms of increase in GNP per capita, Rwanda was quite successful, especially if we take into account its inherent handicaps (land-locked nature, demographic pressure, lack of raw materials) and, certainly, in comparison with its neighbours. Table 1 represents Rwanda's progress and that of its neighbours in the rankings of the World Development Reports published by the World Bank during the period coinciding with the Second Republic.

Table 1. GNP per Capita in Rwanda and Neighbouring Countries (ranking from bottom)

Year	Ranking				
	Rwanda	Burundi	Zaire	Uganda	Tanzania
1976	7	11	16	33	25
1981	16	14	12	13	19
1985	18	11	9	n.a.	21
1990	19	11	12	13	2
Difference					
1976-90	+12	0	-4	-20	-23

Source: World Bank, World Development Reports in Reyntjens (1994).

Thus, within 15 years, Rwanda improved its relative position, moving from bottom to top ranking, while Burundi remained in its original position and the other neighbouring countries became poorer, some even considerably so. Put differently, from poorest of the five in 1976, Rwanda was the least poor in 1990. In other areas such as, for example, infrastructure, progress was equally remarkable, with a road system that may be considered among the best in Africa, a reliable post and telecommunication system, an adequate water supply, expansion of the electricity grid, etc.

Rwanda was during the 1980s seen by the World Bank and others as a successful African economy, with a moderate debt as compared with most other countries on the continent, at least up to the second half of the decade. (In 1987 Rwanda's debt amounted to 28% of GNP-one of the lowest percentages in Africa.) The economy was in balance and the currency was fairly stable, to the extent that it served as hard currency in the region.

Though far from being acceptable, the situation of human rights also improved. For example, the number of political prisoners was reduced, and efforts made to limit and control the undue and excessive use of regulations on preventive custody and on restricted freedom of movement. Furthermore, it should be observed that, between General Habyarimana's assumption of power and the war of October 1990, no major ethnic violence occurred. Today, it is often forgotten that President Habyarimana was rather popular among Tutsi of the interior and that he has even been accused, by some Hutu, of favouring Tutsi (Chrétien, 1993).

Chapter 4

Towards Crisis in Rwanda 1990-1994

General outline: main actors/main factors

On 1 October 1990, the Rwandese Patriotic Front (RPF), or more specifically its military wing, RPA (Rwandese Patriotic Army), began to invade the north of Rwanda from Uganda. Eventually some 7,000 (Tutsi) troops crossed the border. Almost four years later, on 6 July 1994, a RPF-dominated government took over in Kigali, the capital of Rwanda.

The RPF invasion started a continuous crisis that would escalate dramatically after the shooting down in April 1994 of the plane that took President Habyarimana (and his counterpart from Burundi) back from a peace meeting in Dar-es-Salaam (Tanzania). Before dealing in more detail with the period after the RPF invasion and the Arusha process, the main actors and factors in the Rwanda crisis of the 90s will be described. The main actors are the challenged Habyarimana regime, the RPF, the internal political opposition and the international community. The main factors are the refugees and the economic and the political crises. The regional dimension of the whole crisis will be described in a separate chapter.

The RPF; the refugee crisis

The creation of the RPF in the beginning of 1988 in Kampala, the capital of Uganda (following discussions in late 1987), is related to the large involvement of Tutsi men in the Uganda army (NRA) of President Yoweri Museveni. Major-General Fred Rwigyema, who led the RPF into Rwanda on 1 October 1990, was Vice-Minister of Defence under Museveni. Major Paul Kagame, at present Vice-President of Rwanda, was deputy director of military intelligence in Uganda (Prunier, 1995).

Rwandese refugees and citizens in Uganda contributed, in large measure, to Museveni's victory in 1986. Ethnically, they were the third largest group in the NRA (Prunier, 1992). There is recorded evidence that Museveni gave support to the RPF (Prunier, 1992 and 1995; Human Rights Watch /Arms Project, 1994). The RPF constituted a highly-motivated and well-trained force. About 2,500 RPF soldiers had belonged to the Ugandan army (Prunier, 1995). On 3 October, 1990, the RPF offensive was temporarily stopped by the Rwandese Armed Forces (*Forces Armées Rwandaises*, FAR) (Reyntjens, 1994; Prunier, 1995).

RPF is a creation of the Tutsi refugees who fled Rwanda, mainly between 1959 and 1966. Over the years, the desire of the 600,000 refugees in Uganda, Burundi, Zaire and Tanzania (including their descendants) to return to their country of origin remained strong (Guichaoua, 1992; Watson, 1991). The political change in Uganda after 1986 and the involvement of Tutsi in the consolidation process provided a good framework for the planning of a military invasion. Another contributing factor was the support that RPF got for their cause at the refugee congress in Washington, DC in August 1988.

Although the immediate motive for the RPF was settlement of the refugee crisis, the Front also worked out an eight-point political programme with the aim to structurally modify Rwandese political culture. The programme accused the Rwanda government of undemocratic and corrupt practices and of ethnic discrimination. The RPF explicitly projected itself as multi-ethnic. Nevertheless, the vast majority of its leaders and members were Tutsi.

Some observers question the wisdom of the RPF in taking military action at that particular time (Prunier, 1993). The invasion occurred only two months after the 30-month talks supervised by UNHCR and OAU on the refugee problem had led to a (third) ministerial agreement between Rwanda and Uganda that might have led to concrete results, and during a gradually developing political liberalization process within Rwanda. Although it seems as if the negotiations might have led to a breakthrough, the RPF, however, was not prepared to wait any more; it was apparently tired of the continued stalling by the Rwandese government. It is, however, argued that RPF attacked at that time because a possible breakthrough in the areas of democratization, human rights and refugee repatriation would have diminished the legitimacy of an attack (Reyntjens, 1994).

The challenged regime

The Habyarimana regime, with the MRND party and the army as its main pillars, had never really been challenged during its 17 years of existence, until the RPF invasion. This did not mean that the regime was not exposed to criticism. Some men who were or had become hostile to the Habyarimana regime during the 70s and 80s – among them radical Hutu such as Alexis Kanyarengwe and Jean Barahinyura – appeared in the early 90s as prominent RPF members (Reyntjens, 1994). Others would join the domestic opposition, out of which political parties would emerge in 1990.

In general, though, Habyarimana enjoyed considerable popularity, in the Hutu as well as in the Tutsi community. From 1985 onwards, that popularity would begin to erode as a result of a general political and economic crisis. As the conflict evolved, the President was increasingly criticized, even within his own party. He was caught between demands for political liberalization from the opposition and the international community, on the one hand, and refusal of his own supporters to give up political-economic positions, on the other. The build-up of party militias (*Interahamwe*) and of an extremist pro-Hutu party (*Coalition pour la Défense de la République*, CDR), in particular, and expressions of ethnicity in general, are indicators of this opposition to the reform process.

“Extremists within the MRND set up the CDR” officially in March 1992 “with an explicit agenda of Hutu extremism” (African Rights, 1994). Although the CDR probably never enjoyed a big support in numbers, it did exert an important influence on the ethnic and political attitude of the MRND (Reyntjens, 1994). Its ideas were spread via media (the newspaper *Kangura* since 1989, and the radio station RTLMC since July 1993). “*Kangura* used its close links with the highest circles of the military security services and CDR to leak important information to the public, with the explicit aim of generating fear and expectation”. “Closer to the most extreme ideologues of CDR than it was even to Habyarimana, it did not hesitate to criticize the President over the concessions he was forced to make in the course of the Arusha process.” (African Rights, 1994).

Most observers agree with the notion and possibility that Habyarimana had to pay with his life on 6 April 1994 for not giving in to a total boycott of the political liberalization process resulting from the peace negotiations with the RPF and the domestic opposition in Arusha between July 1992 and August 1993 (Reyntjens, 1994; Prunier, 1995; Lemarchand, 1995).

The economic crisis

The conflict described above can be viewed as a struggle between an increasingly worn-out regime and its challengers. The latter could no longer reconcile with a one-party government they viewed as authoritarian, undemocratic and thus not adapted to the new political situation. That opposition was fueled by news in the press about corruption within the regime. The Habyarimana regime was further seen as an obstacle to economic recovery. Indeed, one can see a link between the economic crisis that had hit Rwanda hard since 1985 and the increasing opposition from different parts of Rwandese civil society (Chrétien, 1991). Until the end of the 1980s, Rwanda was described as a small and poor, but economically healthy and self-sufficient country (see under Country Brief above and tables 1–8 in Appendix 1). The average inflation rate during the 1980s was not higher than 4% per annum, compared to sub-Saharan Africa’s (SSA) average rate of 20%. From 1965 until 1980, Rwanda’s GNP per capita grew at a rate one percentage point higher than that of SSA.

Substantial support from multilateral agencies, bilateral donors (Belgium, France, Germany, United States) and NGOs contributed to its development. In 1991, for instance, bilateral and multilateral donor support represented 21.5% (IBRD, 1993) of Rwanda's GNP and 60% of the government's development expenditures, which is higher than SSA's average but far from the highest in the region. Rwanda drew international attention due to its low rural-to-urban migration rate, its sound monetary policy and the active involvement of government and civil society in anti-erosion and reforestation activities, education and health services. International support to Rwanda grew rapidly, from an annual level of US\$35 million in 1971–74 to US\$343 million in 1990–93, the latter figure representing almost US\$50 per capita (OECD statistics).

Problems did develop, however. One major problem was the scarcity of land. Population increase in the already densely-populated country had led to a situation in which the average peasant family did not possess more than 0.7 hectare of land. Under prevailing crop patterns, families faced increasing difficulties to produce sufficiently for their own needs. Whereas in 1982, 9% of the population consumed less than 1,000 calories a day (extreme poverty level), the proportion had increased to 15% in 1989 (with partial famine in the south) and to 31% in 1993 (Maton, 1994). The country, therefore, had in 1993 become more and more dependent on food aid. This deterioration was of course also a result of the civil war. A major attack by the RPA in the most fertile part of the country in January and February 1993 resulted in a massive displacement of 13% of the country's total population and a drop by 15% of agricultural marketed production in one year (Marysse & de Herdt, 1993). All this created ground for extremism and ethnic conflict.

Apart from the internal economic limitations, some major external economic shocks affected Rwanda from the late 1980s. To start with, Rwanda had to close its last tin mine in 1985 due to increasing costs, collapse in world prices and mismanagement (Reyntjens, 1994). Tin provided 15% of Rwanda's export earnings. More dramatic was the decrease in coffee prices on international markets. Coffee usually accounted for more than two-thirds of Rwanda's foreign revenues. Between 1986 and 1992, coffee prices decreased by 75%, resulting in a four-fold increase of the debt service ratio.

Other factors included a severe drought in 1989–90 (which recurred in 1991 and 1993) and diseases affecting two staple crops, cassava and sweet potatoes, which resulted in half a million people experiencing food shortages and malnutrition; increasingly blatant and widespread government corruption; and a diversion of budgetary resources for military expenditures that escalated sharply after the invasion of forces of the RPA from Uganda in October 1990. Over the following three years, several RPA incursions, efforts by government of Rwanda forces to repulse the RPA, reprisals against Tutsi and, most importantly, massive internal population displacements of a million people in the northern half of the country in 1993, all combined to deal a crushing blow to the economy.

The international community responded generously to Rwanda's worsening economic crisis. Net official aid disbursements increased by almost 60% in two years, from US\$242 million in 1989 to an all-time high of US\$375 million in 1991, and were sustained at roughly that level through 1993. A major milestone in the provision of aid to Rwanda was the agreement in September 1990 of a structural adjustment programme with the World Bank and the IMF, which, along with joint and co-financing from seven bilateral donors plus the African Development Bank and the European Union, amounted to US\$216 million. After having resisted structural adjustment for several years, the government of Rwanda decided to initiate discussions after pressures had mounted on both the trade account and the fiscal budget, caused in part by the collapse of coffee prices. The link between coffee prices and the government of Rwanda budget stemmed from a long-standing policy of guaranteeing a fixed price to farmers through a Coffee Equalization Fund, in effect a subsidy when the world coffee price, net of marketing and shipping margins, fell below the guaranteed price. With the continued slide in world prices, the degree of budgetary subvention required to meet the guaranteed price shot up dramatically from 1987 (Marysse 1994; IBRD 1993; World Bank, 1991).

The following list of some of the elements of the programme that was approved in June 1991 suggest the wide range of policy measures incorporated in the structural adjustment package:

- *macro-economic stabilization and improved international competitiveness through:*
 - *maintaining a competitive exchange rate (the Rwanda franc, RWF, had already been devalued by 40% in 1990 and was devalued again by 15% in 1992);*
 - *reducing the government budget deficit to 5% of GDP in 1993 from the 12% level of 1990 through a combination of improved revenue mobilization and reduced spending;*
 - *import liberalization and progressive elimination of controls on domestic prices and other regulations affecting the private sector; and*
 - *improved monetary policy, including liberalization of the interest rate structure.*

- *reduction of the role of the state in the economy through:*
 - *reduction in the guaranteed price to coffee producers and elimination of the subsidy element; and*
 - *an accelerated timetable for reforming 12 of the 86 public enterprises that had been identified for privatization, liquidation or reorganization.*

- *protection of the vulnerable with a "social safety net", through a "Social Action Programme" that included:*
 - (i) labour-intensive programmes of rural road construction and soil erosion protection; (ii) a food security programme for drought-affected areas; (iii) a development programme for small entrepreneurs; (iv) financing the parental share of educational expenditures for the poorest 10% of the population; and (v) a fund for redeploying redundant public sector workers (The first three elements of this plan became part of a 1992 World Bank-funded "Food Security and Social Action Project" that expanded support for several UN-agency-sponsored initiatives).*

Implementation of these measures varied. Two key measures that were not implemented were the elimination of subsidies to coffee producers and meeting the budget deficit target. Rather than falling, the deficit increased to 18% of GDP in 1992 and 19% in 1993. Since the conditions were not met, the second *tranche* of the World Bank structural adjustment credit was not provided (Marysse, 1994; World Bank, 1995).

Of possible relevance to the issue of influence on proximate causes of the genocide are the following questions:

- *to what extent did provisions of the structural adjustment (SA) package lead to increased impoverishment of the rural Hutu population, thereby making large numbers of people susceptible to the hate propaganda to join the militias and to participate in the genocide?*

- *to what extent did some provisions cause resentment among civil servants and other non-agricultural wage and salary earners, leading to increased susceptibility to hate propaganda and active or tacit participation in the genocide?*

With respect to the first question, one issue concerns the impact of the devaluation and the changes in the guaranteed price to coffee farmers. The government of Rwanda reduced the guaranteed price from RWF 125 per kilo to RWF 100 in 1990, but rather than reduce the price further, in line with the SA programme, the government unilaterally raised it to RWF 115 in 1991, out of concern for the impact that a lower price would have on export earnings, as well as on the purchasing power and political support of the rural population. In any event, the "benefits" of the devaluation were not passed on to coffee farmers, so their real incomes undoubtedly fell, owing to the relatively modest decline in the farmgate price of coffee, but probably more importantly, to increased inflation associated with devaluation and deficit financing in the early 1990s (Marysse, 1994; World Bank, 1992; World Bank, 1995). However, the major cause of worsening conditions for the rural population during this period was the

reduction in food production caused by prolonged drought, crop disease and massive population displacement (Maton, 1994).

Relevant to the welfare of both rural and urban populations is what the government of Rwanda did with the "windfall" resulting from the devaluation, which was not passed on to farmers. One of the basic rationales for the devaluation was to enable the government of Rwanda to reduce the budgetary deficit and at the same time maintain essential expenditures in the social sectors, health and education. While the structural adjustment programme called for increased fees and "user charges" in health and education, there were also provisions to maintain public sector social expenditures and initiate programmes intended to protect the poor. But this outcome was also based on an assumption that military expenditures would be brought under control. In fact, military spending quadrupled from 1989 to 1992, from 1.9% to 7.8% of GDP, and subsidies to the coffee sector amounted to 46% of export receipts in 1992. Among the consequences of these pressures was severe damage to the "social safety net"; for example, spending for essential drugs targeted to the poorest was only 25% of the budgeted allocation (Marysse, 1994; World Bank, 1992; World Bank, 1995).

While the structural adjustment programme did not require a retrenchment in civil service employment levels, a freeze on public wage scales was implemented. Some employees were able to compensate by participating in the increased private sector activity associated with liberalization and the expansion of external aid. For others, the freeze compounded their fears about the future, kindled by the marked deterioration in their purchasing power after the two devaluations, the generally deteriorating economic situation and the escalating civil war and violence.

Donors had significant potential leverage on Rwanda in view of the very substantial and increasing levels of economic assistance being provided. As is further developed in Study II, while most of the major donors made economic aid conditional on the human rights situation in principle, and several donors and diplomatic representatives made representation to the government of Rwanda, no donor reduced aid with specific and exclusive reference to the increasingly severe human rights violations taking place in the early 1990s.

Instead, the donor response to the escalating civil violence was to employ "positive conditionality" to promote democratization through support to the justice system, the free press and local human rights organizations. Only when the economic and internal security situation deteriorated even further, in later 1993 and early 1994, did several donors sharply reduce or suspend development aid. But the rationale for this stemmed less from concern over civil violence and human rights violations than it did from (1) the need to increase humanitarian aid, some of which came from restructured project aid, in order to meet the needs of the swelling numbers of internally displaced; and (2) the erosion of project accountability and implementation efficiency as the situation in the country rapidly deteriorated.

The domestic opposition; the political crisis

The one-party state was seen more and more as the obstacle rather than the road to further development. This view was mainly propagated by urban politicians from the opposition and by the RPF. From 1985 rumours about corruption within the regime were on the increase (the formal but declining economy could not offer the same amount of advantages as before). Political opposition against Habyarimana was equally on the rise. Although officially Habyarima was re-elected President for seven years with 99.98% of the votes on 19 December 1988, domestic opposition started to sound louder and louder.

As in other parts of Africa in the early 1990s, several protest demonstrations were held in Rwanda in 1990. A strike was suppressed by the police on 4 July, 1990, and a letter denouncing the one-party system was published and circulated on 1 September. Important also was the resignation from the Central Committee of MRND (on the insistence of the Pope) of the Catholic archbishop, Vincent Nsengiyumva. Up to that date, the Catholic church, and the archbishop, had been traditional allies of the MRND. In April 1990 and in September the same year, on the occasion of a visit by the

Pope, the church expressed its dissatisfaction with the political and economic situation in the country. The discontent, however, mainly stemmed from the lower echelons of the church. The leadership both of the Catholic and the Anglican churches continued to liaise closely with the President and his government throughout the whole period (Reyntjens, 1994; African Rights, 1994).

Whereas in January 1989 President Habyarimana considered any political change feasible only within the one-party system, one and a half years later, on 5 July 1990, he agreed to the necessity of a separation between party and state. On 24 September, 1990 (i.e. before the armed conflict with the RPF), a national expert commission was set up with the task of working out a national charter that would allow the establishment of different political parties (Reyntjens, 1994). It is difficult to ascertain the President's sincerity with respect to the reforms. However, the subsequent RPF invasion did speed up the formal democratization process.

Initially, the expert commission's mandate ran over two years. The new political-military situation following the invasion of 1 October led to the acceptance of the multi-party system by Habyarimana in a speech on 13 November, which led to the creation of new political parties. In March 1991, the Mouvement Démocratique Républicain (MDR) was publicly launched, explicitly stating that it was the successor of MDR-*Parmehutu* of the first President, Grégoire Kayibanda. About half of the launchers of the "new" party originated from Gitarama-Ruhengeri, Grégoire Kayibanda's traditional stronghold (Reyntjens, 1994). Other, smaller parties that came into existence, and that would play a role in the immediate future, were the so-called intellectuals' Parti Social Démocrate (PSD), with some popularity in the south, and the Parti Libéral (PL), which enjoyed some support from business people and, consequently, from the Tutsi group and the Parti Démocrate Chrétien (PDC).

Except for the desire to oppose the Habyarimana regime, there were few ideological differences in the programmes of the different parties (Reyntjens, 1994).

Formally, the one-party system was abrogated with the adoption of a new constitution on 10 June 1991 and the law on political parties, one week later. The position of Prime Minister was institutionalized and parliamentary elections were scheduled for the immediate future by the President. Only six weeks later, on 31 July 1991, the most significant "new" parties (MDR, PDC, PL and PSD) denounced in a common declaration the plans to hold elections so soon. Immediate elections could benefit only the MRND, which had held power for two decades. Instead, they demanded a national convention to discuss in detail reform of the institutions and the call for democratic elections.

Habyarimana rejected the idea of a national convention. Only the small PDC was ready to join a transition government. Also, no elections were held. The other opposition parties showed their political dissatisfaction in demonstrations on 17 November 1991 and 8 January 1992 (Chrétien, 1992). This was a major setback for the Presidential hope to build a unified front of Hutu parties against the RPF. It also meant the introduction of an increasingly violent policy on the part of the Habyarimana regime against any Hutu and Tutsi opposition.

On 6 April 1992, after heavy national and international pressure, a new transitional government was established. It included all the major opposition parties and was led by President Habyarimana and a Prime Minister from the opposition (Dismas Nsengiyaremye, MDR). However, relations between Habyarimana and the MRND on the one hand and the opposition parties on the other remained tense throughout the conflict with the RPF. The domestic opposition was vehemently accused of collaborating with the RPF and the Tutsi, who were more and more being incited as ethnic enemies.

The international community

The international community, and in particular the two major bilateral donors, Belgium and France, played a predominant role throughout the conflict. Belgium abstained from getting involved militarily. Its government withdrew its troops one month after the beginning of the conflict. The Belgian government wanted to give democratization a chance and was in favour of, and fought hard for, a

negotiated peace. The Belgian Ambassador played an important role during the talks leading to establishment of a transition government led by Dismas Nsengiyaremye.

The French sent 370 men to Rwanda in October 1990 and, after a scaling down in March 1991, increased this number to about 670 in February 1993, i.e. after a relatively large-scale attack by the RPF. Some sources claim that France gave active support both in 1990 and in 1993 (African Rights, 1994; Human Rights Watch/Arms Project, 1994; Prunier, 1995). During the latter clashes, the French were observed "assisting the Rwandese army mortaring RPF-positions" (African Rights, 1994). "French soldiers were deployed at least 40 kilometers north of the capital on the road to Byumba, just south of the RPF's recognized zone of control. No French citizens or other Western expatriates are known to be living there." (Human Rights Watch/Arms Project, 1994). It is thus maintained that the French played an important supporting role: by manning checkpoints and advising FAR officers; by providing military training after the start of the conflict; by sending at least \$6 million worth of war material in 1991–92; and by financially guaranteeing material for the same amount shipped via third parties (Human Rights Watch/Arms Project, 1994). Not surprisingly, from the start of the conflict the RPF would require the departure of the French. The French government, however, has officially denied that it actively participated in the conflict.

As far as African countries are concerned, the role of Uganda has been discussed above. The Tanzanian President played an important role bringing the fighting parties to the negotiation table in Arusha and during the whole negotiation process. President Sese Seko Mobutu of Zaire was also involved in the cease-fire negotiations immediately after the start of the conflict. Later, Zaire would play only a secondary role in the conflict. When the conflict had started in October 1990, 500 Zairean troops were sent to Rwanda to help the FAR repel the RPF invasion. Several weeks after their arrival, they were withdrawn amid charges that they had lacked discipline and had abused Rwandese civilians (Human Rights Watch/Arms Project, 1994).

A major international involvement in the conflict came through the the United Nations as a direct result of the Arusha agreements of 4 August 1993. As well as governments and international institutions, human rights groups that regularly issued reports criticizing and exposing human rights abuses during the Habyarimana regime played an important role between 1990 and 1994.

The real influence of the international community is difficult to measure. However, the threat to cut aid in March 1993, following publication of a human rights report blaming Habyarimana for the death of at least 2,000 citizens, for example, is widely believed to have incited the Rwandese President to resume peace talks with the RPF (Reyntjens, 1994).

Evolution of the conflict

As has been shown above, since the beginning of the 1990s the Habyarimana regime had been facing strong internal and external political and military pressure for liberalization (e.g. for a multi-party system, more respect for human rights, good governance and fair settlement of the refugees). Such reforms could lead only to a reduction of the power and privileges enjoyed by the supporters of the one-party system in MRND, the army, local and national administrations, public enterprises etc. One could therefore expect a strong opposition from those groups to the restructuring process.

Below, we will deal first with the positive developments during the conflict period, i.e. the delicate peace-making process between the regime and the opposition. We will describe the different stages of the process and the content of the agreements reached on 4 August 1993. This will be discussed at some length, as it might constitute an important basis for future conflict resolution. Second, we will show why the outcome of the Arusha negotiations never deserved to be called a peace agreement, but were rather a political agreement. In the light of knowledge about the tragedy that hit Rwanda after 6 April 1994, we will deal with the systematic obstruction, mainly by regime supporters, to most reforms. Human rights groups' reports illustrate the systematic use of terror against

assumed ethnic and political opponents of the regime. Ethnicity finally poisoned not only the different political parties, but also major segments of Rwandese society.

The Arusha process

After November 1990 there was a stalemate in the military conflict between the RPF and the Rwandese army. A military solution was thus not in sight. The conflict between the political parties and the difficulties in establishing the first real transition government (without RPF) in April 1992, or 18 months after the RPF invasion, also indicated the difficulties in reaching a negotiated solution. Indeed, the Nsengiyaremye-led government that started negotiations with the RPF on a peace treaty in Arusha on 10 August, 1992 was regularly obstructed by the President and the MRND. Systematically, Habyarimana would veto any breakthrough in negotiations that could lead to a substantial decline of MRND power. It took a lot of international pressure to make the President agree each time. Also important underlying factors were RPF military advances, deterioration of the economy and the increased number of internally displaced persons (from 80,000 in late 1990 to 350,000 in May 1992 after the Byumba offensive and to 950,000 in February 1993).

The preliminaries (October 1990–April 1992)

Seventeen days after the RPF invasion, under mediation by Belgian and Tanzanian officials, President Habyarimana and President Museveni of Uganda agreed in Mwanza (Tanzania) on an OAU- and UNHCR-supervised regional conference on the refugee problem and to continue the talks their governments had had since 1988.

In Mwanza, Habyarimana and Museveni also agreed on direct negotiations with the RPF. Consequently, the RPF was recognized by Habyarimana as a discussion partner. Also important was the continuing dialogue between Habyarimana and Museveni, despite the former's accusation of the latter's active pro-RPF involvement in the conflict in Rwanda.

Until the involvement of the major domestic opposition parties in the Rwandese government (5 April, 1992), little progress, however, was achieved in the mostly-mediated talks between the government and the RPF. No fundamental agreements that would lead to a sustainable peace were signed, but only those, such as cease-fires, that would solve immediate problems.

Chronologically, cease-fires were signed and renewed after consecutive violations: on 26 October 1990 (Gbadolite, Zaire) after active Belgian diplomacy; on 20 November 1990 (Goma, Zaire), confirming and extending the Gbadolite agreement; mid-February 1991 (Dar-es-Salaam, Tanzania); and on 29 March 1991 (Nsele, Zaire). The last-mentioned cease-fire was amended twice: on 16 September 1991 in Gbadolite at an OAU summit and on 12 July 1992 in Arusha. The latter amendment led to the creation of a so-called security zone between RPF-held territory and the rest of Rwanda.

Notwithstanding the agreement at the Goma talks to send a 55-man OAU observer force (GOMN, *Groupeement des Observateurs Militaires Neutres*) to oversee implementation of the cease-fire, by September 1991 only 15 officers had arrived.

The fundamentals (May 1992–August 1993)

About one month after the inauguration of the new government, preliminary talks took place in Brussels and Paris (May and June 1992) between the MDR, PSD and the PL on the one hand and the RPF on the other. Agreement was reached to start peace negotiations (in Arusha), not only to restore the Nsele cease-fire, but also to discuss further democratization, integration of the RPF in government, and military reforms.

Peace negotiations between the Rwandese government and the RPF started on 10 August 1992, and were greatly facilitated by Tanzania and President Ali Hassan Mwinyi and his Ambassador, Ami Mpungwe. Observers from the neighbouring countries of Burundi and Zaire and from Belgium, France, Germany, the United States, Senegal and the OAU would be present at the consecutive

Arusha negotiations. The negotiations continued for one year before final agreement was reached on a total package of protocols on:

- the principle and creation of rule of law (18/8/92);
- power-sharing, the enlargement of the transition government (i.e. with the RPF) and the creation of a transition parliament (30/10/92 and 9/1/93);
- the re-integration of refugees and internally-dislocated persons (9/6/93);
- the creation of a national unified army (i.e. merger of RPA and FAR, stipulations on commanding posts, 3/8/93);

Rule of law

According to the protocol of 18 August 1992, Rwanda should honour the principles of national unity, democracy, pluralism and human rights. All citizens should enjoy the same rights and possibilities irrespective of their ethnic, regional, religious or sexual identity. An implicit consequence was the lifting of the quota system, which attributed power and positions according to a person's ethnic identity. All refugees should have the right to return. The multi-party system should be one of the cornerstones of democracy. All former agreements (Nsele, confirmed in Gbadolite and Arusha) on creation of an enlarged transitional government should be honoured. The protection of human rights should be guaranteed and supervised by a national commission.

The first protocol was concluded in a short period of time. It can be characterized either as a summary of results from earlier negotiations or as a list of more general principles. The situation was different for the negotiations on the ensuing protocols. Real power distribution was then at stake.

Power-sharing and transitional institutions

The texts include stipulations on the transitional institutions (Presidency, government, parliament, courts) and on the power distribution between and within the last three (Communiqué 18/9/92; Protocol 30/10/92; Protocol 9/1/93).

The government should be extended to include the RPF and be composed of 21 ministers: 5 MRND (including Minister of Defence), 5 RPF (including the Vice-Prime Minister and Minister of the Interior), 4 MDR (including Prime Minister and Minister of Finance), 3 PSD, 3 PL and 1 PDC. CDR was thus excluded. The new government should in principle decide by consensus.

The transitional parliament would be composed of 11 members each from MRND, MDR, PSD, PL and RPF, 4 members from PDC and 1 member each from the other recognized parties. President Habyarimana would remain head of state. However, he would have to cede certain powers to the Prime Minister and the government. Presidential and parliamentary elections would be organized at the end of the period of transition. A commission would be given the task to draft a new constitution, which would be the object of a referendum.

Three key ingredients to the agreement need to be stressed:

- 1) the exclusion of CDR;
- 2) the switch from a primarily Presidential system to a primarily parliamentary system in the distribution of power; and
- 3) the requirement that the concurrence of at least four parties would be required to reach a majority vote even though the rhetoric suggested the cabinet would try to work by consensus.

Refugees and internally displaced persons

On 9 June 1993, the government of Rwanda and the RPF reached agreement on a solution for the refugees and the internally displaced persons who had fled the area north of Byumba and Ruhengeri and who numbered about 1,000,000 in February 1993 (Protocol 9/6/93).

Six months after inauguration of the enlarged transitional government, a number of repatriation areas should be identified and equipped. Three months later, a first group of refugees would be allowed to settle in Rwanda. As far as land rights are concerned, it was advised that land that had not been claimed during the previous 10 years should not be considered as property by the returnees. UNHCR and OAU should be asked to convene a donors' conference to discuss the financial implications of the refugee programme.

Military reforms

On 24 June 1993, negotiators from the government and RPF agreed on a definite cease-fire, the inclusion of the RPF in a merged national army (*Armée Nationale*), including the *gendarmerie*. The RPF would obtain a ratio of 40% of all troops and 50% of all commanding posts. It was also specified that the enlarged transitional government would rule the country for at least one year (later specified as a maximum of 22 months). Parliamentary elections would be organized at the end of the transition period (Protocol 24/6/93).

Agreement was further reached at Kinyihira on an army of 13,000 troops and a *gendarmerie* of 6,000 men (Articles 25/7/93). As regards the army, this would imply a considerable reduction compared to the number of troops at that moment: about 28,000 in the FAR and 20,000 in the RPA – in both cases a considerable increase since 1990 (UN Reconnaissance mission to Rwanda, August 1993). The *Armée Nationale* would be headed by a FAR commander, the *gendarmerie* by a RPA commander.

It was also agreed that 600 RPA men (an armoured battalion) would be allowed to see to the protection of the RPF people in Kigali who would participate in the transition government and administration, and to safety in the capital in general. A neutral international force (UN blue helmets) or an enlarged GOMN under UN supervision, would be in charge of the overall security in all Rwanda and, more specifically, operate along the border with Uganda, in the demilitarized zone and in Kigali. That international force would further be in charge of supervision of the inauguration of the enlarged transition government, the transitional parliament, military reforms, demobilization and the preparation of elections. The installation of this force was a precondition for implementation of the Arusha agreements.

Designation of the post-Arusha Prime Minister

At Kinyihira in June 1993, agreement was reached to nominate Faustin Twagiramungu (MDR) as Prime Minister of the enlarged transitional government. However, at the moment of his designation, he was excluded from his party. The immediate reason was that he, as MDR chairman, had consented to President Habyarimana's decision to have Prime Minister Dismas Nsengiyaremye replaced by Agathe Uwilingiyimana as of 17 July 1993.

Legally, Dismas Nsengiyaremye's mandate as Prime Minister expired on 16 July. Politically, the President saw in the nomination of Agathe Uwilingiyimana a means to exploit frictions within the MDR and to divide the main opposition party. One MDR faction was centred around Dismas Nsengiyaremye and opposed to fundamental reforms (the so-called PowerGroup, said to follow the former *Parmehutu* ideology). The second faction supported MDR chairman Faustin Twagiramungu.

On 23 July 1993, a majority of members at an extraordinary congress of the MDR decided to exclude its chairman and Agathe Uwilingiyimana, the new Prime Minister (Reyntjens, 1994). This would not prevent the Prime Minister, and the political parties present in Kinyihira, from deciding on Faustin Twagiramungu as prospective Prime Minister two days later. For the newly-formed "PowerGroup" within the MDR, led by Jean Kambanda, an agreement had been signed without the consent of the MDR, which argued that the Prime Minister did not belong to their party, whereas the Arusha negotiators had always agreed on a MDR politician as Prime Minister.

In the following period, the split within the MDR would remain, probably not to the dissatisfaction of the President, who could refer to the absence of consent within political parties in order to fail to

inaugurate an enlarged transition government in accordance with the Arusha agreements. Whereas the rivalry within the MDR was at the start basically a struggle between several persons, the dispute became more and more dominated by ethnicism. The “PowerGroup” used more and more an anti-Tutsi language, whereas politicians such as Faustin Twagiramungu were open to compromise with other political and ethnic groups.

Non-implementation (August 1993–April 1994)

The actual Arusha agreements signed on 4 August 1993 by President Habyarimana and RPF Chairman Alexis Kanyarengwe comprise the above protocols plus a series of intermediary and *ad hoc* agreements, such as the different cease-fire texts and the stipulations.

Already during the negotiations, substantial delays were encountered before the more fundamental questions were agreed upon. The President showed great unwillingness to go along with many conclusions. Habyarimana would veto, or postpone his consent to, agreements between the government and the RPF on several occasions: in mid-November 1992, and in January, June and July 1993.

After signing of the agreements, a number of interlinked factors would contribute to non-implementation of the Arusha accords by 6 April, 1994: the delayed arrival of UN troops, internal disputes within different parties and basic unwillingness by the President and his regime to go along with the major changes. The final Arusha texts provided for the operation of the (Faustin Twagiramungu) government at most 37 days after the signing (i.e. by 10 September) pending the arrival of UN blue helmets. As the UNAMIR (United Nations Assistance Mission to Rwanda) mandate was not yet approved by the UN Security Council, the caretaker government led by Agathe Uwilingiyimana had to remain in place.

The general political climate was far from peaceful, in particular after the murder on the night of 20–21 October 1993 of the first democratically-elected Hutu President of Burundi, Melchior Ndadaye, by Tutsi soldiers of the Burundian army. Most observers point to this event as a decisive factor for the ensuing tragedy in Rwanda. This is expressed by Linden as follows:

Perhaps the single most important trigger enabling those who were determined to abort the process to win the day was ironically an assassination in Burundi on 21 October 1993, that of the new “Hutu” president, Melchior Ndadaye, one of the first fruits of a process of democratization of its “Tutsi” regime. Tens of thousands died in the wake of the coup and some 70,000 Burundian “Hutu” fled into southern Rwanda. The message of these events to many around Habyarimana was doubtless that the Tutsi would never genuinely accept (Hutu) majority rule within the context of a government of national unity. In other words, the extremists were right: Arusha was too much, too far, too fast (Linden, 1995).

And by Lemarchand:

(Ndadaye’s) death at the hands of an all-Tutsi army carried an immediate and powerful demonstration effect to the Hutu of Rwanda (...) The message came through clear and loud: ‘Never trust the Tutsi!’ (Thus), with Ndadaye’s death vanished what few glimmers of hope remained that Arusha might provide a viable forum for a political compromise with the RPF (Lemarchand, 1995).

If one adds to the above the absence of real reconciliation between conservative and reform-oriented persons and groups, the massive spread of weapons in the country and the harsh economic situation, one will better understand the difficulties in implementing the Arusha accords.

Still, most observers thought in November 1993 that the Arusha agreements would slowly but certainly lead to a more stable situation. Donors tried hard to give their support to a peaceful development. UNDP’s preparation (September 1993–April 1994) of a “Round-Table Conference for the rehabilitation of the areas affected by the war and the social reintegration of the demobilized sol-

diers” is a case in point. After the formal approval on 5 October 1993 by the UN Security Council (Resolution 872) to station 2,500 blue helmets in Rwanda by the end of March 1994, the first troops arrived at the end of October 1993. The final formal obstacle of the 22-months period of the transition government had thus been overcome.

One of the first tasks for the blue helmets was to escort the 600 RPA soldiers and the designated RPF ministers and staff members to Kigali (on 28 December 1993; Operation Clean Corridor). Other tasks were to guarantee the safety of the capital, the border area with Uganda and the demilitarized zone in the north. In 1994, the UN troops would be in charge of the supervision of military reforms, demobilization and demilitarization. In 1995, their attention was to be focused on the process that would lead to municipal, parliamentary and presidential elections during the last six months of the transition.

However, the enlarged transitional government, the cornerstone of the agreement on which most other activities depended, never came into existence. Rwanda’s Prime Minister was still Agathe Uwilingiyimana on the fatal date of 6 April, 1994. After the arrival of the blue helmets, the reasons for delay were internal, accentuated by the violent aftermath of the murder of Melchior Ndadaye in Burundi on 20 October 1993.

The inauguration of a new government and parliament was planned first for 5 January, 1994, later for 23 February and then for 24 March, but did not take place. In the eyes of the President, the different parties were too internally divided to provide for a stable government that he could support. As long as no government was acknowledged, part of the opposition boycotted the installation of a new parliament.

Faustin Twagiramungu, who was proposed as Prime Minister, lacked the support of the majority of his party, which was strongly divided. In the aftermath of the murder of Ndadaye, accusations of corruption and of ethnicism increased. The MDR, the PL and the PSD split politically, between those ready for power-sharing (the moderates) and those who were ready to go to the utmost extremities to retain power (the so-called “Power” fractions). Each side accused the other of complicity with either the MRND or the RPF. For instance, Faustin Twagiramungu (a pro-reform Hutu) was accused of siding with the RPF and of having been corrupted. That accusation allowed the “PowerGroup” within the MDR to adopt a harsher pro-Hutu stance. Within the PL, its chairman, Justin Mugenzi, was accused of anti-RPF positions, whereas the Minister of Social Affairs, Ndasingwa, was accused of siding with the RPF.

In the meantime, in mid-February, Jacques Booh-Booh, the representative of the UN Secretary-General in Rwanda, had seriously warned of the massive spread of weapons among citizens and supporters of the militias.

Manipulation of ethnicity

As noted above, in the early 1990s the Habyarimana regime had attempted to establish a broad Hutu-dominated front. The strategy adopted by at least part of the regime’s supporters was to create a political climate that would result in a political and military marginalization of the RPF and, broadly speaking, of the whole Tutsi population. Political and ethnic polarization was clearly a strategy from the start of the conflict (Reyntjens, 1994). This has been confirmed in a number of reports by different international human rights organizations (Africa Watch, 1992; Amnesty International, 1992; Fédération Internationale des droits de l’homme, 1993; Africa Watch, 1993; Human Rights Watch/Arms Project 1994; African Rights, 1994).

One of these reports, from March 1993, written by a group of international human rights committees, gives a detailed description of offences against human rights. The report gives an idea of the increasing extremism within and around the Presidency and the MRND (Fédération Internationale des droits de l’homme, 1993).

Some examples are: In mid-October 1990, a group of Hutu, agitated by local authorities, take revenge on a group of Tutsi in the region of Kibilira (Gisenyi), killing 300 people and causing a massive flight of refugees (Africa Watch, 1992). Citizens, mainly Tutsi, accused of sympathizing with the RPF, are sentenced to death. More than 8,000 citizens are arrested without clear motives. International diplomatic and NGO pressure results in lifting of the death penalty and the release of the prisoners. After a temporary territorial success for the RPF in the Ruhengeri area, military and civilian authorities take revenge on the Bagogwe, a Tutsi sub-group, causing at least 500 deaths. The Bagogwe were to become further victims of terror during the conflict (December 1991 and November/December 1992).

From the end of 1991, the south of the country became involved in the conflict for the first time (Fédération Internationale des droits de l'homme, 1993). The violence that occurred in Bugesera is indicated by several sources as the dark turning-point in the anti-reform strategy of Habyarimana's supporters. "The 1992 Bugesera massacre marked an important turning point in the development of the methods of killings, because of the central role played by extremist propaganda. For four months before the killing started, extremist politicians and ideologues had been active in the area, inciting the Hutu populace" (African Rights, 1994). Rwambuka, the mayor of Kanzenze who belonged to the central committee of the MRND, was the driving force behind the terror. Five hundred persons were arrested after the events, but in most cases released without charges (Fédération Internationale des droits de l'homme, 1993).

Simultaneous and similar patterns of violent conflicts against Tutsi and reform-minded Hutu at different places (e.g. Kibilira in March 1992; Kibilira, Kayoya, Mutura in November/December 1992) reveal a particular strategy and plan adopted by local authorities, with strong support from the highest levels. Increasing involvement of party militias, multiplication of the number of FAR soldiers by five over a 16-months period, escalating hostile ethnic-political propaganda by highly-placed officials against presumed opponents of the regime (Hutu and Tutsi in opposition parties and RPF), and a deliberately-created climate of insecurity and unsafety, are different indications of an organized aggressive attitude against any opponents of the MRND regime (Fédération Internationale des droits de l'homme, 1993).

To give an example from the build-up of the party militias (*interahamwe* = "those who work together"): They were first seen in action during a massacre carried out at Bugesera in March 1992. "Specific details of the establishment of these militias are found in a Ministry of Defence memorandum dated September 1991. This envisaged at least one armed man for every 10 households and one policeman per sector". While at that date "the mobilization was to be restricted to the northern areas close to the front line", "the 'home guard' project was overtaken by the mass mobilization of party militia throughout the country under the control of very senior politicians and military officers. It is likely that one motivation for this was that, as opposition political parties mobilized, lines of authority from the Presidency to every rural commune began to dissolve. This made it more essential to mobilize a militia whose sole loyalty was to the hard-liners". "*Interahamwe* were recruited widely across Rwanda. Many were unemployed young men". "The arming of the *interahamwe* intensified after the February 1993 offensive by the RPF", notwithstanding several prior demands from the Prime Minister (Dismas Nsengiyaremye) "to the MRND and the CDR to adhere to the law on political parties, and disband the militias" (African Rights, 1994).

The gradual political, military and ethnic escalation benefitted from at least the tacit support of the President. Habyarimana is held personally liable for the death of at least 2,000 people in the period October 1990-January 1993. He never objected, e.g. in speeches, either to the increasingly ethnic-extremist attitude of local authorities or to the increasing involvement of party militias in the gradually-widening conflict since November 1991. One of the main conclusions is that there is a similarity between the different acts of violence committed by regime supporters between October 1990 and February 1993 (Fédération Internationale des droits de l'homme, 1993).

Already in 1993, some members of human rights groups concluded in the report that, since the conflict with the RPF began, the Tutsi population had been exposed to a massacre: "Tutsi have been killed, mutilated, harassed, made to disappear, frightened, only because of their ethnic identity." Bearing the dramatic events of April/May 1994 in mind, little doubt can exist that political manipulation of ethnicity had been on the rise in Rwanda for quite some time (Fédération Internationale des droits de l'homme, 1993).

In November 1992, when an agreement was reached in Arusha, political violence by Habyarimana supporters escalated. In February 1993, the RPF attacked and occupied part of the area of Ruhengeri-Gisenyi, as a direct response to stalling by the President of the negotiations in Arusha, but also as a response to the ethnic harassment of Tutsi by Hutu militias in north-western Rwanda, in which more than 300 people died (Africa Watch, 1993).

The RPF attack caused an internal flow of displaced persons of one out of seven Rwandese, who felt forced to leave areas containing the most fertile soils in the country. The number of internally displaced persons thus increased to about 950,000 in 1993, compared to an estimated 350,000 in mid-1992. After 8 February 1993, the RPF had doubled the size of its occupied territory in Rwanda, thereby infringing one of the basic elements of the cease-fire agreement with the Rwandese government, i.e. the "neutrality" of the buffer zone between "RPF territory" and the rest of Rwanda.

The RPF attacks brought massive protest in and outside the country. In Rwanda, the President and the Prime Minister denounced the latest acts of violence in a joint communique. The European Union, in particular Belgium, France and Germany, expressed its discontent in a similar way. France decided to increase the number of its troops by 300, to discourage the RPF march towards Kigali. Reyntjens (1994) strongly doubts whether the RPF, after its only half-successful invasion of October 1990, really planned to attempt a take-over of Kigali. The February 1993 offensive should rather be seen in the same light as the one in May 1992, when the RPF launched an attack on Byumba to express its discontent with lack of progress at the negotiations with the government. The strategy would be to demonstrate its military strength and superiority to convince the other parties of the necessity of a political agreement with the Front.

New talks were held between the RPF and all the parties of the government save MRND in Bujumbura from 25 February to 2 March 1993, leading to the Dar-es-Salaam cease-fire agreement of 9 March (after promises on the withdrawal of the French troops). This cease-fire agreement was important since it included stipulations on an international force (OAU or UN) to replace the French troops, a demilitarized zone and a resumption of the Arusha talks.

After the agreements of 4 August 1993 were signed, hostility did not diminish. On the contrary, Rwandese society tended to polarize more and more in anti- and pro-RPF (and Tutsi) parties and groups. As described above, the unity of the MDR, the PSD and the PL was put under enormous pressure from Habyarimana's supporters, who tended to equate opponents of the MRND regime with enemies of the Hutu people. Parallel events in neighbouring Burundi added to the polarization.

The political violence that plagued Rwanda throughout 1993 and the first months of 1994 was increasingly fueled by influential media, which agitated the Hutu population against their presumed enemies. On 8 July, 1993, *Radio-Télévision Libre des Mille Collines* (RTLMC) started to broadcast, officially to counterbalance Radio Muhabura (RPF) and the official Radio Rwanda (Reyntjens, 1994). According to African Rights (1994), "RTLMC played a key role in inciting violence against Tutsi and moderate Hutu... (It) fervently opposed the Arusha Accords". Among the RTLMC promoters one found influential people belonging to the right wing of the MRND (e.g. Kabuga) and the CDR: Hassan Ngeze, director of the very pro-CDR newspaper *Kangura* (established already in 1989) and Ferdinand Nahimana, Director of the National Information Services. The latter was even dismissed for his ethnic and regional excesses.

This illustrates the attitude of groups of major regime supporters throughout the conflict. First, creation of a poisoned political climate and of ethnicism had been planned since the beginning of the conflict. Second, direct means (use of militias; spreading of weapons; creation of extremist movements; political assassinations and planned massacres) as well as indirect means (permanent climate of terror and fear; propaganda via the media) were strategically used, certainly from 1992 on. Third, the planning emanated from the highest-ranking persons in the army, the Presidential guard, the administration etc. who had benefitted from the one-party regime (Lemarchand, 1995; African Rights, 1994).

Chapter 5

April 1994 and its Aftermath

The genocide

At 8:30 p.m. on April 6 1994, the control tower at Kigali airport cleared for landing the President's Mystère Falcon aircraft returning from Dar-es-Salaam, Tanzania. Aboard were the President of Rwanda, Juvénal Habyarimana, as well as the President of Burundi, Cyprien Ntaryamira. They were travelling from a meeting in Dar-es-Salaam, where implementation of the power-sharing agreement of August 1993 had been discussed and the implementation agreement finally signed. When the plane was approaching the airport, it was hit by a rocket and exploded. All passengers and crew were killed.

So far, the truth about the shooting down of the aircraft has not been established. Many have been blamed: the RPF, the Belgian government, the Presidential Guard and senior officials from the regular Rwandese Army (African Rights, 1994). The immediate major suspect, however, was the Presidential Guard, who feared the prospect of being dissolved.

Commentators on the event are divided. Some believe that the plane crash unleashed the wave of massacres. Others point to the fact that the killings were planned well ahead, with the aim of physically eliminating the Hutu opposition and Tutsi in general and, thus, argue that the plane crash was an excuse and formed an integral part of a plan to instigate the violence. In the words of Lemarchand:

Who actually fired the missile that brought down Habyarimana's plane may never be known, any more than who ordered the missile to be fired. But if the circumstantial evidence is any index, there is every reason to view the shooting of the plane as an eminently rational act from the standpoint of the immediate goals of Hutu extremists (Lemarchand, 1995).

The violence that followed is one of the worst in the history of humankind. Within a period of less than three months, at least 500,000 people were killed*; thousands and thousands were maimed, raped and both physically and psychologically afflicted for life; two million fled to neighbouring countries; and one million became internally displaced.

There is no question that these massacres took place. Eye-witnesses in Rwanda and all over the world, with their own eyes or on TV, could see how floating bodies filled the rivers and lakes along the borders of Rwanda. Journalists flocked into the area and reported extensively: some 50 publications have already been published on the massacres (Guichaoa, 1995; Braeckman, 1995:1; Prunier, 1995; Verschave, 1994; Brauman, 1994). The most thorough account so far is the report by African Rights of September 1994. The authors of that report have done their utmost to verify what happened during the months of the massacres by interviewing hundreds of people who were victims of or witnesses to the killings. There may well be reason to question some of the conclusions, but no researcher we have confronted questions the account of the killings made in that report; in fact, most others support it (Human Rights Watch/Africa, 1994:3).

* Although no one ever will be certain, many observers lean on this lower figure of 500,000 killed (Human Rights Watch/Africa, Dec 1994). Prunier, however, quotes the higher figure of 800,000, referring to demographic calculations (Prunier, 1995).

The massacres were implemented in such a meticulous way that it is difficult to conclude that they were not organized in advance. Most Rwanda-watchers agree that the massacres were carried out according to a plan well-prepared by higher officials in the local and national government, the army, the Presidential Guard and the MRND party. The African Rights report is based on that conviction and points to several bits of evidence proving that this was the case. The establishment of military and para-military forces and the Hutu extremism during the early 1990s are discussed above. As for the main killers, African Rights states:

The men (and a few women) who brought down the apocalypse on Rwanda are known. And, while some deny that any killing occurred, others are often shamelessly frank about their role and eager to justify genocide.

The killers include the professional interahamwe, soldiers, gendarmes, Presidential Guardsmen and local government officials who actually supervised and carried out the killings. Some of these people have been witnessed, with their clothes literally drenched in blood, at the scene of massacres or at roadblocks. And, above them, there are the architects of genocide – the men who held the highest offices in the land, who controlled the government, army and radio stations, and who planned and implemented the killings from on high. Few of these people actually wielded machetes or even guns, but it was their policies and words that put guns and machetes in the hands of so many people in Rwanda. Some travelled the country inciting hatred, or spoke on the radio, others were active behind the scenes encouraging the extremists and lending them logistical, financial, political and diplomatic support (African Rights, 1994).

Likewise, Lemarchand identifies the actors and the structures behind the genocide as follows:

By 1992, the institutional apparatus of genocide was already in place. It involved four distinctive levels of activity, or sets of actors: a) the akazu (“little house”), that is the core group, consisting of Habyarimana’s immediate entourage, i.e. his wife (Agathe), his three brothers-in-law (Protée Zigiranyirazo, Seraphin Rwabukumba and Elie Sagatwa) and a sprinkling of trusted advisers (most notably Joseph Nzirorera, Laurent Serubuga and Ildephonse Gashumba); b) the rural organizers, numbering anywhere from two to three hundred, drawn from the communal and prefectural cadres (préfets, sous-préfets, conseillers communaux, etc.); c) the militias (interahamwe), estimated at 30,000, forming the ground-level operatives in charge of doing the actual killing; and d) the Presidential Guard, recruited almost exclusively among northerners and trained with a view to providing auxiliary slaughterhouse support to civilian death squads (Lemarchand, 1995) (Cf. also Prunier, 1995).

It thus seems that the killings were no spontaneous outbursts, but followed instructions from the highest level. This is also the only conclusion that can be drawn after having studied the sequence of the massacres. Almost immediately (i.e. the same evening) after the crash of the aircraft, a selective assassination of opposition politicians, of which most were Hutu from parties opposing the party in power, began. The most apparent act was the killing of the Prime Minister, Agathe Uwilingiyimana, along with 10 Belgian UN soldiers who were assigned to protect her. The President of the Constitutional Court and the Minister of Information were other prominent immediate targets. The leadership of every opposition party was hit in a similar way (African Rights, 1994).

The second target group for assassination, once the leading politicians had been killed, were dissenting civilians, Hutu as well as Tutsi. These included journalists, human rights activists, representatives of non-governmental groups and civil servants. African Rights lists as an example, by name and occupation, 27 journalists who were reported killed immediately after April 6.

Following the killing of the opposition, the generalized massacre of Tutsi starts. This is documented by African Rights, 1994, *préfecture by préfecture*; with special accounts dealing with attacks on women and children, on churches and hospitals etc. etc. There is no end to the realism and horror of

the accounts by the witnesses interviewed. Although there are accounts of people who tried to help victims of the massacres, most people willingly, by force or by coercion, seem to have participated in the killings.

The first targets were Tutsi men and boys. Even the smallest boys were not spared. Educated Tutsi men and women were particularly at risk and the university was "cleansed" (African Rights, 1994). Rape was used extensively. There are many reports of women who were both tortured and raped while others who had been wounded were also raped. Children were not spared and many Tutsi children were killed, others maimed and left with physical and psychological scars for the rest of their lives.

The killings were carried out with extraordinary cruelty. People were burnt alive, thrown dead or alive into pit latrines and often forced to kill their friends or relatives. The survivors were hunted all over the country, even into hospitals and church compounds. Some of the worst massacres were directed against people seeking refuge in churches.

Another factor seen by many observers as evidence that the massacres were pre-planned and controlled from above is the very successful strategy in sowing confusion during the period immediately following the plane crash, so that neither Rwandese nor foreigners knew what was happening. The objective was to create fear and ignorance. The strategy included establishment of roadblocks, a nation-wide curfew and the disruption of telephone links, and was implemented almost immediately. In addition, a very efficient and effective campaign of disinformation was being waged by the most active media at that time, RTLMC and Radio Rwanda. For consumption of the foreign community, the Rwanda crisis was blamed on the RPF and its alleged breaking of the cease-fire agreements.

It took the international press almost three weeks to really grasp the magnitude of the killings taking place in Rwanda, in particular in the rural areas. During the first days, international attention largely focused on the plight of foreigners. The next focus was on the battle for Kigali and the role of the UN. Very few reported on the massacres taking place in rural areas. Only when refugees started to arrive in Burundi in the last week of April did the journalists comprehend what really went on.

It has been stated that the objective of the most extreme of the leaders of the massacres went beyond the physical extermination of every Tutsi – the idea was also to transform the collective identity of the Hutu. Those who hold that view point to the systematic killing of moderate Hutu leaders and Hutu who protected their Tutsi friends or relatives, and deliberate efforts to get as many as possible of the ordinary Hutu people to participate in the killings and lootings, voluntarily or by force. Even if this theory is not fully substantiated, the results of the massacres and the political/psychological effects are the same.

An interim government was proclaimed on 9 April, based on the MRND and the factions of the other parties that supported it. Théodore Sindikubwabo, the former Speaker of the parliament, was appointed President and Jean Kambanda Prime Minister. On 13 April, the interim government moved from Kigali to Gitarama on the grounds that order had collapsed in the capital. The interim government did very little to stop, or even oppose, the massacres going on in the country. On the contrary, from the documentation available in the form of interviews and statements over the radio, government representatives rather denied or played down the evidence of killings, and sometimes even encouraged them (cf Théodore Sindikubwabo's speech in Butare on 19 May, 1994) (African Rights, 1994; Prunier, 1995).

Churches

Above it was explained that the leading church representatives were close to the Habyarimana regime. During the massacres, these leaders did nothing to discourage the killing. At a press conference in Nairobi as late as early June 1994, the Anglican archbishop refused unequivocally to denounce the Rwandese interim government (Linden, 1995). The Catholic archbishop even moved with the interim government from Kigali to Gitarama. Furthermore, significant numbers of prominent Christians were involved in the killings, sometimes slaughtering their own church leaders. At the same time, there is also evidence of incidents of martyrdom, heroic self-sacrifice and courage shown by Rwandese Christians (including some foreign missionaries).

The question of complicity of the church must be set in the context of a divided church, split by ethnicity and regionalism. The church (Catholic as well as Anglican) was far from neutral in its sympathies. At another level, "complicity" was about the failure of many church leaders to disassociate themselves enough from and work against the hold that ethnicity had gained over the church in time to speak out strongly against the regime's human rights violations (Linden, 1995).

The civil war

The civil war resumed after the killings began. The 600-strong RPF battalion in Kigali left its headquarters on 7 April and the forces in the north of the country launched an offensive on 8 April. The RPF had kept its forces alert to be able to act swiftly if the peace agreement were to derail. From the slight delay, however, it seems that they were taken by surprise by the shooting down of the plane.

Once the RPF had launched its offensive, it progressed rapidly. After only a short time, the major military base at Byumba was taken, allowing for the re-supply of arms and ammunition. RPF advanced all through April and May, but not fast enough to halt the massacres. An important advance was made when the international airport at Kigali and the nearby Kanombe base were occupied on 22 May. Kigali was taken on 6 July and on 18 July, 1994, RPF declared the war to be over. It announced a cease-fire and formed a new government headed by Pasteur Bizimungu, as President and Faustin Twagiramungu as Prime Minister, both Hutu. Real power, however, rested in the hands of the Tutsi commander of RPF, General Paul Kagame, who became Vice-President and Minister of Defence.

The war was won through a combination of superior fighting skills, higher morale (in part from the need to halt the massacres), discipline and ammunition (African Rights, 1994). The experience from participating in the war in Uganda was important, particularly as regards the tight discipline required of the RPF soldiers. However, human rights groups have reported abuses and excessive violence towards civilians by RPF soldiers during the offensive. Accounts are given, for example, of civilians killed in a mosque in the Bugesera region, of a large number of civilians killed in Kayove (NW Rwanda), of some killings of refugees on May 18 (Rwanda-Tanzania border) and of church groups (Rwantanga near Uganda; Byumba prefecture) (Guichaoua, 1995; African Rights, 1994; Human Rights Watch/Africa, 1994:2 and 1994:3).

The role of the international community

During the 1990s, the international community (OAU, UN, Belgium, France, Germany, USA and Rwanda's neighbouring countries, notably Tanzania) had taken upon itself an important and active role in implementing peace and democracy in Rwanda (see above). There were numerous prior warnings of the violence that erupted on 6 April (African Rights, 1994). Some observers point to detailed written plans that UNAMIR and some of the foreign embassies had seen before the massacres took place (Reyntjens, 1995). Despite all warnings, it appears, however, that the international community was caught unprepared when the massacres broke out. The inactivity, or rather inade-

quate or misdirected kind of activity, continued for several weeks after the massacres started. (This is discussed in detail in Study II.)

This was partly due to the successful disinformation campaign by the leaders of the massacres, partly to the fatigue after the Somalia debacle (Guichaoua, 1995), but also to the fact that most foreign observers did not want to accept the killings for what they were. This was particularly true for the French, who had given their support to the Rwandese government and army all through the early 1990s. However, public opinion in France also cried out heavily against the massacre. Zaire also maintained good relations with the Rwandese interim government throughout the crisis and allowed it and its supporters after the RPF victory to settle in Zaire, keep their weapons and even to operate their radio from Zairian territory. In addition, Zaire, and particularly President Mobutu himself, reaped both diplomatic and economic benefits from the French – as well as the UN – interventions.

The Belgians, who had played an important role during the Arusha process, contributed by sending the largest group of soldiers to UNAMIR. The murder of 10 Belgian soldiers on 7 April led, however, to a popular outcry in Belgium and to the almost immediate withdrawal of its soldiers from Rwanda and the UN task force.

Most tragic of all, however, was the inactivity of the UN and its failure to meet expectations, including those of the citizens of Rwanda. After the arrival of UNAMIR, many Rwandese had high hopes. Those hopes were badly shattered, a fact widely repeated in many of the interviews made by African Rights and personal interviews in Rwanda. Discussions in the Security Council after Belgium announced the withdrawal of its troops continued throughout the period of the massacres, without any real conclusions. The Special Representative of the Secretary-General in Rwanda, Jacques Booh-Booh, his successor, Shaharyar Khan, and other representatives of the UN did not criticize the interim government over the whole period. Instead, they concentrated all their efforts on obtaining a cease-fire between the RPF and the Rwandese army. As the RPF had announced that it would not even discuss a cease-fire unless the killings came to an end, the persistence of the UN to attain a cease-fire without mentioning the massacres was futile.

Thus, while the UN could not respond with any action on the ground, the OAU at least attempted to act more decisively. It was a step ahead of the UN in its analysis, and its public statements. However, divisions among the African countries did not allow for any real intervention.

Although there were UN and OAU soldiers in Rwanda (albeit very few), they did not get an appropriate mandate and sufficient equipment and transport, which might have saved lives. A condemnation of the massacres might have given moral support to the few who tried to stop the killings and a moral leadership role to the UN, but it never came. In the words of Ian Linden:

The withdrawal of the bulk of the UN forces and the failure of the Security Council to re-inforce them and acknowledge that genocide was taking place cost thousands of lives and will be recorded as one of the most culpable and tragic of the UN's many mistakes on intervention (Linden, 1995).

Although a decision to enlarge and strengthen UNAMIR to 5,500 men was taken by the Security Council on 17 May 1994, decisions on the financing of the force and on operational matters took until the end of July. By then, the French, pressed by public opinion in their country and franco-phone leaders of Africa, had decided to dispatch 2,200 soldiers to Goma and Bukavu in Zaire, from where they entered western Rwanda. *Opération Turquoise* started on 23 June. Much has been written about this intervention (See Study II). Suffice it here to say that the Security Council gave this unilateral military force UN status and a Chapter VII mandate (allowing it to use force) for two months until the enlarged UNAMIR force would take over.

The French intervention was welcomed by the interim government, but strongly opposed by the RPF. However, the French came too late to have any sustainable effect either on the war or the massacres (Prunier, 1995). It is estimated, however, that the French, within the so-called Safe Zone they declared in the south-west of Rwanda, saved some 12–15,000 Tutsi. They also helped to provide relief to Hutu internally displaced persons in south-west Rwanda, some of whom stayed in the country after the French left, thereby saving Burundi from an additional refugee crisis (African Rights, 1994; Guichaoua, 1995). The French left Rwanda in August 1994, handing over their Safe Zone to Ethiopian UN troops. The UNAMIR mandate has since been extended a number of times – the latest to 8 March, 1996 – and the UN troops are still present in Rwanda, although their presence is increasingly opposed by the government.

The refugees

The massacres and the war during April–July 1994 provoked massive population movements, internally in Rwanda and from Rwanda to neighbouring countries. In total, about two million people fled Rwanda and the number of internally displaced persons, many in camps, were estimated at about one million*. The first refugees started to flow into Burundi in the end of April; some 270,000 entered the country. The major influx, however, was into Tanzania (580,000) in April–May and into Zaire (1,200,000) in July. The refugee problem is discussed in detail in Study III. Here it suffices to say that the problems and the sacrifices resulting from the inflow of such a large number of refugees in such a short time have been enormous. The international community (multilaterals, bilaterals, neighbouring countries and NGOs), however, responded very rapidly. Though at first acting as the major obstacle to a firm UN intervention in Rwanda, the US government also reacted swiftly to the human crisis in Goma, when hundreds of thousands fled to that small town. Almost immediately, the US Air Force was mobilized to deliver supplies to Goma to save the lives of refugees (African Rights, 1994). Some were Tutsi fleeing from the massacres, but the majority were Hutu, scared of revenge by the RPF. Most of these Tutsi have since returned to Rwanda, while only a smaller part of the Hutu refugees have done so.

Table 2. Rwanda and Burundi refugee figures as of March 1995

Country of Asylum	Country of Origin		Total
	Burundi	Rwanda	
Burundi	-	243,000	243,000
Rwanda	6,000	-	6,000
Tanzania	78,000	589,000	667,000
Uganda	-	4,000	4,000
Zaire	Bukavu	-	347,000
	Uvira	132,000	59,000
	Goma	-	743,000
Total	216,000	1,985,000	2,201,000

Source: UNHCR, *Special Unit for Rwanda and Burundi, March 1995*.

The former leadership of Rwanda, including that of the army, *de facto* if not *de jure*, has taken over control of the external refugee camps and refuses to let the refugees return home, knowing that keeping them in the camps gives leverage over the international community and, thus, over the

* This figure is very difficult to verify and has varied substantially over time. Most sources however, seem to agree that at its peak in early 1993 and again in August–September 1994, the number of IDPs was some one million. Out of those, almost 500,000 stayed in IDP camps in the second half of 1994 (Prunier, 1995). See further Study III and Study IV.

Rwandese government. They use propaganda and spread stories of revenge by the RPF, as well as threats and violence against anyone who shows interest in returning home (Human Rights Watch/Africa, 1994:3). Within the camps, they have re-established the political structures that existed in Rwanda before the massacres: i.e. cells, sectors, *communes* and *préfectures*. They have even reportedly established a system of taxing refugees who work outside the camps. Representatives of international organizations, including NGOs, have been challenging the system, but with little success.

Further, reports and observations have it that the camps are used to build up a new force to strike against the government in Rwanda. Troops of the former Rwandese army have been seen exercising at a number of points close to the camps in Zaire. These troops seem to be well armed. Incursions into Rwanda have already been reported and verified (Human Rights Watch/Africa, 1994:3; Human Rights Watch/Arms Project, 1995).

At the end of December 1994, the former President, Théodore Sindikubwabo, and Prime Minister Jean Kambanda proclaimed a new government in exile in Zaire. At the same time they called for renewed war and preparedness for attack. However, some recent reports point to a loss of power of the self-proclaimed leaders and a deterioration of the morale of the soldiers and the militia. Other reports tell of new training camps for soldiers being established in countries other than Zaire (Amnesty International, 1995).

According to Human Rights Watch Arms Project's report of May 1995, the situation, however, still seems to be very serious:

Ensnared in refugee camps, primarily in eastern Zaire, the perpetrators of the Rwandese genocide have regrouped, rebuilt their military infrastructure, and succeeded in asserting their control over the civilian population in most of the camps during the last year. Acting with impunity, these forces rule over the refugee population through intimidation and terror, effectively preventing the return of refugees to their homes in Rwanda, while inducting fresh recruits into the former Rwandan Armed Forces (FAR) and militias. Emboldened by military assistance, including arms, from France and Zaire, among other countries, they have openly declared their intent to return to Rwanda and, in the words of one ex-FAR commander, Col. Musonera, "kill all Tutsi who prevent us from returning." Currently, the ex-FAR has an estimated troop strength of 50,000 men in over a dozen camps, and has brought the militias more tightly under its control. These forces have launched cross-border raids to destabilize the already precarious situation in Rwanda and to obtain information and experience for a future offensive against the current government in Kigali. In addition, the ex-FAR and Rwandan Hutu militias have aligned themselves with Hutu militias from neighbouring Burundi, inflaming an already tense situation inside Burundi and threatening to regionalize the conflict (Human Rights Watch/Arms Project, 1995).*

The situation has also created problems in Zaire. Conflicts between the refugees and the local community have become more and more common and violent. In the second half of 1995, Zaire increased its pressure on the international community to assist in solving the refugee problem. In August 1995 there were mass deportations of refugees and threats to expel all refugees. However, towards the end of the year it seemed that an agreement was close between Rwanda, Zaire and UNHCR on preparing for an orderly return of refugees from Zaire.

Rwanda after the war

As of 18 July 1994, the new government of the RPF had taken over the leadership of Rwanda. As described above, the country they took over was a country in shock and complete economic

* The French government denies any such involvement.

and social disruption. The economy had collapsed, almost all institutions of local and central government had been destroyed and the social fabric was torn apart. Among the casualties of the conflict were thousands of educated and skilled people. Hence, the country lacked most of the expertise needed for the running of an administration and a government. Taxes could not be collected and the government lacked funds for the most basic services.

The situation was aggravated by the large number of persons who had fled the country as refugees (some two million) or were internally displaced (one million, of which 500,000 in camps) and by the return of the former (Tutsi) refugees (some 500,000) to Rwanda after tens of years outside the country (Prunier, 1995).

The internal situation has improved, particularly with regard to the private sector. However, calls for revenge and the unresolved question of property rights are factors that from time to time cause setbacks to the slow progress achieved.

In order to avoid militia activity in the displaced persons' camps inside Rwanda, the government decided at an early stage to close these, by force if necessary (Human Rights Watch/Africa, 1994:3). Efforts to persuade the displaced to return home voluntarily met with some success in September and October 1994 and even more so in January and February 1995, but came to a complete halt thereafter. In total, some 250,000 internally displaced persons (IDPs) had returned home by the end of March 1995, leaving around 250,000 still in the camps. Reports of arrests and in some cases even of torture of homecoming IDPs caused the government, after pressure from the international community, led by the UN coordinating body UNREO, to postpone further actions in the camps. While the government's intention was to repatriate the IDPs by force, the international community prepared new plans for a gradual and safe settlement. The situation, however, exploded in mid-April 1995, when government troops finally closed down the remaining camps, leading to a massacre in Kibeho camp.

The new government quickly recognized the primacy of the rights of current property owners. But the return of some 500,000 refugees, most of them having lived outside Rwanda since the Tutsi outflows of the 1960s, has made government policy virtually impractical. The new arrivals have occupied land and houses all over the country. Hutu are the major victims of this development. A commission has been created to resolve property disputes. However, this problem is, and will remain, a major problem and obstacle to a peaceful reintegration of Tutsi and Hutu in the future (Human Rights Watch/Africa, 1994:3).

The situation within the government sector is still difficult. Government institutions lack most things required to run a government and a country. Available funds are used to pay salaries, but are far from sufficient. This leads to new problems, which can be summarized as follows:

Because the RPA soldiers receive no government salary, they are susceptible to (bribes) [...] and increasingly participate as well in small-scale extortion and banditry to fill their pockets (Human Rights Watch/Africa, 1994:3).

As the system of tax-collection is only partly repaired, government relies heavily on foreign funding. The international community, however, so far has not, with some exceptions, delivered any substantial aid to fund the new Rwandese government. At the same time, donor organizations in Kigali have all the equipment necessary for implementing their programmes, while the government has very little. This contrast has further exacerbated relations between the government and the donors. Lacking the means to establish a functioning civilian administration and a judicial system, the government cannot respond to the wishes and requirements of either the international community or its own population.

Lack of resources, and, some would argue, lack of political will (Reyntjens, 1995, Human Rights Watch, April 1995), has also had the consequence that the government has not been able to begin prosecuting persons accused of participation in the massacres. The original intention was an orderly prosecution of all accused of killing. With no resources available, and most legal personnel either killed, in exile or themselves implicated, implementation has been stalled. In the meantime, thousands have been arrested and are awaiting trial, lodged in inhuman conditions in prisons and other sites (Human Rights Watch/Africa, 1994:3). Amnesty International emphasizes the large number of "secret detentions", with risks of torture, execution and "disappearance". These are not included in the estimated figure of 58,000 detainees as of October 1995 (Amnesty International, 1995).

With the judicial system in disarray, reprisal killings and disappearances continued. Reports on new abuses of human rights, such as arbitrary arrests, torture and acts of revenge, are made every day. The situation in the overcrowded prisons is appalling. The government has therefore appealed for assistance in the form of judges and prosecutors from other countries to begin the work of investigating and prosecuting the persons charged. The government has been cooperating with the UN human rights operation, but progress has been very slow. With donor funding, new prisons have been built, slightly improving the plight of the detainees. In October 1995 a Supreme Court was also established by an act of parliament.

To catch the leaders who are abroad, either in camps in neighbouring countries or in Europe, an international war-crimes tribunal on Rwanda was created in November 1994. It will be convened in Arusha under the leadership of the well-known South African judge, Richard Goldstone. The tribunal, which has the same prosecutor (Goldstone) and the same appeal judges as the International Criminal Tribunal for former Yugoslavia, is not expected to try more than 20 suspects per year. The vast majority of cases will have to be investigated and prosecuted by the Rwandese judiciary (Amnesty International, 1995). Its first indictment, was signed only on 23 November 1995.

The internal political situation

As stated above, the RPF took over the command of Rwanda in July 1994. To show its preparedness for compromise, the RPF included in the new government Hutu moderates who had survived the massacres. Thus, Faustin Twagiramungu became, as had been agreed in the Arusha negotiations, Prime Minister. Other prominent Hutu politicians in the government were the Minister of the Interior, the Minister of Foreign Affairs and the Minister of Justice.

However, the difficulties encountered in finding funds for running the government and the administration, increasing incursions directed from refugee camps outside the country, the problems of finding proper settlements for returning refugees, particularly the increasing discontent of surviving Tutsi, especially those emigrating from Burundi, is straining the government's ability to hold together and to implement the professed reconciliatory policies of the RPF. It appears that the Tutsi community is increasing its pressure on the government for a more Tutsi-"friendly" policy. On 28 August, Prime Minister Faustin Twagiramungu resigned from office. A new Prime Minister, Pierre-Célestin Rwigyema and a new government were appointed on 30 August.

The current political situation gives little hope for a peaceful long-term development of Rwanda. In a seminar held in Uppsala in early April 1995, Catherine Newbury summarized the preconditions for reconciliation, and thereby peace, under the following headings:

1. End the legacy of violence and culture of impunity;
2. Material reconstruction;
3. Broad political solutions, including orderly repatriation of refugees; and
4. Reconstitution of the social fabric.

These are daunting challenges, but necessary to address.

Annex 1

Rwanda in the Region

Most observers of present-day Rwanda firmly argue that a solution to the political problems of the country must be found in a regional context. The social and political dynamics – intensified by cross-border flows of refugees, weapons, warriors and ideas – cannot be stressed enough when considering possible solutions to Rwanda’s problems. This annex will therefore discuss Rwanda in the region, historically and at present, and with a particular emphasis on recent developments in Burundi. First follows a presentation of the *kinyarwanda*-speaking people and their close relationship and similar development. Second, recent developments in Burundi are discussed and compared with those in Rwanda. The interrelations and interactions between events and developments in the two countries, an important factor all through the 20th century, must be kept in mind. Finally, the national dialogue in Burundi is presented as an example of the efforts made to reach national reconciliation in that country over the last two years.

The Banyarwanda

The Central African Great Lakes region shares a common history, based on co-existence between agriculturalists and pastoralists prior to the major state formations. Historians discuss the development of the region under four headings: the Kitara complex (most of present Bunyoro, Toro and neighbouring portions of Nkore, Mubende and Buganda), the Kintu complex (Buganda, Busoga and Mount Elgon region), the Ruhinda complex (Kigezi district, Ankole, Bukoba district and parts of Burundi and Rwanda) and the Rwanda complex. The term “complex” has been used to emphasize both the multi-ethnic nature of the region and the confluence of cultural traditions that constitutes its history. The four complexes are interconnected and merge into a general history of the region (Ogot, 1984). Although different, they show considerable similarities. The very violent developments over a long period of time in Burundi, Rwanda, Uganda and Zaire are often interrelated and can be investigated and reconciled only in a regional context.

Rwanda had developed into a geopolitical entity possibly already by the 16th century (Ogot, 1984). However, over time the *Banyarwanda*, i.e. the people who speak the language of Rwanda, *kinyarwanda*, have been – and are still – spread over Rwanda, Uganda, Tanzania, Burundi and Zaire. The *Banyarwanda*, close relatives of the *Banyankole* and *Bakiga* in Uganda and the *Barundi* in Burundi, are thus East Africa’s largest ethnic grouping.

Outside Rwanda itself, the *Banyarwanda* in Uganda form the biggest sub-group, and are also the best documented (Watson, 1991). In 1991, they numbered slightly over 1.3 million and fell into three categories:

- One third were truly Ugandan *Banyarwanda*, whose families lived inside Uganda when the colonial boundaries were finally drawn in 1910. The settlement of the colonial borders added *Banyarwanda* population in the south-west of Uganda, the so-called Bafumbira. They were mostly Hutu agriculturalists, but intense land-pressure has since driven thousands to migrate to Kampala. Other *Banyarwanda*, mostly Tutsi, have long been living in Ankole.
- About half were descendants of migrants who came to Uganda in search of a better life between

1920 and 1959, i.e. before the so-called peasant revolt and the process to independence in Rwanda. They came as labourers, responding to the acute lack of manpower following the introduction of cash crops in Uganda. Life is reported to have been easier there than in Rwanda (and Burundi). Baganda employers paid twice the rate compared to those in Rwanda, work and food were plentiful and corporal punishment rare. Both Hutu and Tutsi migrated. Hutu, however, appear to have assimilated more easily.

- Finally, some 15% were refugees, mostly Tutsi, who had arrived mainly between 1959 and 1964. Ugandan authorities have over time ruled that the offspring of these refugees are also to be considered refugees, thus increasing the original count threefold in the early 1990s. Although supported by UNHCR, many of them were able to feed themselves and produce a surplus for sale. The settlements were solid and permanent – more like villages than refugee camps. By and large, the second generation acquired education and moved into towns or to Europe or North America. This level of education (often gained through scholarships from UNHCR) and relative “success” distinguished the refugees from the other two groups of *Banyarwanda* in Uganda. The distinction caused resentment from the local population, but also kept them aware of their heritage and was a basis for their strong urge to return to Rwanda. This was also strengthened by the fact that as refugees – and in spite of their education – they were excluded from employment in the Ugandan public service. They tried to influence the world community to let them return by peaceful means, and when this did not succeed they took to arms (Watson, 1991).

The Habyarimana regime (and its predecessor) had to pay a high price for a policy of more than 20 years of neglect of the “political” Tutsi refugees in Rwanda’s neighbouring countries. The desire of the latter to return to their country of origin was heavily underestimated. That urge was strengthened by a continuous feeling of insecurity in the host countries, not least in Uganda. The refugees never abandoned their wish to become first-class citizens again.

The massive return in a short period of time of Rwandese Tutsi from Burundi and Uganda after the take-over by RPF in July 1994 was impressive. A similar enthusiasm was displayed by a great number of Burundian Hutu – many of whom had been refugees for more than 30 years – who returned, mainly from Tanzania, to their home country after the election victory of a Hutu President in June 1993.

A similar story could be told about the *Banyarwanda* from Zaire, Burundi and Tanzania. Their situation in Zaire resembles closely that in Uganda. The *Banyarwanda* of Zaire also fall into three categories, and the last group of political refugees also ran into difficulties with the local population. Relations were at times very violent (in the 1960s and in the early 1990s) (Reyntjens, 1994; Braeckman, 1992, and Pabanel, 1993). The *Banyarwanda* of Burundi and Tanzania, however, only comprised the later category of political refugees. By and large, the refugees in all three neighbouring countries, mostly Tutsi, have now returned to Rwanda, while the original *Banyarwanda* and the older migrants are citizens of or have been integrated into these countries.

To summarize, people living in the countries surrounding Rwanda have a history similar to that of Rwanda. They comprise groups speaking the same language and who are of the same culture as those in Rwanda. Furthermore, migrants moving from one country to another is nothing new to the region. History also gives evidence of groups who have assimilated with their new surroundings, and of other groups who kept their identity and eventually returned “home”. Thus, cross-border flows of refugees and ideas have been a continuous phenomenon for as long as records show. In this respect, the present situation is far from new.

Rwanda and regional organizations

Rwanda is a member of the Organization of African Unity (OAU), the United Nations Economic Commission for Africa (ECA) and the African Development Bank (ADB). As such, Rwanda also

participates in a number of specialized agencies of these organisations, such as the Scientific, Technical and Research Commission (STRC) and the African Regional Centre for Technology (ARCT) of the OAU and the Pan-African Documentation and Information Service (PADIS), which was established by the ECA in 1980. Rwanda is also a member of the Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa (COMESA), which replaced the Preferential Trade Area for Eastern and Southern Africa (PTA) in 1993.

Closer to home, Rwanda is a member of the Economic Community of Central African States/Communauté Economique des Etats de l'Afrique Centrale (CEEAC), which was founded in 1983 and began operations in 1985. In line with the OAU Lagos Plan of Action of 1980, CEEAC aims at abolition of trade restrictions, erection of a common external tariff, integration of commercial banking and establishment of a development fund. Membership comprises Cameroon, Central African Republic, Chad, Congo, Equatorial Guinea and Gabon, along with Burundi, Rwanda, São Tomé and Príncipe, and Zaire. (Angola has observer status.)

These organizations are of a more general nature. Other cooperation efforts in the region are:

1) *The Economic Community of the Great Lakes Countries/Communauté économique des pays des Grands Lacs (CEPGL)*, which was founded in September 1976, in Gisenyi (Rwanda) by Burundi, Rwanda and Zaire. The idea behind CEPGL was to reconstruct the traditional links between the member countries that existed prior to independence.

The main objective of the CEPGL is to establish a regional common market and to ensure economic security of the member states through coordination and harmonization of economic, financial, commercial, social, cultural, political, military, scientific, technical and tourism policies. So far, a Monetary Arrangement between the central banks has been signed. The member countries have also agreed upon a Social Security Convention, including specific arrangements on the free movement of officials and businessmen and on postal organization.

CEPGL comprises five Specialized Technical Commissions, dealing with: 1) political and juridical matters; 2) social and cultural matters; 3) planning, industry, agriculture and natural resources; 4) commerce, finance, immigration and tourism; and 5) public works, transport and energy. In addition, there are three specialized agencies within the CEPGL framework: 1) the Development Bank of the Great Lakes States/Banque de développement des Etats des Grand Lacs (BDEGL), located in Goma, Zaire; 2) the Energy Organization of the Great Lakes Countries/*Organisation de la CEPGL pour l'Energie* (EGL) at Bujumbura, Burundi; and 3) the Institute of Agricultural Research/*Institut de Recherche Agronomique et Zoologique* (IRAZ) situated in Gitega, Burundi. In addition, there are four joint enterprises of the CEPGL, producing electric power, glass bottles, cement and hoes.

2) *The Organization for the Management and Development of the Kagera River Basin/Organisation pour l'aménagement et le développement du bassin de la rivière Kagera (KBO)* was established in August 1977 at Rusumo (Tanzania-Burundi) by the Presidents of Burundi, Rwanda and Tanzania. The Agreement was amended in May 1981, with the accession of Uganda.

The objective of the KBO is the integrated development of the water and land resources of the Kagera River Basin, including hydro-electricity, telecommunications and transport. Its activities include the construction of a 80.5 MW hydroelectric dam at Rusumo Falls on the Rwanda-Tanzania border; a 2,000-km railway network between the member countries; a telecommunications network to link the four member states; road construction; agricultural and irrigation projects; river transport; and a polytechnic institute.

Although efforts have thus been made to exploit the potential for regional cooperation, progress has in practice, however, been scant and leaves little room for optimism for improved economic cooperation in the near future.

Rwanda and Burundi in crisis: comparative and regional perspective

For a period of 25 years (1965–1990), Rwanda benefitted from a better reputation within the international community than Burundi. On the one hand, both countries were governed by authoritarian one-party regimes supported by specific urban, regional and ethnic groups. On the other, Rwanda was governed by a Hutu majority (about 85–90% of the population in both countries), whereas in Burundi a minority (Bahima) within the Tutsi minority (10–15% of the population) was holding power.

The Burundian minority regime attempted to legitimize itself by publicly denying the existence of ethnicity. The Rwandese authorities, conversely, tried not to endanger their position by *emphasizing* ethnicity.

Whereas in Rwanda the internal Tutsi minority was also discriminated against, its presence in the administration, army, courts and schools was more or less assured through a system of ethnic quotas (since 1973). The half million “political” Tutsi refugees (figures for 1990) who had fled Rwanda in the period 1959–1966, mainly to Uganda, Zaire and Burundi, and who were called “Africa’s oldest refugees”, were treated less favourably. They were simply denied the possibility to return home.

Burundi, as mentioned, was politically and militarily governed by a sub-group of a Tutsi ethnic minority of 2%. The Hutu majority was on several occasions (1965, 1969, 1972, 1988, 1991) the victim of true massacres (Reyntjens, 1995:1). Party and army constituted an entity in Burundi. A major part of public means was allocated to defence. The armies of both Burundi and Rwanda, however, were not trained to act against an external enemy, but rather against possible internal unrest. The success of the RPF provides a good illustration of the relative lack of preparedness of the authorities to face an external threat. In fact, Rwanda had a very small army (5,000) in October 1990, due to the fact that priorities were elsewhere and the international community encouraged Rwanda not to spend too much on defence (Reyntjens, 1994).

Economically, both countries had reached their limits towards the mid-80s. The consequences of the dramatic fall of international coffee prices (down 75% between 1986 and 1992) illustrated the extent to which Rwanda and Burundi, as small but densely-populated, mainly rural and mono-culture countries, depended on external developments. Burundi, having pursued a less stringent economic-monetary policy than Rwanda, was compelled already in the beginning of the 1980s to adhere to a structural adjustment programme. Rwanda was to follow in 1990.

Politically, developments in Burundi and Rwanda became influenced by the consequences of the fall of the Berlin wall and the end of the Cold War. International aid to both countries has since then been increasingly linked to democratization, good governance and respect for human rights.

The reputation of the Burundian army and the Jean-Baptiste Bagaza regime had resulted in an international black-listing of the country already in the period 1984–1988. Political conditionality was applied to Burundi by aid donors in August 1988. A combination of domestic and external pressures made President Pierre Buyoya decide at the end of 1988 to follow a path of reconciliation and democratization. It is to his credit that he did so before formal application of political conditionality by the donor community, and that he respected the democratic rules after his defeat in the Presidential elections of June 1993.

Four years after the violent popular repression under the Jean-Baptiste Bagaza regime, Burundi adopted a new constitution that was to lead to a government of national unity. The Melchior Ndadaye government that was constituted in June 1993 reflected this unity. The dissatisfaction within army circles and by militant Tutsi with the new political situation led, however, to the coup and the tragic events on and after 21 October, 1993. The coup, which was the most successful in a row of four (1989–1993), was the expression of the disagreement in Tutsi/Bahima army and political circles with the reconciliation policies of Pierre Buyoya and his successor, Melchior Ndadaye,

who planned the inclusion of Hutu and other Tutsi groups in the administration, schools, armed forces and the judicial system to break the Bahima power monopoly (Reyntjens, 1995:1).

The passive response demonstrated by the international community in both Burundi (October–November 1993) and Rwanda (April–May 1994) has seriously weakened the potential of any future external political conditionality. To a certain extent, through its non-intervention, the international community has rewarded extremist elements that aim to obstruct any change in the existing system by means of violence. Since Western governments have not been prepared to risk the lives of their soldiers to restore peace and security in the region, and save the lives of local people, the effect of Arusha and other internationally-imposed politico-judicial arrangements in the future is not likely to go beyond the texts.

The economic problems for the peasants (i.e. 90% of the populations) were greater in Rwanda than in Burundi. Starvation in the south of the country in 1989 indicated that food security had become a major problem. The economic crisis and increasing corruption in government circles also led to an accumulating dissatisfaction with the Habyarimana regime and its policies. The one-party system and lack of democracy were seen as the main reasons for the economic crisis.

There is no doubt that by the end of the 1980s, the Burundian one-party minority regime as well as the Rwandese MRND regime were contested. Strong donor signals led to the acceptance by Habyarimana of a structural adjustment package and to the launching of a democratization process in September 1990, i.e. before the RPF invasion. As in Burundi, a national unity charter was to be written that was to lead to the drafting of a new constitution. The invasion of October 1990 speeded up the process. Already in mid-1991 Rwanda adopted a new constitution and formally established a multi-party system.

Like other events and evolutions in the past, the democratization process was launched differently in Rwanda and Burundi. In both cases, reduction of power privileges were at stake. However, in Rwanda a majority regime was put under military pressure to change the system, whereas in Burundi a relatively unchallenged minority regime opted for reconciliation and democratization.

Developments in one of the two countries often have quick repercussions on the other country's political situation. In a number of important events discussed above, developments in Burundi have had serious implications in Rwanda. The most recent case in point is that of the Tutsi refugees who have returned from Burundi to Rwanda and who belong to the most radical and ethnically-extreme factions of the RPF due to their long contacts with the former Burundian single-party (UPRONA) regime.

The national dialogue in Burundi: a way towards conflict resolution?

A number of serious peace and reconciliation efforts have been undertaken by the OAU, different UN agencies, bilateral donor countries and NGOs in Burundi in the past two years. Many of them are commendable and have had positive effects on the fragile peace process and long-term stability of the country. Below follows *one* of these examples, which has been closely followed by the authors of this report. It illustrates an effort to forestall a major crisis, rather than react to its potential consequences.

The international conference on a national dialogue, held in Bujumbura 15–18 May, 1994, was a follow-up to a Geneva symposium on Restoration of Peace and the Process of Democracy in Burundi, which took place on 10–12 December, 1993 at the request of the Burundi government. The Nordic Africa Institute in Uppsala, Sweden, undertook the task of securing political and financial support for the proposal and agreed to hold the conference under its auspices. Financial contributions were received from the governments of Belgium, Denmark, Norway and Sweden. The special representative of the UN Secretary-General, Ambassador Ould Abdallah, undertook responsibility for local arrangements (Cervenka & Legum, 1994).

This section will discuss this effort by the Burundian people to find ways and means for national reconciliation. The initiative was taken by the Burundians themselves and was supported by groups from the two major political parties as well as by the international community. Progress has been made, but the forces of divergence and the enormous obstacles in terms of mistrust and fear are at the same time formidable, and the outcome of the dialogue thus very uncertain.

The objectives of the national dialogue were described as follows:

To provide a forum for a discussion on crucial issues facing the Burundian society – peace, security and confidence-building measures to attain protection of human rights, strengthening of democracy, reconciliation and co-existence, national unity and restoration of confidence in the institutions of the Government (Cervenka & Legum, 1994).

The main themes of the conference were:

Confidence-building measures leading to stability and strengthening of democracy, national security concerns, the restoration of confidence in the institutions of government, ways and means of promoting human rights, the protection of minorities and national unity, and the role of the international community in support of democracy in Burundi (Cervenka & Legum, 1994).

However, the discussions during the five sessions of the conference largely focused on the following hotly-debated issues in Burundi: the origins of the current crisis, the role of the army, the impunity of the perpetrators of crimes against humanity, the way out of the crisis, and the role of the international community.

The national dialogue was attended by an average of 180 people each day. On the day when the role of the army was debated, more than 200 people attended. This was the first occasion on which ministers, senior army officers, opposition leaders and academics, as well as international representatives, met together in an open forum – a fact of considerable importance in developing a dialogue. The exchanges were frank and often hard-hitting. The discussions were reported daily on television and in the press and were broadcast live. A special statement was adopted at the conclusion of the conference containing a number of resolutions, including the following:

- a. *A national dialogue was accepted as the only hope of resolving the political crisis;*
- b. *The need for developing a National Army as an institution enjoying the confidence of the whole population;*
- c. *The strengthening of an independent judiciary system, and a promise that all perpetrators of crimes against humanity would be brought to justice;*
- d. *The strengthening of democratic institutions, the encouragement of pluralism and ensuring loyalty to the Constitution (Cervenka & Legum, 1994).*

On 1 July 1994, 10 weeks after the national dialogue conference, Burundi celebrated its 32nd year of independence. Marking the occasion, interim President Sylvestre Ntibantunganya addressed a public rally at the Prince Louis Rwagasore stadium in Bujumbura, where he reiterated the importance of a meaningful national dialogue and said: “We opted for consultations, understanding, discussions and truth”. He referred to the initiators and sponsors of the national dialogue by describing them as “people whom we need because they have revived hope for Burundians so that we can find solutions to our problems”.

At the time of his speech, the national dialogue focused on the restoration of the institution of the Presidency. The three-month period of interim Presidency was due to expire on 12 July, but no agreement had been reached on the crucial issue of selecting a new President to succeed President Cyprien Ntaryamira, who was killed with the Rwandese President Habyarimana in that fateful plane crash at Kigali on 6 April 1994. President Cyprien Ntaryamira’s predecessor, Melchior Ndadaye-the

first democratically-elected President had been killed in October 1993, three months after he was sworn in, by a small group of Tutsi extremists in the army. Their aim was to create conditions to reverse the process of democratization. In military terms, the coup was a success. However, in political terms, the action by the military extremists was a failure since it did not, at least not in the short term, achieve its major objective of displacing the democratically-elected government. Significantly, the army hierarchy disassociated itself from the action of the Tutsi extremists, which was also condemned by prominent members of the Tutsi establishment.

After the wave of ethnic revenge killings in October 1993 followed a period of relative calm. New waves of violence erupted in the suburbs of Bujumbura in the middle of 1994 and were followed by many more.

There was grave concern about a spill-over effect from Rwanda. About 200,000 Rwandese refugees entered Burundi, causing security problems in regions adjacent to Rwanda.

At first, the events in Rwanda had a traumatic effect on Burundi and appeared to have contributed to the preservation of a fragile peace in the country. But not for long. Clashes between armed groups of Hutu, the army and the police resumed. The situation was aggravated by broadcasts of a Hutu pirate radio station called *Rutomorangingo* (the Radio which Speaks the Truth), which called for the arming of civilians and propagated ethnic hatred. *Rutomorangingo* is modelled on the extremist Rwandese station RTLMC (*Radio Télévision Libre des Mille Collines*).

The FRODEBU government had problems in reasserting its control. By the end of July 1994, the dialogue between the FRODEBU coalition and the opposition parties came to a halt. The opposition, counting on the support of the army and still dominating the civil service, press, banks and judiciary (only 13 out of 241 magistrates are Hutu), continued to demand even more concessions.

The process started by the national dialogue eventually led to the signing, on 10 September 1994, of a National Convention by nine opposition parties and the ruling four parties of the FRODEBU coalition, and the election of the new President, Sylvestre Ntibantunganya, 20 days later, on 30 September 1994.

According to the Convention, the opposition parties shall get 45% of the ministerial posts in the government, including the post of Prime Minister. In the same proportion, the opposition filled the posts of governors of provinces, local administrators and ambassadors of Burundi to foreign countries. The National Convention contains an agreement on the implementation of a number of recommendations made at the national dialogue conference. They include:

- a. Strict respect for human rights; in particular, an absolute respect for life;
- b. Strengthening of the judiciary and neutrality of the police and security forces;
- c. Launching of an educational campaign for the population, in particular the youth, about the values of democracy, peace and tolerance.

In order to appreciate the magnitude of the concessions yielded by FRODEBU to the opposition, it should be recalled that the opposition parties in Burundi, with the exception of the former governing party, UPRONA, are tiny groupings (less than 1% of the vote), making their way into the negotiations by the potential threats they represent, and not on the strength of any significant popular support. Furthermore, with the exception of UPRONA, which includes some Hutu, all the opposition parties are exclusively composed of Tutsi. The reason for the influence of the minority groups lies in the tacit support of the army, which uses them as proxies, and in the moderation of the FRODEBU leaders. They maintain that peace has no price and that civil war would be suicidal. However, their view has not been shared by some FRODEBU parliamentarians and Hutu extremists, who contest the compromises made.

The continuing debate between the opposition and governing parties continues to reflect the discussions that took place at the national dialogue conference in May 1994. It focuses on the balance of power between the Tutsi-dominated army and the Hutu population, and the need for a *modus vivendi* between Hutu and Tutsi in an environment of terror and fear. The problems are enormous and progress extremely slow. Still, as long as the discussions continue, there is hope.

Thus, on 20 March 1995, the establishment and installation of a technical committee vested with the important duty to prepare the forthcoming national debate took place. It was hoped that the debate itself would start in June/July 1995, despite strong opposition from extremist groups and their press. On 29 March 1995, the Prime Minister presented his plan of action before parliament and in the presence of the President of the Republic. On 3 April, when parliament opened for its spring session, the Speaker supported the plan. In mid-April, a nation-wide reconciliation campaign, with the President, the Prime Minister, ministers and parliamentarians travelling all over the country in mixed (majority and opposition) groups, was launched. This campaign has continued throughout the year. The date for the proposed major meeting is, however, still not set.

Annex 2

Arming Rwanda

The influx of weapons from foreign sources to the Rwandese government as well as to the RPF contributed significantly to the civil war during 1990–1994, as well as to the massacres in 1994. Some foreign governments and other suppliers were ready to supply arms.

The major sources for this Annex on the supply of arms to Rwanda are the Human Rights Watch/Arms Project, which issued a comprehensive report on Rwanda in January 1994 and a complementary report in May 1995, and the Human Rights Watch report of December 1994. The reports substantiate their findings with different kinds of evidence. The content of these reports has been discussed with a number of respected researchers, who themselves have found evidence supporting most of the findings therein.

Rwanda government

When the war began in 1990, Rwanda had an army of some 5,000 men (Prunier, 1995). They were equipped with light arms, including Belgian-made FAL, German-made G-3 and Kalashnikov automatic rifles manufactured by China or countries of the former Eastern Bloc. The army's weaponry included eight 81mm mortars, six 57mm anti-tank guns, French-made 83mm Blindicide rocket launchers, 12 AML-60 armoured cars and 16 M-3 armoured personnel carriers (International Institute for Strategic Studies, 1990).

During the war, the Rwandese armed forces expanded, and the arsenal of weaponry increased and became more sophisticated. France, Egypt and South Africa supplied the majority of the weapons. According to the Human Rights Watch/Arms Project, Egypt was the key arms supplier and France the major military supporter.

A major weapons deal was made in March 1992 when Egypt sold US\$6 million worth of arms to Rwanda. The deal was guaranteed by the French bank, Crédit Lyonnais. It included a wide range of light arms, infantry support weapons and ammunition.

France has played an important role in arming and supporting Rwanda. Apart from equipment such as mortars, light artillery, guns, armoured vehicles and even helicopters, France also provided spare parts, technical assistance and military training. The Arms Project has further documented rather large arms supplies coming from South Africa (light arms, machine-guns, grenade launchers and ammunition, valued at US\$5.9 million), and US\$2.3 million worth of military equipment sold by the US to Rwanda.

Belgium was traditionally Rwanda's main supplier of assistance and training. However, after the civil war started in October 1990, Belgium withdrew. France, in contrast, continued its military role, and provided weapons, munitions and advisors. France furthermore deployed troops in Rwanda.

The weapons obtained by the Rwandese government did not go only to the army. Already in 1991, a programme was started by the government to distribute a gun for every unit of 10 households. At the beginning of the war, France sent 300 soldiers to Rwanda. Part of this force was later with-

drawn, but 170 soldiers remained stationed in the country. Immediately after the RPF launched its offensive on 8 February 1993, the number of French soldiers increased to some 670. Two companies were deployed on the main roads north of the capital, and two were posted in strategic positions in Kigali, including the airport.

While the French insisted that their troops were deployed for the purpose of protecting French nationals only, the Arms Project has witnessed first hand French military activities tantamount to direct participation in the war, e.g. French soldiers manning checkpoints just north of Kigali. In addition to combat troops, France sent military advisors to provide training in, among other things, combat skills and commando operations, to Rwandese troops.

In December 1993, following deployment of the UN forces, all French troops were withdrawn.

When the war started in October 1990, the government of Zaire sent about 500 soldiers to assist the Rwandese government against the RPF. They were withdrawn after charges that they lacked discipline and had abused Rwandese civilians.

After the genocide, the pre-war Hutu leadership began reorganizing its army in the refugee camps in Zaire. Representatives of NGOs and the media have reported that troops of the former Rwandese government have been training at a number of sites, including those near the Katindo and Mugunga camps (Human Rights Watch/Africa, 1994:3) Zaire allowed most soldiers to enter the country with their arms, including some heavy weaponry. Rwandese soldiers reportedly maintain howitzers and armoured personnel carriers hidden in a warehouse in Goma that is supposedly under the control of the Zairian military. Human Rights Watch reports on a detailed inventory of arms held by the former Rwandese army: The list includes six helicopters, 50 anti-tank weapons, 40-50 SA-7 missiles, 15 Mistral AAM missiles, 46 air defence weapons, 255 mortars, six 105mm howitzers and 56 armoured personnel carriers.

According to the Human Rights Watch/Arms Project report of May 1995, arms continued to flow to the Hutu ex-government after the massacres started in April 1994 and the United Nations arms embargo of 17 May, 1994. Some weapons came directly from Zairian sources, some from outside the country into the French-controlled zone through Goma airport in Zaire. Zairian troops helped to move the arms across the borders.

As regards arms supplies in the period from June 1994, the Arms Project report lists a number of flights of weapons into Goma. The arms, according to the report, came from France, South Africa and Zaire. Thus, in an interview the honorary French consul in Goma at the time identified five shipments of arms in May/June 1994 as a fulfillment of contracts negotiated with the government of Rwanda prior to the arms embargo. He also mentioned several other shipments that arrived at Goma airport for the exiled Rwandese armed forces in May-July from sources other than the French government. Additional sources referred to by Human Rights Watch/Arms Project are interviews made with airport staff, local businessmen, Zairian officials and aircargo company crews. Reports from NGOs give the same accounts (Observatoire Permanente de la Coopération Française, 1995).

Particularly Zaire seems to have given direct support to the Hutu government in exile and its army. The report notes that a number of Hutu, including the former President's wife, Agathe Kanziga, and her brother participated in a Zairian government delegation to China to discuss the supply of arms.

The report further points to Zairian support by noting that, at a Zairian army base in Goma, an investigator in February 1995 saw heavy weapons and equipment brought from Rwanda being maintained by soldiers of the ex-Rwandese government. The observer also reports that Zairians have allowed the Hutu army to set up camps and conduct training openly at a number of sites close to the border.

Currently, the Rwandese army in exile has an estimated troop strength of 50,000 men in over a dozen camps and has brought the Hutu militias under its control. The Human Rights Watch/Arms Project reports from visits to these camps of an army that is rebuilt, where military ranks are recognized, military discipline observed, an extensive communications network has been set up, and the weaponry and logistics well built up. Finally, the army in exile has aligned itself with Hutu militia from Burundi, inflaming the already tense situation inside Burundi and threatening to regionalize the conflict.

The French government has reacted strongly to the allegations made in the May 1995 report of Human Rights Watch/Arms Project, stating that:

*this report contains incorrect information regarding the attitude of France. The French government did, in fact, very strictly respect the arms embargo regarding Rwanda which was decided by the Security Council on 17 May 1994. Nor were, of course, any arms delivered to Rwandese refugees outside their country. The French government thus categorically denies the allegations on this matter contained in the report, which are completely unfounded.**

In an effort to look further into the matter of arms to Rwanda, on 7 September 1995, the UN Security Council adopted a resolution on the establishment of an international commission of inquiry into the sale and supply of arms and related material to the former government forces in violation of the UN embargo implemented on 17 May 1994 (UNSC Resolution 1013, 1995). The commission shall within three months from its establishment submit an interim report on its findings and conclusions, including recommendations on measures to end the illegal flow of arms into the Great Lakes region.

Rwandese Patriotic Front

The most important source of arms to the RPF has been Uganda. Funds for buying arms were also received from RPF supporters in exile, especially in North America and Europe. A major source was, in addition, weapons and ammunition captured from the Rwandese army.

Many of the Rwandese refugees who stayed in Uganda for decades participated in the Ugandan National Resistance Army (NRA) under Yoweri Museveni and played an important role in its final victory. When the RPA (the RPF military wing) was created, some 3,000 Rwandese of the NRA defected, taking their uniforms and personal weapons as well as ammunition with them. RPA forces also took other weaponry, including landmines, rocket-propelled grenades, mortars and cannons. While the RPA commanders quite openly maintain that they just kept their weapons, this has never been officially accepted by Uganda. The defecting NRA troops were declared to be in violation of the law of Uganda. No one, however, has been reported arrested in spite of frequent visits by RPA commanders and soldiers to Uganda. Journalists, diplomats and international military observers reported a steady flow of light arms, ammunition and supplies from Uganda to the RPA since October 1990. RPA troops were also seen coming back to Uganda, camping in border areas for months.

The RPA claims to have captured most of its weapons from the Rwandese army. The availability of such weapons has been verified by reporters invited to RPA camps inside Rwanda. The quantity of these captured arms is, of course, difficult to assess. In addition, a considerable amount of weapons was purchased with funds from Rwandese exiles. It is also rumoured that Libya and Iraq sold weapons to the RPF, but this has not been possible to verify.

* *French denial issued to the Human Rights Watch/Arms Project, undated.*

Both the Rwandese government and the RPF have procured and used landmines ranging from World War II-vintage mines to modern, non-metallic, anti-personnel and anti-tank types. The heaviest concentration of mines is along the Uganda border.

International peacekeeping

In mid-1992, the Rwandese government and the RPF requested the Organization of African Unity (OAU) to establish a military observer group to monitor the cease-fire as well as to take steps towards ending the war. The 50-member group has operated since the autumn of 1992. In July 1993, at the request of Rwanda and Uganda, the United Nations deployed a contingent of peacekeeping personnel in southern Uganda along the Rwanda border with a mandate to monitor the flow of arms and other supplies into Rwanda.

As an integral part of the Arusha peace agreement, UN peacekeepers should assist in its implementation. UN Security Council Resolution 872 authorized the deployment of 800 soldiers, later growing to 2,500. After the massacres, UN peacekeepers were again deployed in Rwanda, with the latest extension of the mandate valid until 8 March 1996.

Appendix 1

Tables: Economic Indicators

Table 1: Rwanda: Sectoral origin of domestic product (current market prices)

	1987		1992*	
	Rwfr bn	% of total	Rwfr bn	% of total
Agriculture	65,4	38,0	84,0	40,6
Industry	37,9	22,0	46,4	22,4
of which:				
manufacturing	25,7	15,0	33,1	16,0
Services	68,7	40,0	76,5	37,0
GDP	171,9	100,0	206,9	100,0

* Estimates.

Source: World Bank, World Tables.

Table 2: Rwanda: Gross Domestic Product in billions of Rwanda francs (1980–1992)

	GDP Rwfr bn	Annual growth %	
		nom. terms	real terms
1980	108,0		
1981	122,6	13,5	2,8
1982	130,9	6,8	4,1
1983	142,1	8,6	6,2
1984	159,1	12,0	-5,0
1985	173,6	9,1	4,6
1986	168,9	-2,7	5,1
1987	171,9	1,8	-0,6
1988	177,9	3,5	0,5
1989	174,2	-2,1	-6,0
1990	176,5	1,3	-0,1
1991	193,8	9,8	-3,3
1992	207,2	6,9	-1,3
Average 81–91		5,6	0,8

Source: International Financial Statistics Yearbook.

Table 3: Agricultural production for export

	1988	1989	1990	1991	1992	1993
Coffee*:						
'000 60-kg bags	679	510	578	435	647	487
tons	40,740	30,591	34,680	26,131	38,824	29,220
Pyrethrum flowers (tons)	608	816	1,047	915	n/a	n/a
Tea (tons)	12,300	12,900	12,800	13,400	13,400	n/a

* Crop years (April–March) starting in calendar years.

Sources: Département d'agriculture; F. O. Licht.

Table 4: Food crop production ('000 tons)

	1987	1988	1989	1990	1991	1992*
Plantain	2,290	2,287	2,477	2,551	2,502	2,745
Beans	265	254	207	195	205	150
Sorghum	188	178	147	183	205	154
Maize	91	95	95	101	104	109
Sweet potatoes	895	879	704	857	1,000	1,063
Cassava	483	451	210	347	396	261

* Provisional.

Source: Département d'agriculture.

Table 5: Foreign trade (Rwfr millions)

	1988	1989	1990	1991	1992	1993*
Merchandise exports fob	8,291	7,635	9,224	11,598	8,917	6,404
of which:						
coffee	6,544	4,691	6,108	7,210	n/a	n/a
tea	1,082	1,557	2,031	2,797	n/a	n/a
tin	0	381	287	320	n/a	n/a
Merchandise imports cif	28,280	26,642	23,059	38,454	38,263	35,861
of which:						
petroleum	3,647	3,550	3,885	4,555	n/a	n/a
Trade balance	-19,989	-19,007	-13,835	-26,856	-29,346	-29,457

* January–September.

Source: IMF, International Financial Statistics.

Table 6: Main trading partners, 1992

Exports to:	Rwfr m	%	Imports from:	Rwfr m	%
Netherlands	1,982	21.7	Belgium-Luxemburg	6,549	17.0
Germany	1,833	20.1	Kenya	3,718	9.7
Belgium-Luxemburg	1,264	13.8	Germany	3,405	8.9
UK	899	9.8	Japan	3,154	8.2
Total incl others*	9,139	100.0	Total incl others*	38,437	100.0

* Totals differ from those in table above.

Source: Banque nationale du Rwanda, Bulletin.

Table 7: Gross official development assistance* (\$ millions)

	1987	1988	1989	1990	1991	1992
Bilateral, of which:	147,1	144,0	142,3	199,6	241,7	192,5
Belgium	33,5	29,1	26,7	43,4	55,8	45,7
Germany	22,0	25,0	27,2	31,8	40,1	43,6
France	33,2	23,7	19,6	37,2	43,1	30,2
Japan	8,0	10,4	17,1	14,4	9,2	16,8
Switzerland	9,4	12,9	9,1	10,2	17,1	13,8
Canada	6,0	7,6	12,7	13,8	21,2	13,6
Multilateral, of which:	103,9	115,5	99,4	105,6	133,1	171,1
EU	20,6	39,1	32,5	36,0	21,4	82,6
IDA (World Bank)	39,0	25,0	27,0	22,0	49,0	31,8
ADF (Afr. Dev. Bank)	20,7	21,0	16,7	19,4	12,0	23,5
UNDP	7,6	10,2	9,0	12,3	12,8	10,2
Total, of which:	251,1	259,5	241,7	305,2	374,8	363,6
grants	153,7	188,2	178,4	236,8	266,7	285,3

* *Disbursements. Official development assistance is defined as grants and loans with at least a 25% grant element, provided by OECD and OPEC member countries and multilateral agencies, and administered with the aim of promoting development and welfare in the recipient country.*

Source: OECD Development Assistance Committee, Geographical Distribution of Financial Flows to Developing Countries.

Table 8: External debt (\$ millions unless otherwise indicated)

	1987	1988	1989	1990	1991	1992
Total external debt	606,1	654,5	644,3	736,2	833,1	873,3
Long-term debt	559,8	609,3	598,9	687,8	768,7	804,3
Short-term debt	39,3	41,5	44,5	48,3	51,9	56,9
of which:						
interest arrears on						
long-term debt	0,3	0,7	0,9	2,8	4,5	7,6
Use of IMF credit	6,9	3,7	0,9	0,1	12,5	12,0
Public & publicly guaranteed						
long-term debt	559,8	609,3	598,9	687,8	768,7	804,3
Official creditors	548,5	601,9	593,9	684,1	766,1	802,8
Multilateral	390,6	436,3	478,2	542,2	612,6	646,5
Bilateral	157,9	165,6	115,7	142,0	153,5	156,3
Private creditors	11,3	7,4	5,0	3,7	2,6	1,5
Total debt service	23,8	22,7	29,0	21,6	25,3	24,4
Principal	14,2	11,6	16,6	10,3	13,0	11,6
Interest 9,6	11,1	12,3	11,3	12,3	12,8	
of which:						
short-term debt	2,4	2,8	4,8	5,2	5,6	6,1
Ratios (%)						
Total external debt/GNP	29,8	30,8	27,2	33,2	51,4	55,4
Debt-service ratio*	13,3	12,9	18,4	14,4	17,7	n/a
Short-term debt/total						
external debt	6,5	6,3	6,9	6,6	6,2	6,5
Concessional long-term						
loans/long-term debt	97,7	98,6	99,0	99,2	99,5	99,7

Note. Long-term debt is defined as having original maturity of more than one year.

* *Debt service as a percentage of earnings from exports of goods and services.*

Source: World Bank, World Debt Tables.

Appendix 2

Chronology

Based mainly on Dorsey 1994, Reyntjens 1994:1 and McHugh 1995.

1860: The new *mwami*, Kigeri Rwabugiri (1860–1895), expands his power in the central kingdom and in the western region. He also expands the system of clientship.

1880s: The first European explorers arrive in Rwanda.

1895: New *mwami*: Mibambwe Rutarindwa.

1896: *Mwami* Rutarindwa is assassinated and succeeded by Yuhi Musinga.

1899: Germany establishes colonial rule in Ruanda-Urundi and the territory becomes part of German East Africa. The first missionaries arrive.

1910: The frontiers of the Belgian Congo, British Uganda and German East Africa – including the territory of Ruanda-Urundi – are fixed at a conference in Brussels.

1911: A popular uprising in northern Rwanda is crushed by the German *Schutztruppe* and Tutsi chiefs, leaving continuing bitterness among northern Hutu.

1916: Belgium takes over the territory, which after the First World War is administered under a League of Nations mandate.

1931: *Mwami* Musinga is deposed by the Belgians in favour of his son, Charles Rudahigwa Mutara.

1930s: A process of “Tutsification” results in a monopoly of political and administrative power in the hands of Tutsi. Ethnic classification through the introduction of identity cards.

1957: The *Bahutu Manifesto*, a document criticizing the Tutsi monopoly, is issued by nine Hutu intellectuals.

1959: The *jacquérie* takes place – a social revolution by the Hutu population supported by Belgium. Tens of thousands of Tutsi flee into exile. The same year, *mwami* Mutara Rudahigwa dies mysteriously in Bujumbura. He is succeeded by his brother, Kigeri Ndahindurwa.

1960: Rwanda’s first local elections result in an overwhelming victory for the *Parmehutu* party. *Mwami* Kigeri Ndahindurwa chooses not to return from the independence celebrations in the Congo.

1961: The monarchy is formally abolished by a referendum. On 25 September, the first parliamentary elections in Rwanda are held. *Parmehutu* receives 78% of the vote.

1962: On 1 July, Rwanda and Burundi gain independence from Belgium. The first President of independent Rwanda is Grégoire Kayibanda from the *Parmehutu* party.

1963: Armed attacks by Tutsi exiles from Burundi, the so-called *inyenzi*, deepen ethnic tension in Rwanda. In the violence, which escalates in November–December, some 1,000 Tutsi are killed and there is a new wave of Tutsi refugees to Uganda, Tanzania, Burundi and Zaire.

1973: *Coup d'état*; Major-General Juvénal Habyarimana assumes power. He founds a new party, the National Revolutionary Movement for Development (*Mouvement Révolutionnaire National pour le Développement*, MRND). Beginning of the Second Republic.

1978: MRND becomes Rwanda's only party under a new constitution. Habyarimana is confirmed as President in 1978, 1983 and 1988, with more than 99% of the vote.

1987: A military coup takes place in Burundi. President Bagaza is overthrown and Major Pierre Buyoya takes power.

1988: In April, ethnic tensions in Burundi cause a wave of refugees into Rwanda. In connection with a conference on Rwandese refugees, held in Washington D.C., the Rwandese Patriotic Front (RPF) is founded.

1990

July: A first breakthrough in negotiations between Rwanda, Uganda and UNHCR on the repatriation of Rwandese refugees in Uganda is achieved.

5 July: President Habyarimana recognizes the necessity of a separation between the MRND party and the state.

1 September: A protest letter denouncing the one-party system is published by 33 intellectuals.

24 September: A National Commission is set up to prepare for the introduction of a multi-party system.

1 October: Uganda-based RPF invades the northern parts of Rwanda, demanding the right to settle thousands of (mainly Tutsi) refugees and political reforms, such as introduction of a multi-party system. In the war that follows, several RPF leaders are killed and the attack is repulsed.

Mid-October: Local Hutu take revenge on Tutsi in the *commune* of Kibilira (in Gisenyi). More than 300 people are killed.

24 October: A cease-fire concluded in Mwanza, Tanzania, a week earlier is violated.

27 October: The heads of state of Uganda, Rwanda, Burundi and Zaire agree to form a military peace-monitoring force as a first step to end the civil war in Rwanda.

End of October: There is a stalemate in the war. RPF abandons conventional fighting and reverts to guerilla warfare.

October–November: Thousands of RPF “collaborators” are arrested. Most of them are released in March/April 1991.

13 November: President Habyarimana announces the introduction of multi-partyism and the abolition of the ethnic identity cards. The ID cards were, however, never abolished.

20 November: A cease-fire is concluded in Goma, Zaire. An agreement on an OAU observer force is signed.

1991

January–February: Trials of arrested RPF “collaborators” start. Several prisoners are sentenced to death, but no executions are carried out.

23 January: RPF raid in Ruhengeri. Prisoners are liberated, some of whom join the RPF.

29 March: A cease-fire between RPF and the Rwandese government is reached. An agreement on the integration of RPF in a transitional government is signed.

28 April: MRND holds an extraordinary congress, where multi-partyism is accepted and the name and status of the party are changed. New name: *Mouvement Républicain pour le Développement et la Démocratie* (still abbreviated MRND).

10 June: A new constitution is introduced.

18 June: A law on multi-partyism is promulgated.

31 July: The domestic opposition denounces plans to hold elections, insisting that ample time must be allowed for preparations.

16 September: OAU summit in Gbadolite, Zaire. The earlier cease-fire agreement is amended.

Early November: Widespread ethnic violence.

17 November: A Committee of Consultation organizes political demonstrations in Kigali against the government and the one-party system. Some 10,000 people participate.

Early December: The Rwandese Catholic church takes a political stance, calling for serious talks with RPF and formation of an independent transitional government.

30 December: Formation of the Nsanzimana government with one minister from *Partie Démocrate Chrétien* (PDC) and the rest from MRND.

1992

8 January: Demonstrations in Kigali against the government and the one-party system with some 30,000 participants.

Beginning of March: Ethnic violence in Bugesera. At least 300 killed.

13 March: New negotiations between the government and main opposition parties.

March: CDR (*Coalition pour la Défense de la République*) and MRND militias are built up by extremist Hutu supporters.

16 April: Inclusion of all major opposition parties in the government (MDR, PSD, PL, PDC).
Prime Minister: Nsengiyaremye.

May: A major RPF attack on Byumba results in a wave of Hutu peasants from the north moving southward (some 350,000 people).

2 June: Government army forces begin looting in several towns in anticipation of losing their jobs if the government signs a peace pact with RPF.

9 June: After talks in Brussels and Paris between RPF and all government parties except MRND, an agreement to hold a peace conference to end the two years of civil war is reached.

10 August: Formal opening of the peace conference in Arusha, Tanzania.

10–18 August: Negotiations on the Arusha protocol on the rule of law.

7–18 September and 5–30 October: The second Arusha protocol on transitional institutions is discussed.

November: Political violence by extremist Hutu *interahamwe* militia escalates.

End of November: A demonstration, in favour of the peace-talks and against Habyarimana's veto to the protocol on transitional institutions, takes place despite the government's attempts to stop it.

24 November–9 January 1993: A protocol on power-sharing and a transitional parliament is discussed in Arusha, but President Habyarimana refuses to sign it.

1993

21–26 January: Ethnic violence in the north-west. Some 300 people are killed.

8 February: RPF occupation of an important zone in the préfectures of Ruhengeri and Byumba. As a consequence, almost 1 million people are displaced. The French reinforce their troops in Rwanda by 300 men.

25 February–2 March: Peace negotiations between RPF and the opposition parties within the government on the withdrawal of all French troops and their replacement by UN or OAU troops.

7 March: A new cease-fire agreement is signed in Dar-es-Salaam, Tanzania.

Mid-March: The 300 extra French troops are withdrawn.

15 March: Peace talks are taken up again in Arusha (and continue until 24 June).

April: The International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) warns that the 900,000 displaced people in Rwanda face a major humanitarian catastrophe. ICRC says that famine is imminent.

1 June: Presidential elections in Burundi. New President: Melchior Ndadaye (Hutu).

9 June: Agreement concerning refugees and internally displaced people. An estimated 500,000 displaced people are reported to return home.

24 June: Arusha protocol on inclusion of RPF in the army and the *gendarmérie*, and specifications on the transitional institutions.

8 July: The Hutu extremist *Radio Télévision Libre des Mille Collines* (RTLM) starts broadcasting.

16 July: The Prime Minister's transitional mandate expires.

17 July: A new government is formed with Agathe Uwilingiyimana as Prime Minister. This results in a division within MDR.

23–24 July: Extraordinary congress of MDR. Its president, Faustin Twagiramungu, is excluded from the party.

25 July: A more detailed agreement (on military matters) is signed in Kinyihira. It is also agreed that Twagiramungu will be Prime Minister when the new transitional government is established.

4 August: Rwanda's government and RPF sign an accord in Arusha to end the civil war, allowing for power-sharing and the return of refugees.

5 October: The UN Security Council approves a 2,500-strong peacekeeping force to Rwanda, the UN Assistance Mission for Rwanda (UNAMIR).

17–18 October: 37 MRND supporters are killed in the Ruhengeri area.

21 October: A military coup takes place in Burundi, in which Hutu President Ndadaye is killed. The ethnic violence that follows results in tens of thousands of dead and some 600,000 Burundis fleeing into neighbouring countries. Escalated political and ethnic violence in Rwanda.

1 November: The UN starts placing UNAMIR forces in Rwanda.

30 November: At least 20 people are killed when RPF forces break the cease-fire and attack government troops in north-western Rwanda.

28 December: 600 RPF soldiers arrive in Kigali in accordance with the Arusha agreement.

1994

30 December 1993–5 April 1994: Transitional government fails to take off, with each side blaming the other for blocking its formation.

6 April: President Habyarimana of Rwanda, President Ntaryamira of Burundi and a number of government officials are killed in a plane crash in Kigali. President Habyarimana's death sparks violence and widespread massacres in Kigali, which spread throughout the country. The violence soon escalates, mainly targeting Hutu moderates and the Tutsi population.

7 April: Prime Minister Agathe Uwilingiyimana is killed by government forces. Ten Belgian UN peacekeeping soldiers, who were guarding her, are disarmed by the Presidential Guard and killed. As a result, Belgium withdraws its forces. The 600 RPF soldiers in Kigali leave their headquarters.

8 April: RPF forces in northern Rwanda launch an offensive. Former Speaker of parliament Theodore Sindikubwabo announces the formation of an interim government and declares himself interim President. Prime Minister: Jean Kambanda (MDR).

11 April: Relief officials estimate that as many as 20,000 people have been killed in Kigali alone in five days of violence. With foreign journalists out of Rwanda, news from the country is restricted.

12 April: The interim government moves from Kigali to Gitarama as RPF threatens the capital.

21 April: The UN Security Council resolution No. 912 reduces the UNAMIR peacekeeping force in Rwanda from 2,500 to 270 men with an unchanged mandate.

End of April: An estimated 250,000 people stream across the Rwandese border to seek refuge in Tanzania, reportedly the largest mass exodus of people ever witnessed by UNHCR.

30 April: UN Security Council affirms the need to protect refugees and help restore order, but does not mention peacekeepers. At least 100,000 people have been killed and more than 1.3 million have fled their homes.

17 May: The UN Security Council passes a new resolution (No. 918), approving the deployment of 5,500 UNAMIR troops to Rwanda.

22 May: RPF forces gain control of the airport in Kigali and the Kanombe barracks, and extend their control over the northern and eastern parts of Rwanda.

17 June: France announces its plan to the UN Security Council to deploy 2,500 troops to Rwanda as an interim peacekeeping force until the UNAMIR troops arrive.

22 June: The UN Security Council narrowly approves a resolution (No.929) to dispatch 2,500 French troops to Rwanda (*Opération Turquoise*) for a two-month operation under a UN peace-keeping mandate.

28 June: The UN Human Rights Commission's special envoy releases a report stating that the massacres were pre-planned and formed part of a systematic campaign of genocide.

4 July: RPF wins control of Kigali and the southern town of Butare. Its leadership states that it intends to establish a government based on the framework of the Arusha accords. French troops in south-western Rwanda receive orders to halt the RPF advance.

5 July: The French-led operation has established a "safe zone" defined roughly by the *préfectures* of Gikongoro, Cyangugu, and Kibuye. As RPF advances towards the west, the influx of displaced persons into the zone increases from an initial 500,000 to an estimated 1 million within a few days.

13–14 July: As a result of RPF's advance in the north-west, an estimated 1 million people begin to flee towards Zaire. Approximately 10,000–12,000 refugees per hour cross the border and enter the town of Goma. The massive influx creates a severe humanitarian crisis, as there is an acute lack of shelter, food, water, and non-food relief items.

15 July: Members of the Hutu government escape to the French "safe zone". UN Security Council orders cease-fire.

18 July: RPF announces that the war is over, declares a cease-fire and names Pastor Bizimungu as President with Faustin Twagiramungu as Prime Minister.

19 July: The new President and Prime Minister are sworn in, and RPF commander Major-General Paul Kagame is appointed Defence Minister and Vice-President.

End of July: The UN Security Council reaches a final agreement on sending an international force to Rwanda.

24 August: End of *Opération Turquoise*. UNAMIR forces take over from the French.

October: The UN estimates that there are now about 5 million people in Rwanda, compared to 7.9 million before the war.

8 November: UN Security Council adopts a resolution (No. 955) on the establishment of an international court for war criminals of Rwanda.

24 December: An exile government is announced among Hutu refugees in Zaire.

1995

22 April: Soldiers of the RPF army carry out a massacre at the Kibeho camp for internally displaced persons in Rwanda.

April: Refugees are forced to return to their home districts from the camps for internally displaced persons.

23–26 August: Zaire expels refugees from the Goma camps and threatens to expel all refugees. UNHCR takes up a discussion with Zaire.

28 August: Prime Minister Faustin Twagiramungu resigns.

31 August: New Prime Minister, Pierre-Céléstin Rwigyema, and ministers approved in a cabinet reshuffle.

7 September: The UN Security Council adopts a resolution on the establishment of an international commission of inquiry on the sale and supply of arms and related material to the former Rwanda government forces in violation of the UN embargo implemented on 17 May 1994 (Resolution 1013 1995).

13 September: Zaire closes its border with Rwanda following bomb explosions in Goma.

17 October: A Supreme Court is established by an act of parliament.

2–6 November: An international conference on genocide, impunity and accountability is held in Kigali.

7 November: Clash between the army and Hutu rebels on Lake Kivu Island. Many people are reported killed.

23 November: The prosecutor of the International Court for War Criminals of Rwanda, Judge Goldstone, signs his first indictment.

28–29 November: A summit meeting of leaders of the Great Lakes Region takes place in Cairo, Egypt.

14 December: The UN Security Council extends UNAMIR's mandate in Rwanda for an additional three months to 8 March 1996 (Resolution 1019). The Force will be reduced from 2,100 men to 1,400 and concentrate its activities on the return of refugees.

Appendix 3

Annotated Bibliography

Pre-colonial period

In any study of the pre-colonial period, in particular with a focus on ethnicity and patron-client relationships, two schools of thought can be identified. One looks at the issues from a primordialistic point of view, while the other approaches them from a situational perspective.

A sample of the primordialistic writers and cicerones would include Pagès (1933), de Lacger (1939), Maquet (1954) and Kagame (1943, 1947, 1952, 1954, 1957, 1972, 1975). To Vansina (1962), these authors produced “*une déformation systématique*”, i.e. a systematic deformation, of Rwanda’s history. Common to them is their static description of society, where social changes occur after each other and not because of each other. They reflect the ideas and values of the then predominant intellectual currents related to ethnicity studies, viz. the creeds of climatic and genetic determinism. As d’Hertefelt (1971) noted in reference to these ethno-historical sources and related studies, they are based on interpretations of reinterpretations, as in Rennie (1972). *The pre-colonial Kingdom of Rwanda: A reinterpretation.*

The prevailing interpretation of Rwandese political organization resulted from attempts by social scientists to explain how integration into the society was possible despite the political domination of a minority ethnic group. They assumed that ethnic and class stratification between Tutsi and Hutu, as prevailing at that time, were eternal unchanging features of “traditional” Rwanda. The work of Jacques J. Maquet has perhaps been the most influential in this regard. Many subsequent studies accepted the general lines of his view of pre-colonial Rwanda.

Writers who adhere to the situationalistic school are Vansina (1962), d’Hertefelt (1962, 1971), C. Newbury (1974, 1988, 1991), Vidal (1967, 1969, 1973, 1985) and Lema (1993). They give particular attention to regional differences in space and time. They also represent the “post-World War II” view of ethnicity as situational. To them, the Rwandese society was not, and is not, homogeneous, though an ideal picture with some characteristic traits of the whole country can be given. They claim that one should make a distinction between a vertical order concerned with “caste” differences in the centre and a horizontal order dealing with regional-cultural variations in the peripheries, particularly in the north-western regions. We have also drawn considerably on D. Newbury (1979, 1980:1 1980:2, 1987).

Colonial period/independence

Most historians describing the pre-colonial period continue their studies into the colonial period. We have found the two books by Filip Reyntjens extremely valuable: *Pouvoir et Droit au Rwanda* (1985) and *L’Afrique des Grands Lacs en Crise: Rwanda, Burundi 1988–1994* (1994). The first describes the colonial period and the second the period after independence. For a slightly different view we refer to Chrétien’s articles “La crise politique rwandaise” (1992) and “Violence et ethnicité au Rwanda et au Burundi: Peurs et stratégies” (1994). In her book *The Cohesion of Oppression. Clientship and Ethnicity in Rwanda, 1860–1960* (1988), C. Newbury gives a very good picture of the colonial period seen from south-west Rwanda.

1990–1994

Reyntjens (1994:1) provides a description and a multi-disciplinary analysis of the crisis that has been striking Rwanda (and Burundi), mainly since the end of the 1980s. Further useful insights into the crisis are provided by Chrétien (1992:2) and Prunier (1995). Other authors concentrate more on specific factors behind the conflict.

Bézy (1990) and Marysse & de Herdt (1993) describe the increasing (internal and external) economic vulnerability of the country. Along with C. Newbury (1991), these authors investigate the link between economic and political power positions. Maton (1994) tries to establish whether the violence was caused by the population's increasing economic distress.

The issue of refugees, one of the immediate reasons for the October 1990 invasion by the RPF, is described in full details by Watson (1991) and Guichaoua (1992:1, 1992:2). Prunier (1992, 1993) provides further information on the RPF and its links with the Uganda government.

Not less than six consecutive reports from human rights watchers (1992–1994) describe the hostile climate in Rwanda after the RPF invasion, parallel to the peace-making negotiations in Arusha. The outcome of the negotiations can be found in several *communiqués* and *protocoles*.

April 1994 and after

A large number of books on the massacres seen from a journalistic angle have already been published, such as Braeckman (1994), Brauman (1994), Destexhe (1994) and Verschave (1994). More comprehensive books were recently published by Prunier (1995): *The Rwandese Crisis (1959 – 1994)* and by Guichaoua (1995): *Les crises politiques au Burundi et au Rwanda (1993–1994)*. The most thorough account so far on the massacres and their aftermath is the report by African Rights from September 1994. Other documents are by Human Rights Watch/Africa (September 1994, December 1994 and April 1995) and Human Rights Watch/Arms Project (January 1994 and May 1995).

Bibliography

Abdulai, N., Ed. (1994). *Genocide in Rwanda. Background and Current Situation*. London, Africa Research and Information Centre.

Adekanye, J. B. (1995:1). "Structural Adjustment, Democratization and Rising Ethnic Tensions in Africa." *Development and Change* 26 (no 2): 355–374.

Adekanye, J. B. (1995:2). *Rwanda/Burundi: "Uni-ethnic" dominance and the cycle of armed ethnic formations*. Oslo, International Peace Research Institute (PRIO).

African Rights (1994). *Rwanda: Death, despair and defiance*. London.

African Rights (1995). *Rwanda. "A Waste of Hope". The United Nations Human Rights Field Operation*. London.

Africa Watch (1992). *Rwanda. Talking peace and waging war. Human rights since the October 1990 invasion*.

Africa Watch (1993). *Beyond the rhetoric. Continuing human rights abuses in Rwanda*.

Afrique Contemporaine (1995).

Amnesty International (1992). *Rwanda: Persecution of Tutsi minority and repression of government critics, 1990-1992*. London.

Amnesty International (1994). *Rwanda: Reports of killings and abductions by the Rwandese Patriotic Army, April-August 1994*.

- Amnesty International (1995). *Rwanda: Crying out for justice*. London.
- Balandier, G. (1978). *Anthropologie politique*. Paris, PUF (3 ed.).
- Barongo, Y. R. (1994). *Uganda and the Problem of Refugees*. Kampala, Ford Foundation/Makerere Institute of Social Research Refugees Studies Project.
- Bauman/Westerman (1948). *Les peuples et les civilisations de l'Afrique*. Paris, Payot.
- Bézy, F. (1990). *Rwanda: Bilan socio-économique d'un régime. 1962–1989*. Louvain, Institut d'étude des pays en développement, Université de Louvain-la-Neuve.
- Braeckman, C. (1992). "Le Zaïre et ses régions." A. Guichaoua, (ed.): *Enjeux nationaux et dynamiques régionales dans l'Afrique des Grands Lacs*: 33–41.
- Braeckman, C. (1994:1). *Rwanda. Histoire d'un génocide*., Editions Fayard.
- Braeckman, C. (1994:2). *Qui a armé le Rwanda? Chronique d'une tragédie annoncée*. Brussels, Human Rights Watch.
- Brauman, R. (1994). *Devant le mal. Rwanda: un génocide en direct*. Paris, Arléa.
- Cervenka, Z., and C. Legum (1994). *Can national dialogue break the power of terror in Burundi?* Uppsala, the Nordic Africa Institute.
- Chrétien, J.-P., and G. Prunier, Eds. (1989). *Les ethnies ont une histoire*. Paris.
- Chrétien, J.-P. (1991). "Le 'désenclavement' de la région des Grands lacs dans les projets économiques allemands au début du 20ème siècle." *Histoire sociale de l'Afrique de l'Est (XIXe–XXe siècle)*: 335–362.
- Chrétien, J.-P. (1992:1). "La crise politique rwandaise." *Genève-Afrique* vol. 30 (nr 2): 121–140.
- Chrétien, J.-P., B.A. Ogot and J.B. Webster (1992:2). The great lakes region. *General History of Africa. Africa from the 16th to the 18th century*. V: 802–827.
- Chrétien, J.-P. (1992:3). "Le défi de l'intégrisme ethnique dans l'historiographie africaniste. Le cas du Rwanda et du Burundi." *Politique Africaine* (June 1992): 71–83.
- Chrétien, J.-P. (1993). "Pluralisme démocratique, ethnismes et stratégies politiques." *Conac (ed.): L'Afrique en transition vers le pluralisme politique*: 139–147.
- Chrétien, J.-P. (1994). "Violence et ethnicité au Rwanda et au Burundi: Peurs et stratégies." *Croyence et foi* (no 72).
- Chrétien, J.-P. (1995). "Rwanda 1994: Mémoire ou négation d'un génocide?" *ESPRIT* (mars-avril 1995): 99–111.
- Classe, L. (1930). "Pour moderniser le Ruanda." *L'Essor colonial et maritime* (489, 4/12/1930).
- d'Hertefeldt, M. (1962). Les royaumes de la zone interlacustrine. d'Hertefeldt, Trouborst and Scherer (eds.) *Les anciens royaumes de la zone interlacustrine méridionale: Rwanda-Burundi*. Buha.
- d'Hertefeldt, M. (1971). *Les clans du Rwanda ancien: Eléments d'éthnosociologie et d'éthnohistoire*. Tervuren, Musée Royale de l'Afrique Centrale (MRAC).
- Davidson, B. (1994). "On Rwanda." *London Review of Books* (18 August 1994).
- "Décolonisation et indépendance du Rwanda et du Burundi." *Chronique de politique étrangère* XIV (4–6) (1963).
- de Gaay Fortman, B. (1994). *Sitting back in horror: Intra-state conflict in a global context*. The Hague.
- de Heusch, L. (1966). *Le Rwanda et la civilisation interlacustre*. Brussels, Université Libre de Bruxelles, Institut de Sociologie.
- de Lacger, L. (1939). *Le Rwanda*. Namur, Kabgayi, Editions Grands-Lacs.
- de Lacger, L. (1961). *Rwanda*. Kabgayi (2 ed.).

- de Waal, A. (1994). "The genocidal state. Hutu extremism and the origins of the 'final solution' in Rwanda." *Anthropology* (July 1994).
- Delmas, L. (1950). *Généalogies de la noblesse du Ruanda*. Kabgayi, Vicariat Apostolique du Ruanda.
- Des Forges, A. (1972). *Defeat is the only bad news: Rwanda under Musinga, 1896–1931.*, Yale University.
- Destexhe, A. (1994). *Rwanda: Essai sur le génocide*. Brussels, Editions complexe.
- Destexhe, A. (1995). *Rwanda and genocide in the twentieth century*. London/East Haven, Connecticut, Pluto Press.
- Donini, A., and N. Niland (1994). *Rwanda: Lessons learned: A report on the coordination of humanitarian activities.*, United Nations, Department of Humanitarian Affairs.
- Dorsey, L. (1994). *Historical Dictionary of Rwanda*. London, The Scarecrow Press.
- Dupont, P. (1994). *Conflicten in Sub-Sahara-Afrika. Een Zoektocht naar verklaringen*. Brussels, Federale Diensten voor Wetenschappelijke, Technische en Culturele Aangelegenheden.
- Fegley, R., Ed. (1993). *Rwanda*. World Bibliographical Series. Oxford, Clio Press Ltd.
- Fédération Internationale Des Droits De l'Homme (1993). *Rapport de la commission internationale d'enquête sur les violations des droits de l'homme au Rwanda depuis le 1er octobre 1990*. Paris/New York/Washington/London/Ouagadougou/Montreal.
- Gahama, J. (1983). *Le Burundi sous administration belge*. Paris, CRA-Karthala-ACCT.
- Guichaoua, A. (1992:1). *Le problème des réfugiés rwandais et des populations banyarwanda dans la région des grands lacs africains*. Geneva, UNHCR.
- Guichaoua, A., Ed. (1992:2). *Enjeux nationaux et dynamiques régionales dans l'Afrique des grands lacs*. Lille.
- Guichaoua, A. (1995). *Les crises politiques au Burundi et au Rwanda (1993–1994)*. Lille/Paris, Université des Sciences et Technologies de Lille/Karthala.
- Hanssens, A. (1989). *Le désenchantement de la coopération*. Paris, L'Harmattan.
- Harroy, J.-P. (1984). *Rwanda. De la féodalité à la démocratie*. Brussels/Paris, Hayez/Académie des sciences d'Outre-Mer.
- Human Rights Watch/Africa (1994:1). *Genocide in Rwanda. April-May 1994*. New York.
- Human Rights Watch/Africa (1994:2). *The aftermath of genocide in Rwanda: Absence of prosecution, continued killings*. New York.
- Human Rights Watch/Africa (1994:3). *Rwanda: A new catastrophe? Increased international efforts required to punish genocide and prevent further bloodshed*. New York.
- Human Rights Watch/Africa (1995). *Rwanda: The crisis continues*. New York.
- Human Rights Watch/Arms Project (1994). *Arming Rwanda. The arms trade and human rights abuses in the Rwandan war*. New York.
- Human Rights Watch/Arms Project (1995). *Rwanda/Zaire. Rearming with impunity. International Support for the Perpetrators of the Rwandan Genocide*. Washinton, DC.
- International Federation of Red Cross And Red Crescent Societies (1995). *Under the Volcanoes. Special Focus on the Rwandan Refugee Crisis*.
- International Institute for Strategic Studies (1990). *The military balance 1990–91*. London.
- Institut Universitaire d'Etudes du Développement (IUED) (1995). *Pour en terminer avec la "culture de l'impunité" au Rwanda et Burundi. Position du "Groupe écoute et réconciliation dans l'Afrique des Grands Lacs"*. Genève.
- Issue: A Journal of Opinion* (1995).

- Jamoulle, M. (1927). "Notre mandat sur le Ruanda-Urundi." *Congo*: 477–496.
- Kagame (1943). *Inganji Karinga*. Kibayi, Editions Royales. vol. I
- Kagame (1947). *Inganji Karinga*. Kibayi, Editions Royales. vol. II
- Kagame (1952). *Le code des institutions politiques du Rwanda précolonial*. Brussels, IRCB.
- Kagame (1954). *Les organisations socio-familiales de l'ancien Rwanda*. Brussels, ARSC.
- Kagame, A. (1957). *Le pluralisme ethnique et culturel dans le Rwanda-Urundi. Compte rendu de la 30e session de l'Indici*. Brussels.
- Kagame, A. (1972). *Un abrégé de l'éthno-histoire du Rwanda précolonial*. Butare, Editions Universitaires du Rwanda. vol. I
- Kagame, A. (1975). *Un abrégé de l'histoire du Rwanda de 1853 à 1972*. Butare, Editions Universitaires de Rwanda. vol. II
- Kamukama, D. (1995). *Rwanda conflict. Its roots and regional implications.*, Fountain Publishers.
- Kandt, R. (1921). *Caput Nili. Eine Empfindsame Reise zu den Quellen des Nils*. Berlin, Dietrich Reimer.
- Kent, R. (1995). *The aid impasse: Lessons to be learned from Rwanda*, DHA/UNREO.
- Lema, A. (1993). *Africa divided. The creation of "ethnic groups"*. Lund, Lund University Press.
- Lemarchand, R. (1966). "Power and stratification in Rwanda. A reconsideration." *Cahiers d'Etudes Africaines* no. 24.
- Lemarchand, R. (1970). *Rwanda and Burundi*. London, Pall Mall Press.
- Lemarchand, R. (1995). *Rwanda: The rationality of genocide*.
- Linden, I. (1977). *Church and revolution in Rwanda*. Manchester, Manchester University Press.
- Linden, I. (1995). "The Churches and genocide: lessons from Rwanda." *Svensk Missionstidskrift* 83 (3/1995): 5–15.
- Logiest, G. (1988). *Mission au Rwanda. Un Blanc dans la bagarre Tutsi-Hutu*. Brussels, Didier Hattier.
- Louis, W. R. (1963). *Ruanda-Urundi. 1884–1919*. Oxford, Clarendon.
- Maquet, J. J. (1954). The kingdom of Rwanda. *D. Forde (ed.) African worlds. Studies in the cosmological ideas and social values of African peoples*. London, Oxford University Press.
- Maquet, J. J. (1961). *The premise of inequality*. Oxford, Oxford University Press.
- Marysse, S., and T. de Herdt (1993). *L'ajustement structurel en Afrique: les expériences du Mali et du Rwanda*. Antwerp, UFSIA/Centre for Development Studies.
- Marysse, S., T. de Herdt and E. Ndayambaje (1994). *Rwanda: Appauvrissement et ajustement structurel*. Brussels, CEDAF/L'Harmattan.
- Maton, J. (1994). *Développement économique et social au Rwanda entre 1980 et 1993, le dixième dicile en face de l'apocalypse*. Gent, UG/Unité d'enseignement et de recherche au développement.
- McCullum, H. (1995). *The angels have left us. The Rwanda tragedy and the churches*. Geneva, WCC Publications.
- McHugh, H. (1995). *Chronology of events in Rwanda*.
- Mouvement Révolutionnaire National pour le Développement (MRND), (1985). *Imyaka cumi ya MRND--Dix ans du MRND*. Kigali.
- Ndagijimana, F. (1990). *L'Afrique face à ses défis. Les problèmes des réfugiés rwandais*. Geneva, Arunga.

New African Yearbook 1995-96 .

- Newbury, C. (1974). "Deux lignages au Kinyaga." *Cahiers d'Etudes Africaines* 14 (1).
- Newbury, C. (1978). "Ethnicity in Rwanda: The case of Kinyaga." *International African Institute* 48 (1).
- Newbury, C. (1988). *The cohesion of oppression. Clientship and ethnicity in Rwanda 1860–1960*. New York, Columbia University Press.
- Newbury, C. (1991). Rwanda: Recent debates over governance and rural development. *G. Hyden & M. Bratton (eds.): Governance and politics in Africa: 193–219*.
- Newbury, D. (1979). *Kings and Clans: Ijwi Island (Zaire) c. 1780-1840*, University of Wisconsin-Madison.
- Newbury, D. (1980:1). "The clans of Rwanda: An historical hypothesis." *Africa* (50, 4).
- Newbury, D. (1980:2). "What role has kingship?" *Africa-Tervuren*.
- Newbury, D. (1987). 'Bunyabungu': The western Rwandan frontier, c. 1750–1850. *I. Kopytoff (ed.): The African frontier: The reproduction of traditional African societies*. Bloomington, Indiana University Press.
- Nkundabagenzi, F., Ed. (1961). *Rwanda politique 1958–1960*. Brussels, CRISP.
- Observatoire Permanente de la Coopération Française (1995). *Report*. Paris, Desclee de Brouwer.
- Ogot, B. A. (1984). The great lakes region. *General History of Africa. Africa from the 12th to the 16th century*. IV: 498–524.
- Pabanel, J.-P. (1988). "Statistiques tribales au Burundi en 1986..." *Politique Africaine* (43): 111–115.
- Pabanel, J.-P. (1991). "La question de la nationalité au Kivu." *Politique Africaine* (41): 32–40.
- Pabanel, J.-P. (1993). "Conflits locaux et stratégie de tension au Nord-Kivu." *Politique Africaine* (52): 132–134.
- Pagès, A. (1933). *Un royaume Hamite au centre de l'Afrique*. Brussels, IRCB.
- Percival, V., and T. Homer-Dixon (1995). *Environmental scarcity and violent conflict: The case of Rwanda*. Toronto, University of Toronto/American Association for the Advancement of Science.
- Pottier, J. (1995). *Representations of Ethnicity in Post-Genocide Writings on Rwanda*.
- Prunier, G. (1992). L'Ouganda et le Front patriotique rwandais. *A. Guichaoua (ed.): Enjeux nationaux et dynamiques régionales dans l'Afrique des Grands Lacs*.
- Prunier, G. (1993). "Eléments pour une histoire du Front patriotique rwandais." *Politique africaine* vol. 51.
- Prunier, G. (1995). *The Rwandese Crisis (1959–1994)*. London, Hurst.
- Rennie, J. K. (1972). "The precolonial kingdom of Rwanda: A reinterpretation." *TransAfrican Journal of History* vol. 2 (no. 2).
- Reporters Sans Frontières (1994). *Rwanda: médias de la haine ou presse démocratique. Rapport de mission 16 au 24 septembre 1994*. Paris.
- Reyntjens, F. (1985). *Pouvoir et droit au Rwanda*. Tervuren, Musée Royale de l'Afrique Centrale.
- Reyntjens, F. (1994:1). *L'Afrique des Grands Lacs en crise. Rwanda, Burundi: 1988–1994*. Paris, Editions Karthala.
- Reyntjens, F. (1994:2). "Sujets d'inquiétude au Rwanda, en Octobre 1994." *Dialogue* (no. 179): 3-14.
- Reyntjens, F. (1995). "Rwanda. Background to a genocide." *Bulletin des séances* (Académie Royale des Sciences d'Outre-Mer, Brussels) (4/95).
- Reyntjens, F. (1995:1). *Burundi: Breaking the Cycle of Violence*. London, Minority Rights Group.



- Reyntjens, F. (1995:2). "L'an un du 'nouveau Rwanda'." *Le Soir* (20–21 July 1995).
- République Rwandaise *Le Rwanda et le problème de ses réfugiés. Contexte historique, analyse et voies de solution.*
- République Rwandaise (1991). *Enquête sur les besoins d'éducation pour la vie familiale des élèves de l'enseignement secondaire.* Kigali.
- République Rwandaise (1992:1). *Communiqué conjoint publié à l'issue de la première partie de la deuxième phase des négociations politiques entre le gouvernement de la République rwandaise et le Front patriotique rwandais.* Arusha.
- République Rwandaise (1992:2). *Evolution de la Situation Economique du Rwanda 1988–1991 et Tendances 1992.* Kigali.
- République Rwandaise (1992; 1993). *Protocole d'accord entre le gouvernement de la République rwandaise et le Front patriotique rwandais sur le partage du pouvoir dans le cadre d'un gouvernement à base élargie.* Arusha.
- République Rwandaise (1993). *Accord de paix entre le gouvernement de la République rwandaise et le Front Patriotique Rwandais.* Arusha.
- République Rwandaise (1993:2). *Recensement Général de la Population et de l'Habitat au 15 Août 1991.* Kigali.
- République Rwandaise (1993:3). *Articles formulés ou modifiés à Kinihira pour compléter les protocoles d'accord et le projet d'accord de paix préparés à Arusha du 15 mars au 24 juin 1993.* Kinihira.
- République Rwandaise (1993:4). *Protocole d'accord entre le gouvernement de la République rwandaise et le Front patriotique rwandais sur le rapatriement des réfugiés rwandais et la réinstallation des personnes déplacés.* Arusha.
- République Rwandaise (1993:5). *Protocole d'accord entre le gouvernement de la République rwandaise et le Front patriotique rwandais portant sur les questions annexes aux principes faisant l'objet des négociations politiques.* Arusha.
- République Rwandaise (1993:6). *Protocole d'accord entre le gouvernement de la République rwandaise et le Front patriotique rwandais relatif à l'intégration des forces armées des deux parties.* Arusha.
- Roosens, E. (1989). *Creating ethnicity. The process of ethnogenesis.* Newbury Park, Sage Publications.
- Rossel, H. (1992). *Le Rwanda et le Burundi à la veille de leur 30e anniversaire d'indépendance.*
- Rumiya, J. (1992). *Le Rwanda sous le régime du mandat Belge 1916–1931.* Paris, Editions L'Harmattan.
- Sanders, E. R. (1969). "The Hamitic hypothesis: its origin and function in time perspective." *Journal of African History*: 521–532.
- Saucier, J.-F. (1974). *The patron-client relationship in traditional and contemporary Southern Rwanda.*, UMI Dissertation Services.
- Scheffer, H. R. (1986). *Rwanda.* The Hague, Koninklijk Instituut voor de Tropen.
- Schürer, A. (1994). *Folkmordet i Rwanda.* Göteborg, Dep. of peace and development research.
- Sommers, M. (1995). "After the war: The continuing militarization of Rwandan youth." *Program of African Studies* 5 (2).
- The Economist Intelligence Unit (1995). *Rwanda, Burundi, 1994–95.* London.
- The International Centre for Peace and Conflict Reconciliation Initiative for Africa (ICPCRIA) (1995). *The Rwanda Catastrophe: Its Actual Root-Cause and Remedies to Pre-Empt a Similar Situation in Rwanda.* Nairobi.
- UNICEF (1992:1). *Annual Report on Country Situation: Rwanda, 1992.*
- UNICEF (1992:2). *Analyse de la situation des enfants et des femmes au Rwanda. 1992.* Kigali.
- Unrepresented Nations' and Peoples' Organisation (UNPO), (1994). *Batwa Interim Report. An interim report of the UNPO mission investigating the situation of the Batwa people of Rwanda.* Kigali.
- US. Committee for Refugees (1991). *Exile from Rwanda: Background to an invasion.*

- Vanhove, J. (1941). *Essai de droit coutumier du Rwanda*. Brussels, IRCB.
- Vansina, J. (1962). *L'évolution du royaume Rwanda, dès origines à 1900*. Brussels, Académie Royale des Sciences d'Outre-Mer (ARSOM).
- Vassall-Adams, G. (1994). *Rwanda. An agenda for international action*. Oxford, Oxfam Publications.
- Verschave, F.-X. (1994). *Complicité de génocide? La politique de la France au Rwanda*. Paris, Editions la Découverte.
- Vidal (1967). "Anthropologie et histoire: le cas du Rwanda." *Cahiers Internationaux de Sociologie* (43).
- Vidal (1969). "Le Rwanda des anthropologues ou le fétichisme de la vache." *Cahiers d'Etudes Africaines* no. 35.
- Vidal, C. (1973). "Colonisation et décolonisation du Rwanda, la question Tutsi-Hutu." *RFEPA* (91).
- Vidal (1985). "Situations ethniques au Rwanda." *Amselle and M'bokolo (eds.): Au cœur de l'ethnie*.
- von Götzen, G. A. (1895). *Durch Africa von Ost nach West*. Berlin.
- Waller, D. (1993). *Rwanda: Which way now?* Oxford, Oxfam.
- Watson, C. (1991). *Exile from Rwanda: Background to an invasion*. Washington D.C., US Committee for Refugees.
- Watson, P. (1994). "Purging the evil." *Africa Report* (Nov/Dec 1994).
- Willame, J.-C. (1995). *Aux sources de l'hécatombe rwandaise*. Brussels, CEDAF/l'Harmattan.
- World Bank (1991). *Report and Recommendation of the President of the International Development Association to the Executive Directors on a Proposed Credit for SDR 67.5 Million to the Rwandese Republic for a First Structural Adjustment Program*. Washington DC.
- World Bank (1992). *Rwanda: Country Strategy Paper*. Washington DC.
- World Bank (1993). *World Development Report 1990*. Washington DC.
- World Bank (1994). *Rwanda: Poverty reduction and sustainable growth*.
- World Bank (1995). *Implementation Completion Report: Rwandese Republic: Structural Adjustment Credit*. Washington DC.
- World Bank (Sept 1993). *Rwanda—Note de stratégie économique. Vers une croissance durable*.

Appendix 4

Interviews and Meetings

As an important complement to the written sources which formed the basis of this study, a number of interviews with established experts on Rwanda have been carried out during the process of work on Study I. These interviews included talks with:

- Prof. Jean-Pierre Chrétien (*Centre de Recherche Africain*, Paris).
- Dr. José Kagabo (*Centre d'Etudes Africaines*, Paris).
- Dr. Antoine Lema (University of Lund, Sweden).
- Dr. Ian Linden (Catholic Institute for International Relations, London).
- Prof. Stefaan Marysse (University of Antwerp).
- Prof. Catharine Newbury (University of North Carolina).
- Prof. David Newbury (University of North Carolina).
- Prof. Gérard Prunier (*Centre de Recherche Africain*, Paris).
- Prof. Filip Reyntjens (University of Antwerp).

In addition, discussions with other experts have taken place, and some of them also read and commented on the drafts:

- Joël Dine (*Ministère de la Coopération*, Paris).
- Dr. John R. Eriksson (former Director USAID-CDIE).
- Prof. André Guichaoua (University of Lille).

Several workshops and seminars with focus on Rwanda took place during the period of work on Study I. Members of the study team participated in the following seminars: "Preparatory Research seminar on the Rwanda conflict and Church and Society in Central Africa", organised in Uppsala on 6–8 April 1995 by the Swedish Institute of Missionary Research, Life & Peace Institute and the Christian Council of Sweden, and "Perspectives on the future for Rwanda", which was organized by the University of Westminster and took place in London on 12 May 1995. Both these occasions were valuable opportunities to talk with experts on Rwanda, and gave new ideas to the presentation.

Apart from visits to Antwerp (February 1995), Paris (March and November 1995) and London (12 May 1995), the head of the study team also made a brief visit to Rwanda in April 1995, where he met government officials and representatives of various UN and NGO aid agencies.

Appendix 5

List of Abbreviations

ADB	African Development Bank
APROSOMA	<i>Association pour la promotion sociale des masses</i> (Association for Social Promotion of the Masses). Political party in Rwanda
ARCT	African Regional Centre for Technology
BDEGL	<i>Banque de Développement des Etats des Grands Lacs</i> (Development Bank of the Great Lakes States).
CDR	<i>Coalition pour la Défense de la République</i> (Coalition for the Defence of the Republic). Political party in Rwanda.
CEEAC	<i>Communauté Economique des Etats de l'Afrique Centrale</i> (Economic Community of the Central African States)
CEPGL	<i>Communauté Economique des Pays des Grands Lacs</i> (Economic Community of the Great Lakes Countries).
COMESA	Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa
ECA	United Nations Economic Commission for Africa
EGL	Energy Organization of the Great Lakes Countries
FAR	<i>Forces Armées Rwandaises</i> (RAF: Rwandese Armed Forces).
FRODEBU	<i>Front pour la Démocratie au Burundi</i> (Front for Democracy in Burundi). Political party in Burundi.
GOMN	<i>Groupement des Observateurs Militaires Neutres</i> (Group of Neutral Military Observers). OAU/UN-sponsored monitoring group, set up in 1993.
IRAZ	<i>Institut de Recherche Agronomique et Zoologique</i> (Agronomic and Zoological Research Institute).
MDR	<i>Mouvement Démocratique Républicain</i> (Republican Democratic Movement). Political party in Rwanda.
MRND	<i>Mouvement Révolutionnaire National pour le Développement</i> . (National Revolutionary Movement for Development). Political party in Rwanda.
NRA	National Resistance Army (Uganda).
OAU	Organization of African Unity
OBK	<i>Organisation pour l'aménagement et le développement du Bassin de la rivière Kagera</i> (Organization for planning and development of the Kagera river basin).
PADIS	Pan-African Documentation and Information Service
Parmehutu	<i>Parti du mouvement de l'émancipation des Bahutu</i> (Bahutu Emancipation Movement Party). Political party in Rwanda.
PDC	<i>Parti Démocrate Chrétien</i> (Christian Democratic Party). Political party in Rwanda.
PL	<i>Parti Libéral</i> (Liberal Party). Political party in Rwanda.
PSD	<i>Parti Social Démocrate</i> (Social Democratic Party). Political party in Rwanda.
PTA	Preferential Trade Area for Eastern and Southern Africa
RADER	Rassemblement Démocratique Rwandais (Rwandese Democratic Assembly). Political party in Rwanda.
RPA	Rwandese Patriotic Army (<i>Armée Patriotique Rwandaise</i> , APR).