COMMENTARY ON ARTICLE 25
CONCERNING THE MUTUAL AGREEMENT PROCEDURE

I. Preliminary remarks

1. This Article institutes a mutual agreement procedure for resolving difficulties arising out of the application of the Convention in the broadest sense of the term.

2. It provides first, in paragraphs 1 and 2, that the competent authorities shall endeavour by mutual agreement to resolve the situation of taxpayers subjected to taxation not in accordance with the provisions of the Convention.

3. It also, in paragraph 3, invites and authorises the competent authorities of the two States to resolve by mutual agreement problems relating to the interpretation or application of the Convention and, furthermore, to consult together for the elimination of double taxation in cases not provided for in the Convention.

4. Finally, as regards the practical operation of the mutual agreement procedure, the Article, in paragraph 4, merely authorises the competent authorities to communicate with each other directly, without going through diplomatic channels, and, if it seems advisable to them, to have an oral exchange of opinions through a joint commission appointed especially for the purpose. Article 26 applies to the exchange of information for the purposes of the provisions of this Article. The confidentiality of information exchanged for the purposes of a mutual agreement procedure is thus ensured.

5. Since the Article merely lays down general rules concerning the mutual agreement procedure, the comments now following are intended to clarify the purpose of such rules, and also to amplify them, if necessary, by referring, in particular, to the rules followed at international level in the conduct of mutual agreement procedures or at the internal level in the conduct of the procedures which exist in most OECD Member countries for dealing with disputed claims regarding taxes.

II. Commentary on the provisions of the Article

Paragraphs 1 and 2

6. The rules laid down in paragraphs 1 and 2 provide for the elimination in a particular case of taxation which does not accord with the Convention. As is known, in such cases it is normally open to taxpayers to litigate in the tax court, either immediately or upon the dismissal of their objections by the taxation authorities. When taxation not in accordance with the Convention arises from an incorrect application of the Convention in both States, taxpayers are then obliged to litigate in each State, with all the disadvantages
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and uncertainties that such a situation entails. So paragraph 1 makes available to taxpayers
affected, without depriving them of the ordinary legal remedies available, a procedure
which is called the mutual agreement procedure because it is aimed, in its second stage, at
resolving the dispute on an amicable basis, i.e. by agreement between competent
authorities, the first stage being conducted exclusively in the State of residence (except
where the procedure for the application of paragraph 1 of Article 24 is set in motion by the
taxpayer in the State of which he is a national) from the presentation of the objection up to
the decision taken regarding it by the competent authority on the matter.

7. In any case, the mutual agreement procedure is clearly a special procedure outside the
domestic law. It follows that it can be set in motion solely in cases coming within paragraph 1,
i.e. cases where tax has been charged, or is going to be charged, in disregard of the provisions
of the Convention. So where a charge of tax has been made contrary both to the Convention
and the domestic law, this case is amenable to the mutual agreement procedure to the extent
only that the Convention is affected, unless a connecting link exists between the rules of the
Convention and the rules of the domestic law which have been misapplied.

8. In practice, the procedure applies to cases — by far the most numerous — where
the measure in question leads to double taxation which it is the specific purpose of the
Convention to avoid. Among the most common cases, mention must be made of the
following:

— the questions relating to attribution to a permanent establishment of a proportion
of the executive and general administrative expenses incurred by the enterprise,
under paragraph 3 of Article 7;
— the taxation in the State of the payer — in case of a special relationship between
the payer and the beneficial owner — of the excess part of interest and royalties,
under the provisions of Article 9, paragraph 6 of Article 11 or paragraph 4 of
Article 12;
— cases of application of legislation to deal with thin capitalisation when the State
of the debtor company has treated interest as dividends, insofar as such treatment
is based on clauses of a convention corresponding for example to Article 9 or
paragraph 6 of Article 11;
— cases where lack of information as to the taxpayer's actual situation has led to
misapplication of the Convention, especially in regard to the determination of
residence (paragraph 2 of Article 4), the existence of a permanent establishment
(Article 5), or the temporary nature of the services performed by an employee
(paragraph 2 of Article 15).

9. Article 25 also provides machinery to enable competent authorities to consult with
each other with a view to resolving, in the context of transfer pricing problems, not only
problems of juridical double taxation but also those of economic double taxation, and
especially those resulting from the inclusion of profits of associated enterprises under
paragraph 1 of Article 9; the corresponding adjustments to be made in pursuance of
paragraph 2 of the same Article thus fall within the scope of the mutual agreement procedure, both as concerns assessing whether they are well-founded and for determining their amount.

10. This in fact is implicit in the wording of paragraph 2 of Article 9 when the bilateral convention in question contains a clause of this type. When the bilateral convention does not contain rules similar to those of paragraph 2 of Article 9 (as is usually the case for conventions signed before 1977) the mere fact that Contracting States inserted in the convention the text of Article 9, as limited to the text of paragraph 1 — which usually only confirms broadly similar rules existing in domestic laws — indicates that the intention was to have economic double taxation covered by the Convention. As a result, most Member countries consider that economic double taxation resulting from adjustments made to profits by reason of transfer pricing is not in accordance with — at least — the spirit of the convention and falls within the scope of the mutual agreement procedure set up under Article 25. States which do not share this view do, however, in practice, find the means of remedying economic double taxation in most cases involving bona fide companies by making use of provisions in their domestic laws.

11. The mutual agreement procedure is also applicable in the absence of any double taxation contrary to the Convention, once the taxation in dispute is in direct contravention of a rule in the Convention. Such is the case when one State taxes a particular class of income in respect of which the Convention gives an exclusive right to tax to the other State even though the latter is unable to exercise it owing to a gap in its domestic laws. Another category of cases concerns persons who, being nationals of one Contracting State but residents of the other State, are subjected in that other State to taxation treatment which is discriminatory under the provisions of paragraph 1 of Article 24.

12. It should be noted that the mutual agreement procedure, unlike the disputed claims procedure under domestic law, can be set in motion by a taxpayer without waiting until the taxation considered by him to be "not in accordance with the Convention" has been charged against or notified to him. To be able to set the procedure in motion, he must, and it is sufficient if he does, establish that the "actions of one or both of the Contracting States" will result in such taxation, and that this taxation appears as a risk which is not merely possible but probable. Such actions mean all acts or decisions, whether of a legislative or a regulatory nature, and whether of general or individual application, having as their direct and necessary consequence the charging of tax against the complainant contrary to the provisions of the Convention.

13. To be admissible objections presented under paragraph 1 must first meet a twofold requirement expressly formulated in that paragraph: in principle, they must be presented to the competent authority of the taxpayer's State of residence (except where the procedure for the application of paragraph 1 of Article 24 is set in motion by the taxpayer in the State of which he is a national), and they must be so presented within three years of the first notification of the action which gives rise to taxation which is not in accordance with the
14. The requirement laid on the taxpayer to present his case to the competent authority of the State of which he is a resident (except where the procedure for the application of paragraph 1 of Article 24 is set in motion by the taxpayer in the State of which he is a national) is of general application, regardless of whether the taxation objected to has been charged in that or the other State and regardless of whether it has given rise to double taxation or not. If the taxpayer should have transferred his residence to the other Contracting State subsequently to the measure or taxation objected to, he must nevertheless still present his objection to the competent authority of the State of which he was a resident during the year in respect of which such taxation has been or is going to be charged.

15. However, in the case already alluded to where a person who is a national of one State but a resident of the other complains of having been subjected in that other State to an action or taxation which is discriminatory under paragraph 1 of Article 24, it appears more appropriate for obvious reasons to allow him, by way of exception to the general rule set forth above, to present his objection to the competent authority of the Contracting State of which he is a national. Finally, it is to the same competent authority that an objection has to be presented by a person who, while not being a resident of a Contracting State, is a national of a Contracting State, and whose case comes under paragraph 1 of Article 24.

16. On the other hand, Contracting States may, if they consider it preferable, give taxpayers the option of presenting their cases to the competent authority of either State. In such a case, paragraph 1 would have to be modified as follows:

"1. Where a person considers that the actions of one or both of the Contracting States result or will result for him in taxation not in accordance with the provisions of this Convention, he may, irrespective of the remedies provided by the domestic law of those States, present his case to the competent authority of either Contracting State. The case must be presented within three years from the first notification of the action resulting in taxation not in accordance with the provisions of the Convention."

17. The time limit of three years set by the second sentence of paragraph 1 for presenting objections is intended to protect administrations against late objections. This time limit must be regarded as a minimum, so that Contracting States are left free to agree in their bilateral conventions upon a longer period in the interests of taxpayers, e.g. on the analogy in particular of the time limits laid down by their respective domestic regulations in regard to tax conventions. Contracting States may omit the second sentence of paragraph 1 if they concur that their respective domestic regulations apply automatically to such objections and are more favourable in their effects to the taxpayers affected, either because
they allow a longer time for presenting objections or because they do not set any time limits for such purpose.

18. The provision fixing the starting point of the three-year time limit as the date of the "first notification of the action resulting in taxation not in accordance with the provisions of the Convention" should be interpreted in the way most favourable to the taxpayer. Thus, even if such taxation should be directly charged in pursuance of an administrative decision or action of general application, the time limit begins to run only from the date of the notification of the individual action giving rise to such taxation, that is to say, under the most favourable interpretation, from the act of taxation itself, as evidenced by a notice of assessment or an official demand or other instrument for the collection or levy of tax. If the tax is levied by deduction at the source, the time limit begins to run from the moment when the income is paid; however, if the taxpayer proves that only at a later date did he know that the deduction had been made, the time limit will begin from that date. Furthermore, where it is the combination of decisions or actions taken in both Contracting States resulting in taxation not in accordance with the Convention, it begins to run only from the first notification of the most recent decision or action.

19. As regards the procedure itself, it is necessary to consider briefly the two distinct stages into which it is divided (cf. paragraph 6 above).

20. In the first stage, which opens with the presentation of the taxpayer's objections, the procedure takes place exclusively at the level of dealings between him and the competent authorities of his State of residence (except where the procedure for the application of paragraph 1 of Article 24 is set in motion by the taxpayer in the State of which he is a national). The provisions of paragraph 1 give the taxpayer concerned the right to apply to the competent authority of the State of which he is a resident, whether or not he has exhausted all the remedies available to him under the domestic law of each of the two States. On the other hand, that competent authority is under an obligation to consider whether the objection is justified and, if it appears to be justified, take action on it in one of the two forms provided for in paragraph 2.

21. If the competent authority duly approached recognises that the complaint is justified and considers that the taxation complained of is due wholly or in part to a measure taken in the taxpayer's State of residence, it must give the complainant satisfaction as speedily as possible by making such adjustments or allowing such reliefs as appear to be justified. In this situation, the issue can be resolved without resort to the mutual agreement procedure. On the other hand, it may be found useful to exchange views and information with the competent authority of the other Contracting State, in order, for example, to confirm a given interpretation of the Convention.

22. If, however, it appears to that competent authority that the taxation complained of is due wholly or in part to a measure taken in the other State, it will be incumbent on it, indeed
it will be its duty — as clearly appears by the terms of paragraph 2 — to set in motion the mutual agreement procedure proper. It is important that the authority in question carry out this duty as quickly as possible, especially in cases where the profits of associated enterprises have been adjusted as a result of transfer pricing adjustments.

23. A taxpayer is entitled to present his case under paragraph 1 to the competent authority of the State of which he is a resident whether or not he may also have made a claim or commenced litigation under the domestic law of that State. If litigation is pending, the competent authority of the State of residence should not wait for the final adjudication, but should say whether it considers the case to be eligible for the mutual agreement procedure. If it so decides, it has to determine whether it is itself able to arrive at a satisfactory solution or whether the case has to be submitted to the competent authority of the other Contracting State. An application by a taxpayer to set the mutual agreement procedure in motion should not be rejected without good reason.

24. If a claim has been finally adjudicated by a court in the State of residence, a taxpayer may wish even so to present or pursue a claim under the mutual agreement procedure. In some States, the competent authority may be able to arrive at a satisfactory solution which departs from the court decision. In other States, the competent authority is bound by the court decision. It may nevertheless present the case to the competent authority of the other Contracting State and ask the latter to take measures for avoiding double taxation.

25. In its second stage — which opens with the approach to the competent authority of the other State by the competent authority to which the taxpayer has applied — the procedure is henceforward at the level of dealings between States, as if, so to speak, the State to which the complaint was presented had given it its backing. But while this procedure is indisputably a procedure between States, it may, on the other hand, be asked:

— whether, as the title of the Article and the terms employed in the first sentence of paragraph 2 suggest, it is no more than a simple procedure of mutual agreement, or constitutes the implementation of a pactum de contrahendo laying on the parties a mere duty to negotiate but in no way laying on them a duty to reach agreement;
— or whether on the contrary, it is to be regarded (on the assumption of course that it takes place within the framework of a joint commission) as a procedure of a jurisdictional nature laying on the parties a duty to resolve the dispute.

26. Paragraph 2 no doubt entails a duty to negotiate; but as far as reaching mutual agreement through the procedure is concerned, the competent authorities are under a duty merely to use their best endeavours and not to achieve a result. However, Contracting States could agree on a more far-reaching commitment whereby the mutual agreement procedure, and above all the discussions in the joint commission, would produce a solution to the
dispute. Such a rule could be established either by an amendment to paragraph 2 or by an interpretation specified in a protocol or an exchange of letters annexed to the Convention.

27. In seeking a mutual agreement, the competent authorities must first, of course, determine their position in the light of the rules of their respective taxation laws and of the provisions of the Convention, which are as binding on them as much as they are on the taxpayer. Should the strict application of such rules or provisions preclude any agreement, it may reasonably be held that the competent authorities, as in the case of international arbitration, can, subsidiarily, have regard to considerations of equity in order to give the taxpayer satisfaction.

28. The purpose of the last sentence of paragraph 2 is to enable countries with time limits relating to adjustments of assessments and tax refunds in their domestic law to give effect to an agreement despite such time limits. This provision does not prevent, however, such States as are not, on constitutional or other legal grounds, able to overrule the time limits in the domestic law from inserting in the mutual agreement itself such time limits as are adapted to their internal statute of limitation. In certain extreme cases, a Contracting State may prefer not to enter into a mutual agreement, the implementation of which would require that the internal statute of limitation had to be disregarded. Apart from time limits there may exist other obstacles such as "final court decisions" to giving effect to an agreement. Contracting States are free to agree on firm provisions for the removal of such obstacles. As regards the practical implementation of the procedure, it is generally recommended that every effort should be made by tax administrations to ensure that as far as possible the mutual agreement procedure is not in any case frustrated by operational delays or, where time limits would be in point, by the combined effects of time limits and operational delays.

29. The Committee on Fiscal Affairs made a number of recommendations on the problems raised by corresponding adjustments of profits following transfer pricing adjustments (implementation of paragraphs 1 and 2 of Article 9) and of the difficulties of applying the mutual agreement procedure to such situations:

a) Tax authorities should notify taxpayers as soon as possible of their intention to make a transfer pricing adjustment (and, where the date of any such notification may be important, to ensure that a clear formal notification is given as soon as possible), since it is particularly useful to ensure as early and as full contacts as possible on all relevant matters between tax authorities and taxpayers within the same jurisdiction and, across national frontiers, between the associated enterprises and tax authorities concerned.

b) Competent authorities should communicate with each other in these matters in as flexible a manner as possible, whether in writing, by telephone, or by face-to-face or round-the-table discussion, whichever is most suitable, and should seek to develop the most effective ways of solving relevant problems. Use of the provisions of Article 26 on the exchange of information should be encouraged in
order to assist the competent authority in having well-developed factual information on which a decision can be made.

c) In the course of mutual agreement proceedings on transfer pricing matters, the taxpayers concerned should be given every reasonable opportunity to present the relevant facts and arguments to the competent authorities both in writing and orally.

30. As regards the mutual agreement procedure in general, the Committee recommended that:

a) The formalities involved in instituting and operating the mutual agreement procedure should be kept to a minimum and any unnecessary formalities eliminated.

b) Mutual agreement cases should each be settled on their individual merits and not by reference to any balance of the results in other cases.

c) Competent authorities should, where appropriate, formulate and publicise domestic rules, guidelines and procedures concerning use of the mutual agreement procedure.

31. Finally, the case may arise where a mutual agreement is concluded in relation to a taxpayer who has brought a suit for the same purpose in the competent court of either Contracting State and such suit is still pending. In such a case, there would be no grounds for rejecting a request by a taxpayer that he be allowed to defer acceptance of the solution agreed upon as a result of the mutual agreement procedure until the court had delivered its judgment in the suit still pending. On the other hand, it is necessary to take into account the concern of the competent authority to avoid any divergence or contradiction between the decision of the court and the mutual agreement, with the difficulties or risks of abuse that they could entail. In short, therefore, it seems normal that the implementation of a mutual agreement should be made subject:

— to the acceptance of such mutual agreement by the taxpayer, and
— to the taxpayer's withdrawal of his suit at law concerning the points settled in the mutual agreement.

Paragraph 3

32. The first sentence of this paragraph invites and authorises the competent authorities to resolve, if possible, difficulties of interpretation or application by means of mutual agreement. These are essentially difficulties of a general nature which concern, or which may concern, a category of taxpayers, even if they have arisen in connection with an individual case normally coming under the procedure defined in paragraphs 1 and 2.

33. This provision makes it possible to resolve difficulties arising from the application of the Convention. Such difficulties are not only those of a practical nature, which might
arise in connection with the setting up and operation of procedures for the relief from tax
deducted from dividends, interest and royalties in the Contracting State in which they arise,
but also those which could impair or impede the normal operation of the clauses of the
Convention as they were conceived by the negotiators, the solution of which does not
depend on a prior agreement as to the interpretation of the Convention.

34. Under this provision the competent authorities can, in particular:
   — where a term has been incompletely or ambiguously defined in the Convention,
     complete or clarify its definition in order to obviate any difficulty;
   — where the laws of a State have been changed without impairing the balance or
     affecting the substance of the Convention, settle any difficulties that may emerge
     from the new system of taxation arising out of such changes;
   — determine whether, and if so under what conditions, interest may be treated as
     dividends under thin capitalisation rules in the country of the borrower and give
     rise to relief for double taxation in the country of residence of the lender in the
     same way as for dividends (for example relief under a parent/subsidiary regime
     when provision for such relief is made in the relevant bilateral convention).

35. Paragraph 3 confers on the "competent authorities of the Contracting States", i.e.
generally the Ministers of Finance or their authorised representatives normally responsible
for the administration of the Convention, authority to resolve by mutual agreement any
difficulties arising as to the interpretation of the Convention. However, it is important not to
lose sight of the fact that, depending on the domestic law of Contracting States, other
authorities (Ministry of Foreign Affairs, courts) have the right to interpret international
treaties and agreements as well as the "competent authority" designated in the Convention,
and that this is sometimes the exclusive right of such other authorities.

36. Mutual agreements resolving general difficulties of interpretation or application are
binding on administrations as long as the competent authorities do not agree to modify or
rescind the mutual agreement.

37. The second sentence of paragraph 3 enables the competent authorities to deal also
with such cases of double taxation as do not come within the scope of the provisions of the
Convention. Of special interest in this connection is the case of a resident of a third State
having permanent establishments in both Contracting States. It is of course desirable that
the mutual agreement procedure should result in the effective elimination of the double
taxation which can occur in such a situation. An exception must, however, be made for the
case of Contracting States whose domestic law prevents the Convention from being
complemented on points which are not explicitly or at least implicitly dealt with; in such a
case, the Convention could be complemented only by a protocol subject, like the
Convention itself, to ratification or approval.
Paragraph 4

38. This paragraph determines how the competent authorities may consult together for the resolution by mutual agreement, either of an individual case coming under the procedure defined in paragraphs 1 and 2 or of general problems relating in particular to the interpretation or application of the Convention, and which are referred to in paragraph 3.

39. It provides first that the competent authorities may communicate with each other directly. It would therefore not be necessary to go through diplomatic channels.

40. The competent authorities may communicate with each other by letter, facsimile transmission, telephone, direct meetings, or any other convenient means. They may, if they wish, formally establish a joint commission for this purpose.

41. As to this joint commission, paragraph 4 leaves it to the competent authorities of the Contracting States to determine the number of members and the rules of procedure of this body.

42. However, while the Contracting States may avoid any formalism in this field, it is nevertheless their duty to give taxpayers whose cases are brought before the joint commission under paragraph 2 certain essential guarantees, namely:
   — the right to make representations in writing or orally, either in person or through a representative;
   — the right to be assisted by counsel.

43. However, disclosure to the taxpayer or his representatives of the papers in the case does not seem to be warranted, in view of the special nature of the procedure.

44. Without infringing upon the freedom of choice enjoyed in principle by the competent authorities in designating their representatives on the joint commission, it would be desirable for them to agree to entrust the chairmanship of each Delegation — which might include one or more representatives of the service responsible for the procedure — to a high official or judge chosen primarily on account of his special experience; it is reasonable to believe, in fact, that the participation of such persons would be likely to facilitate reaching an agreement.

III. Interaction of the mutual agreement procedure with the dispute resolution mechanism provided by the General Agreement on Trade in Services

44.1 The application of the General Agreement on Trade in Services (GATS), which entered into force on 1 January 1995 and which all Member countries have signed, raises particular concerns in relation to the mutual agreement procedure.
44.2 Paragraph 3 of Article XXII of the GATS provides that a dispute as to the application of Article XVII of the Agreement, a national treatment rule, may not be dealt with under the dispute resolution mechanisms provided by Articles XXII and XXIII of the Agreement if the disputed measure "falls within the scope of an international agreement between them relating to the avoidance of double taxation" (e.g. a tax convention). If there is disagreement over whether a measure "falls within the scope" of such an international agreement, paragraph 3 goes on to provide that either State involved in the dispute may bring the matter to the Council on Trade in Services, which shall refer the dispute for binding arbitration. A footnote to paragraph 3, however, contains the important exception that if the dispute relates to an international agreement "which exist[s] at the time of the entry into force" of the Agreement, the matter may not be brought to the Council on Trade in Services unless both States agree.

44.3 That paragraph raises two particular problems with respect to tax treaties.

44.4 First, the footnote thereto provides for the different treatment of tax conventions concluded before and after the entry into force of the GATS, something that may be considered inappropriate, in particular where a convention in existence at the time of the entry into force of the GATS is subsequently renegotiated or where a protocol is concluded after that time in relation to a convention existing at that time.

44.5 Second, the phrase "falls within the scope" is inherently ambiguous, as indicated by the inclusion in paragraph 3 of Article XXII of the GATS of both an arbitration procedure and a clause exempting pre-existing conventions from its application in order to deal with disagreements related to its meaning. While it seems clear that a country could not argue in good faith\(^1\) that a measure relating to a tax to which no provision of a tax convention applied fell within the scope of that convention, it is unclear whether the phrase covers all measures that relate to taxes that are covered by all or only some provisions of the tax convention.

44.6 Contracting States may wish to avoid these difficulties by extending bilaterally the application of the footnote to paragraph 3 of Article XXII of the GATS to conventions concluded after the entry into force of the GATS. Such a bilateral extension, which would supplement — but not violate in any way — the Contracting States' obligations under the GATS, could be incorporated in the convention by the addition of the following provision:

"For purposes of paragraph 3 of Article XXII (Consultation) of the General Agreement on Trade in Services, the Contracting States agree that, notwithstanding that paragraph, any dispute between them as to whether a measure falls within the scope of this Convention may be brought before the Council for Trade in Services, as

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1. The obligation of applying and interpreting treaties in good faith is expressly recognized in Articles 26 and 31 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties; thus, the exception in paragraph 3 of Article XXII of the GATS applies only to good faith disputes.
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provided by that paragraph, only with the consent of both Contracting States. Any doubt as to the interpretation of this paragraph shall be resolved under paragraph 3 of Article 25 or, failing agreement under that procedure, pursuant to any other procedure agreed to by both Contracting States."

44.7 Problems similar to those discussed above may arise in relation with other bilateral or multilateral agreements related to trade or investment. Contracting States are free, in the course of their bilateral negotiations, to amend the provision suggested above so as to ensure that issues relating to the taxes covered by their tax convention are dealt with through the mutual agreement procedure rather than through the dispute settlement mechanism of such agreements.

IV. Final observations

45. On the whole, the mutual agreement procedure has proved satisfactory. Treaty practice shows that Article 25 has generally represented the maximum that Contracting States were prepared to accept. It must, however, be admitted that this provision is not yet entirely satisfactory from the taxpayer’s viewpoint. This is because the competent authorities are required only to seek a solution and are not obliged to find one (cf. paragraph 26 above). The conclusion of a mutual agreement depends to a large extent on the powers of compromise which the domestic law allows the competent authorities. Thus, if a convention is interpreted or applied differently in two Contracting States, and if the competent authorities are unable to agree on a joint solution within the framework of a mutual agreement procedure, double taxation is still possible although contrary to the sense and purpose of a convention aimed at avoiding double taxation.

46. It is difficult to avoid this situation without going outside the framework of the mutual agreement procedure. The first approach to a solution might consist of seeking an advisory opinion: the two Contracting States would agree to ask the opinion of an impartial third party, although the final decision would still rest with the States.

47. The provisions embodied in this Convention, as well as the Commentary related thereto, are the result of close international joint work within the Committee on Fiscal Affairs. A possibility near at hand would be to call upon the Committee on Fiscal Affairs to give an opinion on the correct understanding of the provisions where special difficulties of interpretation arise as to particular points. Such a practice, which would be in line with the mandate and aims of the Committee on Fiscal Affairs, might well make a valuable contribution to arriving at a desirable uniformity in the application of the provisions.

48. Another solution is that of arbitration. This is the solution adopted by the Member States of the European Communities through their multilateral Arbitration Convention, which was signed on 23 July 1990 and which provides that certain cases of double taxation that have not been solved through the mutual agreement procedure must be submitted to an
arbitration procedure. Also, some recent bilateral conventions provide that the Contracting States may agree to submit unresolved disagreements to arbitration.

Observation on the Commentary

49. Belgium believes that, in the context of a bilateral or multilateral APAs, the first sentence of paragraph 3 allows the competent authorities to solve difficulties related to the application of the arm's length principle provided for in paragraph 1 of Article 9 even where the convention does not include paragraph 2 of that Article.

Reservations on the Article

50. Canada and Portugal reserve their positions on the last sentence of paragraph 1 as they could not accept such a long time-limit.

51. With respect to paragraph 1 of the Article, Turkey reserves the right to provide that the case must be presented to its competent authority within a period of five years following the related taxation year. However, if the notification is made in the last year of that period, such application should be made within one year from the notification.

52. The United Kingdom reserves its position on the last sentence of paragraph 1 on the grounds that it conflicts with the six year time-limit under its domestic legislation.

53. Canada, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Mexico, Portugal, the Slovak Republic, Spain, Switzerland and the United Kingdom reserve their positions on the second sentence of paragraph 2. These countries consider that the implementation of reliefs and refunds following a mutual agreement ought to remain linked to time-limits prescribed by their domestic laws.

54. Turkey reserves its position on the second sentence of paragraph 2. Turkey's tax law provides that refunds of tax, like the assessment itself, must be made within a specific period. According to these provisions, if the administration finds an application for repayment acceptable, it must notify the fact to the taxpayer so that he can present his claim within a period of one year of such notification. If the taxpayer exceeds this time limit, his right to claim repayment lapses. The same procedure applies to the enforcement of judgements of courts under which repayments are required to be made. That is why Turkey is obliged to fix a time-limit for the implementation of agreed mutual agreement procedures as is done for all repayments. For this reason Turkey wishes to reserve the right to mention in the text of bilateral conventions a definite time-limit as regards their implementation.