



## Call for papers - 2017 OECD Global Anti-Corruption & Integrity Forum

The [2017 edition of the OECD Global Anti-Corruption & Integrity Forum](#) will focus on integrity for

inclusive growth. Integrity can significantly boost inclusive growth and sustainable development, by assuring fair and efficient resource allocation, stimulating competition and investment, and fostering innovation. Curbing bribery of public officials and promoting responsible business conduct is important to create a level playing field for companies and to create equitable market conditions and an investment climate that provides fertile ground for business development, competition and innovation. For the public interest to prevail in policy making, accountability and integrity in revenue collection, public finance management and service delivery are crucial and encourage equality and prosperity of societies.

Within this debate, one factor affecting inclusive growth remains particularly unexplored: corruption and the capture of public policies by special interest groups. There is increasing evidence that voters feel disillusioned about political integrity and the intertwinement of elite networks across sectors in society. Indeed, less visible but equally or more harmful than corruption scandals is the influence of narrow interests on public decision making for their own profit. Lobbyists walk a thin line between sharing information, agenda setting and undue influence. Special interest groups inform, influence and sometimes tweak laws, policies and regulations through formal advisory boards and informal networks. Rules for the financing of political parties and electoral campaigns can be stretched and bent, which contributes to the erosion of the already alarming low trust levels in government and public institutions. Similarly, leaks on offshore tax evasion or former public officials taking up lucrative posts and board memberships in banks and multinationals have dented the reputation of elected politicians, established firms and respected countries.

### KEY DATES

- Submission of proposals by **31 December 2016**
- Results notified by **13 January 2017**
- Final selected paper due: **1 March 2017**
- Presentation at IF: **30-31 March 2017**

## Present your paper at the 2017 OECD Global Anti-Corruption & Integrity Forum



In April 2016, 18 posters were presented at the Forum

The OECD invites proposals that feature high quality conceptual papers, as well as qualitative and quantitative empirical research papers focused on topics related to integrity, inclusive growth and policy capture. Innovative topics, methodologies and insights are especially encouraged. Proposals from individuals at all stages of their careers are welcome, including graduate students.

Selected papers will be published on the [OECD Cleangovbiz website](#) and authors of the selected papers will have the opportunity to present their

paper at the 2017 forum in form of a poster presentation. This Forum provides an excellent opportunity to meet with internationally renowned political and business leaders, policy makers, anti-corruption experts and practitioners, civil society representatives and academics. All costs related to the production of the posters will be borne by the OECD. For the authors of the 10 best submissions, travel costs to Paris will be reimbursed. ([See 2016 papers and posters](#))

## Guidelines for submissions

Email your proposals by 31 December 2016 with your **complete contact information** (including institutional affiliation) and an **abstract outlining the key findings and methodology** of your paper (max. 500 words) to: [integrityforum@oecd.org](mailto:integrityforum@oecd.org).



The organisers will acknowledge receipt and notify the submitter of each paper of its decision by 13 January 2017.

Final papers should be max. **20 pages long, double-spaced including references.** The final document as well as an outline of the poster should be sent electronically by **1 March 2017.**

**Possible thematic areas for papers**

- Integrity and inclusive growth
- Anti-corruption, economic development and innovation
- Policy capture, lobbying, political party financing
- Integrity, elections and democratic governance
- Political economy studies of influence, power and integrity
- Behavioural economics related to integrity and anti-corruption
- Sectoral and country case studies on integrity and inclusive growth

**Examples of Posters from the 2016 OECD Global Anti-Corruption & Integrity Forum**

**Pam Davis and Lily Becker**  
The Ever-Changing Compliance Landscape: What is the Next Wave?

**FCPA**  
Why Should Companies Build a Compliance Function?  
• Incentives in the event of criminal investigation or prosecution  
• Establish strong culture of compliance with laws and company policies  
• Create strong internal controls

**SUPPLY CHAIN INTEGRITY**  
• Laws are developing in several jurisdictions relating to human trafficking  
• New rules generally require - transparency - disclosure - supply chain audits

**IS A REQUIREMENT FOR SUPPLY CHAIN INTEGRITY COMPLIANCE PROGRAMS COMING?**

It is estimated that nearly 21 million people around the world are victims of human trafficking.

Will the laws of a few jurisdictions become a global standard?

**Juan O. Perla**  
A Game Theoretic Analysis of the Inter-American Convention against Corruption

**Abstract**  
This paper uses game theory to understand why members of the Organization of American States adopted the Inter-American Convention against Corruption of 2003 (IACAC) and why this ambitious international convention has apparently failed to curb demand side corruption in Latin America. The crux of the argument is that the IACAC has been ineffective, largely because the payoffs that drive its adoption are not aligned with the payoffs of the government officials tasked with upholding its obligations. Domestic enforcement efforts have failed to reduce the demand for bribes. Latin American states should consider reciprocal and multilateral enforcement strategies, such as increasing the enforcement regime under the United States' Foreign Corrupt Practices Act, to create a credible threat of sanctions.

**Analysis**  
Game theory provides a helpful modeling technique for analyzing "transitional" corruption, because corruption bribery often involves the player and the optimal choice for one player depends on the other player's choices. Figure 1 demonstrates how, in a non-regulated environment, bribery is the dominant strategy for U.S. and foreign companies, as well as for government officials. Lower right quadrant, see footnote 10. Figure 2 illustrates the incentives that motivated OAS member states to adopt the IACAC, and, when compared with Figure 1, reveals a misalignment of the incentives between Latin American states and their government officials. Figure 3 reveals the shift towards non-bribery that occurs when government officials perceive a credible threat of sanctions, under an external enforcement regime, thereby giving incentives to eliminate bribery.

**Figure 1: Bribery game between multinational companies and government officials**

Gov't	Gov't Official (Bribe)		Gov't Official (No Bribe)	
	U.S. Multinational	Foreign Multinational	U.S. Multinational	Foreign Multinational
Bribe	4, 2	0, 2	0, 0	0, 0
No Bribe	0, 0	0, 0	4, 0	0, 0

**Figure 2: Corruption game between multinational companies and U.S. companies**

U.S. Company (Supply Side)	Latin American States (Demand Side Countries)	
	U.S. Company (Supply Side)	Latin American States (Demand Side Countries)
Bribe	4, 0	0, 2
No Bribe	0, 0	0, 0

**Figure 3: Corruption game between Latin American states and their government officials**

Gov't Official (Supply)	Latin American States (Demand)	
	Gov't Official (Supply)	Latin American States (Demand)
Bribe	0, 8	0, 14
No Bribe	0, 8	2, 14

**Jake Storey**  
The World Needs a Global Collective Action Strategy

**CORRUPTION CORRUPTS**  
• Corrupt practices are harmful to individuals, but it is a collective problem involving many and requiring alternative solutions to global standards for regulation has to be found.  
• The strength of corrupt practices comes from the complex interplay of many small actors in the past, because they are hard to regulate effectively.

**CORRUPTION - A POLITICAL PROBLEM**  
• Corrupt practices are harmful to individuals, but it is a collective problem involving many and requiring alternative solutions to global standards for regulation has to be found.  
• The strength of corrupt practices comes from the complex interplay of many small actors in the past, because they are hard to regulate effectively.

**COLLECTIVE ACTIONS - THE SILVER BULLET?**  
• "You get corruption, rights you lack." (Dugan)  
• Corrupt practices are harmful to individuals, but it is a collective problem involving many and requiring alternative solutions to global standards for regulation has to be found.  
• The strength of corrupt practices comes from the complex interplay of many small actors in the past, because they are hard to regulate effectively.

**TOWARDS A COLLECTIVE ACTION STRATEGY**  
• "To build the world you need the world to be organized, which is not accomplished by the world alone, but not to know where the line starts and ends." (Dugan)  
• An innovation of framing the problem is through global standards for regulation has to be found.  
• The strength of corrupt practices comes from the complex interplay of many small actors in the past, because they are hard to regulate effectively.

**Collective Action Strategy**

• The purpose of a multi-stakeholder collective action strategy is to establish a framework for preventing and mitigating corruption by addressing all stakeholders and addressing all stakeholders.

• "You get corruption, rights you lack." (Dugan)  
• Corrupt practices are harmful to individuals, but it is a collective problem involving many and requiring alternative solutions to global standards for regulation has to be found.  
• The strength of corrupt practices comes from the complex interplay of many small actors in the past, because they are hard to regulate effectively.

**Mari-Liis Sööt, Lars Johansson, Karin Hilmer Pedersen, Maaja Vadi, Anne Reino**  
Private-to-private corruption. Taking business managers' risk assessment seriously when choosing anti-corruption measures

**Private-to-private corruption**  
Private-to-private corruption is a form of corruption that occurs between private entities, such as companies, rather than between a private entity and a public official. It is a form of corruption that is often overlooked by regulators and the public. This poster explores the risks associated with private-to-private corruption and how business managers can assess these risks when choosing anti-corruption measures.

**Research question**  
Does corruption in private-to-private corruption affect the risk perception of business managers when choosing anti-corruption measures?

**Risk perception and anti-corruption measures**  
The study found that business managers who perceive a higher risk of private-to-private corruption are more likely to choose more stringent anti-corruption measures. This suggests that risk perception is a key factor in the choice of anti-corruption measures.

**Types of corruption**  
The study identified three types of private-to-private corruption: bribery, kickbacks, and nepotism. Each type has different characteristics and risks associated with it.

**Business managers' survey**  
The study conducted a survey of business managers in Estonia and Denmark. The survey asked about their perceptions of private-to-private corruption and their chosen anti-corruption measures.

**Estonia and Denmark - compared**

	Estonia	Denmark
Mean score for private-to-private corruption	2.1	2.1
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