
West African Studies

An Atlas of the Sahara-Sahel

GEOGRAPHY, ECONOMICS AND SECURITY



OECD

SAHEL AND WEST AFRICA Club Secretariat

West African Studies

An Atlas of the Sahara-Sahel

GEOGRAPHY, ECONOMICS AND SECURITY

Under the direction of Laurent Bossard

OECD
BETTER POLICIES FOR BETTER LIVES

SAHEL AND WEST AFRICA Club Secretariat

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Foreword and authors

This Atlas is aligned with the priorities set by SWAC regional organisation members namely, the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS), the West African Economic and Monetary Union (UEMOA) and the Permanent Inter-State Committee for Drought Control in the Sahel (CILSS). It also contributes to achieving the objectives outlined in the OECD's Programme of Work and Budget.

The forward-looking and mapped analyses of Sahara-Sahel areas presented in the Atlas is conducted within the framework of the West African Futures (WAF) cycle of reflection for the 2013–14 Programme of Work.

The cycle is structured around:

- The SWAC Forum, held in November 2013 in Abidjan during the 2nd Sahel and West Africa Week. The Forum, organised under the auspices of His Excellency Alassane Ouattara, President of the Republic of Côte d'Ivoire and Acting Chair of ECOWAS, brought together a representative panel of stakeholders including senior officials, West African ministers, representatives of regional and international organisations, technical and financial partners, researchers, local elected officials and business people. It provided an opportunity to engage in a dialogue on Sahara-Sahel perspectives and the need for deeper regional co-operation between North, West, and Central Africa for the long-term stability of the region. More specifically, the discussions centred on "security and development" initiatives, their consistency and their scope of action. While the areas studied are shared by Algeria, Chad, Libya, Mali, Morocco, Mauritania, Niger and Tunisia, the discussions underscored that these areas form part of larger networks of instability that require broadening the reflection process to include countries in West, Central and North Africa, such as Nigeria.
- This publication addresses security challenges in Sahara-Sahel areas resulting from the mobility characteristic of its territories and populations as well as the socio-economic networks that connect them.

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The maps presented in Chapter 1 were the focus of exhaustive discussion and collaboration between the SWAC Secretariat (especially Philipp Heinrigs and Laurent Bossard) and team at the ADESS (Planning, Development, Environment, Health and Societies) Laboratory, the CNRS (French National Centre for Scientific Research) UMR (Joint Research Unit), Michel de Montaigne-Bordeaux 3 University and University of Bordeaux Segalen. The maps in Part II were created by the SWAC Secretariat in collaboration with Daniel Krüger and Viet Hoa Le. A special thank you goes to the European Union (EEAS and EUSR) as well as to JRC for the creation of certain maps.

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Abbreviations and acronyms

ACLED	Armed Conflict Location and Event Dataset
ACOTA	African Contingency Operations Training and Assistance
ACSRT	African Centre for Study and Research on Terrorism
AEBR	Association of European Border Regions
AEF	French Equatorial Africa
AFD	French Agency for Development
AfDB	African Development Bank
AFISMA	African-led International Support Mission to Mali
AFP	Agence France Presse
AFRICOM	United States Africa Command
ALG	Integrated Development Authority of the Liptako-Gourma
AMU	Arab Maghreb Union
AOF	French West Africa
APSA	African Peace and Security Architecture
AQ	Al-Qaeda
AQIM	Al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb
ATA	Anti-Terrorism Assistance Programme
AU	African Union
AUREP	Autorité pour la promotion de recherche pétrolière
BCE	Before the common era
CAADP	Comprehensive Africa Agriculture Development Programme
CARIM	Consortium for Applied Research on International Migration
CEMAC	Central African Economic and Monetary Community
CEMOC	Combined Operational General Staff Committee
CEN-SAD	Community of Sahel-Saharan States
CER	Regional Economic Communities
CFA	Communauté financière africaine
CFSP	Common Foreign and Security Policy
CGT	Compagnie générale transsaharienne
CILSS	Permanent Inter-State Committee for Drought Control in the Sahel
CIP	Cross-Border Initiatives Programme
CIRAD	Agricultural Research Centre for International Development
CLRT	Trans-Saharan Highway Liaison Committee
CNOOC	China National Offshore Oil Corporation
CNPC	China National Petroleum Corporation
CNRDRE	National Committee for the Re-establishment of Democracy and the Restoration of the State
CNRS	French National Centre for Scientific Research
CODESRIA	Council for the Development of Social Science Research in Africa
COMESA	Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa
CPR	Congress for the Republic
DCFTA	Deep and Comprehensive Free Trade Agreement
DESA	Department of Economic and Social Affairs
DPKO	Department for Peacekeeping Operations
ECCAS	Economic Community of Central African States
ECGLC	Economic Community of the Great Lakes Countries
ECOMOG	Economic Community of West African States Monitoring Group
ECOWAS	Economic Community of West African States
EEAS	European External Action Service
ENA	French National School of Administration
EU	European Union
EUSR	European Union Special Representative
EUTM-Mali	European Union Training Mission in Mali
FAO	Food and Agriculture Organization
FATIM	Armed Forces for the Chadian Intervention in Northern Mali
FIS	Islamic Salvation Group
FLAA	Aïr and Azawad Liberation Front
FLN	National Liberation Front
FLU	Fusion and Liaison Unit
FRONTEX	European Agency for the Management of Operational Co-operation at the External Borders of the Member States of the European Union
GCTAT	Geneva Center for Training and Analysis of Terrorism
GDP	Gross domestic product
GIA	Armed Islamic Group
GIABA	Inter-Governmental Action Group against Money Laundering
GICM	Moroccan Islamic Combatant Group
GNI	Gross national income
GPOI	Global Peace Operations Initiative
GPS	Global Positioning System
GRANIT	Territorial Information Analysis Research Group
GRIP	Groupe de recherche et d'information sur la paix et la sécurité
GSPC	Salafist Group for Preaching and Combat
HCR	United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees
HCUA	High Council for the Unity of Azawad
HDI	Human Development Index

ICAO	International Civil Aviation Organization
ICC	International Criminal Court
ICG	International Crisis Group
ICJ	International Court of Justice
ICT	Information and Communication Technologies
IDB	Islamic Development Bank
IEA	International Energy Agency
IFRI	French Institute of International Relations
ILO	International Labour Organization
IMF	International Monetary Fund
IRIN	Integrated Regional Information Networks, UN Office for the Co-ordination of Humanitarian Affairs
ISTOM	School of International Agro-Development
LIFG	Libyan Islamic Fighting Group
MEND	Movement for the Emancipation of the Niger Delta
MIA	Islamic Movement for Azawad
MINURSO	United Nations Mission for the Referendum in Western Sahara
MINUSMA	United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in Mali
MISAHEL	African Union High Representative for Mali and Sahel
MNJ	Nigerien Movement for Justice
MNLA	National Movement for the Liberation of Azawad
MPA	Popular Movement of Azawad
MRU	Mano River Union
MUJAO	Movement for Unity and Jihad in West Africa
NATO	North Atlantic Treaty Organization
NEPAD	New Partnership for Africa's Development
NGO	Non Governmental Organisation
NTC	National Transitional Council
OCRS	Common Organization of the Saharan Regions
ODA	Official Development Assistance
OECD	Organisation for economic co-operation and development
OEF-TS	Operation Enduring Freedom-Trans Sahara
OIC	Organisation of Islamic Co-operation
PAAGGW	Pan-African Agency of the Great Green Wall
PFUA	African Union Border Programme
PIDA	Programme for Infrastructure Development in Africa
PIP	Priority Investment Programme
PSDG	Secure development and governance centres
PSPDN	Special Programme for Peace, Security and Development in Northern Mali
PURIN	Emergency Programme to Reduce Insecurity in Northern Mali
RFI	Radio France internationale
ROPPA	Network of Farmers' Organisations and Agricultural Producers of West Africa
SADR	Sahrawi Arab Democractic Republic
SDS Sahel-Niger	Strategy for Security and Development in the Sahara-Sahel Areas of Niger
SRSG	Special Representative of the Secretary-General
START	National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism
SWAC	Sahel and West Africa Club
TAC	Territorial Authorities Council
TAH	Trans-African Highway
TSCTP	Trans-Sahara Counterterrorism Partnership
TSGP	Trans-Saharan Gas Pipeline
TSR	Special re-exportation tax
UEMOA	West African Economic and Monetary Union
UN	United Nations
UNDP	United Nations Development Programme
UNESCO	United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization
UNISS	United Nations integrated strategy for the Sahel
UNODC	United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime
UNOWA	United Nations Office for West Africa
USAID	US Agency for International Development
WACI	West Africa Coast Initiative
WAF	West African Futures
WCO	World Customs Organization
WDI	World Development Indicators
WTO	World Trade Organization
XOF	West African Franc

Preface

From fixity to mobility

Forty years after widespread famines hit the Sahel, the area is once again at the centre of world events. During the 1970s, severe drought and the crisis that ensued elicited a large-scale humanitarian and developmental movement in response. In the mid-2010s, the "Sahel" is once again front-page news. But the focus has now shifted to the Sahara, with the spotlight on terrorism. In the media, instead of humanitarian action and development, reports centre on war. After having for a long while not been a focus of international attention, the Sahara is now one with the "Sahel" and occupies a central role.

The combination of the two words into the term "Sahara-Sahel", reminds us that the area shares a common history and geography, despite the length of time it took to recognise these realities.

For Herodotus (5th century BCE), nothing existed in the space beyond the Mediterranean. Starting in Ptolemy's time (2nd century), climatic zones were used to explain human diversity: "We know [...] that the first and the second of the cultivated zones have less civilisation than the other zones. The cultivated area in the first and second zones is interspersed with empty areas and sandy deserts [...]".[1] Not until the 14th century did Arabs first describe trans-Saharan routes. Despite the aridity that prevented continuous human occupation of the area, people were comforted by the thought of a great desert existing beyond the inhabitable world. Imagination then became the "source of information". In the 8th century, people were convinced that a great river, the Nile-Niger, flowed along the southern edge of the Sahara-Sahel. In the 17th century, travellers confirmed the existence of the gold-rich "Mountains of Kong", also in the southern Sahara-Sahel. Not until the very end of the century were these claims exposed as sheer fabrication.

Exploration of the trade routes did not begin in earnest until the late 18th century, yet most had been in use for at least 1 000 years, and the most ancient, for 2 000, 3 000 or more. The establishment of colonial outposts 200 years ago shifted greater prominence to Africa's coastal areas. Long-distance traffic no longer travelled along trans-Saharan routes, which became sectioned off into local segments. When Europeans began penetrating inland Africa, eventually reaching Timbuktu or crossing the Sahara, they shared the same sentiment as their forebears in Ancient times: that the desert was a mysterious, dangerous region.

Over time, travellers benefited from new technology. Their knowledge of the Sahara was expanded by increasingly numerous and detailed maps. Isohyets, topographic relief, human settlements and routes were organised according to a geometrical logic handed down by Ptolemy. It is on this basis that colonisation "rationally" carved the desert into regional entities. Paradoxically, it was by criss-crossing the area, following the routes and being mobile, that geographers locked the Sahara-Sahel into a description that disregarded mobility.

Since prehistoric times, however, this area had been imbued with lifestyles and knowledge that enabled people to overcome the obstacle of aridity. The Sahara is traversed by an abundance of routes, and at the southern end of these multiple routes, a string of towns in the Sahel (a word meaning shore in Arabic) stand in as metaphorical ports.

How can the countries that share the Sahara-Sahel jointly stabilise and develop the region? A partial answer to this question may lie in the reactivation of a circulation zone that was segmented. Our hypothesis, therefore, is that the issue concerns our conceptualisation of space.


On standard regional maps, delineated space must correspond to a measured category or situation. Usually, this approach is deceptive.

It is necessary to free oneself from this framework. A depiction of space based on mobility is more useful to understanding the Sahara-Sahel entity than a pointless search for the correct boundaries. To shift from fixed space to mobile space, from the sedentary standard to the "nomad" standard, is to change spatial paradigms.

The mobile space paradigm centres on the idea that movement determines the organisation of space. Boundaries thus emerge as remote projections of reality, even when rooted in reality, such as national borders.

To accept that one answer to the challenges confronting the Sahara-Sahel involves reactivating circulation spaces requires proof that mobile space is, in itself, the most potentially valuable of regional resources.

Map 0.1
The "geographic" Sahel




Source: UNEP, Environmental Data Explorer – http://geodata.grid.unep.ch

From Sahara to "Sahel"

Having become an area of geopolitical uncertainty, the "Sahel" now refers to a land mass that defies classical geographic description. The bioclimatic zone model has long dominated the delineation of the Sahara and the Sahel. Average significant isohyetal lines were underscored according to their relationship to agricultural and pastoral activities. Accordingly, the 200 mm annual line is considered the cut-off for aridity, below which, with few exceptions, farming and livestock breeding are no longer possible. However, this zonal categorisation was established using a scale incongruent with the scope of societal activity. Despite the convenience of being "natural", this model leads to misleading analyses. In this way, the climatic environment is often associated with a lifestyle. However, zonal societies defy definition (delineation). All

Map 0.2
The "diplomatic" Sahel



Source: French Ministry of Foreign and European Affairs, June 2013

societies have territorial division rationales that cross through limits construed as natural.

Since the mid-2000s, the region has changed shape. Counter-terrorism initiatives have unified the Sahara-Sahel geopolitical entity under the single word "Sahel". As reported by the press, the contours of the unstable areas where travel is "strongly discouraged" by the French Department of Foreign Affairs are surprising. The distortion is in itself illustrative of mobile space. The mobility of threats forces us to relinquish the bioclimatic criteria. Better to accept the possibility of a fluctuating area than to accept the confines of boundaries that are illusory. This perspective also compels us to move beyond national borders and venture into regional analysis. Accordingly, the mapping challenge becomes a political challenge requiring the ability to conceptualise space differently.

Obscured routes and borders

The "peasant and sedentary" approach to spatial occupancy that dominated geography until the mid-20th century divided up the world according to the properties of so-called natural environments and their ability to accommodate relatively dense settlement. The line between "dry" agriculture and oases was the divide between sedentary and nomadic populations. Similarly, the boundaries of pasture lands in the south came to be considered the boundaries of pastoralism. Still further south, the threshold for rain-fed agriculture (600 mm) marks the transition from the steppes of the Sahel to the savannahs of the Sudan. Although it appears to be based on objective measurements, this approach does not stand up to the facts.

For evidence, we need simply look back to the pre-colonial empires. Contrary to the Roman Empire, confined within very specific limits (limes), the pre-colonial empires were founded on the movement, or more accurately, the control of movement and trade. They were "route empires".

Located along the routes were human settlements that classical geography had difficulty in understanding: oases.

The common answer to the question, "Where are the oases?" is "Wherever there is water". Yet the Sahara has an abundance of water sources that did not "create" an oasis. Upon somewhat closer examination, we see that the oases were not isolated, but appeared in strings, clustered together in the desert in no random pattern. They were not used exclusively for agriculture, but also for trade; and they always included something akin to a market, if not a town.

Oases are therefore located first and foremost at crossroads, places that require a minimum of human and production infrastructures.


Oases are stopovers whose fate varies with the flows that move through them. This is still true today. Flourishing oases form part of robust, integrated regional entities. Conversely, when routes languish for various reasons, the oases waste away due to causes that have nothing to do with desertification. When the road is sectioned off and leads to a dead end, failure is guaranteed.

Thus, history shows that routes can follow changing paths. To map the routes and the stopovers located at their crossroads is to attempt to describe a space capable of reconfiguring itself at any moment. In fact, the route is mobile and its stopovers shift with circumstances.

As an area of circulation, the Sahara-Sahel entity is maintained by a correlated social form: the network, which the delineation of territories, ethnicities, nations and borders has obscured. Within the network, society is defined by the ties between its members, from place to place, at the junctions where routes cross. Networks erase the very notion of boundaries. They can be understood only in terms of relationships

between groups and between individuals, and analysed within the spaces they create. The Sahara-Sahel provides an outstanding example of this association between mobile space and mobile societies. To superimpose territories within this space leads to an error of interpretation. The problem is not whether the line drawn (the boundaries or borders) is good or bad, conforming or not to territories that predate colonial divisions. The very notion of division is disrespectful of the space occupied by societies.

Map 0.3
The countries analysed in this study



Source: Retaillé D., P. Drevet, O. Pissoat, J. Pierson 2014

Inventing a legitimate space for mobile societies

The contradiction between the fixed and sedentary is of special relevance when the discussion turns to the ownership of resources in a mobile space. This applies to the competition between crop farming and livestock breeding when it comes to exploiting water areas. It also applies to mining exploration concessions that cover pastoral areas and circulation zones. This type of outside intervention upsets the structuring of space by local societies.

This telescoping can only lead to conflicts of legitimacy.

Today, the world confronts us with a dilemma: how can we invent a legitimate, eventually legal, area that conforms to the spatial realities of mobile societies? The question is being raised in many places around the world. It is particularly timely in the Sahara-Sahel, where instability related to mobility and networks has yet to be overcome by those who think only in terms of territory.

The past decade in the Sahara reminds us of how artificial it can be to divide space into territories. Why must mobility – the primary factor underlying the organisation of societies – be confiscated by terrorist groups that have managed to repurpose the knowledge of nomads to suit their own needs? Why do nations and regional or international organisations, existing in a world of globalisation, cling to the notion of fixity and closed limits?

Denis Retaillé

NOTE

1 *Ibn Khaldun, Muqaddimah I, Second Prefatory Discussion.*

Executive Summary

To understand the Sahara-Sahel based on social, economic and spatial mobility can help bring together its two sides and reactivate an area of mobility currently seen as segmented. The main element of this approach lies in moving beyond two contradictory ways of thinking about space: as production or as movement. According to the former, bioclimatic zones (which determine production) dominate geographic understanding of the area. In this view, the 200 mm annual precipitation isohyet is defined as the cut-off for aridity, below which farming and herding are no longer possible. Yet this approach obscures the reality of these areas, characterised by trade, complementarity and movement. According to the latter, a spatial understanding based on movement or routes sheds light on other opportunities for socio-economic ties and the vitality of networks. Moreover, since the mid-2000s, security concerns and terrorism have made the bioclimatic characterisation of the area overly narrow. The word Sahel now refers to a fluid space mainly characterised by geopolitical uncertainty and where governance of outlying areas is no longer adequate (Chapter 1). The Sahara-Sahel includes towns and markets situated along trans-Saharan routes. These follow a number of changing itineraries given the presence of rest stops. These stopover points depend on a sedentary population based in the middle of an area that, for the most part, is traversed by migratory flows and itinerant activities. Population data show strong growth in Sahel states and stable growth in North African states, accompanied by intense urbanisation. GDP figures reveal a contrasting picture, with the North African economies significantly bigger and income levels higher (Chapter 2). The oil and gas sector alone accounts for one-quarter of the cumulative GDP of Sahara-Sahel countries in 2013, with Algeria and Libya the third and fourth largest African producers (Chapter 3).

This area marked by movement is sustained by a form of social dynamics, namely networks. These networks developed starting with the trade caravans and have continued to evolve over time. The rationales underlying such trade activity are based on pastoral mobility and solidarity, rather than inter-governmental relations between states in the region. These focus more on political power plays, particularly between Algeria and Libya regarding their relations with countries in the Sahel (Chapter 4). Shared human space therefore evolved on the margins of nationhood, centering on economies and migrations, both primarily informal in nature. Starting in the 1960s, the development of the sparsely populated Algerian and Libyan Sahara depends on labour from the North Sahel. This population redistribution, which has since persisted, lays the basis for diaspora dynamics. It constitutes the matrix of a trans-national network in which the nodes are towns, and whose area grows, from the Sahara to the Sahel to almost continental Africa (Chapter 5). Nomadism and its various forms of mobility and pastoralism are part of this integration between the Sahara and the Sahel. It has adapted to change through a partial and limited sedentarisation and a diversification of livelihood means (Chapter 6).

The border regions of the Sahara-Sahel perform a number of functions in an institutional context where free movement is subject to the uncertainties of political developments and, more recently, of security concerns. The use by traffickers of border networks and corridors for various activities, featuring different degrees of violence, is today an added complication (Chapter 7). Although the area has been marked by recurrent instability since the 1960s, violence is a more recent phenomenon, and its dynamics more complex. Multifarious crises have reshaped the political landscape of Maghreb and Sahel countries and their geopolitical relations. These include coups d'état,

protests, revolts and revolutions, insurrections, and lastly, terrorism. The recent conflict in Mali illustrates the difficulty inherent in the security challenges and possible responses: while rebels and terrorists rely on controlling cross-border or regional movement, institutional responses have focused on unilateral or bilateral approaches, rather than regional co-operation. Finally, the constant restructuring or blending of groups and the volatility of these alliances are further complicating factors. However, many initiatives are emerging and illustrate a collective awareness of the need for joint action. These include the EU's Strategy for Development and Security in the Sahel (2011), the UN Integrated Strategy for the Sahel Region (2013), the Nouakchott Process (2013), the AU's Strategy for the Sahel Region (2014), and the ECOWAS Strategy for the Sahel (2014). The fact that actors involved in the Sahara-Sahelian conflicts rely on social networks to control the area, including matrimonial alliances, should encourage the adoption of spatial concepts other than just "corridors" or "sanctuaries". These networks, which are terrorism's true resource, rely on a group of towns and cities whose importance stems from controlling the flow of people and goods, rather than the size of their population or hinterland. From this perspective, controlling specific sites and the distance between them is more important than controlling surface area (Chapter 8).

The role of trafficking amid these security dynamics cannot be underestimated, whether in terms of its structuring or destructuring effects on politics, territories or societies. The form of the different types of trafficking and their criminal severity differ: trafficking is linked to complementarities between neighbouring economies, which can be exploited at border crossings; or to past and recent rebellions (in Libya, in particular), with the circulation of weapons growing and extending across the region. Lastly, cigarette and drug trafficking, like terrorism, connect the Sahara-Sahel to the world economy, an indication of the now international scale of the region's issues and in turn, of potential solutions (Chapter 9). To conclude, the UN, AU, ECOWAS and EU leadership describe their strategies and views on tackling these challenges (Chapter 10), and call for the strengthening of dialogue among all actors involved to achieve lasting security for West African populations.

Part I Reactivating a space of fragmented circulation

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Chapter 1

Sahara-Sahelian space and geography

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Forty years after first gaining global attention, the Sahel has returned to centre stage. During the 1970s, extreme drought and the ensuing famine produced a global humanitarian response. Starting in the mid-2000s, the Sahel in the news now no longer refers to the same area but rather to the Sahara, and returned to centre stage because of terrorism and efforts to address it. Having long been away from public attention, the Sahara – now confused with the Sahel – is at the centre of global security concerns. The current challenge thus faces a dilemma: how does one envision and manage a legitimate space given that this region is defined by mobility? Understanding the Sahara-Sahel through its geography and its evolutions provides some avenues to do so.

1.1 THE SAHARA DELINEATED

For a long time, the Sahara appeared in atlases as a white blotch. Until the mid-19th century, it remained a geographical mystery, subject to latitude and longitude estimates calculated by ancient Greek scholars. For a long time it had no other name but the Great Desert, the word *Sahara* referring to a shifting expanse.

But the white blotch visible on older maps was not devoid of significance. It illustrated one of the earliest geographical concepts: the *ecumene* or the inhabitable part of the earth. With no permanent and continuous human habitation and considered unfit for agriculture due to the lack of rain or insufficient rainfall, the vast mineral expanse could not belong to the human world. Even to cross it was long considered a risky undertaking.

Nineteenth century European explorers, attracted by the accounts of Ancient geographers or Arab geographers of the classical period, followed the routes used by the nomadic peoples of this vast "empty" space. They documented the names of the stopping places they discovered or rediscovered, described landscapes, took a few climate measurements and gathered rock samples. Gradually, a map began to fill in the white blotch.

The Sahara and the Sahel entered the geographical corpus by way of naturalist-explorers. Because aridity is the feature that circumscribes the boundaries of the *ecumene*, discussing it also involves addressing the question of the boundaries of the uninhabitable world.

The many routes travelled by the explorers, and later conquests, began to clarify the map. The map details included topographical relief and the location of watering holes crucial to long crossings. The Arabic word *Sahel* (shore), which is associated with the word *Sahara*, made its entry into the vocabulary of geography.

Despite the fluid nature of an area defined by circulation and movement, geographers drew boundaries between the areas they described and to which they attributed names. Paradoxically, it was by travelling back and forth over the space along the routes, by being mobile, that the geographers locked the Sahara-Sahel into a description that overlooked mobility.


This grid pattern divides the Sahara into two and then four sections. Latitudinally, the "slopes" of the arid desert, devoid of continuous human habitation, descend in step-like fashion toward the northern and southern edges (the Mediterranean that opens to Europe, and the Sahel that opens to *Trab al Sudan*[1]). Longitudinally, a uniform grid divides the central desert and then shrinks back toward the Atlantic Ocean and the Red Sea. Gradually, the Sahara-Sahel is further divided into a total of twenty sub-areas: central, northern, southern,

western, eastern, etc. (Map 1.3). Saharan areas became the confines of sedentary settlement areas; "dead borders" that require some effort to control.

Later, new boundaries would lay a new grid pattern on the desert: state borders and administrative subdivisions. The more sedentary and dense its settlement, the smaller is the space between the grid lines. In desert areas, the lines were spaced far and wide apart (Map 1.4).

In this way, "standard" geography has determined aridity to be the boundary of the *ecumene*. It identifies settlements based on visible activity (lifestyle) without regard for the social or political organisation of space in vast, purportedly "empty" areas. It gives only cursory acknowledgement to what makes Saharan geography, and for that matter, world geography, unique: mobility and the routes by which it flows.


Map 1.1
Relief and hydrography



Source: GEOATLAS.com 2006

Map 1.2


The arid area



Source: JISAO


Map 1.3

The partition into administrative subdivisions



Source: Le Houérou, *Classification éco-climatique des zones arides de l'Afrique du Nord* 1989

Map 1.4
The partition into nation states



Source: Natural Earth 2013 (www.naturalearthdata.com/downloads/10m-cultural-vectors/)

1.2 THE LIMITS


Using maps to record rainfall data intermittently in space but regularly over time makes it possible to establish isohyets lines.

The statistical processing of rainfall data (the volume of rain that falls[2] each day, week, month or year) refined by taking into account rainfall intensity (frequency and duration of rainfall) records water volume over time. The volume of water that falls on the surface of the earth varies a great deal over time (particularly for smaller volumes). Rainfall is therefore expressed as an average annual normal. This produces a fixed image of the climate. Climate normals are expressed as average values calculated over a thirty-year period. In the Sahel, unusually abundant rainfall was recorded in 1940, 1950 and 1960. The trend was interrupted in 1968 with the onset of a drought that lasted until 1984–1987 (Figure 1.1). The 1968–2000 average normal shifted the isohyet lines about one hundred kilometres to the south (Map 1.7). Aridity was advancing and the desert was gaining ground. Based on the same procedure, data recorded in recent years may suggest that moisture is returning.

The aridity isohyet line (an annual average of 150 or 200 mm) does not constitute a clear limit, particularly since the differences can be significant from year to year (Map 1.8). Although average precipitation is low, its intensity is altogether a different matter. This irregularity, which defies statistical forecasting, complicates the interpretation of bioclimatic conditions. This fact is fundamental to managing mobile populations and planning for development.

Any attempt to map the boundaries of aridity, and hence of the "desert", together with its many implications, is futile. Results differ according to the time scale.

Figure 1.1
Rainfall index in CILSS countries between 1895 and 2000




Source: OECD/SWAC, *Regional Atlas on West Africa* 2009

On a prehistoric timescale, the desert was not always a desert, and an arid climate was not always the defining characteristic of the Sahara-Sahel. During the neolithic revolution (from 9 000 to 4 500 B.C.E.), forests and lakes reached up to the 15th parallel and savannah grasslands stretched beyond the Hoggar Mountains (Map 1.9). Evidence of abundant wildlife emerges along the Saharan "chariot route" in rock engravings made by pastoralists and hunters, with no trace of agriculture to be found. Later, aridification led to sedentarism, which became increasingly prevalent as the climate grew more arid. Routes led to ecological niches (near water). These routes structured the vast desert expanse and foreshadowed the pre-colonial routes and the oasis system.

Human activities and the vestiges they leave over time provide more insight into the evolution of political organisations, and their relationships and the movements they engender, than rainfall averages. Isohyets are devoid of cultural, social or political meaning, even over an individual lifetime or a generation exposed to several "surges" of interannual variability; the figure that models Sahara-Sahel contact (between pastoralists and farmers) is an attempt to illustrate this (Figure 1.2).

The interannual and periodic variability of isohyets points to similar variability in dominant activities, and therefore in lifestyles on either side of the boundary. However, no redeployment movement ever followed surges in rainfall. Climatic uncertainty, as well as the accompanying social and political uncertainty, meant moving to small ecological niches along the river valleys, around lakes and ponds, at the foothills of mountains and around towns. This is the key to the complex realities of inter-ethnic encounters, realities quite different than the imaginary clash between the nomadic and sedentary worlds. Any clashes would be political, not geographical, and often the result of colonial and post-colonial territorial partitioning.


Figure 1.2
Pastoralists and farmers in the Sahel cyclical movement



Source: Retaillé D., *Comment lire le contact Sahara-Sahel* 1989a

Map 1.5


Variability of isohyets



Source: JISAO, Sahel rainfall index 2013 (http://jisao.washington.edu/data/sahel/)

Map 1.6


The Sahel, zone of uncertainty



Source: Retaillé D. 1986b

Map 1.7


Variation in isohyets between 1940–1967 and 1968–2000



Source: OECD/SWAC, *Regional Atlas on West Africa* 2009

Map 1.8

Coefficient of variation for annual precipitation, 1901–2006




*standard deviation normalised by the mean, only regions with annual precipitation > 10 mm/year

Source: UK Met Office Hadley Centre; University of East Anglia Climate Research Unit (CRU)

Map 1.9


The Paleo-Sahara



Sources: Rognon, *Biographie d'un désert* 1989; Lhote, *Le cheval et le chameau dans les peintures et les gravures rupestres au Sahara* 1953

Map 1.10

The impossibility of choosing a limit



Source: OECD/SWAC, *Regional Atlas on West Africa* 2009

1.3 THE SAHARA AS A NETWORK

The subdivision of land into geographic regions is based on the concept of the necessity of partitioning, and therefore on the concept of lines that separates. But land can also be divided in another way – based on routes – which connects rather than divides.

The Sahara is criss-crossed by ancient routes whose overall framework has remained unchanged for centuries, even if the flow of people and goods may have sometimes followed different itineraries.

Initially, trans-Saharan routes ran diagonally, connecting the loops of Senegal and Niger Rivers with the Mediterranean, the Nile and the Middle East. The route that linked Chad to the Nile River served as the path along which knowledge was transmitted during the "neolithic revolution" between 9 000 and 6 000 B.C.E. The diagonal routes are evidence of mobility used as a strategy for resisting aridity. Starting in 5 000 B.C.E., longitudinal routes completed the grid. Crossed by travellers and goods, the Sahara has always been called a "desert", although it no longer truly was one.


Connecting the two sides of the desert required the development of stopovers. Oases and the towns associated with them (Map 1.11) began to spring up. Stopovers at crossroads, or oases, owe their settlement to a relocation of populations from outside the desert. Oases are not located where water is found. Rather, they exist at points where routes intersect. Where they became established, water had to be found, sometimes at quite substantial depths. Developing this oasis system required a heavy investment in labour (usually forced labour) and close ties with surrounding areas. Life in the desert depended not on products of the desert, but on trade. Like the oasis towns of the past, offshore mining sites also depend on mobility, transportation and "routes".

An ancient "route" is not a single path that crosses the desert. It comprises a series of traces on the ground that point in a general direction. It therefore affords the possibility of choosing one's path based on circumstances, safety often being the most significant. The diversity of itineraries attests to the instability of the area which, paradoxically, is structured extensively by the routes. Modern roads are by definition stationary. However, they do not deviate from the general pattern established by history; the new roads built to accommodate outward-oriented mining operations also underscore the over-riding necessity of connection (Map 1.12).

The routes that criss-cross the Sahara organise space along trunk lines (the routes) punctuated by stopovers. It makes little sense to describe this arrangement by referencing its geographical scope. From the perspective of the people who live there, the surface area of the land is not an issue. The struggle for power is not played out in clashes along a border; it involves controlling the sites, routes and crossroad stopovers spread out along them. An Arabic word is used to express this social concept of space: *mamlaka* or "route empire".


Although standard geographical descriptions usually focus on its natural features (rainfall volume and intensity, vegetation, etc.), the Sahara-Sahel is, above all, a "country" of towns and roads, even though most of the population is considered pastoral (Maps 1.13 and 1.14).

Map 1.11
Precolonial routes




Sources: Ki-Zerbo J., *Histoire de l'Afrique noire* 1972; Retaillé D., *Études sahariennes* 1986a; Austen R.A., *Trans-Saharan Africa in world history* 2010; Retaillé D. and O. Walther, *L'actualité sahélo-saharienne au Mali : une invitation à penser l'espace mobile* 2013

Map 1.12
The road network




Source: DIVA 2013 (www.diva-gis.org/gdata)

Map 1.13
City population



Source: Natural Earth 2013 (www.naturalearthdata/downloads/10m-cultural-vectors/10m-populated-places/)

Map 1.14
Cities in West Africa, 2010



Source: *Africapolis* - SWAC/OECD 2014


1.4 ROUTE EMPIRES

Not all pre-colonial empires were contemporaneous with each other. However, they all combined a sedentary "centre" with route-centred growth. They successively ensured the security and permanence of Saharan crossings despite discontinuous settlement and the long distances between oasis-town rest stops.

The Garamantes route or "chariot route" still used by caravans today connects the Mediterranean to Niger by way of Fezzan (via Cyrene-Ghadames-Gao) (Map 1.15). Further south, a lake route, the ancient path of the neolithic revolution that spread from the Nile, follows a course since known as the Fula "route", or *lawolpulaku*. The term means both "search for pasture" and "proper conduct".

On the southern side of the Sahara, Sahara-Sahel empires were the counterpart of the "Arab" political organisations on the shores of the Mediterranean. The fall of the Almoravid, Almohad, Umayyad or Abbasid and Ottoman Empires and their reorganisation into territorial principalities preceded in the north a collapse that would begin to affect the Sahel by the end of the 16th century. The most enduring of the empires, the Kanem, and subsequently the Kanem-Bornu (10th to 19th centuries), centred on Lake Chad but extended as far as the current route from Chad to Sudan (Ouaddai Kingdom). It controlled the route to Fezzan (in present-day southern Libya), the main Saharan crossroad, via Ténéré. The Tedda (Tubu) who built the empire ensured the stability and permanence of movement within the Sahara. The Touareg established links with Hausa towns at the most easterly point

Map 1.15
The weight of history



Sources: Ki-Zerbo J., *Histoire de l'Afrique noire* 1972; Retaillé D., *Études sahariennes* 1986a; Austen R.A., *Trans-Saharan Africa in world history* 2010; Retaillé D. and O. Walther, *L'actualité sahélo-saharienne au Mali : une invitation à penser l'espace mobile* 2013; DIVA 2013 (www.diva-gis.org/gdata) ; Natural Earth 2013 (www.naturalearthdata/downloads/10m-cultural-vectors/10m-populated-places/)

on the route in the Songhay Empire (Maps 1.16 and 1.17).

The Songhay Empire, centred on Gao, was the last heir to empires based on the Senegal and Niger Rivers. Successor to the Mali Empire, it was the most extensive of the Sahel-Saharan empires. At its peak in the early 16th century, it ensured the stability and permanence of movement within the Sahara at a time when the Maghreb, which collapsed after the Almohad episode, had not yet returned to stability. The Songhay Empire's demise signalled a kind of apotheosis in "Saharan unity". The Moroccan conquest that brought it to an end in 1591 revived within a single entity the large central Timbuktu-Sijilmasa route, passing through the salt mines of Taghaza (later, and further to the south, Taoudenni) via Tanezrouft. Like the Kanem-Fezzan route through Ténéré, it crossed through the Sahara's most inhospitable terrain.

Saadian Morocco (1554–1660) re-established the former route of the Almoravids from Sijilmasa, the caravan gateway in southern Morocco founded in 757. The Almoravid Empire (11th and 13th centuries) had been built on the ruins of the Ghana Empire (4th to 10th century), which was the first trans-Saharan political power.


The spatial organisation of contemporary states bears traces of this history.

Each of the states whose borders were determined according to a colonial concept of territory recreates the pairing of a sedentary core and a route. Accordingly, the Sahara-Sahel is divided into four zones: Senegal and Mauritania, both sharing the Senegal River; Mali centred on the Niger River; Niger which is attached to the Hausa urban network and the Niger River; and lastly Chad and Lake Chad (Maps 1.19 and 1.20). Through these zones, nomads and sedentary groups remained in permanent contact, not separated by the imaginary limits defined by isohyets.

Despite the invention of borders, social space remained centred around crossroads or the end points of long routes of global scope.

Then, in West Africa, the regional organisation of space was overturned. The development of coastal shorelines and densification of networks centred along them relegated the trans-Saharan routes to a kind of oblivion.


Map 1.16
Kanem Bornu



Source: UNESCO, *General History of Africa*, volumes I to IV, 1980–1988

Map 1.17


Almoravid and Almohad Empires



Source: UNESCO, *General History of Africa,* volumes I to IV, 1980-1988


Map 1.18

Ghana, Mali and Songhay Empires



Source: UNESCO, *General History of Africa,* volumes I to IV, 1980-1988

Map 1.19
Hinges of the Saharan region




Sources: Retaillé D., *Comment lire le contact Sahara-Sahel* 1989a; Retaillé D., *Le contrôle de l'espace : les États sahélo-sahariens* 1989b; Retaillé D. and O. Walther, *Guerre et terrorisme au Sahara-Sahel : la reconversion des savoirs nomades* 2011

1.5 STATES AND BORDERS

African borders have long been considered recent boundaries imposed by colonial powers without regard for local societies or pre-colonial political institutions.

However, not all of the borders of modern Sahara-Sahel states were drawn arbitrarily. Some follow boundaries that pre-date the colonial era, such as the northern boundaries that separate Morocco, Algeria, Tunisia and Libya. South of the Sahara, the artificiality of borders is often a sign of negotiations between colonial powers, sometimes designed to divide competing political entities (Maps 1.21 and 1.22). Such was the case of the border between Niger and Nigeria, which separated political entities that had been permanently incorporated into the Sokoto caliphate from peripheral entities like Maradi and Zinder. It was also the case of the southern border between Nigeria and Benin, which marks the boundary between the Yoruba and Dahomey kingdoms; or the border between Burkina Faso and Mali, which separated the

Map 1.20
Route empires




Sources: Retaillé D., *Comment lire le contact Sahara-Sahel* 1989a; Retaillé D., *Le contrôle de l'espace : les États sahélo-sahariens* 1989b; Retaillé D. et O. Walther, *Guerre et terrorisme au Sahara-Sahel : la reconversion des savoirs nomades* 2011

Fula people of Mali from the Mossi. Furthermore, African borders came to incorporate unprecedented political groupings. These national entities, based on territory, were vaster in size than the pre-colonial political structures that had no set borders. For instance, these Sahara-Sahelian states emerged from a zonal concept of space that merged several bioclimatic areas with complementary agricultural and pastoral vocations. An outline of their territory illustrates the connection evident in the previous maps (Map 1.19).

More than the arbitrary or artificial nature of Africa's borders, the lack of precision and number of historical boundary lines have fuelled the border disputes of the past 50 years. Nine cases have given rise to advisory opinions or rulings by the International Court of Justice,

Map 1.21

Border negotiations




Source: Retaillé D., O. Walther, P. Drevet and O. Pissoat 2014

the earliest of which concerned Western Sahara (1975) and the most recent, the border between Burkina Faso and Niger (2013). International settlement of these disputes is complicated: in the absence of treaties, mere affirmation of the colonial nature of a border is insufficient. States may cite the internal boundaries of imperial holdings (within French West Africa, for example) or boundaries between imperial powers. Other than Western Sahara, where a cease-fire was signed in 1991, the major sources of border tensions today concern the Saharan boundaries between Algeria and its Moroccan and Libyan neighbours. Such tensions limit the functioning of regional alliances intended to facilitate the free flow of goods and persons, such as ECOWAS and the Arab Maghreb Union (AMU). Only the Community of Sahel-Saharan States (CEN-SAD), currently reorganising in the wake of the Libyan crisis, and the African Union (AU), of which Morocco is not a member (the Sahrawi Arab Democratic Republic being a member), transcend the colonial division between the two sides of the Sahara.

For the merchants, migrants and refugees and now for the rebels and religious extremists who make up the flow of Saharan-Sahel movement, borders are more a resource than a constraint. The vitality of their trans-national solidarity networks attests to their ability


Map 1.22
Colonial empire limits in 1914



Source: Retaillé D., O. Walther, P. Drevet and O. Pissoat 2014

Map 1.23

The process of independence



Source: Retaillé D., O. Walther, P. Drevet and O. Pissoat 2014

to adapt to the characteristic uncertainty of the Sahara-Sahel's political, economic and ecological environments. To some extent, this traffic escapes state control. So far, the rise of these mobility-based functional dynamics has scarcely included the creation of local cross-border institutions commensurate with the needs of Sahara-Sahel settlements. The African Union's Border Programme targeted this very issue in 2007. The goal is to stabilise borders dating back to the Addis Ababa decision (1964) in terms of delineation and content, to better transcend them through regional policies.

1.6 THE IMPOSSIBLE MAP

In Mali, 90% of the population is spread over the six administrative regions in the south (Kayes, Koulikoro, Mopti, Ségou, Sikasso and Bamako) whose combined area accounts for one-third of the country's territory. In Algeria, Tamanrasset wilaya covers one-quarter of the national landmass but has only 200 000 inhabitants, or 0.6% of the country's population; the most heavily populated wilayas, located on the coast, are also the smallest in terms of area. Twenty-five percent of the population of Mauritania lives in the city of Nouakchott. As for the vast, sparsely populated expanses, calculating the density per square kilometre makes little sense, particularly when mobility renders such numbers virtually meaningless and when the vast majority of the Sahara-Sahel population resides in urban centres (Maps 1.24 and 1.25).

The size of these urban centres varies: a few hundred inhabitants in Taoudenni (Mali), a few thousand in Chinguetti (Mauritania), 100 000 in Abéché (Chad) and Tamanrasset (Algeria), and 130 000 in Agadez (Niger). The cities located at the mining sites of Arlit (110 000 inhabitants living around the uranium site in Niger) or Hassi-Messaoud (50 000 inhabitants living around oil and gas sites in Algeria), recreate the oasis model and bring the route with them. However, it is not size that determines the importance of a town, but rather its function as a crossroads and gathering place.


For that reason, it is useful to use a different image to represent the settlement patterns in the Sahara-Sahel. Based on the reality of settlement patterns observed in the field, this image expresses population not by surface area but by kilometres of road. Made conspicuous in this way, routes show that the Sahara-Sahel is not "empty" (Map 1.26). However, this image is still quite imperfect.

The context of nomadism, and mobility more generally, inherited from the "route empires" also encompasses a type of settlement pattern that can be described as "floating" (even though it is permanent in many respects). This applies to refugees and migrants whose numbers are difficult to pin down. For example, there were close to 500 000 Malian refugees and displaced persons at the end of December 2013. These flows cross through an area built on the principle of movement and must therefore be taken into account. The only means of doing so is to consider the settlement corridors that the refugees, displaced persons and migrants are able to use, namely, the routes and points of departure, passage and arrival. Because the corridors cross through empty spaces, these calculations are based on inverse densities in relation to the reported kilometres of roads. The result is a spectacular image (Map 1.27). This "impossible map" highlights the reality of the corridor that connects Mali and Niger with the edges of the Maghreb. It also underscores the Sahelian hinge, i.e., the road from Dakar to Abéché that passes through Nouakchott, Bamako, Gao, Niamey and N'Djamena.


The map also confirms that the Sahara-Sahel is, above all, an area characterised by movement along routes that are quite well known but not controlled. This raises an "impossible question": what is the proper administrative division in the region to "frame" the area and the populations that live there?

A headlong rush toward decentralisation has been seen in recent decades. In Niger and Mali, decentralisation policy decisions were made (imposed) as part of the Touareg rebellion peace agreement negotiations. Since 2002, the decentralisation process in Chad has been refined in the most desert-like areas. A multi-step process is being used to reduce

Map 1.24
Population distribution



Map 1.25
Population densities




An Atlas of the Sahara-Sahel © OECD 2014

Inverted representation

The larger circles represent the smallest population size.

Population by administrative subdivision






Source: DIVA 2013 (www.diva-gis.org/gdata)


Density and inversed population representation

The larger circles represent the smallest population size.

inhab./km²








Source: DIVA 2013 (www.diva-gis.org/gdata)

Map 1.26

Linear density of population



23 regions into 14 prefectures. On the other hand, in Niger, regions have been superimposed over preexisting departments; one such region, the Agadez, accounts for half of the country's total area. However, 27 new departments have been created.

In mobile areas where inhabitants attach greater importance to roads than territory, the principle of optimal subdivision of space into ever smaller districts to bring people closer together must be called into question.


1.7 NATURAL RESOURCES

Topographical continuity is not a feature of the agricultural and pastoral lands of the Sahara-Sahel. Agricultural land is quite scarce. Narrow strips of pastoral land stretch out along the valleys and interdunal corridors (Map 1.32). With these ecological niches set far apart, seasonal exchange or travel is the only option available to those who exploit them. Large production areas exist only in peripheral zones. Given that aridity is the key marker of a desert environment, limited settlement reflects the difficulties inherent in agricultural and pastoral activities in the area.

To a greater degree than agro-pastoral production, trade in all its forms is the keystone of the economy. In local terms, it is the reason why oases exist and is essential to their survival. Over long distances, trade in dates, salt, millet, wheat and animals long flourished. But modern means of movement and the very low price of imported food products have caused this trade to collapse.

The many rich underground resources are attracting investment, including oil and gas, phosphate, uranium and iron (Map 1.29). The geographic layout of mining activities is

Map 1.27
The impossible map (anamorphosis using inverse population density)




identical to that of the irrigated agricultural oases (Map 1.28). They form isolated points in a discontinuous space. Regional integration is developing around these sites. Migration plays a role, along with construction related local economic spin-offs (infrastructures, wages and greater openness to the outside world). These elements are helping to modernise and improve traditional oasis based agricultural activities and pastoral herding.

The impact on oases and routes in close proximity to mining infrastructure and sites has been profound. New markets have opened up for garden produce and animal products. Such is the case for the oases between Ouargla and Toggourt, which have profited from their proximity to Hassi Messaoud. In Libya, works undertaken during the Gaddafi era to divert groundwater from the south to the north (known as the Grand River project) have unsettled the country's economic orientation even more than the landscape.

Connection is a key term in the Sahara-Sahel. Communicating and trading are crucial in this part of the world, and depend on regional integration. Broken ties result in isolation, the loss of settlement and the decline of activity. However, strengthened ties through local and regional trade allow the development of activities more economically profitable than self-sufficiency.


Large oases are attached to major towns located along old routes still in existence.

Map 1.28
Mines and industries



Source: USGS, Mineral Resources Data System; USGS, Mining Facilities; Natural Earth


Map 1.29
Hydrocarbons



Source: Geomondiale (www.geomondiale.fr/pipelines/index.html); USGS, Mining Facilities; USGS, Mineral Resources Data System

Map 1.30


Metals and minerals



Source: USGS, Mineral Resources Data System


Map 1.31

Petroleum license blocks



Sources: Mauritania, Ministry of Petroleum and Energy 2009; Chad, Ministry of Petroleum 2008; incorporated by Magrin 2012 (AFD); Niger, Ministry of Energy and Petroleum 2012; Senegal, Petrosen 2011; Mali, Ministry of Energy, Mines and Water Resources 2009; Algeria, Ministry of Energy and Mining 2013; Libya, National oil corporation 2008

Map 1.32
Agricultural production systems




Source: FAO, Major farming systems

More specifically, they are located at their crossroads, a fact that reinforces the idea that movement dominates the organisation of space. Mining sites are never remote, with the exception of the iron zone in Mauritania, located far from the valley, oases, roads, and towns. In this case, a single-purpose rail line 700 kilometres long carries products to the port of embarkation at Nouadhibou. Lastly, these nearby oases and mining centres also form part of a loose network of Bedouin movement reaching to the pastoral areas of the Sahel in the south and the foothills in the north (Map 1.33).

Finally, deep groundwater runs under the surface of the Sahara. A mapping of deep aquifers compared to the locations of exploited resources and integrated regional areas centred on a complex consisting of a road-oasis-mine-pastoral/Bedouin-corridor, generates two contrasting images. It reveals that the large reserves of deep groundwater in the Sahara are situated in locations where past or current human activity has been the most limited.

Map 1.33
Water, oases and breeding




Sources: FAO; Natural Earth; UNESCO - IGRAC - WHYMAP

1.8 MIGRATORY MOVEMENTS

Mobility between the Sahel and the Maghreb via the Sahara has intensified and diversified since the mid-1990s. This mobility is a major spatial and societal fact that countries in the region and within the international community cannot ignore. Contrary to conventional wisdom, it primarily concerns the Maghreb. This mobility developed long before the emergence of "clandestine" land and sea routes to Europe. The Sub-Saharan migrant presence among those making the crossings did not reach significant proportions until the early 2000s, although their numbers remained small. As soon as states gained independence, and to align Saharan territory with national territory (most notably in the Maghreb), states developed the communications infrastructures common to mining exploitation. The corridors that connected the Maghreb side with the Sahel side of the Sahara became increasingly accessible,

Map 1.34
The evolution of migration




Sources: Bensaâd A. 2013; MIGREUROP, *Atlas des migrants d'Europe* 2012

thus facilitating the flow of people. In the new context of globalisation, a migratory pattern emerged in the 1960s between peripheral areas in the Maghreb and the Sahel.

From then on, migrants were no longer confined to Saharan territories, where they nonetheless remained most numerous and made a vital demographic contribution to the cities of the region. Mobility spread to encompass the entire Maghreb. Some Saharan cities became veritable African towers of Babel (Map 1.36). Migration took multiple forms (work, trade, religion, education, entrepreneurship and transit); status could change from one form to another. In the north and in the coastal cities, migrants entered sectors like construction and public works, the service sector, artisanal production, industry or domestic service. Migrants also invested in the entrepreneurial sector. Student immigration from Sahel countries grew and transformed into worker immigration in sectors like IT and telephone technology. Despite its informal nature, migratory movement was by no means confined to marginal areas or limited to survival issues. It was driven by trade and business opportunities, and by disparities in know-how.

Map 1.35
Outsourcing of European migration policies




Sources: MIGREUROP, *Atlas des migrants d'Europe* 2009 and 2012

Conversely, Sub-Saharan migrants helped develop trade between the Maghreb and the Sahel. Migrant-led entrepreneurial networks became genuine "unofficial multinationals". One example involved the recovery of fish overlooked by Western fishing companies in Mauritania; this fish is processed and shipped to the Sahel by migrant-run companies. Lastly, work-related migration to the Maghreb often involves return business activity back in the Sahel, which fosters growth in trade. The dual migration–trade effect is also palpable from the Maghreb towards the Sahel. Accordingly, Moorish shopkeepers have created powerful networks whose impact extends across all of West, Central and Southern Africa, giving competition to Lebanese and Chinese merchants.

Trans-Saharan mobility, which is largely informal, illustrates a regional integration process beyond state control. Existing outside regulatory frameworks, this mobility developed gradually, governed only by social

Map 1.36
Migrants in Tamanrasset



Source: Bensaâd A. 2013

channels. It forms part of a spontaneous, worldwide movement among peripheral elements at different levels.

Today, the intensity of this mobility is reinforcing north-south trade. In doing so, it is reviving the ancient trans-Saharan routes, integrating more recent cities and thoroughfares. They form the basis for a "grassroots integration" movement whose development could become an element of inter-state co-operation.

1.9 TOURISM


Tourism is an indicator of the economic imbalance between the two sides of the Sahara. In the north, the public and private sectors have invested in developing a diversified tourism infrastructure. Urban, seaside, cultural and business tourism accounts for 10% of Morocco's gross domestic product; in Tunisia, the figure is 5% (2011). Saharan sites are part of the main tourism circuits: Moroccan and Tunisian sites are accessible to travellers arriving in Agadir, Marrakesh, Sousse or Djerba. With ten million visitors in 2012, Morocco is the most popular tourism destination, followed by Tunisia (6 million), and Algeria (2.6 million). Morocco also has the largest number of tourist sites, including UNESCO World Heritage sites (Table 1.1).

By comparison, the number of tourists who visit sites in the southern part of the Sahara is rather low. In 2011, 160 000 tourists visited Mali, the most popular destination in the African Sahara-Sahel (with the exception of Senegal). This figure amounts to less than 2% of Moroccan tourism. This predominantly cultural expedition tourism is mainly run by European tour operators. The southern part of the Sahara has only 11 of the 40 UNESCO World Heritage sites in the Sahara desert, the most recent being the Historic Centre of Agadez, Niger, added in 2013 (Map 1.41). Apart from distance and the level of tourism infrastructure, security concerns have been having a major impact on tourism for several decades. The routes chosen for the Paris-Dakar Rally are an example (Map 1.39); they also illustrate the extraordinary mobility of the area and its routes.

In the northern Sahara, the public protests that began in late 2010 affected the annual number of tourists entering countries in the area in different ways. Moroccan tourism ceased to grow in 2011, and then picked up again in 2012.

Map 1.37


The enclave of Ceuta



Source: MIGREUROP, *Atlas des migrants d'Europe* 2012

Map 1.38

Migratory movements



Source: Bensaâd A., D. Retaillé, O. Pissoat, P. Drevet and J. Pierson 2014

Table 1.1
Main tourist sites based on type of site and 2013 rating

	Type of site (Michelin)						Site rating (Michelin and Unesco)		
Country	**Total**	**Architecture, castles and historical districts**	**Religious buildings**	**Museums and works of art**	**Nature and gardens**	**Archeological and historical sites**	**Must see**	**Worth the trip**	**UNESCO sites**
Morocco	61	18	11	1	29	2	9	52	9
Tunisia	37	10	5	7	5	10	13	24	8
Algeria	35	16	3	0	10	6	8	27	7
Libya	26	7	1	1	6	11	9	17	5
Mali	20	3	3	5	9	0	4	16	4
Chad	17	0	1	1	12	3	2	15	1
Niger	16	3	1	1	11	0	4	12	4
Mauritania	10	6	0	1	3	0	2	8	2
Total	**222**	**63**	**25**	**17**	**85**	**32**	**51**	**171**	**40**
In the northern Sahara	159	51	20	9	50	29	39	120	29
In the southern Sahara	63	12	5	8	35	3	12	51	11

Sources: Guide vert Maroc, Michelin 2013; Guide vert Mali, Michelin 2013 Guide vert Tunisie, Michelin 2013; Lonely Planet West Africa, Lonely Planet 2009; La Mauritanie aujourd'hui, Jaguar 2005; Libyen Reisehandbuch, Reise Know-How 2009; and national tourism offices.


In Tunisia, where protests culminated in the overthrow of the regime, tourism dropped in a lasting way after peaking at 7 million tourists in 2008. In Algeria, the number of tourists visiting the country dropped in 2012, a year that was marked by efforts to secure the Sahara after the offensive by Islamist groups and the Touareg rebellion in Mali. In Libya, the country visited by the fewest tourists in North Africa, the opening of tourist sites along the coast (Leptis Magna, Sabratha, and Cyrène) and in the Sahara (Ubari, Waw al-Namus and Djebel al-Uweinat) ended with the outbreak of civil war in 2011.

In the southern Sahara, tourism was affected by kidnappings and executions perpetrated by Islamist groups and the instability caused by the Touareg rebellions since the mid-2000s. Only Chad's Ennedi and Tibesti are still accessible. Armed conflicts led UNESCO to add three Sahara-Sahel sites to its List of World Heritage in Danger: the Air and Ténéré Natural Reserves (Niger); Timbuktu (Mali), where eleven of the city's sixteen tombs were destroyed by Islamist groups in 2012; and the Tomb of the Askias in Gao (Mali). Approximately one in four of the Sahara-Sahel's major tourist sites and UNESCO sites are now within the area that travellers are officially advised to avoid (Map 1.41).

The decline in tourism for conflict-related reasons has had significant economic repercussions for Sahara-Sahel populations that rely on the sector as one means of promoting mobility-based knowledge (guiding) as well as artisanal products and culture (festivals). For example, investments made in Mauritania in the 2000s to promote the heritage of the ancient cities of Adrar and Tagant (Chinguetti, Ouadane, Oualata and Tichitt) were called into question.

The lack of security is only one of many problems affecting tourism in the southern part of the Sahara. Once political stability resumes,


Map 1.39
Routes of the Paris-Dakar Rally



Source: Dakar Retrospective 1979-2013 (www.dakar.com)

the sector will have to correct its structural weaknesses, including the short tourist season, poor quality accommodation and transportation infrastructure, the cost of connecting flights to Europe, and the distance between the main tourist sites and airports.

Map 1.40
Touristic attractions




Sources: Guide vert Michelin Mali 2013, Morocco 2014, Tunisia 2011; West Africa, Guide Lonely Planet 2009; Guide Jaguar, La Mauritanie aujourd'hui, 2003; Libyen Reisehandbuch 2009; National tourist offices

Source: World Heritage List, UNESCO 2013 (whc.unesco.org/en/list/)

Map 1.41

Touristic sites and routes



Sources: Guide vert Michelin Mali 2013, Morocco 2014, Tunisia 2011; West Africa, Guide Lonely Planet 2009; Guide Jaguar, La Mauritanie aujourd'hui 2003; Libyen Reisehandbuch 2009; National tourist offices; World Heritage List, UNESCO 2013; French Ministry of Foreign and European Affairs


1.10 CONFLICT AND INSTABILITY

For the past fifty years, the Sahara-Sahel has been wracked by recurring episodes of violence: the struggle for border control, secessionist or extremist movements and the overthrow of regimes. However, the violence has never been more intense. Since the end of the 2000s, countries in the Sahara-Sahel have seemingly been "overrun by violence". This situation is unusual, to say the least, considering that the number of armed conflicts in Africa has been declining since the early 2000s. While most previous crises around the Sahara-Sahel were geographically limited in space, the current conflicts entail a cross-border dimension that makes regional solutions all the more important.

Today, the sources of conflict are no longer fixed, but mobile. Maps show the circulatory shape they form around the Sahara-Sahel. The first series (Maps 1.42, 1.43 and 1.44) describes the variety of events related to persistent centres of violence in South Sudan, Darfur and Nigeria, not to mention, depending on the period, the wave of "Arab Springs" in the north and domestic conflicts in Gulf of Guinea states from Côte d'Ivoire to Guinea-Bissau. The Sahara-Sahel is not the region most directly affected by what could be compared to a state of war, except for

Map 1.42

Violent events by type between 1997 and 2012



Source: ACLED, data 1997-2011 and 2012 (www.acleddata.com/data/africa)


Violent events include "combat", "violence against civilians" and "riots and protests" Combat rincludes the three categories *"Battle - Rebels overtake territory", "Battle - Government regains territory" and "Battle - No change of territory"*

recent events in Mali. The ongoing connection to peripheral regions and the traffic that passes through the region clearly show that it can be both a connection point between hotbeds of violence and a "sanctuary".


The second series of maps (Maps 1.45, 1.46 and 1.47), which focuses on events in 2012, clearly differentiates combat from other forms of violence and highlights the regions that are in a state of war. The Central African Republic, Libya, Mali, Nigeria and Sudan are not isolated hotspots.

Security conditions in the Sahara-Sahel have deteriorated for a variety of reasons, the most recent being the presence of armed Islamist groups in northern Mali since the mid-2000s. In particular, this includes the Salafist Group for Preaching and Combat (GSPC), renamed Al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM). In 2012, the alliance of convenience between Islamist groups and Touareg rebels seeking independence opened the door to conflict of a geographic magnitude unprecedented in the Sahara-Sahel – with Bamako losing control of over 60% of Malian territory – not to mention the diversity of governmental and non-governmental actors involved. Although the conflict clearly had a trans-national dimension and demanded a regional solution, it was the French military intervention with support from African allies, most notably Chad, which ultimately brought northern Mali under control before an international mission was sent to intervene.


Violence against civilians



Evolution of violences against civilans between 1997 and 2012



Total number of events by type, from 1997 to 2012




Source: ACLED, data 1997-2011 and 2012 (www.acleddata.com/data/africa)


Violent events include "combat", "violence against civilians" and "riots and protests"
Violence against civilans: uses the category "*Violence against civilians*"

The renewed outbreak of conflict around the Sahara-Sahel and the insecurity of movement in and around the desert, of central importance to desert dynamics, are disrupting the economic activities of local stakeholders and multinationals alike. Mining and petroleum sector sites in the Sahara seem like bastions under siege by armed groups, while the once flourishing tourism sector is in decline. North of the line between Ouagadougou and N'Djamena, areas covered by foreign visitor travel advisories issued by France (French Ministry of Foreign Affairs) included more than 60% of the Sahara-Sahel in June 2013 (Map 1.47). The map version of the advisory draws attention to the fact that the Sahara-Sahel extends to northern Nigeria, western and southern Sudan, and the Central African Republic. This proximity entails a risk of destabilisation for Chad, where balance is delicate. The events of the Arab Spring are too varied to be connected to Saharan geopolitical uncertainty, aside from the Libyan crisis which has been contributing to it since 2011.


From a humanitarian perspective, the instability engendered by Sahara-Sahel conflicts is conducive to food crises in areas beyond the reach of international aid, like Kidal. This has led many civilians to flee war-torn zones. The conflict in Mali is responsible for the domestic or transborder displacement of more than 350 000 people, not including some 100 000 Saharawis in camps around Tindouf, Algeria, in some cases since the mid-1970s.

Riots and protests






Total number of events by type, from 1997 to 2012



Evolution of riot and protest numbers between 1997 and 2012




Source: ACLED, data 1997-2011 and 2012 (www.acleddata.com/data/africa)

Violent events include "combat", "violence against civilians" and "riots/protests"


Map 1.43

Violent events between 1997 and 2012


From 1997 to 2000




From 2001 to 2004



From 2005 to 2008




From 2009 to 2012





Total number of violent events, by period




Source: ACLED, data 1997–2011 and 2012 (www.acleddata.com/data/africa)


Map 1.44

Victims of violence between 1997 and 2012


From 1997 to 2000




From 2001 to 2004




From 2005 to 2008




From 2009 to 2012





Total number of deaths from violent events, by period




Source: ACLED, data 1997–2011 and 2012 (www.acleddata.com/data/africa)


Map 1.45

The actors in conflicts in 2012


Civil populations




Police and armies




Identified armed groups



Non-identified armed groups



Number of violent events by the type of actor involved in 2012






Source: ACLED, data 2012 (www.acleddata.com/data/africa)

For a single event, two involved actors can be counted.
This is the case in 71% of violent events in 2012.
These two actors can be of the same type (e.g combat between identified armed groups or a riot opposing civil populations).


Map 1.46

Violent events by type in 2012


Riots and protests



Combat




Violence against civilians





Total number of violent events by type, in 2012




Source: ACLED, data 1997-2011 and 2012 (www.acleddata.com/data/africa)

Map 1.47


Areas reported on by the French Ministry of Foreign and European Affairs

2011




Source: MAEE - June, November 2011

2012




Source: MAEE - February, March, June, October 2012

2013




Source: MAEE - June 2013



Map 1.48

Violent events in 2012



Source: ACLED, data 2012 (www.acleddata.com/data/africa)

NOTES \\

1 *Black Africa.*

2 *Usually expressed as millimetres (mm). One millimetre is equivalent to one litre of water falling on one square metre.*

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Chapter 2


Socio-economic indicators within Sahara-Sahel countries

2.1 Populations 77
2.2 Economy 86

Although fluidity and mobility are important elements in the Sahara-Sahel region, it is necessary to keep in mind realities in the region. National borders may be a contradiction to socio-economic movements and networks, yet they also represent the limits of national sovereignty. It is the convergence or divergence of these sovereign states' policies that will determine the region's future.

The countries of the Sahara-Sahel are classified into two groups: North Africa (Morocco, Algeria, Tunisia and Libya) and the Sahel (Mauritania, Mali, Niger and Chad). Yet this classification is questionable in several respects. In particular, Mauritania is a member of the Arab Maghreb Union, alongside Morocco, Algeria, Tunisia and Libya. Mauritania, however, is also a member of the Permanent Inter-State Committee on Drought Control in the Sahel (CILSS), to which Mali, Niger and Chad also belong.

Map 2.1
Sahara-Sahelian countries




An Atlas of the Sahara-Sahel © OECD 2014

2.1 POPULATIONS

Demographic evolutions

In 2012, the combined population of the eight Sahara-Sahel countries was 136 million. The four North African countries, Algeria, Libya, Morocco and Tunisia, have a combined population of 88 million;, almost double the combined population of its four Sahelian neighbours, Chad, Mali, Mauritania and Niger (48 million). Algeria is the most populated country in the Sahara-Sahel region with 38.5 million people (Figure 2.1).


Figure 2.1
Population by country, 2012



Together, these eight countries cover 9.6 million km²; that is more than twice the area of the European Union and represents nearly a third of the African continent. Since the partition of Sudan, Algeria is the biggest country in Africa in terms of surface area, with 2.4 million km². The four North African countries have a combined surface area of 4.8 million km², with Algeria accounting for 50%. The North African surface area, 4.8 million km², is exactly the combined surface area of the Sahelian countries. However, unlike in North Africa, the Sahelian countries are very similar one to another in terms of land size (Figure 2.2).


Although the Sahelian countries have some of the highest population growth rates in the world, it is only since the end of the 1980s that population growth in the Sahel exceeds that in North Africa. Between 1950 and 1990, the population of North Africa grew by an average annual rate of 2.7%, increasing from 22.1 to 48.7 million inhabitants. During the same period, the population in the Sahel grew by an average annual rate of 2%, increasing from 10.4 to 18.6 million inhabitants (Figure 2.3). By 1990, the population of Algeria (26.2 million) and Morocco (24.7 million) exceeded the combined population of the four Sahelian countries (23.7 million).

Figure 2.2
Surface area by country and region (in million km²)



Source: WDI 2014, World Bank

Figure 2.3
Population growth and total population in North Africa and Sahel, 1950–2012




Source: SWAC/OECD based on DESA UN, *World Population Prospects: the 2012 Revision*

* The population figures correspond to end of period values.

It is only at the beginning of the 1990s that growth rates between the two regions started to diverge. Between 1990 and 2010 the population in the Sahel grew by an average annual rate of 3.3%, almost doubling from 23.7 million to 45.2 million inhabitants. In contrast, North Africa has seen a spectacular reduction in growth rates as they decreased to 1.5% during the 1990–2010 period (Figure 2.4).

These regional trends are slightly more nuanced at the individual country level. Population growth during the 1950–1990 period was fastest in Libya (3.4%) and Mauritania and Niger (both 2.8%) and slowest in Mali (1.4%), Tunisia (2.1%) and Chad (2.3%). During the period 1990–2010, population growth accelerated in all Sahelian countries and slowed down in North Africa (Figure 2.4). However,

Figure 2.4
Country population growth rates 1950–2012



Source: DESA UN, *World Population Prospects: The 2012 Revision* and WDI 2013, World Bank

during the past seven years (2005–12) some of these growth trends reversed. Growth slowed in Chad (from 3.8% in 2000–05 to 3.2%) and Mauritania (from 3% to 2.7%) and increased in Algeria (from 1.4% to 1.8%) and Morocco (from 1% to 1.1%).


Over the period 1950–2012 population growth was fastest in Niger with 3.2%. It surpassed Tunisia and Mali to become the third most populous country in the region, followed by Mauritania (2.9%) and Libya and Chad (2.8%). Growth was slowest in Mali (1.9%), Tunisia (2%) and Morocco (2.1%) (Figure 2.5).

Fertility, mortality and demographic transition

The main reason for the high population growth of Sahelian countries during the past three decades is high and unchanged fertility. While North African countries have seen rapid fertility transitions over the past decades, fertility in the Sahel has only recently started to decline. Fertility in North Africa decreased from a peak of 7.4 children per woman in 1960–65 to just 2.5 in 2005–10. The fertility declines of approximately 1.5 per decade in Algeria, Libya and Morocco have been among the fastest in the world. In the Sahel, fertility peaked in 1990–95 at 7.3 and has since decreased to 6.9 children per woman. A particular case is Mauritania, where fertility started to decline in 1975, albeit at a slower pace (Figure 2.6).

The resulting high population growth rates in the Sahel are associated with a phase in demographic transition that is characterised by a reduction in mortality and continuously high birth rates. The most commonly associated conditions for fertility decline are lower mortality, female education, urbanisation and family planning programmes. While mortality in the Sahel has declined gradually since 1950 (-18.4 deaths per 1 000 population), birth rates have remained flat. In North Africa, mortality declined by 16.9 deaths per 1 000 population, yet birth rates declined even faster (-30.3, from 51.7 to 21.4 births per 1 000 population) (Figure 2.7).

Figure 2.5
Evolution of country population (in million)



Source: DESA UN, *World Population Prospects: The 2012 Revision* and WDI 2013, World Bank


Urbanisation

Urbanisation has been the most spectacular manifestation of the population dynamics observed over the past half century in the Sahel. Although Sahelian countries still have some of the lowest levels of urbanisation in the world, the pace of urbanisation has been astonishing. The level of urbanisation in the Sahel increased from 2% in 1950 to 25% in 2010.[1] The urban population, people living in agglomerations of more than 10 000 inhabitants, increased 46-fold, from 250 000[2] to 11.6 million at an average annual rate of 6.6% per year. Still as of 1980, the combined urban population of the four Sahelian countries was just 2.4 million, the population of Bamako today (2.3 million) (Map 2.2).

The number of agglomerations with more than 10 000 inhabitants increased from 11 to 213, with Bamako, N'Djamena and Niamey exceeding one million inhabitants. These settlement changes have profoundly reshaped the region's economic, political and social environment. In particular, the Sahara-Sahelian areas have above average levels of urbanisation, with several Sahara-Sahelian cities being close to or exceeding, 100 000 inhabitants.


In North Africa, urbanisation dynamics have been significantly different. The level of

Figure 2.6
Fertility transitions (children per woman)



Source: DESA UN, *World Population Prospects: The 2012 Revision*

Figure 2.7
Demographic transition (crude death and birth rates per 1 000 population)



Source: SWAC/OECD 2014 based on DESA UN, *World Population Prospects: The 2012 Revision*

urbanisation increased from 26% in 1950 (the level of Sahelian countries today) to 65% in 2010. The urban population increased from 5.6 to 55.5 million, an average annual rate of 3.9% (Figure 2.8). Over the past decade, urban population growth decreased to 2.4%, yet this is still almost double the rate of rural population growth (Figure 2.8).

After a slowdown in the Sahel between 1980 and 2000, urban population growth accelerated to 5.8% over the past decade – double the rate of rural population growth.


Probably the most significant difference in population dynamics in the two regions is the level of urbanisation. Whereas the Sahelian countries have some of the lowest levels of urbanisation in the world, North Africa boasts levels similar to those of developed countries. Morocco has the lowest level of urbanisation in North Africa with 57%, while Mauritania has the highest of the Sahelian countries with 34%. After 60 years of urban population growth at 7.4%, Niger has a level of urbanisation of 18%, which is similar to Libya's level in 1950 (Figure 2.9).

Rural population

The rural population of Sahelian countries grew by 2.1% over the period 1950–2010, from 10 million to 34 million inhabitants (Figure 2.10). Growth accelerated over the past two decades, after having remained relatively stable at around 1.8% for four decades. This acceleration, simultaneous to accelerations in urban and total population growth, appears more as a consequence of the latter than a reversal in urbanisation dynamics. Except Mali, all Sahelian countries have seen a reduction in rural growth rates in the 2000–10 period. In Mauritania, growth rates declined from 3.6% to 2.1%; in Chad, rates declined from 3.1% to 2%; and in Niger, rates declined from 3.4% to 3.2% (Figure 2.11).

In North Africa, rural population growth declined gradually over the past 60 years.


Figure 2.8
Urban population growth and size: 1950–2010



Source: *Africapolis* – SWAC/OECD 2014; DESA UN, *World Population Prospects: The 2012 Revision*


Map 2.2

Urban areas in the Sahel, 1950 – 1980 – 2010



Source: *Africapolis* - SWAC/OECD 2014

Figure 2.9
Level of urbanisation



Source: *Africapolis* – SWAC/OECD 2014; DESA UN, *World Population Prospects: The 2012 Revision*

During the past decade, rural population started to decrease from 31.3 million to 29.9 million (annual average rate of -0.5%) (Figure 2.10). Although the decline is mainly due to the strong negative growth in Algeria (-1.3%), in Morocco and Tunisia rural population growth is close to 0% (Figure 2.11).

Although rural population in the Sahel more than doubled between 1980 and 2010, rural density increased by only 30% from 1 to 1.3 rural inhabitants per hectare of arable land (Figure 2.12). In North Africa, rural density remained flat but slightly higher than in the Sahel at 1.5 rural inhabitants per hectare of arable land. The highest density is in Mauritania with 5.1 rural inhabitants per hectare, due to the low availability of arable land in this mainly desert country.


Projections

The UN estimates population growth in the Sahel to continue at an annual average rate of 2.9% between 2010 and 2050 (low variant[3]). This is slightly faster than during the 40 years between 1970 and 2010 (2.8%). The population of the Sahelian countries would grow by an additional 95 million people, which is twice today's population (45 million), to reach 141.2 million inhabitants. Projections for North Africa (medium variant[4]) envisage annual average population growth of 0.8%. Under these assumptions, North Africa's population will reach 118.9 million by 2050 (Figure 2.13).

Niger's population is projected to continue growing by 3.5% per year. By 2050 this would make it the region's most populous country with a population of 63.3 million, adding 47 million inhabitants to its current population (Figure 2.14). Niger will account for 50% of the total population increase in the Sahel. Mali's population is projected to grow by an annual average of 2.7%. Both in Niger and in Mali, population growth is projected to be faster than in the previous 40 years. In contrast, growth is expected to decline in Chad to 2.4% per year,

Figure 2.10

Evolution of rural population (number in million and average annual growth in %)




Sources: *Africapolis* – SWAC/OECD 2014; DESA UN, *World Population Prospects: The 2012 Revision*

* The population figures correspond to end of period values.


Figure 2.11

Rural population growth by country



Sources: *Africapolis* – SWAC/OECD 2014; DESA UN, *World Population Prospects: The 2012 Revision*

Figure 2.12
Rural density (in rural inhabitants per ha of arable land)



Source: *Africapolis* – SWAC/OECD 2014; FAOSTAT 2014, FAO (http://faostat.fao.org/site/291/default.aspx)

from 3% during 1970–2010, and in Mauritania to 1.7%, from 2.9%.

In North Africa, population growth will continue to slow down, with Algeria's growth projected fastest at 1% per year. Algeria will account for 50% of the additional 34 million inhabitants.

These estimates are based on underlying assumptions about trends in fertility, mortality and migration and are naturally subject to debate. In particular, assumptions on future urbanisation and migration dynamics play an important role, and the UN is cautious on both. In particular the migration hypotheses appear low. For many analysts, the population of the Sahelian countries will not increase by as much because migratory pressure will continue to grow towards the coastal countries of West, Central and North Africa[5] But also current contexts, such as ease of access to contraceptive methods, new and broader reach of media and renewed attention to population policies merit attention when considering projected fertility declines.

2.2 ECONOMY

Gross domestic product in US dollars


In 2012, the combined gross domestic product (GDP) of Morocco, Algeria and Tunisia surpassed the GDP of its southern neighbours Mauritania, Mali, Niger and Chad by a factor of 11, or USD 350 billion versus USD 32 billion. In 1970, the respective figures were USD 10.3 billion and USD 1.6 billion, or a factor of six. In 2009, the last year for which GDP figures for Libya are available, the factor was 14. Even more revealing, the GDP of Tunisia, the smallest economy of the North African countries, is still 40% bigger than the combined GDP of the Sahelian countries. (Figure 2.15)

Per capita Gross national income

Gross national income (GNI) per capita, the indicator used by the World Bank to classify countries according to income, confirms the contrast between the two shores of the Sahara:

Figure 2.13

Population growth Sahel vs. North Africa 1950–2050




Source: DESA UN, *World Population Prospects: The 2012 Revision*

* The population figures correspond to end of period values.

Figure 2.14

Population size projection by country: 1950–2050 (in million inhabitants)



Projections for North Africa: WPP medium variant, for the Sahel: WPP 2012 low variant

Source: DESA UN, *World Population Prospects: The 2012 Revision and WDI 2013*, World Bank

Niger, Mali and Chad are low income countries with a GNI per capita of USD 740 or less (Atlas method), while Libya is a high income country with a similar GNI per capita as Poland (USD 12 930). Mauritania, with a GNI per capita of USD 1 110, is now becoming a lower middle income country (above USD 1 035). Morocco is the only North African country that is still a lower middle income country, though exceeding Mauritania's GNI per capita by 260% (and Chad's and Mali's by 400%). Tunisia and Algeria are ranked as upper middle income countries (above USD 4 085) with a GNI per capita of USD 4 150 and 4 110, respectively (Figure 2.16).


Human Development Index

The Human Development Index (HDI) is a broad measure of wellbeing that combines aspects of health, economics and education. It further underlines differences in development levels. In the 2012 HDI rankings, Niger was last, with Mali and Chad only a few places higher (Table 2.1).

Real GDP growth

Although the Sahelian countries have fallen further behind their northern neighbours in terms of combined GDP since 1970, the gap peaked in 1985 and has since fallen. North Africa grew strongly during the 1970s and 1980s, a period often referred to as the lost decades of Sub-Saharan Africa (Figure 2.17). This period was marked by the debt crises, ensuing structural adjustment programmes and the severe droughts that particularly affected the Sahelian countries. However, over the last two decades the Sahelian countries' real GDP growth rate exceeded that of North Africa. Since 2000, GDP growth further accelerated in the Sahel, averaging 5.5%. With the exception of Niger, all Sahel countries grew faster than their North African neighbours.


Figure 2.15
The Sahara-Sahelian GDP divide



* latest data available 2009

Source: SWAC/OECD based on WDI 2013, World Bank

Figure 2.16
Per capita income



* 2009 data; ** 2011 data

Source: SWAC/OECD based on WDI 2013, World Bank


Table 2.1
Human Development Index (HDI), 2012

Rank (out of 187)	Countries	HDI Value in 2012	Quintiles	
1	Norway	0.955	1st	Very high human development
64	Libya	0.769	2nd	High human development
93	Algeria	0.713	3rd	Medium human development
94	Tunisia	0.712	3rd	
130	Morocco	0.591	4th	
155	Mauritania	0.467	5th	
182	Mali	0.344	5th	Low human development
184	Chad	0.340	5th	
187	Niger	0.304	5th	

Source: UNDP 2013

Figure 2.17

Real GDP growth rates over the past four decades (annual average)




* Data for Libya 2000–2009
** North Africa average excluding Libya

Source: SWAC/OECD based on WDI 2013, World Bank

Figure 2.18

Per capita real GDP growth rates over the past four decades (annual average)



* Data for Libya 2000–2009
** North Africa average excluding Libya

Source: SWAC/OECD based on WDI 2013, World Bank

NOTES \\\

1 *The data on urbanisation is from Africapolis - SWAC/OECD (2014, forthcoming). These data were compiled by combining census data with aerial and satellite imagery, providing estimates of size and growth of urban agglomerations from 1950–2010. These data are particularly useful for international comparisons as they use a uniform definition of "urban", an agglomeration with more than 10 000 inhabitants.*

2 *In 1950, nearly 30% of the total urban population lived in Bamako (83 000).*

3 *In the medium variant, average annual growth is 3.1% and total population for the Sahel is estimated at 156 million inhabitants.*

4 *In the low variant for North Africa, annual average population growth is 0.5%. It remains stable from 2035 onwards at 103 million inhabitants.*

5 *For example, Alaka Basu, a Professor of development sociology at Cornell University and Kaushik Basu, Chief Economist, World Bank wrote in a recent letter to The Economist "Although it is true that birth rates in Africa have not fallen as much as the UN expected there is more reason to be optimistic about the future than you think. If one goes by the historical experience of fertility declines, several features of contemporary life in Africa, such as the recent increase in contraceptive use and reduction in childhood death-rates and AIDS mortality, suggest that a demographic dividend might now be on the horizon. The continent lost out by beginning its fertility decline when investments in family planning and population policies were falling drastically, but that disinterest is now in abeyance" (The Economist, 22 March 2014).*

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Chapter 3

Petroleum and networks of influence in the Sahara-Sahel

3.1 Oil companies in the Sahel 94
3.2 Remoteness 99

In 2013, petroleum alone accounted for roughly one-quarter of the cumulative GDP of Sahara-Sahel countries; Algeria and Libya were Africa's third and fourth top-ranking producers, respectively, trailing behind Nigeria and Angola. Algeria was also the leading African producer of natural gas (almost 40% of total African output), and Europe's second major supplier after Russia (Figure 3.1).

Although Algeria and Libya began production in the late 1950s, the other countries have a more recent petroleum history. The Doba basin of southern Chad entered production as recently as 2003. Mauritania started producing in 2006 (Chinguetti offshore oil field 70 kilometres from Nouakchott). Niger entered the circle in 2011 (Agadem oil fields).

3.1 OIL COMPANIES IN THE SAHEL

Foiled regional ambitions by Algeria's Sonatrach company


No description of the influence of the *Société nationale de transport et de la commercialisation des hydrocarbures* (Sonatrach) in Sahara-Sahel countries would be complete without a discussion of the Algerian hydrocarbon sector. As the continent's leading producer of natural gas, Algeria reported an annual output of 77 billion cubic meters in 2012, ahead of Egypt (54 billion cubic metres) and Nigeria (41 billion cubic metres). In 2012, it produced 1.66 million barrels of oil a day, making it the third largest producer in Africa, after Nigeria and Angola.

Yet despite the figures, the outlook is quite bleak. Algeria is feeling the strain of its 2005 Hydrocarbons Law and the regulation requiring that Sonatrach hold a 51% controlling share in all new oil projects launched in the country. Furthermore, since 2006, foreign oil companies have been required to pay a special tax when the price of crude exceeds 30 dollars per barrel (the case every year since 2004). This policy has had two outcomes: first, the country saw the massive fall in interest of foreign companies, with calls for tender expiring unanswered since 2004[1]; and second, some oil companies already active in Algeria are not investing as much as hoped and remain on stand-by. Yet, foreign oil companies are key players given the vastness of the area (requiring extensive capital) and the technological challenges inherent in complex exploration activities. Discoveries are declining, and most are now made by Sonatrach[2] (83% of the 20 oil fields discovered in 2011) (Figure 3.3).

Domestic consumption of petroleum products (from 11 to 18 million tonnes between 2002 and 2012) (AIE, 2014) and of natural gas (20 to 28 billion cubic metres from 2002 to 2012) is growing. Algeria's current dilemma is to determine how long it can continue to honour its natural gas and oil contracts with foreign partners amid stagnating production combined with increased consumption. The 2012 reform of the 2005 Hydrocarbons Law remains vague and its impact, uncertain.[3] Moreover, Sonatrach acts as a social pressure valve. Between 2010 and 2011, to prevent the spread of the Arab Spring to Algeria, it hired 5 000 new employees.[4] At the same time, its payroll swelled from 874 million to 1 billion euros. All of this has taken a toll on its capacity for action in neighbouring countries.

Algeria wants to achieve political and economic clout in the region through oil. By investing in oil, it gains a foothold in its "sphere of influence" while improving its knowledge of the geology of its cross-border basins.[5] In this respect, the Petroleum Exploration and

Figure 3.1
African petroleum production (000 barrels per day)



Sources: BP, *Statistical Review of World Energy* 2014 and US Energy Information Administration 2014

Production Corporation or Sipex, created in 1999, is Sonatrach's primary mechanism.

Sipex's expansion into the Sahel began in 2005 when it acquired a 20% share in two blocks held by Total in the Mauritanian section of the Taoudenni basin. It also took a share in the Nigerien block in Kafra (north-eastern section of the country) where it has since delayed its drilling obligations.[6] The same thing happened in the Malian section of the same basin, where it abandoned five blocks obtained under a partnership with the Italian company ENI,[7] keeping only one block for itself.

The Chinese strategy

Active in the Sudan since 1996, the China National Petroleum Corporation (the CNPC is one of three state companies together with CNOOC and Sinopec) entered Ghinguetti in the

Table 3.1
Sahel-Maghreb region producers


Country (production start-up year)	Major companies	2012 output	Proven reserves in 2012	Hydrocarbon revenues as budgetary %
Algeria (1958)	Sonatrach/ BP/Statoil/ ENI/Anadarko /CNPC/Pertamina	Petroleum: 1.66 million b/d Natural gas: 81.5 billion cubic metres	Petroleum: 12.2 billion barrels Natural gas: 159 trillion cubic feet	70%: 71 billion USD revenue in 2011
Libya (1961)	NOC/ ENI/Gazprom/Shell	Petroleum: 1.5 million b/d Natural gas: 12.2 billion cubic metres	Petroleum: 48 billion barrels Natural gas: 54.6 trillion cubic feet	75%: 42 billion USD revenue in 2010
Tunisia (1970)	ETAP/ OMV/BG/ENI	Petroleum: 52 000 b/d Natural gas: 0.2 billion cubic metres	Petroleum: 0.38 billion barrels Natural gas: 2 trillion cubic feet	
Mauritania (2006)	Petronas/ Tullow/Total	Petroleum: 6 000 b/d Natural gas: 0	Petroleum: 100 million barrels Natural gas: 1.2 trillion cubic feet	68 million USD, 7% (non-ODA) in revenue in 2011
Chad (2003)	Exxon/ Government of Chad since the 2014 buyback of shares from Chevron/ Petronas	Petroleum: 100 000 b/d Natural gas: 0	Petroleum: 1.5 billion barrels Natural gas: 0	78%: 2.2 billion USD revenue in 2011
Niger (2011)	CNPC	Petroleum: 20 000 b/d Natural gas: 0	Petroleum: 600 million barrels Natural gas: 0	

Sources : BP Statistical Review of World Energy 2013, www.etap.com.tn/index.php?id=1164, Africa Energy Intelligence, CIA World Fact book, www.tresor.mr, www.opec.org, EITI

Mauritanian coastal basin in 2005. Following dry drilling operations in 2007, the company returned its zone to the government in 2009, as it did in the Mauritanian Taoudenni. Although the CNPC is not yet established in Mali, it is very active in Niger and Chad. It entered Niger in 2003 on the Ténéré block (Diffa, Zinder and Agadez regions [8]). In 2008, it took control of the gigantic Agadem zone in the eastern part of the country, where production began in December 2011 (20 000 bpd).


China's presence in the Sahel partly results from the need to secure its oil supply, which since 1993 is no longer met by domestic coal and petroleum resources.[9] In Sudan and in the Sahel, China has taken advantage of the pull-out by other oil companies. In Niger, reserves on the Agadem block have been established since the late 1990s. However, the Elf, Exxon and Petronas multinational companies do not consider development of this project to be cost-effective given its enclavement and the volume of exploitable reserves. Furthermore, although roughly ten companies expressed interest in developing Agadem in 2008, very few agreed to the conditions set by President Mamadou Tandja. He imposed the expensive and construction of a refinery in Zinder with a capacity of 20 000 barrels per day, making profits difficult. Chinese companies follow a different strategy. State-run, they can afford to make short-term investments devoid of the slightest profit on the hope of a return over the very long term, thus securing crude reserves.

Figure 3.2
Petroleum production, exports and consumption in Algeria



Source: IEA, *Oil Information Statistics* 2014

Figure 3.3
Natural gas production, exports and consumption in Algeria



Source: IEA, *Natural Gas Information Statistics* 2013

Western major and minor players

Apart from Algerian and Asian companies, the four Sahel countries "play host" to other foreign companies. The largest of the high-stakes players, like Elf (now Total-Fina-Elf), Exxon, Chevron and ENI, have engaged in exploration activities one after the other since the 1970s in Chad, Mali and Niger. In Mauritania, exploration activity in the Taoudenni basin was limited before the massive influx of companies in the mid-2000s. After the announcement of the 2001 Chinguetti discovery in the country's coastal waters, at a time when prices were rising, they wanted to get control of blocks still unassigned. However, Total (a French company), Repsol (Spanish) and Wintershall (German) withdrew from the country in 2012.

After attracting major players like ENI (Italy now included), Mali has assigned oil exploration to small operators, some of who do not hold licenses anywhere else in Africa. The same scenario played out in Niger. In a country dominated until recently by the CNPC, many small, unknown companies were granted licenses in 2012.

In Chad, the U.S. consortium Exxon/Chevron[10] and Petronas (Malaysia) operated the Doba fields in the southern part of the country. Output has been exported since 2003 via a pipeline linked to the port town of Kribi, in southern Cameroon. The drop in production at these fields (from 150 000 to 86 000 barrels per day in ten years) was offset by CNPC output at the Ronier fields near Bousso (since 2011, 20 000 b/d and later 60 000 b/d), followed by Mangara and Mandila (near the Central African Republic border), which Caracal Energy and Glencore placed in production in 2013. Since late 2013, these fields have produced 36 000 b/d. Another interesting area in Chad is the Erdis sub-basin (on the border with Sudan and Libya). Starting in 2010, the government decided to issue licenses to companies as yet unknown in African, similar to the course taken by Niger and Mali.[11]

By turning to small companies, Chad, Mali and Niger have made choices that could compromise the future. These companies have no technical expertise in the exploration field. They are keeping investments to a minimum in anticipation of a discovery at a nearby basin in order to establish a partnership. The risk involves "stalling" exploration in entire zones. Since 2007, Mauritania has slowed its licensing process and eliminates companies that fail to comply with their contractual obligations. The outlook for these Sahel countries is uncertain. Exploration in areas subject to greater desertification demands heightened security measures (military and private security companies). The cost of exploration in the Sahara could increase significantly. The profitability of petroleum projects requires that very large reserves be proven, which is not always the case.

The outcome of recent drilling in the Mauritanian section of the Taoudenni basin has been disappointing, and activities in this vast basin could grind to a halt for several years. For countries that are already producers, like Chad and Niger (and to a lesser degree, Mauritania), reserves may not be large, but still hold the promise of several more decades worth of investment.

Petroleum governance

The petroleum sector has been a recent concern among Sahel leaders. Only Chad and Niger have established a Ministry of Petroleum, while Mauritania and Mali are content to make do with a Ministry of Mines. Mauritania and Chad have national companies that manage the government's share of productive fields. In Mali, the *Autorité pour la promotion de recherche pétrolière* (AUREP), or authority for the promotion of oil exploration, grants the blocks; it can be considered a branch of the Ministry of Mines, with the notable distinction of having its own premises, budget and discretionary control over petroleum matters. Two scenarios are possible: state-owned blocks are developed with the support of "friendly" corporations;[12] or the state holds minority shares in zones operated by foreign companies. These ministries, national companies or agencies function exclusively on the skill of a few rare individuals. Furthermore, these institutions are very often short-circuited by presidencies concerned with retaining control over a potentially very lucrative sector. Often, this results in contracts that are relatively disadvantageous for states because of ineffective negotiations by presidential advisors ill-equipped to transact with multinationals.

Traditional financial donors have long tried to influence the governance of petroleum resources.

In the late 1990s, although multinationals were convinced of the petroleum potential of the Doba basin fields (south), they were reluctant to invest on their own. Four billion dollars was needed to develop the fields, processing plants and pipeline to Kribi in Cameroon. The World Bank and the European Investment Bank entered the process by guaranteeing the private investments and lending funds to Chad. In return, both institutions compelled the government of Chad to create a fund for future generations and to spend almost all of the revenues generated on priority sectors (health, education, infrastructures and water). In 2008, however, buoyed by its now considerable resources, Chad decided to repay the World Bank and EIB loans before maturity, thus largely freeing it from international oversight.

Niger's petroleum project took the same path that Sudan had followed in the second half of the 1990s: China supplied all of the funding. Traditional funding bodies were never involved.

Mauritanian oil production began a year after the coup that ousted Maaouya Ould Taya in 2005. The international community forced the putschist government of Ely Ould Mohamed Vall to agree to the transparent use of oil revenues. Since 2007, a monthly petroleum report has been published on the internet[13] (daily output, exports, revenues paid to government and the operator, etc.). Though a small producer (6 000 b/d on average in 2013), Mauritania is one of the most transparent countries in the world.

3.2 REMOTENESS

Enclavement poses the problem of shipping crude oil to ports. Local processing of a portion of the crude is also a possibility.

Chinese refineries: A local solution for crude oil

In Niger, Mamadou Tandja was no doubt persuaded to license the Agadem field (estimated at 300 to 600 million barrels) to the Chinese because of the construction of a 20 000 b/d refinery in Zinder, the country's second largest city. The country consumes 10 000 b/d in petroleum products, previously imported from Nigeria, which amounts to half of Zinder's capacity. Opened in 2011, the refinery's cost-effectiveness is however uncertain. The gasoline it produced sold at the pump for 0.82 euros in 2012 compared to 0.45 euros in Nigeria, where it is subsidised. The city is located near the Nigerian border. Every day, thousands of barrels of refined contraband products cross the border unbeknownst to customs officials. Furthermore, the CNPC claims to have expended 980 million dollars on the refinery. This amount is disputed by the Nigerian side and by a UNDP audit.

In 2011, the CNPC built a refinery in Chad with the same capacity as the Zinder refinery based in Djermaya, 40 kilometres north of N'Djamena. The Ronier and Mimosa fields near the town of Bousso (south-west) supply Djermaya via a 311-kilometre long pipeline. After opening in 2011, President Idriss Déby closed the refinery from 19 January to 9 February 2012. The decision was made in retaliation for the artificial gas shortage created by CNPC, expressing its dissatisfaction with a sale price considered too low. While this problem and the issue of managerial positions to be filled by residents of Chad, and their salaries, were being negotiated by the Minister of Justice, relations between the government and CNPC remained complicated. In August 2013, operations were halted at exploration sites on the Ronier blocks after crude was found stored in open pits, a practice in violation of Chadian legislation and dangerous during the rainy season.

Exporting crude oil from Sahel areas

Given the weakness of the local market, petroleum exploitation in the Sahara-Sahel depends on pipelines. Chad constructed a 1 070 kilometre pipeline between the Doba production basin and Kribi in Cameroon.

For excess output from the Agadem block (not processed in Zinder) east of the Niger, CNPC has shown a preference since 2010 to


transit through Chad. The pipeline would take it to the Chad border some 200 kilometres away. It would then travel north of Lake Chad, and on to the facility operated by ExxonMobil, carrying petroleum from the Doba basin to the port of Kribi in Cameroon. In Chad, the new connecting structure would be 800 kilometres long. Negotiations between the Ministers of Petroleum for Niger, Chad (transit nation) and Cameroon are underway.

Drilling conducted by Total in the Mauritanian section of the Taoudenni basin in 2009 and 2013 took place more than 600 kilometres from the coast. Expensive infrastructures will have to be built in the event of a significant discovery, which was still not the case in 2013. The most likely probability is the discovery of gas, in which case the hydrocarbon would have to be liquefied on the Mauritanian coast given the limited regional market. In the event of drilling (seemingly not for several years until the political and security situation allow) in the Malian Taoudenni, output would travel through Mauritanian territory.

The Trans-Saharan Gas Pipeline

The Trans-Saharan Gas Pipeline project would make it possible to ship natural gas (30 billion cubic metres per year) from Nigeria to Europe via Niger and Algeria. Its appeal is proportional to the growing gas needs of the European Union (where gas consumption is declining but where production is declining even faster).

Map 3.1
Petroleum in Niger



It is also contingent on the notion of decreased dependence on Russia (currently supplying 30% of the gas needs of the 28 member countries compared to Algeria's 14%).

At an estimated cost of some 21 billion USD, the Trans-Saharan Gas Pipeline – TSGP – or Nigal (Nigeria/Algeria) project was officially launched in September 2001. It remained on hold until 2003, when gas prices skyrocketed (Figure 3.4).


In 2006, a feasibility study confirmed that the project was economically sound and technically feasible. The Trans-Saharan Gas Pipeline would start in the Niger Delta region near the town of Warri (south-east Nigeria), head to Kano in northern Nigeria (over 1 000 km), and travel 841 km through Niger and close to 2 000 through Algeria to the Hassi R'mel gas transmission connections (northern region of the Algerian Sahara). In 2009, Nigeria, Niger and Algeria signed an intergovernmental agreement on TSGP development.

Security risks

The Niger Delta is prey to chronic instability as a result of action by the Movement for the Emancipation of the Niger Delta (MEND). MEND believes that the petroleum revenues paid to the nine producing states (13% of revenues) are too low. Together with other movements (Ogoni and Ijaw), it also denounces the practices of oil companies (pollution and discrimination against local populations). The instability generated by MEND caused output to drop from 2.2 million b/d (Organisation of the Petroleum Exporting Countries quota) in 2006, to less than one million in 2009.

In 2009, amnesty legislation enabled the disarmament of 26 000 militants. Many of them returned to criminal activities, such as siphoning off crude oil from pipelines at a cost of billions of dollars a year. These losses were estimated at 150 000 b/d in 2011 and 200 000 b/d in 2013 (a year in which the government also suggested a figure of 400 000 b/d). Although gas and oil production reverted starting in 2010 to their pre-2006 levels, investment diminished as a result of security concerns and legal ambiguities (the Petroleum Industry Bill has been under discussion since 2007). The flow could therefore diminish further because of chronic under-investment over the past several years.

Figure 3.4
Natural gas prices (average import price per EU pipeline)



Source: SWAC/OECD based on IEA, *Natural Gas Information* 2013 and 2014


In addition, three threats exist along the proposed route: Touareg groups in Niger and Mali, Sahara-Sahel Islamist groups and Boko Haram in northern Nigeria.

In Algeria, since the January 2013 hostage-taking at In Amenas, AQIM and other terrorist groups are taken very seriously. The affected site produces 10% of total national gas output. Since then, Algeria, one of the TSGP's promoters, considers its southern sector relatively non-secure.

The liquid natural gas alternative

Is this project an illusion? Despite a positive feasibility study, only European companies

Map 3.2
The Trans-Saharan Gas Pipeline



Source : Sonatrach 2014

have expressed interest. Was their motive to flatter authorities in host countries to obtain access to reserves and thus to oil fields? The fact that no American or Asian company has come forward raises doubts about the true profitability of the gas pipeline.

Furthermore, large natural gas consumers like Germany, France, Great Britain and Spain now prefer to purchase liquefied natural gas that can be exported by ship. Since 2009, many liquefaction plant projects have sprung up in Nigeria. While the infrastructure costs are significant (the cost of a liquefaction unit amounts to billions of dollars), the liquid natural gas option would circumvent the security problems inherent in a trans-Saharan gas pipeline. Russia, apparently concerned by the project several years ago, no longer sees it as a serious competitor.

NOTES

1 *Although the 2005 Call for Tenders was a success with 9 of the 10 licenses offered being allocated, the others were all failures. In 2008, 4 of 16 licenses were allocated; in 2009, 3 of 10 licenses were allocated; and in 2011, 2 of 10 were allocated.*

2 *However, reports issued by the national corporation do not mention the specific locations or volumes per discovery.*

3 *Application decrees have been issued sparingly since early 2014. Apart from more favourable conditions among oil companies for non-conventional gas and oil exploration (shale gas, tight gas resources, etc.), to what extent is conventional field exploration (oil and natural gas) involved? The reform does not question either the 51% for Sonatrach or the tax on exceptional profits.*

4 *Climbing from 47 965 employees in 2010 to 51 521 in 2011 (2011 Annual Report, Sonatrach).*

5 *The Taoudenni basin is shared by Mali and Mauritania and "spills over" into the south-western part of Algeria. Although Sonatrach's exploration of the Algerian Taoudenni has been very limited, the company profits doubly from the outcome of its searches by taking blocks in bordering countries.*

6 *On signing oil contracts, the companies agree to a minimum work programme during the term of the exploration periods. This could take the form of specific work (gravimetry, seismic, drilling) or an amount to be spent on field studies.*

7 *Sonatrach therefore has a stake in the five licenses but has not drilled a single well. Junior oil companies have since taken control of these licenses in agreements with the Malian government. The Canadian junior company Simba Energy took back block 3 in 2012, while the French-Angolan PetroPlus operates licenses 1A and 1B. A few weeks prior to the end of the transition in Mali, the last two councils of ministers in July 2013 allocated license 4 to the United Arab Emirates-based fund New Catalyst Capital Investments and license 6 to Corvus Resources Management (Raven Resources Group). The main role of these junior companies is to attract larger companies with the necessary exploration resources. The decision to issue licenses to junior players is risky, however. It could cause the area to stagnate for lack of funds and expertise.*

8 *Africa Energy Intelligence, No. 475, 26 November 2003.*

9 *In 2012, China consumed 10 million barrels per day and produced 4.1 million (BP, 2013)*

10 *Since May 2014, the state of Chad has owned 25% of Chevron's assets in the country through a Glencore trader loan.*

11 *The first to obtain a license in 2010 was SAS Petroleum led by the former governor of the Nigerian state of Borno, Ali Modu Sheriff. The Brazilian company Petra Energia owns concessions. As in Mali, Simba Energy owns a block on Erdis (in addition to two others in the southern area of the country).However, this enclaved zone requires resources available only to major players.*

12 *Such as between the Société mauritanienne des hydrocarbures (Mauritanian hydrocarbon corporation) and Sonatrach.*

13 *Mauritanian Treasury site.*

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Part II Securing the Sahara-Sahel by integrating its social and spatial mobility

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Chapter 4

Ancient and new mobility in the Sahara-Sahel

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The Sahara is an ancient site of trade, having been criss-crossed and structured by the movement of caravans since the Middle Ages. Its importance waned, however, during the colonial era, when attention shifted to the maritime trade routes connecting West and North Africa with the European continent. Following independence, individual states developed ties with each other, most notably in the 1990s, when Libya strengthened its policies towards Sahelian countries and Maghreb leaders sought to build economic relationships with their neighbours. Yet while this area defined by mobility is indeed shared by many, it cannot be described as "common" from an economic point of view.

4.1 PEOPLE, PRODUCTS AND ROUTES


The Sahara has always played the role of intermediary between North Africa and Sub-Saharan Africa. Military routes passed through it before the Roman era, although caravan traffic was minimal at the time. With the Roman acquisition of the new province of Africa after the fall of Carthage in 146 BC, trade between the North African plains and the palm groves of the northern Sahara continued. The trade in ivory from Sub-Saharan Africa was carried out by Saharan tribes. These nomads traded products from the northern regions, including dates, salt and sheep, in exchange for grain and wine. Dromedary breeders and owners provided transportation. Roman administrators also paid them to supply small, isolated forts with fresh vegetables and to deliver the mail. The southern region remained largely unknown, with its arid zones and their plains forming a hostile border.

The first indications of significant trade activity date back to the 8th century, when Islamised Berber groups developed routes travelled by dromedaries. While an accurate picture starts to emerge in written Arabic sources from the 10th century, the oldest evidence is archaeological in nature. In the Sahel areas that surround Lake Chad, on the western shore of the Niger River and the southern shore of the Senegal River, princely tombs rich in funerary artefacts confirm a trans-Saharan trade in luxury items. The artefacts include weapons and armour from Islamic countries and other items from farther afield, including carnelian pearls from India.

Most of the earliest routes are well known. One connected Tahert in Algeria with Gao in Mali as early as the middle of the 8th century; another linked Sijilmasa in Morocco with Koumbi Sahel in southern Mauritania. Beginning in the 9th century, eastern routes connected Egypt with Gao along Lake Chad or Cyrenaica before heading deep into the desert. One route, from the Gulf of Sidra in Libya to the Gao region, passed through Fezzan, Tassili n'Ajjer, Ahaggar, and Adrar des Iforas (Map 4.1). Caravan journeys were long and fraught with danger. The trip from Sijilmasa to the kingdom of Ghana took fifty days, and from Gao to Egypt it took eighty days. The routes were trails marked by camels' hoof prints. In the mountainous regions, these trails followed the valleys, forming a natural connection from well to well through the most easily traversable passes. On sandy terrain they would disappear, and the caravan would rely on the guide. Every forty kilometres, the traders would stop at a watering hole or a palm grove.

Trans-Saharan trade obeyed the laws of supply and demand, based on complementarity between the northern and southern parts of the desert. Islamic countries imported ostrich feathers, ivory, plant- or animal-based medicines, and, most importantly, the gold dust needed to mint coins and trade with other areas (three tonnes of gold are estimated

Map 4.1
Trans-Saharan commerce according to Monod's circulation zones



Source: Drozdz M. 2005, geoconfluences.ens-lyon.fr, ENS-Lyon / DGESCO


to have crossed the Sahara annually). Starting in the 11th century, the slave trade began to expand. Slave trafficking was conducted by Sahelian leaders who had gradually become Islamised and who, having no agricultural or mining resources, procured slaves from the non-Islamised societies to the south. Little mention is made in written sources about products exported from North Africa. However, archaeological digs have uncovered dishware, decorative copperware, metal bars, perfume, fabrics and silks. Salt from the Saharan salt mines also made its way over the trade routes to the south.

Before the 11th century, trader communities existed on the political and geographical fringes of North African societies, and they underwent a dual process of Arabisation and Islamisation. Extremely active economically, these groups included Muslim minorities who were considered dissidents, such as the Kharijites.[1] These entrepreneurs partnered with other minorities who were not Muslim, including Jews. The Kharijites provided an interface with the south and the Jews with the Mediterranean basin in the north. The vitality of these communities was rooted in family loyalties and religious affiliation. This facilitated investment in watering holes and supply stations, setting up economic links and trading posts and creating a warranty system for currency exchange activities and payment orders.

Starting in the 11th century, more cities were impacted by the annual comings and goings of the caravans, which would spend a number of months in the political hubs of the kingdoms of Sub-Saharan Africa. Travel was less risky; the caravanners would navigate by the stars and were familiar with the different watering holes, salt mines and rest stops. They would send messengers ahead of the caravans to make preparations for their arrival, accommodations and administrative formalities.

Map 4.2

Trans-Saharan routes in the Middle Ages




Source: le-cartographe.net

Trade was changing the desert. The Islamisation of the Sahara followed in the wake of the traders. The Monarch of Gao was the first to convert in the 10th century. Starting in the middle of the 11th century, conversion became more commonplace among the reigning families of the Sahelian kingdoms.[2] This process of Islamisation, no doubt driven by the ulemas,[3] remained closely associated with trade. The Muslim religion offered traders guarantees through the commercial laws, values and points of reference it upheld, transcending specific local factors.

Oases were established. Artesian well technology and foggaras (underground channels siphoning water from shallow aquifers) made wells and irrigation possible. Cities sprung up initially in the western Sahara and later in the central Sahara. Timbuktu and Djenne benefited from the growth in trade. Agadez, Katsina, Kano and Zinder became gathering points for networks of traders and the movement of goods that connected Hausa country with Tripolitania and Cyrenaica (present-day Libya). Other cities sprang up and disappeared, temporarily serving as fleeting terminals for the arrival and departure of the large caravans. Examples include Tegdaoust, Koumbi Saleh[4] (both in present-day Mauritania), and Sijilmasa (in present-day Morocco), which entered in decline when the power base of the Mali Empire shifted to Songhay in the 15th century.

Map 4.3
Sahelian empires and their routes



Source: UNESCO, *General History of Africa*, volumes I to IV 1980-1988


4.2 COMMERCE UNDER COLONISATION

Gradual decline in trade

When the Europeans established trading posts in the 16th century, African gold was diverted to the Atlantic coast. However, trans-Saharan trade did not come to a complete halt. The Bornu Empire maintained ties with North Africa through the Fezzan region (Map 4.3). After defeating the Portuguese near Tangiers in 1578, the Saadien dynasty of Morocco sent its troops to conquer Gourara in the east and the Songhay Empire in the south. The army of Pacha Djouderr – born in Spain and converted to Islam – crossed the desert and wiped out the Sudanese troops in March 1591. While ties of subjection between the Sharif Kingdom and the Niger territories weakened in the 17th century, trade continued. The number of slaves traded to Algeria and Libya between 1700 and 1880 is estimated at 65 000 and 400 000, respectively.

In 1899, with the capture of the In Salah oasis, the French occupation of the Sahara became a reality. The conquest was slow and painful. In 1902, the Touareg nobility in

Map 4.4
Exploration itineraries 1770–1890



Sources: Encyclopædia Universalis, *Le grand atlas des explorations* 1991; Bouillet M.N., *Atlas universel d'histoire et de géographie* 1865

Ahaggar was decimated during the Battle of Tit. The following year, a series of military operations led to the surrender of the Kel Ataram Oulliminden in what is now northern Mali. The colonial presence slowed down traditional trans-Saharan trade. The desert areas were abandoned in favour of the Mediterranean and Atlantic coasts, with routes organised around ports. In Chad, the southern centres of Fort Archambault and Moundou were on the rise; cotton fibre and livestock were sent to the Gulf of Guinea for export by sea. In 1905, Great Britain organised a free marine transportation service between Tripoli and Lagos, from where merchandise could be sent on to Kano in Nigeria by rail. It became more expensive to transport goods through the desert than by sea.

Against this backdrop, trade in the Sahara became refocused on the regional and local levels. The economic space was shrinking. Commercial logic was based more on pastoral mobility and regional solidarity than on profits from retailing products. Caravans did, of course, continue to cross the desert. However, goods shipped across the Sahara were heavily taxed when they arrived in the Sahel. Only the

Touareg salt caravans from Mali and Niger continued. They would supply the Taoudenni oasis first, then those at Bilma and Fachi, with millet, skins and fabric. On returning south, they would bring back salt, natron and dates.[5]

The borders

The Sahara held no economic interest for the French colonisers. Because it was a dry zone and a blind spot as far as economic activity went, the region was controlled indirectly by a military government. Traditional leaders served as assistant administrators. In northern Sudan, law and order were maintained by the French and Sudanese *méharistes* camel corps. *Goumiers*[6] and agents, recruited among the nomadic populations were responsible for conveying messages from the judicial administrator to the local Touareg or Moorish leaders.

In addition to being controlled by a number of powers, the French Sahara was divided into three areas. The first area was the southern Algerian territories, subdivided into four separate territories, namely Aïn Sefra, Ghardaïa, Touggourt and the Oases, before being organised into two departments – Oasis and Saoura – on August 7, 1957. The second area was West Africa, which included Mali and Niger. The third area was Equatorial Africa, which included Chad, Gabon, Congo, and present-day Central African Republic. The Sahel regions were politically cut off from North Africa.

Infrastructure and the Common Organization of the Saharan Regions

While colonisation weakened the ties between Sub-Saharan Africa and the Arab countries, they were not completely severed. Starting in the late 19th century, French engineers began working on plans for a trans-Saharan railroad along a number of possible routes. In 1874, at the initiative of the Algiers Chamber of Commerce, Paul Soleillet introduced the idea of a railway line connecting the Algerian coast to Senegal via Mali.

After Colonel Laperrien established a liaison between the Sudanese and Algerian troops in 1904, trans-Saharan railway projects were revived for political and strategic reasons. Extending the Colomb-Béchar railway as far as Saint-Louis would make it possible to take Morocco from the rear, without raising suspicion among the other colonial powers. Although the railway was an instrument of French imperialism, it was not without economic appeal to its supporters. Opening up the Sudanese market to Algerian products would make it possible to market North African wines beyond the Sahara without having to compete with metropolitan wine growers. In return, African labourers would work the land in Mitidja and Oranais.


After World War I, rivalries between the colonial powers faded. Strategic considerations gave way to economic concerns alone, and to exploiting the Saharan and Sudanese territories. Initiated in Libya by the English and Italians during the war, automobile rallies, like the Citroën rally between Touggourt and Timbuktu in 1922–23 (the *Croisière Noire* expedition), confirmed the technical feasibility of trans-Saharan road transport. In 1927, the *Compagnie générale transsaharienne* (CGT) introduced a bi-weekly trans-Saharan automobile transportation service on the Colomb-Béchar – Reggan – Gao route. In 1935, the same company introduced the first Colomb-Béchar – Gao – Niamey – Cotonou airline connection.

With the economic crisis that started in 1929, however, the trans-Saharan railway project was abandoned, and on the eve of World War II, the talk had dwindled to a connection between the Mediterranean and Niger. After 1945, the need for such a connection was challenged; airplanes were now providing regular transportation services between the Mediterranean and the South Atlantic. Although route markers were gradually being put in place on the trans-Saharan routes, they followed the path of oil and gas exploration (Map 4.5).

For over half a century, and with varying degrees of success, France pursued the goal of a Sahara united by transportation infrastructure. The creation of the Common Organization of the Saharan Regions (OCRS) was in some respects the logical outcome of this vision. It was founded on the idea that the administrative fragmentation of the Sahara was an obstacle to the development of an integrated Saharan economy. The OCRS enabling legislation was enacted on 10 January 1957, a few months after oil was discovered in Hassi Messaoud. The

Map 4.5

Trans-Saharan projects before independence



Sources: Les collections de l'histoire n°58:63; Encyclopédie d'outre-mer 1956


OCRS encompassed central and southern Algeria, starting from Laghouat, and the northern regions of Mali, Niger and Chad.

The administrative unification of the desert was intended to foster the development of the Sahara's underground wealth of oil, natural gas and ore. In particular, investment would be directed toward developing Algerian oil resources and building a pipeline to carry it to the Mediterranean. Plans were also made to mine Algerian coal and manganese; uranium development was still in the prospecting stages in the Ahaggar and Aïr mountains.

Apart from underground resources, the OCRS also proposed a comprehensive development project that included agricultural and pastoral resources. This would have involved upgrading the north-south route network and developing east-west rail lines. Lastly, continental France was also interested in protecting nuclear testing sites; the country had already conducted tests in the regions of In Ecker and Reggan.

Niger's Diori Hamani and Chad's François Tombalbaye signed on to the project. However, politicians from Mali and Algeria rejected it. The leaders of the National Liberation Front (FLN) opposed any partitioning of Algeria or sectioning off of the Sahara. The 1962 Evian Agreements marked the end of the OCRS project, but the organisation left a lasting mark. The OCRS had enlisted the support of the Saharan Touareg and Chaamba populations and raised the hope of relative autonomy, if not eventual independence (Map 4.6).

Map 4.6
The OCRS and its hoped-for resources



Source: Les collections de l'histoire n°58:63

4.3 RENEWED TRANS-SAHARAN RELATIONS

Economic strategies of the Maghreb countries…

In the years following independence, the Maghreb countries started developing relations with their southern neighbours. This interest, occurring in tandem with the exploitation of a desert rich in natural resources, materialised in co-operation efforts. The Maghreb countries developed two types of policies in relation to Sub-Saharan Africa:

- The policies developed by Morocco and Tunisia failed to thrive. The Moroccan policy was weakened by land claims in Mauritania and the former Spanish Sahara, and by focusing on relations with France and the European Economic Community. While it had no real presence in the African capitals, Morocco did maintain political relations with Senegal, Gabon, Côte d'Ivoire and Zaire. In the 1970s and 1980s, its commercial trade with other African countries was limited. After independence, Tunisia hoped to serve as a bridge between the Mediterranean and Francophone countries in Sub-Saharan Africa. However, like Morocco, its relations with the West were holding it back and the former Ifriqiya[7] was caught in a vice between its Algerian and Libyan neighbours.
- The policies developed by Algeria and Libya were ambitious, but they delivered limited results. The young Algerian state supported liberation movements in Africa. It tried to support the newly independent states and foster African unity by strengthening co-operation and communications networks. Between 1963 and 1976, 16 cultural and scientific co-operation agreements were signed with Francophone countries for terms of two to five years; 21 transportation and communications agreements were also signed. While many trade agreements were signed (more than 40), they accomplished little. The official level of trade between Algeria and Sub-Saharan Africa was just slightly greater than 1% of the country's total volume of imports and exports. The creation of mixed investment companies was one of Algeria's favourite tools for commercial co-operation with Sub-Saharan Africa. Mifergui-Nimba, a company valued at 2 million dollars, was founded in 1973 to develop Mount Nimba's iron ore. Guinea holds a 50% share in the company, while the balance is owned by a number of countries, including Algeria, through the intermediary of Sonarem.[8] The Algerian- and Mauritanian-owned fishing company Calmap and the Mauritanian marine navigation company Comaunam were created in 1974. That same year, a mixed investment shipping company was created in Benin; one year later, a fishing company was established in Guinea-Bissau and a transportation company in Mali. These companies, often run by a board of directors with equal representation given to Algeria and the country hosting its headquarters, were created using Algerian aid in the form of subsidies or loans, along with technical assistance for maintenance and staff training.

Colonel Gaddafi launched an aggressive African policy. In 1974, Libya signed a series of agreements with African countries to create Libyan-African mixed investment companies. They were financed by the Libyan Foreign Bank, which was founded in 1972, and supported with revenues from the oil and gas industry. In the mid-1970s, Libyan policies became enmeshed in conflicts that affected trade with its neighbours, starting with Chad, with whom there was a dispute over the Aouzou Strip.[9]

After the settlement of the conflict between Chad and Libya (in April 1994, the International Court of Justice assigned sovereignty over the Aouzou Strip to Chad), the border was re-opened and cross-border trade resumed. As it resumed, so did economic, diplomatic and cultural relations. Financial aid and donations (foodstuffs, fuel, ambulances, hydro poles and generators) flooded into Chad. Libya invested heavily in N'Djamena. The resumed trade activity exemplified a policy shift in the absence of support from the Arab countries and the end of French influence. A similar dynamic came into play in most African states. At

the end of 1985, Niger and Libya began to develop ties. Their trade centred on livestock, subsidised Libyan products and cigarettes. It was dominated by Arab business interests, including Nigeriens acting as Libyan front men; the other traders were left with only the trans-border retail trade. Libya was a major importer of livestock; it imported 1 700 tonnes of meat per year and close to 500 000 live lambs and sheep in the 1990s. The limited success of breeding stations forced Libya to turn to foreign countries, notably its neighbour Niger, in order to meet its needs. Spurred by a few prominent Nigerien business people from Agadez, Nigerien livestock exports to Libya intensified in 1984. In 1985, the Libyan company Tagimiat Shariat was created to enter into livestock supply contracts with Nigerien exporters. The insecurity in Touareg areas and the company's financial difficulties in the 1990s affected these cross-border movements. The livestock trade is estimated at West African Franc (XOF) 3 billion per year.

Morocco, Algeria and Tunisia sought to strengthen their relations with Sub-Saharan Africa through South-South socio-economic co-operation, establishing economic interests in those markets, and creating favourable conditions for the Maghreb private sector. Legal frameworks were enhanced. Bilateral co-operation management structures (joint commissions) were created, and the number of visits by government officials and private operators increased. However, each of these countries took a different approach. As Mohammed VI rose to power in Morocco against the backdrop of the Arab Maghreb Union blockade, which had been in place since 1994, the country launched an economic and trade offensive with support from the diplomatic corps and the private sector. In 1998 alone, 20 co-operation agreements were signed, compared to a total of 88 between 1972 and 1985. As a result of this policy, trade between Morocco and its African partners climbed from USD 533 million in 1998 to close to USD 3 billion in 2008, an increase of 463% (Map 4.8).

After being weakened by ten years of civil war, at the end of the 1990s, Algeria undertook to regain its position as an African power. The country resumed its policy of "good offices", highlighting its role in the Non-Aligned Movement. Founded by South Africa, Nigeria, Algeria, Egypt and Senegal, the New Partnership for Africa's Development (NEPAD) enabled President Bouteflika to rejoin the club of Africa's most influential leaders and modernise Algeria's developmental ambitions. In 2006, Algiers stepped forward to mediate the conflict between Touareg combatants and the Malian government. The crisis in Libya and the conflict in Mali reconfigured the power landscape (Chapter 8). Its economic policy focused on two areas: energy and infrastructure. In 2006, Sonatrach,[10] which has interests in Mali, Mauritania and Niger, signed an agreement with Niger for three exploration blocks, but without any real productive investments. The main projects include building the Trans-Saharan Gas Pipeline (TSGP) between Algeria and Nigeria via Niger, and paving the final sections of the Trans-Saharan Highway.


... And the reality of trade

In Maghreb countries, preferred trade partners are chosen in relation to two criteria: one concerns cultural and geographical proximity, and the other concerns, economics. Maghreb countries generally trade with Francophone countries and import goods from South Africa.[11] The exception is Libya, which exports mainly to East Africa. Morocco's main suppliers are Gabon, Côte d'Ivoire and South Africa. Senegal, Nigeria and Côte d'Ivoire are the major importers of Moroccan products. Tunisian companies are present in agro-industries in Côte d'Ivoire, in construction and public works projects in Senegal and in postal service modernisation in Benin. Similarly, the *Banque de l'Habitat de Tunisie* is involved in establishing specialised mortgage loans banks in Congo, Mali and Burkina Faso.

A number of key projects have been undertaken. The Tangiers – Nouakchott – Dakar road, telecommunications infrastructure between Morocco and West Africa, the port of Tangiers-Med, the Trans-Saharan Highway and the pipeline between Algeria and Nigeria illustrate the interest among Maghreb countries to strengthen ties with their neighbours in the southern Sahara. In 2008, officials from

Map 4.7
Regional co-operation institutions

Community of Sahel-Saharan States (CEN-SAD)



Arab Maghreb Union (AMU)



African Union (AU)



Sources: uemoa.int, ecowas.int, au.int, maghrebarabe.org, au.int/en/recs/censad

Libya – on behalf of the Community of Sahel-Saharan States or CEN-SAD – and Mali signed on to the Malybia project. The project involves building roads and canals in order to develop and cultivate 100 000 hectares of farmland in the *Office du Niger* area.


The strategic vision of the countries involved and the impassioned speeches of their leaders appear to be out of sync with the reality of the official economic relations between the two sides of the Sahara. Trade between the Maghreb countries and Sub-Saharan Africa, despite strong growth, remains low in comparison to trade relations with historical European partners and emerging powers such as China. In 2009, 2010 and 2011, more than half of Algerian imports came from the European Union. Imports from within Africa represented a mere 4.5%, 4.7% and 3.3% of the country's total imports, while imports from Sub-Saharan Africa represented 2%, 2.5% and 1%. Africa absorbed only 2% of total Libyan exports in 2009, 1.4% in 2010 and 0.4% in 2011. The Maghreb countries absorbed 70% and 50% of that total in 2009 and 2010, respectively, before dropping to 9% in 2011 due to instability in Tunisia, one of Tripoli's main clients. As for Morocco, 77% of its exports were shipped to Europe between 2000 and 2005, while 5% stayed on the African continent. In 2009, a mere 1% of Moroccan imports came from Sub-Saharan Africa. In 2011, countries within the European Union accounted for 85% of exports from Tunisia, while non-Arab countries within the Arab Maghreb Union accounted for 1.5%. As for Tunisian imports from within Sub-Saharan Africa, they represented a mere 7%, 5.6% and 3.6% of the total in 2009, 2010 and 2011, respectively.

The following factors explain this European bias on the part of the Maghreb countries:


- Maghreb economic structures suffer from limited export diversification, which impedes trade with Sub-Saharan Africa (more than 95% of exports from Algeria and Libya are oil and gas products).
- The size of the economies of African countries, the land-locked nature of some, the lack of transportation and communications infrastructure, insufficient numbers of direct shipping links, bureaucratic red tape, tariff and non-tariff trade barriers, the inadequacy of some legislation, and instability are all obstacles to developing trade between North Africa and West Africa.

At a meeting in Niamey, Niger in June 2009, the Trans-Saharan Highway Liaison Committee (CLRT) discussed the limited volume of trade between Maghreb countries and southern

Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS)




West African Economic and Monetary Union (UEMOA)




Map 4.8

Morocco's commercial expansion in Africa



Growth of trade between Morocco and Sub-Saharan Africa 2000–2010



Source: Moroccan Ministry of Economy and Finance 2012


Sahara. According to Mohamed Ayadi, the committee's Secretary General, fewer than 30 vehicles cross the Algeria-Niger border per day. Fifteen times more vehicles cross the Niger-Nigeria border each day.

The grey market

Trans-Saharan trade officially recorded by Maghreb countries represents only a portion of all commercial activity. Trans-Saharan routes are a prime means for trafficking drugs, weapons and migrants. Trade opportunities arise from the subsidy and protectionist policies of Algeria and Libya: arbitrage from reselling subsidised goods for a higher price on the other side of the border, avoiding the often exorbitant import duties and taxes, circumventing import and export prohibitions, or avoiding problems related to the non-convertibility of Maghreb currencies. The grey market and the revenue it produces pose genuine challenges to countries called upon to distinguish between criminal activity and the informal practices upon which many border populations depend for basic consumer goods. The size and dynamism of these activities, as well as the co-operation among the various trafficking networks spread across West Africa and North Africa, attest to the true economic integration of both sides of the Sahara. However, the level of trade has no significant impact on the economies of North Africa or Sub-Saharan Africa, with the exception of the northern borders of some Sahelian countries such as northern Niger, under the influence of Libya, or northern Mali, under the influence of Algeria (Figure 4.2).

The Maghreb and the Sahel, despite their similarities and common heritage, remain insufficiently connected. But the dissemination of cultural, religious and linguistic trends, the movement of people, and their trade relations with one another serve as ancient bridges between the two regions. The need for unskilled labour in southern Algeria and Libya has also given rise to regular migration for work purposes (Chapter 5). But renewed trans-Saharan relations are in the very early stages. Strengthened relations between countries and populations on both sides of the Sahara require infrastructure, increased trade, and a new definition of the border concept. They also require a change in the approach to the territory: one that envisions the Sahara not as an interruption, but as a continuous space, a hyphen between two regions with a common history that share dynamics and movements that are trans-national in nature.


Figure 4.1
The growth of trade between North and Sub-Saharan Africa



Source: UN Comtrade 2013

Map 4.9


Complementary economies?



* The irrigation potential only includes renewable water resources. Algeria and Libya also use non-renewable resources (fossil groundwater), which explains values over 100%.

Source: Moïse Sonou 2000


An Atlas of the Sahara-Sahel © OECD 2014



Source: FAO 2014

Figure 4.2


The size of the informal economy



Source: Bacchetta M. et al., *Globalisation and informal jobs in developing countries*, ILO-WTO 2009.

Map 4.10

The trans-Saharan road gap



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ANNEX 4.A1


Table 4.A1.1

Transport and communications agreements signed by Algeria and countries in Sub-Saharan Africa (1963–1976)


Co-signatory countries	Type of agreement	Place	Date
Angola	Air transport agreement	Algiers	16 January 1976
Cape Verde	Marine navigation agreement Air transport agreement	Algiers Algiers	10 May 1976 10 May 1976
Congo (RP)	Air transport agreement	Brazzaville	1 April 1972
Côte d'Ivoire	Air transport agreement	Algiers	16 February 1967
Guinea	Marine navigation agreement Air transport agreement	Algiers Algiers	12 July 1972 12 July 1972
Guinea-Bissau	Air transport agreement Road transport agreement Air transport agreement	Algiers Algiers Algiers	22 July 1963 20 December 1963 5 February 1972
Mali	Telecommunications agreement Road transport agreement	Bamako Bamako	28 March 1975 30 June 1975
Mauritania	Air transport agreement Road transport agreement Marine navigation and fisheries agreement	Algiers Nouakchott Nouakchott	17 March 1965 1 November 1973 1 November 1973
Niger	Air transport agreement Air transport agreement Road transport agreement	Algiers Niamey Niamey	3 June 1964 1 April 1973 1 September 1976
Nigeria	Air transport agreement	Lagos	25 May 1972
Senegal	Maritime link agreement Air transport agreement	Algiers Dakar	9 September 1972 10 July 1974

Source: Chikh, S. (1980), "La politique africaine de l'Algérie", in S. Chikh, *Le Maghreb et l'Afrique subsaharienne*, Paris, Éditions du CNRS, pp. 1–54, p. 34

Figure 4.A1.1
Geographic breakdown of Algerian and Moroccan exports and imports, 2011
Weight of Africa in imports and exports



Source: 2011 Foreign trade statistics, Directorate-General of Customs - Algeria



Source: 2012 activity report of customs and indirect taxation - Morocco

Table 4.A1.2

Morocco: Bilateral agreements signed with African partners

Partner	Type of agreement	Date
Algeria	Trade and tariff agreement	14 March 1989
Angola	Trade agreement	17 February 1983
Benin	Trade agreement	7 March 1991
Burkina Faso	Trade agreement	29 June 1996
Cameroon	Trade agreement	15 April 1987
Central African Republic	Trade agreement	26 June 1986
Congo	Trade agreement	18 September 1996
Côte d'Ivoire	Trade agreement	5 May 1995
Egypt	Free trade agreement	25 May 1998
Gabon	Trade agreement	6 November 1974
Guinea	Trade and tariff agreement	12 April 1997
Equatorial Guinea	Trade agreement	12 September 1986
Libya	Trade and tariff agreement	26 June 1990
Mali	Trade and tariff agreement	17 September 1987
Mauritania	Trade agreement	4 August 1986
Niger	Trade agreement	7 November 1982
Nigeria	Trade agreement	4 April 1977
DRC	Trade agreement	14 October 1972
Senegal	Trade agreement Additional protocol	13 Febuary 1963 26 March 1981
Sudan	Trade and tariff agreement Additional protocol	19 June 1975 9 December 1982
Chad	Trade and tariff agreement	4 December 1997 (lists not yet drawn up)
Tunisia	Free trade agreement	16 March 1999

Sources: Moroccan Ministry of Industry, Commerce and New Technology and Moroccan International Chamber of Commerce.

Table 4.A1.3

Tunisia: Bilateral agreements signed with African partners

Partner	Type of agreement	Date
South Africa	Trade agreement	3 April 2001
Algeria	Trade and tariff agreement Additional protocol	21 March 1981 15 May 1991
Benin	Trade agreement	4 June 1993
Burkina Faso	Trade agreement	7 January 1993
Cameroon	Trade agreement	5 August 1995
Côte d'Ivoire	Trade agreement	16 May 1995
Djibouti	Trade agreement	29 January 2002
Egypt	Agreement on the establishment of a free trade zone	5 March 1998
Ethiopia	Trade agreement	3 November 1994
Gabon	Trade agreement	30 May 1995
Gambia	Trade agreement	21 June 2000
Guinea	Trade agreement	15 January 1993
Liberia	Trade agreement	29 April 1965
Libya	Agreement on the establishment of a free trade zone	26 November 2001
Mali	Trade agreement	1 July 1986
Morocco	Agreement on the establishment of a free trade zone	16 March 1999
Mauritania	Trade agreement Additional protocol	25 September 1964 28 February 1986
Mozambique	Trade agreement	25 October 1993
Namibia	Trade agreement	26 May 1995
Niger	Trade agreement Additional protocol	30 September 1982 5 June 1992
Nigeria	Trade agreement	27 June 2001
Senegal	Trade agreement Additional protocol	30 March 1962 4 February 1997
Somalia	Trade agreement	31 March 1988
Togo	Trade agreement	16 May 1996
Chad	Trade agreement	12 June 2003
Zimbabwe	Trade agreement	22 June 1990

Source: Central Chamber of Commerce and Industry (Tunisia).

NOTES

1 *Kharijism is a puritan form of Islam. It was brought to the Berbers by the first Arab tribes who fled westward in the early Middle Ages from Umayyad persecution. Kharijism was used by some North Africans as a form of opposition to the Caliphates (Umayyad, Abbasid and Fatimid).*

2 *In the Middle Ages, conversions were generally limited to kings, some of their family members, and other members of the elite. Before the populist jihad movements in the 18th and 19th centuries, Islamisation was an urban phenomenon.*

3 *Ulemas are scholars who research on the Koran and the prophetic traditions (Sunnah). Generally independent from secular power, Ulemas are guardians of the Muslim tradition and are men of reference.*

4 *Koumbi Saleh was the capital of the Empire of Ghana until the 10th century.*

5 *Salt caravans still exist in northern Chad. They are run by Tubu and Chadian Arabs.*

6 *Moroccan Goumiers were soldiers who served in auxiliary units attached to the French Army of Africa between 1908 and 1956. The term Goumier was also occasionally used to designate native soldiers in the French army of the French Sudan and Upper Volta during the colonial era.*

7 *Ifriqiya includes some territories part of North Africa during the Middle Ages. These territories include today's Tunisia, the east of Constantine (eastern Algeria) and Tripolitania (western Libya).*

8 *After Algeria gained independence in 1962, the Algerian government aimed to strengthen its sovereignty by establishing natural resource institutions, such as the National Research and Mining Corporation (SONAREM), after nationalising its mines.*

9 *The Aouzou Strip is a territory that is 114,000 km² and 100 km wide (including the city of Aouzou). Claimed by Libya, it was invaded in 1973 and annexed in 1976. The Aouzou Strip was after reconquered by Chad in 1987.*

10 *Sonatrach (The National Company for Research, Production, Transportation, Processing, and Commercialisation of Hydrocarbons s.p.a.) is an Algerian national company that is a major player in the petroleum industry. In 2009, its revenue amounted to USD 77 billion. With this revenue, Sonatrach is by far the number one company in Africa (all types of activities included throughout Africa).*

11 *The GDPs of South Africa and Nigeria account for 54% of Sub-Saharan Africa's GDP.*

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UEMOA (www.uemoa.int)

United Nations Comtrade (http://comtrade.un.org)

World Trade Organization (www.wto.org)

Chapter 5

Migrations and the Sahara

5.1 A criss-crossed territory 132
5.2 Migratory movements, a regional integration 136

Since the early 1990s, mobility between Sahel and Maghreb countries has become increasingly widespread and diversified. This has set the stage for a common economic and human space developing on the edges of states. Despite gaining significant visibility, Sub-Saharan immigration to the Maghreb is not a focus of public opinion or decision makers. Ignored because of its informality and its initial concentration in Saharan regions or along a few coastal areas of North Africa, Sub-Saharan immigration entered the realm of public debate through its relation to Europe. In light of increasingly rigid European policies, the question of Sub-Saharan migration became a condition of European-Maghreb relations. This situation complicated relations with other African countries.

5.1 A CRISS-CROSSED TERRITORY


Illegal immigration by Sub-Saharans into Europe via the Maghreb represents only a small percentage of migrants (and a small percentage of all people crossing the Mediterranean, who are primarily Maghrebis). Of those who immigrated to Spain between 2000 and 2004, there were eleven times as many Moroccans as migrants from Sub-Saharan Africa, and ten times fewer Algerians than Moroccans, who make up the second largest national group (de Larramendi and Bravo, 2006). Surveillance mechanisms along the Spanish coast pushed illegal migrants south toward Italy, a trend that continues. In 2006 and 2008, the two peak years for landings in Sicily, close to 80% of migrants were from Maghreb countries (including 40% from Morocco), followed by migrants from the Middle East. The number of migrants from Sub-Saharan Africa, most of them fleeing war-torn countries, is minimal;[1] 21 400 landed in Italy in 2006, and 31 000 in 2008 (ibid). Given that these people all transited through Libya, this figure is low compared to the average 1.5 million migrants there. When war erupted in that country in 2011, Tunisia took in 540 000 refugees, and Egypt, 200 000; at the same time, close to 100 000 headed back to Sub-Saharan Africa. Few of them landed in Sicily (Bensaâd, 2012).

In the 1960s, developing the sparsely populated Algerian or Libyan Sahara required bringing in workers from the northern Sahel. The area expanded in step with the development and disenclavement of the Saharan regions (Grégoire, 1999). Immigration in Libya (which reached a total of 20% of the population) outstripped immigration in European countries. Since the early 1970s, waves of deportation affected hundreds of thousands of people. In Mauritania, migration accompanied the birth of the nation, and supported the development of an infrastructure and urban base. In Nouakchott and Nouadhibou today, migrants account for 20% and 30% of the population, respectively. By far the largest percentage of migrants (close to 80%) is located in Nouakchott, not Nouadhibou, a stopover city on the way to Europe.

Since the drop in trans-Saharan trade and up until the eve of independence, mobility was largely confined to the Saharan area. It was based on bartering agricultural products such as millet, dates and salt. At the time of independence, mobility between Mali and Niger, and between Algeria and Libya, began to grow. This consisted mostly of seasonal migration related to agricultural work. An agreement signed by Libya and Niger in 1967 provided a legal framework for this largely informal migration. The agreement was intended to place different kinds of limits on migration, including those that


Map 5.1
The opening up of the Algerian territory

The development of Algerian transport routes



Sources: Drozdz M. 2004; Côte M. 1996

The shrinking of the Saharan area



Space-time calculation: for each of the 30 agglomerations shown, the time needed to travel by road to all remaining 29 agglomerations is summed. In 1962, the Algerian territory has two pockets of less than 600 hours, Algiers metropolitan area and the Hassi Rmel – Hassi Messaoud oil and gas area; half of the Saharan area is between 1 000 and 1 600 hours. In 1992, after completion of several road infrastructure projects, two thirds of the territory falls within the 600 hour range. Only some areas on the southern periphery exceed 1 000 hours.

were based on sectors (agricultural activities) space (the Saharan province of Fezzan) and time (seasonal). Gradually, with the intense urbanisation of the Sahara, a portion of the workforce was directed to urban work sites and services. This movement of people supported a certain level of commercial activity based on the non-convertibility of the Algerian and Libyan dinar, which in turn produced networks of merchants. The migratory system was negatively affected by the droughts of the 1970s and 1980s, as well as by the Touareg rebellions of the early 1990s. The Touareg refugees who flooded in from Mali and Niger were able to build on tribal and family ties of solidarity with the Algerian and Libyan Touareg, thereby helping to "unlock" the border. Confronted with drought and police control, communities moved up to the northern borders and into areas that had been abandoned for centuries. They spread out, settling in various Saharan centres with a degree of mobility, thus creating a vast network.


Despite waves of repression, migration has broadened in scope and continued over time. The number of migrants, their resilience, and above all, their change in profile make these migrations a lasting social and spatial phenomenon. In the early 2000s, the number of migrants in Libya was estimated at 1.5 million, 300 000 in Mauritania, almost as many in Algeria, and tens of thousands in Tunisia and Morocco. Close to 100 000 per year were passing through Agadez, one of the major transit points (Bensaâd, 2003). Most migrants

stayed for a number of years. The migratory pool is growing and extends far beyond the traditional neighbouring countries (Senegal for Mauritania and Morocco, Mali and Niger for Algeria, and Niger and Chad for Libya).

Immigration expands out from the Sahel to all of Africa, dominated by the Gulf of Guinea and a large number of Central African nations. The sociological changes it brings are significant. Most migrants are young urbanites, and women make up 25% of the flow of people. Increasingly, they are highly educated.

No longer confined to the Saharan territories, where it remains strongest and makes a vital demographic contribution to the cities, migration is spreading throughout the Maghreb, from the Saharan border cities to the Atlantic and Mediterranean coastal cities. The impact can be seen in cities such as Nouakchott and Nouadhibou in Mauritania, Sebha in Libya and Tamanrasset in Algeria, where more than 20 nationalities live side by side. Benghazi, Tripoli, Oran, Tangiers, Rabat and Casablanca have African quarters not only on their outskirts, but also in their centres. This reality is part of a diverse social landscape that includes a strong presence in the Saharan labour market (agriculture, construction, and services) (Bensaâd, 2008). Despite unemployment among local populations in the Saharan areas of North African countries, the use of workers from Sub-Saharan Africa is structurally integrated into the economies of North Africa, as evident in the construction industry (including housing, tourism, industrial and service sites). This specific industry,

Map 5.2
The role of Algeria's Adrar rest stop



Source: Drozdz M. 2004

in the throes of expansion, is mobilising small and large companies with fluctuating personnel needs. Sub-Saharans, many of whom have qualifications suited to the construction industry, provide the flexibility needed by the market.

Sub-Saharans also engage in entrepreneurship despite living in precarious economic and legal environments. Student immigration, an excellent source for the development of private post-secondary education in the Maghreb (Mazella, 2009), is increasing. Student immigration is evolving into employment-related immigration in the IT, call centre, communications and office automation sectors.

These dynamics may result from territorial imbalances, such as the situation in the sparsely populated Algerian and Libyan Sahara, and subsequently acquire economic and strategic importance. Trade mobilises major operators and "ant trade" networks alike. The dynamics at work may also emanate from anthropological complementarities. In Mauritania, for example, traditional occupational segmentation dictates that some trades (urban, artisanal or fishing) not practiced by the Moorish population are filled by Sub-Saharan Africans. In Morocco and Tunisia, waning French proficiency, at a time when a growing number of French call centres and communication agencies are relocating, is benefitting students from Francophone Sub-Saharan Africa. In Libya, the economic viability of the rentier system is based on immigrant labour in all economic sectors and areas.

The depth of interpenetration created by migratory movements back and forth between the Maghreb and the Sahel is difficult to reverse and generates opportunities. Migrants are changing the spatial organisation of the region. The Saharan regions are experiencing dramatic population and urban growth, outpacing every country surrounding the Sahara. In the space of 60 years, the Saharan population has increased eight-fold, rising from close to 2 million in 1948 to 15 million today. In Algeria, the Saharan population has gone from 600 000 to 4 million, or double the entire population of the Sahara in 1948. The level of urbanisation in the Saharan portion of the country was significantly lower than it was for the country as a whole (24% vs. 36%) in 1966; today, it far outstrips the rest of the country (80% vs. 66% in 2008). In the Saharan regions of Libya and in the Western Sahara, the level of urbanisation has reached 90% and 95%, respectively.


The growth is occurring along the north-south trade and movement routes (Arlit, Tamanrasset or Sebha). The ancient trans-Saharan centres have been revived (Agadez), along with the crossroads of old (Ouargla, Timbuktu, Koufra and Abeche). The Sahara has gained a secular function as a land of transit and trade. The Saharan merchant diaspora operates within global networks, at the margins (or even in violation of) official trade frameworks (Bensaâd, 2012). The merchants invest in sensitive sectors, such as Angolan diamonds, Congolese precious metals and financial and foreign currency markets, in a region where the use of banking systems is limited. Sometimes, with an almost religious aura, their efficiency can rival that of the Lebanese and the Chinese. The Saharan merchant networks, Moorish in particular, are using their enhanced economic clout in traditional destination countries to generate new business with Dubai and China.

In some cases, this renewed connection with the Maghreb has tempered conflict situations, as when differences resurfaced between Senegal and Mauritania in 2000 over development of the Senegal River valley; key figures intervened to minimise the impact on the migrant populations.

For fear of destabilising certain strategic Saharan areas where population intermingling is extensive (Tamanrasset, Tindouf, Sebha and Koufra), Algeria and Libya are now trying to refrain from repression in favour of more tolerant policies.

The dense ties are reflected in the large number of mixed marriages or cultural events. Migrants have brought about the return (or introduction) of French and English as well as the Catholic and Protestant religions. Arabic and Tamashek are spreading in Sahel countries because they are used by smuggling networks. These kinds of identity-related interactions are not exclusive to conflicts. They include tensions, confrontations or withdrawals that revive the obsession with identity.

Map 5.3
Migratory itineraries



Source: Brachet J., A. Choplin, O. Pliez 2011

5.2 MIGRATORY MOVEMENTS, A REGIONAL INTEGRATION

Sub-Saharan immigration is growing in an area of the Maghreb that has transformed from a land of emigration to a land of immigration without any true economic boom or incentive, unlike in the Gulf-region countries. Even Libya remains constrained by its reliance on resource-based revenue, under development, and a largely informal economy. The reasons for these migratory movements differ from those of highly attractive countries, such as those on the American or European continents (Rea and Tripier, 2008). They are part of an intermingling process that has reconnected the Maghreb and the Sahel by building more social ties and networks between them (Map 5.3).

After the decline in trans-Saharan trade, independence brought with it a revitalisation of the Saharan areas (Chapter 4). The willingness of states to align their Saharan territories within a national entity coincided with the discovery of natural resources (oil and gas, phosphate, uranium and iron) (Map 1.28). This resulted in the construction of infrastructure and the implementation of government measures that encouraged economic activity and a sedentary lifestyle. Saharan areas did some catching up, most notably in the Maghreb; this fostered the emergence of developed and urbanised areas (Bisson, 2013).

Informal networks capitalised on these opportunities, creating trade routes, marketplaces and supranational transit zones. Migratory movements shadowed these commercial activities. The Sahara, connecting the Sahel and the Maghreb again, now serves as a bridge between these regions. It also reinforces the links between these regions.

Local development thus determines movements and routes. Migratory movements become broader, shorter, or simply different based on the emergence of high growth areas and their development (Bensaâd, 2009). It is for this reason that for a long time a migrant from Senegal or Guinea would make a detour of 3 000 km through Agadez and Tamanrasset to

reach northern Algeria or Morocco, with work stopovers in Libya, to save money for the trip. Mobility between the Sahel and the Maghreb was reactivated by the ancient Agadez-Tamanrasset and Agadez-Sebha routes, and the latter remains a preferred route, precisely because its economic and urban development began early.

The development of oil and gas resources in the Algerian and Libyan Sahara has been complemented by uranium mining in Arlit in Niger and the revitalisation of Agadez. The use of the Agadez-Tamanrasset and Agadez-Sebha routes has resulted in increased purchasing power for the Algerian and Libyan populations and enabled them to meet their economic needs. However, investment is still focused on production and infrastructure at the expense of social investments. Basic foodstuffs are heavily subsidised and are more easily available and accessible, compared to the situation in the Sahelian region. These basic foodstuffs from the Maghreb are traded in the Sahel for livestock products, manufactured goods and contraband goods (Chapter 4).

Integration along the western corridor (Senegal – Mauritania – Morocco) has been less rapid. Starting in 2006, Nouadhibou became a gateway for migrants headed for Europe. This integration is tied to completion of the 2004 Atlantic trans-Saharan route (Tangiers to Dakar via the Mauritanian cities of Nouadhibou, Nouakchott and Rosso) and the "Highway of Hope"[2] linking Mali with Nouakchott. These routes connect the Mauritanian capital with the Sahel and the Gulf of Guinea by way of Dakar, the enclaved Sahelian-Saharan areas (Gao and Timbuktu) by way of Néma, and the shores of the Mediterranean facing the Strait of Gibraltar by way of Tangiers (Maps 1.34, 1.35, 1.36, 1.37 and 1.38).

A portion of the Mauritanian workforce is Senegalese or Malian. The Moorish shopkeeper and merchant networks in Mauritania are the economic and human face of the immigrant presence in the country. Its dual status as a poor nation and a destination for immigration results from the fact that regional migration is based on socio-ethnic and occupational complementarities, and income differentials play a smaller role.

While drought cycles result in significant population movements, these migrations are essentially within the Sahara-Sahelian areas. The trans-Saharan migrations are different. Even though they might take place after a drought and follow the same corridors used by drought refugees, they involve other African populations, with a high percentage of Nigerians, Ghanaians and Cameroonians.

The Saharan communities that fell victim to drought reorganised their lives and helped strengthen regional dynamics. These episodes accentuated divisions. Refugees relocated to the cities, thereby contributing to the growth of urban areas. A portion of the Saharan populations from the fringe of the Sahel migrated to the fringe of the Maghreb. This redistribution of population has created a Saharan diaspora. It laid the basis for a trans-national network, in which cities serve as the central nodes, and that has expanded from a Saharan area, to a Sahelian and almost African area (Box 5.1).

Box 5.1
From informality to irregularity

Migration has been, for the most part, informal. It developed gradually "from the bottom up", regulated only by social connections. It was nonetheless tolerated and managed based on national interests.

In Algeria, the oldest destination country, informal management of immigration resembled a territorial adjustment variable in favour of the Saharan regions. Algeria tolerated immigration in its Saharan areas because this meant having a cost-effective workforce that could work on development projects and entrepreneurial activities encouraged in this zone due to the Sahara's strategic importance. However, when immigration spreads to northern areas, the authorities reject it (Bensaâd, 2009).

In Libya, the informality of immigration is organised by the government. Its ambiguous policy waivers between tolerance of immigration, which is vital to the economy, and maintaining its informal nature to ensure that it can be reversed. Some refer to it as "institutionalised informality". Immigration policy has fluctuated between calls for migrants to come and mass deportations, which occurred in 1979, 1981, 1985, 1995, 2000 and 2007 (Bensaâd, 2012).

In Mauritania, immigration is regulated exclusively by informal channels, despite its structurally important role. While it is not formalised, managed, or controlled by the government, it is not necessarily transgressive or illegal. Informal regulation measures eliminate conflicts, even though they suffer from Europeanisation of the immigration issue.

Even during the transit phase, migration is self-structuring. Each country has its own structures including migrants' associations, food and accommodation facilities, and ethnic and family networks. These structures automatically regulate the flow of people based on employment and reception capacity. Before arriving in the Maghreb, most migrants have had some mobility-related experience in another African country. Their journeys are usually completed in phases, dictated by circumstances rather than by pre-determined choices. They may go from one Maghreb country to another, settle down, or attempt a crossing to Europe. Until recently, they did not identify themselves in relation to a particular destination or status. The question of status arose with the emergence of migrants transiting through the Maghreb en route to Europe. This shift has had significant social, political and geopolitical ramifications. Repression, while certainly recurrent and long-standing, is on the rise and is connected to an "international legitimisation" movement. For instance, the 2007 and 2010 deportations from Libya were preceded by a campaign for legal compliance. This also helps polish the image of a country that has re-embraced international legality. In Mauritania, where West Africans circulate freely, this situation gave rise to the category known as "undocumented migrants" subject to expulsion, which is similar to how the Senegalese in Morocco or the Malians in Algeria are categorised. Geopolitical tensions emerged, such as when Malian residents violently opposed Mauritanian police officers who were escorting the expelled migrants out of the country. Socio-economic systems in the Saharan Maghreb were disrupted. The overall situation pushed the question of immigration beyond the informal regulation mechanisms. Maghreb countries thus reformed the laws governing foreign nationals (Perrin, 2009) and introduced more repressive policies in spite of their destination status and Sahel-Maghreb realties. These "compliance" factors (Zeghbib, 2009), based on the European context, have paradoxically plunged the intense migratory movement between the Sahel and the Maghreb into non-compliance. Informal immigration has been reborn as non-compliant immigration in the Maghreb.

NOTES \\

1 *In 2006, the breakdown by nationality of the 21 400 migrants who arrived in Italy was as follows: 8 400 Moroccans, 4 200 Egyptians, 2 288 Tunisians, and 1 100 Algerians.*

2 *The Highway of Hope – also known as the "Trans-Mauritanian" – is the largest roadway in Mauritania. Cutting across the country in a virtually straight line from west to east, this paved road connects the capital Nouakchott to Nema, near the border with Mali. The west-east link serves: Nouakchott, Boutilimit, Aleg, Kiffa, Ayoun el-Atrouss, Timbedra and Néma.*

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Chapter 6

Nomadism and mobility in the Sahara-Sahel

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In many respects, the current geopolitical context is similar to that of the early 1960s when countries in the Sahara-Sahelian areas were gaining independence; there are permeable borders, instability and "terrorism", Touareg independence claims and rebellions, and investment in resource development. However, the current percentage of nomads in the region is much smaller. Urbanisation has exploded, and irrigated agriculture has improved. The business community has diversified, and drought is a recurring phenomenon (Bisson, 2003). As a result, the cultural and social life of nomadic groups has changed dramatically. They are now influenced by education, a cash economy, the workforce, industry and living in cities.

"Traditional" nomadic pastoralism has become a vestige of the past. Tribes and entire regions no longer rely on it. The nomadic pastoral economy weakened with the decline of its commercial role and the gradual disappearance of the complementarity relationship with farmers (Bonte, 2004). A number of factors account for this decline. Some of them are ecological, including desertification, drought, and a reduction in the quality and diversity of the plants preferred by the herds. There are also economic or political factors such as the gradual marginalisation of the nomads within the nation (Salzmann and Galaty, 1990).

However, the observed decline requires further explanation. Nomadism now exists in new forms, including relative and limited sedentarism and diversified livelihoods. Living in a village, owning a garden, or engaging in trade is compatible with the new pastoral thinking and forms of mobility; these phenomena are not captured by statistics.

6.1 BETWEEN CONTINUITY AND CHANGE


Reality does not fit either of the two nomadic stereotypes: neither the one of a merchant/warrior perched on his dromedary and long lines of caravans, nor the other of a pick-up truck full of combatants armed with Kalashnikovs. If we step back from these stereotypes, what common threats and parameters can shed light on the Saharan nomadism[1] of today? While the restrictive living conditions imposed by the desert environment remain partly unchanged, livelihood mechanisms are now more diversified. Nomads are still masters at "reading" tracks in the sand to identify and follow an animal or individual (Gagnol, 2014), but they also use cell phones and GPS devices.

Pastoralism and its migration

Pastoral nomadism[2] was long the dominant lifestyle in the Sahara and along its Sahelian perimeter (Capot-Rey, 1953; Retaillé, 1989). It is defined as the livelihood of a group of human beings based on the movement of large herds of herbivores maximising use of plant and water resources, which are, limited, variable and dispersed in the Sahara and the Sahel. These conditions involve frequent and regular travel as well as fragmentation of the social group and the herd.

Pastoral migrations follow the rhythm of the seasons and relations of complementarity. The duration and distance of the travel vary based on the composition of the herds, the shepherds, etc. Nomadic societies use animal husbandry techniques that have been adapted to climatic vagaries to increase the size of the herd.[3] Accordingly, animal husbandry contributes to the development of abandoned and isolated areas by ensuring a human presence in areas with significant security issues[4] (Map 6.1).

Map 6.1
Transhumance and nomadism in Sahelian countries



Sources: FAO-CIRAD, *Atlas of trends in pastoral systems in the Sahel* 2012; OECD/SWAC 2009

A small minority are solely nomadic pastoralists living in tents[5] and earning their keep from livestock products, bartering or livestock sales. These include certain groups of Wodaabe-Fula, Azawagh-Touareg, Mahamid Arabs of the Diffa region, Kreda-Tubu of Bahr El Gazel. They now live in the Sahel rather than the Sahara. Nomadic herding has shifted southward from the Sahara Desert to the tree steppes for the camel herders, and from the Sahel to the savannah and even to the tropical forests for the cattle herders, particularly the Fula. This is a long-term movement that intensified during colonisation and during the climatic and political crises of the late 1960s. Today, the pastoralists are Arabophone, including the Shuwa and Fula Mbororo from central Nigeria to the Central African Republic and to the northern Democratic Republic of the Congo in the case of the latter. This can create problems with other pastoral populations and farmers who have no tradition of complementary co-existence with nomads (Map 6.2).


Some governments (e.g., Mauritania, Niger and DR Congo) have expelled or threatened to expel nomadic pastoralists by military force, viewing them to be foreign migrants despite their presence in those countries since the major droughts of the 1980s. Unwelcome among the local population, they often carry weapons to deal with livestock raiding and are sometimes taken (rightly or wrongly) for militia. The situations are too complex to speak of simple wars between nomadic pastoralists and farmers. However, local land disputes are commonplace between sedentary populations, who consider themselves indigenous and are interested in developing the land that is still available, and pastoralists, who have access rights (via transhumance corridors) and collective historical or recent ownership of their pastoral rangelands. Used for political and sometimes religious leverage, these conflicts are at times violent, as they have been on the Jos Plateau (Nigeria), in Darfur (Sudan), or in the Central African Republic.

Strictly speaking, most groups are transhumant or semi-nomadic (Bernus, 1982). Transhumance differs from nomadism in that

Map 6.2

Transhumance and its adaptation to isohyets

1950s



In the lower valley, 75% of Fulani farm the walo during the dry season, very few do so in the diéri area. The lands cultivated after flood waters recedeare rented out by the Wolof and Moor.
In Bogué, very little arable land belong to the Fulani. Cropping is concentrated in the walo and around Demét (middle valley).

1970s



Aridity advances north of of the river as shown by the southward shift in isohyets. During the dry season, Moorish and Fulani cattle herds find refuge south of the river. campsites gradually move further south.

1980s




67% and 74% of Mauritanian Fulani in Rosso and Rkîz practice flood recession agriculture, mainly in four zones (Garak streamlets, around the diéri, walo basins between Rosso and the Ganien forest, lake Rkîz and its streamlets). Most land is owned by Moor and Wolof (Dagana, Gani and Guidakhar). On the Mauritanian side of the river between Dar el Barka and Bogué, the Fulani seem to own the majority of land, especially along the diéri. Transhumance is becoming more concentrated around the river, while at the same time agricultural activities intensify.

- Isohyets
- Main transhumance routes
- Settlement sites
- (25) Number of rice plantations farmed by Mauritanian Fulani

Source: SWAC/OECD 2004

pastoral mobility concerns only shepherds, either family members or employees, rather than an entire social group. Their movements are regular and seasonal, passing over the same trails and pasturelands, sometimes starting at a fixed dwelling. Transhumance is common along the edges of the Sahara, both in the north and the south. It is common in rain-fed crop regions (producing grains in the Tell region[6] or pearl mill in the Sahel) and near mountainous regions during summer pasturing, especially in Agdal near the Atlas Mountains of Morocco. Semi-nomadism implies an annual cycle, involving one or more periods of nomadism, punctuated by a stable phase characterised by seasonal agricultural activity and, usually, a fixed, permanent dwelling. These people are pastoralists who own palm groves and/or irrigated gardens in oases and agricultural centres. Despite the tidiness of the proposed classifications, real-life situations are often more complex, changeable and diverse (de Planhol and Rognon, 1970) (Map 6.3).

Map 6.3
Livestock systems in Mali



Source: FAO-CIRAD, *Atlas of trends in pastoral systems in the Sahel* 2012

Nomadic space


Among the nomadic pastoralists of the Sahara, three trans-national groups dominate, occupying what Théodore Monod (1968) calls *"fuseaux sahariens"* or Saharan zones. These zones form the core of settlement areas and nomadic population dispersion anchored around southern travel routes. From west to east, these nomadic populations include the Moorish, Touareg and Tubu groups.

Most Moor reside in Mauritania, although some can be found as far away as Morocco, Mali and Niger (including the Rgaybat or Reguibat of the Western Sahara and the Berabich and Kunta of Mali). The Touareg are scattered among five nations of the Sahara and the central Sahel. The Tubu or Goranes (Teda, Daza) live in Chad, Libya and Niger. The Zaghawa live in neighbouring areas on both sides of the Sudan-Chad border, along with the Bideyat of Ennedi, who are related to both groups. Fula groups are spread along the southern border of the Sahara, in Senegal, and in the Sudan, forming a Sahelian zonal area. Arab nomads are located on the northern border of Morocco and in Egypt, with a few Arabophone tribes along the Sahelian border, particularly in Chad (Baggara, Ouled Suleiman). Nomadic Berbers inhabit southern Morocco (Aït Atta) and southern Tunisia.

The location of the nomadic groups elicits two comments. First of all, their presence is more visible on the southern edge of the Sahara (especially its Sahelian section) than in the Maghreb portion of the Sahara because of the long-standing and widespread sedentarisation policy in North Africa. Furthermore, all of the nomadic groups, without exception, are trans-national.

High diversity therefore exists among in the people deemed "nomadic" in terms of their languages (Berber, Arabic and Nilo-Saharan or Nigero-Congolese languages), their living environments, and in their sources of livelihood. Herd composition is also extremely varied. Some groups, like the Saharan nomads (Moorish, Touareg, Chaanba and Teda), prefer dromedaries. Others specialise in raising cattle (e.g., some Touareg, Fula, Moor, Daza,

Map 6.4
Major nomadic groups



Source: Bourgeot A. 2000, Autrepart n°16, according to Ch. de Foucauld, Vol. 38-9, 2nd quarter 1955

Zaghawa, Arabs of Chad, etc.) or sheep (e.g., the Fula Ouddah), which transhume toward the northern foothills and high plains of North Africa or toward the southern areas of Nigeria or Cameroon, where water is more abundant (Map 6.4).

Social diversity is also vast. Despite the simultaneous presence of "tribes", "clans", and "castes", nomads have no specific social organisation. Some groups are relatively egalitarian (such as the Tubu), while others are rigidly hierarchical (such as the Fula, Touareg and Moor). Most are endogamous, although exogamous family structures and others also exist. Although Islam dominates today, some nomads remain animists. During recent conflicts, a mistaken assumption created an association between the nomad identity and the Muslim religion, yet nomads have only been Islamised relatively recently. Practice is carefully structured by Sufi brotherhoods (quietist and characterised by pilgrimages, visits to the graves of saints, etc.).

The nomad identity is also rooted in the relationship to space. According to the conventional definition of the word, nomadism is defined as the absence of a house or any other permanent dwelling, village, city, garden, field (or any intensive land use), homeland, territory and even nation. By default, this definition is incorrect: nomadism today covers a vast range of highly variable situations, while including these factors. Rather than rigid categories, we should speak of different gradients or shades of nomadism occurring along a dual scale of "mobility" (from continual movement to fixity) and "pastoral movement" (from the pure pastoralist living exclusively for and by means of his herd to the crop-livestock farmer who keeps a few meat animals) (Gallais, 1975).

Shared pastoral resources

The collective management of natural resources (plants and water) is a feature common to all the various degrees of **pastorality**. Animals are individually owned.[7] Pastures and wells are administered collectively or among several encampments based on good neighbourliness or family ties. Collective control is not synonymous with free access and public use. The people who drill or rehabilitate a well and use the surrounding pastures regularly have priority rights. However, they do not have exclusive rights. They will usually allow any other transhumance group to water their animals at the well for a specific period of time. This ensures reciprocal usage rights for all concerned.

The collective management of pastoral resources fluctuates between (Mauss, 1906):

- The long and difficult dry season, which forces herds and encampments to scatter and stabilize around customary pastures and watering holes. This pace is a marker of identity.
- A brief time of plenty during winter. This "rainy season" is characterised by the concentration of herds and encampments. This is a time of abundance thanks to milk (flowing profusely as a result of good pastures and "salt curing"[8]) as well as the date harvest. Encampments gather together, and social life reaches its peak (marriages, celebrations, meetings to resolve disputes or prepare caravans, bartering and buying, etc.).

Anchors and mobility

The degree of **mobility** of Saharan pastoralists is extremely heterogeneous. Today, it is rare to witness any form of nomadism that involves multiple tent movements over long distances. The mobile habitat is no longer a marker of nomad identity. On the other hand, a fixed dwelling made of durable materials (e.g., "*banco*" or adobe homes of unfired bricks made from a mixture of sand and straw) is not necessarily synonymous with sedentarism.

This semi-nomadism is generalised. It combines several types of dwellings used alternatively over the year. The domestic group residential unit may be a fixed and fenced "concession", comprising several types of habitat, including banco houses, enclosures and hangars. Nomad tents may appear in concessions within villages (and sometimes cities). Their social and ritual role remains vitally important. During the rainy and/or cold season, the group (or part of it) sets off in a nomadic movement with a mobile tent. Banco houses are left completely or partially vacant for part of the year. Only the elderly and young children remain behind. Nomadism is defined not by the type of dwelling, but its occupancy;

what perpetuates it is the mobility of the people, which makes it possible to occupy and operate several locations during the year, and the reversibility of domestic space (Charbonneau and Gagnol, 2013).

At the same time, agriculture (irrigated gardens or rain-fed fields) does not imply the disappearance of pastoralism and a certain type of nomadism. Nomads engaged for a while in agriculture through the forced labour of subjugated peoples, whether in terms of oasis palm groves or villages of farmers required to hand over a portion of their harvest to their overlords. Such a production system is today a thing of the past. Some nomadic groups have become farmer-pastoralists, and no longer consider it beneath them to work the land. Irrigated sectors, planned by the nations of North Africa, and unplanned agricultural centres along the edges of wadis[9] (or depressions, tidal areas and the shores of the Niger and Senegal Rivers) have increased in the Sahara: Adagh in Mali, Aïr in Niger, Tibesti and Borkou in Chad, Ahaggar and Ajjer in Algeria, the Atlas foothills in the Maghreb, etc. Farming limits pastoral movement; such movement occurs by the day where small livestock is concerned, whereas camels stray in the brush over distances of several dozen kilometres.

Nomadic family groups are often fractured. Some family members stay close to the garden, while others live a nomadic existence with small livestock (particularly Touareg women) or baby camels (particularly young men). Still others join caravans to engage in trade activities. The largest Saharan caravanners, the Touareg Kel Ewey (and the Kel Gres) of Niger, are farmer-pastoralists with concessions and gardens in Aïr or millet fields in Ader. Some cross the Ténéré desert to trade their farm products for salt and dates (e.g., Fachi, Bilma and Djado). They resell or trade them for millet, sugar, tea, clothing or manufactured goods in southern Niger or northern Nigeria. Every year, these caravans cover distances of more than 2 000 km (Gagnol, 2009).

Fluidity of social ties and activities

Pastorality and mobility scales therefore fluctuate by nomadic group, and the combinations are complex. To understand the various types of pastoral nomadism, we need to consider the perpetual dispersion and reconfiguration of nomadic groups, which fragment the domestic group and herd allotment alike. These combinations entail a share of anchoring and agriculture. Combined with mobility, changing social ties inject flexibility and diversity into the different sources of livelihood. Saharan nomadic societies can be described as segmented based on lineage or "tribal" bonds and undergoing constant reconfiguration. Although the emergence of a "tribe" depends on the principle of filiation or descendancy from a common ancestor, marriage ties expand the bonds of kinship. Lineage is therefore not static; it grows, combines, and also splinters apart under the influence of changing strategies.

Nomadic social life operates according to networks that connect people at different places engaged in different activities. Life paths can be changeable; a pastoralist can become a farmer, engage in trade in town, and then return to take charge of livestock left temporarily in the care of another. Similarly, domestic groups can become sedentary for the time it takes to reconstitute their livestock before resuming their pastoral existence. The strategies are therefore fluid, flexible and reversible.

Nomadism definitely involves a netlike concept of space not conceived in terms of delineated surfaces, regions or territories to which human groups have exclusive rights (the principle of land ownership and territorial sovereignty). Rather, nomadic space is open, consisting of the lines formed by itineraries/routes, and meeting at nodes such as wells, encampments, palm groves, salt sources and towns.

6.2 NOMADS AND THE STATE

Doing a census of nomads

The nomad population is difficult to estimate. Census data is partial and biased, based on the reported or observed form of residency criterion. Representatives of nomad and pastoral organisations criticise this data for underestimating the actual situation. However, the data still illustrate trends (Figure 6.1). In Mauritania, nomads accounted for approximately two-thirds of the population at the time of independence in 1960, one-third in 1977, and less than 6% in 2000. In Mali, the figures amounted to 6% at independence in 1960 (310 000 individuals) and 1% as of the last census in 2009. In Chad, the 1993 estimate was 6% and the 2009 estimate was 3%, with the nomad population increasing from 350 000 to 390 000. In Algeria, their numbers represented less than 1% of the total population, or 230 000 people, in 2008,[10] compared to 10% at independence. In 1955, the Saharan regions of the Nefzaoua and Jerid in Tunisia were 50% nomadic, and Libya was 25%. However, nomads have now virtually disappeared in both countries. In Nigeria, there are currently some 9.4 million nomads (one-third of them fishermen), the highest number in Africa.


Taken together, these census data show that nomads are now a minority in each country, which is a shift from the period before the early 1960s, when they were still a majority (especially in the Saharan regions).

Their numbers are diminishing due to limited natural growth and sedentarism. Census methods are not adapted to nomadic lifestyles. Sedentary residents conduct the surveys by visiting wells and consulting tribal leaders. The results are biased in at least two ways. On the one hand, they reduce nomadism to groups living in tents and uninvolved in agriculture; on the other hand, the statistical categories are too rigid and exclude semi-nomadism, the most common situation. How is an encampment to be differentiated from a hamlet, a neighbourhood, a village, or even a watering hole? Rigid categories overlook the in-between situations or shifting points. A watering hole may be inhabited on a seasonal basis, at which point it becomes an encampment or a hamlet. A hamlet near a village is difficult to distinguish from a neighbourhood. These living categories determine the changing spatial realities of nomads.

Administering nomads

Nomads are difficult to integrate into the type of communalism practised in Sahel nations: how does one decide that an encampment should be counted and taxed as part of a given community? Decentralisation policies have "normalised" nomadic areas by ending a situation that had persisted since the colonial era, a type of administrative exception. Unlike the policies of village districts and groupings in French Algeria, there

Figure 6.1
Share of nomadic population




Sources: Authors and WDI 2014, World Bank

was no deliberate effort to sedentarise French West Africa (AOF).[11] Indirect military governance became established in nomadic areas through tribal leaders, without territorialised administration. The colonial management model was based on a surveillance system known as the "law and order" approach (Gagnol, 2009), differentiating between the administration of nomadic zones and "useful" sedentary zones (Marty, 1999). This system survived until the decentralisation reforms, which in nomadic zones resembled a "territorialising revolution". A challenge remains in terms of current decentralisation policies regarding nomad involvement in civic affairs and the administration of outlying zones (Map 6.5).

Droughts hasten the process of sedentarisation (Bisson, 1989) as well as changes in power management principles, the administration of persons and the appropriation of natural resources. One reason that nomads today tend to build permanent shelters near wells and pastures but live in them only temporarily is also to ensure control over their pastureland resources. These "stationary facilities" (Charbonneau and Gagnol, 2013) are also created for the purpose of being identified as an "administrative village" in order to attract investment (from the state, international institutions, NGOs, etc.[12]) and government services (education and health care).

Competition over land exists with private livestock farming, rain-fed or irrigated agriculture (pearl mill fields), prospecting, private hunting reserves, or natural parks. Uranium mines in northern Niger (Imouraren and Azelik) have affected and/or dispossessed dozens of nomadic families from their lands without compensation (Gagnol, 2010, 2014). Pastoral land securing is becoming increasingly frequent as transhumance corridors are marked and mapped, along with pasturelands to avoid encroachment and conflict. International transhumance permits have been issued and pastoral codes implemented. Legal recognition for "homelands" has led to priority rights granted on rangelands. However, these institutional tools remain limited in scope because they are not publicised, applied or enforced.

Map 6.5
Chad's nomadic population



Source: Second general census of population and housing, Republic of Chad 2009

6.3 SOCIO-ECONOMIC CHANGES

Inequities are emerging between extensive, mobile family pastoralism and the more intensive "modern" commercial and speculative livestock agriculture. Many pastoralists earn a living from caring for herds owned by rich urbanites rather than from caring for their own animals. They invest their capital in ranch-type herding. They use modern means to augment herd size and no longer abide by traditional rules and hierarchies. Based on the livestock farming model used in Libya and the Middle East, they pay the herders and use tank trucks. Some of them fence in pastureland. Commercial herding is developing to the detriment of traditional pastoralism, which lacks the same economic benefits or political clout to ensure access to pastoral resources and urban consumer markets (e.g., for milk and meat). Caravan traffic, long associated with pastoralism, has been declining since the advent of motor vehicles and the development of road infrastructure.

Complementarity with farmers is fading, such as that with Sahel millet growers or during the achaba[13] near the high plains of the Tell. In the past, pastoralists/caravanners would negotiate contracts to fertilise the fields with manure in return for hospitality and a few sacks of grain. They would also use camels to transport farm products. This system is being undermined by the use of commercial fertiliser, transport trucks and the blurred boundaries of formerly specialised lifestyles. Farmers are trying to economise by raising livestock, while pastoralists are diversifying their income by growing a field crop or irrigated garden. This agro-pastoral model minimises risk by diversifying sources of income (Bonfiglioli, 1990); however, it no longer lends itself to traditional complementarities.

The economic diversification sought by nomads has long led them to visit, live or sometimes settle in towns. The rise of the urban phenomenon occurred earlier in North Africa than in the Sahel. Town living is sometimes fleeting and seasonal. Cyclical migration is developing between the bush and the town, either at the regional level (Faya, Agadez, Kidal, Atar, Ouarzazate, Tamanghasset, Sebha, etc.) or internationally (Kano and the capital cities of the Sahara-Sahelian states, as well as coastal capitals like Abidjan or Lagos). The economic diversification of nomadism is therefore ushering in small-scale urban trades, such as retail commerce, animal guarding, and to a lesser degree, tourism[14] and crafts. Towns provide access to diverse resources and the ability to stock up on supplies, sell products and increase social and political capital. Encampments are moving closer to the cities, or stretching out along communication routes, thus facilitating access to markets and cities. Urban vitality is an integral part of the renewal afoot in trade in goods, transportation, migration and trafficking at the regional or international levels (Pliez, 2006).

The cities preferred by nomads are stopping places or road hubs along the trans-Saharan routes. The reactivation of trans-Saharan ties is based on the dispersal of nomadic groups and their mobility capital (Ciavolella, 2010). Trans-Saharan relations no longer hinge on climate differences, as traditional pastoralism did, but on an economic differential based on border crossings (McDougall and Scheele, 2012). Trade is centred on traditional foodstuffs subsidised by North African governments (oil, pasta, powdered milk, sweetened drinks, etc.) (Chapter 4). From the government's point of view, these items are contraband. Nevertheless, they play a vital role in the Saharan economy.

In addition to this trade are other, more lucrative rackets (e.g., gasoline, cigarettes, migrants, weapons and, more recently, cocaine) that sometimes operate using the same networks (Chapter 8). They challenge inherited social hierarchies and generate untold violence to control trading locations and markets. Nomads are only partial players in this trafficking and conflict. They are also victims, comprising an easily recruitable labour force for rebel movements or governments seeking militia members (e.g., Libya, Mali and Sudan). Modern warfare strategies in the Sahara probably rely on nomadic mobility. Chad's army, which consists primarily of Bideyat and Zaghawa, is seasoned in these recruiting techniques. The nomad's skills in driving on sand, the role of sand dust and wind, land-marking, orientation and tracking are decisive advantages in the military setting.

The decline of the traditional nomadic economy based on camel herding and long-distance trade[15] began earlier in the Maghrebian countries. It is still in progress in the Sahel countries. Nomadism has always existed in ongoing interaction with the sedentary world, both rural and urban, but this complementarity is disappearing with the saturation of space and the diversification of sources of income. The redeployment of nomadism via new trans-Saharan routes places it in a paradoxical and sometimes violent position. This economic deadlock can stretch the capacity of Saharan nomadism to adapt to these changes.

Without speaking of a social deadlock, there is every indication that a transformation is in progress and remains to be developed. Like land claims, but on a different scale, pastoralists want control of their wells and surrounding pasturelands. The concepts of land rights and territorial sovereignty have changed. The underlying principal of nomadism as a space open to negotiated rights is being sorely tested as a viable political and social model. The bonds of lineage are holding firm, but based on different lines of reasoning, with the reactivation of trade and sedentarism. Nomadic groups are reorganising along territorial lines to ensure pastoral mobility and to control the movement of persons and goods. Increasingly complex and changing forms of mobility and fluidity are emerging.

NOTES \\

1 *It is difficult to get an overall picture of the current situation of the nomads, most notably in Libya, Algeria, northern Chad, etc. While monographs and jointly-authored works have added to our knowledge, many sectors have been ignored, and some of the data is reliable but quite outdated. See, however, the summary by J. Bisson (2003), the collections Enjeux sahariens (1984), Le nomade, l'oasis et la ville (1989), Horizons nomades en Afrique sahélienne (1999), edited by D. Chatty (2006) and journal issues like those edited by P. Bonte and Y. Ben Hounet (2009).*

2 *This Atlas does not discuss hunter-gatherer nomads, the fringe groups related to warrior or religious tribes. Today, with scant animal resources due to drought and the introduction of new hunting techniques involving rifles and motorised vehicles, they can no longer survive on predation alone; the Nemadi of Mauritania have been assimilated, while the Azza of Niger and Chad now hunt only occasionally (Baroin, 2006). The Imraguen fishing tribe of Mauritania has settled in villages, intensified their fishing techniques and joined larger-scale trade routes (Boulay, 2013).*

3 *The herds are important for reasons other than economic onces; socio-cultural, ritualistic and emotional elements are associated with the animals and involve values that are inherent to pastoral societies.*

4 *Empirical studies on Saharan-Sahelian pastoralism have made considerable progress in recent years, through scientific and institutional recognition of the effectiveness and sustainability of extensive and mobile pastoral herding: see the conference organised in N'Djamena in May 2013 (co-organised by SWAC/OECD and the World Bank) on the theme of pastoral nomadism, especially the final declaration of the conference.*

5 *Dwellings are often transportable, composed of lightweight, perishable materials. The encampments (basic living and socio-economic units) comprise a group of tents (small family units). Vellum is made of strips of woven wool (in the Saharan Maghreb and among the Maghrebis), an assembly of tanned skins (by the Touareg), a woven material made of braided fronds of the doum palm (by the Touareg and Tubu), or nowadays, imported white cotton or plastic tarps. A dwelling can be as simple as mere thorny enclosures or huts, as in the case of the Wodaabe-Fulani, or crude shelters for transhumants and caravanners on the move.*

6 *The Tell region is an area that spans from the north-east of Morocco to the north-west of Tunisia. It crosses through Algeria and is bordered by the north coast and the highlands in the south. It comprises most of the fertile lands of Algeria.*

7 *This does not preclude lending, whereby livestock moves within family and social circles.*

8 *This concerns an annual transhumance of many pastoralists toward the pasture lands and salt sources essential to the vitality and health of the herd. The best known occur in the Eghazer region of Niger, around the village of In Gall. It provides a stage for state-organised celebrations (Afane and Gagnol, 2014).*

9 *A wadi is a waterway in semi-desert areas with irregular hydrological regimes. Most often dry, a wadi can cause dramatic floods that sometimes result due to the changes in the course of the river.*

10 *Some nomads are stateless, having no identity papers and unable to prove that they (or their parents) were born in the country where they live. In Algeria, the situation is especially sensitive for the migrant Touareg who live there, some since the rebellion against Mali in 1964. In Libya, they obtained nationality by enrolling in the army. In Sahel countries, civil status registration campaigns have been conducted.*

11 *We should nevertheless mention the episodes of extreme violence during times of conflict (particularly the 1916–17 rebellions) and other intermittent operations that failed to achieve their goals (like the "freedom villages" for emancipating slaves).*

12 *In the name of adapting to change and strengthening the capacity for resiliency, development projects have initiated and accentuated this phenomenon.*

13 *The achaba is a tribal summer migration to Tell.*

14 *Saharan tourism is based on folklore common not only among Westerners but also rich city dwellers who like to try tent living for a weekend here and there. This nomadic identity is put on stage by public authorities or NGOs at celebrations or music festivals. However, Touareg guitar music still reveals traces of persisting cultural vitality.*

15 *For a long time, the wealth of Sahara-Sahelian areas has been linked to trans-Saharan trade activity. The last caravan to cross the Sahara was reported in Tabelbala (south-west Algeria) in 1937 (Capot-Rey, 1953).*

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Chapter 7

Borders, cross-border co-operation and freedom of movement in the Sahara-Sahel

7.1 Cross-border functional dynamics 156
7.2 Institutional integration 164

The contemporary transformation of Sahara-Sahelian borders can be illustrated by putting into perspective the functional dynamics of economic players and the institutional responses intended to foster regional integration. The former are analysed on the basis of cities and towns located near national borders, border markets and cross-border functional regions in which economic interaction is quite well developed. Institutional responses describe, in turn, the intergovernmental organisations and bilateral agreements that bind together countries in the Sahel and the Sahara with respect to matters involving economic development and the free circulation of goods and people. However, these initiatives have been slowed by border conflicts or conflicts that have border-related consequences.

7.1 CROSS-BORDER FUNCTIONAL DYNAMICS

Borders and cross-border movement as resources

Long considered artificial obstacles generated by colonisation, borders are offering Sahara-Sahelian players new opportunities. Drug, weapons and cigarette trafficking between the two sides of the Sahara follow cross-border routes. The networks that control this trafficking rely on major traffickers capable of hauling goods over long distances and the collusion of certain government representatives. Rebels and religious extremists also capitalise on national borders, which can be used to create sanctuaries so that guerrilla warfare or acts of terrorism can be waged in other countries. The ensuing conflicts produce movements of refugees, which also occur across borders.


Territorial discontinuities encourage the development of cross-border economic activities over relatively long distances. Whether it concerns regional agricultural products or manufactured goods arriving from the global market place, formal and informal economic movement in the Sahara-Sahelian region crosses borders. Small and large traders capitalise on differences in currency exchange rates, taxation levels and national subsidies (particularly on basic foodstuffs and gasoline). They also bypass the import and export restrictions applicable to certain products (Chapter 4).

For governments, borders are a resource and a drawback. Governments benefit from transit taxes and economic dynamics generated by cross-border traffic, but there are concerns in terms of security. The political agenda endeavours to make the most of available trade opportunities and to work toward stabilising these spaces that are of vital importance to regional and continental integration. This evolution goes hand in hand with a more liberal outlook on relations with other nations. Its primary objective is the free movement of persons and goods. While economic nationalism has dominated international relations since the 1960s, nations today seem to be seeking out regional synergies. Divergent national policies are a powerful driving force for regional migration (Chapter 5). Finally, some border areas have outstanding potential that, by capitalising on population centres and markets on both sides of the border, could constitute vast cross-border functional regions.

Border population centres

The distance over which the influence of national borders is visible varies by country. In some cases, economic activity is limited

Map 7.1
Border agglomerations, 2010



Sources: *Africapolis* - SWAC/OECD 2014; Ayadi, L. et al. 2013; Scheele 2012; National Statistics Office (Algeria); High Commission for Planning (Morocco) and authors

to a narrow strip of land along the border. In others, major portions of the national territory are directly affected by borderland trade activity. Niger and Nigeria are two examples. In Gambia, Benin and Togo, the entire national territory is affected by border activity.

The map of border towns attests to this diversity (Map 7.1). The urban border population is distributed differently in the countries of West Africa[1] and North Africa.[2] In North Africa, the major agglomerations are located on the Mediterranean coast, between Morocco, Spain and Algeria, and between Algeria and Tunisia. The Saharan borders are characterised by small border towns located far apart.

In West Africa, border agglomerations are concentrated along the border between Togo and Benin.[3] These two small, elongated countries account for one-quarter of the total

border agglomerations over distances of 20 and 50 km (Table 7.1). They are heavily represented around Nigeria, which has the largest number regardless of the distance. In Nigeria, over one-quarter of the total urban population lives within 100 km of a national border.

The number of inhabitants of West African borderlands is growing quickly, but remains stable in relation to the total urban population (Table 7.2), despite the potential economic attraction of border regions. The specific nature of borderland population centres is therefore not demographically unique. It is based on certain specific economic functions.

Map 7.2 shows population centres of more than 100 000 inhabitants living less than 100 km away from land-based borders. In 2010, they accounted for 55 of the 151 population centres in West Africa and 16 in North Africa; they play an important role in the general movement of goods and persons. In Sub-Saharan Africa, they serve as transit centres for the movement of re-exported goods, as export markets (particularly for agricultural products), or as supply centres for retail goods sold in smaller centres. The geographic proximity of regional centres on both sides of borders, such as between Maradi (Niger) and Katsina (Nigeria), Bobo-Dioulasso (Burkina Faso) and Sikasso (Mali), N'Djamena (Chad) and Kousséri (Cameroon), or Ziguinchor (Senegal) and Bissau (Guinea Bissau), strengthens regional integration potential (World Bank, 2009).

Table 7.1
Number of West African agglomerations by distance from borders, 2010

	Distance from borders		
	20 km	**50 km**	**100 km**
The 5 countries most directly concerned and the total number of agglomerations	Nigeria 56	Nigeria 139	Nigeria 294
	Benin 38	Benin 63	Ghana 86
	Togo 28	Togo 54	Côte d'Ivoire 82
	Senegal 23	Ghana 40	Benin 81
	Côte d'Ivoire 18	Senegal 34	Togo, Burkina Faso 54
Total number of agglomerations	**255**	**514**	**904**

Source: Africapolis. Author's calculations

Border markets

Not all of the population centres identified in the previous section are polarised by border-related economic activities. To qualify as borderland markets, border centre development must primarily depend on the transfer of goods and persons across national borders. This is not the case for some places located off the main trade routes with undeveloped markets. Similarly, some population centres have thriving markets, but their demographic and economic growth is more the outcome of their function as an economic and/or political centre than their proximity to borders. This is the case for capital cities like Niamey in Niger or N'Djamena in Chad, which today have over one million residents.

The specific nature of border markets relates to the various economic functions they fulfil at different levels. First of all, they provide central locations for local producers and consumers. Compared to other national markets, having a border offers an added advantage to farm producers interested in investing in revenue-generating activities. Agricultural products can be exported to the neighbouring country based on changes in demand. The border markets therefore provide business opportunities to small-scale merchants who take advantage of local differentials. For example, they can ship manufactured products between twin cities: between Illela and Birni N'Konni or Djibya and Dan Issa on the Nigeria-Niger border, between Idi Iroko and Igolo on the Benin-Nigeria border, or between Zelten and Ben Gardane on the Libya-Tunisia border. Although price differentials are small, they are nonetheless profitable given low labour costs and informal negotiations with authorities responsible for controlling the flow of border activity (Map 7.3).

On a larger scale, border markets offer a favourable location for large traders by encouraging the development of trans-national trade corridors. In recent decades, some of the

Table 7.2


West African urban population by distance from borders and proportion of the total urban population 1950–2010 (in million)

	1950	1960	1970	1980	1990	2000	2010
Distance : 20 km	0.5	1.1	2	3.5	5.6	8.2	11.9
Distance : 50 km	1	2.1	3.7	6.3	10	14.2	20.4
Distance : 100 km	2.4	5.4	9.3	15.8	26	37	52.6
Total urban population	**7**	**15**	**23.6**	**39.3**	**65.3**	**92.8**	**138.8**
Share of urban pop., 20 km, %	7	8	9	19	9	9	9
Share of urban pop., 50 km, %	14	14	16	16	15	15	15
Share of urban pop., 100 km, %	34	36	39	40	40	40	38

Source: Africapolis, SWAC/OECD calculations


Map 7.2

Border agglomerations with over 100 000 inhabitants, 2010



Sources: *Africapolis* - SWAC/OECD 2014; National Statistics Office (Algeria); High Commission for Planning (Morocco); authors

Map 7.3
The working of border markets



Source: SWAC/OECD 2003

border markets located along these trade corridors have transformed into trans-national hubs, a status that sets them apart from the role of other markets. For example, from the ports of the Gulf of Guinea, the mass flow of goods feeds large coastal urban markets, or is re-exported to Sahel countries on the way to their final destination, thus avoiding import restrictions. Border markets play a vital role in this movement by serving as an interface with flexible business networks.

Consequently, the economic importance of border markets rarely depends on their demographic size, but rather their geographic location and specialisation in certain products, such as regional farm products, livestock or textiles. "While African border towns may be geographically peripheral, they are often economically pivotal" (Nugent, 2012). The Nigerian town of Gaya, a re-exportation trade hub, interfacing with Benin and Nigeria, illustrates this unique feature; close to 20% of total imports and 70% of total exports from Niger flow through it, despite the fact that the town's population was only 38 000 in 2010.

The fact that border markets are characterised as much by their key role as by their position as regional hubs signifies that they are practically indistinguishable from other population centres based on a strictly demographic criterion. Map 7.4 shows border centres where economic activity has been identified as heavily centred on cross-border movement.


From the Atlantic Ocean to Chad, West Africa contains 134 border markets. Like borderland population centres, their distribution is uneven, with denser concentrations found primarily in Senegambia, between Togo, Benin and Nigeria and between Niger and Nigeria. In the Saharan region, only a selection of border towns is shown due to the absence of an exhaustive inventory of markets in the region or a standardised data base.

Cross-border functional regions

The concentration of markets along borders suggests the presence of potential functional regions. These are defined as spaces that

Map 7.4

West African border markets and Saharan border agglomerations



National border

West Africa

- Border market

North Africa

- Border city, selection

1. Assahoun
2. Kévé
3. Noépé
4. Pobè
5. Igolo Ifangni
6. Adjara
7. Avrankou
8. Porto-Novo
9. Akraké
10. Kwémé
11. Roumdji
12. Maiadoua
13. Magaria
14. Tinkim
15. Blangoua
16. Mahada
17. Fotokol
18. Figuil
19. Touroua
20. Barra
21. Karang
22. Brikana Ba
23. Bansang
24. Basse Sante Su
25. Medina Y. Foula
26. Pata
27. Farafenni
28. Koury
29. Béněna
30. Kadiana
31. Diébougou
32. Gaoua
33. Sanga
34. S.-Odienné
35. S.-Beyla
36. Booko

Sources: Abdoul and Trémolières 2004; Abdoul et al. 2007a, 2007b; Afouda 2010; Bennafla 2002; Boluvi 2004; Chalfin 2001; Dahou et al. 2007; Fadahunsi and Rosa 2002; Gonzallo 2010; Grant 2008; Grégoire 1986, 1991, 1993, 2003; Grégoire and Labazée 1993; Harre 1993; Igué 1989, 1993, 1995, 2010; Igué and Soulé 1993 ; Labazée 1993; Lambert and Egg 1994; McKim 1972; Niang 2013; Nicolas 1986; Nugent 2008; OECD 2009; Sanka 2013; Soulé 2010; Walther 2007, 2008, 2009, 2010, 2011, 2012; Warms 1994; World Bank 2009

possess strong internal cohesion based on the relations among socio-economic actors across borders. In the absence of any scientific analysis of cross-border interaction, their identification relies on the presence of border towns and markets. It therefore remains theoretical. After grouping together border markets that are located in close proximity to one another, we identify 19 potential functional regions in West Africa. Table 7.3 describes the border markets that comprise these potential functional regions. Twin markets – indicated by a dash – are particularly abundant.

The illustration of potential functional regions raises two points (Map 7.5). First, the geographic coverage of these regions is approximate, since

Table 7.3


Potential functional regions and main West and Central African border markets, 2010

	Regions	Markets
1	North-East Nigeria	Garoua (CM), Gurin (NG)-Touroua (CM), Figuil (CM)-Léré (TD), Maroua (CM), Kerawa (NG)-Kerawa (CM), Banki (NG)-Amchidé (CM), Bongor (TD)-Yagoua (CM)
2	Lake Chad	N'Djaména (TD)-Kousséri (CM), Gambaru (NG)-Fotokol (CM), Blangoua (CM)-Mahada (TD), Diffa (NE)-Damasak (NG), Maïné Soroa (NE), Kukawa (NG)
3	North Nigeria	Maigatari (NG), Tinkim (NE), Magaria (NE), Roumdji (NE), Matameye (NE), Maiadoua (NG), Daura (NG), Maradi (NG), Katsina (NG), Djibya (NG)-Dan Issa (NE)
4	Nigeria–Benin South-West	Kétou (BJ)-Illara (NG), Oja-Odan (NG)-Pobè (BJ), Igolo (BJ)-Ifangni (BJ)-Idi Iroko (NG), Adjara (BJ), Avrankou (BJ), Idiroko (NG), Porto-Novo (BJ), Akraké (BJ)-Kwémé (NG), Cotonou (BJ)
5	Togo–South Ghana	Badou (TG), Tomégbé (Akroa) (TG), Assahoun (TG), Kpalimé (TG), Kévé (TG), Noépé (TG), Djodze (GH), Lomé (TG)-Aflao (GH), Agotime Kpetoe (GH)
6	South Mali	Kadiolo (ML), Ouangolodougou (CI), Niangoloko (BF), Tingréla (CI)-Kadiana (ML), Béména (ML)-Djibasso (BF), Koury (ML)-Faramana (BF), Loulouni (ML), Zégoua (ML)
7	Eastern Guinea	Sirana-Odienné (CI)-Sirana-Beyla (GN), Booko (CI), Odienné (CI), Touba (CI), Nzérékoré (GN), Guéckédou (GN)-Kessini (LR), Macenta (GN), Gbéléban (CI), Danané (CI), Kissidougou (GN), Man (CI), Kailahun (SL)
8	Senegambia	Karang (SE), Barra (GM), Banjul (GM), Nioro du Rip (SE)-Farafenni (GM), Ziguinchor (SE)-Sao Domingos (GW), Diaobé (SE), Basse Santa Su (GM)-Vélingara (SE), Bansang (GM)-Médina Yoro Foula (SN), Brikama Ba (GM)-Pata (SN)
9	Birni N'Konni-Illela	Illéla (NG)-Birni N'Konni (NE)
10	Gaya–Malanville–Kamba	Gaya (NE)-Malanville (BJ)-Kamba (NG)
11	North Togo	Bawku (GH), Sinsanké (TG)-Sanga (BF), Bittou (BF), Dapaong (TG)
12	North Ghana	Diébougou (BF), Hamalé (GH)-Hamalé (BU), Lawra (GH), Bouna (CI), Doropo (CI), Gaoua (BF), Bolé (GH), Wa (GH)
13	Bondoukou	Bondoukou (CI)-Sampa (GH), Agnibélékrou (CI)-Dormaa Ahenkro (GH)
14	Ghana-Côte d'Ivoire	Elubo (GH)-Noé (CI)
15	Kédougou	Kédougou (SE)-Maali (GN)
16	Western Mali	Kidira (SE)-Diboli (ML), Bakel (SN), Sélibabi (ML)
17	Rosso	Rosso (MR)-Rosso (SE)
18	Kaédi	Kaédi (MR)-Thilogne (SN)
19	Nikki–Chikanda–Okuta	Nikki (BJ), Chikanda (NG), Okuta (NG)

Sources: See Map 7.5. N.B.: Saharan and North African markets are not included. Country codes: Benin (BJ), Burkina Faso (BF), Chad (TD), Côte d'Ivoire (CI), Gambia (GM), Ghana (GH), Guinea (GN), Guinea Bissau (GW), Liberia (LR), Mali (ML), Mauritania (MR), Niger (NE), Nigeria (NG), Senegal (SN), Sierra Leone (SR), Togo (TG).

Map 7.5

Border markets and potential cross-border functional region, 2010



Sources: Abdoul and Trémolières 2004; Abdoul et al. 2007a, 2007b; Afouda 2010; Bennafla 2002; Boluvi 2004; Chalfin 2001; Dahou et al. 2007; Fadahunsi and Rosa 2002; Gonzallo 2010; Grant 2008; Grégoire 1986, 1991, 1993, 2003; Grégoire and Labazée 1993; Harre 1993; Igué 1989, 1993, 1995, 2010; Igué and Soulé 1993; Labazée 1993; Lambert and Egg 1994; McKim 1972; Niang 2013; Nicolas 1986; Nugent 2008; OECD 2009; Sanka 2013; Soulé 2010; Walther 2007, 2008, 2009, 2010, 2011, 2012; Warms 1994; World Bank 2009

cross-border interaction at this scale is not generally known, given the informal or illegal nature of the trade.

Second, potential functional regions are not commercial islands that stand apart from the rest of the urban structure. Urban centres with a population of over 100 000 and located less than 100 km from national borders are a reminder of the link between local and regional dynamics (Map 7.5). If actual cross-border interaction were known, the border markets in question would appear as centres in the networks between world markets and the major West African consumer centres, or as steps in the flow of regional products inland throughout the continent.

Several potential regions have a trade history dating back to pre-colonial times. In Nigeria, the north-east region corresponds to the Adamawa Kingdom, which provided slaves to the Sokoto Caliphate in the 19th century, while the Lake Chad area comprises the traditional birthplace of the Kanem-Bornu Empire, which maintained its influence from the 9th century until 1900 (Map 1.17).

Along the existing Niger-Nigeria border, the identified functional region corresponds to the traditional core where the major trade networks linking Hausa lands to the Ashanti region developed. The Nikki-Chikanda-Okuta functional region reflects the birthplace of the Borgou states, which were dominated by Wangara[4] traders. Further west, the functional regions of southern Mali and eastern Guinea have been traditionally influenced by the Dioula trade networks between Timbuktu and Koumassi via Bobo-Dioulasso. They contributed to the rise of the Kabadougou Kingdom, organised around Odienné.

On the Atlantic, the Senegambian area is known for its active involvement in the Atlantic economy until the mid-19th century. On the Gulf of Guinea, the dense network of border markets reflects the influence of the centralised Old-Oyo kingdoms that dominated the Yoruba kingdoms and the Dahomey kingdoms until the start of colonisation.

The correspondence observed between functional regions and older entities is not a mere vestige of pre-colonial dynamics. The structure and players involved in the pre-colonial networks were indeed affected by colonisation. Many markets that flourished before colonisation have vanished or dramatically declined, such as Salaga (Ghana), Kong (Côte d'Ivoire), or the Saharan markets, which lost their role as points of passage (Ghadames). Others now survive exclusively through the underground economy (e.g. Bordj Badji Mokhtar and al-Khalil between Mali and Algeria, and the Nigerian Djado oasis) or tourism (e.g., Ghat in Libya and Zagora in Morocco) (Scheele, 2012; Brachet, 2012). Inversely, some of the more dynamic markets are products of colonialism, strategically placed along the new transportation routes created from the Gulf of Guinea onward. Their existence relates to the presence of a national border. For example, the Beninese market of Malanville, a city founded by the French in the early 20th century, is now a major centre of regional agriculture and textile re-exportation.

An analysis conducted in 2010 of the urban population of each of the potential functional regions shows extreme variability. It ranges from 1.9 million people in the Benin-southern Nigeria region to less than 15 000 people between Côte d'Ivoire and Ghana (Table 7.4). A gap exists from a statistical standpoint between regions with more than 500 000 inhabitants – considered major regions – and those that are less populous. The functional regions surrounding Nigeria are heavily populated. Of the total 9 million residents living in the border markets identified, over half (54.3%) are in Nigeria or in a market bordering Nigeria. This percentage is 23.7% for residents living in border regions of Ghana, 23.3% in areas bordering Benin, and 11.3% in those around Senegal.

Table 7.4
Urban population of West African border markets by potential region of operation, 2010

N°	Regions	Population
4	Nigeria-South Benin	1 899 476
5	Togo-South Ghana	1 627 441
2	Lake Chad	1 340 865
8	Senegambia	907 786
7	Eastern Guinea	829 963
3	Northern Nigeria	746 073
1	North-East Nigeria	630 719
11	North Togo	177 914
12	North Ghana	175 004
6	South Mali	169 866
13	Bondoukou	141 795
10	Gaya-Malanville-Kamba	128 427
9	Birni N'Konni-Illela	81 332
19	Nikki-Chikanda-Okuta	70 087
18	Kaédi	49 980
17	Rosso	48 989
8	Western Mali	37 421
15	Kédougou	20 936
14	Ghana-Côte d'Ivoire	14 159
Total		9 020 473

Sources: *Africapolis* and the author's calculations. N.B.: Alternative sources were used for population centres not listed in Africapolis. Population in 2010 or the nearest thereto.

7.2 INSTITUTIONAL INTEGRATION

Intergovernmental structures and principal agreements


Cross-border economic activity developed in an institutional context characterised by a large number of intergovernmental organisations. West Africa seems generally well-integrated from an official point of view through the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS), created in 1975 and comprising 15 members, and the West African Economic and Monetary Union

(UEMOA), created in 1994 and comprising eight members (Map 7.6).

The Protocol on Free Movement of Persons, Right of Residence and Establishment, dating back to 1979, places free movement at the centre of the ECOWAS plan. This protocol was supplemented by several other agreements: the Citizenship Code (1982), the Travel Certificate (1985), Resident Map (1990) and Community Passport (2000). More recent agreements include the Regulatory Informal Trade Programme; and the initiative to standardise road maintenance and construction standards under the Intergovernmental Agreement on the Trans-African Highway Network (Trans-African Highway, TAH) (ECOWAS, 2013).

Furthermore, ECOWAS instituted a Cross-Border Initiatives Programme (CIP) in 2006 to co-ordinate and formalise cross-border initiatives and to expand co-operative frameworks for intra-community borders. UEMOA also introduced a community land development policy, which was supported by the Regional Integration and Cross-Border Co-operation Support Fund. Implemented in May 2011, the Territorial Authorities Council (TAC) institutionalised the political representation of territorial authorities within the Union. The Regional Trade Promotion Programme funded by the UEMOA Regional Agricultural Development Fund invests in promoting regional trade and facilitating intra-regional trade in border areas.

Map 7.6
Intergovernmental organisations, 2013



Sources: uemoa.int, ecowas.int, au.int, about.comesa.int, cepgl-cepgl.org, ceeac-eccas.org, liptakogourma.org, cemac.int, maghrebarabe.org, au.int/en/recs/censad

On a smaller scale, the Mano River Union (Liberia, Sierra Leone, Guinea and Côte d'Ivoire) and the Integrated Development Authority of the Liptako-Gourma region (Burkina Faso, Mali and Niger), are also implementing cross-border programmes.

North Africa shares several organisations and treaties responsible for promoting regional integration on a bilateral or multilateral basis, include the following (Table 7.5):

- The Arab Maghreb Union (AMU), whose mission is to promote free movement among its five members.
- The Union for the Mediterranean and the Euro-Mediterranean Association Agreements signed between the European Union (EU) and seven Mediterranean shoreline countries between 1998 and 2005, including Morocco, Algeria and Tunisia under the European Neighbourhood Policy. Negotiations are currently underway with Morocco to reach a Deep and Comprehensive Free Trade Agreement (DCFTA) that would foster Morocco's integration into the European common market through the gradual harmonisation of investment standards.
- The Agadir Free Trade Agreement (2007) between Morocco, Egypt, Jordan and Tunisia.

These efforts essentially concern the movement of goods between the shores of the Mediterranean. They contrast with initiatives taken in relation to the movement of people in collaboration with the European Agency for the Management of Operational Co-operation of the External Borders of the Member States of the European Union (Frontex). The implementation of Frontex in 2005 led the EU to "externalise" some control over its external borders in African countries through which migratory movements flow, such as Mauritania, Libya or Morocco (Choplin, 2012) (Chapter 5).

At the continental level, Sahel-Saharan countries are also members of the African Union (AU), except for Morocco. In 2007, the AU created the African Union Border Programme (PFUA). Specifically, its objectives are to:

- Facilitate and support the delineation and demarcation of African borders, where such activities remain to be completed;
- Strengthen the integration process under the Regional Economic Communities and other large-scale co-operation initiatives;
- Develop local cross-border co-operation;
- Strengthen the border management capacity of member states (AEBR, 2012).

The New Partnership for Africa's Development (NEPAD), now integrated into the structures of the AU, is also trying to encourage intra-regional trade and co-operation.

Although the initiatives conducted by inter-governmental organisations recognise the need to promote regional integration and reduce border disparities, their impact on local economic development remains limited (Mistry, 2000; Kessides and al., 2009). Political dissent is affecting the operations of the Arab Maghreb Union (AMU), the Community of Sahel-Saharan States (CEN-SAD) and the Mano River Union (MRU), which experienced a long period of inactivity resulting from the civil wars in Liberia and Sierra Leone before its reactivation in 2004.

Tracing borders

The geographic inaccuracy of the boundaries inherited from colonisation resulted in various border conflicts as soon as independence was declared. Since 1975, nine of them have resulted in judgements or opinions issued by the International Court of Justice (ICJ) (Table 7.6).

Boundary dispute settlement is complex simply because the intangible nature of the borders resulting from colonisation (*uti possidetis juris*[5]), legitimised by African institutions since the 1960s, is an insufficient basis for reaching a verdict. In the absence of treaties, nations can base their claims on historic rights or rely on borders established at various times in colonial history. The borders claimed by the nations sometimes reflect the internal boundaries of imperial groupings or imperial limits. In the border conflict between Mali and Burkina Faso in 1985–86, the absence of points of reference for accurately establishing the boundary between the two nations led the ICJ to look for rare, tangible signs existing at the end of the colonial period. Each of the nations was granted sovereignty over a portion of the villages and legally disputed territories.[6] In

Table 7.5
Main bi- and multilateral agreements

Organisation or treaty	Date of creation/implementation
Integrated Development Authority of the Liptako-Gourma Region (ALG)	3 December 1970
Economic Community of West African States Treaty (ECOWAS)	28 May 1975
Economic Community of the Great Lakes Countries (ECGLC)	20 September 1976
Protocol on Free Movement of Persons, Right of Residence and Establishment (ECOWAS)	29 May 1979 (additional protocols signed in 1985, 1989 and 1990)
Protocol on the Code of Citizenship of the Community (ECOWAS)	20 May 1982
Economic Community of Central African States (ECCAS)	18 October 1983
West African Economic and Monetary Union (UEMOA)	10 January 1994
Free Trade Treaty, Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa (COMESA)	8 December 1994
Euro-Mediterranean Association Agreement between the EU and Tunisia	1 March 1998
Community of Sahel-Saharan States (CEN-SAD)	4 February 1998
Euro-Mediterranean Association Agreement between the EU and Morocco	1 March 2000
New Partnership for Africa's Development (NEPAD)	9–11 July 2001
Mano River Union (MRU)	(1973), 20 May 2004
Euro-Mediterranean Association Agreement between the EU and Algeria	1 September 2005
Agadir Agreement	27 March 2007
Union for the Mediterranean (45 members including Algeria, Morocco, Mauritania and Tunisia)	13 July 2008
EU-Morocco agreement concerning reciprocal liberalisation measures on agricultural products and fishery products	1 October 2012
Deep and Comprehensive Free Trade Agreement between the EU and Morocco	Negotiations in progress since 1 March 2013

Sources: uemoa.int, ecowas.int, au.int, about.comesa.int, cepgl-cepgl.org, ceeac-eccas.org, liptakogourma.org, cemac.int, maghrebarabe.org, au.int/en/recs/censad, www.europa.eu, www.agadiragreement.org, www.ufmsecretariat.org.

the dispute between Niger and Benin, the ICJ based its 2005 judgement on the principle of *uti possidetis juris* and on historical consolidation, which concerns the way that colonial titles were interpreted during the colonial era. It followed claims by Niger regarding the Nigerien portion of the Niger River boundary and Benin's claims concerning the Mekrou River, thus ending a dispute that has been brewing since the 1960s.

A few current border conflicts in the Sahara-Sahel remain to be addressed by an ICJ decision, or resolved through bilateral agreements. They concern disputed enclaves (Ceuta and Mellila) and islands (Chafarinas, Perejil, Peñón de Alhucemas and Peñón de Vélez de la Gomera) between Spain and Morocco, as well as areas between Morocco and Algeria (certain parts of the Sahara as well as the towns of Figuig and Tindouf) and between Algeria and

Table 7.6


Border disputes at the International Court of Justice, 1975–2013

Case	Status	Major decisions
Border dispute between Burkina Faso and Niger	Judgement dated 16 April 2013, recognised by both parties	Disputed region divided between the parties
Border dispute between Benin and Nigeria (#125)	Judgement dated 12 July 2005, recognised by both parties	Niger's demands were accepted concerning the Niger River and Benin's demands concerning the Mekrou River were allowed
Land and maritime border between Cameroon and Nigeria (#94)	Judgement dated 10 October 2002, challenged by the Nigerian Senate	Transfer of sovereignty from Nigeria to Cameroon
Maritime delimitation between Guinea-Bissau and Senegal (#85)	Judgement dated 12 November 1991 and an Order dated 8 November 1995, recognised by both parties	Demands by Senegal accepted for Cape Roxo (1989). Maritime zone managed by bilateral agency (1993)
Territorial dispute between Libyan Arab Jamahiriya and Chad (#83)	Judgement dated 3 February 1994, recognised by both parties	Chad's sovereignty over the Aozou strip regained
Territorial dispute between Burkina Faso and the Republic of Mali (#69)	Judgement dated 22 December 1986, recognised by both parties	Burkina Faso's sovereignty over the disputed rivers and Mali's sovereignty over disputed villages
Case concerning the Continental Shelf between the Libyan Arab Jamahiriya and Malta (#68)	Judgement dated 3 June 1985, recognised by both parties	Median line suggested by the Court. Only a part of the disputed area was covered by the judgement
Case concerning the Continental Shelf between Tunisia and the Libyan Arab Jamahiriya (#63)	Judgement dated 24 February 1982, challenged by Tunisia	Demands of the parties delineating two border segments dismissed by the Court
Advisory Opinion concerning the western Sahara (#61)	Advisory opinion dated 16 October 1975	Territorial sovereignty not recognised by Court. Historical ties of allegiance does not challenge the principle of self-determination

Sources: International Court of Justice, OECD/SWAC, 2013

Map 7.7


Sahara-Sahelian borders



Source: Wikipedia

Libya (the Djanet region). Generally speaking, border strategies seem to be enforced less assertively in the southern Sahara than in the north, where borders are more firmly established and national sentiment is more deeply entrenched (Foucher, 1991). This partly explains the reason for the two major traditional foci of conflict in the Sahara-Sahel: the Western Sahara, in which Morocco and Algeria are always directly involved, and the Libyan borders, which are the cause of multiple tensions, including the conflict over the Aouzou Strip (1973–87). These inter-country rivalries slow the implementation of genuine co-operation in the Maghreb region. One case in point is the difficulties facing the implementation of the Arab Maghreb Union (AMU), which is hamstrung by the Sahrawi conflict. Another issue is that Maghreb countries place greater importance on their Saharan borders than the Sahelian states of West and Central Africa do. In addition, major investment and development programmes have been and are still being implemented in the south part of Morocco, Algeria and Libya, along with a significant deployment of military resources (McDougall and Scheele, 2012). This situation contrasts with the northern boundaries of the Sahel nations, which are poorly-controlled from a territorial and political point of view, as recently evidenced by the Malian conflict around Azawad.[7]

In the Sahel nations of West and Central Africa, borders are an issue of interest to local stakeholders who earn their living from the regional flow of goods and persons, and to governments concerned with optimising custom duty collection activities. From an institutional perspective, intergovernmental organisations are recreating rather than transcending the colonial-based opposition between West Africa and North Africa. Except for the Community of Sahel-Saharan States and the African Union, no other economically-oriented organisations have bridged the two sides of the Sahara. In North Africa, calls for the creation of trans-Saharan institutions are frustrated by three factors: conflicts between nations, particularly the unresolved issue of the Western Sahara; imbalances between each region's investments in Saharan border areas (already considerable on the Maghrebian side, and very limited on the West African side); and the possibility of economic integration with the European common market. West Africa has long valued the free movement of persons and goods. Nevertheless, these principles are subject to obstacles, not to mention insecurity and the rise of trafficking. These obstacles include: the limited local impact of regional organisations; the weakness of spatially-defined investment (for example, certain potentially dynamic functional regions); the limited number of local institutional partnerships that promote synergy between towns and local territorial authorities with similar needs; and finally, uneven levels of decentralisation.



Source: Bouquet C. 2003, *L'artificialité des frontières en Afrique subsaharienne,* Les Cahiers d'Outre-Mer n° 222

NOTES

1 *For West African countries, harmonised demographic data generated by the Africapolis programme (Africapolis-SWAC/OECD, 2014) were used. These countries are as follows: Benin, Burkina Faso, Chad, Côte d'Ivoire, Gambia, Ghana, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Liberia, Mali, Mauritania (here included with West African countries since it was covered by the Africapolis study), Niger, Nigeria, Senegal, Sierra Leone and Togo.*

2 *For Algeria, Morocco and Tunisia, national, non-harmonised data were used.*

3 *The narrowness of Benin and Togo, barely more than 100 km in width, means that most of its territory is considered borderland if a 50 km buffer is applied.*

4 *Wangara traders specialised in gold trading. They have been associated with the medieval empires of Ghana and Mali. They represented a large commercial centre in the region before this was replaced by Timbuktu.*

5 *Uti possidetis juris is a principle in international law in which newly independent states retain their possessions regardless of the terms of a treaty. This expression comes from the term uti possidetis, ita possideatis, which means, "may you continue to possess such as you do possess" (lit., "as you possess, thus may you possess") in Latin.*

6 *Disputed plots in legal terms.*

7 *Azawad, a territory in northern Mali, covers the Sahara and Sahelian areas in which Touareg separatist groups have called for independence or autonomy since 1958. In 2012, such groups proclaimed independence but abandoned the claim later on. The word Azawad, which means "grazing area", is derived from the word tamasheq Azawagh.*

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Economic Community of the Great Lakes Countries (ECGLC) (www.cepgl.org)

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Chapter 8

Security issues, movement and networks in the Sahara-Sahel

8.1 Recurring crises since the 1960s 174
8.2 Recent violent episodes 178
8.3 The conflict in Mali 184
8.4 Geopolitical dynamics 196
8.5 (Re)Defining the Sahara-Sahel 216

A period of severe instability in the recent history of Sahara-Sahelian areas began in 2003 when the Salafist Group for Preaching and Combat (GSPC) – later known as Al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) in 2007 – kidnapped some thirty Western tourists in the Algerian desert. This was the first time since independence that the Sahara or the Sahel was affected by such widespread and violent insecurity. From Mauritania to Libya and points in between, including Niger, Algeria, Mali and Nigeria, Chad is the only country in this area that has been left unscathed by armed conflicts or terrorism since 2010; this is somewhat paradoxical for a country long plagued by civil war and rebellion.

The historical evolution of regional instability since the 1960s and an analysis of the triggers shed light on the specific features of Sahara-Sahelian conflicts. These features include wildly shifting loyalties of individuals to combatant groups as well as military strategies based on mobility. Although the Sahara-Sahel has experienced recurring episodes of instability, the nature of the conflicts has changed over the past decade. Less locally contained and often cross-border in nature, the modern-day crises require new institutional responses. The conflict in Mali illustrates the complexities of a situation that encompasses independence movements, religious extremism and transnational trafficking.


8.1 RECURRING CRISES SINCE THE 1960s

The history of Sahara-Sahelian conflicts since the 1960s is characterised by several periods of violence. During the first (1960–75), the area was relatively stable and free of major confrontations. A number of coups d'état ushered in authoritarian regimes, including that of Moussa Traoré in Mali (1968–91), Seyni Kountché in Niger (1974–87), and Muammar Gaddafi in Libya (1969–2011). The following fifteen years – the second period – was marked by Saharawi and Libyan conflicts. In the far west region of the continent, the Western Sahara crisis brought Morocco, Algeria, Mauritania and the Polisario Front into conflict. Libya and Chad clashed over the desert area of the Aouzou Strip from its conquest by Libya in 1973 until the ceasefire in 1987. The International Court of Justice settled the dispute in 1994 resulting in the withdrawal of Libyan forces. A number of smaller-scale border disputes erupted in the 1980s between Burkina Faso and Mali (1985–86), and between Nigeria and Chad (1987) (Maps 8.1 and 8.2) (Table 8.1).

The third period, which began in the 1990s, was characterised by the Touareg rebellions that raged in Mali and Niger, and by the Algerian civil war (1991–2002). In Niger and Mali, the rebellions culminated in a series of tenuous peace agreements. In Algeria, a long and bloody conflict began in 1991 between the government and various Islamist groups. It ended in 2002 with the surrender of the Islamic Salvation Group, an offshoot of the Islamic Salvation Front (FIS), and the defeat of the Armed Islamic Group (GIA). During the same period, major armed conflicts between nations were brought to a standstill (Western Sahara) or resolved (Aouzou Strip).

The fourth and the most significant period of instability to date began in 2003. Almost all of the countries are embroiled in conflict or political instability: coups d'état took place in Mauritania (2005 and 2008), Mali (2012) and Niger (2010). The situation contrasted sharply with the overall decrease in African conflicts that took place in the early 2000s (Williams, 2011). The "Arab Spring" that began in late

Map 8.1
Chadian wars, 1964–2000




Sources: Retaillé D., P. Drevet, O. Pissoat, J. Pierson 2014

2010 engendered a fresh outbreak of political violence and religious extremism in Tunisia and Libya. The most visible sign is the terrorism associated with the AQIM and other Islamist groups operating on both sides of the Sahara.

Between 1974 and 2013, at least 31 non-state groups entered into conflicts with Sahara-Sahelian states at one time or another (Annex 8.A1). Eighteen coups d'état were successful in overthrowing governments in the region, notably in Mauritania (1978, 1984, 2005 and 2008), Niger (1974, 1996, 1999 and 2010), Chad (1975, 1980, 1982 and 1990) and Mali (1968, 1991 and 2012). The violence was especially long-lasting in Algeria (from 1991 to 2002 and then more intermittently) and in Chad

Map 8.2

The advancement of the wall in Western Sahara, 1980–1987



Sources: Bäschlin, E. and M. Sidati, *Western Sahara: Territoriality, border conceptions and border realities* 2011; Ingiusto, Cartografare il presente 2010

(1973–1994, 1997–2002 and 2005–09). In Algeria, success in the fight against terrorism reduced the number of attacks perpetrated in Kabylie. In other Sahara-Sahel countries, outbreaks of violence during the same period were shorter but nevertheless disrupted the operation of democratic institutions in place starting in the 1990s, such as in Niger and in Mali.

Table 8.1

Evolution of political stability, 1960–2013

Stable
Major tension:
X Coups d'état
C Armed conflict, including rebellion
PU Political unrest
T Terrorism

	Mauritania	Mali	Niger	W. Sahara	Algeria	Tunisia	Libya	Chad	Morocco
1960					C			PU	
1961					C	C		PU	
1962		C			C			PU	
1963		C			C			PU	C
1964		C						PU	
1965					X			PU	PU
1966								PU	PU
1967								PU	PU
1968		X						PU	PU
1969							X	PU	PU
1970								PU	PU
1971								PU	PU
1972								PU	PU
1973							C	PU	
1974			X				C	C	
1975							C	C, X	
1976	C			C		PU	C	C	C
1977	C			C		PU	C	C	C
1978	X, C			C		PU	C	C	C
1979	C			C		PU	C	C, X	C
1980				C		PU	C	C	C
1981				C		PU	C	C	C
1982				C		PU	C	C, X	C
1983				C		PU	C	C	C
1984	X			C		PU	C	C	C
1985		C		C		PU	C	C	C
1986				C		PU	C	C	C
1987				C		X, T	C	C	C
1988				C				C	C
1989				C				C	C
1990		C	C	C				X, C	C
1991		X,C	C	C	C, T			C	C

	Mauritania	Mali	Niger	W. Sahara	Algeria	Tunisia	Libya	Chad	Morocco
1992		C	C		C, T			C	
1993		C	C		C, T			C	
1994		C	C		C, T			C	
1995		C	C		C, T				
1996			X		C, T				
1997					C, T			C	
1998					C, T			C	
1999			X		C, T			C	
2000					C, T			C	
2001					C, T			C	
2002					C, T	T		C	
2003		T	T		T				T
2004		T	T		T				
2005	X,T				T			C	
2006		C,T	T		T			C, T	
2007	T	C	C		T			C	
2008	X,T	C	C,T		T	PU		C, C	
2009	T	C,T	C, T		T			C	
2010	T	T	X, T	PU	T	PU			
2011	PU, T	T	T		T	PU	C		T, PU
2012		X,T,C	T		T	T	T, C		
2013		T,C	T		T	T	T, C		

Sources : Williams 2001 and author's update

8.2 RECENT VIOLENT EPISODES


Since the beginning of the 21st century, multiple varieties of crises – including military coups d'état, protest movements, rebellions and revolutions – have reshaped the political landscape of countries in the Maghreb and Sahel and their geopolitical ties (Map 8.3).

Military coups d'état[7]

Four coups d'état have occurred in the past ten years: two in Mauritania, respectively in 2005 and 2008, one in Niger in 2010, and another in Mali in 2012 . As a result, elected governments were overthrown and/or transitional military governments were established with a mandate to hold new elections. However, local circumstances varied. Some soldiers left the army to stand for election as civilian candidates (Mauritania). Non-military leaders also won elections organised by transitional governments (Niger). Most of the coups were led by senior officers (generals or lieutenant colonels), but not so in Mali in 2012. The army played a central role in orchestrating and supporting the political transition process, both before and after the coup.

In Mauritania, military coups have been recurrent since 1978. This instability relates to

Map 8.3
Violent events between 1997 and 2012



Source: ACLED 2012

the conflict in the Sahara. Every regime elected to power has been led by former members of the military who often spearheaded the coup and supervised the election schedule. Despite the political liberalisation process of 1991, the army remained the backbone of the regime. In 1984, Ould Taya entered power after a coup against his predecessor, Colonel Haidallah. Taya introduced a new constitution based on a multi-party system and served as a civilian president, winning elections in 1992, 1997 and 2003. He was ousted by Ely Ould Mohamed Vall, the Director General of National Security, in an internationally-led coup d'état in 2005. The coup was condemned by the United States, France, the UN Secretary-General and the African Union. In an election monitored by international observers, Sidi Ould Abdallahi was elected as president in 2007, the first civilian in three decades to hold the highest office in the land. He was deposed and imprisoned a year later in a military coup organised by Mohamed Ould Abdel Aziz, the recently dismissed head of the Presidential Guard. Although once again condemned by the United States and Algeria (but not by Libya, Senegal or Morocco), the international community recognised the outcome of the presidential election won by Abdel Aziz in 2009.

In Niger, Mamadou Tandja, a former lieutenant colonel who became a minister in the military government of Ali Chaibou

(president from 1987 to 1993), took power after the elections that followed on the heels of the 1999 coup. He was ousted from power after deciding to change the constitution in order to run for a third term in the October 2009 elections. Mass protests ensued. The 2010 coup d'état was condemned by ECOWAS and the international community. The Supreme Council for the Restoration of Democracy, headed by Salou Djibo, took the helm of the transitional government. Mahamadou Issoufou was elected president in April 2011.

Protest movements,[2] from economic to political demands

Despite some democratic setbacks, most countries in the Sahel region have been undergoing significant political change since the turn of the century. Social and political protests have called more for expanded democracy than a regime change. Although demonstrations have called for leaders to resign, and respect for the constitution and democratic process (Senegal 2011), the domino effect remains superficial. In 2010, food riots spread across West Africa. As food prices spiked (in Mali, Niger, Chad and Burkina Faso), the ability of government policies to adjust was called into question.

The "Arab uprisings" in North Africa also emerged at a time of social protest against the cost of living and youth unemployment. In Algeria, many protests were crushed in 2010 and 2011 and did not lead to demands for a regime change. The government took emergency measures such as reducing the import duties and taxes on cooking oil and sugar to relieve pressure on domestic prices. The 2011 riots, the worst to sweep the country in many years, calmed. The state of emergency declared in 1992 was lifted in 2011, no doubt in order to prevent an "Arab Spring" effect. However, the security climate remained tense: residual terrorism persisted and dissident factions of the GIA, such as the GSPC (Salafist Group for Preaching and Combat) and the AQIM continued to operate in the Sahel, along Algeria's southern borders and to the north in Kabylie.

Mohammed IV's ascension to power in Morocco in 1999 ushered in an era of political and economic liberalisation perceived as a departure from his father's more authoritarian regime. Starting in 2000, protests were limited and called for more social services. Over the course of the decade, new demands were made by identity-oriented groups (feminist movements, Islamists or anti-globalisation groups) seeking compensation for actions committed by the Hassan II regime. The regime responded with a crackdown, especially in the southern provinces. Starting in 2003, labour law and family code reforms were introduced followed by the creation of a Justice and Reconciliation Commission, which was tasked with reconciling Moroccans with the dark period in their history known as "the black years" (1963–1994). The Commission acknowledged the torture of opposition members and human rights violations. In January 2011, riots in response to economic conditions erupted in many Moroccan villages. As in Algeria, grassroots unrest calmed, although the militants demanded radical change. While opposition emerged with the opening up of a new political space, the majority of the population did not call into question the monarchy.

Rebellions and revolutions

There are specific reasons for the revolutions in Egypt,[3] Libya and Tunisia. On the surface, their contexts were identical: an economic crisis and limited political liberalisation (except in Libya). However, the army's ability to protect the regime from a general uprising played a crucial role in the turn of events. Apart from the Libyan revolution, outside influences were not decisive.

In Tunisia, on 17 December 2010, a street vendor named Mohammed Bouazzizi, who operated on the southern outskirts of Tunis, set himself on fire after police confiscated his vending cart. This local act triggered a national political protest, a popular uprising and then a revolution. On 10 January 2011, President Ben Ali stepped down from office. The existence of national political structures capable of planning and organising the uprising, together with the army's non-interventionist approach, played a major role. They initiated a powerful social movement intent on overthrowing the regime. The target of this movement is the President and his family and not the


single-party regime structure itself. An-Nahda (an Islamist party whose Arabic name means "renaissance movement") proved to be the best prepared for the elections, although the revolution was not dominated by Islamist doctrine. Harshly repressed under the former regime, the party received 41.5% of the vote and won 89 of the 217 seats during the Constituent Assembly elections on 23 October 2011. Second place went to the Congress for the Republic (CPR, the left-wing nationalist party), which managed to win only 30 seats (13.82% of the votes) (Map 8.4).

In Libya, since the monarchy was overthrown in September 1969, and especially since the rise of the Libyan Arab Jamahiriya in 1977 (a neologism which translates as "the people's state"), Gaddafi was completely opposed to any form of independent political or social expression. Under the "direct popular democracy" system, all Libyans were expected to join together in unions (women, youth, labour, etc.) and express at local meetings their opinions on all topics related to local, national and international politics. These "popular decisions" were then brought by delegates to the General People's Congress, the equivalent of a parliament. In reality, the country was run by one man and his clan, backed by oil and gas revenues. In the late 1990s, an Islamist uprising[4] against the regime was suppressed with bloodshed in Benghazi and Derna, in Cyrenaica, where tribes were politically opposed to Gaddafi.[5] Other sporadic uprisings followed, but the regime appeared to be ruling the country with an iron fist.

Yet Arab uprisings in Tunisia and Egypt began spreading in early 2011. Once again, the first protests occurred in Cyrenaica. This time, however, they quickly deteriorated into all-out civil war. At the end of February, a National Transitional Council was established in Benghazi and was soon supported by most of the international community. In March, the UN authorised multi-national military intervention including air strikes to prevent the regime from responding to the growing rebellion. In October, Gaddafi was captured and lynched while fleeing Sirte, the city in Tripolitania where he was born.

The rapid spread of the Libyan revolution is due in large part to NATO air strikes. It also resulted from the fact that Gaddafi had no time to regain control of the strategic city of Benghazi (and Cyrenaica more generally) before the bombings began. It also relates to a complete lack of organisation on the part of the state, especially the regular army, which Gaddafi had long distrusted, preferring to rely on militias and mercenaries. Lacking weapons and motivation, it soon became clear that some Libyan soldiers were not up to the task. The mercenary forces (composed of Sub-Saharans) were preoccupied with protecting themselves from public recrimination and escaping the country, alongside many migrant workers who had become unpopular and unwelcome.

Map 8.4
An-Nahda electoral results in October 2011



Source: el-kasbah.com

National average = 37%

Insurrections

Touareg rebellions

The northern parts of Niger and Mali are the two main Touareg population centres, with some 1.8 million in Niger and 750 000 in Mali. No more than 250 000 live in Algeria and Libya, with several tens of thousands in Burkina Faso.[6] Traditionally, they were divided into eight confederations, each based in the nomadic area that bears its name. This original division partly explains the number and volatility of the groups involved in the various outbreaks of rebellion. At no time did a united, lasting Touareg front emerge, like the Saharawi Polisario Front. Touareg society is not uniform, despite powerful shared qualities, such as language. Islam is a unifying force. Religion has adapted to ancestral practices that remain widespread, including monogamy and matrilineal descent, practices that conflict with the Sunni Salafist reading of the Koran.

A number of Touareg rebellion cycles have affected Niger and Mali. The first two were connected: the 1991 rebellion in Niger facilitated the 1995 rebellion in Mali, and the 2005 uprising in Mali facilitatedthe 2007 insurgency in Niger. During the first rebellion, the war between Libya and Chad – in which many Touareg fought on the Libyan side – came to an end in the 1980s. International economic sanctions against the regime in Tripoli led Gaddafi to expel tens of thousands of Malian and Nigerien Touareg. Gripped by an economic crisis, Algeria also expelled thousands of Touareg. This influx was a triggering factor in rebellions in the northern part of both Sahel countries that persisted, with only a temporary pause in the mid-1990s.

The 2011 Libyan crisis and its regional outcome – the return of thousands of armed Touareg – had a different impact in Niger and in Mali. In Niger, Touareg movements had long championed federalist, rather than secessionist demands (Grégoire and Bourgeot, 2011). Located in an area containing uranium mines and feeling excluded from the benefits, the Touareg demanded a share in the profits. This was taken into account in the peace agreement signed in 1995. It paved the way for a decentralisation statute and the allocation of a share in the resources generated by mining and industry to territorial communities (later set at 15%). The agreement, which provides for the inclusion of former rebels into military, police, customs and government positions, underscores a willingness to integrate members of the Touareg community into political activities. While not universally supported, it constituted significant progress. Unlike the 1991 and 2006 agreements signed by the Touareg rebels and the government of Mali, it made no provision for a government withdrawal from the northern part of the country.

After agreeing to negotiate, Niger reacted with force to the 2007 resurgence in violence. Those involved in the rebellion demanded 50% of mining revenues and jobs for local populations. However, the Nigerien army considered them bandits and traffickers. In April 2009, Gaddafi negotiated a compromise that included significant financial compensation payable to the movement's leaders (that was intended to be shared with the soldiers, but was not), which forced the Nigerien Movement for Justice (MNJ) to lay down its weapons. However, no peace agreement was ever signed. In contrast, the government of Mali signed an agreement with Touareg rebels in Algiers in 2006.

Libya's collapse in 2011 did not reignite rebellion in Niger. Brigi Faffini, a Touareg from Agadez, became Prime Minister. Another Touareg is the army's second in command. The MNJ founder is advisor to the head of state. Yet another was chair of the board of directors of the country's largest mining company. Decentralisation created local structures in which former rebel leaders held positions as councillors or mayors.

Clearly, Niger negotiated its Touareg issue more successfully than Mali, its neighbour. The fact that the Touareg community made up a much larger percentage of the population (10% compared to 5% in Mali) may have been a factor, along with the presence of mining resources. In Niger, a percentage of the uranium revenues was allocated to local communities. Mali, however, created a region with a Touareg majority (Kidal[7]), but no economic base.

Boko Haram: A regional threat?


In 1999, Nigeria emerged from sixteen years of dictatorship, a period marked by the development of corruption and crime of every sort. In the northern part of the country, a gulf grew

between members of the elite and the general population which, supported and nurtured by many religious leaders and movements, became convinced that stricter compliance with Sharia law would instil morality into social and political life. At the turn of the century, this led to an extension of Koranic criminal law to 12 states, often against the wishes of political authorities.

Mohammed Yusuf was one such religious leader. He espoused a philosophy that combined Wahhabism (he studied in Saudi Arabia), Shiism and animism, placing him out of step with the ideological tenets of Al-Qaeda. The Boko Haram sect originated in the state of Yobé, and began as a protest movement in response to corruption among northern governors responsible for implementing Sharia law. Its supporters demanded full application of Koranic law and rejected the "modernity" of southern Nigeria, whose misguided "education" was considered a sin (Pérouse de Montclos, 2012).

In 2003, Yusuf and his followers created a rural community called the "celestial city" in the state of Yobé. They were driven out by the local population and expelled from the state. Many relocated to Maïduguri in Borno, where their contact with authorities quickly deteriorated under the strain of sporadic confrontations. In July 2009, security forces killed hundreds of sect members, including

Map 8.5
Boko Haram



Mohammed Yusuf. Boko Haram radically changed. The sect became an ultra-violent organisation; it widened the spectrum of its targets and gradually extended its geographic range to include, by 2014 , almost the entire northern half of Nigeria (Map 8.5).

From 2009 to 2013, more than 800 attacks were attributed to the group, whose techniques came to resemble those of Al-Qaeda and its affiliates. Its ties with other terrorist groups operating in the Sahara-Sahel are difficult to determine. After Yusuf's death in 2009, the AQIM made a public commitment to deliver arms to Boko Haram. It seems likely that the two groups had contact with each other. It also seems likely that the Movement for Unity and Jihad in West Africa (MUJAO), which surfaced during the Mali crisis in 2011–2012, welcomed Boko Haram defectors into its organisation. On 22 May 2014, the United Nations Security Council added Boko Haram to its terrorist group blacklist based on its ties with Al-Qaeda.

But is Boko Haram a truly regional group with regional goals?

Its ethno-linguistic base is Kanouri, a trans-national region covering the south-eastern part of the Diffa region in Niger and the far northern part of Cameroon, and touching Chad. Although Boko Haram cannot be considered an ethnic organisation (its purpose is not to create a Kanouri political entity and Mohammed Yusuf was not a member of that ethnic group), its recruitment efforts focus on this area, where fringe areas of Chad, Cameroon and Niger provide it with a fall-back base. At this point, little action has occurred in the first two countries although a prison was attacked in June 2013 in Niger.

The intensity of the sect's terrorist activities has also led to arms and munitions trafficking, networks which are likely shared with other terrorist groups in the region. By definition, this trafficking creates instability, particularly along the route between Libya and northern Nigeria via north-western Chad and northern Cameroon.

A threat to Nigeria's stability would threaten the entire region, from the Atlantic coast to the shores of the Mediterranean. At present, experts doubt whether Boko Haram is capable of sparking what could become a religious civil war. In any case, the sect's actions are sowing unhealthy and dangerous seeds: Yoruba and Ibo militant splinter groups are calling for revenge and war, and Christian extremist groups are beginning to emerge.

The Paris Summit of May 2014, where heads of state from Benin, Cameroon, Chad, Niger and Nigeria met over Boko Haram, indicates a political willingness to address the threat on a regional basis.

8.3 THE CONFLICT IN MALI

Better known for droughts and occasional acts of brigandry, the Sahel and the Sahara regions have become a theatre of military operations conducted by Islamist groups, rebels seeking autonomy, and national and foreign military forces. This situation offsets the relative decrease in the number of conflicts seen elsewhere on the African continent since the beginning of the 2000s. The example of Mali clearly illustrates the tension between nomadic expertise converted to serve the economy of war and trafficking, and the ability of states to control this mobility and protect their territory. While the rebels and terrorists rely on their mastery of movement, especially across borders, institutional responses to the development of these conflicts and terrorist activity in the Sahara-Sahel generally rely on unilateral or bilateral approaches rather than regional co-operation (Box 8.1) (Map 8.6).

The complex patterns of violence

With respect to the crisis in Mali, the factors normally used to explain conflicts in Africa (territorial inequalities, clientelism of the elite, ethnic and religious differences, and natural resources) (Williams, 2011) form a complex web of interdependent variables.

Territorial inequalities

The independence demands of the National Movement for the Liberation of Azawad (MNLA) call attention to the limited public

investment in northern Mali and the unequal development of the southern and northern portions of the nation. The first issue is self-evident. Like Niger or Chad, Mali has invested very little in its north – starting with roads – unlike Maghreb countries – not to mention areas such as education, health, and subsidised foodstuffs and petroleum products. The second is more questionable, whether in terms of monetary poverty or access to basic social services (Map 8.7).

Nevertheless, this analysis does take into account internal inequalities within Saharan regions or the motives of the parties involved. Poverty levels are not homogenous among the societies that populate the Sahara-Sahel. The instigators of the independence movements involved in the 2012 conflict are not the most marginalised. Well connected on both sides of the Sahara and taking advantage of state "withdrawal" since the mid-1990s, some groups started trafficking with neighbouring countries and took part in uprisings sponsored by the AQIM in the 2000s. The newfound wealth of this segment of nomadic society created a divide between them and the general population (Grégoire, 2013).

A direct connection between poverty and terrorism is difficult to establish, given the complex dynamics involved. According to one widely-held view, terrorism is a product of poverty. It allegedly fosters the recruitment of youth who are vulnerable to ideological indoctrination. According to this theory, which would apply to the Sahara-Sahelian situation, terrorists are products of the most disadvantaged and least educated segments of society with few job prospects. However, recent studies on the profile of jihadist terrorists show that recruitment primarily targets educated and middle- or upperclass adults (Sageman, 2004; bin Khaled al-Saud and Gow, 2013). Some universities in northern Nigeria have long been suspected of facilitating the Islamist radicalisation of students (Alao, 2013).

Social networks also play a clear role as shown by the fact that terrorist groups are able to act far from their home bases and regions of origin (Medina and Hepner, 2013).

The social ties established within immigrant communities and during visits to conflict zones foster group ties, training and the dissemination of combat techniques. This explains the structure of closely connected clusters and its resiliency in the face of outside threats (Sageman, 2008). Thus, leaders of Islamist groups in the Sahara-Sahel have extensive combat experience acquired in Algeria, West Africa and the Middle East. Local recruits are assigned the least sophisticated and most dangerous tasks, including suicide bombings or close-quarters combat. Their motives are more economically driven. During the conflict in Mali, this discrimination fuelled internal divisions within armed groups.


Clientelism strategies

The political context can exacerbate divisions or foster greater balance among communities. For that reason, some countries that share the same historical legacy follow different paths. Niger and Mali comprise similar nomadic and sedentary populations and have confronted similar irredentist movements for over fifty years. However, while Niger was spared the Touareg rebellion in 2012, the same did not hold true in the 1980s and 1990s. Did this owe to the fact that certain leaders of previous rebellions were now members of the Nigerien government and political circle? Decentralisation, while imperfect (but including some transfer of uranium revenues), seems to have allowed the people better access to the management of their regions and urban communities, without state withdrawal from the north (Grégoire, 2013).

Mali followed an altogether different path. The Tamanrasset agreements signed in 1991 provided for demilitarisation of the Kidal, Gao and Timbuktu regions. Fifteen years later, the Algiers Agreement (2006) led to the de facto withdrawal by government from the Kidal region; army barracks were relocated to the city of Kidal alone. Special units "comprised essentially of individuals from the nomadic zones" according to the wording of the agreement, were expected to single-handedly maintain security in rural areas, in other words, the entire territory.

President Amadou Toumani Touré's (2002–2012) strategy capitalised on the divisions within Touareg society. It favoured some tribes that had traditionally been vassals of

Map 8.6
The ephemeral Azawad



Sources: Retaillé D. and O. Walther, *New ways of conceptualizing space and mobility* 2012; *Africapolis* - SWAC/OECD 2014; Natural Earth 2013



Source: ACLED 2012 (www.acleddata.com/data/africa/)

the Ifoghas tribes, called Imghad, and Arab tribes from Timbuktu and Gao to govern the northern part of the country (Lacher and Tull, 2013). After the fall of Muammar Gaddafi in 2011, the return of Malian Touareg who had served in Libya upset the balance of power between the Imghad tribes, backed by the government in Bamako, and the "noble" Ifoghas tribes active in the MNLA independence movements and Ansar Dine.

Outside all government control, northern Mali combines all of the features attractive to trans-national criminal networks. It is also equipped with airports capable of facilitating the flow of drugs and other types of trafficking to Europe. It seems highly likely that members of the government, the army and probably groups with direct or indirect ties to political power are involved (Lacher, 2011). Accordingly, interest groups develop between the seat of power – in the broad sense of the term – and mafia groups acting in direct association with terrorist factions. This phenomenon, far from limited to Mali, attests to the financial power of international trafficking compared to the indigent budgets of governments (Chapter 9).

Ethnic and religious aspects

A virtual line between two large ethnic groups cuts through the centre of Mali: Sub-Saharans in the south and Arab-Berbers in the north. Despite the oversimplified maps of the original areas occupied by the different groups, Mali is a remarkable ethno-linguistic mosaic where some sixty ethnic groups and twenty languages co-exist. The population is comprised of 90% Sub-Saharans and 10% Arab-Berbers, half of them Touareg (or 5% of the total national population).

The ethno-linguistic landscape of northern Mali is also diverse. The majority of the population in the Timbuktu (675 000 inhabitants in 2009 according to the last census) and Gao (542 000 inhabitants) regions are Sub-Saharan (Songhay, Fila, Dagon, Bozo, Someone, etc.). The Kidal area (68 000 inhabitants), created later in 1991 following the 1990/1991 rebellion, was custom-carved around the Adrar des Ifoghas Mountains. The majority of its population is Touareg.

The population of this vast area comprising three regions (800 000 km²) is, in reality, concentrated in a narrow strip of land along the river valley, amounting to less than 1% of

Box 8.1
Key events[8]

2012

22 March: soldiers announce that President Touré's regime has been overthrown. Under the leadership of Captain Amadou Haya Sanogo, members of the National Committee for the Re-establishment of Democracy and the Restoration of the State (CNRDRE) suspend the Constitution.

30 March: the armed Islamist movement known as Ansar Dine, with support from the National Movement for the Liberation of Azawad (MNLA) and elements within the AQIM, take the city of Kidal in the north-east, and then Gao and Timbuktu.

6 April: the MNLA unilaterally declares the Azawad region to be independent. A framework agreement for the transfer of power to civilian authorities is signed by the junta and ECOWAS.

12 April: Dioncounda Traoré, former President of the National Assembly, is inaugurated as president. On 17 April, Cheick Modibo Diarra is named acting Prime Minister.

28 June: Touareg rebels belonging to the MNLA leave Timbuktu. MUJAO Islamists take complete control of Gao after engaging in violent combat with Touareg rebels.

30 June to 2 July: in Timbuktu, Ansar Dine Islamists destroy a number of UNESCO World Heritage mausoleums and monuments. The prosecutor for the International Criminal Court, Fatou Bensouda, declares the destruction of the Muslim holy sites in Timbuktu a "war crime" liable to prosecution by the ICC.

20 August: Cheick Modibo Diarra announces the names of the members of the national unity government, including various public figures with ties to putschists, and a Touareg minister.

9 October: Ban Ki-moon, the Secretary General of the United Nations, appoints Romano Prodi as Special Envoy for the Sahel.

12 October: the UN Security Council passes a resolution urging West African countries to specify their plans given a military intervention to retake northern Mali.

11 November: summit in Abuja on the situation in Mali. ECOWAS and other African countries decide to send 3 300 soldiers to assist the Malian army.

14 November: Ansar Dine abandons its plans to impose Islamic law throughout the country, except in its stronghold of Kidal. The armed group claims that it is willing to help "rid" the north of "terrorism" and "foreign movements".

16 November: Ansar Dine and MNLA representatives meet with mediator Blaise Compaoré in Ouagadougou. They say they are ready to engage in "political dialogue" with Bamako.

Night of 10 to 11 December 2012: the Prime Minister is arrested on orders from Captain Sanogo. He resigns from government. Diango Cissoko, mediator for the Republic, is appointed to replace him.

2013

January: in response to an appeal from the President of Mali, France intervenes militarily (Operation Serval). The Security Council declares the intervention consistent with international law and the UN Charter, and supports the operation. France's priority is still "the

the total area. From Niafounké to Ansongo, via Timbuktu, Bourem and Gao, 80 to 90% of the population of northern Mali live in this area; most are sedentary farmers (Map 8.8).

This may partially explain why – although it claims to address all "Azawad people" – the political goal of independence championed by the MNLA is by no means supported by a majority of the population, including the Touareg, some of whom live in southern parts of Mali. More specifically, this is evident in the creation of militia groups, Songhay in particular but also Arab, fighting the MNLA and its allies. Inter-ethnic clashes have indeed taken

implementation of UN resolution 2085". The resolution authorises the short-term deployment of an essentially African international force to retake northern Mali. In the National Assembly, the President of the Republic of Chad officially announces the deployment of troops from Chad. Their contingent becomes part of the African-led International Support Mission in Mali (AFISMA) (in March).
Islamists attack a gas plant at In Amenas, claiming to be acting "in response to Algeria's interference"; Algeria had authorised the French air force to fly over its territory. Algerian forces lead the assault. Outcome: 37 foreign hostages and 29 jihadists are killed.
A Touareg faction of Ansar Dine, one of the Islamist groups controlling northern Mali, leaves the organisation and announces that they are ready to negotiate with the Bamako government.
Konna, Diabali, Douentza and Gao, followed by Timbuktu, are retaken by Malian and French forces. Kidal is "secured" by some 1 800 Chadians (in February).
At an international donors conference in Addis Ababa, a total of 445 billion dollars is pledged, most of it earmarked to fund military operations.

25 April: the Security Council authorises a force of 12 600 peacekeepers to stabilise the north. Known as the United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in Mali (MINUSMA), the peacekeepers are scheduled for deployment and to replace MISMA on 1 July.

28 July and 11 August: first and second rounds of the presidential elections. Ibrahim Boubacar Keïta is elected with 77.61% of the votes.

14 August: Captain Sanogo, leader of the March 2012 coup d'état, is promoted to general. The announcement surprises and angers human rights organisations.

14 October: the Minister of Justice alludes to the possibility of amnesty for crimes committed in the north. Government authorities want to proceed with the first round of legislative elections slated for 24 November.

29 November: an MNLA official announces that the movement is taking up arms again following clashes between Touareg and the Malian army in Kidal.

December: Oumar Tatam Ly, the Prime Minister of Mali, affirms that the government is still open to holding discussions with MNLA Touareg rebels.
Malian President Ibrahim Boubacar Keïta meets in Berlin with Chancellor Angela Merkel. Germany confirms its support.
The second round of legislative elections takes place amid tensions over the death of two Senegalese UN peacekeepers killed in a fatal attack in Kidal.

2014

January: the Managing Director of the International Monetary Fund, Christine Lagarde, visits Mali and expresses her wish to "strengthen the partnership" between the IMF and Bamako.
Ibrahim Boubacar Keïta makes an official visit to Nouakchott. Mauritania and Mali sign a co-operation agreement to combat armed or terrorist groups.


Source: Deutsche Welle

place. However, they are a result, not the cause, of the conflict.

The Malachite rite of Sunni Islam, suffused by animism and tolerance, is the religion of the vast majority of Malians (roughly 90%). Mali is a secular state; religious freedom is guaranteed under Article 4 of the Constitution: "Every person has the right to freedom of thought, conscience, religion, worship, opinion, and creation in respect to the law".

Three types of religious conflicts exist: those in which a majority religion clashes with a minority religion, those between two major monotheistic religions, and those in which

Map 8.7
Poverty in Mali



one religion is divided by competing currents (Basedau and De Juan, 2008). The contemporary conflicts in Nigeria, Mali, Niger, Algeria and the Sudan fall into the latter category.

In these countries, the Hanbali school stands opposed to the Maliki school. The Hanbali school supports a much more puritanical Sunni rite compared to the Maliki school. It is composed of two currents, Wahhabism and Salafism, the two closely related at an ideological level. Both support a literal reading of the Koran whose precepts, to the exclusion of any other authority, must guide all individual and collective social practices. Salafism is merely an even more conservative version of Wahhabism. In particular, Salafism opposes any form of Western influence and all of the animist practices underlying Sub-Saharan Malekism.


Salafism fuelled the religious radicalism of the 1970s in northern Nigeria with the rise of the preacher Mohammed Marwa, known as Maitatsine (Loimeier, 1997). A number of Islamist movements followed in his footsteps up to the 2000s. These movements were based on the Salafist Jihadism[9] of the 1980s emerging from the resistance movement following the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan. The teachings of these groups (Islamic Movement of Nigeria, Jamaatu Izalat Al-Bida Wa Iqamatus al-sunna, known as Izala, and Jamā'at Ahl as-Sunnah lid-da'wa wal-Jihād, known as Boko Haram) centre on a rejection of the secular state, strict Islamic orthodoxy, the introduction of Sharia law, and the fight against all forms of westernisation (Alao, 2013; Kane, 2003). Gradually, these teachings became part of jihad thinking.

The strictly religious nature of the tension is sometimes blurred because the clashes are made to serve political purposes. For instance, in Nigeria, the Islamist surge conceals intense political struggles. Islamism is also used by local and regional leaders to enhance their electoral popularity. Access to government jobs and resources, especially oil and gas, is facilitated for those who claim to be devout and strict followers of Islam.

The religious nature of the conflicts gradually dissolved into illicit activities. During the Algerian civil war (1991–2002), some Islamist leaders fighting against the government

Map 8.8

The truncated perception of ethnic groups in Mali



	Number	as % of total pop.
Bambara	4 040 000	25
Senoufo	1 996 000	12
Songhay	1 591 000	10
Fula	1 475 000	9
Malinké	1 294 000	8
Soninké	1 252 000	8
Dogon	907 100	6
Moor	840 000	5
Touareg	813 000	5
Bozo	762 900	5
Bomu	248 000	2
Khassonké	222 000	1
Toucouleur	231 000	1

Source: Atlas Jeune Afrique 2010

augmented their social and financial capital by engaging in criminal activities such as in the black market (Martinez, 2000). A similar evolution characterises the Islamist protagonists of the conflict in Mali, such as Mokhtar Belmokhtar, known for their involvement in illegal cross-border trade.

Until the early 2000s, the scope of the violence perpetrated by radical Islamist movements was local before it became regional. The settlement by AQIM and Islamist groups in northern Mali from Algeria attests to the propensity of radical Islamism to go beyond the limits of nation states. Farther south, Boko Haram implemented a strategy of suicide attacks targeting the Nigerian government, traditional and secular leaders, as well as Christians. Working from its original headquarters in Maiduguri, it has launched operations in other Nigerian states (Zenn, 2013). The group's dissemination capacity and multi-dimensionality pose the greatest challenge to security initiatives implemented by state and inter-state organisations.

Resources

Although the presence of natural resources may exacerbate violence, it cannot entirely account for the nature and evolution of conflicts (Benjaminsen, 2012). In the Great Lakes region, the abundance of natural resources like coltan[10] or diamonds enables protagonists of the conflicts to conduct long-term military operations. The leaders of the Sahara-Sahelian

conflicts receive little of the revenues generated by local resources such as gold or uranium. The division of the revenues from uranium mined at Arlit, in northern Niger, and its ecological impact are nevertheless among the demands made by Touareg rebel movements. The Nigerien Movement for Justice carried out several operations against mining site facilities or roads leading to them (2007–2008) before AQIM took five employees from the companies Areva and Satom hostage in 2010.

Scant resources alone cannot explain the rebellions in Mali and Niger (desertification or competition between farmers and herders). The 1963 rebellion occurred at a time of abundant rainfall, while the uprisings of the 1990s began in Kidal, in the Adrar des Ifoghas region, several hundred kilometres north of the Niger River where local clashes were taking place between herders and farmers. In the Mali conflict, the most important financial resource involved is human, not mineral. Hostage ransoms help finance Islamist groups in northern Mali, alliances between Touareg and Arab tribes, the release of Islamist prisoners, and the enrichment of certain government intermediaries. Kidnappings discourage any Western presence in the Sahara-Sahel and pressure Western forces to withdraw from Afghanistan. Between 2003 and 2013, 85 Westerners and seven Algerian diplomats were taken hostage; at least six of them died as a result of their captivity (Annex 8.A1). Most kidnappings result in the payment of ransom or an exchange of prisoners despite the fact that some countries officially refuse to negotiate.[11]

Reorganisation and mobility, key features of conflicts in the Sahara and in the Sahel

Membership in combatant groups and group blending

Individual membership in the groups changes with circumstances and generally aligns with tribal or ethnic cleavages. In Mali, the joint military offensive by AQIM and MNLA rebel Islamists in January 2012 caused many soldiers to flee or join enemy ranks. When the military upper hand of the Islamists became apparent, many MNLA rebels joined AQIM and other Islamist groups established during that period. The MUJAO distanced itself from AQIM in mid-2011 before merging in 2012 with a dissident group known as the Signed-in-Blood Battalion led by Mokhtar Belmokhtar. The two groups joined forces in August 2013 under the name Almoravid (Al-Mourabitoun). In January 2013, French military intervention provoked significant divisions within the ranks of Ansar Dine, the movement created by Iyad Ag Ghaly in 2012. Some Touareg leaders from the Ifoghas region left Ansar Dine to form the Islamic Movement for Azawad (MIA) in January 2013, under the command of Alghabass Ag Intallah, the son of Amenokal des Ifoghas Intallah ag Attaher. The MIA disbanded in May 2013 to become part of the High Council for the Unity of Azawad (HCUA). Some Ansar Dine combatants, having left the MNLA in 2012, likely rejoined the group in 2013 and some Arabo-Berbers likely left Ansar Dine to form their own group, Ansar al-Sharia (Lacher and Tull, 2013).

The life of the Touareg Ag Ghaly is a prime example of this mobility. Born in 1953 or 1954 into an important family in Adrar des Ifoghas, he fought in Muammar Gaddafi's Islamic Legion in the 1980s, like many other Malian Touareg. On his return to Mali in the late 1980s, he took over as head of the Popular Movement of Azawad (MPA) in 1991. In the 2000s, Ag Ghaly became a negotiator on behalf of the government of Mali. He played a role in the release of a number of Western hostages. In 2008, he was appointed as Mali's consular advisor in Djeddah, Saudi Arabia, before he was expelled because of alleged ties to Al-Qaeda. He returned again to Mali where he made an unsuccessful bid for leadership of the MNLA in 2010 before founding Ansar Dine in 2012.

Among Algerian Islamists, new group blendings were based more on ideology. Before swearing allegiance to Osama Bin Laden in 2006 and adopting the name Al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) in 2007, the GSPC separated from the Armed Islamic Group (GIA) in 1996. Ostensibly, it opposed the AQIM's policy of excommunication and civilian massacres. Some analysts perceived the GSPC's allegiance to Al-Qaeda and name change as an attempt to broaden the scope of its operations to a trans-national level. It had previously focused its action on combating the "enemy at hand", namely the Algerian government, rather than

the "distant enemy" embodied by the United States and France (Gray and Stockham, 2008). The AQIM's strategy was similar to that of Al-Qaeda: conducting suicide attacks aimed at public figures or symbolic sites, posting videos on militant websites and taking Westerners hostage (Pham, 2011).

Mobility

Mobility, especially cross-border mobility, is a key factor in the military operations carried out by Sahara-Sahelian rebel groups (Gow, Olonisakin and Dijxhoorn, 2013). The purpose of most assaults is to control strategic transnational sites or roads, not to capture or defend territory.

This is one of the misunderstood factors of the Mali conflict. Although allies during the January 2012 offensive, the MNLA and the AQIM pursue opposing territorial objectives. The MNLA claims to be "fighting for the unity of the sons of Azawad". In July 2012, Ansar Dine proclaimed, "All we want is the introduction of Sharia law. We are opposed to independence" (AFP, 2012). Initially, nomad expertise was used to control strategic sites and routes, however, the AQIM and Ansar Dine ultimately drove out the MNLA Touareg, not wanting to use their military resources to occupy vast territories.

A number of analyses show that the way in which the AQIM manages the Sahara-Sahelian area differs from that adopted in Algeria by the GIA and GSPC movements, the latter of which divided the country into nine regional zones each led by an emir (Tawil, 2010). When the GSPC became the AQIM in 2007 (by request of Abdelmalek Droukdel, emir of the GSPC since 2004 and, subsequently, of the AQIM), the area was reorganised into four or five zones: central, eastern, western and southern (Sahara-Sahel). But the zones did not emerge simultaneously. The AQIM relies on a system of oaths of allegiance taken between influential individuals (Guidère, 2011) with a great deal of autonomy, rather than a centralised system of command vulnerable to attacks.

Many differences exist among the various battalions (Katibas). For example, some intend to pursue the long-standing conflict with the Algerian government; others are intent on waging armed conflict at the international level (Filiu, 2009). Thus, Mokhtar Belmokhtar (alias Khaled Abou al-Abbas), emir of the "The Turbaned Ones", maintains strained ties with Abdelmalek Droukdel. This is why Abdelmalek Droukdel, among others, fostered the creation of the Katiba Tariq Ibn Ziyad led by emir Abdelhamid Abou Zeid (alias Mohamed Ghedir). When Zeid died in 2013, he was replaced by Saïd Abou Moughatil, known as Abou Saïd el-Djazaïri (Porter, 2011).

In addition to the Al-Muthalimin and Tarik Ibn Ziyad Katibas, there are two or three other Katibas, or about 1 000 men in total, under the command of Djamel Okacha, alias Yahia Abou el Houmâm, emir of AQIM for the Sahara and the Sahel (replaced after his death by Nabil Abu Alkama (alias Nabil Makloufi):

- Katiba Al Ansar, led by Hamada Ag Hama, alias Abdelkrim Taleb.
- Katiba Al Fourghan, led by Aderrahmane, alias Talha.
- Katiba Youssef Ibn Tachfin, created in November 2012, led by Abou Abdel Hakim Al Ghairawany.

This structure was significantly affected by the defection of Mokhtar Belmokhtar who established the dissident group Signed-in-Blood Battalion (Katiba) in December 2012, and by the French military intervention in Chad during which Abou Zeid was killed (Map 8.9).

Analyses show that Abou Zeid's movements in Mali were primarily centred in the region between Adrar des Ifoghas, Timbuktu and Taoudenni, while Mokhtar Belmokhtar operated between Timbuktu and Lake Faguibine (GCTAT, 2013). Belmokhtar is believed to be active in Mali, Mauritania and Niger, whereas Zeid was present in the eastern and south-eastern Sahara, between Algeria, Mali and Niger (Wilkinson, 2012). Some sources show that Abou Anas Abn al-Rahman al-Shanqiti, the Mauritanian leader of the AQIM, is based between Mauritania, Algeria and Mali (Tawil, 2010). The fact that Belmokhtar claimed responsibility for the attack on the gas plant at In Amenas in January 2013, and the suicide attacks at Arlit and Agadez in May 2013 (more than 1 100 kilometres from Timbuktu), shows that these individuals move with relative freedom throughout these states; or that they are able to mobilise networks that enable them to strike from a distance. The different regional AQIM leaders do not control


territory exclusively. They operate through networks established with Touareg and Arab tribes that inhabit the region and are extremely mobile. Their zones of operation often overlap (Wilkinson, 2012).

The fact that the actors in the Sahara-Sahelian conflicts rely on social networks, including matrimonial alliances, to control a given area should contribute to the use of descriptive images other than "corridors" or "sanctuaries". Spatial identification of the social networks would make it possible to simultaneously visualise an actor's position and geographic location within a social network (Retaillé and Walther, 2011, 2013) (Map 8.10).

Actors involved in terrorism in the Sahara-Sahel cannot be spatially identified exclusively based on their ties with a zone or a single location. The violent events attributed to terrorist groups between 2003 and 2012 are not limited to the major climatic areas or any one of the trans-border corridors defined by the American initiatives (Pan Sahel and trans-Saharan counter-terrorism Initiative). The map cannot, however, place the different acts of terrorism in relation to each other and to the network of ties between the different actors. It is static. There are two spatial logics, depending on the groups under consideration: on the one hand, there are the cross-border movements of Algerian Islamist groups operating from northern Mali and, on the other, the largely national movements of Boko Haram, which has spread from its historical base in Maiduguri in the north-east towards the rest of Nigeria.

The social networks that comprise the true resource of terrorism are based on a group of towns important for their control over movement rather than the size of their population or the importance of their hinterlands, which in any case do not exist in the Sahara. In this type of configuration, command of specific sites and the distance between sites is more important than controlling areas. In Mali, that site is Kidal, in Adrar des Ifoghas, the starting point of the Malian Touareg rebellions and birthplace of Iyad Ag Ghaly, the Ansar Dine leader. Kidal is connected to towns along the Niger River such as Timbuktu, Bourem, Gao and Ansongo, which provide access to the trans-Saharan routes. This network of large towns is complemented by Algerian border towns such as Bordj Badji Mokhtar, al-Khalil, Tessalit and Tin Zaouaten. Without the support of the latter, it would be impossible to supply the Saharan Islamists. They are important stopovers for trans-Saharan trafficking (Scheele, 2012) (Map 8.11).


Map 8.9
GSPC's spatial organisation



Source: globalterrorwatch.ch


Map 8.10

Location of incidents by terrorist group, 2003–2012



Source: Armed Conflict Location and Event Dataset, ACLED 2013

Map 8.11
Communications network in northern Mali



Source: Institut géographique national du Mali

Box 8.2
Libyan centrifugal forces

The divisions between the Sahel and Libya accentuate the centrifugal forces at work in the Libyan state. Cyrenaica, rich in energy resources, could lean toward Egypt, opening up a gap in regional geopolitics. On 6 March 2012, Ahmed Zubair Senoussi was elected emir by the leaders of the Cyrenaica tribes, a political act indicating movement towards federalism. Initially motivated by monetary claims, successive interruptions inoil and gas production resulted in inter-tribal conflicts rooted in issues related to autonomy and separatism. To date, the Libyan state is estimated to have lost some 13 billion dollars. The government was concerned about taking strong measures for fear of alienating powerful tribes with a strong commitment to autonomy and control over the eastern part of the country, such as the Mgharba. More specifically, Tripoli, like Kurdistan in Iraq, fears losing control of Cyrenaica's oil reserves if the region leans toward options of federalism or autonomy. At the same time, the oil wells have created new tribal territorialities that feed the long-standing covetousness and divisions suspended during the Gaddafi era. Neither the National Transitional Council, nor the governments in place before and after the legislative elections held on 7 July 2012, have been able to overcome the destabilising forces re-emerging from the depths of Libyan history.

Mehdi Taje (2014)

8.4 GEOPOLITICAL DYNAMICS

Gaddafi in Africa and consequences of the fall of the Libyan regime

After unsuccessfully focusing its foreign policy on pan-Arabism in the 1970s, Libya turned its attention to the African continent starting in the 1980s. Gaddafi broadened his diplomatic, financial, military and family ties to the continent. This policy facilitated economic migration into Libya, most notably from the Sahel and the Maghreb. Workers flooded in to take advantage of opportunities in the oil and gas sector. As the driving force behind the creation of the Community of Sahel-Saharan States (CEN-SAD) in 1998, an organisation for which he alone provided 80% of the budget, Gaddafi came close to achieving his dream of union among all African countries. In just over a decade, the number of CEN-SAD members increased from 5 to 28 as a result of generous contributions financed by petrodollars. Borne along by his stated ambition of creating the "United States of Africa", Gaddafi was also one of the key figures involved in transforming the OAU into the African Union (AU). It is in Sirte, the city of Gaddafi's birth, that the decision is taken on 9 September 1999 to create the AU; he was the president of the Union from December 2009 to January 2010. Until 2011, Libya was the AU's largest financial contributor (15% of the budget); the country also financed the creation of a conflict resolution mechanism and peacekeeping operations in Darfur (where it also funded and trained rebels) and Somalia.

By integrating Africans from the Sahel into his army, most notably the Touareg, Gaddafi established ties with rebel movements who were grateful to him for supporting their cause. The Islamic Legion, composed of combatants from the Sahel, among other places, was mobilised during various Libyan expeditions on the continent. It is disbanded at the end of the 1980s when the war with Chad came to an end; some of its 6 000 to 8 000 men became part of Gaddafi's repressive security apparatus. In 2009, he acted as a mediator in Niger during the Touareg rebellion. While a peace agreement was not signed (as in Ouagadougou in 1995), Libyan oil revenues were leveraged to persuade rebel leaders to lay down their arms. In 2006, in Timbuktu, he created the Popular and Social League of the Great Sahara Tribes, encouraging the Touareg from Algeria, Mali and Niger (but not from Libya) to unite as a political and military force. Gaddafi had several irons in the fire. He was aiding regimes that had been ostracised by the international community for undermining democracy (Mauritania and Niger). Through loans and investments in financially strapped Sahel countries, he promoted his foreign policy (for example, encouraging the non-recognition of Israel).

The fall of the Libyan Arab Jamahiriya was a financial blow to the AU; it also orphaned CEN-SAD. Numerous investment programmes in a number of countries came to an abrupt halt; for example, the construction of the road between Agadez (Niger) and the Algerian border or the project to develop 100 000 hectares of land in the Office du Niger, Mali.

The outbreak of civil war in early 2011 led to a massive outflow of immigrant populations. At that time, immigrants accounted for 1.2 million of the country's 8 million people. The number of illegal immigrants was no doubt significant but impossible to quantify; uncorroborated estimates set the number at more than one, if not two million. Hundreds of thousands of people from Niger, Chad, Mali, and the Maghreb in particular, returned to their home countries. Non-Libyan members of Gaddafi's security force and system of repression fled alongside the economic migrants. As in the 1990s, they took their weapons and culture of war with them. Their return, which the Malian security forces were unable to control, was connected with the formation of the MNLA in 2011. Gaddafi had opened up the arsenals in all Libyan cities; significant quantities of weapons made their way into the theatre of operations in Mali where they were quickly pressed into service.

Beyond Mali, the entire region was experiencing the repercussions of a civil war that did not end with the death of Gaddafi in October 2011. Significantly higher quantities of weapons circulated in the Sahara-Sahelian areas. In southern and eastern Libya, the government failed to assert its authority. Cyrenaica, where Gaddafi's regime had violently crushed a

number of rebellions,[12] was unsettled by the presence and violence of Salafist groups.[13] In the south, another war was developing between Arab militias and the Tubu, a nomadic people from Sub-Saharan Africa living in Chad and Niger. The conflict, a combination of long-standing resentment,[14] the presence of Salafist groups, and economic stakes,[15] posed a threat to the integrity of Libya and the stability of Chad, Niger, Algeria and Tunisia (Map 8.12).

Political reconfigurations after the crises in Libya and Mali


Algeria, the regional powerhouse

Algeria is by far the most powerful country in its region; its economy, worth 200 billion USD (2011), is based on oil and gas resources that account for 97% of its export revenues. It is Europe's third-largest supplier of natural gas and also has considerable shale gas reserves. The defence budget – an indication of, among other things, the army's major role in national political life – reached 10 billion USD in 2013, 65 times the size of Mali's or 130 times the size of Niger's defence budget. The fifteen first years of the 21st century will have profoundly changed the country's regional geopolitical environment (Map 8.13).


The fall of Colonel Gaddafi's regime brought an end to the power that Algiers had often viewed from the perspective of regional rivalries (Chena and Tisseron, 2013). In theory, it opened up a new sphere of influence while setting in motion new threats: Chad, Libya, Mali and Niger in addition to the unresolved question of the Western Sahara and tensions in Tunisia. Algeria, which is the only country to have escaped the "Arab Spring", is at the centre of a trans-national dynamic of declared or potential instability.

More than ever, Algeria remained concerned about the Touareg issue. Its policy of integration and sedentarisation of Algerian

Map 8.12
The risk of Libyan explosion



Map 8.13
Military expenditures



Source: SIPRI Military Expenditure Database 2014

Touareg had produced results, even if tensions remained with the Berber (of which the Touareg constitute only a small percentage) and Arab communities. In 2006, the Algerian Touareg rejected Libya's offer to create a large Touareg state. To avoid the risk of contagion from the south, Algeria has played a number of times a decisive role as a mediator between the Mali government and the country's Touareg groups (1991, 1995, 2006 and 2011–14).

As the original base of Salafist groups in the 2000s (GSPC), the country was at the centre of the issue of their proliferation, even though the Algerian authorities were uncertain of the nature of the ties between the AQIM and the GSPC terrorists operating in Algeria.

In April 2010, Algeria facilitated the establishment of a regional security plan involving a regional monitoring force of 75 000 men. In the end, no force was sent. That same year, a central intelligence cell intended to facilitate co-ordination between Saharan and Sahelian countries (Combined Operational General Staff Committee, CEMOC) was created in Tamanrasset. The first meeting, held in Bamako on 29 April 2011, was dominated by discussions between the Algerian, Malian, Nigerien and Mauritanian defence leaders on how to control spill-over from the Libyan revolution. Joint military exercises along the borders were organised, followed by a successful attack in the Wagadou forest, resulting in the destruction of AQIM's supply camp. The Algerian policy on terrorism and its involvement in mediating "the Touareg issue" raised expectations in the Sahel states. Its approval of French intervention in Mali in 2012 marked its first step away from one of the founding principles of its foreign policy: non-interference. It facilitated the movement and provisioning of French forces stationed in Mali (Lagarde, 2013). However, it distanced itself from initiatives taken by Westerners and their African allies to stabilise the region, although it used its influence to convince the Malian Touareg to combat Salafist groups in 2012.

The attack on the gas plant at In Amenas by the Islamic brigade known as the "Signed-in-Blood-Battalion" in 2012 came as a shock. The attack confirmed that southern Libya – from where the assailants seem to have hailed – was a refuge for some of the Salafist groups forced out of northern Mali. Once again, it underscored the need for joint regional action.

Given the high-level co-ordination and planning involved, the outcome in terms of joint, coherent action has been poor. In practice, Algeria has had little involvement in counter-terrorism beyond its own borders, even after constitutional amendments in 2010 authorised it to do so. However, it remains the principal interlocutor for the United States, its main supplier of military equipment. Notably, the United States supports its quest for "political" rather than "interventionist" solutions to terrorism. The In Amenas crisis strengthened ties between the two countries. In return for information provided by American drones intended to help Algeria secure its southern borders, Algeria further opened up its no-fly zone (along the Algerian-Mali border) (Ammour, 2013).

A weakened Libya should theoretically strengthen Algeria's influence. Yet perhaps foreign armed intervention (Operation Serval) and the difficulties encountered by Algeria in its mediation efforts have fostered a rebalancing of sorts between an economically and militarily dominant Algeria, and the militarily weak and economically fragile Sahelian states.

Chad: A still fragile emerging actor

From its independence to the end of the 2000s, Chad experienced a continuous period of instability and conflict. The country leveraged the Islamist threat (posed by Sudan and the AQIM) to garner international support for its geopolitical ambitions. Funded by oil and gas revenues, supported by France, and in the absence of any serious domestic threat, the president used his new political capital to resolve long-standing trans-border tensions with the country's neighbours, most notably in the eastern Sahel.[16]

Chad also sent the largest contingent of troops to take part in the French military operation in Mali (about 2 000 soldiers in early January 2012). Its soldiers paid the heaviest price while demonstrating remarkable skill. The military operation provided Idriss Déby with an opportunity to position his country as an indispensable regional actor in Western and Central Africa. The official reasons for this commitment[17] are related to regional solidarity (Chad and Mali are members of the CILSS,


CEN-SAD, and the Niger Basin Authority; the President of Mali, Amadou Toumani Touré, had also personally requested assistance from President Déby in January 2012).

But Chad is also pursuing its own strategy to address new perils emerging in the wake of the Malian and Libyan crises; this augments the potential for destabilisation, most notably in the north-western part of Chad's territory.

"The region is a strategic area in Saharan geopolitics due to the constant migration of the principal ethnic groups living in the area; the alliances between the Tubu from Tibest, Niger and from Libya; and the pervasive Arab-Muslim influence. The Tubu question in Chad, Niger and Libya, and Touareg irredentism lend a regional dimension to local political problems due to historical cross-border solidarities. North-western Chad shares a zone of operation with AQIM, namely northern Niger and northern Mali, a hostile desert environment inhabited by nomadic populations whose main activity is cross-border trade. For example, the rebel Nigerien Touareg have obtained arms from northern Chad. (Moreover), the north-west is used by traffickers to transport drugs to the Maghreb, Europe and the Middle East. […] Currently, the concerns of the Chadian authorities relative to the possible spread of fundamentalism converge on Niger and Nigeria. According to Chadian intelligence services, Nigeria 'exports' to Chad many members of the Boko Haram sect fleeing the repression of the army" (ICG, 2011).

This threat in the northwest, exacerbated by increasingly violent clashes between the Tubu and the Arab militia in southern Libya, compounds the long-standing tensions in the east (South Sudan) and in the south (Central African Republic).

Map 8.14
Chad faced with regional threats



The regional environment is therefore a concern for the country, and despite its robust security apparatus, it faces threats on a number of fronts. Chad is also one of the poorest countries in world; chronic food insecurity remains a reality for much of the nation and its population (Map 8.14).

Mauritania: The safe strategy option

Like a hinge connecting Sub-Saharan Africa and the Maghreb, Mauritania is a Muslim country (Islamic Republic) whose population practises the Maliki rite of Sunni Islam widespread in North and Sub-Saharan Africa. "The first violent signs of religious radicalism did not surface in the area until the mid-1990s. Repressed by Ould Taya, who was extremely hostile toward fundamentalist beliefs, (the Islamists) gradually expanded their audience, but without necessarily making decisive inroads. When he left for Riyad to attend the funeral of King Fahed of Arabia in August 2005, Ould Taya never suspected he might not return. The Army ousted him from power and launched what would become a two-year transition. Ould Cheikh Abdallahi, the first civilian elected to the presidency since the fall of Ould Daddah, authorised the creation of an Islamist party in 2007 before he, in turn, was overthrown in August 2008 by General Ould Abdelaziz. The General was voted into power when elections were held one year later. […] Under Ould Abdelaziz, Mauritania began to play an active role in the fight against Islamist terrorism, to the point where Mauritania's government would soon receive warnings, including two or three warning shots" (Raimbaud, 2013).

Mauritania has long provided safe haven to Touareg refugees fleeing northern Mali (some 110 000 had settled in the country before the outbreak of conflict in 2012). The Moor, the politically and demographically dominant group, and the Touareg share blood ties. After opposing the French military intervention, and six months after Operation Serval, the Mauritanian government like other Sahelian leaders announced its plans to send troops into Mali (1 800 soldiers). President Ould Abdel Aziz's initial reluctance was grounded in fears of possible reprisals (terrorist attacks). Although the country had been the target of attacks between 2007 and 2011, the situation began to stabilise after the spectacular collapse of the Malian army in early 2012, when AQIM fighters had difficulty fighting on several fronts.

Between 2009 and 2010, the Mauritanian army took part in military campaigns against AQIM, especially following hostage-taking incidents. A "deradicalisation" campaign followed (2009–11) in an effort to rehabilitate former youth members.

By the late 2000s, the government was engaged in an exhaustive effort to develop a national antiterrorism and trans-national anti-crime strategy, which was later implemented in 2012. This strategy – criticised by one opposition party as "the death of freedom" – combines a strengthened legal arsenal, a new military doctrine, active diplomacy and an ambitious communications/education policy centred on Islam's principles of tolerance.

Relations with neighbouring countries played a key role in implementing the strategy. Relations with Morocco were strengthened by numerous economic co-operation agreements. Agreements with Algeria, albeit limited to economic issues (fishing, trade, etc.), allowed both countries to underscore their willingness to revitalize their customs co-operation and fight against organised crime.

Tensions with Mali[18] eased following security-related co-operation agreements signed in January 2014 (sharing methods for fighting terrorism and joint military patrols). Incidentally, it is Mauritanian President Ould Abdel Aziz, as Chairperson of the African Union, who brokered a ceasefire in May 2014 after the renewed outbreak of violence and the capture of Kidal by Touareg groups. Mauritania is thus positioning itself in turn as a regional partner not to be ignored (Map 8.15).

Niger: A weakened link

Although it firmly opposed NATO's intervention in Libya, Niger was a staunch supporter from the outset of French military action in Mali given its geographic proximity and vulnerability to disturbances in northern Mali. Five hundred ground troops were sent to support Operation Serval.

Prior to the French intervention and following the Libyan revolution, the Government of Niger introduced measures to disarm refugees entering the country. It

strengthened its military capacity to secure its borders. President Issoufou modernised his air fleet with two new combat aircraft (Ukranian Sukhoi SU-25) and strengthened his ground grid referencing capacity with the support of French and US surveillance systems and drones positioned inside the country.

Niger's stance was consistent with its hardline position against the Islamist groups[19] responsible for many major attacks in its territory. The country was affected by the aborted suicide attack fomented by AQIM and MUJAO against the Nigerien military base at Menaka in northern Mali (January 2012); attacks at Arlit and Agadez by MUJAO (May 2013); the attack against a civilian prison in Niamey by Boko Haram (June 2013) and, as claimed by the Signed-in-Blood Battalion, against the police station in Niamey (June 2013).

However, the country now faces a triple threat. This includes the risk of destabilisation originating to the west of northern Mali, the growing influence of Boko Haram in the south and the risks inherent in the ongoing war between the Tubu and the militia in the north-east.

Inside this delicate regional context, the country remains vulnerable due to its structural exposure to extreme poverty and malnutrition. Social needs are great, and a portion of the population perceives them as taking second place to security concerns. "Like Mali, the disappointment arising from a still deficient democratic edifice nurtures the development of a highly critical Islamic civil society. This civil society constitutes both a force for radical, potentially violent protest, and a more peaceful undertaking for a 'moral re-centring' of public life" (ICG, 2013). In particular, this civil society criticises the presence of foreign military forces (Map 8.16).

Tunisia: Fear of contagion

Tunisia seems to have remained relatively untouched by the spread of the Sahara-Sahelian jihadist movement. While the Salafist movement is a reality in this country of 11 million inhabitants, the vast majority of them followers of the Maliki rite of Sunni Islam, until 2010 its Salafist jihad branch seemed active primarily outside the country, within AQIM, the dissident group led by Mokhtar Belmokhtar, etc.

Since the fall of Gaddafi and the reconquest of northern Mali during Operation Serval, Tunisia's eastern border with Libya has come under careful surveillance. It has become the site of arms trafficking from Libya to Algeria and Mali but also to Tunisia itself. Since 2012, a large number of weapon caches have been discovered. In January 2012, Ali Laarayedh (Prime Minister from February 2013 to January 2014) alluded to the existence of a training camp led by three Algerians with close ties to AQIM leader Abou Moussab Abdel Wadoud, in the Kasserine region (300 km south-west of Tunis). In February 2013, in the centre of the country at Sidi Bouzid, the army attacked a mosque where armed jihadists had taken refuge. A few days later, lawyer and opposition leader Chokri Belaïd was assassinated. In July 2013, eight soldiers were killed at Mont Chaambi, near the border with Algeria; apparently, the "Okba Ibn Nafaa Katiba" was suspected of having ties to Al-Qaeda and was said to include veterans of the Islamist rebellion in northern Mali. In the same month, member of the opposition Mohamed Brahmi was also murdered with the same weapon used to assassinate Chokri Belaïd; converging information indicates that the Islamist movement was behind both assassinations.


The rising power of Islamism in its most radical form occurred at a time of domestic political turmoil after the fall of the Ben Ali regime in February 2011. Significantly, Islam in society played a role in this turn of events.

Morocco: While awaiting settlement of the Saharawi issue

Despite its reputation for stability and as a land of tolerant Islam, Morocco has been prey since the 1970s and 1980s to the rise of Salafist Jihadism which, like in Algeria, aligned itself with Al-Qaeda in the early 2000s. In Casablanca, in May 2003, the Moroccan Islamic Combatant Group (GICM), very close to the Algerian GSPC, perpetrated the most severe terrorist attack against Morocco in the country's history.

These events enabled the government, with the unanimous support of members of Parliament, to urgently pass anti-terrorist legislation that had been under lengthy discussion for many months and had faced opposition from

Map 8.15
Mauritania between the Maghreb and the Sahel




civil society. Specifically, this opposition centred on the imprecisions and ambiguities in the definition of both terrorism and the incitement to terrorism. The implementation of this legislation is often the target of criticism by human rights organisations as the cause of secret confinements, prisoner mistreatment and attacks on freedom of speech. It poses the problem of restricting rights for reasons of national security. This law, combined with extensive training programmes for imams and broadcasts of Maliki Sunni Islam messages of tolerance, seem to have contained the Salafist jihadist phenomenon, despite a few attacks. The US State Department, in its 2003 annual report on global terrorism, underscored that, "Morocco effectively dismantled terrorist cells within the country by leveraging intelligence collection, work by security services, and collaboration with regional and international partners".

At the regional level, the crisis in Mali gave Morocco an opportunity to attempt to play a geopolitical role monopolised by Algeria during the previous Touareg rebellions. In early 2014, Moroccan authorities expressed their willingness to mediate between the rebels and the Bamako government. Both the MNLA and the government responded favourably to the offer during a visit by Mohammed VI to Bamako in February. Morocco also offered to provide technical assistance in the areas of counter-terrorism and imam training.

Above and beyond good intentions, the antagonistic relationship with Algeria, which officially remains on the side of the Malian

Map 8.16
Niger faced with regional threats



crisis facilitators, along with Mauritania and Burkina Faso, was interwoven through the Moroccan initiative. Morocco and Algeria were unable to officially co-operate with each other because the Saharawi issue remains unresolved. This issue is therefore one of the keys to long-term stabilisation of the Sahara-Sahel.

Institutional responses to terrorism in the context of the Malian crisis[20]

National, bilateral, regional, continental and international responses and initiatives have been numerous. The corpus of international conventions is abundant and comprehensive, but still translates in diverse ways into national

legislation. Although the countries of the Maghreb and Sahel express a willingness to engage in regional co-operation, they sometimes follow diverging paths and find it difficult to put old antagonisms to rest, especially Algeria and Morocco concerning the unresolved issue of the Western Sahara. This situation works to the detriment of long-term security issues. Regardless of the individual interests and motives of each country in the region, their ability to co-operate more effectively is vital. Shared and permeable borders mean that "dislodging" or "flushing out" terrorists in one area simply means waiting for them to resurface and create problems elsewhere, or regroup and come back later. The intervention framework should include an understanding of networks and the ability to adapt in response to organisational or geographic mobility. As offshoots of the state, regional and continental institutions are no strangers to these contradictions.

The international community is developing more and more initiatives, a sign of its interest in the future of the Sahara-Sahel, which is unquestionably perceived as a global problem. The future issue is how to co-ordinate the initiatives.

International conventions

Terrorism is not a new phenomenon. It has been on the international agenda since the early 1930s, when the League of Nations introduced a draft convention for its prevention and punishment. The first attempt to define acts of terrorism dates back to the Geneva Conventions Act of 1937. Since the early 1960s, the United Nations has had universal jurisdiction over the offences and crimes that fall within the preview of terrorism. There are now fourteen international treaties and four amendments, as well as several regional treaties, a number of which pertain to West Africa. These mechanisms attempt to codify terrorist offences and provide adapted legal tools to prosecute crimes against civil aviation, shipping and continental platforms, and persons, involving the use, possession or threatened use of bombs or nuclear materials. Furthermore, these laws criminalise the financing of terrorism (O'Donnell, 2006).

The first major international treaty was the Convention on Offences and Certain Other Acts Committed on Board Aircraft, enacted in Tokyo on 14 September 1963 (O'Donnell, 2006). The most recent addition is the Convention on the Suppression of Unlawful Acts Relating to International Civil Aviation, adopted on 10 September 2010 in Beijing by the International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO) (United Nations, 2006b). The United Nations Global Counter-Terrorism Strategy was adopted on 8 September 2006. It was the first time "that all member states have agreed to a common strategic approach to fight terrorism, not only sending a clear message that terrorism is unacceptable in all its forms and manifestation but also resolving to take practical steps individually and collectively to prevent and combat it" (United Nations, 2006a). In West Africa, Mauritania, Mali and Niger ratified fourteen international conventions. Nigeria ratified thirteen, while Chad ratified four.

There are, of course, advantages in adopting treaties on terrorism. Such treaties can clearly define jurisdiction over specific crimes, establish extradition protocols and processes, and develop international norms that can be incorporated into local and state specific legislative responses to terrorism. However, states "have predicated their jurisdiction to prosecute and punish criminal offenders on one or more of the following principles: territoriality, nationality, protection/security,and universality" (Galicki, 2005). Consequently, the conventions on terrorism have failed to garner the universal support required for their transcription into national legislation (Centre for Biomedical Ethics and Law, 2008). International treaties have proved an inadequate means of combating terrorism, in part because of weak co-operation between states with very different legal regimes and ideological frameworks (Batsanov, 2006) (Table 8.2).

States

By 2003, Morocco had adopted highly repressive counter-terrorism legislation. The country was pursuing a strategy in which military, economic and religious concerns converged. In November 2013, Morocco hosted the second regional ministerial conference on border security, attended by the foreign ministers of 19 countries. The conference followed

implementation of the Tripoli Plan of Action adopted at the first such conference held in Tripoli on 11 and 12 March 2012. In particular, its objectives include:

- "Drawing up and implementing a list of priority projects integrating the strategies and initiatives of the different United Nations entities, international and regional bodies, and all the machinery related to the struggle against terrorism and organised trans-national crime.
- Creating a regional centre for the instruction and training of officers responsible for border security in the countries of the region, based on lessons learned by other countries and partners.
- Creating sector-based working groups in the fields of security, intelligence, customs, and justice, to develop proposals in those fields before the next session of the ministerial conference.
- Exchanging information related to border security between the countries of the region […].
- Enhancing the capacity of countries in the region to share information on border security […] and capacity-building […] relative to new equipment and technologies for greater border security".

King Mohammed VI has also ventured onto religious terrain by signing an agreement with Mali in November 2013 to award 500 bursaries in Morocco to Malian imams; the objective was to counteract the radicalism espoused by Saudi and Pakistani missionaries. Similar partnerships have been announced with Tunisia, Guinea and Libya.

With a legal arsenal already in place, Algeria significantly strengthened its counter-terrorist legislation in 2013, specifically by aligning with the definitions of acts of terrorism set out in international conventions (financing of terrorism, attacks with explosives or nuclear materials, air, land and sea infrastructure deterioration, destruction of communications and hostage-takings).

In 2010, at the instigation of Algeria, a Regional Command for Joint Counter Terrorism Operations (CEMOC) was created in Tamanrasset composed of Algerians, Nigeriens, Malians and Mauritanians (with Chad and Libya as associates). The objective was to co-ordinate counter-terrorism efforts on both

Table 8.2
Ratification of some anti-terrorism international conventions

Ratified less than ten years after convention
Ratified more than ten years after convention
Not yet ratified

	Tokyo 1963 [a]	New York 1979 [b]	New York 1997 [c]	New York 1999 [d]
Algeria	1995	1996	2001	2001
Libya	1972	2000	2000	2002
Mali	1971	1990	2002	2002
Morocco	1975	2007	2007	2002
Mauritania	1977	1998	2003	2003
Niger	1969	2004	2004	2004
Chad	1970	2006		
Tunisia	1975	1997	2005	2003

a) 1963 Convention on Offences and Certain Other Acts Committed on Board Aircraft; 1979 International Convention Against the Taking of Hostages; c) 1997 International Convention for the Suppression of Terrorist Bombings; d) 1999 International Convention for the Suppression of the Financing of Terrorism.

Sources : https://www.unodc.org/tldb/laws_legislative_database.html and https://treaties.un.org/pages/ViewDetails.aspx?src=TREATY&mtdsg_no=XVIII-11&chapter=18&lang=en

sides of the Sahara, by creating joint combat units. The CEMOC never became operational, undermined by the fact that Morocco and Libya, two important regional players, were not official members (Lacher, 2011). The fact that Mali twice released members of AQIM during negotiations for the release of Western hostages also dampened regional co-operation. Again in 2010, Algeria instigated the creation of the Fusion and Liaison Unit (UFL). Based in Algiers, the FLU combines the intelligence services of eight countries (Algeria, Burkina Faso, Chad, Libya, Mali, Mauritania and Niger); Nigeria became a member in 2011. The mission of the FLU is to pool intelligence in order to optimise the fight against terrorism. It also has a communications service responsible for counteracting extremist propaganda. Unlike the CEMOC, the FLU operates, meets regularly and has established a secure communications system expected to expand in 2014 to include three nonmember countries (Côte d'Ivoire, Guinea and Senegal).

Mauritania has ratified most international legal instruments related to terrorism and established counter-terrorist units within its justice system (OECD/SWAC, 2013). In July 2010, it enacted a law against terrorism that strengthens the provisions of the 2005 Act, which contains 24 definitions of terrorism, and provides harsher sentences. In 2012, the country also adopted a National Strategy for Combatting Terrorism and Trans-national Crime which, apart from its legal aspects, includes security force operations, diplomacy and prevention.

Niger has also ratified many instruments. However, its system remains less elaborate than Mauritania's 2010 legislation. In response to the United Nations Security Council Resolution 1373 (2001), Niger established a committee to monitor counter-terrorism measures. In late 2012, the country launched a Strategy for Security and Development in the Sahara-Sahel Areas of Niger (SDS Sahel-Niger) and a high commission to implement the strategy, responding to the Prime Minister. The SDS is the outcome of a unique, regional process of reflection that takes a single approach to security, economic development, access to basic social services, local governance and the integration of repatriates. It concerns the regions of Tillabéry, Agadez and Diffa as well as northern sections of the Tahoua, Maradi and Zinder regions, or 89% of the nation's territory. However, all regions are covered by security-related programmes.

In Mali, the fight against terrorism is grounded in legislation passed on 23 July 2008 concerning counter-terrorism and the imprescriptibility of terrorist crimes. However, these legal provisions are less exhaustive than those of Mauritania and Algeria, particularly in terms of how they define terrorism. Mali has also developed specific programmes to stabilise and develop its northern region. These include:

- The Emergency Programme to Reduce Insecurity in Northern Mali (PURIN) and fight terrorism in the 2010–2012 period. Implementation of the programme was expected to allow the government to resume activity in areas where state structures had withdrawn, thus correcting the negative effects of certain provisions of the National Pact, signed in April 1992, between the government and movements and fronts arising from the Arab-Touareg rebellion.
- The Special Programme for Peace, Security and Development in Northern Mali (PSPDN) (phase one in 2010–2011) financed by the EU. Its objective is to reduce terrorism in northern Mali by "re-establishing a state security and administrative presence in eleven strategic sites" known as secure development and governance centres (PSDG).

The implementation of these two programmes, often negatively perceived by populations in southern Mali, was interrupted starting in late 2011 with the outbreak of the rebellion. The government and its international partners drew on lessons learned from the experience in 2013 as they prepared to develop a new plan for ending the crisis. The 2013–14 Plan for the Sustainable Recovery of Mali relinquishes the approach centred on northern Mali alone and instead addresses the country's entire territory and population.

Except for the CEMOC effort, joint operations are extremely rare, not to mention that rebel and Islamist activities know no boundaries. The Malian and Mauritanian armies sometimes collaborate, as they did during the Wagadou Forest sweep in June 2011. Mauritania

also conducted various unilateral operations on Malian territory. In July 2010, the Mauritanian army claimed the right of pursuit to conduct a raid in northern Mali to free hostage Michel Germaneau, with the support of the French army. In September 2010, a Mauritanian air raid was conducted against AQIM units in the Râs El Mâ region on the western edge of Lake Faguibine in Mali, targeting the al Furqan Katiba of Yahya abu Hammam (RFI, 2010).

In February 2014, the Heads of State of Burkina Faso, Chad, Mali, Mauritania and Niger attended a summit meeting held in Nouakchott. Comprising the "Sahel G-5", these nations firmly stated their belief in the interdependence between security and development challenges, and renewed their staunch opposition to terrorism in all its forms, while reaffirming their determination to preserve the territorial integrity of member states, and work together to guarantee security in the Sahel zone.

Regional African organisations

The crisis in Mali spurred many regional and international organisations into action. United Nations Security Council Resolution 2085 of 20 December 2012 authorised the deployment of an African-led International Support Mission to Mali (AFISMA). In collaboration with the EU and other partners, the mission was tasked with supporting efforts by Malian authorities to protect their civilian populations, restore territorial integrity and assist in the movement of humanitarian aid in the northern part of the country (United Nations, 2012). Plans were then made to have ECOWAS and the African Union (AU) co-operate on determining the best military strategy to follow prior to military intervention, in particular by enlisting the ECOMOG brigade.

The joint MNLA rebel and AQIM Islamist offensive in the early days of 2013 against the town of Konna, about 70 km north of Mopti, brought this situation to an end. The government of Mali sought help from France to counter the military offensive, with African institutions playing only a secondary role. With extensive combat experience in Saharan settings, the Armed Forces for the Chadian Intervention in Northern Mali (FATIM) – starting from Niger – participated. They captured Gao and fought off Islamists entrenched in the Adrar des Ifoghas region before being incorporated into the AFISMA in March 2013. Starting in July 2013, AFISMA was replaced by the Multidimensional integrated Stabilisation Mission in Mali (MINUSMA), a United Nations operation created in April 2013 by authority of United Nations Security Council Resolution 2100 (United Nations, 2012).

Regional West African organisations also developed a wide range of documents and initiatives.

In 2002, UEMOA adopted a regulation concerning the freezing of funds and other financial resources in connection with combating the financing of terrorism, a regulation concerning payment systems within UEMOA member states and a directive concerning the fight against money laundering.

ECOWAS member countries were slow to implement UN Security Council Resolution 1373 on the financing of terrorism. Adopted following the attacks of 11 September 2001, it calls for denying safe haven to "any person who participates in the financing, planning, preparation or perpetration of terrorist acts", and to ensure that "such terrorist acts are established as serious criminal offences in domestic laws and regulations" (Olajide, 2011). Insufficient capacity, gaps in local legislation and competing priorities are all factors that account for these delays. The pace of ratification varied (Ford, 2011). In some cases, legal systems were based on English "common law" while in others, on the French "Napoleonic Code".

ECOWAS has developed a number of instruments, including the Convention on Mutual Assistance in Criminal Matters (29 July 1992); the Convention on Extradition (6 August 1994); the Declaration on the Moratorium on the Import, Export and Manufacture of Light Weapons (31 October 1998) and the Protocol relating to the Mechanism for Conflict Prevention, Management, Resolution, Peace-Keeping and Security (10 December 1999). The organisation also created the Inter-Governmental Action Group against Money Laundering (GIABA) in West Africa (12 November 1999) – responsible for co-ordinating action to combat money laundering and help governments make the appropriate legal provisions – and the Conflict Prevention Framework (16 January 2008). In support of the ECOWAS plan of action on illicit

drug trafficking and organised crime, the UNODC, the UNOWA, the DPKO (Department for Peacekeeping Operations) and INTERPOL launched the West Africa Coast Initiative (WACI) (8 July 2009). This organisation recently adopted a counter-terrorism strategy and plan of action (official press release, 2010).

In May 2014, ECOWAS developed a Strategy for the Sahel, designed to contribute to:

- Regional operational responses at the appropriate level, without discrimination based on institutional affiliation.
- Improved cohesion and consistency among ECOWAS, UEMOA and CILSS in responding to the common Sahel-Saharan cause; and the mobilisation of all pertinent regional technical institutions in identified areas of priority; including watershed agencies and trans-national structures specialising in pastoralism, irrigation, youth, gender, peace education and democracy.
- Strengthened, interregional political dialogue with North Africa and Central Africa given that the threat confronts these three regions, and therefore compels them to find common stabilisation and development solutions".

Its three pillars are connective infrastructure, food resiliency and security, and education. Measures to support peace and security form part of a related activity.

In Algiers, in 1999, the AU adopted a Convention on preventing and fighting terrorism. It requires member states to criminally sanction acts of terrorism through national laws. The Convention defines areas of co-operation among member countries, establishes their competence over acts of terrorism and provides a legal framework for extradition, extraterritorial investigations and legal co-operation. Introduced in December 2002, it has been ratified by 40 member states to date (African Union, 2013). In 2004, the AU created the African Centre for Study and Research on Terrorism (ACSRT) in an effort to strengthen co-operation among African countries in the fight against terrorism. It also plays an important role in sharing experiences, analyses and training. An additional Protocol to the 1999 Convention on the Prevention and Combatting of Terrorism was adopted at the Third Ordinary Session of the African Union Assembly held in Addis Ababa in July 2004, which led to the Dakar Declaration against Terrorism. The Protocol acknowledges the increasing frequency of terrorism in Africa and the growing number of linkages between terrorism, drug trafficking, trans-national organised crime, money laundering and the illicit proliferation of light and small-calibre weapons. The purpose of the Protocol is to co-ordinate and harmonise continental efforts to prevent and fight all forms of terrorism. It will enter into force thirty days after the fifteenth instrument of ratification; to date, it has been ratified by 12 states.

Furthermore, the AU Commission developed a "Model Anti-Terrorism Law" approved by the AU in Malabo in July 2011. Member states can use it to strengthen and/or update their national laws. The African Peace and Security Architecture (APSA) is based on a broad concept of development security. It includes "threats to the existence, development and sustenance of political, economic, military, human, and social, gender and environmental systems at State, regional and continental levels". APSA includes a Peace and Security Council, a Panel of the Wise, a Continental Early Warning System and an African Rapid Intervention Force (not yet operational). Based on the subsidiarity principle, this force is built around five regional brigades with a civilian and police component from the continent's five regions, not including North Africa, centred on the existing Regional Economic Communities (CERs) (Institut numérique, 2014). In response to the Malian crisis, the African Union launched the Strategic Concept for the Resolution of the Crises in Mali (2012) and the Nouakchott process on security co-operation and the operationalisation of African Peace and Security Architecture (APSA) in the Sahel-Saharan region (2013). An African Union High Representative for Mali and Sahel (MISAHEL) was appointed (Map 8.17).


In 2014, the AU also developed a strategy for the Sahel region which can be said to capitalise on and extend all of the instruments described above while incorporating them into a cohesive approach. Centred on Algeria, Burkina Faso, Chad, Libya, Mali, Mauritania, Niger and Sudan, it focuses on three major areas: security, governance and development.

In terms of the Arab Maghreb Union (AMU), co-operation has stagnated, undermined by the dispute between Morocco and Algeria. The Supreme Council has not met since the Algeria-Morocco border closed. Responses to terrorism have, to a larger extent, been the result of unilateral initiatives. After many years of relative inactivity, CEN-SAD was invested with a new treaty in February 2013 in Ndjamena; more specifically, the treaty provides for the creation of a Peace and Security Council. Given its trans-Saharan vocation, CEN-SAD could play a role in stabilising the Sahara-Sahel; however, its one chronic weakness persists: Algeria is not a member (Map 8.18).

European Union

The European Union (EU) made its counter-terrorism policy in the Sahara-Sahel official in its Strategy for Development and Security in the Sahel (European Union, 2011, 2012a, b). The Strategy forms a linkage between security and development, and stresses the need to promote strong institutions. It also constitutes a response to the numerous critics who commented on the impossibility of building strong military organisations based on weak

Map 8.17
African peace and security architecture



Map 8.18
International initiatives




CEMOC

The Combined Operational General Staff Committee was put in place in April 2010 to co-ordinate the fight against terrorism and criminality (Algeria, Mali, Mauritania, Niger). Chad and Libya are associated.




Fusion and Liaison Unit

Mechanism put in place by the militaries of the countries involved to share information and co-ordinate operations against terrorism, weapons smuggling, and narcotics.




Nouakchott Process (AU)

Launched in 2013 with the aim of reinforcing security co-operation and operationalising APSA in the Sahel.



European Union

Adopted in March 2011 and revised in 2014, the Strategy for Security and Development in the Sahel targets five countries but underscores that challenges also impact Algeria, Libya, Morocco and Nigeria.



United Nations

Adopted in 2013, the United Nations Integrated Strategy for the Sahel is focused on five countries while underscoring that Algeria and Libya are also very vulnerable to terrorism. The World Bank focuses its Sahel work on the five countries identified by the United Nations.



African Union

Adopted in 2014, the strategy targets Algeria, Burkina Faso, Chad, Libya, Mali, Mauritania, Niger and Sudan. It also includes countries deserving special attention: Côte d'Ivoire, Guinea, Guinea Bissau, Nigeria and Senegal.

Box 8.3
U.S. Initiatives

The United States recognised the risk inherent in the rise of Sahara-Sahel terrorism very early on. After the attacks of 11 September 2001, a number of initiatives were developed on the continent. These initiatives combined military action and development. Africa is now one of the major battlegrounds in the fight against global terrorism. Evidence of this includes the 2008 creation of a separate military command, the United States Africa Command (AFRICOM). U.S. interest in the continent is not limited to security concerns. The existence of mining resources, diseases like HIV/AIDS, poverty, armed conflicts and natural disasters are the focus of other U.S. involvement (Francis, 2010).

Since early 2000, programmes have been created to address a threat no longer limited to North Africa alone, but that is spreading to West Africa through the Sahara (Table 8.3). The names of U.S. programmes indicate a new awareness of mobility among terrorist players in the region, and the cross-border nature of the threats. The Pan Sahel Initiative (2002–05) was to equip Chad, Mali, Mauritania and Niger to more effectively fight the flow of illicit trafficking across their borders. It has since been replaced by the Trans-Sahara Counterterrorism Partnership (TSCTP). Its objective is to fight terrorism on both sides of the Sahara and reinforce the stability of the 10 countries concerned.[21] The TSCTP initiative was part of AFRICOM in 2008 (US Africa Command, 2010). The programme includes a civilian component and a military component under Operation Enduring Freedom-Trans Sahara (OEF-TS) (Global Security, 2013). The TSCTP programme includes regular field exercises, known as "Flintlocks", during which special African forces are trained by their U.S. counterparts and the Joint Task Force Aztec Silence, whose purpose is to fight terrorism in North Africa and West Africa.


Along with the TSCTP, the United States supports bilateral programmes like the Anti-Terrorism Assistance Programme (ATA) with Morocco and Libya. The purpose of the ATA is to train government police forces to protect borders, strategic infrastructures and public figures, respond to acts of terrorism and manage terrorism-related crises (U.S. Department of State, 2012). They rely on military training and African intelligence services, and seek to secure the lasting involvement of other Western allies, such as France.

or non-transparent countries (Chuter, 2011). The Strategy also emphasises the role of regional co-operation in fighting terrorism and trafficking. Although almost all leaders of the terrorist groups active in Mali until 2013 were Algerian, the EU observed that the networks developed by these players since the early 2000s could only be fought through the creation of a multinational strategy that unites all African Sahel-Sahara and North African countries, an approach that was non-existent before the creation of CEMOC (European Union, 2011).

Several factors affect the role of the EU in settling the conflict in Mali: first, the response by France to the call for help from the Malian government; secondly, the relative indifference among certain members of the EU toward the Sahel (Gourdin, 2013); and lastly, the reluctance of certain members to support foreign military action and preference for negotiation-based crisis management. Europe intervenes in Mali through the European Union Training Mission in Mali (EUTM-Mali) under the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP). France, which remains the lead nation for EUTM-Mali, primarily collaborates with the United States on logistics and intelligence, and with Chad on field operations. The EU has also appointed a Special Representative for the Sahel to assist in achieving regional stability by supporting the strategy developed by the Union.

Table 8.3

U.S. Initiatives in the Sahara-Sahel, 2001–2013



Sources : Volman (2010), AFRICOM

The EU has begun expanding implementation of its strategy for security and development in the Sahel, most notably following the findings of the Council on 17 March 2014, which clarifies the extension of its initial perimeter (Mali, Mauritania and Niger) to include Chad and Burkina Faso.

United Nations

On 5 July 2012, the Security Council requested, through resolution 2056 (2012), that Secretary General Mr Ban Ki-moon develop and implement, in consultation with regional organisations, an integrated UN strategy for the Sahel encompassing security, governance and resilience. The strategy is based on good governance across the entire region and on national and regional security mechanisms with the capacity to address cross-border threats; it also includes humanitarian and development interventions to ensure long-term resilience. It was endorsed by the United Nations Security Council and by three significant UN partners (the European Union, the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund). The Action Fund for the Sahel region will be administered by the African Development Bank. At the regional level, overall responsibility lies with the United Nations system under the authority of the Special Representative of the Secretary-General (SRSG) for West Africa, in collaboration with national authorities of

concerned countries and regional and international organisations.

At a regional ministerial meeting at Bamako on 5 November 2013, a co-ordination platform was established to provide political leadership and strategic vision. It consists of governments of Sahara-Sahel countries, sub-regional, regional and international organisations, as well as financial institutions. The platform is chaired on a biennial rotational basis; the Republic of Mali is the chair for the first two-year period. A technical secretariat co-chaired by the United Nations and the African Union provides technical support. Other members of the platform include the World Bank, the African Development Bank, the Islamic Development Bank, the European Union, the Organisation of Islamic Co-operation, the Arab Maghreb Union, ECOWAS, ECCAS and CEN-SAD. The core group of concerned countries consists of Burkina Faso, Chad, Mali, Mauritania and Niger.

8.5 (RE)DEFINING THE SAHARA-SAHEL

The Sahel is no longer solely associated with the countries afflicted by the drought and famine of the 1970s and 1980s. In political discourse, and in the press, "Sahel" has become a generic name for the entity comprising the Sahel-Sahara, stretching from the Atlantic to the Indian Ocean.

The expanded definition of the Sahel, which now includes the Saharan zone, marks a break with former times when the Maghreb was considered, at least in geopolitical terms, to be separate from the Sahel, with bilateral relations (Libya/Chad or Mali/Algeria) at best. The expanded definition includes a reformulation of its characteristics, now centred much more on the individual or collective shortfalls of its composite countries in terms of security, governance, and effective monitoring of territory and borders. Inspired primarily by international concerns about the proliferation of Islamist terrorist groups with ties to AQIM, drug trafficking and illegal immigration to Europe, this new definition underlies many of the international initiatives mentioned earlier.

This outlook on the Sahara-Sahel sheds light on an area criss-crossed by complex social and family networks (Scheele, 2009). Given this mobility, which also applies to jihadist Islamic movements, weapons traffickers and kidnappers, an adapted response is necessary. How is a co-ordinated security and developmentalist response, based on an understanding of the regional interdependence of populations, networks and mobility, possible in this context?

The emphasis must not centre exclusively on monitoring borders to make them less vulnerable to terrorist threats and criminal networks. It must also address ways to ensure freedom of movement and trade for the people who live in this area, and whose means of existence depends on the free cross-border movement of persons and goods.

"While Africa may seem like a hotbed for challenges of every sort – international terrorism, major crime involving drug, weapons and human trafficking, or government corruption – these threats are not mutually exclusive. Their combined presence creates a vicious cycle of insecurity and underdevelopment that demands an integrated response"(Institut numérique, 2014).

ANNEX 8.A1

Table 8.A1.1

Conflicts between states and non-state actors and rebellions, 1990–2013

Country	Period of violence	Non-state actors opposed to the government
Algeria	1991–2013	Jamaat Al Muslimeen (1991) Islamic Salvation Army and Front (AIS, FIS 1992–97) Armed Islamic Movement (MIA 1992–97) Armed Islamic Group (GIA 1993–2003) (Al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM, since 1999) Salafist Group for Preaching and Combat (GSPC 1999–2009)
Chad	1990–94 1997–02 2005–09	Islamic Legion (1990) Patriotic Salvation Movement (MPS 1990) Movement for Democracy and Development (MDD 1991–93, 1997) National Reform Council of Chad (CNR 1992–94) National Revitalization Committee for Peace and Democracy (CSNPD 1992–94) National Liberation Front of Chad (1990–93) Armed Forces for the Federal Republic (FARF 1997–98) Movement for Democracy and Justice in Chad (MDJT 1999–02) United Front for Democratic Change (FUCD 2005–06) Rally of Democratic Forces (RAFD 2006) Union of Forces for Democracy and Development (UFDD 2006–07) National Alliance (2008) Union of Resistance Forces (UFR 2009)
Libya	2011–13	Islamic Martyrs Movement (since 1996) National Transitional Council (NTC 2011) Libyan Islamic Fighting Group (LIFG 1995–2009) Ansar al-Sharia (since 2011) Al-Qaeda (AQ) Al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM since at least 2011) Barqa Youth Movement (2013)
Mali	1990 1994 Since 2007	Popular Movement of Azawad (MPA 1990) Islamic Arab Front of Azawad (FIAA 1994) Salafist Group for Preaching and Combat (GSPC 2003–07) May 23, 2006 Democratic Alliance for Change (ADC 2007–09) Northern Mali Touareg Alliance for Change (ATNMC 2007–09) Al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM since 2007) National Movement for the Liberation of Azawad (MNLA since 2011) Movement for Unity and Jihad in West Africa (MUJAO since 2011) Ansar Dine (since 2012)
Mauritania	Episodic violence	Salafist Group for Preaching and Combat (GSPC 2005) Al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM since 2007)
Morocco	Episodic violence	Al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM since 2009) Moroccan Islamic Combatant Group (GICM) Salafia Jihadia (2003)
Niger	1991–92 1994 1995 1997 2007–08 Since 2010	Aïr and Azawad Liberation Front (FLAA 1991–92) Armed Co-ordination Resistance (CRA 1994) Democratic Front for Renewal (FDR 1995) Union of the Forces of Armed Resistance (FARS 1997) Revolutionary Armed Forces of the Sahara (FARS 1997) Salafist Group for Preaching and Combat (GSPC 2003–07) Nigerien Movement for Justice (MNJ 2007–08) Al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM since 2007)
Tunisia	Episodic violence	Al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM 2008)

Sources: Williams (2011), U.S. Department of State, National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism (START) and the author's research. Note: border conflicts (Niger-Benin, Burkina Faso-Mali) and ethnic militias (Janjaweed, Ganda Koi) are not included here.

Table 8.A1.2

Kidnappings in the Sahara-Sahel, 2003–2013

Individual	Location	Date	Notes
1 Italian national	Djanet, Algeria	02.02.13	Released on 17.04.13
1 French-speaking Portuguese national	Diéma, Mali	20.11.12	
1 Swiss national	Timbuktu, Mali	15.04.12	Released on 24.04.12
7 Algerian diplomats	Gao, Mali	05.04.12	Three hostages released in July 2012; one diplomat is said to have been executed in September 2012, but this has not been confirmed.
2 French nationals	Hombori, Mali	24. 11.11	1 hostage executed, confirmed on 15.07.13
1 Italian national	Djanet, Algeria	02.02.11	Released on 17.04.12 in Tessalit, Mali
2 French nationals	Niamey, Niger	07.01.11	2 hostages killed during a raid conducted by French forces on the Niger-Mali border
5 French nationals, 1 Togolese national and 1 Malagasy national	Arlit, Niger	15.10.10	Taken to Mali. One French hostage and the Togolese and Malagasy hostages released on 25.02.11; the others were released on 29.10.13.
1 French national	Inabangaret, Niger; then Mali	20.04.10	Executed or died from lack of care between May and 22 July 2010
2 Italian-speaking Burkinabe nationals	N'Eissira, Mauritania	18.12.09	Released in Mali on 16.04.09
3 Spanish nationals	170 km north of Nouakchott, Mauritania	29.11.09	Released in Mali on 10.03.10 and 23.08.10 in exchange for Islamist prisoners being held in Mauritania.
1 French national	Ménaka, Mali	26.11.09	Released on 23.02.10
2 Swiss nationals, 1 German national and 1 British national	Bani Bangou, Amberamboukane, Niger	22.01.09	Swiss and German nationals released on 22.04.09 and 12.07.09. British national executed at an unknown location on 31.05.09.
2 Canadian diplomats	40 km north of Niamey, Niger	14.12.08	Released in Mali on 22.04.09
2 Austrian nationals	Border between Tunisia and Algeria	22.02.08	Released in Mali on 31.10.08
21 Italian nationals, 1 German national and 1 Brazilian national	Border between Niger and Chad, north of Lake Chad	21.08.06	21 hostages released on 22.08.06; 2 Italian nationals released on 13.10.06.
32 tourists from Germany, the Netherlands, Switzerland and Austria	Between Illizi and Amguid, Algeria. Then northern Mali and Aïr, Ténéré and Tibesti	21.02.03 - 11.04.03	17 hostages released in southern Algeria on 13.05.03, 14 released in Mali on 18.08.03, 1 hostage died of exhaustion on 07.03.03.

Sources: Retaillé and Walther (2011), with author's updates. Note: hostages taken in Nigeria are not included here. The assassination of four French nationals in Aleg (Mauritania) on 24 December 2007 and one American humanitarian aid worker in Nouakchott (Mauritania) on 23 June 2009 are not included here.

NOTES \\

1 *In Coup d'état: A Practical Handbook, military historian Edward Luttwak defines a coup as: "the infiltration of a small but critical segment of the state apparatus, which is then used to displace the government from its control of the remainder". The armed forces, whether military or paramilitary, is not a defining criterion of coups. Furthermore, the point of view according to which all coups are a threat to democracy has been nuanced by the concept of a "democratic coup" "in response to a popular uprising against an authoritarian regime resulting in the overthrow of that regime for the time required to organise the free and impartial election of civilian leaders..."*

2 *Political protest is a form of political activity: demonstrations, strikes that sometimes involve violence by persons with no access to the resources or organised lobby groups or whose values clash with those of the dominant elite. Sometimes, protests focus on a specific issue or set of issues; sometimes they primarily relate to the general demands of certain groups such as ethnic or linguistic minorities, farmers, women or youth.*

3 *Not addressed in this analysis.*

4 *Libyan Islamic Fighting Group (GIGL – Jam'at Islamiyyah al-Mutaqatilah).*

5 *The Libyan monarchy (1951–69) was led by tribes from Cyrenaique that maintained close ties with the Gaddafi regime.*

6 *The Sahel and West Africa Club Secretariat estimates based on population figures and University of Laval (Quebec) estimates of the relative percentages of ethno-linguistic groups (www.axl.cefan.ulaval.ca/).*

7 *The Kidal region was created in August 1991 following the Tamanrasset agreements giving rise to decentralisation.*

8 *Excerpts taken from Deutsche Welle www.dw.de/mali-chronologie-dune-crise/a-16109719-1*

9 *Unlike Salafism based on teachings that reject the use of violence.*

10 *A rare mineral used in the electronics and aeronautics industries.*

11 *In 2012, governments and families of the Western hostages paid the AQIM an estimated total of 90 million dollars (Nossiter, 2012) and 150 million euros (Denécé and Rodier, 2012).*

12 *King Idris I, ousted by Gaddafi in 1969, was a member of the Senoussi brotherhood.*

13 *In particular, Ansar Ashariaa, firmly established in Derna and Benghazi with active networks in other countries, especially Tunisia.*

14 *The Gaddafi regime considered the Tubu to be second-class citizens.*

15 *The area is rich in oil and gas resources.*

16 *In particular with the Sudan, before it was partitioned, and the Central African Republic.*

17 *Speech delivered by President Idriss Déby to the National Assembly of Chad on 16 January 2013.*

18 *After enduring attacks by terriorist groups based in northern Mali, Mauritania considered Bamako to be too lax in dealing with the threat. Conversely, Mali criticised Mautitania for military incursions into its territory without advance co-ordination.*

19 *The President spoke of "bandits and drug traffickers".*

20 *This section illustrates certain strategies and responses. It does not purport to provide an exhaustive list.*

21 *Algeria, Burkina Faso, Chad, Mali, Mauritania, Morocco, Niger, Nigeria, Senegal, and Tunisia. Although greater alignment with the U.S. Strategy is desireable, discussions concerning Libya's inclusion in the programme have not yet reached completion. This programme is carried out by the US Department of Defense, USAID and the US Department of Justice.*

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Chapter 9

Trafficking economies in the Sahara-Sahel

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9.2 The impact of trafficking 233

Long considered a topic related to terrorism in the Sahelian area and an anecdotal theme to academic researchers, the trafficking economy has become a subject in its own right due to the significant and destabilising effects it has on the politics, territories and societies of Sahelian countries.

While the crisis in Mali made the impact of trafficking evident, particularly its link with financing Salafist Jihadists, the concept of narco-terrorism, or the Drug-Terror Nexus,[1] provides only a very imperfect picture of a more complex reality. That reality is rooted in the fact that trafficking is just as or even more destabilising than terrorism. Addressing that reality involves various types of debates:

- "How can we speak of [development] […] without centring our analysis on three major historical events, namely Africa's eviction from the regular world markets; the specific ways it was included in the underground international economy; and lastly, the splintering of government power that accompanies both processes?" asks Achille Mbembe (2000). Far from indicating an economic contraction resulting from the shift to illicit criminal activities, the rise of trafficking reflects a specific method of inclusion in the global economy. "Trafficking activities […] [do not reflect] a state of anomie; far from marginalising Africa, they hasten its inclusion in the flows and networks of globalisation". Roger Botte (2002) goes on to say, "Moreover, the two largest economies in the area (South Africa and Nigeria) are also the two largest criminal economies".
- Without straying into narrow demographic determinism, states struggles to offer services, infrastructures, security and justice to its growing youth and urban populations. The official public and private job markets (Beaujeu, Kolie, Sempéré and Udher, 2011) absorb only from 10% to 20% of any given age group. The black market, family linkages, migration and the grey market thus emerge as survival strategies. Involvement in trafficking, just like joining a gang or an ideological-political movement, provides an alternative means of climbing the social ladder (Nwajiaku-Dahou, 2014).

Trafficking also raises questions regarding the economic ties on both sides of the Sahara. The Maghreb is the point of origin and reception for the products trafficked, which takes place along traditional trans-Saharan trade routes.

9.1 THE NATURE OF TRAFFICKING AND GEOGRAPHIC SCALES

Complementarities and cross-border trade

Trafficking takes place as a result of the complementarity that exists between neighbouring economies and hence the opportunities afforded by crossing borders. This situation applies to certain distant communities but also to states engaging in re-exportation activities that contribute to the national economy. Examples include Benin or The Gambia, as well as Mauritania for certain technological goods and Niger for cigarettes and petrol. Two types of commodities in particular generate profits: petrol and subsidised food-stuffs.

A portion of Algerian fuel output is siphoned off as contraband to neighbouring countries. Contraband shippers apparently control 25%[2] of the petrol produced in Algeria. The Tlemcen region, in the western extremity of the country, would therefore consume more fuel than Algiers. Petrol trafficking with

Morocco has reached a point at which finding fuel in Tlemcen and east of the region, on the Algerian side, has become difficult. False-bottom trucks make round trips to Morocco, sometimes returning with cannabis and alcohol (ibid.). Traffickers can also carry fuel in cars or two-wheeled vehicles.

On the Tunisian border, trafficking is also heavy. A recent study conducted by the World Bank estimates that 921 million litres, with a market value of 525 million USD, cross the border each year (Ayadi et al., 2013). The price differential between the two countries is considerable: 0.23 EUR per litre in Algeria compared to 0.76 EUR in Tunisia (AFP, 2013). Along the entire border, Algerian authorities counted 2 636 cases of trafficking between January and November 2012 (ibid.). The seizure of merchandise is the only risk faced by traffickers. Some customs officers participate as well. Algerian authorities who battle the trafficking of drugs and especially weapons[3] often take a milder approach to trafficking petrol, an activity that ensures the survival of thousands of families.

Petrol shipments to the south are less significant. Subsidised petrol is shipped from the Tindouf camps to the Moroccan section of the Western Sahara (Bennafla, 2013). Algerian petrol also travels through northern Mauritania, north-eastern Mali and, much less frequently, Niger. The annual amount of fuel exported from Tamanrasset wilaya (province) to Mali is estimated at 29 million litres, most of which is diesel. With the addition of the amount channelled through trafficking – some 13 million litres – the total represents close to 20% of the annual supply for the Tamanrasset region (Bensassi et al., 2014).

In Mauritania, trafficking has long been practised in the Tiris-Zemmour region and, to a lesser extent, in Adrar and Dakhlet Nouadhibou (Centre). It is known and tolerated by the authorities. Tiris-Zemmour is an enclaved region, and trafficking has lowered prices that would otherwise be unaffordable for the population. Petrol trafficking is now[4] thought to be confined to Tiris-Zemmour.[5] Only professional shippers can move volumes of 140 litres. Petrol trafficking has also developed between Algeria and north-east Mali and between Libya and Tunisia. Several articulated lorries equipped with dual tanks [...] cross the Ras Jedir border station daily on their way to Ben Guerdane and Zarzis over the Medenine road (La Presse de Tunisie, 2012).


Often associated with petrol trafficking, contraband subsidised food-stuffs often travel the same routes. From west to east, the first route connects the Saharawi camps in Tindouf with Mauritania. A portion of the aid intended for refugee camps is resold further to the south. Sahrawi Arab Democratic Republic (SADR) authorities do not deny this movement of goods but call them "surplus inventory" that is resold to purchase products[6] that are needed. This flow of commodities (flour, pasta, oil, etc.) supplies the regions of Tiris-Zemmour, Adrar and Inchiri. Before the crisis in Mali, the north-east section of the country was generally supplied via Algeria. The dependence on Algerian products is such that Algiers regularly uses it to apply political pressure (particularly during the Touareg rebellion from 2006 to 2009), threatening to close the border and create shortages. In 2011, the height of trade between the two countries, 4 640 tonnes of goods were traded between Algeria and Mali per week, corresponding to 180 lorries per week. In 2014, that flow fell to 40 lorries per week, or 1 040 tonnes. Food products, including pasta, flour, semolina, and powdered milk and sugar, account for the bulk of the traded goods and represent close to 90% of revenues and 80% of the tonnage (Bensassi et al., 2014) (Figure 9.1).

Consistent with this pattern, Libya supplies subsidised food-stuffs (flour, oil, powdered milk, etc.) to Niger and, to a lesser extent, Chad. This trafficking was once controlled from Sebha (to the wells of Toummo on the Nigerien border and then to Dirkou or Agadez) by merchants with close ties to Gaddafi or senior Libyan officials (Grégoire, 2004). After the collapse of the Gaddafi regime, trafficking activities remained heavy along the southern borders of Libya, but control over them became subject to cut-throat competition (Le Figaro, 2012).

The regional light weapons market

Two different types of movement are used for light weapons trafficking in the area. First, illegal weapons flow within the mobility zone of conflict areas. That zone and the surrounding areas have been experiencing conflict for

Figure 9.1
Estimate of weekly value of smuggling from Algeria to Mali



Source: Bensassi S. et al. 2014

decades: Western Sahara; Liberia; Sierra Leone; Casamance; Algeria; the Touareg uprisings of the 1990s and 2000s; Darfur; recurring conflicts in Chad; and the Libyan conflict. Weapons move from former hotbeds of tension to emerging conflict zones. During the 2006–2009 uprisings in Niger and Mali, weapons flowed from Sudan, Liberia and Sierra Leone through Guinea. Land mines from Chad were resold.[7]

Second, national military arsenals are another source of light weapons. A sometimes significant number of weapons flow from regular armies to armed groups. Insufficiently controlled arsenals appear to be the rule rather than the exception, as is the case in Mauritania. In the 1990s, weapons from the stockpiles of the Polisario Front made their way into the country. Some were sent from Mauritania to Malian territory. In Mali, during the uprisings of the 1990s and 2000s, weapons were distributed by some members of the military to the dominant Songhay self-defence group, the Patriotic Movement of Ganda Koy, which was fighting against the Touareg.

The case of Mali clearly illustrates both of these two types of movements. In 2008, the Malian authorities reported that weapons from Guinea were being trafficked (Berghezan, 2013a), originating from Liberia and Sierra Leone. At that time, arms were also being moved from Mali to Algeria. The impact of the Libyan crisis in 2011 was significant, and the situation with Libyan arsenals is a concern (Le Monde/AFP, 2011). Light weapons, as well as surface-to-air missiles, anti-tank rocket launchers, explosives (including Semtex) and large inventories of poison gas are for sale and have started to travel to Mali,[8] as well as to Tunisia, Algeria and the Middle East. Convoys headed for Mali were intercepted in Niger and Algeria in 2011. In addition, Malian Touareg soldiers from the Libyan army returned to Mali. Some of them, equipped with light armoured vehicles, machine guns, anti-aircraft guns and the means of communication, contributed to forming the MNLA. At the same time, AQIM looked to the Libyan market to consolidate its already significant stockpile of weapons in the Tigharghar massif (Adrar des Ifoghas), which was later destroyed during Operation Serval. However, a large portion of the weapons used by combatant groups in northern Mali also

came from regular army garrisons that were abandoned when the army fled various locations in the northern part of the country. Army deserters who joined up with certain groups brought their weapons with them (Map 9.1).

Trafficking and the global economy


Cigarettes

Cigarette trafficking[9] is estimated to account for 10% or more (depending on the source[10]) of world-wide production. Contraband activity occurs on a large scale, involving the illicit transportation and distribution of cigarettes and escaping all taxation. It targets markets protected by heavy taxation designed to protect national industries (Algeria, Morocco and Libya in the 2000s). It also targets countries, particularly European countries developing ambitious public health policies.

The bulk of contraband cigarettes that move through the Sahel are manufactured in Asia. Shipments land at ports in the Gulf of Guinea, such as Cotonou, Nouakchott and Nouadhibou. They cross West Africa and the Sahel on their way to consumer markets in Maghreb or, to a lesser degree, European countries.


In Niger, transit agencies have been transporting cigarettes from Gulf of Guinea ports in fully articulated lorries since the 1980s (Brachet, 2004). They are shipped to the military border station in Madama (Niger-Libya border), where they are unloaded onto smaller trucks owned by Libyan merchants. These transfers are both legal and illegal. On the Nigerien side of the border, cigarette re-exportation is regulated, as tobacco is subject to a special re-exportation tax (TSR) of 15% (Grégoire, 1998). Lorry convoys are

Map 9.1
Major seizures of illicit weapons



Source: *Transnational organized crime in West Africa: A Threat Assessment*, UNODC 2013

Map 9.2
Cigarettes' long march



escorted by customs vehicles to the Libyan border. On the Libyan side of the border, cigarette importation is illegal, where it requires corruption. Between Sebbah and Agadez, one truck could pay a few years ago up to one million FCFA in taxes (no receipts issued).

Further to the west, between Mali and Algeria, these shipments move through Gao, Kidal, Bordj Badji Mokthar, Adrar or Gao, Kidal, Tinzaouatène, Tamanrasset, In Salah. Two roads lead out of Mauritania (one to Algeria and the other to Morocco), through Nouakchott, Atar, Tindouf and Nouadhibou, Laayoune and Casablanca. "The quantity of cigarettes imported into Mauritania exceeds Moroccan imports, even though the latter country has ten times the population" (AMI, 2007). In the 2000s,[11] Mauritania was becoming a hub of international trafficking, most of it headed for Algeria and Morocco, with the remainder being channelled through Nioro du Sahel (Mali) to Guinea and Sierra Leone.

In North Africa, cigarette trafficking is valued at more than one billion USD: 75% of cigarettes consumed in Libya enter the country illegally (Le Monde, 2013). In Sahel areas, the impact of this trade is equally important to local societies, although the arrival of cocaine and hashish have won converts due to the potentially higher profits for a similar risk.

Recent data confirm the gradual decline in cigarette trafficking between the Sahel and North Africa. In particular, the opening up of the Algerian cigarette market since 2005 has considerably reduced the economic benefits of this trade.[12] Data on tobacco seized by Algerian authorities between 2011 and 2013 highlight the dramatic nature of the decline, although

the insecurity that has been a feature of this area since 2012 also strongly contributed to the decline (Bensassi et al., 2014).

Today, the quantity of cigarettes trafficked from Mali to Algeria is estimated at around 9 000 cartons per week, mainly originating in Burkina Faso. The annual revenue generated by this activity in Malian territory is estimated at 1.5 million USD (Map 9.2).

Cocaine

Although the use of cocaine was not widespread in West Africa in the early 2000s, seizures of the product increased dramatically in the middle of the decade. The reason for this involves the Columbian cartels, who lost control of the routes into the North American markets (which were shrinking) to Mexican cartels. It was therefore in their interest to target another consumer market, namely Europe (where consumption was on the rise),[13] by finding routes that were safer than direct ones.

West Africa offers many advantages: weak legal institutions and capacities; very limited financial resources to fight drugs; officers with limited training; the ease of potential bribery including in the justice department and security services; and the government's inability to protect its public servants.

As a convenient and low-risk location for moving and storing merchandise, West Africa provides a platform via which to reach Europe, where a kilogram of cocaine purchased for 2 000 to 3 000 EUR in Latin American production areas sells for as much as 60 000 EUR wholesale, and is often cut with other products (Map 9.3).

Initially, flows were concentrated along West Africa's most westerly coastlines (Gambia, Guinea-Bissau, Mauritania and Senegal) and the Cape Verde Islands. The phenomenon is now spreading to countries in the Gulf of Guinea and enclaved Sahelian countries. Shipments to European markets are made using three modes of transportation:

- By boat to European ports for the largest shipments.
- Smaller shipments are moved over land via the Sahara to the Maghreb (today, these appear to be moving primarily through Niger and, to a lesser extent, through Mali and Chad) and then on to Europe.
- By air, in smaller amounts, using "mules".[14] The transit countries in West Africa or the Maghreb are becoming increasingly large consumers. Some of the players involved are paid in kilos of cocaine that are resold to members of the local elite or processed into crack cocaine and sold at lower prices geared to local populations (Lapaque, 2013) (Map 9.4).

Hashish


Morocco is the world's leading producer and exporter of hashish; the country was the source of 15% of world-wide consumption in 2010 (UNODC).[15] Its consumer markets are based in Europe and, to a lesser extent, the Middle East. Most of the goods enter Europe directly from Morocco[16] or other Maghreb countries. However, some of the merchandise travels over Saharan routes (Map 9.5), especially the Saharan portion of Sahel countries, before heading back toward North Africa (Libya and Egypt) or to the Red Sea and Middle Eastern markets (Julien, 2011). Hashish is the primary drug transiting through northern Mauritania and Mali. In Mali, various communities compete to control its trade (Le Prétoire, 2013) (Map 9.5).

Stolen Cars

Trafficking in stolen cars, especially European but also North African cars, occurs via Maghreb countries towards the Sahel and West Africa. For instance, vehicles are sent through Libya or Algeria to Niger, and from there they are sent on to countries along the coast. In Morocco, cars are moved to Mauritania and then to various countries in the area (Guinea, Mali, Senegal…[17]). For a cost of 6 000 to 9 000 EUR, a person can buy a vehicle worth several tens of thousands of euros in Europe. They are sold at no depreciation in neighbouring countries a year later.

Map 9.3


Cocaine seizures from 2005 to 2011



Source: *Transnational organized crime in West Africa*, UNODC 2013


Map 9.4

Cocaine flows



Source: UNODC 2013

Map 9.5
Hashish flows



Sources: Simon J., *Le Sahel comme espace de transit des stupéfiants. Acteurs et conséquences politiques*, Hérodote 2011/3 n° 142; Labrousse A., *L'approvisionnement en haschich du marché français* 2003

9.2 THE IMPACT OF TRAFFICKING

The impact of trafficking is varied: increased violence, health effects, loss of taxation revenues, the cost of fighting these trafficking activities, money laundering, governance and more. The trafficking economy firmly binds the Sahel and Maghreb economies together, perhaps more than the ties generated by official trade activity, which is relatively weak. On both sides of the Sahara, it raises questions about the impact on policy and governance on surrounding areas.

Cocaine or an ambiguous relationship between trafficking and politics

The UNODC and others have been sounding the alarm for a number of years about the growth of trafficking in Guinea-Bissau and its consequences (2007):

- Military involvement in trafficking and political collusion;
- A powerless judicial apparatus;
- Increased criminal activity;
- Compromised development trajectory;
- Threats to regime stability (the market value of a single seizure can amount to more than the annual budget of the justice system).

The types of players involved vary and emanates from the criminal underworld (Julien, 2011). Accordingly, participants include Latin American organised crime (cartels) and European organised crime (Italian mafia and "subcultures" from other countries); West African mafia

groups (especially Nigerians); criminals loosely associated with certain communities present in the Sahara; persons associated with Salafist Jihadism (MUJAO, Mokthar Belmokthar's group and AQIM); members of the Lebanese community; members of the West African diaspora in Europe; and lastly, true state mafias.

These players perform a range of functions. Some ship; others store, protect, organise or purchase protection. They may also work with different volumes. Large shipments must be differentiated from the kilos of cocaine used to pay for "little favours".

In some African states, there are interest groups that have significant capacity for official and unofficial accumulation: "The existence of an obscure, fraternity-like power structures that surrounds, and even controls, officials in whom repose such power, and benefits from the privatisation of the use of legitimate enforcement […]; the exploitation, by this fraternal and partially obscure power structure, of economic activities considered criminal under international law, by international organisations and by international morality" (Bayart et al., 1997). This structure does not encompass the entire state or all political leaders, but it remains powerful and resilient enough to be difficult to eradicate by the remaining political authorities.

The aim is not to determine how the state can combat trafficking but to understand how the economy created by trafficking fits within extant power structures and interferes with the governance of territories. Authorities cannot ignore trafficking; it generates funds that sometimes exceed certain sectors of the official economy. The issue is therefore twofold: to determine which regulatory elements official authorities; puts in place and to understand how this controlled trafficking economy becomes one among many sources of income.

The last years of the Amadou Toumani Touré regime in Mali reveal a great deal. There is evidence that money generated by drugs and trafficking found its way into election campaign funding. Members of security forces, elected officials and persons connected with the presidency were involved.

New sources of revenues arise directly or indirectly from the management of government affairs, such as profiteering from international aid, urban land, extractive industries and control over imports via granting import licenses to allies. This is evident in the Sahel countries where political bodies are geared more toward the control/taxation of cross-border flows than on the legal taxation[18] of residents or products, i.e., the gatekeeper state[19] described by Frederick Cooper (2002).

Governance of peripheral spaces

The management of trafficking by central governments in outlying areas is not binary (control/non control). Governance methods can differ between the centre of a country and the peripheral areas or from one region to another, but the state is never entirely without instruments.

Accordingly, along the Algeria-Tunisia border, the pursuit of traffickers by Algerian authorities is uneven. Severe means are used to combat weapons and drug (especially hashish) trafficking, while players involved in petrol trafficking are given considerable latitude. The government, faced with difficulty in promoting legal activity in this enclaved area, allows them to capitalise on one of its assets (Le Quotidien d'Oran, 2010). Increased controls had, incidentally, previously led to riots.[20]

Border trafficking regulation falls within the purview of diplomatic relations and foreign policy. Closure of the border with Mali was a decisive factor in Algiers' negotiations during the 2006 Touareg uprising. One Algerian diplomat[21] described trade in food products with Mali as a facet of Algerian co-operation, when trafficking in subsidised products was actually at issue.

In Mauritania, during the Ould Sid'Ahmed Taya regime,[22] the president used trafficking to gradually build a type of security architecture in the north: "(He) succeeded, by relying on alliances among business people in the official and unofficial economy (trafficking in particular), in stabilising the northern part of the country through economic diplomacy that reconciled the Polisario side with the Moroccan side.[23] Far from being a marginal phenomenon or one that is specific to marginal players, trafficking or at least some trafficking in the northern part of the country, was directly controlled by the inner circles of power" (Antil, 2009). Trafficking, integrated into the power structure and security

strategy, was a temporary stabilising factor in the northern area and a focus of economic diplomacy (Antil, 2004).

In Mali, under the Touré regime, the apparently lax approach to the question of trafficking was an organised laxity. Those in power used trafficking activities they could control to favour one or another of the groups that could counterbalance the influence of the most hostile of the Touareg groups, especially those groups, such as the Ifoghas, who joined forces with the MNLA. Using groups against each other instrumentally, with help from development projects, elected positions and access to the proceeds of trafficking, the regime engaged in a form of indirect rule. Trafficking, like other forms of income, was used as a political instrument in the northern part of the country.

The territorial division process is important because it derives from an evolution in the societies of northern Mali. In fact, it marks a breakdown in hierarchical ties between ruling communities and their former dependents. Judith Scheele (2009) has analysed the evolution of contraband and trafficking in the Al Khalil border zone (near Bordj Badji Mokthar on the Algerian side): in the 1970s and 1980s, fraud involving various foodstuffs enriched certain merchants who then engaged in cigarette and weapons trafficking. The arrival of cocaine generated wealth even more rapidly, but also redefined status in the area. "Some Arab groups in the Tilemsi valley used their newfound wealth from trafficking to challenge the dominance of the Kunta, on whom they had formerly depended" (Brachet, 2004). There was also dissent over hierarchical relationships in northern communities (Touareg, Arab, Songhay, Fulani, etc.). Tensions arose in the area because of uprisings and violence from 2012 to 2013 and over control of shipments. Another social consequence[24] concerns the greater difficulty among northern communities in deterring young people from joining the trafficking economy, especially drug trafficking. Similar developments are evident in northern Cameroon, where traditional hierarchies are having difficulty guiding their youth, who are becoming involved in highway robbery, child kidnappings (for ransom) and cattle rustling (Seignobos, 2011; Musila, 2012).

Lastly, drug trafficking finances (at least partially) rebel or Salafist jihadist groups. Before the war, one-third of financing for groups like AQIM came from trafficking (convoy protection), and the remainder came from ransom. In the Sahel, and in northern Niger in particular, traffickers have amassed so much money that they are now in a position to finance any military-political undertaking they please.[25]

NOTES \\\

1 See, in particular, the paper by Wolfram Lacher (2013) criticising these concepts.

2 "25% of national petrol production is wasted or illegally exported" according to www.mediaterranee.com, 14 July 2013.

3 They launched a major offensive along some of their borders in the summer of 2013, deploying 25 000 additional security force members.

4 Conversation in Nouakchott with a Mauritanian reporter in June 2013.

5 In 2011, however, a professional petroleum product distributor in Nouakchott confided to us that one-third of the country's petrol stations were partially or entirely supplied with contraband petrol.

6 Conversations with a researcher in Tifariti and in Rouen, 2007.

7 Conversation with a Small Arms Survey researcher, 2008.

8 For an exhaustive analysis of the weapons found in northern Mali(Conflict Armament/Small Arms Survey, 2013).

9 Here, "trafficking" refers to both cigarettes sold on the underground market and counterfeit cigarettes. Counterfeiting penalizes both governments and multinational firms; the availability of non-counterfeit cigarettes on the underground market does not always damage the interests of large firms. Such trafficking can make it possible to reach overly protected markets.

10 A researcher interviewed in Paris in March 2008 told us that one WCO (World Customs Organization) document that was not made public reported a 30% discrepancy between the number of cigarettes produced world-wide and the number officially sold.

11 Surveys conducted in Nouakchott in June 2013 produced highly contradictory results. However, it appears that trafficking in cigarettes headed for Algeria has diminished, which is not necessarily the case for goods headed to Morocco.

12 In 2002, the Société nationale des tabacs et allumettes created STEAM in a joint venture with emirati investors and was granted a license by Philip Morris International to import Marlboro and L&M.

13 The 2010 World Drug Report (UNODC publication) stated that in 2008, the European market accounted for 26% (by volume) of the total global consumption.

14 Term used to refer to a person recruited to carry an amount of drugs from one point to another in his/her luggage or digestive tract.

15 *According to L'Économiste, the Morrocan economic magazine, revenues from the sector (from producer to European consumer) were estimated at about one billion USD in 2011. Cannabis culture provides about 800 000 people with a livelihood, providing half of their annual income.*

16 *Via Spain, where 30% to 40% of Moroccan hash enters annually.*

17 *Conversation in Nouakchott in June 2013 with a police officer.*

18 *We insist on the use of the term legal, as it is clear that forced and informal fees and taxes do exist.*

19 *The concept of a gatekeeper state was introduced by Africa historian Frederick Cooper in his book "Africa Since 1940: The Past of the Present". It is used to describe African nations whose main function is balancing the instability of internal political control against the influence of external factors.*

20 *Interview with a researcher in Paris specialising in Algeria, September 2013.*

21 *In a discussion on the Sahel at the Palais d'Egmont in Brussels, 2011*

22 *In power from 1984 to 2005.*

23 *Unable to oppose Morocco, Polisario or his powerful Algerian protector, as evidenced by the successive overthrows of Mokthar Ould Daddah (1978), who was too pro-Moroccan, and Mohamed Ould Haïdallah (1984), who was too close to the Polisario, President Ould Taya patiently developed a policy of "positive neutrality" around the Western Sahara issue.*

24 *Conversation in Nouakchott with an influential resident of the Timbuktu region, March 2012.*

25 *Conversation with a Nigerien official in Tunis in August 2012.*

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Chapter 10

An institutional point of view on the challenges of the Sahara-Sahel

10.1 The Sahara-Sahelian challenge: A European perspective 240
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10.3 The “security and development” nexus and regional co-operation 246
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The security context of the Sahara-Sahel has led to the development of numerous international, regional and multilateral initiatives, such as the G5. As a result, there is a collective understanding of the need for these efforts to work together. These initiatives include the EU Strategy for Security and Development in the Sahel (2011), the UN Integrated Strategy for the Sahel (2013), the AU Strategy for the Sahel Region (2014) and the ECOWAS Strategy for the Sahel (2014). The call of these initiatives for strengthening dialogue among all actors involved to achieve lasting security for the West African population is shared by all, as is expressed through the following contributions.

10.1 THE SAHARA-SAHELIAN CHALLENGE: A EUROPEAN PERSPECTIVE

Mr. Reveyrand de Menthon, European Union Special Representative for the Sahel
Mr. Jérôme Spinoza, Political Adviser to the European Union Special Representative for the Sahel

The Sahara-Sahelian area remains a top priority for Africans in the Sub-Saharan and northern regions of the continent, Europeans and international partners more generally.

This priority is linked to clear political emergencies including terrorist activity, humanitarian challenges and migration. This focus is framed in the long-term, equally for Sub-Saharan states with fragile institutions and societies, as for Europeans and North Africans.

Significant demographic growth in the southern part of the Sahara combined with unknown climate factors of high concern and a lack of response to the basic needs of the population lay the basis for exacerbating the turmoil, likely in a violent manner. All of this is having a major impact, particularly in Europe. But is Europe sufficiently aware of the situation? The illusion of a southern European "fortress" is beginning to spring leaks, as are the hulls of the boats that transport clandestine migrants from the Sahara to Italy or Spain.

That being the case, an understanding of what lies beneath the concept of Sahelo-Saharan space is not immediately evident, not even in not-too-distant Europe. It is therefore time to revive two concepts.

Firstly, consider the concept of a "vertical Europe – Maghreb – Sahel relationship", which is actually not new. In the 16th century, European renegades took part in the conquest of Timbuktu on Morocco's behalf; for a time, Spain was taken over by the Almoravids, who hailed from the area known today as Mauritania; and archeology has unearthed gold coins from the Roman era in the Sahel. Today, this vertical relationship translates into a rapid intensification of human and economic relations between all three entities.

Secondly, consider the horizontal relationship that connects the Atlantic with the Arab-Persian world. We now know that the Niger River is not a distant tributary of the Nile – a theory long espoused by the Mediterranean from antiquity to the time of Ibn Batutta, the Moroccan explorer. Yet one too easily forgets the incessant movement of people, merchandise and ideas between Mauritania or Niger and the Arabian Peninsula, via the Sudan along one of the Muslim pilgrimage routes. At the center lies Chad, which today is involved in all Sahara-Sahel issues.

A third notion, that of a diagonal relationship, goes unacknowledged. In the case of drugs trafficking, it connects the Atlantic with the Middle East via the Sinai. In the case of migrants, they are smuggled from the Horn of Africa into Europe via the Libyan-Tunisian Gulf of Sirte.


With respect to both activities, the western and eastern portions of the Sahel are connected by the large area around Lake Chad, which has served as a point of redistribution from late antiquity to the present day.

In addition, the geography of organised crime and terrorist violence points to flows and interactions at the continental, and sometimes international, levels. These constitute contemporary forms of the movement of goods and people traversing the vast area between Europe, Sub-Saharan Africa and the Arab-Persian world.

Briefly put, there are a variety of focal points as well as geographic and mental spaces that suggest as many different policies in response. These policies are necessarily regional and international, but also local.

Map 10.1

Border areas, some priorities



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
Production carried out by the European Commission's Joint Research Centre with the support of the Instrument contributing to Stability and Peace (ICSP).

1. Note by Turkey: The information in this document with reference to "Cyprus" relates to the southern part of the Island. There is no single authority representing both Turkish and Greek Cypriot people on the Island. Turkey recognises the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus (TRNC). Until a lasting and equitable solution is found within the context of the United Nations, Turkey shall preserve its position concerning the "Cyprus issue".

2. Note by all the European Union Member States of the OECD and the European Union: The Republic of Cyprus is recognised by all members of the United Nations with the exception of Turkey. The information in this document relates to the area under the effective control of the Government of the Republic of Cyprus.

Map 10.2

Regional security responses



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The Sahara is at the heart of this dynamic; it delineates a specific zone with its own turbulence factors. Why has there been a shift from the relative stability of the precolonial and colonial eras to a state of exacerbated turbulence since the 1970s, from the Western Sahara to the Sudan via Mali and Tibesti? It may be due to the almost simultaneous development of two physical and legal technologies – the combustion engine and the intangibility of the borders inherited from the colonial period – together with the real or imagined (depending on the case) issue of multiple mining resources present in the Saharan world, which is sometimes characterised by the atavism of "the art of not being governed", to paraphrase James C. Scott in reference to the mountain peoples of South-East Asia.

By providing the inherited capitals of pre-colonial states and their "uniformed service personnel" with an opportunity to establish permanent settlements in the Saharan area, which up to that point had been managed only in a more or less suzerain manner, this settlement was intended to control movement, illicit or otherwise, and underground resources. As a result, confrontations with local populations would inevitably become structural. Inter-state rivalries created fault lines and resulted in the implosion of Mali and the Sudan, and the fragility of many other countries.

The margins of the Sahara-Sahel area are both social and geographic in nature. From the Tindouf camps to the slums of the capital cities of countries in the Sahel, and for the young Saharans affected by and the easy money associated with trafficking, the ground offers long-term fertility for political entrepreneurs who use community and religious identity as tools.

In all, despite the growing numbers of declared crises combined with the persistence of suspended conflicts, the problem remains of finding a suitable regional framework for this area, which straddles at least three institutional regions (ECOWAS, AMU and ECCAS); it awaits a solution commensurate with the issues.

This is indeed the priority. The international co-ordination "platform" and the "Sahel G5" are significant opportunities not be missed; but they are recent and fragile, and need to be transformed as quickly as possible. The African Union can play a strategic role through, in particular, its own strategy for the Sahel and the Nouakchott process. The EU is clearly involved in supporting regional and continental initiatives by collaborating as closely as possible with the United Nations and their Special Envoy for the Sahel.

As regards the management of the Sahara itself, a system that respects the sovereignty of states and the importance of adapting the management of people and goods to the reality of a unique territory has yet to be outlined. It would be an understatement to say that the only example promoted by the French Fourth Republic and the young African republics associated with it in the dying hours of the Union Française, through the short-lived Common Organization of the Saharan Regions (OCRS, 1957), served as a foil in the eyes of many.

Now more than ever, Europe, in addressing the situation in the Sahara and Sahel, its southern neighbours, must – in collaboration with North Africa and its regional and international partners, including the United Nations – react in a manner that is commensurate with the policy, security, demographic, education and climate challenges by prioritising the development of a joint security mechanism that is as operational as possible. That is the price of the opportunities that could be realised in these countries. The lengthy timeline or horizon implicit in these issues is made clear in this comprehensive atlas of the Sahel.

10.2 STRENGTHENING STATE OWNERSHIP OF STRATEGIES AND INITIATIVES AND CO-ORDINATING INTERNATIONAL SUPPORT FOR STABILITY IN THE SAHEL

Ms. Hiroute Guebre Sellassie, Special Envoy of the United Nations Secretary General for the Sahel

The interconnected and cross-border nature of challenges in the Sahel

The crises in Libya and Mali have focused international attention and concern on the Sahel. But the political and security crisis in Mali is, in reality, only one aspect of a more deep-seated and multidimensional crisis, whose structural causes are rooted in fragile state institutions, problems related to governance and vulnerable local populations. These factors have laid the ground for the development of cross-border criminal activity in the Sahel, including the trafficking of drugs, weapons, cigarettes and people. In addition, the ability of states to control vast portions of their territories and provide basic public services to their populations has been limited by a number of factors. These include the vast size of the Sahel territory, inadequate coverage by state governments in the region, the permeability of borders, unco-ordinated migration policies and uneven regional integration, with regional organisations whose composition and capacities vary. Those same factors have also enabled criminal networks to flourish in the region through exploiting the vulnerability of local populations. From this perspective, the crisis in Libya was merely a trigger for an already explosive situation. It no doubt added fuel to the fire in northern Mali, and it – or any other trigger element – could ignite other hot spots in the region, if the structural causes of the instability in the Sahel are not addressed.

The diversity of regional and international interventions and stakeholders in the Sahel

The international community has understood the interconnected and cross-border nature of the challenges facing the Sahel and has responded with regional and multisectoral "Sahel strategies". These strategies are not only intended to find a solution to the political and security crisis, but also to address the root causes of instability in the Sahel. In consultation with the countries in the region, the European Union (EU), the African Union (AU) and the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) have adopted (or are on the verge of adopting) "Sahel strategies" that address areas as diverse as governance, education, security, extremism, resilience and development. Financial institutions such as the World Bank and the African Development Bank (AfDB) have also developed specific programs for the Sahel. The United Nations integrated strategy for the Sahel (UNISS) was developed in consultation with agencies in the United Nations system, governments in the region and their partners, regional organisations, and international organisations and financial institutions. In July 2013, the Security Council endorsed the strategy, which focuses on three pillars: 1) governance, 2) security and 3) resilience.[1]

A number of international partners have also appointed representatives or special envoys for the Sahel: the EU and Switzerland have designated Special Envoys for the Sahel, while the AU has a High Representative for Mali and the Sahel. As for the United Nations, it has appointed a Regional Humanitarian Co-ordinator for the Sahel and a Special Envoy of the Secretary-General for the Sahel to develop the UNISS and co-ordinate its implementation. Mr Romani Prodi held the latter position until his mandate expired in February 2014, at which time it was my honour to replace him.

The importance of national and regional ownership

These "Sahel strategies" can only effectively contribute to the stability of states and an improved quality of life for local populations if there is buy-in on the part of beneficiaries at the national and regional levels. Ownership is a necessity, given that the implementation of different "Sahel strategies" will necessarily involve structural reforms, particularly in the

area of governance, that can only be achieved in a legitimate and sovereign manner by states in the region, with support from their partners. And given the number of strategies, ownership will necessarily involve co-ordinating the initiatives that already exist and any future initiatives put forth by the states concerned. This logic was the basis for developing the ministerial co-ordination platform for the Sahel, established at a ministerial meeting on 5 November 2013 as part of the Secretary-General's high-level joint mission in the Sahel. The platform members – foreign affairs ministers of the countries concerned – meet twice a year; the rotating two-year chairmanship is currently held by Mali, whose mandate will expire in November 2015. The purpose of the platform is to: 1) ensure the sustainability of efforts to address challenges in the Sahel; 2) keep attention focused on the most significant challenges facing the region; 3) facilitate the convergence of differing points of view as to the priority areas to be addressed by the regional initiatives for the Sahel; and 4) monitor progress and accomplishments, in particular through co-ordinating support from the international community.[2] The platform's technical secretariat is cochaired by the AU, through its High Representative for Mali and the Sahel, and by the UN, through its Office of the Special Envoy for the Sahel. It includes other international institution members such as the AfDB, the World Bank, the Islamic Development Bank (IDB), the Economic Community of Central African States (ECCAS), ECOWAS, the Community of Sahel-Saharan States (CEN-SAD), the Organisation of Islamic Co-operation (OIC), the Arab Maghreb Union (AMU) and the EU. The platform is not intended to replace the other Sahel initiatives, but rather to co-ordinate and support them. At the second platform meeting, held in Bamako in May 2014, the participants welcomed other regional initiatives such as the "Sahel G5",[3] the Nouakchott process[4], the ECOWAS Strategy and the AU strategy for the Sahel, as well as the steps taken to implement the UNISS and the EU Strategy for the Sahel. In its presidential statement on 27 August, the Security Council welcomed the various regional co-ordination initiatives and urged international partners to support the platform, the "Sahel G5" and the Nouakchott process.

The central role of the UN in co-ordinating the "Sahel strategies"

Given the number of Sahel initiatives and stakeholders, together with the resulting risk of resource dispersal, there has been a call for a higher degree of co-ordination of international support for the Sahel. The United Nations, given its convening capacity; expertise in the areas of governance, security and resilience; and its capacity to mobilise political will and resources, is well placed to bring together all stakeholders in order to harmonise the different Sahel initiatives. Mr Gérard Araud, the Permanent Representative of France to the United Nations, delivered a statement to the Security Council on 19 June 2014, in the context of the Secretary-General's report on the implementation of the UNISS. He emphasised the importance of the co-ordination role played by the United Nations in the Sahel, first through the UNISS, which must "define a common trans-national approach to all agencies", and second, by helping "all stakeholders to co-ordinate their efforts for the Sahel". In so doing, Mr Araud was merely reiterating the Security Council's call in a presidential statement on 16 July 2013,[5] in which the Council stressed the importance of "a co-ordinated approach" and regional and national ownership. It recommended that the UNISS be implemented in close consultation with states in the Sahel, West Africa and the Maghreb, and with regional organisations and international partners. In a new presidential statement on 27 August 2014, the Council reiterated the importance of national and regional ownership of the UNISS, and invited regional and international partners, including the United Nations, through its Special Envoy for the Sahel, to support the efforts of countries in the Sahel to "address the threats to peace, security and development in the Sahel".[6] Other regional and international partners, as well as Sahel Heads of State, also called for a higher degree of co-ordination of the "Sahel strategies" during bilateral meetings I attended. The necessity of better co-ordination is the observation most frequently shared by the different actors working in the Sahel. This is precisely what the work of the Special Envoy for the Sahel is helping to translate into reality.

Co-ordinating regional and international actors: A priority for the Special Envoy for the Sahel

Co-ordination of the regional and international players working in the Sahel is the key to the success of the different initiatives for this region. That is the message that the UN Secretary-General wished to send in organising two major events. The first was a high-level meeting convened on the sidelines of the General Assembly in September 2013, during which the Sahel states and their regional and international partners welcomed the adoption of the UNISS, and made a commitment to work together to meet the challenges facing the Sahel. The second involved playing a leading role in the high-level joint mission in the Sahel region[7] in November 2013, in which the Chairperson of the AU Commission, the President of the World Bank, the President of the AfDB and the EU Commissioner for Development participated. On the sidelines of that visit, the ministerial co-ordination platform for the Sahel strategies was created (see the section above on "The importance of national and regional ownership"). Since taking up this position I, like my predecessor, have been in regular contact with international institutions and other partners who have developed a "Sahel strategy", and with others who have not developed a strategy, but who play an important role in the stability of the region. These consultations are important to ensure that our interventions are consistent and our messages to states in the region are streamlined.

It is clear that the multitude of actors and interventions in the Sahel do not pose an obstacle, but rather, constitute an opportunity for the Sahel, on condition that this surge in generosity be co-ordinated so as to respond to real needs, as identified by the states and peoples of the region. Given the multidimensional crisis facing the Sahel, no amount of support can be considered excessive, and the specific expertise and resources of the different stakeholders will no doubt all find needs to be addressed. It is a question of finding how best to use our skills and resources in a manner that is co-ordinated and that takes into account the comparative advantages of each, for the well-being of the populations in the Sahel. The United Nations, at the request of other stakeholders, will continue to play its vital role in co-ordinating international actors and promoting national and regional ownership.

10.3 THE "SECURITY AND DEVELOPMENT" NEXUS AND REGIONAL CO-OPERATION

Dr. Ibrahim Assane Mayaki, Chief Executive Officer of the Secretariat of the New Partnership for Africa's Development (NEPAD)

The African Union's Strategy for the Sahel region focuses on three main pillars: governance, security and development. The Sahara-Sahelian areas concerned raise issues that are very closely tied to both security and development. How does NEPAD envision taking security matters into account in medium- and short-term programmes to develop these areas? Through what mechanisms?

In Africa, security and development issues have always been closely connected: during the colonial era, it was necessary to "secure" the conditions for exploiting natural resources; after independence, it was a matter of "securing" the conditions for the creation of nation states, and we know that over the past three centuries nation states have emerged as part of conflictual processes.

Sahara-Sahelian areas were directly subjected to the painful process of the birth of the Algerian state, which includes a large part of the Sahara. The African Union, with support from ECOWAS and the UEMOA, is now focusing on three key areas: governance, security and development.

It is important to recognise that inclusion of these three elements in development plans for the region is currently quite low given the institutional isolation of the security aspect. And while significant progress has been made with respect to governance (multi-party system, electoral processes and accountability

mechanisms), it is still too early to say whether these improvements will have any immediate impact in terms of real change (citizenship development, strengthening the foundations of communities, etc.).

However, in order to make better use of the gains generated by economic development in areas such as the Sahel, a number of initiatives have been undertaken in areas such as conflict management, peace and security, economic growth, public finance management and the empowerment of women. At the sectoral level, the continent has promoted development policies and programmes that target agriculture, food security and nutrition, infrastructure, education, health, trade and access to markets, ICT, environmental protection, and science and technology.

Examples include initiatives at the continental level that have a direct impact on the Sahel region, such as the Comprehensive Africa Agriculture Development Programme (CAADP) or the Pan-African Agency of the Great Green Wall (PAAGGW). In terms of infrastructure development, a number of regional and trans-regional initiatives by NEPAD have directly contributed to the integrated continental plan for the development of regional infrastructure, namely, the Programme for Infrastructure Development in Africa (PIDA).

PIDA focuses on "development corridors" thereby "fostering the practical integration of the 'security' component".

The AU's strategy acknowledges the trans-national nature of the challenges. At the global level, all African and international stakeholders stress that long-term stability in Sahara-Sahel areas necessarily requires enhanced regional co-operation. How does NEPAD view this "regional imperative"?

The creation of the AU and the adoption of NEPAD marked the beginning of a new era of continental reforms. The AU, as a pan-African entity, has made a start at creating institutional space and policy guidelines, while NEPAD has become a veritable implementing agency; it has supported the regional economic communities, thereby responding to the "regional imperative", including in Sahara-Sahel areas.

However, despite the progress made across the continent (particularly the continuously positive growth rates over the past number of years) in agriculture, health care, and education, more than 40% of the population of Sub-Saharan Africa is living on less than a dollar a day, a percentage that represents three-quarters of the world's poor (subsisting on less than one dollar per day). While urban centre populations are growing, most of Africa's poor live in rural areas and rely on agriculture to provide sustenance and a livelihood.

In this context, regional co-operation is imperative for economic and social investment in one country to have trans-national impacts not only on the populations of neighbouring countries, but on the continent as a whole. Fortunately, various indicators point to a willingness among African nations to take such a trans-national approach. For example, from 2003 to 2013, the Eastern African Community launched seven infrastructure projects (mostly in electricity production) valued at 1.8 billion dollars, making it the most active sub-region in Sub-Saharan Africa.

The West African Economic and Monetary Union completed five infrastructure projects worth 1.5 billion dollars. Another energy project, valued at 130 million dollars, was launched in the Economic Community of Central African States sub-region. Lastly, the funding deficit of 40 million dollars required to build the missing stretch of the Trans-Saharan Highway has been offset. Implementation of the project can begin; construction is expected to be completed in 2016.

To conclude, some promising figures and forecasts confirm that our continent is indeed experiencing growth. African GDP is expected to reach 2 600 billion USD in 2020, while consumer spending should peak at 1 400 billion dollars in the same period, making Africa one of the most attractive regions in the world in terms of investment opportunities and rates of return. The number of sectors ripe for investment is increasing in areas of strong growth such as telecommunications, banking services, agriculture, infrastructure and energy and consumer goods. All of this bodes well for the 1.1 billion Africans of working age between now and 2040 and the 128 million African households expected to constitute a solid middle class by 2020 ... if the dykes of governance hold.

10.4 A REGIONAL AGENDA AND COMMUNICATION INFRASTRUCTURE

Mr. Kadré Désiré Ouedraogo, President of the Economic Community of West African States Commission (ECOWAS)

The ECOWAS Strategy for the Sahel is the result of a joint approach with UEMOA and CILSS. If the three regional organisations work together for the Sahel, it is to promote a regional agenda to emerge from crisis and lead to development. How is this agenda important?

For the past ten years or so, the Sahelo-Saharan areas have been plagued by chronic instability which has brought serious threats to West Africa and to its neighbouring regions – North and Central Africa – as well as to the international community.

This instability feeds and is fed by the systemic problems that afflict these areas, in particular: the difficulties inherent in managing vast expanses of steppe and desert and the inadequate means and capacity of the public authorities, irredentism, economic marginalisation, isolation and poor links to regional markets, low levels of education and restricted access to basic social services, endemic poverty accompanied by chronic food insecurity, aridification and interannual climate variations. These areas have a real economic potential (pastoral and nomadic livestock herding, irrigated agriculture in certain cases, hydrocarbons and mining, tourism, energy, trade, etc.). However, such potential remains largely untapped, and even when it is exploited, it brings few benefits to local economies. Thus, the Sahara-Sahelian areas are often seen as "vast wastelands", more prone to bringing risk than development, and difficult and costly to manage. Yet they account for almost half of the land mass of West Africa, two-thirds of Chad, 80% of North Africa and almost the whole of Mauritania.

So it is with all countries concerned, without exception, that lasting solutions can be found. Regional co-operation, including of a trans-Sahara nature, is a requirement that applies to all.

All stakeholders agree on the profoundly regional nature of the threats. Mafia-like and terrorist groups are actively pursuing their aims through dynamic networks that cover all of West, North and Central Africa. A number of lawful trans-national activities have been threatened such as nomadic or transhumant pastoralism, trade and tourism. Furthermore, the Sahelian countries are structurally dependent on co-operation with their neighbours, with whom they share river basins.

The Sahel strategies all underline the importance of the regional nature of the issues at stake. However, there are few regional responses at this stage. Regional responses that do exist tend to focus strictly on the security aspects (co-operation in the field of intelligence, counter terrorism and conflict prevention) and policy dialogue and are often seen as difficult to implement. This failure is compounded by difficulties in designing adequate actions aimed at effectively combining security and development issues. This situation calls for a special effort to promote and implement regional security and development programmes, in parallel with the strategies that are being implemented at the national level.

West African regional organisations place great emphasis on opening up the Sahel. Why is road building a priority?

The Sahara-Sahelian areas are largely cut off from the rest of Africa, to the south as well as the north. From Bamako, it is very difficult to reach northern Mali by road. In Niger, a road goes as far as the Arlit uranium mine. Northern Chad is devoid of communications infrastructure. On the other side of the border in Algeria, a single road reaches Tamanrasset. With the exception of the coastal Trans-Saharan Highway running between Morocco and Mauritania, there are no communications routes across the Sahara and the Sahel to link the two sides of the desert.

This situation reflects the fact that, with the exception of oil, gas and mining, the Sahara-Sahelian areas are not seen as "useful". There is therefore no need to "irrigate" them with transport and telecommunications networks. This is not what we believe.

On the contrary, what is needed if a programme of opening up the region through roads, rural paths, mobile telephony, in a word, through "connection". And yet there is a clear correlation between accessibility and rural poverty. The World Bank has complied a ranking of West African countries based on their Rural Access Index (i.e., percentage of the rural population living within a radius of 2 km of an all-weather road). The bottom three countries in the ranking are Mauritania (3%), Chad (5%), and Mali (14%).

Territorial integration is a precondition for social integration (access to education, healthcare, water, electricity, and mobile telephone service) and economic integration (links to markets, access to more and less expensive commodities, developing trade as well as new upstream and downstream activities, and developing tourism, agriculture and pastoral livestock farming).

On a more geopolitical level, the low level of trans-Saharan connectivity infrastructure demonstrates to us the lack of mutual interest that has until recently marked countries on both shores of the desert.

The aim of building roads across the Sahara is to finally develop economic co-operation with North Africa, increase trade between complementary economies, and build a common future. This kind of will is necessary to help address the dual challenges of stabilisation and development within the vast desert spaces that we share.

NOTES \\

1 *This is not an exhaustive list of "Sahel strategies". It does not include bilateral co-operation between Sahel states and international partners or the strategies implemented by international NGOs operating in the Sahel, some of which have been working in the region for decades. As regards other strategies, it is important to note that Switzerland is focusing on Mali, one of the Swiss Confederation's priority African partners with whom a memorandum of understanding was signed on 3 February 2012 concerning the Strategy for Co-operation in Mali from 2012–2015.*

2 *Road map for Mali's chairship of the ministerial co-ordination platform for the Sahel strategies.*

3 *The "Sahel G5" was established by Burkina Faso, Chad, Mali, Mauritania and Niger in February 2014 in Nouakchott, Mauritania. It is an "institutional framework for co-ordinating and monitoring regional co-operation" in the areas of security and development. The "Sahel G5", with support from technical and financial partners, is in the process of preparing a Priority Investment Programme (PIP) for the Sahel in order to address "development needs in governance, security, economic resilience, and infrastructure".*

4 *Launched by the African Union in 2013, the "Nouakchott process" serves as the "security" component of the African Union's Strategy for the Sahel Region and is intended to implement the African Peace and Security Architecture (APSA) in the region.*

5 *S/PRST/2013/10.*

6 *Statement made by the President of the Security Council on "Peace and security in Africa" (S/PRST/2014/17) .*

7 *The high-level delegation visited Burkina Faso, Chad, Mali and Niger.*

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An Atlas of the Sahara-Sahel

GEOGRAPHY, ECONOMICS AND SECURITY

While the Sahara-Sahel region has experienced recurrent episodes of instability, the recent crises in Libya and Mali have increased the level of violence. These two crises have reshaped the region's geopolitical and geographical dynamics. The current crises are cross-border and regional, and addressing them requires new institutional responses. How can the countries that share this space – Algeria, Chad, Libya, Mali, Morocco, Mauritania, Niger and Tunisia – in collaboration with other countries of the region, such as Nigeria, work together towards its stabilisation and development?

Historically, the Sahara plays the role of intermediary between North Africa and Sub-Saharan Africa. Even before Roman times, the area was criss-crossed by roads, principally serving a military use in this period. Today, commercial and human exchange is vibrant, founded on social networks. These networks have more recently been used by traffickers. Understanding the nature of this trafficking, the geographic and organisational mobility of criminal groups, as well as migratory movements is of strategic importance. This work aims to contribute towards this objective and to help inform the Sahel strategies of the European Union, United Nations, African Union and ECOWAS (Economic Community of West African States) in their attempts to forge a lasting peace.

This Atlas proposes a cartographic and regional analysis of security and development issues. It provides objective information for the necessary dialogue between regional and international organisations, states, researchers and local stakeholders.

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Chapter 2. Socio-economic indicators within Sahara-Sahel countries

Chapter 3. Petroleum and networks of influence in the Sahara-Sahel

Part II. Securing the Sahara-Sahel by integrating its social and spatial mobility

Chapter 4. Ancient and new mobility in the Sahara-Sahel

Chapter 5. Migration and the Sahara

Chapter 6. Nomadism and mobility in the Sahara-Sahel

Chapter 7. Borders, cross-border co-operation and freedom of movement in the Sahara-Sahel

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